

**The State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia
and Its Interaction with Ministries of Internal Affairs in
Serb-Controlled Entities
1990-1995**

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**Research report prepared for the case of
STANIŠIĆ and SIMATOVIĆ (IT-03-69)**

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Autonomous Province (<i>Autonomna pokrajina</i>)
APZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (<i>Autonomna pokrajina Zapadna Bosna</i>)
ARK	Autonomous Region Krajina (<i>Autonomna regija Krajina</i>)
BIA	Security Information Agency (<i>Bezbednosna informativna agencija</i>)
CRDB	Centre of the State Security Division (<i>Centar resora državne bezb[j]ednosti</i>)
CSB	Security Services Centre (<i>Centar službi bezbjednosti</i>)
FNU	First name unknown
HDZ	Croat Democratic Union (<i>Hrvatska demokratska zajednica</i>)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IKM	Forward Command Post (<i>Istureno komandno m[j]esto</i>)
JATD	Unit for Anti-Terrorist Actions (<i>Jedinica za antiteroristička dejstva</i>)
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army (<i>Jugoslovenska narodna armija</i>)
JPN	Unit for Special Purposes (<i>Jedinica za specijalne nam[j]ene</i>)
JSO	Unit for Special Operations (<i>Jedinica za specijalne operacije</i>)
LNU	Last name unknown
MUP	Ministry of Internal Affairs (<i>Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova</i>)
OA	Operational Action (<i>Operativna akcija</i>)
OO	Operational Treatment (<i>Operativna obrada</i>)
PJM	Special Police Units (<i>Posebne jedinice milicije</i>)
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<i>Republika Bosna i Hercegovina</i>)
RDB	State Security Division (<i>Resor državne bezb[j]ednosti</i>)
RJB	Public Security Division (<i>Resor javne bezb[j]ednosti</i>)

RS	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Republika Srpska ¹
RSK	Republika Srpska Krajina
RSUP	Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (<i>Republički sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove</i>)
SAO	Serb Autonomous District (<i>Srpska autonomna oblast</i>)
SČP	Serb Chetnik Movement (<i>Srpski četnički pokret</i>)
SBZS	Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania (<i>Slavonija, Baranja i zapadni Srem</i>)
SDA	Party of Democratic Action (<i>Stranka demokratske akcije</i>)
SDB	State Security Service (<i>Služba državne bezbjednosti</i>)
SDG	Serb Volunteer Guard (<i>Srpska dobrovoljačka garda</i>)
SDK	Service of Social Accounting (<i>Služba državnog knjigovodstva</i>)
SDS	Serb Democratic Party (<i>Srpska demokratska stranka</i>)
SFRJ	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (<i>Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija</i>)
SGRS	Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia (<i>Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije</i>)
SGRSrp	Official Gazette of Republika Srpska (<i>Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske</i>)
SGSRS	Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (<i>Službeni glasnik Socijalističke Republike Srbije</i>)
SJB	Public Security Station (<i>Stanica javne bezbjednosti</i>)
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia (<i>Savez komunista Jugoslavije</i>)
SLSFRJ	Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (<i>Službeni list Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije</i>)
SM	Police Station (<i>Stanica milicije</i>)
SNB	National Security Service (<i>Služba nacionalne bezbjednosti</i>)

¹ The name of the republic was officially changed from the “Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” to “Republika Srpska” in August 1992. Amendments VII and VIII to the Constitution of Republika Srpska, 02-802/92, 12 August 1992, *SGRS*, I, No. 15 (29 September 1992), 569 (0044-7014. See also 0149-0881-0149-0881).

SNO	Serb National Renewal (<i>Srpska narodna obnova</i>)
SPO	Serb Renewal Movement (<i>Srpski pokret obnove</i>)
SRBiH	Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<i>Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina</i>)
SRJ	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (<i>Savezna Republika Jugoslavija</i>)
SRS	Serb Radical Party (<i>Srpska radikalna stranka</i>)
SSNO	Federal Secretariat for People's Defence (<i>Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu</i>)
SSUP	Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (<i>Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove</i>)
SUP	Secretariat of Internal Affairs (<i>Sekretarijat unutrašnjih poslova</i>)
SVK	Serb Army of the Krajina (<i>Srpska Vojska Krajine</i>)
TG	Tactical Group (<i>taktička grupa</i>)
TO	Territorial Defence (<i>Teritorijalna odbrana</i>)
USDB	Administration of the State Security Service (<i>Uprava Službe državne bezbednosti</i>)
VJ	Army of Yugoslavia (<i>Vojska Jugoslavije</i>)
VRS	Army of Republika Srpska (<i>Vojska Republike Srpske</i>)
VSO	Supreme Defence Council (<i>Vrhovni savet odbrane</i>)

Executive Summary

E1. This research report aims to provide an overview and analysis of the functioning of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova*, MUP) of the Republic of Serbia, and in particular the State Security Service of the MUP, in the period from 1990 until the end of 1995. In addition to explaining the structure and jurisdiction of the MUP in Serbia, the report will focus on the relationship between the MUP of Serbia and the ministries of internal affairs established in the self-proclaimed Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

General Background

E2. In socialist Yugoslavia and its successor states secretariats (i.e. ministries) for internal affairs encompassed public security services, whose primary duty was policing, and state security services, whose primary duty was to protect the constitutionally established order against both internal and external threats. Socialist Yugoslavia was a party-state, and state security therefore included the protection of the political monopoly of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

E3. In both socialist Yugoslavia and its successor states, the work of the organs of internal affairs was defined and regulated by the respective constitutions and laws. On the operational level, the organs of internal affairs and their constituent services had detailed rulebooks which defined and regulated their organizational structure and their operational work. The secretariats or ministries received programmatic orientation from the executive councils (governments) of which they were a part and reported to these executive councils and to the highest governing bodies in the state, including the respective presidency.

E4. The hierarchy of the organs of internal affairs in socialist Yugoslavia followed the federal structure of the state. At the top stood the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SSUP). Each of the six republics had its own secretariats for internal affairs. In addition, within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, both of the autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, had their own secretariats for internal affairs. As a direct consequence of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, internal affairs became heavily decentralized.

E5. At the end of the 1980s, the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia under President Slobodan Milošević moved to recentralize internal affairs and passed constitutional amendments and other legislation to reassert the primacy of the republican secretariat for internal affairs.

Internal Affairs and State Security in Serbia

E6. Until 1991, the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia included the State Security Service (SDB) and the Public Security Service, each headed by a chief who was simultaneously an undersecretary of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs.

E7. The work of the SDB was organized both territorially and along the functional lines of the work of the SDB in order to guarantee its uniformity and coordination. In the seat of the SDB, the functional lines were distributed among different administrations.

E8. In accordance with the political changes experienced with the collapse of Yugoslavia and the discarding of the socialist system, the rulebooks of the State Security Service were revised at the beginning of 1992. The SDB was renamed the State Security Division (RDB). New internal rulebooks were promulgated to define the work of the RDB. These rulebooks specified that the RDB performed and provided the service of state security through counterintelligence, intelligence and other related work, and specifically through the prevention of extremism and terrorism. The RDB's mandate also included collecting about all forms of threats to the national and cultural-historical autonomy [*samosvojnost*] of Serbs who lived outside the Republic.

E9. In October 1992, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia (MUP Serbia) took over the headquarters of the SSUP. After this point in time, the most significant operations related to state security were managed by the RDB of Serbia.

E10. On 6 June 1990, Jovica STANIŠIĆ was appointed as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, who was simultaneously the Assistant Chief of the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia. From 31 December 1991 until 27 October 1998, STANIŠIĆ served as the Chief of the SDB/RDB and simultaneously as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

E11. Franko SIMATOVIĆ served as a Senior Inspector in the Second Department of the Administration of the SDB (USDB) in Belgrade from 15 December 1990. On 29 April 1992, Jovica STANIŠIĆ appointed SIMATOVIĆ as a Senior Inspector to the post of Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB. By 27 June 1994, Franko SIMATOVIĆ had been promoted to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB. SIMATOVIĆ retained this post until at least January 1996.

E12. The chief of the Public Security Service or Division of Public Security, respectively, during the period from 1991 to 1995 was Radovan Stojičić "Badža." Like Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Stojičić also served as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

E13. In 1990, the first multi-party elections were held in Yugoslavia, including in Serbia. In the context of increasing political and interethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, political parties in Serbia began to sponsor the formation of paramilitary or volunteer units. This development worried the Serbian authorities. The SDB worked to counter "extremism," which stemmed from various political directions and which might pose a danger to the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. The SDB's work included a focus on nationalist extremism among Serbs.

E14. The annual reports filed by the SDB/RDB from 1990 to 1995 make it clear that the SDB/RDB knew that Serb nationalist paramilitary organizations sent their members to fight outside the territory of Serbia. However, the measures taken by the SDB/RDB were not designed to prevent such activities, focusing instead on the illegal import of weapons and ammunition by these groups into Serbia, as well as on the risk that these groups posed

to the political authorities in Serbia. Particularly after the beginning of armed hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDB/RDB worked to prevent Serb paramilitary organizations from threatening areas in which ethnic minorities resided in Serbia.

E15. The available portions of the annual reports of the SDB/RDB do not include detailed information about their activities outside the borders of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

E16. The actions of Serb paramilitary groups in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the negative consequences of these actions were discussed at several meetings of the Supreme Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the top officials representing Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.

E17. Generally speaking, even in those cases where the RDB became aware of the commission of crimes by Serb paramilitary groups in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina – and on at least one occasion on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – little was done to curtail the operation of these groups. Only in a few cases does legal action appear to have been taken against such paramilitary groups, and then mostly for violations related to weapons and ammunition.

Particular Units of the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia

E18. Starting in the spring of 1991, the SDB/RDB of Serbia assisted with the establishment and training of special police units in Serb-controlled areas of Croatia. The training camp established by Dragan Vasiljković (“Captain Dragan”) and Franko SIMATOVIĆ was later heralded by SIMATOVIĆ as the origin of what came to be known colloquially to its members as “the unit.” The purpose of the training conducted at Golubić near Knin was twofold: to form a special police unit that could assist the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina (SAO Krajina) in combat operations, and to train instructors who could in turn train other special police units in Serb-controlled areas of Croatia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina. These activities were undertaken with the knowledge of Jovica STANIŠIĆ and leading officials of the Republic of Serbia.

E19. By the spring of 1992, the core of the unit which had been formed at Golubić transferred to Vojvodina in Serbia for further training. The available documentation shows that Jovica STANIŠIĆ was directly involved in approving candidates for admission into what was called the Unit for Special Purposes (JPN) of MUP Serbia. The autobiographies composed by members of the unit document their participation in combat activities in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

E20. In the summer of 1993, the JPN was transformed into the Unit for Anti-Terrorist Actions (JATD). The process of creating the JATD involved a series of application and vetting procedures. Yet a continuity was preserved in the unit going back to the training at Golubić in the spring of 1991. In the minds of its members, the JATD was the same unit as the JPN, even though some members had not joined the unit until 1992 or 1993.

E21. Similarly, when the Unit for Special Operations (JSO) was established in May 1996, the members of this unit regarded it as the latest evolution of a single unit dating back to the spring of 1991. At an awards ceremony held at the Kula headquarters of the JSO in May 1996, Franko SIMATOVIĆ told Slobodan Milošević that the unit had been formed on 4 May 1991 and had fought and worked since that date to defend the Serb nation.

E22. Throughout its existence, the unit undertook to remain covert. Particularly in the early days of the unit, many officials in MUP Serbia and in the Yugoslav People's Army (later the Army of Yugoslavia) knew comparatively little about the existence or purpose of the unit. The available military documentation shows that military officers on occasion reported negatively about the conduct of the unit and on its alleged involvement in criminal activities.

E23. On a number of occasions during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unit came into conflict with local military and civilian authorities, for among other reasons because of disagreements about the chain-of-command.

E24. In addition to the aforementioned unit, the SDB/RDB of MUP Serbia was also closely associated with two paramilitary formations which participated in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two units were the Serb Volunteer Guard (SDG) of Željko Ražnatović "Arkan" and the Scorpions of Slobodan Medić "Boca." Ražnatović had a long criminal background prior to 1991, and his unit became known for perpetrating crimes against the civilian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the authorities in Serbia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seemed primarily concerned about the possible threat posed by the SDG to the political authorities in Serbia and to the Serb civilian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Ministries of Internal Affairs of Serb-Controlled Entities in Croatia

E25. In April and May 1990, the first multi-party elections brought the Croat nationalist Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) to victory. This victory created great anxiety among the Serb minority in Croatia. In the context of the political transformations and increasing tension between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) began to contemplate the establishment of self-rule for areas inhabited predominantly by Serbs.

E26. By August 1990, the "Log Revolution" began, pitting the SDS and Serbs desiring autonomy against the HDZ and the Croatian government authorities in Zagreb. Milan Martić, who headed the police in Knin, played a pivotal role in these events.

E27. In December 1990, the Serb Autonomous District (SAO) Krajina was established. Subsequently two other such SAOs were formed, one for Western Slavonia and one for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.

E28. As the authorities in Croatia consolidated their power and moved Croatia towards independence from Yugoslavia, the authorities in the SAOs pushed to remain in Yugoslavia and closely associated with Serbia. Serb political and police officials from Croatia sought and received advice and assistance from Serbia and from the federal authorities in Belgrade.

E29. After the outbreak of armed hostilities in Croatia in June 1991, the organs of internal affairs in the SAO Krajina received extensive assistance from Serbia. However, as indicated by the establishment of the training camp at Golubić in the spring of 1991, such assistance predated the independence of Croatia and the commencement of armed hostilities. Operatives of the SDB of Serbia had also deployed covertly to Croatia to gather intelligence.

E30. As part of its efforts to gather intelligence and to influence events in Croatia and in the SAOs, the SDB of Serbia recruited and employed a number of Serbs from Croatia. In most cases, these persons were veterans of the MUP of Croatia. While these persons were covertly employed full-time by the SDB of Serbia, they simultaneously held important posts in the structures of the SAOs and later in the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK).

E31. In January 1992, the presidents of the assemblies of the SAO Krajina, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania (SAO SBZS) jointly proclaimed the Constitution of the RSK. On 26 February 1992, Goran Hadžić was elected President of the RSK. On 25 or 26 February 1992, Milan Martić was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK.

E32. On 23 January 1994, Milan Martić was elected as the President of the RSK. Until the fall of the RSK in August 1995, Martić remained committed to the eventual unification of the RSK with Serbia.

E33. The ministries of internal affairs of the SAOs and later of the RSK encompassed public security and state security. As early as February 1991, the SAO Krajina was operating a "State Security Service."

E34. At the end of May 1991, the SAO Krajina Assembly authorized the establishment of special purpose police units. Although formally within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the special purpose police units were in practice under the control of the Ministry of Defence, a practice facilitated by the dual role of Milan Martić as Minister of both Internal Affairs and Defence.

E35. By the end of July 1991, the MUP of the SAO Krajina had with extensive assistance from Serbia established a unit for special purposes (JPN). This unit was in fact the same unit that came to form the core of the JPN of the MUP of Serbia, and which was later transformed into the JATD and the JSO.

E36. During the autumn of 1991, as armed hostilities raged in eastern Croatia, the SAO SBZS hosted a variety of Yugoslav and Serb armed formations, including the JO, the Territorial Defence (TO) of the SAO SBZS, the police of the SAO SBZS and paramilitary groups. These paramilitary groups included the SDG of Željko Ražnatović "Arkan" and paramilitaries affiliated with Serb Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Šešelj. The available documentation includes reports about crimes committed by these formations against the civilian population in the area.

E37. Radovan Stojičić “Badža,” the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia and the Chief of the Public Security Service of MUP Serbia, simultaneously headed the TO of the SAO SBZS in the autumn of 1991.

E38. After the signing of the Vance Plan in November 1991, the RSK attempted to circumvent demilitarization by transforming TO units into RSK MUP units.

E39. By the end of 1992, the RSK MUP embarked upon the establishment of a special brigade of the police.

E40. Throughout their existence, the SAOs and the RSK remained heavily dependent on financial and material support from Serbia and Yugoslavia. This dependency applied to the entire functioning of these entities, from republican, district and municipal governments to the equipping and operating of the police, territorial defence and military. The RSK MUP also sent personnel to receive training in Serbia. In addition to operational contacts between MUP Serbia and RSK MUP, the political leadership of the RSK on occasion also met with the political leadership of Serbia in Belgrade.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska

E41. After the November 1990 multi-party elections in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH), posts within the Republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (SRBiH MUP) were divided among the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ). E2. Constant jostling for positions steadily increased frictions among the parties, leading to mutual recriminations and, eventually, open hostility. Tensions between the SDA and the SDS were particularly pronounced, with the latter accusing the former of marginalising Bosnian Serbs and of seeking to form a Bosnian (Muslim) police force or even army through the SRBiH MUP. The war in neighbouring Croatia exacerbated these tensions still further.

E42. For the SDS and for Serb employees in the SRBiH MUP, the autumn of 1991 was marked by cautious and mostly covert steps to consolidate their position in the SRBiH MUP. This included contemplation of a program of decentralisation and regionalisation of policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

E43. In October 1991, leading SDS officials and Serbian employees in the SRBiH MUP began to examine the possibilities for the establishment of a separate, “Serb MUP” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their internal discussions, this scenario included contemplation of armed conflict. In mid-December 1991, the SDS produced a set of instructions that contemplated the establishment of SDS party rule at the municipal level. The implementation of these instructions entailed mobilisation of the police.

E44. A general consensus existed among all nationalities in the SRBiH MUP in late 1991 and 1992 that the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was deteriorating and that politics and policing were fragmenting along ethnic lines.

E45. During the first four months of 1992, leading SDS officials and Serb employees in the SRBiH MUP finalised preparations for the establishment of a Serb Ministry of Internal

Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Attempts to achieve a political solution for the SRBiH MUP acceptable to the three main political parties proved unsuccessful.

E46. As early as the late summer and autumn of 1991, the Serbs in the SRBiH MUP assisted with what they recognised to be the illegal distribution of weapons to Bosnian Serbs in SDS-controlled municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This continued until April 1992.

E47. On 28 February 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a Law on Internal Affairs, thereby laying the basis for the formal establishment a Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the same day, the Assembly adopted the Constitution. The new Law on Internal Affairs was based extensively on the expurgated 17 April 1990 SRBiH Law on Internal Affairs.

E48. By the end of March 1992, the SRBiH MUP was nearing dissolution. On 31 March, Momčilo Mandić, a Bosnian Serb and an Assistant Minister in the SRBiH MUP, announced the formation of the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs (RS MUP).

E49. In addition to the Law on Internal Affairs, the RS MUP's organization and activities were further delineated in the RS MUP Rulebook (*pravilnik*) on the Internal Organization of the Ministry.

E50. The RS Ministry of Internal Affairs participated extensively in combat operations from April 1992 to the end of the year. The Ministry formed a constituent part of the armed forces of Republika Srpska. Until the establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) on 12 May 1992, the RS MUP was the only armed force solely under the control of the RS authorities. After the establishment of the VRS, the RS MUP coordinated combat and other activities with the VRS throughout 1992.

E51. The RS MUP cooperated with the VRS in working to achieve the strategic goals announced by the Bosnian Serb leadership on 12 May 1992. These goals included the separation of ethnic communities, the division of Sarajevo, the achievement of access to the sea, the elimination of the Drina river as a border, the establishment of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina and the establishment of a border on the rivers Una and Neretva.

E52. In concert with the JNA and the TO, and later the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), the RS MUP worked to disarm non-Serbs in the spring and summer of 1992. Both municipal and regional Crisis Staffs issued relevant orders. During the campaign to find "illegal weapons" and remove them from the possession of the non-Serb population, the armed forces of the RS harassed, detained and eventually expelled large portions of that population from the RS.

E53. After the formation of the RS MUP, non-Serbs in the police in the RS were either dismissed from the service or compelled to take loyalty oaths to the RS. By the end of June 1992, there were only very few non-Serbs serving in the RS MUP.

E54. Cooperation among the police, the military, and the civilian authorities was a general feature in the RS. This cooperation often involved leading police officials either becoming

permanent members of local Crisis Staffs or *ex-officio* members who attended meetings in order to brief Crisis Staffs or other governmental bodies on the current security situation.

E55. By mid-April 1992, the RS Minister of Internal Affairs, Mićo Stanišić, claimed that thousands of active and reserve police officers were helping to control “nearly 70% of the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.” On 15 May 1992, Stanišić ordered that all employees be organised formally into “war units” (*ratne jedinice*). This formalised the cooperation of RS MUP with the military.

E56. Throughout 1992, the RS MUP established numerous special police units at the central, regional and municipal levels. These special police units participated extensively in combat operations and were armed with heavy weapons. In numerous cases, internal RS MUP reports stated that these special police units had engaged in disorderly conduct or illegal activities.

E57. Within weeks of its establishment, the RS MUP set in place procedures for the collection and reporting of events affecting security matters in the field.

E58. Already in mid-April 1992, indications emerged in reports produced by the RS MUP that the ministry was not fully succeeding in its attempts to maintain law and order on the territory under its control. Throughout the remainder of the year, the RS MUP cited the extensive involvement of police in combat operations as a hindrance to the execution of ordinary policing and crime prevention. The RS MUP acknowledged repeatedly that police officers were participating in looting and plundering, although attempts were made to stamp out this practice.

E59. The RS MUP established and supervised the operation of numerous detention facilities. RS police officers commanded and guarded numerous detention facilities, with the full knowledge of their superior officers in the Ministry. RS MUP officials also coordinated with VRS officials running the Manjača detention facility.

E60. By mid-July at the latest, the entire hierarchy of the RS MUP was well aware that conditions in these facilities were atrocious and that most of the detainees were non-Serbs. Police officers were involved in the interrogation and killing of detainees, both in the camps and in prisoner convoys. These events were reported to the Ministry and to the Minister himself. The available documentation does not indicate that substantive investigations of these events were undertaken by the Ministry.

E61. By late July at the latest, RS MUP officials at all levels of the Ministry were aware that large numbers of non-Serb detainees were neither guilty nor suspected of activities directed against the RS. RS MUP officials allowed these individuals to leave the detention centres only on condition of emigration or proposed exchanging them for Serbs detained by Muslim or Croatian forces.

E62. By July 1992, top officials in the RS MUP had reached the conclusion that there was excessive civilian and political interference in the work of the Ministry. As a result, the Ministry decided to pursue a centralisation of internal affairs in the RS.

E63. Within the RS MUP, the National Security Service conducted police intelligence work. This included reporting on intelligence-related matters and conducting counter-intelligence operations.

E64. From at least July 1991 the Bosnian Serbs in the SRBIH MUP collaborated with MUP Serbia in arming the Serb people on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intercepted telephone communications show that Jovica STANIŠIĆ communicated directly with Bosnian Serb leaders including Radovan Karadžić. In these conversations, Karadžić briefed STANIŠIĆ on the political situation and developments, and also solicited advice from STANIŠIĆ. Karadžić also spoke frequently with Slobodan Milošević.

E65. In conceiving their plans for the division of the SRBiH MUP, the Bosnian Serbs specifically contemplated support from organs of the Federation and Serbia, including the SSUP and MUP Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs knew that an armed conflict was likely and that assistance from Serbia would be essential, particularly in the eastern municipalities bordering Serbia.

E66. During the first months of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some portions of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs could only be reached through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such areas were dependent on assistance from MUP Serbia.

E67. Operational information was shared regularly between the RS MUP and police authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

E68. The diary of Ratko Mladić include several references to meetings with Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Slobodan Milošević and other top civilian, police and military figures in Serbia. These entries demonstrate that the assistance of MUP Serbia extended to the VRS as well as to the RS MUP.

E69. The RS MUP coordinated and cooperated with MUP Serbia, MUP Montenegro and the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Belgrade from April 1992 to the end of the year. This included material and financial assistance. Armed units of MUP Serbia which deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina and participated in combat operations, including at the time of the conquest of Srebrenica in July 1995. The Scorpions not only participated in this operation but also afterwards filmed themselves executing Bosnian Muslims.

E70. The available documentation indicates that the RS MUP took few concrete actions to stop paramilitary attacks on non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In many cases, RS MUP units cooperated with Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, and this cooperation was condoned by leading officials in the Ministry. Although the Ministry began to subdue paramilitary groups in the summer of 1992, individual units and commanders within the RS MUP continued to support paramilitary activities. Activity against Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups was undertaken primarily in order to prevent attacks and crimes committed by these groups against Bosnian Serbs. Both MUP Serbia and the SSUP were aware of these problems by June 1992 at the latest.

E71. In addition to offering extensive assistance to the RS MUP, the RDB of MUP Serbia also used the presence of its personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina to monitor the political situation for dissent directed against Belgrade. The attempt to control and direct political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina took on additional importance during phases of the war in which the leadership of Serbia and Republika Srpska agreed about the course of the war and international negotiations.

E72. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslims in northwestern Bosnia split into two factions. One faction continued to support the Bosnian government in Sarajevo, while the other faction, led by Fikret Abdić, proclaimed the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia (APZB). Abdić received support and material assistance from the government of Slobodan Milošević.

E73. From approximately November 1994 until the autumn of 1995, the RDB of MUP Serbia deployed men from the JATD to assist the APZB militarily. This operation was called "*Pauk*" (Spider) and featured the direct involvement of both Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Franko SIMATOVIĆ.

I. Introduction to the Subject and Ambit of the Report

1. This research report aims to provide an overview and analysis of the functioning of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova*, MUP) of the Republic of Serbia, and in particular the State Security Service of the MUP, in the period from 1990 until the end of 1995. In addition to explaining the structure and jurisdiction of the MUP in Serbia, the report will focus on the relationship between the MUP of Serbia and the ministries of internal affairs established in the self-proclaimed Serb entities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. I received the terms of reference for this report from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the MICT in April 2016.²

3. This report incorporates significant portions from my previous research reports on the MUP of Serb-controlled entities in Croatia and the MUP of Republika Srpska.³ Although these reports have of course been made available to all parties in the present case, my intention is to provide the reader with as much relevant information as possible in one unified report. This report does not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis or history of the political developments and armed conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia from 1990 to 1995.

4. This report is based on primary sources produced by the relevant government, police and military organs in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serb-controlled entities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overwhelming majority of documents cited in this report stem from organs controlled by Serbs. The documentation cited in the report represents a selection of a larger collection of documentation possessed by the OTP of the ICTY/MICT. I identified and selected many of these documents already during my period of employment as a Research Officer in the OTP. Other documents were made available to me later by the OTP in several phases, and where necessary I also performed additional searches for relevant documents utilizing the ICTY Court Records database and the ICTY Electronic Disclosure System.

5. My analysis of the available documentation has been made based on the original version of this documentation. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this report are my own.

² OTP, Questions to Be Addressed by MUP Expert Christian Nielsen," 15 April 2016.

³ Christian Axboe Nielsen, "The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs: Genesis, Performance and Command and Control, 1990-1992," Corrected Version Prepared for the Case of Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-I), 19 May 2011 (0680-1593-0680-1716); Christian Axboe Nielsen, "Policing and Internal Affairs in the Serb-Controlled Entities in Croatia, 1990-1993," Research Report Prepared for the Case of Hadžić (IT-04-75), 29 June 2012 (0683-7034-0683-7087).

II. Brief General Historical and Political Background

6. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija*, SFRJ) consisted of six socialist republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Alone among the six socialist republics, Serbia also encompassed two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

7. The uncontested leader of socialist Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in May 1980 was President Josip Broz Tito. After the death of Tito, the SFRJ was controlled by a collective presidency whose chairmanship rotated among the members of the socialist republics and the autonomous provinces.

8. Throughout the history of socialist Yugoslavia, it was governed by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista Jugoslavije*, SKJ).⁴ No other political parties were permitted to function, no contested elections were held, and all important public offices in the country could be held exclusively by members of the SKJ. Yugoslavia therefore operated as a communist party-state.

III. Internal Affairs and State Security in Socialist Yugoslavia

9. The term “internal affairs” (*unutrašnji poslovi*) in socialist Yugoslavia encompassed the work of both the public security service (policing) and the state security service. Throughout the history of socialist Yugoslavia, the secretariats or ministries of internal affairs mirrored the federal structure of the Yugoslav state.⁵ During the last decades of its existence, the SFRJ underwent a considerable decentralization that received its fullest expression through the 1974 Constitution.⁶ At the time of the collapse of Yugoslavia, in addition to the federal secretariat of internal affairs (SSUP), there were six republican secretariats of internal affairs and two provincial secretariats for Vojvodina and Kosovo. At all levels of the federation, the secretariats of internal affairs were part of the respective governments (called “executive councils” in Serbo-Croatian), and the secretaries (ministers) of internal affairs were members of these governments. Hence, at the federal level, the Secretary for Internal Affairs was a member of the Federal Executive Council (*Savezno izvršno veće*, SIV).⁷ The federal secretariats, including that for internal affairs, were described in Articles 363-368 of the Constitution.⁸ The Federal Assembly appointed the federal secretaries for terms of four years. The Law on the Organization

⁴ Until 1953, the SKJ had been known as the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije*, KPJ).

⁵ Throughout the history of socialist Yugoslavia, the official terminology repeatedly varied between “ministry” (*ministarstvo*) and “secretariat” (*sekretarijat*). At the time of the collapse of Yugoslavia, the term “secretariat” was in use.

⁶ Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972).

⁷ Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972).

⁸ Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972).

and the Jurisdiction of Federal Administrative Organs and Federal Organizations determined the ambit of the federal secretariats.⁹

10. The SSUP was the highest organ of internal affairs in the SFRJ, and the Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security afforded it an important coordinating role on all matters related to state security. The ambit of the SSUP could in practice be further defined by the Presidency of the SFRJ or by the Federal Executive Council.¹⁰ The SSUP had to report on its work to the relevant committees and councils of the SFRJ Presidency, the Federal Assembly and the Federal Government. The work of the SSUP was further regulated through the Law on the Performance of Internal Affairs from the Jurisdiction of Federal Organs of Administration.¹¹

11. The last federal Yugoslav Secretary of Internal Affairs was Petar Gračanin. He was appointed to this position by the SFRJ Federal Assembly on 16 March 1989.¹²

12. With respect to subordinate organs of internal affairs, the SSUP could issue binding orders to these organs.¹³ The SSUP could also perform inspections of subordinate republican and provincial organs in order to ensure that these organs were properly executing their functions.¹⁴ The state security services of the individual republics had to inform the SSUP in a timely and continuous manner about all events, occurrences and information that was relevant for the security of the SFRJ. This reporting was done separately for each administration (*uprava*) of the state security service.

13. According to Article 7 on the Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security, the constituent republics and autonomous provinces were responsible for the protection of state security on their territories in cooperation with the SSUP.¹⁵ The state security services were on a day-to-day and operational basis responsible for their own

⁹ Law on the Organization and Ambit of Federal Administrative Organs and Federal Organizations, *SLSFRJ*, No. 22/78, 28 April 1978 (C000-1932-C000-1937); Decision on the Measures for the Implementation of Articles 47-55 of the Law on the Organization and Ambit of Federal Administrative Organs and Federal Organizations, *SLSFRJ*, No. 24/78, 5 May 1978, (C000-1938-C000-1940).

¹⁰ Articles 7-8, Law on the Foundation of the System of State Security of the SFRJ, *SLSFRJ*, No. 1/74, 3. January 1974, (C000-1929-C000-1931).

¹¹ Law on the Performance of Internal Affairs from the Jurisdiction of Federal Organs of Administration, *SLSFRJ*, No. 7/85, 15 February 1985 (0606-0135-0606-0183, at 0606-0150-0606-0183).

¹² Decision on the Election of the Federal Executive Council, *SLSFRJ*, No. 20/89, 17 March 1989 (0055-8631-0055-8632).

¹³ Article 22, Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security, *SLSFRJ*, No. 15/84, 30 May 1984, (0038-1214-0038-1217, at 0038-1216). In the previous law from 1974, the cooperation between the SSUP on the one hand and the republican and provincial secretariats for internal affairs was obligatory. Article 16, Law on the Foundations of the Systems of State Security, *SLSFRJ*, No. 1/74, 3 January 1974, (C000-1929-C000-1931, at C000-1930).

¹⁴ Articles 21-22, Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security, *SLSFRJ*, No. 15/84, 30 May 1984, (0038-1214-0038-1217, at 0038-1216); Article 16, Law on the Performance of Internal Affairs from the Jurisdiction of Federal Organs of Administration *SLSFRJ*, No. 7/85, 15 February 1985 (0606-0135-0606-0183, at 0606-0158-0606-0159).

¹⁵ Article 5, Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security, *SLSFRJ*, No. 1/74, 3 January 1974, (C000-1929-C000-1931, at C000-1929).

work and only had to discuss this with the SSUP insofar as this work required coordination with other republics or involved possible international consequences.

14. Within the secretariats of internal affairs, a division existed between the Public Security Service (*služba javne bezbednosti*) and the State Security Service (*služba državne bezbednosti*).¹⁶ At the federal level, in the SSUP, an undersecretary headed the State Security Service. Whereas the secretary of the SSUP was generally responsible for the political direction of the SSUP, the undersecretary handled operational matters. In accordance with the process of decentralization that defined the 1974 Constitution, the SFRJ had a federal state security service (SDB SSUP), six republican state security services and two state security services for Vojvodina and Kosovo.¹⁷

15. "State security" as a term in socialist Yugoslavia was synonymous with the protection of the constitutionally established order. The threats to state security could be either internal or external in nature. Given that the Preamble to the 1974 Constitution confirmed the leading role of the SKJ, this meant that the state security services protected the interests of the party-state.¹⁸ All employees of internal affairs in socialist Yugoslavia were expected to be members of the SKJ, and the secretariats of internal affairs were required to implement the policies of the SKJ. The SKJ defined the programmatic guidelines for the operation of the state security services. The Federal Secretary was an *ex officio* member of the Yugoslav Federal Presidency's Committee for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, the highest policy coordination body for all matters pertaining to state security.

16. The state security services were not the only organs charged with the protection of the Yugoslav state. In the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence, there was a Security Administration (*Uprava bezbednosti*, UB) and the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija*, JNA) had its own counter-intelligence service in the Second Administration of its General Staff. In the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, there was a Service for Research and Documentation (*Služba za istraživanje i dokumentaciju*, SID). The Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security provided the framework for all matters related to state security.¹⁹ In addition, throughout the last two decades of the existence of the SFRJ, a considerable number of normative acts were issued in an ongoing attempt to define and harmonize the duties and cooperation of the aforementioned security services.

¹⁶ For linguistic reasons, variations on these terms existed in various republics and autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia. I will in this report generally use the Serbian terminology.

¹⁷ Article 3, Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine*, 4/74, 2 March 1974 (2D02-3750-2D02-3796, at 2D02-3756); Article 280, Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Kosova*, 4/74, 21 February 1975 (2D02-4254-2D02-4304, at 2D02-4288).

¹⁸ Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972, at 0229-4921-0229-4922).

¹⁹ Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security, *SLSFRJ*, No. 15/84, 30 March 1984 (0038-1214-0038-1217).

IV. Internal Affairs and State Security in the Socialist Republic of Serbia and in the Republic of Serbia

17. In the 1980s, it was a matter of general public knowledge that politicians and intellectuals in Serbia were dissatisfied with the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, and in particular with the extensive autonomy afforded Vojvodina and Kosovo. Like the other five socialist republics, Serbia and its autonomous provinces had also promulgated new constitutions in 1974.²⁰ In 1986, members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drafted a memorandum that was leaked, and which claimed that Serbia and Serbs were discriminated against in Yugoslavia.²¹ The plight of Serbs in Kosovo was particularly highlighted. In 1989, the Socialist Republic of Serbia (SR Serbia) amended its constitution, significantly curtailing the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo.²² With amendment XLIII, matters of the protection of the constitutionally established order (state security) and public security throughout the territory of SR Serbia were placed primarily in the jurisdiction of the republic.²³ In 1990, Vojvodina promulgated a new law on internal affairs, while Kosovo retained its law from 1987.²⁴

18. Just as the SSUP was one of the constituent secretariats of the Federal Executive Council, so the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of SR Serbia was a constituent secretariat of the Republican Executive Council, and the secretary was a member of this council. On 5 December 1989, Radmilo Bogdanović was appointed as secretary for internal affairs in SR Serbia, and he served in this position until 30 May 1991.²⁵ His successor, Zoran Sokolović, served from 30 May 1991 until 15 April 1997.²⁶

²⁰ Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, *Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Srbije*, 25 February 1974 (0035-9277-0035-9306); Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine*, 4/74, 2 March 1974 (2D02-3750-2D02-3796); Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Kosova*, 4/74, 21 February 1975 (2D02-4254-2D02-4304).

²¹ Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, *Memorandum*, 1986 (0205-8098-0205-8153).

²² Amendments IX to XLIX to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, *SGSRS*, 28 March 1989 (0035-9310-0035-9327). See in particular Amendments XXXI, XXXIII, XLIII and XLVII.

²³ Amendment XLIII to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, *SGSRS*, 28 March 1989 (0035-9310-0035-9327, at 0035-9325).

²⁴ Law on Internal Affairs, *Službeni list Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine*, 24/90, 31 July 1990 (2D02-3839-2D02-3845); Correction of the Law on Internal Affairs, *Službeni list Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine*, 31/90, 15 October 1990 (2D02-3846-2D02-3846); Law on Internal Affairs, *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Kosova*, 46/87, 31 December 1987 (2D02-3991-2D02-4007).

²⁵ Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1996* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1996) and Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1998* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1998) (0610-6424-0610-6431, at 0610-6426-0610-6427).

²⁶ Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1996* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1996) and Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1998* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1998) (0610-6424-0610-6431, at 0610-6427-0610-6431).

19. The position of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs in the system of state administration of SR Serbia is accurately reflected in an organogram provided to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities.²⁷

20. On 28 September 1990, a new constitution was promulgated in Serbia.²⁸ This constitution removed the term “socialist” from the name of the republic and further stripped away the language of Yugoslav socialism that had been present in the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. In addition, the 1990 constitution confirmed the centralization of the Republic of Serbia and the removal of autonomy from Vojvodina and Kosovo, although they retained the title of “autonomous provinces.” Articles 90-94 defined the government of the Republic of Serbia and marked a shift in terminology from “secretariats” to “ministries.”²⁹ Hence, the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (RSUP) became known as the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP).

21. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the main laws governing the Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia were:

- the Law on the Foundations of the System of State Administration;³⁰
- the Law on the Foundations of the System of State Security
- the Law on the Federal Executive Council and Federal Administrative Organs;
- the Law on Internal Affairs (20 July 1989, updated on 17 July 1991);³¹
- the Law on Ministries.³²

22. According to the 1989 Law on Internal Affairs, the Public Security Service and the State Security Service were each headed by an undersecretary.³³

23. In accordance with the constitutional amendments that had been promulgated in order to centralize power in Serbia, Article 3 of the 1989 Law on Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia specified that internal affairs were to be carried out in a

²⁷ Position of the SDB of the RSUP in the System of State Administration of SR Serbia (0606-0112-0606-0112).

²⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 28 September 1990 (0229-4973-0229-5005).

²⁹ Articles 90-94 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 28 September 1990 (0229-4973-0229-5005, at 0229-4990-0229-0229-4991).

³⁰ Law on the Foundations of the System of State Administration, *SLSFRJ* (see versions listed in 0611-2345-0611-2616).

³¹ Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 30/89, 20 July 1989 and Law on the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 40/90 (0293-1436-0293-1452).

³² Law on Ministries, undated, consolidated text from *SGRS*, Nos. 7/91, 8/91, 44/91, 87/92 and 67/93 (0606-0184-0606-0203). Article 7 treats the Ministry of Internal Affairs (0606-0184-0606-0203, at 0606-0187-0606-0188).

³³ Article 68, Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 30/89, 20 July 1989 and Law on the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 40/90 (0293-1436-0293-1452, at 0293-1444).

unified manner on the entire territory of the Republic.³⁴ This was reiterated in Article 1 of the 1991 Law on Internal Affairs.³⁵

24. Article 14 of the 1989 Law also specified that the State Security Service was to carry out its tasks in a unified manner in accordance with guidelines issued by the Federation, with the republican secretary issuing binding instructions for the republic of whole to the state security services of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo.³⁶

25. On 17 July 1991, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, proclaimed the Law on Internal Affairs which had been passed the same day by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.³⁷ This law briefly defined internal affairs as “the legally confirmed affairs through which the responsible republican organs realize the security of the Republic and its citizens and guarantee the realization of the rights confirmed in the Constitution and other laws.”³⁸ A much more detailed definition of internal affairs was provided in Article 7 of the Law of Ministries.³⁹

26. Article 17 of the 1991 Law on Internal Affairs gave the president of Serbia direct authority over the police in the case of a state of emergency.⁴⁰ Similarly, Article 5 of the 1991 Law on Defence of the Republic of Serbia also provided the president of Serbia with direct authority over the police in states of emergency, imminent threat of war or war.⁴¹ In Article 10 of the Law on Defence, the responsibilities and authority of the minister of internal affairs were explained.⁴² The minister:

- organizes and carries out preparations for defence and for work in the case of imminent threat of war and in war;
- confirms the organization and the size of the police force in the case of imminent threat of war and in war;
- organizes security measures and undertakes the protection of buildings which are significant for the defence of the Republic;
- carries out the affairs of the centres for intelligence in accordance with the regulation which this Ministry and the Ministry of Defence mutually agree upon;

³⁴ Article 3, Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 30/89, 20 July 1989 and Law on the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 40/90 (0293-1436-0293-1452, at 0293-1436).

³⁵ Article 1, Law on Internal Affairs, *SGRS*, No. 44/91, 17 July 1991 (0046-1945-0046-1970, at 0046-1945).

³⁶ Article 14, Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 30/89, 20 July 1989 and Law on the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, *SGSRS*, No. 40/90 (0293-1436-0293-1452, at 0293-1438).

³⁷ Law on Internal Affairs, *SGRS*, No. 44/91, 17 July 1991 (0046-1945-0046-1970).

³⁸ Article 1, Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, *SGRS*, No. 44/91, 17 July 1991 (0046-1945-0046-1970).

³⁹ Law on Ministries, undated, consolidated text from *SGRS*, Nos. 7/91, 8/91, 44/91, 87/92 and 67/93 (0606-0184-0606-0203).

⁴⁰ Article 17, Law on Internal Affairs, *SGRS*, No. 44/91, 17 July 1991 (0046-1945-0046-1970, at 0046-1946).

⁴¹ Article 5, Law on Defence, *SGRS*, No. 45/91, 27 July 1991 (0216-2249-0216-2261, at 0216-2249).

⁴² Article 10, Law on Defence, *SGRS*, No. 45/91, 27 July 1991 (0216-2249-0216-2261, at 0216-2250).

- organizes, prepares and plans the use of the police in war, in the case of an imminent threat of war and in a case of emergency.

27. In addition to the legal framework provided by the relevant laws, the details of the work of the State Security Service and the functions of its employees were described in the internal rulebooks (*pravilnici*) produced by the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The rulebooks were revised at the beginning of 1990 in order to reflect the new Law on Internal Affairs.⁴³ The main rulebooks were:

- the Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (10 February 1990);⁴⁴
- the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (10 February 1990);⁴⁵
- the Rulebook on the Amendments to the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (28 March 1990);⁴⁶
- the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (February 1990).⁴⁷

28. The position of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia in the system of state administration of SR Serbia is accurately reflected in an organogram provided to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities.⁴⁸ Likewise, the structure of the State Security Service in 1990-1991 is accurately reflected in a diagram provided to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities.⁴⁹

29. On 24 April 1990, Miroslav Mišković, the Vice President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, appointed Zoran Janačković as Undersecretary in the RSUP of SR Serbia.⁵⁰

30. On 31 October 1990, Stanko Radmilović, the President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, appointed Zoran Janačković as Chief of the State Security

⁴³ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0567).

⁴⁴ SRS RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 10 February 1990 (0635-2230-0635-2305).

⁴⁵ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 10 February 1990 (0635-2040-0635-2229). But what is: 0635-3764-0635-3780??

⁴⁶ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Amendments to the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 28 March 1990 (0635-2306-0635-2308).

⁴⁷ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616).

⁴⁸ Position of the SDB of the RSUP in the System of State Administration of SR Serbia (0606-0113-0606-0113).

⁴⁹ Organogram of the State Security Service of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1990-1991 (0606-0115-0606-0115).

⁵⁰ Decision on the Appointment of Zoran Janačković as Undersecretary in the RSUP of SR Serbia, 24 April 1990 (0606-0513-0606-0513).

Service of the Republic of Serbia, who was simultaneously also Undersecretary in the RSUP.⁵¹

31. On 31 December 1991, Zoran Janačković was appointed as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs.⁵²

A. The Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (February 1990)

32. The basic organization and mission for the work of the SDB of the Republic of Serbia was described in the Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs.⁵³ Article 3 of the rulebook defined the work of the SDB as the uncovering and prevention of activities aimed at the undermining or destruction of the constitutionally confirmed order, or at the endangering of the security of the country.⁵⁴ The SDB was bound to adhere to principles of constitutionality and legality in its work, respecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the republic.

B. The Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs (February 1990)

33. The Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs regulated the precise number of employees in the State Security Service and provided a specific explanation of their professional and educational qualifications, tasks and responsibilities.⁵⁵ As of February 1991, the SDB of SR Serbia was at a full level of staffing to have 1,119 employees.⁵⁶

34. Article 6 of the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service emphasized that the operational work of the SDB of SR Serbia was to focus particularly on the gathering of intelligence about, and prevention of, individuals, groups and organizations engaged in “the undermining or destruction of the constitutionally confirmed order.”⁵⁷ The SDB was also responsible for protecting Yugoslav

⁵¹ Decision on the Appointment of Zoran Janačković as the Chief of the SDB of the Republic of Serbia, 31 October 1990 (0606-0514-0606-0514).

⁵² Decision on the Appointment of Zoran Janačković as the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, 31 December 1991 (0606-0515-0606-0515).

⁵³ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243).

⁵⁴ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0222).

⁵⁵ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616).

⁵⁶ Article 2, SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2350).

⁵⁷ Article 6, SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2351).

citizens abroad, protecting certain tasks, affairs, buildings and areas, preparation for work in states of emergency, imminent threat of war and war, and for collecting all kinds of intelligence related to the protection of the security, political, and economic interests of the country. This included the collection of intelligence outside Serbia, which would be performed in cooperation with the other Yugoslav republics and with the SSUP.

35. Article 27 of the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service defined the post of chief of the SDB, who was at the same time the undersecretary of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs.⁵⁸ His tasks and affairs were defined as follows:

- leads the Service;
- organizes the execution of tasks and affairs from the purview of the Service;
- directs and coordinates the work of all organizational units of the Service;
- is responsible for the utilization of means and methods of the Service;
- prepares and proposes the work programme of the Service and takes care of its implementation;
- gives suggestions regarding the organization and work and the systematization of tasks and affairs of the Service;
- suggests other documents and guidelines from the purview of the Service;
- is responsible for the operational-expert harmonization of the work of state security services in the carrying out of affairs of state security of interest to the Republic as a whole;
- realizes the coordination and cooperation of the Service with state security services in the Federal and republican secretariats for internal affairs, with the security organs of the armed forces of the SFRJ (JNA, TO), with the Service for Research and Documentation of the SSIP, with the Public Security Service, as well as with other subjects of all people's defence and social self-protection.⁵⁹

36. Article 28 of the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service defined the post of the deputy chief of the SDB, who was at the same time assistant secretary of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs.⁶⁰ His tasks and affairs were defined as follows:

⁵⁸ Article 27, SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2372-0611-2373).

⁵⁹ All People's Defence and social self-protection were key concepts of national security in the SFRJ. For All People's Defence, see Article 240, Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972, at 0229-4948); Law on All People's Defence, *SLSFRJ*, No. 21/82, 23 April 1982 (0216-6067-0216-6102). For social self-protection, see section IV of the preamble of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *SLSFRJ*, No. 9/74, 21 February 1974 (0229-4916-0229-4972, at 0229-4919).

⁶⁰ Article 28, SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2373-0611-2374).

- substitutes for the chief of the Service;
- prepares and proposes the operational work programme of the Service and takes care of its implementation;
- organizes the carrying out of tasks and affairs from the purview of the Service connection to the implementation of various specific operations in conditions of the imminent threat of war and other extraordinary circumstances, as well as the preparation for the work of the Service in the case of the temporary occupation of a part of territory by an aggressor;
- directs, coordinates and is responsible for the implementation of the measures of self-protection in the Service.

37. Article 29 of the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service defined the post of the assistant chiefs of the SDB, listing four such positions.⁶¹

38. Note that throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, the republican state security services could only conduct operations on the territory of another republic(s) (or outside Yugoslavia) with the permission of the relevant republic(s) and through coordination with the SSUP.

39. According to Article 5 of the Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, the basic organizational units of the RSUP of the SR Serbia were the State Security Service, the Public Security Service and the Service for Joint Affairs.⁶² Within the RSUP SRS, Article 12 of the Rulebook established a steering council (*kolegijum*) consisting of the republican secretary, the deputy republican secretary, the undersecretaries for public and state security and the assistant republican secretary from the Service for Joint Affairs.⁶³ This service handled personnel, material-financial, technical and other matters in order to effectivize and rationalize joint matters from both the Public Security Service and the State Security Service.⁶⁴

40. The ambit of the work of both the Public Security Service and the Service for Joint Affairs was described in detail in the Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs. However, a similarly detailed description of the work of the State Security Service was to be found only in a separate rulebook. Whereas the aforementioned rulebook was classified as an official secret and strictly confidential, the Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the State Security Service in

⁶¹ Article 29, SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2374-0611-2376).

⁶² SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 10 February 1990 (0635-2230-0635-2305).

⁶³ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 12, 10 February 1990 (0635-2230-0635-2305 at 0635-2237). See also Article 67 (at 0606-0240-0606-0241).

⁶⁴ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Articles 57 and 58, 10 February 1990 (0635-2230-0635-2305 at 0635-2275-0635-2276).

the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs was classified as a state secret.⁶⁵ The reason for this was the particular confidentiality that surrounded the work of the State Security Service, whose documents were consistently classified at a higher level than those of other components of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs.

41. The structure of the State Security Service in SR Serbia with respect to the overall structure of organs of internal affairs in the SFRJ is accurately reflected in an organizational diagram provided to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities.⁶⁶

42. The State Security Service was headed by a chief who was simultaneously the undersecretary of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs. The deputy chief of the State Security Service as well as the two assistant chiefs and the chief of the Administration of the SDB in Belgrade were all simultaneously assistant secretaries in the Secretariat.⁶⁷

43. The basic organizational unit of the SDB was the administration or directorate (*uprava*), of which there were several (Articles 6 and 7). In addition to the administrations within the seat of the SDB, there was a particular administration for the city of Belgrade (Articles 8, 23).⁶⁸ Beneath the administrations, the subordinate hierarchy consisted of sectors, departments, sections, groups and desks.

44. The work of the SDB was organized both territorially and along the functional lines of the work of the SDB (*linijski rad*) in order to guarantee its uniformity and coordination.⁶⁹ The administrations of the SDB corresponded to the functional lines of its work. As of February 1990, there were seven administrations in the SDB, covering the following areas:

1. First Administration: the intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact and other socialist countries, as well as the activities of the Cominform (i.e. pro-Soviet) Yugoslav émigrés and ethnic Albanian émigrés from Yugoslavia;⁷⁰
2. Second Administration: the intelligence services of NATO countries and other capitalist countries, as well as the activities of Yugoslav émigrés in those countries;⁷¹
3. Third Administration: the activities of internal enemies of the Yugoslav state;⁷²

⁶⁵ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 61, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0242).

⁶⁶ Diagram of the Position of the State Security Service of RSUP SR Serbia in the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the SFRJ, undated (0606-0111-0606-0111).

⁶⁷ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 4, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0222).

⁶⁸ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Articles 8 and 23, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0223 and 0606-0228).

⁶⁹ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 15, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0225-0606-0226).

⁷⁰ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 16, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0226).

⁷¹ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 17, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0226).

4. Fourth Administration: the protection of buildings and areas of interest to the defence of the Yugoslav state;⁷³
5. Fifth Administration: the analysis and documentation of the work of the SDB and the dissemination of information about its work;⁷⁴
6. Sixth Administration: the protection of persons, delegations and buildings;⁷⁵
7. Seventh Administration: the uncovering of enemy activity and the protection of certain persons, tasks, affairs and buildings.⁷⁶

45. Upon discovering enemy or other subversive activity, the SDB would use its means and methods to prevent such activity.⁷⁷ This included the protection of Yugoslav citizens and interests abroad. As regards "internal enemies," this among other things encompassed nationalist extremism.

46. All constituent parts of the SDB were responsible during peacetime for preparing relevant plans for their work in times of war, extraordinary circumstances or for cases of the imminent threat of war.⁷⁸

47. The chief (*načelnik*) of the SDB headed the service and could in cases of hindrance or absence be represented by the deputy chief.⁷⁹

48. The outlines of the work of the SDB were laid out in the annual work plan of the SDB, and were further developed in quarterly and monthly work plans.⁸⁰ The work of the SDB was to be carried out in accordance with the rules on the work of the SDB which were issued by the SDB of the SSUP, and in cooperation with other organs and services that also carried out matters of state security.⁸¹

49. As noted in the 1990 annual report on the work of the SDB, it reported continuously and in a timely manner on its work to the SDB SSUP, the SDBs of the

⁷² SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 18, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0226-0606-0227).

⁷³ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 19, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0227). ON REORGANIZATION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION SEE 0684-0581.

⁷⁴ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 20, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0227).

⁷⁵ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 21, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0228).

⁷⁶ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 22, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0228).

⁷⁷ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Articles 41-3, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0235).

⁷⁸ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 44, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0236).

⁷⁹ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 45, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0236-0606-0237).

⁸⁰ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Articles 51-2, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0239).

⁸¹ SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Organization and Work of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Article 17, 10 February 1990 (0606-0218-0606-0243, at 0606-0240).

autonomous regions and the other Yugoslav republics, the Security Service of the JNA and also to political institutions of the Republic of Serbia, namely the Presidency, the Republican Executive Council, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, the Committee for Questions of the Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia, the Committee for the Supervision of the Work of the SDB, etc.⁸²

50. In addition to the aforementioned rulebook, the SDB was further described in another rulebook from February 1990, the Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the SDB in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs.⁸³ The primary purpose of this rulebook was to prescribe the number and type of employees needed to perform effectively the work of the SDB. In 1990, a total of 1,120 employees in the SDB of the Republic of Serbia was foreseen.⁸⁴ However, according to the 1990 annual report on the work of the SDB, only approximately 71% of the posts were actually filled, and about a third of those employed in the SDB had insufficient educational qualifications for the posts which they held. The understaffing of the SDB was in part due to the departure of a significant number of employees of Albanian ethnicity.⁸⁵

V. The Political Leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 1992-1995

51. On 27 April 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Savezna Republika Jugoslavija*, or SRJ) consisting of the republics of Serbia (encompassing Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro proclaimed its constitution.⁸⁶ Article 77 of the constitution described the responsibilities of the organs of the SRJ, including “the defence and security of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁸⁷

52. On 15 June 1992, the writer and member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Dobrica Ćosić was elected as the president of the SRJ.⁸⁸

53. On 14 July 1992, the Federal Assembly of the SRJ elected Milan Panić as president of the government of the SRJ.⁸⁹

54. The president of Serbia was Slobodan Milošević. The president of Montenegro was Momir Bulatović.

⁸² RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0554).

⁸³ SRS RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616).

⁸⁴ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0567).

⁸⁵ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0568).

⁸⁶ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 April 1992 (0046-1795-0046-1844).

⁸⁷ Article 77, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 April 1992 (0046-1795-0046-1844, at 0046-1816-0046-1817.)

⁸⁸ Decision on the Election of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 15 June 1992, *SLSRJ*, No. 12/92 (0605-9174-0605-9174).

⁸⁹ Decision on the Election of the President of the Federal Government, 14 July 1992, *SLSRJ*, No. 22/92 (0605-9175-0605-9175).

55. On 2 March 1993, the Federal Assembly of the SRJ elected Radoje Kontić as president of the government of the SRJ.⁹⁰
56. On 25 June 1993, Zoran Lilić was elected as the president of the SRJ.⁹¹
57. Both Kontić and Lilić remained in their respective positions until after 1995.

VI. The Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, and the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia, 1992-1995

58. Throughout the period from 1992 to 1995, the basic structure of the organs of internal affairs in Serbia remained the same. Internal affairs continued to consist of two main components: public security and state security. Compared to the earlier period, the main change concerned the emasculation of the federal organs of internal affairs. Whereas the republican organs of internal affairs in Serbia had until 1991 been subordinate to the federal organs of internal affairs, steps taken in 1992 left the SSUP with little actual power. Similarly, whereas the organs of internal affairs of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo had until 1989 enjoyed significant autonomy with respect to the republican organs of internal affairs of Serbia, the constitutional changes enacted in 1989 firmly subordinated Vojvodina and Kosovo to Serbia. In sum, throughout the period of concern to this report, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia was the dominant organ of internal affairs in Serbia including Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia was the dominant state security service.

59. On 14 July 1992, the Federal Assembly appointed Pavle Bulatović as the federal minister of internal affairs.⁹² He replaced Petar Gračanin, who had been the federal secretary of internal affairs since 1989.

60. Besides Pavle Bulatović, another person in the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs who would come to have significance for the State Security Service in Serbia was Mihalj Kertes. According to information about his pension, Kertes was employed in the SSUP from 1 April 1992 until 28 August 1992.⁹³ According to an official note from July 1992, Kertes at that point held the post of assistant federal secretary for internal affairs.⁹⁴ Later, Kertes worked for the Serbian government before taking charge of the Federal

⁹⁰ Decision on the Election of the President of the Federal Government, 2 March 1993, *SLSRJ*, No. 9/93 (0605-9185-0605-9185).

⁹¹ Decision on the Election of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 25 June 1993, *SLSRJ*, No. 32/93 (0605-9187-0605-9187).

⁹² Decision on the Election of the President of the Federal Government, 14 July 1992, *SLSRJ*, No. 22/92 (0605-9175-0605-9175).

⁹³ Republican Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance, Certification of Pension for Mihalj Kertes, 30 September 2009 (Y035-0407-Y035-0407).

⁹⁴ SSUP, Cabinet of the Federal Secretary, Official Note, 3 July 1992 (Y035-0833-Y035-0841). See also handwritten note of 2 July 1992 (Y035-0842-Y035-0847, at Y035-0844).

Customs Administration. Kertes was known as a person who enjoyed the confidence of President Slobodan Milošević.⁹⁵

61. According to Article 44 of the Law on State Administration of April 1992, the minister was responsible for ensuring the efficient and legal functioning of the relevant ministry.⁹⁶ Article 45 imposed comparable responsibility on those officials in a ministry who headed organizational units within a ministry.⁹⁷

62. On 18 October 1992, officials of MUP Serbia took over the headquarters of the SSUP in Belgrade, justifying this move based on an unresolved property dispute. On 2 November 1992, the Council for the Harmonization of Positions on State Policy convened to discuss the “endangering of the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁹⁸ Minister Pavle Bulatović described the takeover, noting also that pressure had been exerted on employees of the SDB SSUP to join the SDB of the Republic of Serbia.⁹⁹ Bulatović expressed concern about the implications of the takeover for the rule of law in the country. He suggested that the situation should either be returned to the *status quo ante*, or a commission should be established to study the situation in the state security services and propose further steps to be taken. The Council concluded that the federal and Serbian ministers of internal affairs should meet within three days in order to agree on the functioning of the SDB SSUP.¹⁰⁰

63. In an interview in *Politika* on 22 November 1992, Ćosić discussed the crisis surrounding the SDB SSUP.

As I have already stated, the republican ministry of internal affairs has based on a “legal property” reason [*imovinsko-pravnim razlogom*] usurped the building and technical base of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and practically shut down the State Security Service of the federal state. The federal government and the federal state have been deprived of one of their basic constitutional functions. If by 24 November, the date set by the court, this “legal property dispute” is not resolved, and with it the Federal State Security Service and the functioning of the whole ministry, I will turn to the Federal Assembly with the proposal that it examine the endangerment of constitutional order of the country.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Regional SUP Vojvodina, Department of the State Security Service, Informational Report, 20 May 1991 (Y037-1627-Y037-1650).

⁹⁶ Article 44, Law on State Administration, *SGRS*, No. 20/92; Law on Changes and Amendments to Law on State Administration, *SGRS*, No. 48/93 (0291-0271-0291-0279, at 0291-0274).

⁹⁷ Article 45, Law on State Administration, *SGRS*, No. 20/92; Law on Changes and Amendments to Law on State Administration, *SGRS*, No. 48/93 (0291-0271-0291-0279, at 0291-0275).

⁹⁸ Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for the Harmonization of Positions on State Policy, 2 November 1992 (0294-3949-0294-3953).

⁹⁹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for the Harmonization of Positions on State Policy, 2 November 1992 (0294-3949-0294-3953, at 0294-3951).

¹⁰⁰ Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for the Harmonization of Positions on State Policy, 2 November 1992 (0294-3949-0294-3953, at 0294-3952). See also the last page of this document with respect to paramilitary formations in Serbia.

¹⁰¹ “Dobrica Ćosić: Očekujem da izbori uvedu vladavinu više stranaka,” *Politika*, 22 November 1992 (0423-1820-0423-1822, at 0423-1822).

64. In his memoirs, former SRJ President Dobrica Ćosić recalled that he was en route to diplomatic negotiations in Switzerland when he had been informed about the takeover of the SSUP.

I am shocked by Milošević's act, which he carried out on Sunday [18 October 1992], while I was travelling to Geneva. His police forcibly entered the building of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and the premises of the State Security Service, disarmed the police, took over the technical surveillance equipment, the documentation, the archive and threw the federal officials out. The federal state was left without the State Security Service, by which it was deprived of one of its basic constitutional functions. The Požarevac despot [i.e. Milošević] carried out this putsch while Panić and I were not in the country. What does that man intend? This destructive act towards the federal state is carried out under the command of the SDB of Serbia, and with the knowledge of the chief of the General Staff and of the KOS [a colloquial reference to the counter-intelligence service of the JNA]. This event has received great publicity in the world and has drastically weakened the authority of Panić and me at home and abroad.

I called Ljubo Tadić to confer with him about what to do. He believes that Milošević has with this usurpation of the State Security Service removed himself from the field of legitimacy and that I should push the military into defending the constitutional order of the country.

Tomorrow, I will visit the General Staff and listen to the generals. I will tell them that Milošević is destroying the federal state and that it is in the national interest that that usurper leaves the office of the president of Serbia. I will see whether the generals are ready to support me.¹⁰²

65. Ćosić also recounted his experience of the meeting on 2 November 1992. Ćosić claimed that Slobodan Milošević had ordered the takeover of the SSUP. "Milošević is taking command over all mechanisms of power," wrote Ćosić.¹⁰³

66. Upon his impeachment and removal from the presidency of the SRJ, Ćosić at the beginning of June 1993 once again referred to the events of October 1992. After setting out a long list of events, of which the "liquidation of the Federal State Security Service" was merely one, Ćosić concluded that "the Federal State, if it even exists, is practically a protectorate of Slobodan Milošević and the Government of Serbia."¹⁰⁴ Ćosić also called his removal a "coup d'état through the parliament."¹⁰⁵

67. Although the SDB SSUP continued to exist on paper after October 1992, for all intents and purposes it was emasculated by the takeover. Already in November 1992, changes were made to the January 1992 Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB. In the January 1992 rulebook, Article 2 stated that the RDB's mission was to protect the security of the "Republic," i.e. the Republic of Serbia.¹⁰⁶ Article 1 of the amendments from November 1992 modified Article 2 to read as follows:

¹⁰² Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2004) (0421-8567-0421-8779, at 0421-8658).

¹⁰³ Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2004) (0421-8567-0421-8779, at 0421-8663).

¹⁰⁴ Statement of Dobrica Ćosić to Tanjug cited in Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2004) (0421-8567-0421-8779, at 0421-8766).

¹⁰⁵ "Ćosić: Državni udar preko parlamenta," *Politika*, 3 June 1993 (0605-9157-0605-9158).

¹⁰⁶ Article 2, Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, January 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0290).

The Division carries out affairs of state administration which relate to the protection of the security of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the prevention of activities aimed at the undermining or destruction of the order confirmed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the territory of the Republic.¹⁰⁷

68. Article 3 of the January 1992 rulebook, which referred to counterintelligence, intelligence and other affairs of security, was also amended to broaden the geographical scope of the RDB to include the entire territory of the SRJ.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, Articles 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37 of the January 1992 rulebook established RDB centres on the territory of both Vojvodina and Kosovo, thereby further implementing a centralization of internal affairs.¹⁰⁹

69. In 1994, the SRJ adopted the Regulation on the Establishment of Federal Ministries and Other Federal Organs and Ministries, which defined the ambit of the SSUP.¹¹⁰ In practice, however, the SSUP retained little actual authority.

70. The structure of the State Security Service from 1992 to 1996 is accurately reflected in a diagram provided to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities.¹¹¹

VII. Functions Held by Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Franko SIMATOVIĆ and Other Leading Officials of MUP Serbia

A. Jovica STANIŠIĆ

71. Jovica STANIŠIĆ commenced his employment in the State Security Service of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in 1975.¹¹² On 15 December 1975, STANIŠIĆ commenced a one-year probationary employment in OSDB Belgrade.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ Article 1, Rulebook on the Changes and Amendments to the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, 13 November 1992 (0606-0494-0606-0497, at 0606-0495).

¹⁰⁸ Article 3, Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, January 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0291); Article 2, Rulebook on the Changes and Amendments to the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, 13 November 1992 (0606-0494-0606-0497, at 0606-0496).

¹⁰⁹ Articles 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37, Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, January 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0300 and 0606-0302-0606-0304).

¹¹⁰ Article 20, Regulation on the Establishment of Federal Ministries and Other Federal Organs and Ministries, *SLSRJ*, 67/94, 14 September 1994 (0610-6292-0610-6299, at 0610-6293).

¹¹¹ Organogram of the State Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1992-1996 (0606-0114-0606-0114).

¹¹² Letter of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to OSDB Belgrade, received 12 August 1975 (0611-1610-0611-1611); OSDB Belgrade, Decision on Employment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 7 November 1975 (0611-1639-0611-1640).

¹¹³ OSDB Belgrade and USDB Belgrade were the terms used in the respective periods for the main branch office of the Serbian SDB in Belgrade. Between 1975 and 1977, OSDB Belgrade was renamed USDB Belgrade. RSUP SRS, Decision on the Appointment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to Probationary Employment in OSDB Belgrade, 9 December 1975 (0611-1641-0611-1641).

72. At the end of 1977, STANIŠIĆ attained the title of Inspector in the Administration of the SDB (*Uprava Službe državne bezbednosti*, USDB) in Belgrade.¹¹⁴ On 22 April 1980, STANIŠIĆ was promoted to Independent Inspector in USDB Belgrade, effective 1 January 1980.¹¹⁵
73. Starting in April 1983, Jovica STANIŠIĆ worked in the headquarters of the SDB of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.¹¹⁶
74. On 22 April 1985, Jovica STANIŠIĆ was promoted to Senior Inspector in the SDB of SR Serbia, effective 1 January 1985.¹¹⁷
75. On 8 February 1990, Jovica STANIŠIĆ attained the qualification of Advisor in the SDB of SR Serbia, effective 1 January 1990.¹¹⁸
76. On 6 June 1990, Stanko Radmilović, the President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, appointed Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, who was simultaneously the Assistant Chief of the State Security Service of the RSUP of the Republic of Serbia.¹¹⁹
77. On 31 December 1991, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Zoran Sokolović appointed STANIŠIĆ as the Chief of the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia.¹²⁰ He held this position until 27 October 1998. On 31 December 1991, Jovica STANIŠIĆ was also appointed as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs.¹²¹
78. On 21 May 1994, the Vice President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Babić, reappointed Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs.¹²²

¹¹⁴ RSUP SRS, Decision on the Promotion of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to Inspector, 29 December 1977 (0611-1651-0611-1651).

¹¹⁵ RSUP SRS, Decision on the Qualification of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Independent Inspector, 22 April 1980 (0611-1656-0611-1656).

¹¹⁶ RSUP SRS, Decision on the Appointment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to a Post in SDB RSUP SRS, 12 April 1983 (0611-1668-0611-1668).

¹¹⁷ RSUP SRS, Decision on the Qualification of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Senior Inspector, 22 April 1985 (0611-1608-0611-1608).

¹¹⁸ Decision on the Appointment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Advisor, 8 February 1990 (0608-2101-0608-2101).

¹¹⁹ Decision on the Appointment of the Assistant Republican Secretary for Internal Affairs, 6 June 1990 (0606-0516-0606-0516).

¹²⁰ Decision on the Appointment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as the Chief of the SDB of the Republic of Serbia, 31 December 1991 (0606-0519-0606-0519); Decision on the Appointment of the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, 31 December 1991, *SGRS*, No. 80/91, 31 December 1991 (0363-4048-0363-4049, at 0363-4048).

¹²¹ Decision on the Appointment of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, 31 December 1991 (0606-0517-0606-0517).

¹²² Decision on the Appointment of the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, 21 May 1994 (0606-0518-0606-0518).

79. On 27 October 1998, Radio Belgrade announced that Jovica STANIŠIĆ had been removed from his post as Chief of the RDB.¹²³ The following day STANIŠIĆ made a public statement about his departure from the RDB:

With regard to the Serbian government's decision to relieve me of my duties as the Chief of State Security of the Republic of Serbia, I would like to state the following: I spent seven years in that position – from 1991 to 1998, in complex historical, international and national circumstances. Under my leadership, the Service acted in accordance with its constitutional and legal authorities, and under the permanent legal supervision of the Supreme Court of Serbia. The Service tied its work and responsibility, which follows from that, primarily to the institution of the President of Serbia. I want to believe that the Service will also in the future, which is not free from threats against national security, perform its duty based on the principles which I respected and which I served.¹²⁴

80. The personnel dossier provided for Jovica STANIŠIĆ does not include any document reflecting this dismissal. Although STANIŠIĆ no longer served as the head of the RDB after October 1998, his formal employment with the RDB was not terminated until 31 July 2000, by a decision issued on 20 June 2000.¹²⁵ On 17 July 2000, the MUP of Serbia confirmed that STANIŠIĆ had already attained early pensionable status, having accrued 24 years, 7 months and 3 days of service.¹²⁶ On 1 August 2000, the MUP of Serbia presented STANIŠIĆ with a 9mm Herstal pistol in gratitude for his service.¹²⁷ On 25 August 2000, the MUP of Serbia further confirmed STANIŠIĆ's pension and issued him a severance payment.¹²⁸

B. Franko SIMATOVIĆ

81. Franko SIMATOVIĆ applied to work for the State Security Service of SR Serbia in 1978.¹²⁹ On 28 June 1978, Franko SIMATOVIĆ was recommended for probationary employment as an operative in USDB Belgrade, effective 1 July 1978.¹³⁰ One year later, SIMATOVIĆ completed his probationary employment and became a regular employee.¹³¹ As of 1 July 1979, SIMATOVIĆ attained the rank of Junior Inspector in USDB Belgrade.¹³²

¹²³ Dejan Anastasijević, "Noć dugih ušiju," *Vreme*, 31 October 1998 (0610-5671-0610-5671).

¹²⁴ Quoted in Dejan Anastasijević, "Noć dugih ušiju," *Vreme*, 31 October 1998 (0610-5671-0610-5671).

¹²⁵ Decision on the Termination of Employment, 20 June 2000 (0608-2113-0608-2114).

¹²⁶ Certification of Years Worked, 17 July 2000 (0608-2118-0608-2118).

¹²⁷ Decision on Awarding of Pistol to Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 1 August 2000 (0608-2121-0608-2121).

¹²⁸ Confirmation of Pension, 25 August 2000 (0608-2119-0608-2119); Decision on Severance Pay (0608-2120-0608-2120).

¹²⁹ Franko SIMATOVIĆ, Request to Personnel Service of SDB Belgrade, 10 February 1978 (0608-1545-0608-1546).

¹³⁰ USDB Belgrade to RSUP SR Serbia, Personnel Department, 28 June 1978 (0608-1566-0608-1567).

¹³¹ RSUP SRS, Certification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Employee of USDB Belgrade, 28 June 1979 (0611-1757-0611-1757).

¹³² USDB Belgrade, Decision on Qualification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Junior Inspector, 2 October 1979 (0611-1759-0611-1759).

82. As of 1 July 1984, SIMATOVIĆ was promoted to the rank of Inspector in USDB Belgrade.¹³³

83. The available work evaluations for Franko SIMATOVIĆ from the 1980s show that he worked in the Second Sector of USDB Belgrade, whose main task was the monitoring of enemy émigrés and the activities of the intelligence agencies from NATO countries.¹³⁴

84. On 18 December 1989, the Secretary for Internal Affairs in SR Serbia, Radmilo Bogdanović, deployed a number of SDB employees from throughout Serbia to Kosovo in order to assist their colleagues there. Franko SIMATOVIĆ was one of the employees sent from USDB Belgrade to Kosovo.¹³⁵ According to the annual work evaluation for Franko SIMATOVIĆ for 1990, he worked as an operational officer in USDB Belgrade but was deployed at OSDB Peć for that entire year.¹³⁶

85. On 8 January 1991, Franko SIMATOVIĆ was appointed, effective 15 December 1990, as a Senior Inspector in the Second Department of USDB Belgrade.¹³⁷ His post was identified as corresponding to Article 42, Number 18 in the Second Department of USDB Belgrade, the Chief of the Section responsible for the monitoring of the intelligence services of the United States of America.¹³⁸

86. On 18 March 1992, a backdated decision was issued for Franko SIMATOVIĆ, who was at that point a section chief in the Second Department of the Administration of the SDB in Belgrade.¹³⁹ The decision showed that SIMATOVIĆ had been in Kosovo on official duty in the PSUP of Kosovo and Metohija from 12 April until 17 October 1991. However, as is seen elsewhere in this report, SIMATOVIĆ was at this time active in operations concerning the Serb-controlled areas of Croatia and in meetings with relevant persons in Belgrade. This backdated decision, as well as that issued on the same day for Dragan FILIPOVIĆ, who worked with SIMATOVIĆ in the Second Department of USDB Belgrade, and for Milan Radonjić of the Fourth Department of USDB Belgrade, strongly suggests that the reason for backdating these decisions was to conceal covert activities.¹⁴⁰

87. On 29 April 1992, the Chief of the RDB Jovica STANIŠIĆ appointed Franko SIMATOVIĆ as a Senior Inspector to the post of the Deputy Chief of the Second

¹³³ RSUP SRS, Decision on Qualification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Inspector, (date partly illegible) 1984 (0611-1770-0611-1770).

¹³⁴ Annual Work Evaluations of Franko SIMATOVIĆ (0608-1629-0608-1658).

¹³⁵ Decision of SR Serbia Secretary for Internal Affairs Radmilo Bogdanović (0608-1585-0608-1585).

¹³⁶ Annual Work Evaluation of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 March 1991 (0608-1629-0608-1630).

¹³⁷ Decision on the Appointment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector in USDB Belgrade, 8 January 1991 (0608-1586-0606-1586).

¹³⁸ Article 42, Number 18 in SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2510).

¹³⁹ Decision on the Deployment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ to PSUP AP Kosovo and Metohija, 18 March 1992 (0608-1588-0608-1588).

¹⁴⁰ MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 18 March 1992 (0611-1589-0611-1589); MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 18 March 1992 (0637-6910-0637-6910).

Administration of the RDB.¹⁴¹ On 30 November 1992, SIMATOVIĆ'S salary as a Senior Inspector was confirmed.¹⁴² The annual work evaluation for 1992 shows that SIMATOVIĆ in that year worked as the Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB.¹⁴³ The RDB's planning foresaw a total of 95 employees (including the Chief) in the Second Administration.¹⁴⁴ However, given what is generally known about staffing levels in the RDB from annual reports of the RDB, actual staffing was most likely below this level.¹⁴⁵

88. On 12 May 1993, Jovica STANIŠIĆ appointed Franko SIMATOVIĆ as a Senior Inspector in the RDB. SIMATOVIĆ was appointed to the post from Article 7, Number 1 in the Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the MUP of Serbia, corresponding to the post of Special Advisor.¹⁴⁶ The Rulebook foresaw six such posts.¹⁴⁷

89. A letter sent by Vojislav Cvetković as Deputy Chief of the RDB on 18 May 1994 to Franko SIMATOVIĆ identifies him as the Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB.¹⁴⁸ SIMATOVIĆ retained this post until at least January 1996.¹⁴⁹

90. By 27 June 1994, Franko SIMATOVIĆ had been promoted to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB, and Dragan Filipović had replaced him as Deputy Chief.¹⁵⁰

91. On 28 August 1995, Franko SIMATOVIĆ'S salary coefficient for the month of August 1995 was reduced because he had not sufficiently performed his duties as Special Advisor in the RDB during that month.¹⁵¹ This decision was signed by Jovica STANIŠIĆ.

¹⁴¹ Decision on the Qualification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 29 April 1992 (0608-1589-0608-1589); Article 11, Number 2 in the Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 8 April 1992 (0606-0310-0606-0351, at 0606-0313).

¹⁴² Decision on the Confirmation of Salary of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 30 November 1992 (0608-1590-0608-1590).

¹⁴³ Annual Work Evaluation of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 20 April 1993 (0608-1657-0608-1658).

¹⁴⁴ Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 8 April 1992 (0606-0310-0606-0351, at 0606-0313).

¹⁴⁵ Overview of Demanded Statistical Data for the Period from 1991 to 1995, undated (1D04-5548-1D04-5550).

¹⁴⁶ Decision on the Qualification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 12 May 1993 (0608-1591-0608-1592); Article 7, Number 1 in the Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 8 April 1992 (0606-0310-0606-0351, at 0606-0313); Decision on the Confirmation of the Salary of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 12 May 1993 (0608-1592-0608-1592).

¹⁴⁷ Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 8 April 1992 (0606-0310-0606-0351, at 0606-0313).

¹⁴⁸ Letter of Deputy Chief of the RDB Vojislav Cvetković to Franko SIMATOVIĆ, Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB, 18 May 1994 (0608-3878-0608-3884).

¹⁴⁹ MUP Serbia JATD, Letter of Special Advisor and Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Franko SIMATOVIĆ to Deputy Chief of the RDB Vojislav CVETKOVIĆ, 22 January 1996 (0608-7767-0608-7866).

¹⁵⁰ Letter of Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Dragan Filipović to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 27 June 1994 (0608-4554-0608-4555).

¹⁵¹ Decision on the Reduction of the Salary of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 28 August 1995 (0608-1593-0608-1593).

92. On 5 April 1996, Franko SIMATOVIĆ was appointed as Inspector and was confirmed as a Special Advisor in the RDB.¹⁵² This meant that he simultaneously served as the Assistant Chief of the RDB.¹⁵³

93. On 13 August 1999, Franko SIMATOVIĆ was appointed as Independent Inspector and was confirmed as a Special Advisor in the RDB.¹⁵⁴

94. On 7 December 1999, SIMATOVIĆ was given the rank of Lieutenant and was appointed to the position from Article 8, Number 1 of the Rulebook on Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP of 1 December 1999.¹⁵⁵ This rulebook is not available, however in a document dated 31 December 1999 recommending SIMATOVIĆ for extraordinary promotion to the rank of captain, his post was identified as Assistant Chief of the RDB.¹⁵⁶ It was also noted that he had held this post since 5 April 1996. In the justification of the promotion, the Chief of the RDB Radomir Marković wrote that SIMATOVIĆ “has achieved significant results and made an exceptional contribution in the realization of the security of the Republic and its citizens.”¹⁵⁷

95. On 7 December 2001, Franko SIMATOVIĆ attained pensionable status, and his employment with the RDB was terminated.¹⁵⁸ According to the certification on pension issued to SIMATOVIĆ on 5 February 2002, he had in the period from 26 October 1979 until 30 December 2001 accrued 22 years, 6 months and 2 days of service.¹⁵⁹ On 7 February 2002, SIMATOVIĆ received 132,059.90 dinars as a severance payment.¹⁶⁰ On 26 February 2002, SIMATOVIĆ signed a confidentiality agreement.¹⁶¹

96. In March 2014, Franko SIMATOVIĆ gave a statement to the Prosecutor for Organized Crime in Belgrade.¹⁶² SIMATOVIĆ stated that the SDB/RDB worked according

¹⁵² Decision on the Appointment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Inspector and Special Advisor in the RDB, 13 August 1998 (0608-1597-0608-1597).

¹⁵³ Statement of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 March 2014 (CF00-0134-CF00-0160, at CF00-0141).

¹⁵⁴ Decision on the Appointment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Inspector and Special Advisor in the RDB, 5 April 1996 (0608-1594-0608-1594).

¹⁵⁵ Decision on the Appointment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ to the Rank of Lieutenant, 7 December 1999 (0608-1538-0608-1538). Military-style ranks were introduced in MUP Serbia in December 1995. Law on Ranks of the Members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, *SGRS*, 53/95, 28 December 1995 (1D06-0187-1D06-0188).

¹⁵⁶ Proposal for the Extraordinary Promotion of Franko SIMATOVIĆ to the Rank of Captain, 30 December 1999 (0608-1600-0608-1601).

¹⁵⁷ Proposal for the Extraordinary Promotion of Franko SIMATOVIĆ to the Rank of Captain, 30 December 1999 (0608-1600-0608-1601).

¹⁵⁸ Decision on the Termination of the Employment of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 7 December 2001 (0608-1604-0608-1604).

¹⁵⁹ Certification of Pension of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 February 2002 (0608-1605-0608-1605). As noted earlier, SIMATOVIĆ’s employment commenced in 1978, but the calculation of pension most probably did not include his initial probationary period of employment.

¹⁶⁰ Decision on Severance Payment for Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 7 February 2002 (0608-1606-0608-1606).

¹⁶¹ Statement on Maintaining Confidentiality, 26 February 2002 (0608-1613-0608-1613).

¹⁶² Republic of Serbia, Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime, Statement of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 March 2014 (CF00-0134-CF00-0160).

to hierarchical principles of subordination.¹⁶³ SIMATOVIĆ explained that Of his own role during his tenure as an assistant chief of the RDB, SIMATOVIĆ stated that such assistant chiefs did what the chief of the service required or tasked them to do. According to SIMATOVIĆ ,

depending on what you get from the chief of the service, you do this, that is you do not have that in the description of the job as if you are now appointed, you are only appointed as the assistant chief of the service, and you receive the task in the manner that I told you. That means that the chief of the service tasks you, I was responsible for intelligence work during the time of Jovica STANIŠIĆ.¹⁶⁴

C. Other Leading Officials of the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia

97. The Serbian authorities provided a list of names of leading officials of the SDB from 1990 to 1992.¹⁶⁵ A similar list was also provided for leading officials of the RDB from 1992 until 1996.¹⁶⁶ In August 2006, the Serbian authorities also provided a list of names of leading officials of the RDB in the period from 1 January 1992 until 31 December 1995.¹⁶⁷

98. On 30 May 1990, Milan Tepavčević was appointed as Assistant Chief of the State Security Service with the qualification of Senior Advisor.¹⁶⁸ On 10 February 1992, Tepavčević was qualified as Senior Advisor in the function of the Deputy Chief of the SDB of the Republic of Serbia.¹⁶⁹ On 28 June 1992, Jovica STANIŠIĆ qualified Tepavčević as a Senior Advisor in the RDB with an appointment as Deputy Chief.¹⁷⁰

99. On 30 May 1990, Ljubomir Ristić was appointed as Assistant Chief of the State Security Service with the qualification of Advisor.¹⁷¹ On 29 April 1992, Jovica STANIŠIĆ appointed Ristić as Assistant Chief of the RDB and was qualified as an Advisor.¹⁷²

100. On 8 November 1990, Radosav Lukić was appointed as Assistant Chief of the State Security Service with the qualification of Senior Advisor.¹⁷³

¹⁶³ Republic of Serbia, Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Statement of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 March 2014 (CF00-0134-CF00-0160, at CF00-0141).

¹⁶⁴ Republic of Serbia, Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Statement of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 5 March 2014 (CF00-0134-CF00-0160, at CF00-0141).

¹⁶⁵ List of Officials in the SDB from 1990 to 1992, undated (0611-2333-0611-2338).

¹⁶⁶ List of Officials in the RDB from 1992 to 1996, undated (0611-2339-0611-2344).

¹⁶⁷ Leadership of the RDB in the Period from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1995, 6 August 2006 (0606-0093-0606-0110, at 0606-0110).

¹⁶⁸ SRS RSUP, Decision, 30 May 1990 (0606-0522-0606-0522).

¹⁶⁹ Decision on the Appointment of Milan Tepavčević as the Deputy Chief of the SDB, 10 February 1992 (0606-0520-0606-0520).

¹⁷⁰ Decision on the Qualification of Milan Tepavčević as Senior Advisor, 28 June 1992 (0606-0521-0606-0521).

¹⁷¹ SRS RSUP, Decision, 30 May 1990 (0606-0546-0606-0546).

¹⁷² MUP Serbia, Decision, 29 April 1992 (0606-0526-0606-0526).

¹⁷³ Republic of Serbia RSUP, Decision, 8 November 1990 (0606-0523-0606-0523).

101. On 12 May 1993, Jovica STANIŠIĆ appointed Dragiša Ristivojević as Assistant Chief of the RDB with the qualification of Senior Advisor.¹⁷⁴ On the same day, STANIŠIĆ also appointed Olga Rešetar as Assistant Chief of the RDB with the qualification of Senior Advisor.¹⁷⁵

102. A letter sent by Vojislav Cvetković as Deputy Chief of the RDB on 18 May 1994 to Franko SIMATOVIĆ identifies Cvetković as the Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB.¹⁷⁶ Cvetković retained this post until at least January 1996.¹⁷⁷

103. By at least 27 June 1994, Franko SIMATOVIĆ had been promoted to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB, and Dragan Filipović had replaced him as Deputy Chief.¹⁷⁸ As of 30 June 1997, Filipović was the Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB.¹⁷⁹

D. Radovan Stojičić “Badža” and the Public Security Service

104. As noted previously, internal affairs were divided into public security and state security services, which were obliged to cooperate with each other in performing the tasks and duties foreseen for the organs of internal affairs. Just as the State Security Service (SDB) was transformed into the Division of State Security (RDB) in Serbia in 1992, so the Public Security Service (*Služba javne bezbednosti*) was transformed into the Division of Public Security (*Resor javne bezbednosti*, RJB).

105. The chief of the Public Security Service or Division of Public Security, respectively, during the period from 1991 to 1995 was Radovan Stojičić “Badža.” Stojičić was appointed as assistant minister of internal affairs (for public security) of the Republic of Serbia on 31 December 1991, the same day that Jovica STANIŠIĆ was also appointed as assistant minister of internal affairs (for state security).¹⁸⁰

106. By a decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs, special police units (*posebne jedinice milicije*, PJM) were established on 12 May 1992, reaching a strength of about 3,000 members by June 1993.¹⁸¹ At that point, they were reorganized by Assistant Minister and

¹⁷⁴ MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 12 May 1993 (0606-0524-0606-0524).

¹⁷⁵ MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 12 May 1993 (0606-0525-0606-0525).

¹⁷⁶ Letter of Deputy Chief of the RDB Vojislav Cvetković to Franko SIMATOVIĆ, Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB, 18 May 1994 (0608-3878-0608-3884).

¹⁷⁷ MUP Serbia RDB JATD, Letter of Special Advisor and Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Franko SIMATOVIĆ to Deputy Chief of the RDB Vojislav Cvetković, 22 January 1996 (0608-7767-0608-7866).

¹⁷⁸ Letter of Deputy Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Dragan Filipović to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 27 June 1994 (0608-4554-0608-4555).

¹⁷⁹ Letter of Chief of CRDB Novi Sad Milovan Popivoda to Chief of the Second Administration of the RDB Dragan Filipović, 30 June 1997 (0609-0283-0609-0283).

¹⁸⁰ Decision on the Appointment of the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, 31 December 1991, *SGRS*, No. 80/91, 31 December 1991 (0363-4048-0363-4049, at 0363-4049). See also MUP Serbia RJB, Letter of Assistant Minister Radovan Stojičić, 27 May 1992 (0160-2990-0160-2992).

¹⁸¹ MUP Serbia RJB, Reorganization of the PJM, 14 June 1993 (1D01-2312-1D01-2313).

Chief of the RJB Radovan Stojičić. In February 1993, the PJM had carried out combat training at Bajina Bašta on the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸²

107. On 17 August 1993, Stojičić wrote to all SUPs in Serbia and to the Staff of the PJMs in Priština stating that the Minister of Internal Affairs had on 1 August 1993 confirmed the new organization of the PJMs.¹⁸³

108. Radovan Stojičić was promoted to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on 11 August 1993.¹⁸⁴

109. As will be seen in the section of this report dealing with Serb-controlled entities in Croatia, Radovan Stojičić was also appointed to positions in the structures of these entities.

VIII. The Structure and Operations of the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia

110. In accordance with the political changes experienced with the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emergence of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the discarding of the socialist system, the rulebooks of the State Security Service were revised again at the beginning of 1992. The State Security Service (SDB) was renamed as the State Security Department (*Resor državne bezbednosti*, RDB). In January 1992, a new Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP was issued.¹⁸⁵ In April 1992, a new Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB was unveiled, along with a description of each post in the RDB.¹⁸⁶ On 13 November 1992, a Rulebook on the Changes and Amendments to the Rulebook on the Systematization of the Posts in the RDB in the MUP was issued.¹⁸⁷

111. According to Article 2 of the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB, the Department performed tasks aimed at protecting the Republic of Serbia by discovering and preventing activities aimed at the undermining or destruction of the constitutionally confirmed order.¹⁸⁸ While again having discarded the class-based terminology of socialist

¹⁸² MUP Serbia RJB, Letter of Radovan Stojičić, 13 February 1993 (0613-3783-0613-3783).

¹⁸³ MUP Serbia RJB, Letter of Radovan Stojičić, 17 August 1993 (0632-1126-0632-1128).

¹⁸⁴ Decision on the Appointment of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, 11 August 1993 in *SGRS*, No. 72/93, 12 August 1993 (Y008-8918-Y008-8918).

¹⁸⁵ Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB in the MUP, January 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309).

¹⁸⁶ Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309); Description of the Systematized Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0352-0606-0477).

¹⁸⁷ Rulebook on the Changes and Amendments to the Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 13 November 1992 (0606-0478-0606-0493).

¹⁸⁸ Article 2, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0290).

Yugoslavia, Article 2 as such provided a very standardized definition of a state security service.

112. Article 3 of the Rulebook specified that the RDB performed and provided the service of state security through counterintelligence, intelligence and other related work, and specifically through the prevention of extremism and terrorism.¹⁸⁹

Counterintelligence tasks are tasks of collecting intelligence, facts and information about the activities of foreign intelligence services, police-security and other institutions who are threatening the constitutionally confirmed order of the Republic.

Intelligence tasks are tasks of collecting intelligence, facts and information of interest to the Republic in the realms of politics, the economy, defence, security as well as in other realms of interest to the Republic. Intelligence tasks are also the tasks of collecting intelligence, facts and information about all forms of threats to the national and cultural-historical autonomy [*samosvojnost*] of Serbs who live outside the Republic.

Tasks of preventing extremism and terrorism are tasks of collecting intelligence, facts and information about the activities which threaten the constitutionally confirmed order of the Republic.¹⁹⁰

113. The sentence regarding the protection of the autonomy of Serbs outside the Republic marked a significant addition and expansion of the ambit of the work of the RDB. It raised the question of how – and in cooperation with whom – the RDB would seek to fulfil this portion of its mandate. Moreover, depending on how the RDB operationalized this task, it arguably risked stepping beyond the activities permitted by the Law on Internal Affairs.

114. The Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the RDB changed the number of administrations at headquarters from seven to eight.¹⁹¹ These administrations were defined as follows:

- First Administration: operational-instructional administration, handling counterintelligence matters;
- Second Administration: operational-instructional administration, handling intelligence matters;
- Third Administration: operational-instructional administration, handles matters involving the prevention of extremism and terrorism;
- Fourth Administration: operational-instructional administration, organizes and carries out preparations for the defence and the work of the Division in the case of an imminent threat of war and in war; prepares the relevant

¹⁸⁹ Article 3, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0290).

¹⁹⁰ Article 3, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0290-0606-0291).

¹⁹¹ Compare Organogram of the State Security Service of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1990-1991 (0606-0115-0606-0115) with Organogram of the State Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 1992-1996 (0606-0114-0606-0114).

annexes for the plan for the defence of the Republic; plans and coordinates the protection of buildings, areas and workplaces which are significant for the defence of the Republic; organizes and carries out cryptographic protection and special purpose communications;

- Fifth Administration: operational analytical-instructional administration, handles matters of the Division related to analysis, reporting, informing, research, documenting, registering, statistics, microfilm and archiving;
- Sixth Administration: operational-instructional administration, together with other administrations organizes the counterintelligence protection of republican organs and persons whose protection is in the interest of the Republic;
- Seventh Administration: operational-technical-instructional administration, handles matters related to the research, development and use of operational-technical means which the Division uses in its work;
- Eighth Administration: operational-technical-instructional administration, handles matters related to the organizational structure, training and recruitment of personnel, material-technical preparation, as well as handling other personnel-related matters such as disciplinary cases, assignment of security and duty officers, etc.¹⁹²

115. At the top of the RDB, the Chief of the Department was simultaneously an Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, and he had a cabinet, assistant chiefs, special advisors and advisors, as well as a Deputy Chief.

116. Outside of the seat of the ministry, the previous sectors in major cities and towns were renamed centres, and were to some extent geographically reshuffled. Below the centres were, departments, sections, operational groups and detachments.¹⁹³

117. The 1992 Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB described the functions of the Chief of the RDB as follows:

- leading employee with the function of assistant minister;
- organizes the performance of affairs within the purview of the Division;
- directs and coordinates the work of all organizational units of the Service;
- is responsible for the application of the means and methods of the Division;
- prepares and suggests the work programme of the Division and ensures its implementation;
- makes suggestions about the internal organization and systematization of posts in the Division;
- also proposes other documents and instructions from the purview of the Division;

¹⁹² Articles 13-20, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0295-0606-0296).

¹⁹³ Article 5, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0288-0606-0309, at 0606-0290).

- organizes the execution of tasks and affairs from the purview of the Division in states of emergency, imminent threat of war and war;¹⁹⁴
- ensures the coordination and cooperation of the Division with the state security service in the federation and in the republics, as well as with other defence and security organs.¹⁹⁵

118. As described in the Rulebook on the Organization of the Work of the SDB, the ambit of its work encompassed a very considerable number of subjects, only some of which are relevant for the purposes of this report.

119. In order to commence an analysis of the work of the SDB/RDB after 1990, it is best to first examine the periodical reports produced by the SDB/RDB during this period. A number of these reports have been provided to the ICTY, though mostly only in partial and/or redacted form. The first of these reports is the report of the SDB on its work in 1990, which the table of contents reveals to be at least 61 pages long, of which 18 were made available to the ICTY.¹⁹⁶ Partial reports are also available for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. In addition, excerpts from the annual “programmatic orientation” paper, which defined the policies guiding the operations of the SDB for the coming year, are available for 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995.

120. 1990 featured no armed conflicts in the SFRJ but it was also a year in which the security situation throughout the country worsened dramatically, and this is reflected in the SDB report. The SDB worked to counter “extremism,” which stemmed from various political directions, of which one was “Serb nationalism.”¹⁹⁷ This in particular included Serbs who harboured strong affinities for the nationalist ideology of the royalist Chetnik movement from the Second World War. According to the SDB, Serb nationalists had “abused the process of democratization and the establishment of the multiparty system in the Republic of Serbia. It is characteristic for this group of extremists in 1990 that as a constitutive part of their ideological orientation they have adopted a pro-Chetnik stance (*pročetništvo*) [...]. This mentioned form of extremism manifests itself through the advocacy of liquidating political opponents, the forcible reshaping of borders in Yugoslavia, genocide against members of other nations, settlings of accounts with communists and veterans (*borci*), the restoration of monarchy and a total rupture with all the legacies of the postwar period.”¹⁹⁸ Nor were such sentiments confined merely to verbal expression, as an increase in violent physical altercations showed. The SDB noted that “social circumstances” had made it significantly more difficult to deal with Serb extremism.

121. The 1990 report also noted increases in “Muslim extremism.” Confronting this phenomenon had also become more difficult because of changes in Bosnia and

¹⁹⁴ See Article 5, Law on Defence, *SGRS*, 45/91, 27 July 1991 (0216-2249-0216-2261, at 0216-2249).

¹⁹⁵ Description of the Systematized Posts in the RDB in the MUP, April 1992 (0606-0352-0606-0477, at 0606-0355).

¹⁹⁶ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569).

¹⁹⁷ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0552).

¹⁹⁸ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0559);

USDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1990, 12 January 1991 (Y036-7438-Y036-7442, at Y036-7439).

Herzegovina. Specifically, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action was among the victors in the November 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was hence a part of the government in that republic.¹⁹⁹

122. The programmatic orientation for 1991 was “based on the security evaluation and on relations in Yugoslavia and more broadly,” and was designed to enable the SDB to perform its job as effectively as possible.²⁰⁰ The SDB foresaw a particular need to focus on stabilizing the situation in Kosovo.²⁰¹ Cooperation with both the military security organs as well as with the state security services of neighbouring republics was still emphasized. Likewise, the SDB planned to continue reporting regularly to state organs of the Republic of Serbia about all matters related to security, albeit in a “significantly more selective” manner.²⁰²
123. Although no annual report is available for the entire SDB for 1991, an annual report for USDB Belgrade is available.²⁰³ Given that the USDB Belgrade was the most important office of the SDB outside of headquarters, its annual report provides some insight on the work of the SDB as a whole in 1991. The report shows that the SDB worked intensively on tracking the formation of “party armies” (*stranačke vojske*), i.e. paramilitary groups established by newly emerging political parties, especially those of Serb nationalist orientation.²⁰⁴ Vuk Drašković, the SPO and the Serb Guard were mentioned, as was the SRS. USDB Belgrade collected information concerning the situation in Croatia both from refugees and from volunteers returning from Croatia.²⁰⁵
124. Like the 1990 annual report on the work of the SDB, the 1992 annual report on the work of the RDB covered a variety of “extremisms,” including “Serb extremism.”²⁰⁶ At the outset of the report, the RDB asserted that its work in 1992 had been complicated by attempts by “international factors” to transfer armed conflict “from the territory of BiH to the territory of the Republic of Serbia,” and as such undermine the constitutionally established order of the Republic of Serbia.²⁰⁷ The RDB was concerned about the spillover of the conflicts in Croatia and BiH to Serbia, especially to multi-ethnic areas such as

¹⁹⁹ RSUP SDB, Report on the Work in 1990, January 1991 (0684-0551-0684-0569, at 0684-0560).

²⁰⁰ RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1991, January 1991 (0684-0708-0684-0712, at 0684-0710). See also RSUP SDB, Integral Programmatic Orientation of the SDB in 1990, January 1990 (Y034-9606-Y034-9612).

²⁰¹ RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1991, January 1991 (0684-0708-0684-0712, at 0684-0712). See also fragment of same document (Y034-9614-Y034-9627).

²⁰² RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1991, January 1991 (0684-0708-0684-0712, at 0684-0711).

²⁰³ USDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1991, 14 January 1992 (Y036-7443-Y036-7460, compare with 0684-0784-0684-0800).

²⁰⁴ USDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1991, 14 January 1992 (Y036-7443-Y036-7460, at Y036-7446).

²⁰⁵ USDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1991, 14 January 1992 (Y036-7443-Y036-7460, at Y036-7447).

²⁰⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0570A, compare with other version of same document at Y036-7363-Y036-7377).

²⁰⁷ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0572).

Vojvodina, the Sandžak (Raška) and Kosovo.²⁰⁸ These threats were accompanied by other negative tendencies such as “war profiteering” and the illegal smuggling of weapons and ammunition in those regions of Serbia bordering conflict areas in Croatia and BiH. However, the RDB assessed that it had been largely successful in meeting these challenges.²⁰⁹

125. At the end of 1992, the largest group of individuals under “operational treatment” (*operativna obrada*, OO) by the RDB were those falling into the category of “Serb extremism.”²¹⁰ However, during 1992 the RDB had not filed any criminal or misdemeanour complaints against “external enemies,” choosing instead to refer such cases to the Public Security Division (*Resor javne bezbednosti*, RJB) for “repressive measures.”²¹¹ The intentions of Serb extremists who had been under surveillance by the RDB were defined as “the forcible changing of the Constitutional order, deposing the authorities, imperilling the integrity of the country, public order and the security of citizens and property.”²¹² The RDB placed particular focus on the public demonstrations. Specific mention was made of Operational Action Tomson, which had been initiated in July 1991, and which will be dealt with separately below.²¹³

126. The 1992 annual report referred to the impact of the armed conflicts in Croatia and BiH on the security situation in Serbia. According to the view of the RDB, “genocide” was being perpetrated against the Serbs in BiH.²¹⁴ In an operation called “Kontakt,” the RDB monitored radio traffic on the territory of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja as well as amateur radio traffic between Vojvodina and Hungary.²¹⁵ The RDB had also “offered full cooperation to Republika Srpska and to Republika Srpska Krajina with all measures of cryptographic protection, accompanied by the establishment and temporary organization of cryptographic protection in order to exchange information.”²¹⁶ In the 1992 annual report, the RDB also put emphasis on its preparedness for war.²¹⁷ The 1992 annual report for the Centre of the State Security Division (*Centar resora državne bezbednosti*, CRDB) Belgrade also showed a continued focus on extremism among all ethnicities, with Serb extremism most prominently represented.²¹⁸

²⁰⁸ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (Y036-7363-Y036-7377, at Y036-7364; see also Y034-9639-Y034-9644).

²⁰⁹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0573).

²¹⁰ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0573).

²¹¹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0574).

²¹² RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0574).

²¹³ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0575).

²¹⁴ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0581).

²¹⁵ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0583).

²¹⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0583).

²¹⁷ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585).

²¹⁸ CRDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1992, 18 January 1993 (Y036-7461-Y036-7472, at Y036-7463).

127. The 1993 programmatic orientation of the RDB outlined the main priorities for the work of the RDB, including cooperation with the authorities of the RS and the RSK.²¹⁹ With respect to Serb extremism, the emphasis was on preventing illegal attempts to take over power in Serbia through the provocation of civil war and through the formation and arming of paramilitary groups.²²⁰ “Permanent cooperation” with the RJB and the Security Service of the VJ would contribute to achieving this goal. The protection of the Serb nation outside of the Republic of Serbia was also listed as a priority, with assistance being lent in order to help the “Serb nation in Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina to effectively oppose the aggression of the Muslim and Croat forces.”²²¹ The surveillance of the war-torn areas of Croatia and BiH was also described as being “permanent.”²²²
128. The 1993 annual report emphasized that priority had been given to the “protection of the overall Serb national interest, through an offensive intelligence component of the work of the Service and through the offering of various types of professional and other assistance to the security services of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina.”²²³ The RDB also continued to work on blocking the activities of illegal paramilitary formations. The report specifically mentioned the “Serb Guard,” the Serb Chetnik Movement (*Srpski četnički pokret*, SČP) and the Serb National Renewal (*Srpska narodna obnova*, SNO).²²⁴ To the earlier category of extremism, the 1993 annual report also added the term “terrorism.”²²⁵
129. As in previous years, the RDB monitored these phenomena among all ethnic groups, including Serbs. The RDB believed that most Serb extremists were active “under the patronage of political parties.”²²⁶ The Serb Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, SPO) and its Serb Guard (*Srpska garda*, SG) was particularly highlighted, although the SRS and its SČP also received mention. “To a somewhat lesser extent,” the RDB had examined links between Serb extremists with “certain structures in the RSK and the RS as regards the acquiring and illegal import [*unošenje*] of weapons and military equipment, as well as other types of linkage.”²²⁷
130. With respect to the SČP, the RDB reported that it had been subjected to broad repressive measures. The RDB possessed information that the SČP had been involved in “crimes against the civilian population, killings out of base motives, committed and

²¹⁹ RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1993, March 1993 (0684-0713-0684-0724); see also the version of the same document at Y036-7347-7358 and Y034-9629-Y034-9632.

²²⁰ RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1993, March 1993 (0684-0713-0684-0724, at 0684-0720).

²²¹ RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1993, March 1993 (0684-0713-0684-0724, at 0684-0722).

²²² RSUP SDB, Programmatic Orientation of the State Security Service in 1993, March 1993 (0684-0713-0684-0724, at 0684-0722).

²²³ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0598, compare with other version of same document at Y036-7378-Y036-7397 and Y034-9645-Y034-9652).

²²⁴ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0599).

²²⁵ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0600).

²²⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0610).

²²⁷ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0611).

planned terrorist attacks on buildings whose owners were of non-Serb ethnicity, terrorist attacks on the refugee camp at Velika Kopašnica, [and] the illegal possession of weapons and ammunition."²²⁸ These activities had led to 20 criminal complaints against 36 "extremists," as well as 9 complaints related to the illegal possession of weapons and ammunition.

131. The 1993 annual report of the RDB confirmed that Operational Action Tomson was still operational, and also mentioned Operational Action *Jug* ("South").²²⁹ The RDB had showed particular concern for extremist activities based at destabilizing multiethnic settlements in Vojvodina. The RDB possessed information pointing to support lent to Serb extremists by "the right wing" of the Serb Orthodox Church.²³⁰ Of the approximately 2,500 individuals engaged in "Serb extremism and terrorism," the RDB estimated that 5.2% of them were covered by various measures with which the RDB disposed, and that the work of the RDB on this sector had improved significantly compared to 1992.²³¹ The 1993 annual report of CRDB stated that information about the possible commission of crimes by paramilitary formations in war-torn areas had been collected, and specifically mentioned the case of the Yellow Wasps.²³²
132. In the section on operational technical equipment, the 1993 annual report of the RDB made mention of technical communications assistance linked to the "locations of the JATD."²³³ This was a reference to the Unit for Anti-Terrorist Actions (*Jedinica za antiteroristička dejstva*), which will be treated subsequently in this report.
133. With respect to the professional development and training of personnel and with respect to the reporting of duty officers, the RDB in 1993 supported and maintained links with the RDB of Montenegro, the RDB of the RSK and the National Security Service (*Služba nacionalne bezbjednosti, SNB*) of the RS.²³⁴
134. The 1994 annual report followed the same categories as the 1993 annual report. At the outset of the report, it was stated that "in conformity with the tasks from the programmatic orientation for 1994, the Service notwithstanding the more difficult circumstances persisted in contributing fully to the protection of state and national interests outside the Republic of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively, through the offensive intelligence component of its work and through offering assistance and cooperation with the security services in Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska

²²⁸ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0612).

²²⁹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0612).

²³⁰ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0612).

²³¹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0613).

²³² CRDB Belgrade, Report on the Work in 1993, 10 December 1993 (Y036-7473-Y036-7493, at Y036-7483).

²³³ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0619).

²³⁴ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1993, February 1994 (0684-0594-0684-0626, at 0684-0625-0684-0626).

Krajina.”²³⁵ The RDB had also collected information on the armed conflicts in the RS and the RSK in addition to monitoring their relationships with Serbia.²³⁶

135. In 1994, the RDB continued to cover “Serb extremism and terrorism.” From the list of groups and activities covered, it appears that the RDB also continued to define “extremism” broadly. Hence, “independent media” were subsumed under this category.²³⁷ Both OA Tomson and OA Jug continued.

136. In the case of some of those members of paramilitary organizations identified by the RDB as being “the most extreme,” criminal complaints were filed with the local prosecutor. The RDB monitored the activities of 35 members of the “White Eagles” (*Beli orlovi*) who were engaged in illegal activities involving arms in Serbia and in the RS. Some weapons were confiscated, 35 statements were taken, and the resulting documentation was sent to the RJB for consideration for criminal prosecution.²³⁸ The RDB stated that it had worked on preventing activities of paramilitary groups aimed at the expulsion and/or intimidation of the non-Serb population. “During 1994, because of extremist illegal activities aimed at forming, popularizing and at the illegal arming of paramilitary party organizations, because of the commission of acts of war crimes on the territory of the RS, committed and planned terrorist attacks on persons and buildings owned by members of non-Serb nationality, 34 criminal complaints were filed, encompassing 40 extremists.”²³⁹

137. The RDB continued to monitor extremist groups not just because of their criminal activities, but also because several of them desired to see a return of the monarchy which had been abolished in Serbia at the end of the Second World War.²⁴⁰ Some extremist groups also opposed efforts being taken by the authorities in Serbia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “to end the war in the former BiH.”²⁴¹

²³⁵ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0633, compare with other version of same document at Y036-7398-Y036-7437). The date of the 1994 annual report on the work of the RDB presents an analytical anomaly. According to the cover of the report, it stems from March 1994, which makes little sense given that such a report should appear at the very earliest in January of the year following the one on which it reports. The date of the report is therefore in all likelihood March 1995.

²³⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0634). See also Y034-9653-Y034-9661.

²³⁷ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0644).

²³⁸ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0645).

²³⁹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0645).

²⁴⁰ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0646).

²⁴¹ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0646).

138. In 1994, the RDB continued to cooperate with the security services of both the RS and the RSK, and also offered maintenance of the communications systems of these entities.²⁴²
139. The 1995 annual report on the work of the RDB demonstrated continued continuity in the work of the Service.²⁴³ Particular mention was made of the chronically poor economic situation and of the collapse of the RSK, from which the flow of refugees had created negative consequences in Serbia.²⁴⁴ In the struggle against Serb extremism, the RDB in 1995 prioritized the SČP, the Serb Guard, the SČO, the White Eagles, the Ravna Gora Movement and the Serb Fatherland Union.²⁴⁵ The operations “Tomson” and “Jug” remained active.
140. From the description of the measures undertaken with respect to Serb extremist organizations, it is apparent that the RDB knew that these organizations sent their members to fight outside of the territory of Serbia.²⁴⁶ However, the measures of the RDB were not designed to prevent such activities, but rather focused instead on the illegal import of weapons and ammunition by these groups into Serbia, as well as on the risk that these groups posed to the political authorities in Serbia. The RDB also worked to prevent Serb paramilitary organizations from threatening areas in which ethnic minorities lived in Serbia.²⁴⁷
141. Those portions of the annual reports of the SDB/RDB that have been available for analysis do not include any detailed reporting about the activities of the SDB/RDB outside the borders of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

A. Operational Action Pauk

142. On 2 July 1991, the chief of the SDB of MUP Serbia, Zoran Janačković, wrote to Minister Zoran Sokolović proposing an operational action called “Pauk” (Spider).²⁴⁸ The proposed operational action was aimed at the discovery and prevention of intelligence, terrorist, and other activities directed against Serbs who lived outside the borders of the Republic of Serbia. On 28 June 1991, Minister Sokolović approved the operational action.²⁴⁹ In his decision, Sokolović specified that the use of the operational means and methods would be organized, coordinated and led by the First Administration. The

²⁴² RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1994, March 1995 (0684-0627-0684-0666, particularly at 0684-0582-0684-0585, at 0684-0657 and 0684-0661).

²⁴³ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1995, February 1996 (0684-0667-0684-0707). See also Y034-9662-Y034-9672.

²⁴⁴ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1995, February 1996 (0684-0667-0684-0707, at 0684-0672). (Is there any documentation available on the forcible recruiting by Arkan of RSK refugees in 1995 and 1996?)

²⁴⁵ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1995, February 1996 (0684-0667-0684-0707, at 0684-0689).

²⁴⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1995, February 1996 (0684-0667-0684-0707, at 0684-0689).

²⁴⁷ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1995, February 1996 (0684-0667-0684-0707, at 0684-0691).

²⁴⁸ Letter of Chief of SDB Serbia Zoran Janačković, 2 July 1991 (Y037-7707-Y037-7711, at Y037-7707).

²⁴⁹ Letter of Chief of SDB Serbia Zoran Janačković, 2 July 1991 (Y037-7707-Y037-7711, at Y037-7708-Y037-7709).

maintenance of communications for special purposes would be coordinated and led by a special section of the Fourth Administration.

143. Although Sokolović stated that an operational action plan and draft for communications constituted a part of his decision, these are not present in the available documentation.
144. There are no detailed references to the further implementation of Sokolović's decision.²⁵⁰ However, as is apparent from documentation cited elsewhere in this report, it is apparent that the SDB/RDB of Serbia both prior and subsequent to July 1991 acted in the spirit of Sokolović's decision. There are also indications that some Serbs from Croatia who were simultaneously employed in both the RSK MUP and in MUP Serbia were employed within the Fourth Administration of the SDB/RDB of MUP Serbia.

B. Operational Action Tomson²⁵¹

145. As has been seen earlier, the State Security Service in the Republic of Serbia watched the deteriorating security situation in both Serbia and in Yugoslavia as a whole with considerable attention in 1990 and 1991. Of particular concern to the SDB was the formation of armed groups. On 23 July 1991, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia Zoran Sokolović remarked that

the dramatic development of the situation in the country has significantly contributed to various attempts to organize and arm certain groups and has threatened the normal functioning of institutions of the legal state [*pravna država*] in the Republic of Serbia as well. Already, various forms and levels of anti-constitutional and illegal organizations of party, ethnic, and other armed groups are active semi-legally and illegally. The activities which individual parties are undertaking in opposition to the law with respect to recruiting and arming "volunteers" are directly aimed at the undermining and destruction of the constitutional order in Serbia, the breaking up of the JNA and the weakening of the defensive ability of the Republic.²⁵²

146. Specific mention was made of "Albanian secessionists" and "Muslim extremists," and of indications that Croats and Hungarians were also arming themselves.²⁵³ There were also attempts to disrupt the mobilization implemented by the JNA. "Proceeding from the dispositions of the Law on Defence the organs of internal affairs have an obligation to

²⁵⁰ The 1992 annual report of CRDB Belgrade mentions "Pauk." CRDB Belgrade, Fifth Department, Report on the Work in 1992, 18 January 1993 (0684-0801-0604-0817, at 0604-0808).

²⁵¹ In the available RDB documentation, this operational action is sometimes named "Tomson," and sometimes "Tompson." In all likelihood, given the operational action's focus on illegal weaponry and ammunition, the name stems from the Thompson submachine gun.

²⁵² MUP Serbia, Introduction of Operational Action "Tomson," 23 July 1991 (Y034-5948-Y034-5955). See also Tape Recording of Fifth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council, 7 August 1992 (0345-7047-0345-7088, at 0345-7061-0345-7065).

²⁵³ MUP Serbia, Introduction of Operational Action "Tomson," 23 July 1991 (Y034-5948-Y034-5955, at Y034-5948-Y034-5949).

prevent all activities related to the establishment and operation of any sort of armed and unarmed groups.”²⁵⁴

147. For these reasons, Minister Sokolović initiated the Operational Action (*Operativna akcija*, OA) Tomson. He established a staff consisting of the chief of the SDB (leader of the staff), the chief of the SJB and the chief of the Administration of the Police. The staff was tasked with the “disarming of all illegally armed individuals and groups and the preventing of the further illegal arming of groups and individuals and attempts to create paramilitary formations.”²⁵⁵ All organizational units of both the SDB and the SJB were to form special teams whose exclusive task it would be to work towards these goals. These teams were to cooperate with the JNA and the TO. Special attention was to be paid to Kosovo, Novi Pazar, Titovo Užice, Vojvodina and Belgrade, and to the movement of weapons and ammunition across the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to putting together a plan for the implementation of OA Tomson, participants were also to compile all relevant information about extremists and their activities and plans.
148. OA Tomson encompassed intensive and continuous monitoring, surveillance, documentation and other activities aimed at countering and preventing “the hostile activities of militant individuals and groups [which are] directed towards illegal paramilitary organization, including the registration of volunteers, the carrying out of some forms of training, attempts to gather weaponry, and similar activities.”²⁵⁶
149. On 27 May 1992, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs Radovan Stojičić answered a parliamentary question regarding the arrest of Dragoslav Bokan, the leader of the “White Eagles.”²⁵⁷ Bokan had been arrested in his apartment in Belgrade for the possession of illegal weapons. In responding to the parliamentary question, Stojičić explained the police’s procedures in such cases and noted that Bokan had allegedly brought the illegal weapons with him from “battlefields” near Okučani and Zvornik, and had given these weapons to other persons.
150. On 8 March 1995, the Fifth Administration of the RDB requested that the CRDBs prepare reports on the “results and further directions for operational work on OA ‘Tomson’.”²⁵⁸ The reports submitted by the CRDBs during the summer of 1995 provide very detailed information about the nature and extent of paramilitary activity throughout Serbia during the period from 1991 to 1995.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ MUP Serbia, Introduction of Operational Action “Tomson,” 23 July 1991 (Y034-5948-Y034-5955, at Y034-5949).

²⁵⁵ MUP Serbia, Introduction of Operational Action “Tomson,” 23 July 1991 (Y034-5948-Y034-5955, at Y034-5949).

²⁵⁶ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0575).

²⁵⁷ MUP Serbia RJB, Letter of Assistant Minister Radovan Stojičić, 27 May 1992 (0160-2990-0160-2992).

²⁵⁸ RDB Fifth Administration request referenced in CRDB Belgrade, Fifth Department, “Results and Further Directions for Operational Work on OA ‘Tomson’,” 19 July 1995 (0608-1316-0608-1316).

²⁵⁹ See also CRDB Zaječar, “Results and Further Directions of Operational Work on OA ‘Tomson,’” July 1995 (Y035-2882-Y035-2893); CRDB Gnjilane, “Results and Further Directions of Operational Work

151. The available documentation on paramilitary formations in Serbia focuses primarily on those established by nationalist political parties, including the SPO, the SRS and the SČP. In July 1995, the RDB Centre Valjevo remembered that the first paramilitary formations had emerged in 1991, "through volunteers or their inclusion in the organs of internal affairs and the territorial defence, [these formations] armed and trained themselves in handling firearms, and all with the goal of deployment to the war areas in the Republic of Croatia."²⁶⁰ The RDB described the persons involved in these paramilitary formations as "extremists." Upon returning back to Serbia from the battlefield, these persons often brought with them weapons and ammunition. Describing members of the SČP from Valjevo, the RDB noted that some of their members had "upon return from the battlefield in Eastern Slavonia ... shown a particular interest in warehouses of weaponry and military materiel in Valjevo and the surroundings, reconnoitred the manner of security, the strength of the units, the number and position of guard posts, the location of stores in the warehouses, etc."²⁶¹
152. The RDB viewed returning paramilitary formations as a security threat. In terms of the RDB's primary mission to protect the constitutionally established order of the Republic of Serbia, paramilitary formations associated with political parties posed a

on OA "Tomson," July 1995 (0608-1451-0608-1465); CRDB Leskovac, "Results and Further Directions of Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 10 July 1995 (0632-2102-0632-2106); CRDB Prizren, Fifth Administration, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 24 July 1995 (0608-1482-0608-1496); CRDB Novi Sad, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 24 July 1995 (Y035-2910-Y035-2935); CRDB Pančevo, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 26 July 1995 (Y035-2936-Y035-2956); CRDB Zrenjanin, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 26 July 1995 (Y035-2957-Y035-2965); CRDB Kraljevo, Fifth Administration, "Results and Further Directions of Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 31 July 1995 (Y034-5799-Y034-5809); CRDB Kragujevac, Fifth Administration, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 20 July 1995 (Y034-5810-Y034-5847); CRDB Smederevo, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 27 July 1995 (Y034-7550-Y034-7559); CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 2 August 1995 (Y034-5848-Y034-5864); CRDB Vranje, "Results and Further Directions of Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 4 August 1995 (Y036-7599-Y036-7603); CRDB Niš, "Results and Further Directions for Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 8 August 1995 (0608-1389-0608-1395); CRDB Subotica, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 30 August 1995 (Y034-9264-Y034-9278); CRDB Užice, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA "Tomson," 19 September 1995 (Y034-9745-Y034-9808); CRDB Novi Sad, "Activities of Militant Groups from the Position of Serb Extremism - SČO, Serb Guard, White Eagles, Ravna Gora Movement and Others (Contribution)," October 1995 (0632-2059-0632-2075).
²⁶⁰ RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4165).

²⁶¹ RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA "Tomson," 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4166).

potential threat to the official Serbian authorities. This was particularly the case for adherents of the SRS, "who have stressed that their party has not given up on the destabilization of the political-security situation and the forcible takeover of power in the Republic of Serbia."²⁶² Towns in Serbia such as Loznica, Valjevo and Šabac, which bordered or were proximate to eastern Bosnia, were of particular concern.²⁶³ Furthermore, given the ethnic diversity of areas of Serbia such as Kosovo, Vojvodina and the Sandžak, the risk also existed that these paramilitary formations would threaten ethnic minorities. There was even the risk that the more unscrupulous members of these paramilitary formations would sell the weapons and ammunition that they had smuggled into Serbia to ethnic Albanians who entertained thoughts of armed uprising or secession.²⁶⁴

153. In addition to regular communications, the RDB reported on OA Tomson in its annual report for 1992. Here it was noted that the individuals under surveillance in this operation included "numerous persons from criminal milieus, predisposed to physical attacks and intimidation of those with whom they disagree, disruption of public law and order, and even aggressive behaviour towards members of the organs of internal affairs."²⁶⁵
154. In the scope of OA Tomson, the RDB deployed its available operational means and methods. This included wiretapping and other forms of surveillance and electronic eavesdropping and the recruitment of informants.²⁶⁶ In addition, the police and the public prosecutor used repressive means to confiscate illegal weapons and ammunition and punish those engaged in illegal activities on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. In the context of OA Tomson, the RDB cooperated with the Public Security Department, the security organs of the VJ, judicial organs and other relevant state institutions.²⁶⁷
155. It must be emphasized that, although the war-torn areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were consistently identified as the primary source of illegal weaponry and ammunition, the RDB apparently made little effort within the context of OA Tomson to investigate any possible illegal activity perpetrated by Serb paramilitary formations outside the territory of the Republic of Serbia. In recounting the course of OA Tomson,

²⁶² RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA 'Tomson,'" 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4167-Y034-4168).

²⁶³ RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA 'Tomson,'" 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4168-Y034-4169).

²⁶⁴ RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA 'Tomson,'" 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4166-Y034-4167).

²⁶⁵ RSUP RDB, Report on the Work in 1992, February 1993 (0684-0570-0684-0593, at 0684-0575).

²⁶⁶ RDB Centre Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA 'Tomson,'" 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4177-Y034-4178).

²⁶⁷ CRDB Valjevo, Third Section, "Contribution to the Development of the Topic: 'Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA 'Tomson,'" 28 July 1995 (Y034-4165-Y034-4190, at Y034-4180).

CRDB Sremska Mitrovica observed that the paramilitary organizations under observation at the outset of the operational action in the summer of 1991 had “directed their activity (combat activities) towards the territory of the then Republic of Croatia (second half of 1991), now the RSK – Eastern Slavonia. The aforementioned paramilitary formations were composed of groups of persons of extreme behaviour whose numbers varied between 200 and 300 members.”²⁶⁸

156. The RDB did express strong dissatisfaction with the seeming reluctance of local prosecutorial authorities in Serbia to raise indictments against “Serb extremists.”
157. However, some documents pertaining to OA Tomson did include information on such alleged illegal activities. In July 1995, CRDB Belgrade noted that Vojin Vučković had in April 1992 through the SČP of the SRS founded the paramilitary formation “Igor Mirković” more commonly known as “the Yellow Wasps,” which had been particularly active in Zvornik municipality.²⁶⁹ The CRDB Belgrade expressed awareness that there existed information pointing to the commission by the “Yellow Wasps” of “war crimes against the civilian population” and looting. This led to the arrest in November 1993 of Vučković and his brother Dušan, who was nicknamed “Repić.”²⁷⁰ Weapons, ammunition and plastic explosives were also confiscated. The CRDB Belgrade interviewed both Vučković brothers, who confirmed that they had tortured, raped and killed Muslims in Zvornik. “According to his own statement, Dušan had back then ‘liquidated’ approximately 50 Muslims.”²⁷¹ This information led to indictments against the two brothers.
158. Employees of the Fourth Department of CRDB Belgrade at Obrenovac visited the RS from 20 to 22 October 1993 in order to gather information about the activities of

²⁶⁸ CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, “Contribution to the Development of the Topic: ‘Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on PO OA ‘Tomson,’” 2 August 1995 (Y034-5848-Y034-5864, at Y034-5848).

²⁶⁹ CRDB Belgrade, Fifth Department, “Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA ‘Tomson,’” 19 July 1995 (Y034-5764-Y034-5798, at Y034-5767-Y034-5768).

²⁷⁰ Statements of Vojin Vučković to officials of the MUP of Serbia, 4 and 5 November 1993 (0608-0985-0608-0987, Y034-9809-Y034-9810, Y034-9841-Y034-9844); Statement of Duško Vučković to officials of MUP Serbia, 4 November 1993 (Y034-5503-Y034-5513); Statement of Vojin Vučković to official of MUP Serbia, 4 November 1993 (Y036-7825-Y036-7830); CRDB Belgrade, Fourth Department, Obrenovac, Official Note Re: Activities of Vojin Vučković called Žuća, 4 November 1993 (Y034-5869-Y034-5874); CRDB Belgrade, Decision on Detention of Dušan Vučković “Repić,” 5 November 1993 (Y034-9837-Y037-9838); CRDB Belgrade, Decision on Detention of Vojin Vučković, 5 November 1993 (Y034-9839-Y037-9840); CRDB Valjevo, Criminal Complaint against Dušan Vučković and Vojin Vučković, 6 November 1993 (Y034-9925-Y034-9939); District Court in Šabac, Transcript of Interrogation of Accused, 8 November 1993 (0040-8552-0040-8558); CRDB Belgrade, Confirmation of Return of Items Temporarily Seized from Duško and Vojin Vučković, 10 November 1993 (Y034-9845-Y034-9849); District Court in Šabac, Indictment of Duško Vučković and Vojin Vučković, 28 April 1994 (0040-8511-0040-8516); District Court in Šabac, Judgement against Duško Vučković and Vojin Vučković, 8 July 1996 (0045-1331-0045-1351); Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bijeljina, Indictment against Vojin Vučković and Others, 13 September 1999 (0365-8190-0365-8202). See also CRDB Valjevo, Informational Report, 17 October 1993 (Y034-9896-Y034-9904).

²⁷¹ CRDB Belgrade, Fifth Department, “Results and Further Directions for the Operational Work on OA ‘Tomson,’” 19 July 1995 (Y034-5764-Y034-5798, at Y034-5768-Y034-5679).

paramilitary formations, in particular the Yellow Wasps. This information pointed to the conclusion that “in essence almost all of these formations engage more in criminal activity than in warfare. It seems that their basic impulse was the attainment of material goods and the acquisition of money, and least of all patriotism and the desire to assist the Serb nation in Bosnia.”²⁷²

159. At the seventh session of the VSO, the “activity of paramilitary political armies on the territory of Yugoslavia,” was included on the agenda.²⁷³ Colonel-General Života Panić stated at the outset of the meeting that this topic was under the purview of “MUP Yugoslavia, MUP Serbia and MUP Montenegro.”²⁷⁴ Thereafter, a discussion ensued between Slobodan Milošević and Dobrica Ćosić about the extent to which “political paramilitary groups,” i.e. those armed groups established by political parties in Serbia, were a problem or not. Radoje Kontić noted that there was no longer a “MUP Yugoslavia” (i.e. SSUP).²⁷⁵
160. At the eighth session of the VSO in March 1993, the security situation in the country and the “activity of party paramilitary formations” was discussed. However, the VSO was not satisfied with the information provided to it on this topic, and the SSUP was therefore asked to prepare new material in cooperation with MUP Serbia and MUP Montenegro.²⁷⁶ It is not clear whether this material was ever delivered.
161. At the tenth session of the VSO in July 1993, there was a discussion of paramilitary groups and their influence on the VJ. President Slobodan Milošević stated that the problem of paramilitary groups was a joint challenge for the police, the army, the government and for legislation. “We in Serbia have the possibility to prevent this; we have very strong police forces who can eliminate [paramilitary groups], but we must coordinate that completely.”²⁷⁷
162. In 1992 and 1993, paramilitary groups known as “the White Eagles” (*Beli orlovi*) and Milan Lukić and his paramilitary unit known as “the Avengers” (*Osvetnici*) were active on both the territory of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the territory of the SRJ.²⁷⁸ As such, these groups provide case studies in how the RDB dealt with Serb paramilitary units active in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁷² CRDB Belgrade, Fourth Department, Obrenovac, Official Note Re: Activities of Vojin Vučković called Žuča, 4 November 1993 (Y034-5869-Y034-5874, at Y034-5869).

²⁷³ Stenographic Notes of the Seventh Session of the VSO, 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7152).

²⁷⁴ Stenographic Notes of the Seventh Session of the VSO, 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7154).

²⁷⁵ Stenographic Notes of the Seventh Session of the VSO, 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7156).

²⁷⁶ Minutes of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0113-2411-0113-2413).

²⁷⁷ Stenographic Notes of the Tenth Session of the VSO, 5 July 1993 (0345-7277-0345-7340, at 0345-7338).

²⁷⁸ CRDB Užice, The Activity of Militant Groups from the Position of Serb Extremism – SČO, Serb Guard, White Eagles, Ravna Gora Movement and Others, 17 October 1995 (0641-4194-0641-4218, at 0641-4199-0641-4204).

163. The White Eagles were known to RDB already in April 1992, and were a concern to the RDB because of the group's aggressive intentions towards Muslims and towards police officers in Priboj.²⁷⁹ The White Eagles were thought to be linked to the political party SNO and to be in favour of "the most radical measures, including the physical liquidation of Muslims."²⁸⁰ By the beginning of June 1992, CRDB Užice had collected detailed information indicating that this group was involved in crimes including the killing – CRDB Užice used the word "slaughter" – of Muslim civilians in the Višegrad area.²⁸¹ Moreover, the group desired to "bring the fire of war also to parts of the SRJ where Muslims live."²⁸²

164. Lukić was subsequently interviewed several times by the MUP in Serbia.²⁸³ He stated that he and his group had undergone training at Ilok – at which point they were known as the "Obrenovac group." The training had been carried out by men known as "Pupe and Zoran, red berets – *knindže*." Thereafter Lukić's unit had departed for Višegrad, placing themselves under the command of SUP Višegrad and in the composition of the TO Višegrad.²⁸⁴ According to Lukić

With my unit I participated in all the most important military operations on the territory of Višegrad. This is a real ethnic war and I came to the battlefield with only one goal, to protect Serbs and Serbdom in those areas. Since the arrival of Vinko Pandurević, I am under his command in legal units of the RS. Through my personal example, I had quite an impression on the readiness of Serb fighters and I personally liquidated a large number of Muslims – extremists from the territory of Višegrad, about whom it was known that they had mistreated the Serb inhabitants. In confronting the Muslim fighters I am uncompromising and unlike the Serbs from Višegrad, when I came, I came ready to kill everyone who threatens Serbdom.²⁸⁵

165. Although Lukić left Višegrad in September, he returned there at the invitation of the local leadership, having gathered new volunteers in Zvornik, Šabac and Belgrade. Lukić denied having kidnapped Muslims from a bus in Sjeverin in October 1992 but said that he would congratulate whoever had done so.

166. On 2 November 1992, CRDB Užice filed a report on an interview of two sources who claimed that Lukić had been involved in the killing of Bosnian Muslims near Višegrad on 22 October 1992.²⁸⁶ The sources also reported about an altercation between President

²⁷⁹ CRDB Užice, Official Note, 23 April 1992 (0641-4145-0641-4146).

²⁸⁰ CRDB Užice, Official Note, 24 April 1992 (0641-4147-0641-4148).

²⁸¹ CRDB Užice, Official Notes, 4 June 1992 (0632-1460-0632-1461, 0641-4149-0641-4149 and 0641-4150-0641-4150); CRDB Užice Official Note, 11 June 1992 (0641-4151-0641-4151); CRDB Užice Official Note, 4 August 1992 (0641-4152-0641-4152); CRDB Užice Official Note, 24 August 1992 (0641-4153-0641-4154); CRDB Užice Official Notes, 27 August 1992 (0641-4155-0641-4155 and 0641-4156-0641-4158); CRDB Užice Official Notes, 5 October 1992 (0641-4159-0641-4159 and 0641-4160-0641-4161).

²⁸² CRDB Užice, Official Note, 4 June 1992 (0641-4149-0641-4149).

²⁸³ Statement of Milan Lukić, 27 October 1992 (Y034-9863-Y034-9870).

²⁸⁴ CRDB Užice, Official Note, 2 November 1992 (Y034-9871-Y034-9878, at Y034-9871).

²⁸⁵ CRDB Užice, Official Note, 2 November 1992 (0607-9118-0607-9121, at 0607-9119).

²⁸⁶ CRDB Užice, Official Note, 2 November 1992 (0607-9114-0607-9117). See also CRDB Užice, Official Note, 29 October 1992 (0607-9112-0607-9113); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 2 November 1992

Karadžić and the father of Milan Lukić, who had allegedly threatened to intervene with armed men to secure the release of his son.

167. In February 1993, CRDB Užice reported that a group of 30 armed men had stopped the train traveling between Belgrade and Bar and detained approximately 23 persons.²⁸⁷ Milan Lukić was thought to be behind this operation. Of those who were detained, the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina had been mobilized. Nothing was stated about the fate of the others.
168. At the eighth session of the VSO held on 12 March 1993, the incident at Štrpci was discussed. Momir Bulatović stated that the authorities had tried to pay a ransom for those people who had been kidnapped from the train.²⁸⁸ However, they had all been killed.
169. Bulatović then proceeded to state that the State Security Service of Montenegro had knowledge of Lukić's plans to kill someone, but Slobodan Milošević interrupted Bulatović. Milošević told the VSO that Lukić had been arrested, and "we will see how to proceed."²⁸⁹ Milošević said that Lukić's arrest was being kept secret because other similar actors were to be apprehended. Milošević called Lukić "a killer and a villain," but Bulatović expressed sympathy for Lukić, whom he called a "tragic personality." Bulatović then appeared to continue his earlier interrupted thought, noting that it would be a catastrophe if groups like the White Eagles would engage in violent behaviour in the Sandžak. "This is one of the most important elements of our state strategy, even more so as ideas are coming from the highest positions in Republika Srpska that we should in an organized manner enter into ethnic cleansing, which would be catastrophic."²⁹⁰ This was the second time at this meeting that Bulatović had mentioned that RS officials, including the president of the RS government, were recommending "that we ethnically cleanse the Sandžak and kill the Muslims there."²⁹¹

(0632-1391-0632-1394); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 18 November 1992 (0641-4164-0641-4165); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 2 December 1992 (0641-4166-0641-4166); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 14 December 1992 (0641-4167-0641-4168); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 17 December 1992 (0641-4169-0641-4171); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 8 February 1993 (0641-4172-0641-4173); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 22 February 1993 (0641-4174-0641-4175).

²⁸⁷ CRDB Užice, Official Notes, 4 March 1993 (Y034-9886-Y034-9890 and Y034-9891-Y034-9895).

²⁸⁸ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7221). See also CRDB Užice, Official Note, 3 March 1993 (0632-1395-0632-1395); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 5 March 1993 (0607-9122-0607-9123); CRDB Užice, Official Note, 8 April 1993 (0632-1404-0632-1405).

²⁸⁹ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7222).

²⁹⁰ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7222).

²⁹¹ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7210).

170. Milošević stated that this was new to him, and that “with such people we have nothing to discuss.”²⁹² Later at the meeting, Milošević also stated that the thought that the SRJ was only for Serbs and Montenegrins rather than all citizens was also a kind of “fascist ideology.”²⁹³
171. With respect to Lukić and similar paramilitaries, Dobrica Ćosić suggested that the relevant information be collected, and General Života Panić thought that the “MUP of Yugoslavia” (i.e. the SSUP) should do this.²⁹⁴
172. Generally speaking, the authorities seemed to be most concerned about weapons or ammunition that Lukić and his group – and similar paramilitary groups – might bring to Serbia from Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croatia. The other major point of concern was the possible threat posed to the government by these groups.
173. OA Tomson, initiated in July 1991, was not formally terminated until January 2006.²⁹⁵

IX. Particular Units of the State Security Service of MUP Serbia

A. Special Units of the MUP and/or JATD

174. In the early 1980s, owing to civil unrest in Kosovo, the SSUP had formed a special police unit consisting of personnel from throughout Yugoslavia. Some republican secretariats of internal affairs also featured special police units. Although the Serbian State Security Service had, like other state security services in Yugoslavia, engaged in “special operations,” which featured special operational teams – including outside the SFRJ – these cannot be compared to the type of units that came into existence in Serbia after the collapse of Yugoslavia.
175. The history and structure of the special police unit(s) of the Serbian SDB and RDB in the 1990s is clouded in obscurity. As will be seen in this and subsequent sections of the report, this is to a significant extent the deliberate result of conspiratorial steps taken to keep the existence and identity of such units confidential. The covert nature of these units was so extensive that even the Yugoslav military – the JNA, and later the VJ – appear not to have been briefed about the existence and nature of these units.
176. This section draws on the personnel files of employees of the special police unit(s) of MUP Serbia and other relevant documentation. Although for the most part only specific documents are cited here from these personnel files, these have been selected

²⁹² Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7222).

²⁹³ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7223).

²⁹⁴ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7222).

²⁹⁵ BIA, Cabinet of the Director, Decision on the Termination of the Operational Action “Tomson,” 17 January 2006 (0632-2021-0632-2022).

based on a review of the totality of the personnel files which the Serbian authorities have made available to the ICTY.

177. A reconstruction of the history of the special police unit(s) of the Serbian SDB and RDB must begin with the training that commenced in the spring of 1991 at Golubić near Knin in Croatia. The men who completed this training emerged as the nucleus not only of the future special forces of the SDB/RDB, but also in many cases themselves became trainers for other units in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including paramilitary units. In dating the beginning of this history, attention must be given to the speech which Franko SIMATOVIĆ held at the base of the JSO in Kula many years later. In welcoming Slobodan Milošević to Kula, SIMATOVIĆ stated that the JSO was established on 4 May 1991.²⁹⁶
178. At some point in the spring or early summer of 1991, a training camp for police forces was established at Golubić near Knin.²⁹⁷ The training at this camp was provided by a number of persons from outside the RSK, including Danijel Snedden (aka Dragan Vasiljković, Captain Dragan) and Franko SIMATOVIĆ affiliated with the State Security Service of Serbia.²⁹⁸ In the personnel file of one of the graduates of the Golubić training centre, Borjan Vučković, the unit trained at Golubić was referred to as the "Unit for Special Purposes of the RDB of MUP Serbia."²⁹⁹
179. The men trained at Golubić were colloquially referred to as "*knindže*," an amalgam of the toponym Knin and the term "ninja."³⁰⁰ At a press conference in August 1991, Milan Martić acknowledged the assistance of "Captain Dragan."³⁰¹ From this press conference, it emerged that the presence and activities of "Captain Dragan" in the SAO Krajina were a matter of contention between Martić and Milan Babić.

²⁹⁶ Speech of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 4 May 1997 (V000-3533-V000-3533).

²⁹⁷ List of first cohorts who completed training at Golubić, undated (0280-4323-0280-4328); Wartime Path of the Plaški Brigade, 1995 (0203-2603-0203-2619, at 0203-2604). In his autobiography, Davor Subotić states that he arrived at Golubić in April 1991. Autobiography of Davor Subotić, 14 February 1992 (0558-8935-0558-8935); autobiography of Davor Subotić, undated (0706-5697-0706-5697). JNA intelligence report, May-June 1991 (0218-9157-0218-9169, at 0218-9157). See also statement of Neđeljko Orlić regarding training allegedly conducted by "Frenki" and "Fićo" from 10 April to 5 May 1990. Orlić gave the statement in 1993 and likely meant to refer to 1991 instead of 1990. SUP Knin, Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 18 March 1993 (0400-4789-0400-4791).

²⁹⁸ Report of Danijel Snedden to "State Security Service," undated (0113-3710-0113-3712); letter from Dragan Vasiljković to the Secretary of the SUP, 27 May 1991 (0280-4583-0280-4584); order likely issued by Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 16 June 1991 (0113-3707-0113-3707); minutes of meeting attended by "Frenki," "Captain Dragan" and others regarding training at Golubić, 14 June 1991 (0113-3708-0113-3709); Informational Report on Daniel Snedden, alias "Captain Dragan," 28 August 1991 (0340-4983-0340-4985). On Captain Dragan, see also report of War Staff of Dvor Municipality, 23 July 1991 (0207-7616-0207-7616), minutes of meeting of War Staff of Dvor Municipality, 24 July 1991 (0207-7620-0207-7624), report of Radio Knin, 31 July 1991 (0113-3911-0113-3919); letter of Serbian Minister of Defence Marko Negovanović to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 20 January 1992 (0160-2986-0160-2986); note of Dragan Vasiljković, undated (0113-3713-0113-3713). See also (probably military) report on the training centre Alfa, undated (R042-0473-R042-0479).

²⁹⁹ Biography of Borjan Vučković, undated (0682-1876-0682-1876).

³⁰⁰ Report of Radio Knin, 31 July 1991 (0113-3911-0113-3919, at 0113-3914).

³⁰¹ "The Cease Fire Is a Sham," *Borba*, 14 August 1991 (0207-7675-0207-7675).

180. In both the case of the Golubić training centre and a separate training facility known as Šamarica, documents pertaining to these centres on some occasions identified these facilities as being under the auspices of the Republic of Serbia.³⁰²
181. During the summer of 1991, the special units and State Security Service of the SAO Krajina received material assistance from the MUP of Serbia. This included weapons,³⁰³ communications equipment as well as motor vehicles.³⁰⁴ Assistance was also provided in the form of training for the police of the SAO Krajina.³⁰⁵ Captain Dragan Vasiljković (aka Dani[j]el Snedden) was one of these trainers.³⁰⁶ It should be noted that Milan Babić publicly stated that Dragan had been brought to Krajina by Milan Martić, without the permission of Babić.³⁰⁷ Another individual from Serbia who played a significant role during this period with respect to the SAO Krajina police was Franko SIMATOVIĆ (aka Frenki). SIMATOVIĆ was involved in running the training centre for the police established at Golubić near Knin, and his role there appears to have been a leading one.³⁰⁸ SIMATOVIĆ was also included as a recipient on some documentation of the structures of the armed forces of the SAO Krajina.³⁰⁹
182. In October 1991, Dragan Vasiljković wrote to the command of the TO of the Republic of Serbia requesting to define his status with respect to his engagement at the training centre at Bubanj Potok in Belgrade.³¹⁰ In this letter, Vasiljković referred to his “obligation towards the State Security of the Republic of Serbia” and noted that his engagement with the TO would have to be in concordance with this obligation.
183. At some point between 31 July and 23 December 1991, Dragan Vasiljković met with the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Simović.³¹¹ The available

³⁰² See order likely issued by Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 16 June 1991 (0113-3707-0113-3707); Training Centre Šamarica, Overview, 10 August 1991 (0419-0150-0419-0150); Conclusions of Meeting at Training Centre Šamarica, 26 August 1991 (0217-0903-0217-0903) and Instructions for Further Work, undated (0400-5946-0400-5948).

³⁰³ Report, likely signed by Franko SIMATOVIĆ, approximately 28 July 1991 (0113-3706-0113-3706).

³⁰⁴ Statement of RSK TO Captain Milenko Sučević, 7 May 1992 (0281-1437-0281-1437). Some of this equipment was sent to the area of the SAO SBZS.

³⁰⁵ Interview with Milan Martić, *Politika*, 7 July 1991 (0364-6122-0364-6122).

³⁰⁶ “Primirje je lažno,” *Borba*, 14 August 1991 (0207-7675-0207-7675); note signed by Danijel Snedden, probably June 1991 (0113-3710-0113-3712).

³⁰⁷ Video of Belgrade press conference given by Milan Babić and Goran Hadžić, probably 31 October or 1 November 1991 (V000-2250-V000-2250).

³⁰⁸ Order likely issued by Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 16 June 1991 (0113-3707-0113-3707); minutes of meeting attended by “Frenki,” “Captain Dragan” and others regarding training at Golubić, 14 June 1991 (0113-3708-0113-3709); report of “Captain Dragan” from Glina, 19 July 1991 (0280-5122-0280-5122); report of Živojin Ivanović, 26 July 1991 (0419-2677-0419-2678); informational Report on Daniel Snedden, alias “Captain Dragan,” 28 August 1991 (0340-4983-0340-4985); USDB Belgrade, Letter, 3(?) April 19?? (Y034-9260-Y034-9263); USDB Belgrade, 3 April 1991 (Y035-2352-Y035-2354).

³⁰⁹ SAO Krajina TO Staff, 19 July 1991 (0280-6536-0280-6537).

³¹⁰ Letter of Dragan Vasiljković, 8 November 1991 (0290-5836-0290-5836).

³¹¹ Simović was minister of Serbia during this period. Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1996* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1996) and Nebojša Rodić and Ljubomir Iv. Jović, *Vlade Srbije, 1805-1998* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 1998) (0610-6424-0610-6431, at 0610-6427).

fragment of the notes of this meeting show that Simović and Vasiljković discussed the “Captain Dragan Fund,” a charity which Vasiljković had established. Vasiljković spoke of his background and stated that he had come back to Serbia at the invitation of the SDB. “He cooperated with STANIŠIĆ and Radmilo Bogdanović. He [i.e. Vasiljković] had the task to train volunteers and to work in cooperation with Martić and Babić.”³¹² Allegedly concerned because of the publicity that had been created around the persona of “Captain Dragan,” and the danger of exposing the role of the SDB, Vasiljković had returned from Knin to Bor in order to train new volunteers. However, this did not work out. Vasiljković had then gone to Baranja only to discover that Arkan was in charge there.

184. In a letter dated 8 November 1991, Minister Simović noted that he had spoken with “Dragan Vasiljković, the so-called Captain Dragan” regarding the lack of military conscripts for the JNA.³¹³ Simović felt certain that it was necessary to exploit the popularity of Vasiljković with respect to volunteers, and Simović had therefore decided to engage Vasiljković as a trainer at the training centre at Bubanj Potok. Simović noted, however, that a problem had arisen in that Vasiljković was being denied entry to the centre and asked that this be resolved.

185. It should be noted that prior to his arrival at Golubić near Knin, Dragan Vasiljković (aka Daniel Snedden) had been placed under electronic surveillance by a decision of Minister Bogdanović dated 3 April 1991.³¹⁴ This surveillance was carried out by the Second Department of USDB Belgrade, where Franko SIMATOVIĆ worked at the time. The surveillance report of 12 April 1991, which was signed by Dragan Filipović, noted Vasiljković’s contacts with, among others, Nikola Šainović of the Serbian government and a certain FNU Tepavčević. The report also included noted that Vasiljković was planning to return to “Krajina,” where he had earlier been, and that Šainović had facilitated a meeting between Vasiljković and the Minister of Internal Affairs Radmilo Bogdanović. Vasiljković had arrived in Yugoslavia at the end of October 1990, and the SDB of Serbia had been concerned about his contacts with the SPO, which was allegedly planning to forcibly remove Milošević from power.³¹⁵

186. On 13 April 1991, Franko SIMATOVIĆ, in his capacity as an operative in the Second Department of USDB Belgrade, filed an official note on contact with Dragan Vasiljković, aka Danijel Snedden.³¹⁶ SIMATOVIĆ stated that the reason for the meeting was to discuss the further engagement of Snedden based on a plan which had been presented to him at their previous meeting. SIMATOVIĆ reported that Vasiljković had “through his contacts analysed our needs,” which appeared to related to “light infantry weaponry for

³¹² Fragment of Note of Meeting between Minister of Defence of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Simović and Dragan Vasiljković, undated (0290-5948-0290-5949, at 0290-5949).

³¹³ Letter of Minister Tomislav Simović to Command of the First Military District, 8 November 1991 (Y034-7328-Y034-7331).

³¹⁴ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Report on the Results of Surveillance on Daniel Snedden, 12 April 1991 (0607-6090-0607-6100); MUP Serbia, Decision of Minister Bogdanović, 3 April 1991 (Y036-1588-Y036-1589).

³¹⁵ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Report on the Results of Surveillance on Daniel Snedden, 12 April 1991 (0607-6090-0607-6100, at 0607-6099-0607-6100).

³¹⁶ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Official Note, 13 April 1991 (Y037-0570-Y037-0574).

special purposes” that could be obtained from Israel.³¹⁷ SIMATOVIĆ reported that he had several times tried to provoke Vasiljković into providing information about weapons transports through Bosnia, but that he avoided this topic. SIMATOVIĆ believed that Vasiljković was linked with the intelligence services of Israel, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. SIMATOVIĆ suggested that Vasiljković could be secretly detained for interrogation about his contacts with foreign intelligence services, but noted that the leadership of both the Second Administration and of the SDB must first be consulted.

187. In mid-April 1991, Dragan Vasiljković discussed the smuggling of weapons through Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia.³¹⁸ From the context of the discussion, it was clear that he was adhering to a plan with tight deadlines and which would involve extensive work in the coming months.

188. On 15 August 1991, Minister Sokolović renewed the authorization for wiretapping of Dragan Vasiljković, citing his links to foreign intelligence services and the SPO.³¹⁹ A request for renewed wiretapping of Vasiljković was made in November 1991.³²⁰ This proposal recalled Vasiljković’s contacts with the SPO regarding among other things “the formation and arming of paramilitary formations, with the goal of their engagement in the resolution of political conflicts in the country.”³²¹ The proposal demonstrated awareness of Vasiljković’s involvement in armed conflict in Croatia, and suggested that the surveillance be permanent.

189. Along with Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Dragan Vasiljković was at a later date awarded a security poster in recognition of his service to the RSK.³²² As late as January 1993, Vasiljković brought “one thousand volunteers” to Knin.³²³ In 1994, SIMATOVIĆ put a Mercedes at the disposal of the Captain Dragan Fund.³²⁴ In 1996, SIMATOVIĆ helped Vasiljković to regulate a firearm.³²⁵

190. According to Franko SIMATOVIĆ, an aerial squadron was formed in May 1991 using improvised airfields for transportation of equipment and other purposes.³²⁶ He also stated that the unit transferred to Serbia in September 1991, where it was restructured and retrained before participating in combat in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.

³¹⁷ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Official Note, 13 April 1991 (Y037-0570-Y037-0574, at Y037-0570).

³¹⁸ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Report on the Results of Surveillance on Daniel Snedden, 15 April 1991 (Y034-7332-Y034-7350).

³¹⁹ MUP Serbia, Decision of Minister Sokolović, 15 August 1991 (Y034-4388-Y034-4390).

³²⁰ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Proposal for the Secret Control of Telephone Conversations, 6 November 1991 (Y034-9134-Y034-9137).

³²¹ USDB Belgrade, Second Department, Proposal for the Secret Control of Telephone Conversations, 6 November 1991 (Y034-9134-Y034-9137, at Y034-9134).

³²² List of Recipients of Security Poster, 5 July, no year listed (0414-2989-0414-2990).

³²³ Broadcast of Radio Belgrade, 25 January 1993 (Y035-2141-Y035-2141).

³²⁴ MUP Serbia, 17 October 1994 (0682-2271-0682-2271).

³²⁵ MUP Serbia RDB, Letter of Franko SIMATOVIĆ 30 January 1996 (0682-2270-0682-2270).

³²⁶ V003-3533 Transcript, p. 8.

191. On 28 February 1992, the chief of the SDB of MUP Serbia Jovica STANIŠIĆ wrote to the SDB Sector in Vranje requesting background checks on Stojan Stojanović and Dragan Đorđević. Both were candidates for the “Special Unit of MUP Serbia.”³²⁷ STANIŠIĆ did not provide a more specific name for the unit or describe its place in the overall organizational structure of MUP Serbia. However, the available documentation from Dragan Đorđević’s personnel dossier shows that he was admitted into the JPN, and that he had seen military action in Bapska in Eastern Slavonia.³²⁸ No date was given for his entry into the unit. However, in a subsequent document in his personnel dossier, Đorđević’s date of entry into the JPN was given as 5 October 1991 – an earlier date than the background check requested by STANIŠIĆ.³²⁹ Đorđević was identified as a deputy platoon commander. In a separate document also dated 14 February 1992, Đorđević was identified as the commander of the first rifle department of the JPN.³³⁰ On 23 February 1992 asked to be included in the active composition of the JPN.³³¹
192. Mile Majstorović joined “the unit” through the Captain Dragan Fund on 18 January 1992.³³² By March he had learned that the unit was called the “Unit for Special Purposes” of MUP Serbia. Majstorović emphasized that he had joined the unit for nationalist reasons and that he would not under any circumstances participate in actions against other Serbs. He stated that he felt that he had been deceived into joining the unit.
193. Likewise, Dragan Oluić, who trained at Golubić in May 1991 subsequently entered the JPN of the RSK MUP.³³³ As a JPN member, Oluić saw combat at Ljubovo, Plitvice, Glina, Kostajnica, Northern Dalmatia, Bapska and Šaregrad (Pajzoš). In 1992, he fought in the area of Višegrad and Žepa. On 21 April 1992, Oluić applied for admission into the JPN of MUP Serbia.³³⁴ However, in his request for admission, Oluić noted that he had already been in the unit since 28 May 1991. This date corresponds approximately to the completion of his training at Golubić.
194. Similarly, in his autobiography, Davor Subotić stated that Golubić was the place where the Unit for Special Purposes (*Jedinica za posebne namene*, JPN) of “the RSK” was established.³³⁵ After completing training, Subotić participated in combat “throughout the RSK,” before then transferring for further training to the camp Ležimir at Fruška Gora in Vojvodina, Serbia. Thereafter, corroborating the aforementioned chronology of SIMATOVIĆ, Subotić participated in combat in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia before then transferring to Mount Ozren in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he fought in

³²⁷ MUP Serbia SDB, Letter of Chief of SDB Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 28 February 1992 (0613-1591-0613-1591). See also MUP Serbia SDB, Letters of Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 28 February 1992 (0608-8394-0608-8394, 0706-5699-0706-5699, 0706-5864-0706-5864, 0706-5745-0706-5745, 0682-2318-0682-2318).

³²⁸ MUP Serbia, JPN, Personnel Form for Member of the JPN for Dragan Đorđević, undated (0613-1596-0613-1596).

³²⁹ MUP Serbia, JPN, Autobiography of Dragan Đorđević, 14 February 1992 (0613-1603-0613-1603).

³³⁰ MUP Serbia, JPN, Information about Dragan Đorđević, 14 February 1992 (0613-1605-0613-1605).

³³¹ MUP Serbia, JPN, Request of Dragan Đorđević, 23 February 1992 (0613-1608-0613-1608).

³³² Statement of Mile Majstorović, 7 March 1992 (0558-8226-0558-8226).

³³³ Autobiography of Dragan Oluić, undated (0558-8502-0558-8502).

³³⁴ MUP Serbia, JPN, Request of Dragan Oluić, 21 April 1992 (0558-8509-0558-8509).

³³⁵ Autobiography of Davor Subotić, undated (0706-5697-0706-5697).

the “corridor” operation at Doboj, Bosanski Šamac and the surrounding area. As of January 1993, Subotić was deployed in operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina near Višegrad and Žepa.

195. An undated document found in several personnel dossiers lists 55 persons who possessed identification cards from the MUP of Krajina. This list includes numerous names of persons who from the spring of 1991 onwards were members of the various units operated by MUP Serbia in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.³³⁶
196. As of December 1991, MUP Serbia had a special police unit at Ležimir, encompassing a number of those who had trained at Golubić, and with Živojin Ivanović listed as their commander.³³⁷ The unit’s existence was still conspirative, and the regular police in the vicinity were not informed about it. Hence, when several of the unit’s member were involved in an accident involving a landmine at IKM Pajzoš near Ilok, Ivanović had difficulties with the police until he mentioned the name of Jovica STANIŠIĆ – whom Ivanović identified incorrectly as the republican secretary of internal affairs.³³⁸
197. The autobiographies of members such as Davor Subotić and Dragan Oluić point to the conclusion that the JPN of the SAO Krajina or RSK MUP, respectively, was either a

³³⁶ List of Personnel Who Possess Identification Cards of the MUP of Krajina, undated (0706-4888-0706-4889). Of the personnel listed in this document, MUP Serbia personnel files or individual MUP Serbia personnel documents are available for Živojin Ivanović (0609-0281-0609-0281), Radojica Božović (0609-0174-0609-0174), Vasilije Mijović (0609-0292-0609-03332), Borislav Kovačević (0681-9393-0681-9410), Dragiša Grujić (0706-4930-0706-4981), Budimir Zečević (0706-5853-0706-5887), Perica Zbućnović (0682-2322-0682-2349), Željko Pavkov (0613-6621-0613-6621), Milenko Popović (0706-5526-0706-5556), Davor Subotić (0706-5693-0706-5726), Nedeljko Drača (0681-8694-0681-8708), Željko Đokić (0704-3919-0704-3928), Vinko Kočić (0704-1569-0704-1574), Branko Pavlović (0682-0818-0682-0833), Svetozar Radić (0682-1374-0682-1391), Gojko Živković (0682-2364-0682-2386), Bogdan Santrač (0682-2073-0682-2092), Milan Barać (0681-8575-0681-8585), Nikola Pilipović (0706-5491-0706-5525), Aleksandar Uzur (0682-2237-0682-2250), Stanko Orlandić (0682-0775-0682-0797), Mile Pajić (0682-0798-0682-0808), Radivoje Soldo (0558-8906-0558-8910), Veselin Mićević (0704-2323-0704-2325), Goran Skočajić (0704-3294-0704-3295), Miloš Jeličić (0704-1247-0704-1261), Predrag Kovačević (0704-1698-0704-1723), Vukašin Ivanović (0681-9818-0681-9821), Jovan Kujundžić (0706-5103-0706-5117), Miodrag Milić (Y036-2090-Y036-2091), Raško Milić (Y036-2092-Y036-2093), Stojan Stojanović (0608-8393-0608-8403), Milan Obradović (0704-2652-0704-2660), Ljubomir Obradović (0704-2627-0704-2651), Gavra Malivuk (0682-0376-0682-0383), Đuro (Đurica?) Banjac (0706-4859-0706-4903), Vojislav Letić (0558-8208-0558-8209), Dragan Zirojević (0682-2350-0682-2352), Dimitrije Lazić (0609-6619-0609-6667).

³³⁷ Order of Commander Živojin Ivanović, 19 December 1991 (0682-1879-06820-1879). See also autobiography of Zoran Raić, October 1992 (0608-8232-0608-8232).

³³⁸ Ivanović also mentioned “Frenki,” but was surprised to hear that the police official with whom Ivanović was talking did not know “Frenki.” Report of Commander Živojin Ivanović, 19 December 1991 (0682-1897-0682-1900, at 0682-0682-1900). See also MUP Serbia RDB, JATD, Report on Activities Undertaken on the Territory of the RSK – MZ Ilok in the Period from 15 to 30 January 1994 (0682-1467, 0682-1482-0682-1482, at 0682-1482).

unit of MUP Serbia unit since its inception or became so by February 1992, when most or all of the members of the unit committed short autobiographies to paper.³³⁹

198. Further indicating the affiliation of the JPN with MUP Serbia, it can be seen that on 6 March 1992, Živojin Ivanović asked to be accepted into this unit.³⁴⁰ A separate document from 1997 signed by Dragoslav Krsmanović certified that Živojin Ivanović had been “engaged in carrying out certain affairs and tasks since 1 June 1991.”³⁴¹
199. At the fifth session of the Supreme Defence Council on 7 August 1992, the federal minister of internal affairs Pavle Bulatović stated that he had shown Minister Sokolović two faxes which mentioned Tikveš and Ilok and “some commander Crnogorac – Živojin Ivanović, as the commander of a unit of special purposes... He is signing as the commander of some special unit, he has a stamp; he gives himself the authority that his orders have to be obeyed. I asked Minister Sokolović whether he knows who that is; he said that he had never heard of him, but probably those people have crossed with that permit through Montenegro.”³⁴²
200. According to a document from the VRS, Ranko Laičević of the JPN of MUP Serbia was present in the area of Skelani and Bratunac from at least mid-February until the end of May 1993 as an instructor of special units of the VRS.³⁴³ On 18 June 1993, Vasilije Mijović, acting in his capacity as the commander of the JPN of MUP Serbia, ordered Momir Filipović from Bratunac to be deployed to the JPN at Bratunac.³⁴⁴ Mijović’s order was affixed with the stamp of the JPN, which depicted a snarling wolf below the Serb national logo.
201. By the spring of 1993, the JPN of MUP Serbia had established a camp at Mt. Tara in western Serbia. The camp was under the command of Zvezdan Jovanović and Radojica Božović.³⁴⁵ On 13 February 1993, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of RJB Serbia Radovan Stojičić sent PJM members to Tara for combat training with the

³³⁹ In addition to those already cited, see the autobiographies of Slobodan Majstorović, undated (0704-2163-0704-2163); Dragan Đorđević 14 February 1992 (0613-1603-0613-1603) and 23 February 1992 (0613-1606-0613-1606); Dragiša Grujić, 14 February 1992 (0558-7976-0558-7976); Nikola Pilipović, 13 January 1992 (0706-5496-0706-5496), 14 February 1992 (0706-5495-0706-5495), 25 February 1992 (0706-5521-0706-5521), undated (0706-5525-0706-5525) and 4 December 1993 (0706-5505-0706-5506); Ilija Vučković, 13 February 1992 (0706-5850-0706-5850).

³⁴⁰ MUP Serbia, JPN, Request of Živojin Ivanović, 6 March 1992 (0609-0286-0609-0286).

³⁴¹ MUP Serbia, Certification, 27 October 1997 (0609-0282-0609-0282).

³⁴² Tape Recording of Fifth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council, 7 August 1992 (0345-7047-0345-7088, at 0345-7068-0345-7069).

³⁴³ Command of the First Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, Certificate, 27 May 1993 (0067-1843-0067-1843). See also the statement of Miomir Popović, 11 August 1999 (0706-5590-0706-5591).

³⁴⁴ MUP Serbia, JPN, Order of Commander Vasilije Mijović, 18 June 1993 (0067-1845-0067-1845). See also Command of Bratunac Military Police, Daily Report, 23 February 1993 (0132-2095-0132-2096); Daily Reports of the Commander of the Special Unit of the RS, 25 February 1993 and 6 March 1993 (0178-0057-0178-0058; 0178-0071-0178-0071).

³⁴⁵ Statement of Miomir Popović, 11 August 1999 (0706-5590-0706-5591, at 0706-5591).

instructors based there.³⁴⁶ Bosnian Serbs also received combat training at Tara before returning to participate in combat operations in their home areas.³⁴⁷

202. A list of per diems paid to JPN members in August and September 1993 includes several persons who were in the JPN of the SAO Krajina (and MUP Serbia) in July 1991.³⁴⁸
203. In the summer of 1993, the special unit(s) of MUP Serbia appear to have undergone a transformation and formalization. This development involved the establishment of a Unit for Anti-Terrorist Actions (*Jedinica za antiteroristička dejstva*, JATD). According to the available documentation on the personnel of the special units of MUP Serbia, the JATD existed at least since Minister Zoran Sokolović signed a document on the systematization of work tasks in the JATD on 4 August 1993.³⁴⁹ Elsewhere, this document is referred to as a decision establishing the JATD.³⁵⁰ The original ministerial decision has never been provided to the ICTY.³⁵¹
204. As mentioned above, those persons who had undergone training at Golubić in 1991 and had seen combat with the unit in the summer, autumn, and winter of 1991 had to apply to join the JPN at Ležimir in February 1992. Similarly, the process of creating the JATD involved a series of application and vetting procedures. A review of the available personnel files shows that even those people who had been in the unit since the very beginning were subjected to background checks. Yet even as they applied for membership in the JATD, they referred to already being in the unit, just as they had done when applying for membership in the JPN. On 16 August 1993, Dragoslav Krsmanović, identified as the “commander of the Centre,” and writing on behalf of the JATD, wrote to the Eighth Administration of the RDB asking for background checks to be carried out for 31 persons for the active and reserve staff of the unit.³⁵² The signature of Krsmanović was still affixed with the seal of the JPN, which bore a striking similarity to the seal of the JATD, and later the seal of the JSO. On 1 September 1993, Krsmanović wrote to the deputy chief of the

³⁴⁶ MUP Serbia RJB, Letter of Radovan Stojičić, 13 February 1993 (0613-3783-0613-3783).

³⁴⁷ Autobiography of Dragutin Stanojević, 10 December 1993 (0608-8299-0608-8299).

³⁴⁸ MUP Serbia, JPN, Overview of Per Diems, 21 August to 10 September 1993(?) (0632-8426-0632-8436).

³⁴⁹ Personnel document for Radojica Božović, citing ministerial decision DT 01-2497/93 of 4 August 1993, undated (0609-0181-0609-0181); personnel document for Zoran Raić, citing same decision, undated (0643-5232-0643-5232); personnel document for Dejan Slišković, 23 May 1994 (0675-1983-0675-1983). See also, BIA, Report of the Commission for the Determination of the Circumstances Connected to the Documentation Sought with the Request of the Prosecutor of the ICTY Number 1691, February 2009 (0648-8998-0648-9036).

³⁵⁰ MUP Serbia RDB, Eighth Administration, Decision, 17 January 1994 (0609-6868-0609-6868).


³⁵¹ See MUP Serbia and BIA, Report of the Commission for the Clarification of the Circumstances Related to the Documentation Sought by the Request of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY Number 1691, February 2009 (0648-8993-0648-9492, at 0648-9022-0648-9028).

³⁵² MUP Serbia, JATD, Letters of Dragoslav Krsmanović to the Eighth Administration of the RDB, 16 August 1993 (0608-7844-0608-7746 and 0609-6970-0609-6972); MUP Serbia, JATD, 19 August 1993 (0682-1875-0682-1875).

RDB proposing four members of the “special police of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia” as trainers for the JATD.³⁵³



From left to right: The stamp of the JPN (0682-1875), the stamp of the JATD (0634-5809), and the stamp of the JSO (0295-0235).



The letterhead of the JPN on a personnel form (0704-3919)

205. Years later, at the Kula awards ceremony in May 1997, Franko SIMATOVIĆ stood before a large metal map of the former Yugoslavia onto which were affixed metal images of wolves at those locations where “the unit” had been active.

³⁵³ MUP Serbia RDB, JATD, Letter of Dragoslav Krsmanović to the Deputy Chief of the RDB, 1 September 1993 (0609-6086-0609-6086).



This map appears in V000-3533 at approximately 20:42.

206. Radojica Božović was one of the 31 persons listed in the aforementioned document. Another, undated, document proposing the employment of Božović identifies Milan Radonjić as the Deputy Commander of the JATD.³⁵⁴ Milan Radonjić had in December 1990 been appointed as an inspector in the Fourth Department of USDB Belgrade.³⁵⁵
207. Although information about the JATD is sparse, a number of lists with overviews of per diem payments made to members of the JATD are available.³⁵⁶ The earliest of these,

³⁵⁴ Personnel document for Radojica Božović, citing ministerial decision DT 01-2497/93 of 4 August 1993, undated (0609-0181-0609-0181); see also MUP Serbia RDB, Letter, 28 October 1994 (0608-7828-0608-7829).

³⁵⁵ RSUP Serbia, Administration for Personnel and Employment Affairs, 23 January 1991 (0637-6911-0637-6911).

³⁵⁶ JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 16 January 1994 (0634-5808-0634-5818); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 17 to 31 January 1994 (0634-5788-0634-5799); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 15 to 30 June 1994 (0634-6260-0634-6273); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 July 1994 (0634-6201-0634-6213); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 31 August 1994 (0634-6174-0634-6186); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 September 1994 (0634-6142-0634-6157); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 September 1994 (0634-6124-0634-6137); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 September 1994 (0634-6124-0634-6137); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 October 1994 (0634-6094-0634-6107); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 October 1994 (0634-6062-0634-6079); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 November 1994 (0634-6020-0634-6038); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 November 1994 (0634-5992-0634-6010); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 16 December 1994 (0634-5950-0634-5974); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 19 to 31 December 1994 (0634-5919-0634-5942); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 January 1995 (0633-2618-0633-2640); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 January 1995 (0633-2583-0633-2604); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 February 1995 (0633-2531-0633-2551); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 28 February 1995 (0633-2496-0633-2513); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 March 1995 (0633-2466-0633-2482); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 March 1995 (0633-2445-0633-2461); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 April to 15 April 1995 (0633-2409-0633-2425); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 April 1995 (0633-2384-0633-2401); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 May to 15 May 1995 (0632-6836-0632-6857); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31

covering the period from 1 to 16 January 1994, are affixed with the stamp of the JATD.³⁵⁷ This stamp, which depicted a snarling wolf below the Serb national logo, shows that the JATD belonged organizationally to the RDB of MUP Serbia. The first page of the list is signed by Milan Radonjić, who is identified as the Deputy Commander of the JATD.

208. The JATD was therefore not established from scratch. In the personnel dossier of Vasilije Mijović, in a questionnaire dated 11 December 1995, Mijović stated that he had served in the JATD since 1991.³⁵⁸ Similarly, in an undated request for transfer to the RJB, JATD member Bogoslav Janjatović stated that he had served in the JATD “formally” since 1 June 1994. However, he also stated that he had been “informally in the JATD since 1991, when I from the place where I was born, Otočac, Republic of Croatia, went to battle for the freedom of the Serb nation. I have participated in all battles which the JATD has fought since 1991.”³⁵⁹ Janjatović also participated in the training led by Dragan Vasiljković at Golubić in the summer of 1991.³⁶⁰ In another document, Janjatović specified that he had after completion of the training at Golubić joined the “Unit of the Police” commanded by Predrag Baklajić and had on 12 February 1992 joined the JPN of MUP Serbia.³⁶¹ Hence Janjatović conflated the JPN and the JATD.

209. It therefore appears very probable that the establishment of the JATD merely formalized the existence of an already existing unit, and bestowed upon this unit a new name.

210. 1991 was an important marker for the identity of the JATD as a unit. This was illustrated by the existence of a “commemorative token 1991,” awarded “for participation

May 1995 (0632-6811-0632-6835); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 June 1995 (0632-6786-0632-6809); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 June 1995 (0632-6759-0632-6785); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 July 1995 (0632-6890-0632-6910); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 July 1995 (0632-6862-0632-6889); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 August 1995 (0633-3090-0633-3119); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 August 1995 (0633-3059-0633-3089); JATD, List of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 September 1995 (0633-2985-0633-3023); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 September 1995 (0633-2930-0633-2976); JATD, Overview of the Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 October 1995 (0633-2822-0633-2902); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 October 1995 (0633-2748-0633-2815); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 November 1995 (0633-2647-0633-2720); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 30 November 1995 (0633-3313-0633-3384); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 15 December 1995 (0633-3240-0633-3307); JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 16 to 31 December 1995 (0633-3186-0633-3226).

³⁵⁷ JATD, Overview of Per Diem Payments for the Period from 1 to 16 January 1994 (0634-5808-0634-5818).

³⁵⁸ Questionnaire for Vasilije Mijović, 11 December 1995 (0609-0313-0609-0319, at 0609-0313).

³⁵⁹ Request of JATD Member Bogoslav Janjatović, undated (0706-5012-0706-5012). This document was initialled by Franko SIMATOVIĆ.

³⁶⁰ RSK MUP, RDB Second Administration, Background Check, 21 July 1995 (0558-8043-0558-8077).

³⁶¹ Autobiography of Bogoslav Janjatović, undated (0706-5017-0706-5017).

in the defence of the Serb nation.”³⁶² The template certificate for the commemorative token provided spaces for the signatures of Jovica STANIŠIĆ as the Chief of the RDB and for Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Special Advisor to the Chief of the RDB, a position to which SIMATOVIĆ had advanced in May 1993.³⁶³

211. Not all members of the JATD had served together since 1991. Numerous members joined the unit at later points. Some of these members arrived from other units, including paramilitary units. Dragutin Stanojević, who hailed from Srebrenica, had belonged to both the “Drina Wolves” (*Drinski vukovi*) and a RS MUP special police unit prior to joining the JATD.³⁶⁴
212. The hypothesis that the JPN, the JATD and the JSO were one and the same unit is also significantly strengthened by statements made by participants at a ceremony that took place at the Kula base of the JSO in 1997.³⁶⁵ Both Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Franko SIMATOVIĆ were present at this ceremony, which was also attended by President Slobodan Milošević.
213. At the Kula ceremony, Milošević greeted veterans of the unit. Milošević stated to Colonel Radojica Božović that Milošević had read some of the reports which Božović had written.³⁶⁶
214. In his speech in front of President Milošević, SIMATOVIĆ stated that the “Unit for Special Operations of the State Security Service” had been formed on 4 May 1991.³⁶⁷ The unit had been active on the entire area inhabited by the Serb nation, which had faced an existential threat. SIMATOVIĆ further recounted that the unit had suffered 47 dead and 270 wounded members in 50 different locations.³⁶⁸ Specifically, SIMATOVIĆ referred to combat engagements from 12 October 1991 at Benkovac, Stari Gospić, Plitvice, Glina, Kostajnica in support of the “liberation of all regions of Republika Srpska Krajina. In these battles about 5,000 fighters were engaged, whose actions were coordinated by the command of the unit and the intelligence team of the Second Administration.”³⁶⁹ SIMATOVIĆ stated that an aerial-helicopter squadron had been formed in May 1991. In September 1991, a portion of the unit was sent to Serbia for restructuring and training, after which they participated in operations in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western

³⁶² RDB, JATD, Certificate for the Awarding of the Commemorative Token 1991, undated (0214-1335-0214-1335).

³⁶³ Decision on the Qualification of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 12 May 1993 (0608-1592-0608-1592); Article 7, Number 1 in the Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the RDB in the MUP, 8 April 1992 (0606-0310-0606-0351, at 0606-0313); Decision on the Confirmation of the Salary of Franko SIMATOVIĆ as Senior Inspector, 12 May 1993 (0608-1592-0608-1592).

³⁶⁴ Dragan Kijac, RDB, RS MUP, to MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, 8 March 1994 (0608-8296-0608-8296). See also MUP Serbia, RDB, JATD, Confirmation of Use of Leave of JATD Member, 25 December 1993 (0608-8298-0608-8298).

³⁶⁵ Video of Kula Ceremony (V003-3533). See also MUP Serbia RDB JSO, Informational Report, 5 June 1997 (0609-0297-0609-0299).

³⁶⁶ V003-3533 Transcript, 3.

³⁶⁷ V003-3533 Transcript, 7.

³⁶⁸ V003-3533 Transcript, 7.

³⁶⁹ V003-3533 Transcript, 8.

Syrmia. SIMATOVIĆ stated that the unit had established 26 training camps for special police in the RS and in the RSK.

215. From a proposal sent to Milan Radonjić on 19 September 1994, it can be inferred that the JATD encompassed combat groups (*borbene grupe*) and also a reconnaissance section.³⁷⁰
216. In the fragment of a report that appears to stem from 1996 or later, VJ intelligence or security officials treated the origins of the JSO.³⁷¹ According to the intelligence gathered by the VJ, “the special unit of the RDB ‘the Wolves,’ which is under the direct command of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, called ‘Frenki,’ now the chief of the intelligence administration of the RDB of the Republic of Serbia, represents the core of this unit. This unit was engaged on the areas of the RSK and the RS since the beginning of the war. In [the unit] are also a number of very problematic persons, killers, plunderers [*pljačkaši*] and ones inclined to terrorism.”³⁷²
217. A separate VJ report provided an overview of the paramilitary unit of Slobodan Medić “Boca,” the SDG of Željko Ražnatović “Arkan”, the unit of Vasilije Mijović and the “Red Berets” commanded by Žika Ivanović “Crnogorac.”³⁷³ In addition to participating in combat activities, these units had been involved in war profiteering, with the exploitation of forests and petroleum specifically among those activities mentioned.³⁷⁴
218. Medić’s unit was described as numbering between 150 and 200 members. The unit was particularly active on the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia.³⁷⁵
219. The SDG was described as numbering up to 100 members, and as having been based at Erdut “since the beginning of the war.”³⁷⁶ “Arkan is linked to MUP Serbia, which is testified to among other things the fact that some individual members of the unit possessed official IDs (attached).”³⁷⁷

³⁷⁰ JATD, Proposal for the Punishment of a Member of the JATD, 19 September 1994 (0609-6067-0609-6067).

³⁷¹ VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated (0214-1322-0214-1334). Appended to this document is a list of members of the JSO marked “Kula,” as well as several lists of commendations awarded

³⁷² VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated, probably 1996 (0214-1322-0214-1334, at 0214-1322).

³⁷³ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated, probably 1996 (0214-1319-0214-1321).

³⁷⁴ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1319).

³⁷⁵ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1319). See also SVK Communication of 6 January 1995, which states that President Milan Martić had visited the base of Medić’s unit at Đeletovci, and that the unit numbered approximately 200 members. Accusations that this unit included “thieves, smugglers and profiteers” were redacted from another SVK report. SVK Communication, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4252).

³⁷⁶ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320).

³⁷⁷ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320). The attachment is missing from this document.

220. The unit of Vasilije Mijović, with about 300 members, was described as being “officially a special unit of the MUP, directly linked to the MUP (RDB) of the Republic of Serbia. However, based on its activities in Baranja (smuggling, killings, looting [*pljačka*], rapes, threats and blackmail, etc.) it has all the markers of a paramilitary unit.”³⁷⁸
221. No number of members was provided for the Red Berets commanded by Žika Ivanović. This formation was said to have belong to the RDB and to have been engaged in the RSK and the RS (including Skelani) “since the beginning of the war.”³⁷⁹ Like Mijović’s unit, the Red Berets no longer officially existed, and most of its former members had instead been entered “other paramilitary units and special units of the MUP (RDB) of the Republic of Serbia.”³⁸⁰ Others were engaged in “extreme groups” or in “business.”³⁸¹ These groups and individuals were assessed to be a potential terrorist threat.
222. The VJ assessed that most of the members of the aforementioned units would not join the JSO, but would instead be available as freelancers to carry out “special operations” for their “sponsors in the RDB and in the MUP and outside of these structures.”³⁸² These “special operations” would likely include criminal activities such as racketeering, smuggling, and “liquidations of undesirable witnesses.”³⁸³ It was also expected that (former) members of these units would engage in various combinations of legal or illegal “business” such as private security companies and detective agencies. In part, such operations were designed to solicit funds – either voluntarily or forcibly (*milom ili silom*) from companies in Serbia. Links were also mentioned to the smuggling of narcotics, where indications pointed to both Mihalj Kertes and Jovica STANIŠIĆ.³⁸⁴ A separate report of July 1992, from the CRDB Novi Sad, noted that there was dissatisfaction in Vukovar and Eastern Slavonia. In the eyes of some people, Kertes and others were responsible for this, and Hadžić and the members of the government were “Serb spies, and they are paid by the UDB [i.e. by Serbian State Security], and they should be removed quickly.”³⁸⁵
223. In April 1993, Mihalj Kertes introduced himself to the controversial banker Dafina Milanović as “the chief of paramilitary formations,” claiming that he had over 30,000 armed men who were ready to do “anything.”³⁸⁶
224. The VJ observed that numerous awards had been bestowed upon many individuals at ceremonies held at the Centre for Anti-Terrorist Activities at Kula on 4 and

³⁷⁸ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320).

³⁷⁹ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320).

³⁸⁰ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320).

³⁸¹ VJ, Information on Paramilitary Units, undated (0214-1319-0214-1321, at 0214-1320).

³⁸² VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated (0214-1322-0214-1334, at 0214-1323).

³⁸³ VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated (0214-1322-0214-1334, at 0214-1323).

³⁸⁴ VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated (0214-1322-0214-1334, at 0214-1324).

³⁸⁵ CRDB Novi Sad, Informational Report, 25 July 1992 (0608-4144-0608-4147, at 0608-4146). See also CRDB Novi Sad, Informational Report, 7 June 1993 (0608-4532-0608-4537).

³⁸⁶ CRDB Belgrade, Fifth Department, Informational Report, 1 April 1993 (0608-4232-0608-4238, at 0608-4237).

13 May 1996 marking the establishment of the JSO.³⁸⁷ President Milošević was among the recipients.

225. According to unit member Željko Mandić, in June 1995, a training centre known as “Sova” (Owl) existed near Knin.³⁸⁸
226. At some point in 1995 or 1996, a portion of the JATD seems to have established a detachment called “Poskok” (Viper).³⁸⁹ As of March 1996, Miloš Opačić was proposed as the commander of this detachment in a document sent to Franko SIMATOVIĆ.³⁹⁰ A significant number of members of the unit have documentation in their personnel files showing that they were at some point issued with uniforms for the Poskok detachment. These uniforms included red berets with a Poskok badge. The detachment seems to have been active in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania after the defeat of the RSK in August 1995.³⁹¹
227. Although the JSO was officially established only in 1996, it represented a transformation of the previously existing “unit” rather than a new entity. This was reflected in the personnel documentation produced by the JSO. Hence, although JPN member Predrag Baklaić had been killed in 1993, a document in his personnel file describes him as a “member of the reserve staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia – the Unit of Special Operations.”³⁹² Similarly, in 2001, Slobodan Majstorović, who had trained at Golubić in 1991 and served with “the unit” ever since, was certified by Major Duško Maričić, the commander of the JSO, as having been “engaged in certain affairs and tasks in the Unit for Special Operations from 4 May 1991 until 30 May 2001.”³⁹³

B. Željko Ražnatović “Arkan” and the Serb Volunteer Guard

228. Throughout the existence of the RSK and until the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania into Croatia, Željko Ražnatović “Arkan” and his men maintained a presence in Erdut at the Centre for Special Training.³⁹⁴ Goran Hadžić had in

³⁸⁷ VJ, Information on the Formation of the JSO of the RDB of Serbia and Other Information Relevant to Security, undated (0214-1322-0214-1334, at 0214-1327).

³⁸⁸ Autobiography of Željko Mandić, 26 January 2000 (0608-8062-0608-8063).

³⁸⁹ MUP Serbia RDB, JATD, Centre Lipovica, Statement of Boban Bandić, 7 March 1996 (0681-9039-0681-9039).

³⁹⁰ MUP Serbia RDB, JATD, Proposal, 11 March 1996 (0613-1563-0613-1563).

³⁹¹ MUP Serbia RDB CRDB Novi Sad(?), Letter, 7 January 1997 (0608-8129-0608-8129).

³⁹² Description of Predrag Baklaić, undated, probably 2000 (0706-4845-0706-4845).

³⁹³ MUP Serbia RDB JSO, Letter, 6 July 2001 (0706-5237-0706-5237).

³⁹⁴ Letter of Željko Ražnatović to the Director of State Enterprise Dalj, 17 January 1992 (0088-7075-0088-7075); Information of Security Department of the VJ General Staff, 12 May 1993 (0340-4897-0340-4898). See also note of Military Security Organ, 18 August 1995 (0340-4905-0340-4905), undated explanatory note of Military Security organ (0340-4923-0340-4925), undated explanatory note of Military Security organ (0340-4904-0340-4904) and undated intelligence note on paramilitary organizations (0214-1319-0214-1321); Receipt for Expenditures of Training Camp at Erdut, 22 January 1992 (0229-0280-0229-0282); Centre for Special Training TO S[A]O SBZS, 4 December 1991 (BG00-2087-BG00-2087); Centre for Special Training TO S[A]O SBZS, Confirmation, 18 October 1991 (BG00-4069-BG00-4069); information report of Military Security, January 1992 (0340-4882-0340-

September 1991, in his capacity as the President of the Government of the SAO SBZS appointed Ražnatović as commander of the TO Centre at Erdut. Ražnatović had until that point served as the commander of special units of the TO of SAO SBZS.³⁹⁵ It should be remembered that during this period Radovan Stojičić “Badža,” who headed the Public Security Service in MUP Serbia, was simultaneously the head of the TO in the SAO SBZS.³⁹⁶

229. Prior to the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, Željko Ražnatović had been associated with the SSUP. On 9 January 1990, the Chief of the SDB of the RSUP Serbia wrote to Zdravko Mustač, the Chief of the federal SDB in the SSUP and informed him that Ražnatović had been used operationally by the SDB of the SSUP for several years without the knowledge or consent of the SDB of the RSUP of Serbia.³⁹⁷
230. On 29 November 1990, Željko Ražnatović was arrested in possession of illegal weapons and ammunition in Croatia and was later put on trial.³⁹⁸ After several months in detention, Ražnatović was released on 14 June 1991 despite having been sentenced that same day to two years in prison.³⁹⁹ The circumstances of his release have not been clarified to this day
231. After his release in Croatia, Ražnatović moved between various areas of the RSK, the RS and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁴⁰⁰ At a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council on 31 July 1992, the Montenegrin president Momir Bulatović informed the most senior leadership of the SRJ that “Arkan is driving around Herzegovina with police license plates ‘M-900’ of the Federal SUP.”⁴⁰¹ Pavle Bulatović, the federal minister of internal affairs stated that all the members of the Council had received a letter about this matter.⁴⁰² The officials present exchanged opinions and information regarding both Arkan and “Captain Dragan.” The proliferation of various improvised and self-proclaimed units, as well as identification cards – real and forged, especially from “Krajina” – posed a challenge.

4887); information report of Military Security organ of Novi Sad District Command, 30 September 1991 (0340-4866-0340-4867). See also statement of Milisav Tomić, 2 October 1995 (0340-4915-0340-4916).

³⁹⁵ Order of Goran Hadžić, President of the SAO SBZS Government, 21 September 1991 (Y034-6031-Y034-6032).

³⁹⁶ Command of Twelfth Corps, Letter of Major General Andrija Biorčević, 23 November 1991 (Y034-5357-Y034-5358).

³⁹⁷ Letter of Chief of the SDB of the RSUP of Serbia, Zoran Janačković, 9 January 1990 (Y034-5976-Y034-5977).

³⁹⁸ USDB Belgrade, Sixth Department, 30 November 1990 (Y035-2107-Y035-2108); RSUP Serbia SDB, Third Administration, Official Note, 14 December 1990 (Y034-8389-Y034-8390A). Letter of Željko Ražnatović, 29 November 1990 (R108-7480-R108-7490).

³⁹⁹ District Court in Zagreb, Judgement, 14 June 1991 (0638-1347-0638-1352); District Court in Zagreb, Letter, 14 June 1991 (0638-1345-0638-1345).

⁴⁰⁰ See for example SAO Krajina SUB SDB official note, 31 May 1991 (0280-3822-0280-3823); Arkan's location at the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7219).

⁴⁰¹ Tape Recording of Fourth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 31 July 1992 (0345-7005-0345-7046, at 0345-7020).

⁴⁰² Pavle Bulatović may have been referring to an official note sent by the Security Organ of the First Army on 30 May 1992, mentioning this particular vehicle. First Army Security Organ, Official Note to SSUP and MUP Serbia, 30 May 1992 (0340-4932-0340-4933).

Yet Slobodan Milošević expressed confidence that the situation was firmly under control on the territory of the Republic of Serbia.⁴⁰³ By contrast, Dobrica Ćosić stated that “we always have differing, contradictory information; everyone has his own service, his own measures, nothing is functioning.”⁴⁰⁴

232. As has been alluded to elsewhere, Željko Ražnatović and the SDG were instrumental in helping the Bosnian Serbs seize control of Bijeljina and Zvornik.⁴⁰⁵ In Zvornik municipality, Ražnatović participated actively in the “negotiations” leading to the takeover of the municipality by Serbs.⁴⁰⁶

233. At the fifth session of the Supreme Defence Council on 7 August 1992, the federal minister of internal affairs Pavle Bulatović stated the following regarding paramilitary units:

This story is not new; probably three-four months; but in my opinion it is a question that is being confirmed, that certain activities at some point come back like a boomerang; in the situation of the outbreak of war, when there was a call for mobilization, when anyone who wanted to could be accepted into volunteer units, regardless of mindset and other personal characteristics, with time they became more independent, formed their own units, withdrew from the command of the military and separated from the ministry of internal affairs; now we have the problems which we have – problems, which exist on the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Arkan’s men, those of Captain Dragan, some Mauzer, four-five groups, where now simply, there is a risk to the Serb nation from them – there also in the sense of looting, rapes, detention, robbing of freedom. That is, they are already trying to realize paramilitary authority there. I am afraid, today, that this fate awaits also the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, when they come back from there. That is one thing. The other thing is that when paramilitary formations are discussed, we now, it is as if we are transferring, or accusing one another, but we have to admit that they exist. We cannot dispute that they exist. We cannot dispute that we have serious problems with them.⁴⁰⁷

234. According to a VJ report, “since the beginning of the war in 1991 a number of paramilitary formations were engaged on the territory of the RSK and the RS. These were (and remained) directly connected to the RDB and MUP of the Republic of Serbia or were engaged under the guise of special units of the RDB or the MUP, respectively. This applies

⁴⁰³ Tape Recording of Fourth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 31 July 1992 (0345-7005-0345-7046, at 0345-7022).

⁴⁰⁴ Tape Recording of Fourth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 31 July 1992 (0345-7005-0345-7046, at 0345-7024).

⁴⁰⁵ JNA 17th Corps Command, Daily Operational Report, 4 April 1992 (SA03-3329-SA03-3331); JNA 17th Corps Command, Daily Operational Report, 5 April 1992 (SA03-3327-SA03-3328); dispatch from SJB Bijeljina to Minister Mićo Stanišić (sent after 13 April 1992) (0074-9558-0074-9558); Željko Ražnatović “Arkan” on “My Guest, His Truth,” (V000-0268); transcript of telephone conversation between Ražnatović and Radmila LNU, 16 April 1992 (0111-5647-0111-5652).

⁴⁰⁶ Dispatch of Izet Mehinagić sent to General Milutin Kukanjac, 8 April 1992 (0207-2662-0207-2662). See also Statement of Svetislav Mitrović “Niški,” SJB Bijeljina, 3 August 1992 (0052-4893-0052-4894).

⁴⁰⁷ Tape Recording of Fifth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council, 7 August 1992 (0345-7047-0345-7088, at 0345-7065).

in particular to the SDG of Željko Ražnatović, the special unit of the MUP under the command of the independent Colonel Vasilije Mijović, the special unit 'the Red Berets' under the command of Žika Ivanović, called Crnogorac, and the paramilitary unit of Slobodan Medić, called Boca."⁴⁰⁸

235. Despite his association with the Serbian cause, sections of Federal Yugoslav military intelligence viewed Ražnatović as an essentially criminal phenomenon, whose primary interests were to increase his own popularity among Serbs and to amass large quantities of wealth through theft, smuggling and the sale of "ranks" to politicians and businessmen.⁴⁰⁹ The behaviour of Ražnatović and his men met with criticism by the military, and Ražnatović was involved in physical altercations with members of the military.⁴¹⁰ As of June 1992, Ražnatović's Serb Volunteer Guard was reported to be continuing to operate the centre at Erdut under the leadership of an officer with a background in the French Foreign Legion.⁴¹¹ According to a report from the RDB of Serbia in October 1992, a well-placed source in Western Slavonia informed them that there were rumours that Hadžić was preparing Ražnatović to replace Martić. "Namely, Hadžić is often seen in the company of Arkan on the territory of Krajina, which according to the source's opinion is politically harmful for Hadžić and the RSK."⁴¹² According to another, undated, letter from Minister Sokolović to Minister of People's Defence Admiral Jokić, Sokolović was aware of Ražnatović's criminal past and referred to him as a misfit.⁴¹³

236. In August 1991, USDB Belgrade reported that

Željko Ražnatović - Arkan has organized a group of his followers, the so-called Serb Volunteer Guard with the goal to unify in Belgrade all patriotically oriented persons in order to offer help to Serbs on the threatened territories of Croatia. The aforementioned persons, allegedly, have membership cards, are armed with automatic weapons Heckler-Koch, which Arkan supplies them with and train regularly at the stadium of the football club Red Star. ... Connected to this, Arkan has several times been in the area of Osijek with his group and had several "successful" actions.⁴¹⁴

237. On 20 November 1991, Ražnatović and Goran Hadžić were filmed together.⁴¹⁵ According to the SAO Krajina Minister of Internal Affairs, Borislav Bogunović, Ražnatović,

⁴⁰⁸ VJ Report on the JSO of the RDB of Serbia, undated (1996) (0214-1322-0214-1327).

⁴⁰⁹ Information of First Military District Security Organ, 3 March 1992 (0340-4890-0340-4890); Information of Counter-Intelligence Operational Technical Centre, 14 September 1992 (0340-4893-0340-4896); on the earlier criminal background of Ražnatović see letter to Federal Secretariat for People's Defence, Third Administration, 19 July 1982 (0340-4926-0340-4927) and Report of Republican SUP of Serbia, Administration of the State Security Service, 7 January 1991 (0632-0999-0632-1010).

⁴¹⁰ Information of First Military District Security Organ, 17 March 1992 (0340-4891-0340-4892).

⁴¹¹ Report of CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, 15 June 1992 (0607-6264-0607-6265).

⁴¹² Official Note of MUP RS RDB Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195).

⁴¹³ Letter of Minister Sokolović, undated (Y035-0739-Y035-0741).

⁴¹⁴ USDB Belgrade, Information on the Creation of Paramilitary Formations in the Organization of the Unregistered Serb Chetnik Movement (SČP) and the Serb National Renewal (SNO), 1 August 1991 (Y034-9120-Y034-9128).

⁴¹⁵ Video recording, 20 November 1991 (V000-1260).

Hadžić and others including Major Veselin Šljivančanin and Ilija Končarević met in Vukovar on that day to discuss the situation in Vukovar.⁴¹⁶

238. At a session of the SFRJ Presidency held on 16 April 1992, the forcible removal of civilians from Vukovar and Lovas – Ruthenians, Czechs and others – was mentioned by General Života Panić.⁴¹⁷ He stated that the JNA had now succeeded in putting a halt to this, although paramilitary activity continued. Panić specifically mentioned the Chetniks or “White Eagles” of Mirko Jović, as well as Ražnatović. Panić stated that “Hadžić runs [*vodi*] Arkan. ... He is running him like some bodyguard. It is necessary to ask Hadžić and tell him to remove that Arkan from that area.”⁴¹⁸ Panić also mentioned that he had discussed this topic with Slobodan Milošević, who was doing “everything” to help resolve the problem.⁴¹⁹ However, Panić and Borisav Jović, the representative of Serbia at the meeting, disagreed about who should arrest Arkan and the “White Eagles.” Panić thought that “the MUP” should take care of it – it was not clear which MUP he was thinking of – while Jović thought that the military should handle the arrest. Jović expressed concern about the consequences for the perception of Yugoslavia because of the actions of paramilitaries. He noted that there had been no problem as long as these units were fighting the Croats. “We did not forbid them from fighting with the Ustaše, but we forbid them from persecuting innocent people, that is the thing.”⁴²⁰ Panić also admitted that the military had earlier accepted Ražnatović and thought that he had “been carrying out tasks very well on that territory.”⁴²¹

239. On the topic of forced removal of the civilian population, it should be noted that Hadžić had addressed this specific topic at an earlier meeting of the SFRJ Presidency. On 2 March 1992, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had mentioned a possible population exchange of Croats from Vojvodina with Serbs from Krajina. He then asked “Who will force the Croats from Vojvodina to go to Krajina? Those are nebulous ideas and the world is shocked by them, although India and Pakistan even did also such things. At this moment in Europe, it is questionable whether that would be feasible.”⁴²² To this Hadžić immediately interjected: “That is not nebulous.”⁴²³

⁴¹⁶ Statement of Borislav Bogunović given to the District Court in Novi Sad, 25 June 2003 (0346-5294-0346-5297).

⁴¹⁷ Stenographic Records of 194th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 16 April 1992 (0466-4902-0466-4994, at 0466-4965).

⁴¹⁸ Stenographic Records of 194th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 16 April 1992 (0466-4902-0466-4994, at 0466-4966).

⁴¹⁹ Stenographic Records of 194th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 16 April 1992 (0466-4902-0466-4994, at 0466-4966).

⁴²⁰ Stenographic Records of 194th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 16 April 1992 (0466-4902-0466-4994, at 0466-4968).

⁴²¹ Stenographic Records of 194th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 16 April 1992 (0466-4902-0466-4994, at 0466-4969).

⁴²² Stenographic Records of 189th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 2 March 1992 (0466-4539-0466-4693, at 0466-4629-0466-4630).

⁴²³ Stenographic Records of 189th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 2 March 1992 (0466-4539-0466-4693, at 0466-4629-0466-4630).

240. On 3 August 1992, SUP Vukovar reported to the RSK MUP that a unit called the "Red Tigers" was being formed by Ražnatović at Ernestinovo.⁴²⁴ The new unit was to be led by Nenad Milanović, the brother of RSK Assistant Defence Minister Milan Milanović "Mrgud." According to the dispatch, "The aforementioned unit wears uniforms of MUP of the Republic of Serbia, which they have received two days ago with the approval of the Assistant Minister [of Internal Affairs] of the Republic of Serbia Radovan Stojičić-Badža [*sic*, Stojičić], while weaponry was obtained from the Ministry of Defence." The dispatch further noted that the new unit was being formed out of "revolt that with the order of the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK Ilija Kojić on 1 August 1992 the reserve staff of the police on the territory of Eastern Slavonia and Western Sylvania was disbanded." Police officers at Ernestinovo who did not fulfil the criteria for service on the active staff of the police station in Ernestinovo were joining the new unit instead. Given the tense situation, RSK President Goran Hadžić had on 31 July 1992 orally approved the formation of a crisis staff composed of local civilian, military and police leaders, including the chief of SUP Vukovar Dragan Đukić. However, the situation remained critical with disagreements among these leaders.
241. On 26 January 1993, SJB Obrovac reported to the RSK MUP that Ražnatović had arrived on the territory of that SJB, which was involved in combat operations.⁴²⁵
242. In an article in the Belgrade newspaper *Borba* in February 1993, Milan Martić was quoted as referring to Ražnatović as being a "special advisor of the President of the RSK Goran Hadžić, and that he [Ražnatović] has the right to be present at government sessions."⁴²⁶ In the same interview, Ražnatović confirmed that he held this post, stating that he had been appointed to this function already on 26 February 1992.
243. However, also in February 1993, the RSK MUP sent a notice to all SUPs in the RSK banning Željko Ražnatović and members of his unit from entering the RSK. The reason provided was "the improper conduct in the battles during January and February 1993 on the territory of Benkovac, Obrovac and Gračac, as well as the abuse of the civilian population."⁴²⁷ At the end of February, however, Martić rescinded this ban.⁴²⁸
244. In February 1993, the Intelligence Security Organ of the Fifteenth Corps Command of the SVK wrote that the arrival of Željko Ražnatović with 200 volunteers had negatively affected the security situation in the Korenica area.⁴²⁹ The Intelligence Security Organ further wrote that

Actually, the presence of "Arkan" with his fighters, their courage, boldness and endurance on the one hand adds confidence and motivates the battle composition, but on the other hand their behaviour, privileges and the veneration which they add

⁴²⁴ Dispatch of SUP Vukovar to RSK MUP, 3 August 1992 (0207-6696-0207-6697).

⁴²⁵ Dispatch of SJB Obrovac to RSK MUP, 26 January 1993 (0280-4277-0280-4277) and 27 January 1993 (0280-4268-0280-4269).

⁴²⁶ "I Offered to Resign," *Borba*, 16 February 1993 (0800-0319-0800-0319).

⁴²⁷ RSK MUP, Announcement, 21 February 1993 (Y035-2142-Y035-2143).

⁴²⁸ Summary of intercepted conversation, 27 February 1993 (0416-1698-0416-1698)

⁴²⁹ Intelligence Security Organ of the Fifteenth Corps of the SVK, State of Security in Mobilized Units, 16 February 1993 (0207-6719-0207-6721, at 0207-6719).

through the open physical abuse of individual soldiers and officers leads to open dissatisfaction, which can provoke open conflicts and broader escalations. A part of the [Ninth Motorized] brigade command has accepted this kind of bizarre behaviour, which provokes a fear of "ArkanIZATION" among the soldiers and could have negative consequences.⁴³⁰

245. The SDB/RDB monitored the activities of the SDG. As such, the SDB/RDB was also aware of efforts made by the SDG to mobilize personnel and to deploy them to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³¹
246. In March 1993, at its eighth session, the VSO discussed Željko Ražnatović. Života Panić of the VJ adamantly told President Ćosić that Arkan "is not with us. ... He is in Krajina with Hadžić."⁴³² However, Ćosić stated that "He also operates in Serbia. His soldiers wear uniforms and carry weapons; there was also some shooting. We cannot overlook Arkan and not talk about a paramilitary formation."⁴³³ Ćosić asked how it was possible that Panić was not receiving information for the VSO from MUP Serbia and MUP Montenegro. Milošević asked whether they had requested this information, which Panić confirmed. They then all agreed to ask for a new report which should include the relevant information. Milošević stated that the criminal code was being changed in order to punish the formation of paramilitary groups with the maximum penalty. Later in the meeting, Ćosić also argued that Arkan's formation was more of a "parastate" formation than a paramilitary formation.⁴³⁴
247. Although the SDG cooperated with Serbs in both the RSK and the RS, there were at times tensions between the SDG and local inhabitants. In March 1993, the CRDB Novi Sad reported that members of the SDG had detained and abused eight persons in Erdut, including RSK officials.⁴³⁵
248. In October 1994, Milan Martić was stopped at Tovarnik by armed men who he believed stemmed from bases at Erdut and Pajzoš. After this incident, Martić called President Milošević and angrily demanded that he order Jovica STANIŠIĆ to remove these men from Eastern Slavonia. Martić threatened to use armed force against these men unless they left the area, and Milošević agreed to discuss the matter with STANIŠIĆ.⁴³⁶ A few days after the phone call, Martić sent a detailed letter about the incident to Milošević,

⁴³⁰ Intelligence Security Organ of the Fifteenth Corps of the SVK, State of Security in Mobilized Units, 16 February 1993 (0207-6719-0207-6721, at 0207-6720).

⁴³¹ SAP Vojvodina, SUP, SDB Department, Information, 15 October 1991 (0632-1488-0632-1488); CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, Section Ruma, 14 November 1994 (0632-1487-0632-1487).

⁴³² Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7218).

⁴³³ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7218-0345-7219).

⁴³⁴ Stenographic Record of the Eighth Session of the VSO, 12 March 1993 (0345-7184-0345-7240, at 0345-7236).

⁴³⁵ CRDB Novi Sad, Informational Report, 15 March 1993 (Y034-4191-Y034-4195).

⁴³⁶ Intercepted telephone conversation between Milan Martić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 October 1994 (0329-6688-0329-6688, CF00-0176-CF00-0176).

Minister of Internal Affairs Sokolović, President of the Serbian Government Mirko Marjanović and Chief of the General Staff of the VJ Momčilo Perišić.⁴³⁷

249. In an interview at his home in Vukovar in March 1995, Goran Hadžić commented on his relationship with Ražnatović.⁴³⁸ Hadžić recalled that Ražnatović had visited him at home every day. Hadžić further stated that he had first met Ražnatović “three years ago,” and denied that Ražnatović had been involved in the smuggling of petroleum from Eastern Slavonia or other irregularities. Hadžić noted that others in the RSK had criticized him for permitting Ražnatović to attend sessions of the RSK Government, stating that “I respected his military knowledge and he has as such attended the sessions.”⁴³⁹
250. After the fall of the RSK in August 1995, Ražnatović and his unit, with the knowledge of MUP Serbia, engaged in the forcible mobilization of men from Krajina.⁴⁴⁰
251. According to the available documentation, Željko Ražnatović “Arkan” at certain points in time was placed under surveillance by the SDB/RDB. In August 1991, in the context of the SDB’s action “Tompson,” USDB Belgrade reported on surveillance of both Ražnatović’s pastry shop “Ari” and of the football stadium of Red Star Belgrade, where Ražnatović played an important role.⁴⁴¹ The SDB monitored the business and political connections of Ražnatović.⁴⁴² In June 1992, CRDB Sremska Mitrovica reported on links of Ražnatović with Vojislav Šešelj and with the Serb Orthodox Church.⁴⁴³ The report also noted that Ražnatović had several times intervened with the police, including on one occasion with “Badža” on behalf of the SDG’s members. The SDG was at that point allegedly not deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at all but was instead on standby at Erdut. In February 1995, Ražnatović, with the codename “Kafa” (Coffee) was being monitored by CRDB Belgrade.⁴⁴⁴ Given what is known about Ražnatović’s association with the SDB/RDB and with high-ranking officials of the SRJ and Serbia, such surveillance

⁴³⁷ Letter of Milan Martić, 7 October 1994 (0280-6502-0280-6504).

⁴³⁸ Interview with Goran Hadžić, *Intervju*, 24 March 1995 (0207-4394-0207-4397).

⁴³⁹ Interview with Goran Hadžić, *Intervju*, 24 March 1995 (0207-4394-0207-4397). There were indications that Hadžić’s association with Ražnatović persisted after Hadžić was no longer President of the RSK. In a report of Military Security regarding a meeting with a source on 2 September 1995, Hadžić was alleged to want Arkan’s Serb Volunteer Guard to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Slavonia and Western Sylvania. Ražnatović was also alleged to positioning himself to be named minister of internal affairs of SBZS and to want to take control of the area’s oil industry. Note of Military Security regarding meeting of 2 September 1995 (0340-4907-0340-4908).

⁴⁴⁰ Explanation of Captain Milan Kosanović, undated (0216-2544-0216-2546).

⁴⁴¹ USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 22 August 1991 (Y034-5760-Y034-5763); USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 23 August 1991 (Y034-5373-Y034-5376); USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 24 August 1991 (Y034-5704-Y034-5705); USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 27 August 1991 (Y034-5724-Y034-5727); USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 29 August 1991 (Y034-5728-Y034-5729); USDB Belgrade Savski Venac, Official Note, 30 August 1991 (Y034-5730-Y034-5731); USDB Belgrade Zemun, Fourth Department, Official Note, 29 August 1991 (0632-1029-0632-1029).

⁴⁴² SDB, Official Note of Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 10 December 1991 (Y020-4022-Y020-4023).

⁴⁴³ CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, Excerpt from Report of Informant, 15 June 1992 (Y034-9138-Y034-9141).

⁴⁴⁴ CRDB Belgrade, Fourth Department, Voždovac, Report, 7 February 1995 (0608-3999-0608-4001).

measures may at first glance appear paradoxical. These measures are to be understood in the context of Ražnatović's illicit business activities as well as the potential political threat posed by his political party to the Serbian government.

C. Slobodan Medić "Boca" and the Scorpions

252. Another paramilitary unit that maintained a relationship with the RDB of MUP Serbia was the *Škorpioni* (Scorpions). This unit was led by Slobodan Medić "Boca," who hailed from Sremski Banovci in Vojvodina, where he had been engaged in smuggling and the sale of cattle until the outbreak of the war.⁴⁴⁵ Later, Medić with 10-15 people provided security for the oil fields at Đeletovci in Croatia. As president of the RSK, Goran Hadžić promoted Medić to major, and Medić's unit grew to approximately 300 men by 1995.⁴⁴⁶ Although located in the RSK, the unit did not bear any RSK insignia, but rather "gold scorpions."⁴⁴⁷ CRDB Novi Sad believed that Medić's unit was directly subordinate to Milan Martić and to Colonel Španović, the chief of staff of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps.⁴⁴⁸ Yet Medić was believed to be most interested in profiteering from the war, including through the smuggling of oil.⁴⁴⁹ In addition to reporting on connections between Medić and Martić, Milan Milanović Mrgud, the assistant minister of defence of the RSK and Radovan Stojičić, the chief of the RJB in MUP Serbia, CRDB Novi Sad also noted that General Ratko Mladić and Medić had discussed the possible use of Medić's unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

253. At a meeting with Slobodan Milošević, Fikret Abdić and others that took place at the seat of the VJ General Staff on 30 June 1995, Jovica STANIŠIĆ remarked, apparently with dissatisfaction, that his men had been called paramilitaries by others – presumably military officers – in the field.⁴⁵⁰ STANIŠIĆ offered that he could send 120 "perfect men" to assist Fikret Abdić. STANIŠIĆ stated that "we have given 80 from Erdut and 80 from Đeletovci." Slobodan Medić and the Scorpions were based at Đeletovci.⁴⁵¹

X. The Ministries of Internal Affairs of Serb-Controlled Entities in Croatia

A. SAO Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia, SAO SBZS and Republika Srpska Krajina

254. This section of the report describes the establishment and structure of Serb organs of internal affairs on the territory of the Republic of Croatia in the period from

⁴⁴⁵ CRDB Novi Sad, Slobodan Medić Boco [sic], Overview of Information, 9 February 1995 (Y036-8325-Y036-8330. at Y036-8325).

⁴⁴⁶ CRDB Novi Sad, Slobodan Medić Boco [sic], Overview of Information, 9 February 1995 (Y036-8325-Y036-8330. at Y036-8325). Compare with undated list of members of the Scorpions (0422-4648-0422-4650).

⁴⁴⁷ CRDB Novi Sad, Slobodan Medić Boco [sic], Overview of Information, 9 February 1995 (Y036-8325-Y036-8330. at Y036-8326).

⁴⁴⁸ CRDB Novi Sad, Slobodan Medić Boco [sic], Overview of Information, 9 February 1995 (Y036-8325-Y036-8330. at Y036-8326).

⁴⁴⁹ CRDB Novi Sad, Slobodan Medić Boco [sic], Overview of Information, 9 February 1995 (Y036-8325-Y036-8330. at Y036-8325-Y036-8326).

⁴⁵⁰ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 30 June 1995 (0649-0539-0649-0540).

⁴⁵¹ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 30 June 1995 (0649-0539-0649-0540).

1990 to 1995. In order to provide the necessary context, key political developments will be summarized, in particular the establishment of the Serb Autonomous Districts in Croatia and the emergence of Serb-controlled ministries of internal affairs on the territories controlled by these entities until the establishment of Republika Srpska Krajina in January 1992. For the following period until August 1995, the report will cover significant developments related to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska Krajina.

1. Political Developments in Croatia and the Establishment of SAO Krajina

255. According to the last census conducted in Yugoslavia in 1991, the Socialist Republic of Croatia had a population of 4,784,265 people, of which 3,736,356 (78.1%) were Croats and 581,663 (12.2%) were Serbs.⁴⁵² The census also registered over 20 other, less numerous minorities, including Muslims, Hungarians, Slovenes, Czechs and Slovaks.
256. In April and May 1990, the first multi-party elections were held in Croatia, with nationalist parties obtaining victory. The Croat Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) obtained the largest percentage of votes, 41.76%.⁴⁵³ Under the election rules, this result translated into a majority in the parliament. On 30 May 1990, the leader of the HDZ, Franjo Tuđman, was elected President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The Serb Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka*, SDS), which had been established in Knin on 17 February 1990, was officially registered in Croatia on 6 March 1990.⁴⁵⁴ At the elections in April and May 1990, the SDS obtained a substantial portion of the vote of Serbs residing in Croatia, taking political control of the municipalities of Donji Lapac, Gračac and Knin.⁴⁵⁵ The SDS portrayed itself as the protector of Serb national interests in Croatia.⁴⁵⁶
257. The victory of the HDZ created considerable anxiety among the Serb minority in Croatia, where many felt that Serbs would be subject to discrimination and the loss of political rights. These expectations were frequently linked by politicians and the media to the experiences of the Second World War, when the fascist Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH) had implemented extremely discriminatory policies against Serbs and other minorities, culminating in a genocide against the Serbs of the NDH, the territory of which included the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of

⁴⁵² Republic of Croatia, Republican Bureau of Statistics, 1991 Census, published April 1992 (0344-7982-0344-8320, at 0344-7988).

⁴⁵³ Institute for Informational Activity of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, Statistical Indicators on the Elections Held for Representatives in the Sabor of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, 1990, http://www.izbori.hr/arhiva/pdf/1990/1990_2_1_Sabor_Statistika_Stat_podaci.pdf.

⁴⁵⁴ SRH, Republican Secretariat for Justice and Administration, Decision on Registration of the Serb Democratic Party, 6 March 1990 (0214-1797-0214-1798).

⁴⁵⁵ Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005) (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6513).

⁴⁵⁶ Statement of SDS leader Jovan Rašković, February 1990 in a pamphlet of the SDS (0214-1801-0214-1816).

Serbia.⁴⁵⁷ Frequent references to the Ustasha movement that had led the NDH were heard in the media. At the same time, Croatian media and politicians increasingly referred to Serbs generically as Chetniks, the royalist nationalist Serb movement from the Second World War. The Chetniks, although nominally aligned with the Allies during the war, had also collaborated extensively with the Axis forces and were remembered for committing attacks on civilians in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

258. In the context of the political transformations and increasing tension between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, the SDS began to contemplate the establishment of self-rule for areas inhabited predominately by Serbs. On 27 June 1990, the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Gračac, Donji Lapac, Obrovac and Titova Korenica founded the Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika.⁴⁵⁸ On 25 July 1990, Croatian Serbs held a mass political gathering at Srb and issued a "Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serb Nation."⁴⁵⁹ The Declaration called for the formation of a Serb National Congress (*Srpsko nacionalno vijeće*), which would be charged with holding a referendum on the position of the Serb nation in Croatia.⁴⁶⁰ On 31 July 1990, the Serb National Congress chose Milan Babić as its president and called again for a referendum to be held. The referendum was held between 19 August and 2 September 1990, resulting in an overwhelming vote for the autonomy of Serbs in Croatia.⁴⁶¹
259. Shortly before the referendum began, the authorities of the Republic of Croatia stated that the referendum was illegal, and Croatian police deployed to police stations in areas populated by a Serb majority in an unsuccessful attempt to disarm the police there.⁴⁶² On 17 August 1990, the Serbs in and around Knin, under the command of Milan Martić, began erecting barricades and road blocks.⁴⁶³ The chief of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (*Sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove*, or SUP) in Šibenik also suspended several employees of the Public Security Station in Knin, including Milan Martić.⁴⁶⁴
260. The use of logs to create barricades and roadblocks caused the events of August 1990 to be dubbed the "Log Revolution" (*balvan revolucija*). In July 1992, the government of the Republika Srpska Krajina retroactively proclaimed 17 August 1990 to have been the

⁴⁵⁷ Milan Martić, in his 1994 interview for the BBC documentary "Death of a Nation," referred to a "clear indication of the restoration of [N]azism from the period 1941-45." BBC Interview with Milan Martić, 14 October 1994 (0219-5504-0219-5518, at 0219-5504).

⁴⁵⁸ Knin Municipal Assembly, Decision on the Establishment and Constitution of the Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika, 27 June 1990 (0214-1845-0214-1846).

⁴⁵⁹ Declaration on Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serb People, 25 July 1990 (0214-1952-0214-1953).

⁴⁶⁰ Tanjug, " 'Serbian National Council' Calls for Referendum," 31 July 1990 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS) (R028-8592-R028-8592).

⁴⁶¹ Report on the Performed Expression of the Serb People in the Republic of Croatia on Serbian Autonomy, 30 September 1990 (0214-1960-0214-1960).

⁴⁶² BBC Interview with Milan Martić, 14 October 1994 (0219-5504-0219-5518, at 0219-5509).

⁴⁶³ BBC Interview with Milan Martić, 14 October 1994 (0219-5504-0219-5518, at 0219-5509); Background Check for Zoran Rajić, Undated (0643-5174-0643-5174).

⁴⁶⁴ Dispatch of Public Security Station Knin, 20 August 1990 (0207-7586-0207-7586). See also dispatch of Public Security Station Knin, 21 August 1990 (0207-7587-0207-7587).

beginning of the war “on the territory of the Republika Srpska Krajina.”⁴⁶⁵ The training centre for special police officers that would later be established at Golubić near Knin came to be officially called the “17th August Centre.”⁴⁶⁶

261. In September 1990, tensions rose as the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova*, or MUP) of Croatia demanded that Serbs hand in “illegal” weapons and ammunition, a demand viewed by Serbs as an attempt to disarm the police in areas inhabited predominantly by Serbs.⁴⁶⁷

262. On 20 December 1990, the municipal assembly in Knin, whose president was Milan Babić, adopted a decision on the implementation of a statute for a Serb Autonomous District of Krajina (*Srpska Autonomna Oblast Krajine*, or SAO Krajina).⁴⁶⁸ According to Article 1 of the Statute, the SAO Krajina “is established in order to realize the national equality, as well as cultural and historical characteristics of the Serb people residing on the territory of the Dalmatian and Military Krajina, which is located in the structure of the Republic of Croatia in the frame of federal Yugoslavia.”⁴⁶⁹ Article 6 of the Statute stated that the institutions of the SAO Krajina would be responsible for its proper functioning, and that they would implement all relevant laws, rules and regulations entrusted to it by the Republic of Croatia and by the federal Yugoslav government.⁴⁷⁰ Article 9 of the Statute provided that the Assembly of the SAO Krajina would “secure the autonomy of the judicial and police organs which operate in the District.”⁴⁷¹

263. On 22 December 1990, the Croatian Sabor (parliament) promulgated a new constitution for the Republic of Croatia.⁴⁷² The Constitution based itself on strong notions of the historical right of the Croat nation to statehood and independence. According to the Constitution, Croatia was established “as the national state of the Croat nation and as the state of members of other nations and minorities, who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, to whom are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croat nationality [*narodnost*] and the realization of national rights in harmony with the democratic norms of the UN and countries of the free world.”⁴⁷³ In

⁴⁶⁵ Decision of the Republika Srpska Krajina Government, 28 July 1992 (0280-7892-0280-7892). See also Časlav OČIĆ, “Hronika Srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991,” in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 396-399 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6136-0683-6137).

⁴⁶⁶ Autobiography of Jovo Mirković, 6 December 1995 (0608-8149-0608-8149).

⁴⁶⁷ Časlav Očić, “Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991,” in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 403-407 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6139-0683-6141).

⁴⁶⁸ Decision on the Implementation of the Statute of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina, 20 December 1990 (0214-1852-0214-1852).

⁴⁶⁹ Article 1, Statute of the SAO Krajina, December 1990 (0214-1849-0214-1851, at 0214-1850).

⁴⁷⁰ Article 6, Statute of the SAO Krajina, December 1990 (0214-1849-0214-1851, at 0214-1851).

⁴⁷¹ Article 9, Statute of the SAO Krajina, December 1990 (0214-1849-0214-1851, at 0214-1851).

⁴⁷² Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 22 December 1990 (0087-3837-0087-3850, at 0087-3839).

⁴⁷³ “Original Foundations” in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 22 December 1990 (0087-3837-0087-3850, at 0087-3839).

the eyes of the Croatian Serbs, the language of the new constitution demoted them from their previous status as a constituent nation of the Republic of Croatia.⁴⁷⁴

264. Since winning the elections in April and May 1990, the HDZ-controlled government and President Franjo Tuđman had pushed increasingly for the establishment of an independent Croatia. In the first months of 1991, Croatia continued to move towards independence. On 21 February 1991, the Croatian Sabor passed a resolution initiating Croatia's disassociation from the SFRJ, though this resolution still contemplated the possibility of a loose federation of sovereign republics.⁴⁷⁵ On 19 May 1991, Croatia held a referendum on independence, resulting in a positive vote, though the referendum was not held in areas controlled by the SAO Krajina.⁴⁷⁶ Croatia declared its independence from the SFRJ on 25 June 1991.⁴⁷⁷ The SFRJ continued to exist in truncated form until 27 April 1992, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created, incorporating Serbia (with Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro.⁴⁷⁸

265. During this same period, the authorities representing the SAO Krajina moved to establish it as a politically viable entity. On 18 March 1991, the SAO Krajina Assembly passed a decision declaring that federal regulations and regulations of the SAO Krajina would be applied on the territory of the SAO Krajina. Legal acts of the Republic of Croatia would be applied only insofar as they did not conflict with either legal acts of the federal Yugoslav state or the SAO Krajina.⁴⁷⁹ On the same day, the Statute of the SAO Krajina was changed to reflect a cutting of ties with Croatia.⁴⁸⁰ The SAO Krajina Assembly also moved to annex areas of adjacent municipalities, creating an enlarged municipality of Knin.⁴⁸¹

266. On 1 April 1991, the Executive Council of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina decided to unite the SAO Krajina with the Republic of Serbia.⁴⁸² On 30 April 1991, the SAO Krajina Assembly decided to hold a referendum on joining the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, and on staying in Yugoslavia with "Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to

⁴⁷⁴ Compare with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, 22 February 1974 (0144-9801-0144-9853, at 0144-9808).

⁴⁷⁵ Croatian Sabor, Resolution on the Acceptance of the Procedure for Disassociation of the SFRJ and on the Possible Association in a Federation of Sovereign Republics, *Narodne novine*, 21 February 1991 (0089-4048-0089-4049).

⁴⁷⁶ Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005) (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6571).

⁴⁷⁷ Časlav OČIĆ, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 420 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6148).

⁴⁷⁸ Declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 April 1992, in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. *Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1994) (0035-9421-0035-9425).

⁴⁷⁹ Decision on the Application of Laws and Other Regulations on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 18 March 1991, published in *Glasnik Krajine*, 2 April 1991 (0364-6098-0364-6098).

⁴⁸⁰ Statutory Decision on the Change of the Statue of the SAO Krajina, 18 March 1991, published in *Glasnik Krajine*, 2 April 1991 (0364-6098-0364-6098).

⁴⁸¹ SAO Krajina Assembly, Decision on the Joining to Knin Municipality of Local Communities from the Territory of the Municipalities of Drniš, Sinj and Knin, 18 March 1991 (0217-2155-0217-2155).

⁴⁸² Decision of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, 1 April 1991 (0217-2158-0217-2159); published in *Glasnik Krajine* on 20 April 1991 (0207-7887-0207-7887).

preserve Yugoslavia."⁴⁸³ On that date, the Assembly also elected Milan Babić as the president of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina.⁴⁸⁴ The referendum was held on 12 May 1991, and resulted in a large majority favouring remaining in Yugoslavia.⁴⁸⁵ The merger was, however, not implemented.

267. On 30 April 1991, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina established a Council for People's Defence.⁴⁸⁶ The seven members of this council included the President of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, the President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina and the Secretary of the SAO Krajina SUP, Milan Martić.

268. On 29 May 1991, the Statute of the SAO Krajina was proclaimed to be the Constitutional Law of the SAO Krajina.⁴⁸⁷ On the same day, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina promulgated a number of significant laws, including the Law on the Government,⁴⁸⁸ the Law on the Ministries⁴⁸⁹ and the Law on the Courts.⁴⁹⁰ Milan Martić was appointed as the Minister of Defence of the SAO Krajina.⁴⁹¹ In addition, the Law on the Application of the Legal Regulations of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina went into effect.⁴⁹²

269. On 27 June 1991, Martić was also (re)appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina.⁴⁹³ Furthermore, on 8 August 1991, the President of the SAO Krajina Government Milan Babić nominated Martić as the Deputy Commander of the "Territorial Defence (Armed Forces) of the SAO Krajina."⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸³ SAO Krajina Assembly, Decision on the Holding of a Referendum for the Joining of the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia and that Krajina Stay in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and Others Who Wish to Preserve Yugoslavia, 30 April 1991 (0214-1880-0214-1880).

⁴⁸⁴ Decision on the Election of the President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, 30 April 1991 (0217-2164-0217-2164).

⁴⁸⁵ SAO Krajina Assembly, Report on the Referendum Held on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 14 May 1991 (0214-1854-0214-1859). See also Decision on the Merger of the SAO Krajina with the Republic of Serbia and to Stay in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and Others Who Desire to Preserve Yugoslavia, 17 May 1991 (0043-4080-0043-4081).

⁴⁸⁶ Article 39, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, 30 April 1991 (0214-1922-0214-1941, at 0214-1930).

⁴⁸⁷ Decision on the Proclamation of the Statute of the SAO Krajina as the Constitutional Law of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1863-0214-1863); Constitutional Law of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1864-0214-1869); Supplementary Law to the Constitutional Law of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1870-0214-1871).

⁴⁸⁸ Law on the Government of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1894-0214-1899).

⁴⁸⁹ Law on the Ministries of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1900-0214-1905).

⁴⁹⁰ Law on the Courts of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1906-0214-1919).

⁴⁹¹ Decision on the Election of Milan Martić as Minister of Defence of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1844-0214-1844).

⁴⁹² Law on the Application of the Legal Regulations of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0364-6115-0364-6116).

⁴⁹³ Decision on the Election of Milan Martić as Minister of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina, 27 June 1991 (0214-1944-0214-1944).

⁴⁹⁴ Order on the Appointment of Milan Martić as the Deputy Commander of the Territorial Defence (Armed Forces) of the SAO Krajina, 8 August 1991 (0207-7591-0207-7591).

270. On 7 July 1991, the news agency Tanjug reported that Milan Martić stated that his police force was well-armed. This was above all thanks to “the most significant aid [which] came from the government of Serbia, in nearly all forms.”⁴⁹⁵ Martić also stated that the main instructor of the police force of SAO Krajina was a “top professional” with experience from Africa and the Middle East.

2. The Establishment of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania

271. The referendum on autonomy for Serbs that was held between 19 August and 2 September 1990 in areas that became the SAO Krajina were also held in parts of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁴⁹⁶

272. The Serb National Council was founded in secret on Orthodox Christmas, 7 January 1991, in Šidski Banovci in harmony with the declaration of 25 July 1990 at Srb.⁴⁹⁷ The gathering declared that it did not “accept the decision by which the current republics of Croatia and Slovenia, without the agreement of the Serb nation of Sl Ba Zs [Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania], withdraw these territories from the state of Yugoslavia.”⁴⁹⁸ The Serb National Council would henceforth, “as the only legitimate organ of the Serb nation in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania[,] represent the interests of that nation in all negotiations related to the future of the Serb nation in the current Republic of Croatia.”⁴⁹⁹

273. On 26 February 1991, the Serbs of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania convened a “Serb National Council” and passed a “Declaration on the Sovereign Autonomy of the Serb Nation of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.”⁵⁰⁰ The Declaration held the Serbs of this region to be “an inseparable part of the sovereign Serb nation which lives in Yugoslavia.” As such, the Serbs had a right to exercise their autonomy with a respect to a broad palette of issues, including “the protection of public order, peace and security.” This meant the establishment of appropriate organs to exercise such autonomy, first and foremost an assembly, with the Serb National Council acting as an interim organ. These organs would in turn cooperate with the organs of “other parts of the Serb nation in

⁴⁹⁵ Tanjug, “Krajina Interior Minister: ‘Police Well Armed,’” 7 July 1991 (R029-6471-R029-6471).

⁴⁹⁶ Report on the Performed Expression of the Serb People in the Republic of Croatia on Serbian Autonomy, 30 September 1990 (0214-1960-0214-1960).

⁴⁹⁷ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6260-0184-6261); see also 1991 television interview with members of the Serb National Council (V000-1282-1-A), and interview with Goran Hadžić in *Borovo*, 2 May 1996 (0357-7805-0357-7806).

⁴⁹⁸ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6264).

⁴⁹⁹ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6264).

⁵⁰⁰ Declaration on the Sovereign Autonomy of the Serb Nation of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania,” 26 February 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0422). According to Ilija Petrović, the declaration was actually issued on 25 January 1991, but the date was subsequently changed to 26 January 1991. Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6281-0184-6282).

Yugoslavia.” The autonomy was to be exercised in all municipalities and local communities (*mjesne zajednice*) which had a Serb majority population as of 6 April 1941, i.e. before the establishment of the fascist Independent State of Croatia. The final paragraph of the Declaration stated that “The sovereign Serb autonomy of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania exists and acts within the current Republic of Croatia only on the condition that Yugoslavia exists as a joint state. Insofar as Yugoslavia ceases to exist or is reformed into a gathering of independent states, this autonomy will continue to exist as part of the mother state [*matična država*] of the Serb nation.”

274. On 17 March 1991, the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania chose Goran Hadžić, the President of Municipal Board of the Vukovar SDS, and a member of the Main Board of the SDS Knin, as its president.⁵⁰¹ On 28 April, the Serb National Council elected an Executive Council consisting of nine members.⁵⁰²
275. As a direct result of an incident involving Goran Hadžić at the Plitvice National Park at the end of March 1991, the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania on 31 March passed a “decision on the joining of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania (without the territory in the composition of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina) to the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, and the Republic of Serbia, respectively.”⁵⁰³
276. On 20 May 1991, Mihalj Kertes, a “confidant [*poverenik*] of the President of the Republic of Serbia,” and Radovan Pankov, the Deputy President of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, held a meeting with representatives of Serbs from Slavonia in Bačka Palanka in Vojvodina. Goran Hadžić was among the participants. At the meeting, Kertes demanded that the Slavonian Serbs should cease seeking assistance from “self-proclaimed helpers,” and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to achieve complete agreement about joint activities.⁵⁰⁴ Hadžić stated that he was not undertaking anything on his own initiative, but was rather doing everything in consultation with people from Belgrade and Novi Sad. However, given the number of people present at the meeting, Hadžić did not wish to provide the names of these individuals.⁵⁰⁵ Kertes recommended that a coordinating body be formed among the Serbs from Slavonia in order to avoid disputes

⁵⁰¹ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6292); the titles of Goran Hadžić's posts in the SDS are listed in 1991 television interview with members of the Serb National Council (V000-1282-1-A); see also witness statement of Goran Hadžić given to the District Court in Novi Sad, 30 September 2003 (0346-5262-0346-5267, at 0346-5263), and the registration form of the SDS Municipal Board Vukovar, signed by Goran Hadžić, 14 August 1990 (0632-0778-0632-0778). On the platform of the SDS in Slavonia and Baranja, see Work Program of the SDS of Slavonia and Baranja, 3 February 1991 (0280-3763-0280-3766).

⁵⁰² Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6293).

⁵⁰³ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6297).

⁵⁰⁴ Regional SUP Vojvodina, Department of the State Security Service, Informational Report, 20 May 1991 (Y037-1627-Y037-1650, at Y037-1628).

⁵⁰⁵ Regional SUP Vojvodina, Department of the State Security Service, Informational Report, 20 May 1991 (Y037-1627-Y037-1650, at Y037-1636).

and misunderstandings; the participants accepted this proposal.⁵⁰⁶ Kertes further stated that he was aware that the lack of weapons was the biggest problem, and therefore asked for the participants to tell him what their respective villages needed. “This was also done so that at the end of the meeting Kertes had lists with the necessary weapons for the villages, which he took with him to Belgrade. At the very end of his presentation, Kertes stated that the position of Serbia was unambiguous – that all Serbs should live in one state, regardless of what it is called.”⁵⁰⁷

277. On 28 May 1991, the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania wrote to the SFRJ Presidency about the deteriorating security situation.⁵⁰⁸ According to the Serb National Council, the most recent decisions of the Federal Presidency were not sufficient to guarantee the safety of the Serb population of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania. Writing on behalf of the Serb National Council, Ilija Petrović claimed that all Croatian police stations had drawn up lists of Serbs who were to be arrested or killed. The Serb nation therefore felt itself forced to organize and defend itself.
278. On 10 June 1991, the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania decided to call a referendum on the legal position of the Serb nation in those areas.⁵⁰⁹ The referendum was held on 23 June 1991, resulting in an expressed desire to remain in a state together with Serbia and Montenegro.
279. On 25 June 1991, the Great National Assembly of the Serbs of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania passed a decision reiterating the desire of the Serbs of this region to remain in Yugoslavia and affirming the primacy of the laws and constitution of the SFRJ.⁵¹⁰ This decision took effect upon the independence of Croatia from the SFRJ. “In accordance with the Declaration on the autonomy of the Serb nation from Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, the Great National Assembly decided that the territories of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania would constitute themselves as the Autonomous District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.”⁵¹¹ The Serb National Council was to act as the executive organ of the Great National Assembly.⁵¹²
280. According to the politician Ilija Petrović, on 11 July 1991 at Borovo Selo,

⁵⁰⁶ Regional SUP Vojvodina, Department of the State Security Service, Informational Report, 20 May 1991 (Y037-1627-Y037-1650, at Y037-1638).

⁵⁰⁷ Regional SUP Vojvodina, Department of the State Security Service, Informational Report, 20 May 1991 (Y037-1627-Y037-1650, at Y037-1638).

⁵⁰⁸ SFRJ Presidency, 30 May 1991, forwarding letter of Ilija Petrović of 28 May 1991 (0052-5573-0052-5573).

⁵⁰⁹ Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005) (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6559).

⁵¹⁰ Decision on the Position of the Serb Nation of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Sylvania in the Yugoslav State Community, 25 June 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0423).

⁵¹¹ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6326).

⁵¹² Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6376).

Goran Hadžić was presented to domestic and foreign journalists as “the president of the Serb government for Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.” ... And in order to protect the territorial and other interests in the District, the Serb National Council on the same day asked the minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Serbia to dismiss all police officers of Serb nationality from the territory of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania who had “during the preceding several months, under the pressure of the Ustaša authorities” abandoned their earlier places of work and employed themselves in police stations in Serbia, and send them to work in the District secretariat for internal affairs with its seat at Vukovar.⁵¹³

281. On 14 July 1991, the Executive Council of the Great National Assembly formed a Territorial Defence Staff at Borovo Selo and a District Secretariat for Internal Affairs with its seat in Vukovar.⁵¹⁴ According to Ilija Petrović, a member of the Executive Council, “the Council carried out an entire array of matters of a military character, beginning with the organizing of the defensive preparations in all Serb settlements on the territory of Western Sylvania and Baranja, to the arming of members of the Serb territorial defence.”⁵¹⁵

282. On 16 July 1991,

estimating that that was in the interest of the Serb nation and its Autonomy, the Serb National Council published a decision of the Great National Assembly Sl Ba ZC that the territory of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania be constituted as the Autonomous District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and that it, the Serb National Council, continue to function as the executive organ of that Assembly, or the Government of the Autonomy, respectively. The public was also informed that the Serb National Council, in accordance with its powers, formed the District Staff of territorial defence and the District secretariat for internal affairs. And Goran Hadžić was officially presented as the president of the Serb National Council, or as the president of the Government of the new Serb Autonomy, respectively.⁵¹⁶

283. On 23 July 1991, the Serb National Council convened at Borovo Selo and elected two vice presidents of its government and five ministers, in addition to appointing five advisors.⁵¹⁷ The government also formed a recruiting centre at Prigrevica for Serb volunteers, though this seems not to have entered into function.

284. On 1 August 1991, Serb forces took control of Dalj.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹³ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6336).

⁵¹⁴ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6338).

⁵¹⁵ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6392).

⁵¹⁶ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6340).

⁵¹⁷ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6344-0184-6345).

⁵¹⁸ Časlav Očić, “Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991,” in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 420 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6148).

285. On 18 August 1991, the Government of the SAO SBZS initiated the promulgation of a statute, a law on ministries and rules of procedure on the work of the SAO SBZS government.⁵¹⁹
286. On 23 August 1991, the Serb National Council proclaimed a general mobilization in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁵²⁰
287. On 30 August 1991, the Serb National Council proclaimed that the constitution and laws of the Republic of Croatia were null and void on the territory of the Autonomous District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁵²¹ In their place, the federal Yugoslav constitution and federal Yugoslav and Serbian laws would be applied until new laws could be promulgated. At the same session, the Serb National Council considered a draft law on ministries and discussed the formation of a government.
288. At its session held on 25 September 1991, the Great National Assembly of the Serbs of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania promulgated the Constitutional Law for the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁵²² Article 1 of the Constitutional Law defined the District as “an independent federal unit in Yugoslavia and equal with other federal units and their parts which have passed decisions to remain in Yugoslavia.” The text of the accompanying Law on the Implementation of the Constitutional Law made mention of a meeting of the Government of the Autonomous District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania that had taken place on 30 August 1991 in Dalj.⁵²³ At this session, it had been decided that the “Constitution, Laws and other regulations of the Republic of Croatia” were null and void. Interim government organs were to function until permanent organs could be established.
289. At the same session on 25 September 1991, the Great National Assembly of the Serbs of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania also passed a Law on Ministries.⁵²⁴ Article 5 of this law provided for the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose purview was described in

⁵¹⁹ Decision of the Government of the SAO SBZS, 18 August 1991, published in the *Službeni glasnik Srpske oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, 5 February 1992, Year 2, No. 2 (0055-5290-0055-5290).

⁵²⁰ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6360).

⁵²¹ Decision on the Application of Regulations, 30 August 1991, published 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9329-0280-9329).

⁵²² Constitutional Law of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0423-0089-0426).

⁵²³ Law on the Implementation of the Constitutional Law of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0426-0089-0426).

⁵²⁴ Law on Ministries, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0427-0089-0429).

Article 7.⁵²⁵ On the same day, the Great National Assembly elected Goran Hadžić as the President of the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania;⁵²⁶ Ilija Končarević was elected as the President of the Great National Assembly.⁵²⁷

290. On 27 September 1991, the government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania decided to establish staffs and units of civil protection.⁵²⁸ The main staff was to be based in Borovo Selo. On the same day the government headed by the President of the Government, Goran Hadžić, appointed Stojadin Todić commander of the District's civil protection staff.⁵²⁹
291. At its third session on 9 October 1991, the Great National Assembly promulgated a Law on the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁵³⁰ The government replaced the Serb National Council.⁵³¹ At the same session, the Government also enacted a Law on Measures in the Case of a State of Emergency.⁵³² In such cases, the President of the Government was able to enact special measures for the duration of the state of emergency.
292. On 9 or 10 October 1991, the Great National Assembly decided to formally merge the territorial defence forces of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania with the armed forces of the SFRJ.⁵³³ On 17 October 1991, the government of the Serb

⁵²⁵ Article 5 and 7, Law on Ministries, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0427).

⁵²⁶ Decision on the Election of Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and Ministers in the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0430).

⁵²⁷ Decision on the Election of the President of the Great National Assembly of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0427).

⁵²⁸ Decision on the Establishment, Organizational Structure, and Equipment of Staffs and Units and Other Organs of Civil Protection, 27 September 1991, published on 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9330-0280-9331).

⁵²⁹ Decision on the Appointment of the Commander of the District Staff of Civil Protection, 27 September 1991, published on 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9331-0280-9331).

⁵³⁰ Law on the Government of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 9 October 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0431-0089-0433).

⁵³¹ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6374).

⁵³² Law on Measures in the Case of a State of Emergency, 9 October 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0434).

⁵³³ Decision of the Merging of the Territorial Defence of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania with the Armed Forces of the SFRJ, 10 October 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457,

District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania passed a decision on the organization and ambit of the territorial defence and the civil protection.⁵³⁴ The decision described the territorial defence of the Serb District as “part of the unified armed forces of the SFRJ.”

293. In October 1991, the Great National Assembly also asked that the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania be permitted to participate as an equal entity by the Presidency of Yugoslavia.⁵³⁵
294. On 8 November 1991, the Great National Assembly promulgated the Law on Internal Affairs.⁵³⁶ The law was very compact and required the minister of internal affairs to report about the work of the ministry and on the state of security in the SAO to the Great National Assembly. The law noted that the ministry had an active staff and a reserve staff, but otherwise did not elaborate upon the internal structure of the ministry, leaving this to the minister.
295. On 20 November 1991, the JNA and armed forces of the SAO SBZS entered Vukovar.⁵³⁷
296. At its fifth session on 22 November 1991, the Great National Assembly passed the Law on the Temporary Territorial Organization of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and Temporary Local Administration.⁵³⁸ According to Article 11, the Serb District included Vukovar, Beli Manastir and Dalj municipalities. Osijek was also included as a municipality, though with a temporary seat at Tenja, as was Vinkovci, with a temporary seat at Mirkovci.
297. Also on 22 November 1991, the Great National Assembly established two oversight committees: the Committee for People’s Defence and the Committee for Internal Affairs and Security.⁵³⁹

at 0089-0441-0089-0442). There is a discrepancy in the document, as both 9 and 10 October are given as the date of the decision.

⁵³⁴ Decision on the Organization and Activity of the Territorial Defence and the Civil Protection, 17 October 1991, published on 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9332-0280-9334).

⁵³⁵ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6376).

⁵³⁶ Law on Internal Affairs, 8 November 1991, published 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9334-0280-9335).

⁵³⁷ Časlav OČIĆ, “Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991,” in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 422 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6149).

⁵³⁸ Law on the Temporary Territorial Organization of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and Temporary Local Administration, 22 November 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0450-0089-0454).

⁵³⁹ Decision on the Formation, Ambit and Composition of the Committee for People’s Defence and Decision on the Formation, Ambit and Composition of the Committee for Internal Affairs and Security, 22 November 1991, published 5 February 1992 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9337-0280-9338).

298. On 7 January 1991, Jovica STANIŠIĆ spoke to Radovan Karadžić. STANIŠIĆ confirmed that he was capable of appointing people among the Serbs in Croatia.⁵⁴⁰
299. Although part of the RSK after 26 February 1992, the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania continued to exist as a legal entity, with its own statute and Great National Assembly.⁵⁴¹

3. The Establishment of the SAO Western Slavonia

300. Although the Serbs of Western Slavonia initially intended to join the SAO Krajina, a combination of geographical and personal factors led to the establishment of the SAO Western Slavonia on 12 August 1991.⁵⁴² Initial attempts to include Western Slavonia in the SAO SBZS foundered on clashes of personalities in these two areas, in particular that of the president of the government of the SAO Western Slavonia, Veljko Džakula.⁵⁴³
301. In May 1991, Džakula referred to consultations of the Serbs of Western Slavonia with the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević.⁵⁴⁴
302. On 5 October 1991, the TO of SAO Western Slavonia established a police unit “for special purposes” based in Pakrac.⁵⁴⁵
303. On 9 December 1991, a delegation from the SAO Western Slavonia including Veljko Džakula, attended a session of the SFRJ Presidency.⁵⁴⁶ During the meeting, Mile Paspalj, the president of the Assembly of the SAO Western Slavonia, reminded the SFRJ leadership that Serbia had promised to protect Serbs outside Serbia.⁵⁴⁷
304. Documents exist indicating that the SDB of MUP Serbia received detailed information on the situation in Western Slavonia in 1991. On 15 May 1991, the First Administration of the SDB wrote a report about the formation of armed units on the

⁵⁴⁰ Telephone conversation between Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Radovan Karadžić, 7 January 1992 (0324-4664-0324-4670, at 0324-4669).

⁵⁴¹ Decision on the Change and Amendment of the Statute of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 15 November 1993 (0292-0017-0292-0017) and Decision on the Holding of Elections for Deputies of the Great National Assembly of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 15 November 1993 (0292-0017-0292-0017).

⁵⁴² Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005) (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6551).

⁵⁴³ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6264-0184-6266).

⁵⁴⁴ Transcript of Meeting of Regional SDS Committee, held on 8 May 1991 in Smrtići. (0207-7300-0207-7302)

⁵⁴⁵ Staff of the TO of Western Slavonia, 5 October 1991 (2D02-1439-2D02-1439).

⁵⁴⁶ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149).

⁵⁴⁷ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149, at 0280-6111).

territory of Western Slavonia.⁵⁴⁸ This report included an itemized list of equipment, weaponry and ammunition required for the “organized defence and offering of more serious resistance to the forces of the MUP RH.”⁵⁴⁹ On 21 June 1991, an updated report was composed.⁵⁵⁰ On 6 December 1991, the First Administration of the SDB submitted a report on this topic.⁵⁵¹ Reports such as this one were not restricted to observations about policing or civilian intelligence, but rather also included information on the JNA and the TO. Of particular concern were rumours that the Serb civilian population and the local military and Serb civilian leadership were preparing to abandon Western Slavonia and consolidate instead in Eastern Slavonia.

305. Most of the available SDB reports concerning the situation in Western Slavonia are signed with the initials “BP” or “PB.” Based on a later report from the First Administration of the RDB of MUP Serbia, it is likely that these reports were authored by the operative Branko Pavić.⁵⁵² In October 1992, CRDB Kragujevac interviewed the refugee Milorad Ćasić, who in 1991 had been in the “Serb military” near Pakrac.⁵⁵³ Ćasić recalled:

After those events the behaviour of individual organizers of the uprising such as Branko Pavić, the former commander of the police station in Pakrac and Boško Bunčić, the driver of PIK “Pakrac”, both now employees in MUP Serbia in Belgrade, was indicative. Their behaviour after the withdrawal of the Serb army from that territory, the smuggling of vehicles and weapons in Serbia and [their] employment in Belgrade provoked revulsion among most of the fighters.⁵⁵⁴

306. A partial personnel dossier is available for Branko Pavić, who is listed as having been an operative for MUP Serbia from 1 August 1991 until 31 December 1994.⁵⁵⁵ In a decision dated 17 September 1991, Pavić was appointed to the position of “independent operative instructor” in the Fourth Administration of the SDB of MUP Serbia.⁵⁵⁶ On 27

⁵⁴⁸ MUP Serbia, SDB, First Administration, Report on the Formation of Armed Units on the Territory of SO Pakrac and Some Villages on the Territory of SO Daruvar, Novska, Slavonska Požega and Nova Gradiška, 15 May 1991 (0608-4153-0608-0608-4156).

⁵⁴⁹ MUP Serbia, SDB, First Administration, Report on the Formation of Armed Units on the Territory of SO Pakrac and Some Villages on the Territory of SO Daruvar, Novska, Slavonska Požega and Nova Gradiška, 15 May 1991 (0608-4153-0608-0608-4156, at 0608-4155).

⁵⁵⁰ MUP Serbia, SDB, First Administration, Official Note, 21 June 1991 (0608-4159-0608-4159).

⁵⁵¹ MUP Serbia, SDB, First Administration, Information on the Situation on the Battlefield in Western Slavonia, 6 December 1991 (0608-4163-0608-4164).

⁵⁵² MUP Serbia, RDB, First Administration, Official Note, 9 April 1992 (0608-4186-0608-4187).

⁵⁵³ CRDB Kragujevac, Official Note, 28 October 1992 (0607-6484-0607-6485).

⁵⁵⁴ CRDB Kragujevac, Official Note, 28 October 1992 (0607-6484-0607-6485, at 0607-6484). In April 1992 and again in April 1993, a Branko Pavić submitted a report to the Second Administration of MUP Serbia RDB. MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Report of Informant, 22 April 1993 (0608-4549-0608-4553).

⁵⁵⁵ MUP Serbia, Administration for Joint Affairs, Certificate, 30 December 1994 (0641-4526-0641-4544, at 0641-4529).

⁵⁵⁶ MUP Serbia, Decision, 17 September 1991 (0641-4526-0641-4544, at 0641-4532). Compare with Article 38, Number 4 in SR Serbia, RSUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Tasks and Affairs of the State Security Service in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, February 1990 (0611-2345-0611-2616, at 0611-2406).

September 1991, Pavić was designated as an advisor in the Fourth Administration of the SDB of MUP Serbia.⁵⁵⁷

307. On 9 December 1991, Jovica STANIŠIĆ in his capacity as Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs wrote to Minister Sokolović of MUP Serbia. STANIŠIĆ had received new information from the TO and police of Western Slavonia suggesting a worsening of the situation there. STANIŠIĆ's sources had informed him that "if adequate assistance is not offered, the danger exists that the fighters and the population in general will leave the territory of Western Slavonia."⁵⁵⁸
308. On 23 December 1991, Marko Lazović, the deputy chief of the First Administration of the SDB of Serbia, wrote a report about the situation in Western Slavonia.⁵⁵⁹ Lazović was receiving information from operatives who were in the area about the poor performance of the TO in the area and about the "activity of various criminal groups" who were with impunity committing property crimes and other crimes against the civilian population in the area.⁵⁶⁰ The arrival to the area of volunteers, who included members of the Serb Radical Party, was aggravating the situation.⁵⁶¹ One group had allegedly committed a massacre of approximately 100 individuals in the villages of Voćin, Hum, Balinci and Čeralije.⁵⁶² According to the report, the commander of the police station in Voćin, Mile Crnobrnja, might have information about the massacre in these villages.⁵⁶³
309. In a report filed by the SDB on the following day about the Western Slavonia, the deteriorating security situation for Serbs was described, including information about the political and military leadership in SAO Western Slavonia.⁵⁶⁴ This report focused on the consequences of the conflict for Serb civilians, but also noted that armed groups had plundered the houses of Croats.⁵⁶⁵ Criminal actors, including some in the local leadership
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- ⁵⁵⁷ MUP Serbia, Administration for Personnel and Work Relations, Decision, 27 September 1991 (0641-4526-0641-4544, at 0641-4533).
- ⁵⁵⁸ Assistant Minister Jovica STANIŠIĆ to Minister Sokolović, 9 December 1991 (0608-4165-0608-4165).
- ⁵⁵⁹ Report of Marko Lazović, 23 December 1991 (0608-4173-0608-4175); RSUP Serbia, Decision, 2 October 1990 (0611-1584-0611-1584). On 13 April 1992, Lazović was appointed as the chief of the Second Administration of RDB Serbia, and on 28 January 1992 he was confirmed as a senior advisor in the RDB. MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 13 April 1992 (0611-1585-0611-1585); MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 28 January 1993 (0611-1586-0611-1586).
- ⁵⁶⁰ Report of Marko Lazović, 23 December 1991 (0608-4173-0608-4175, at 0608-4173). On criminal groups, see also Security Organ for Western Slavonia, Information, 22 November 1991 (0084-9924-0084-9928).
- ⁵⁶¹ On the arrival of SRS volunteers in Eastern and Western Slavonia, see also USDB Belgrade, Official Note on Conversation with Lj. Petrović, 26 November 1991 (0608-4160-0608-4162); SAO Krajina, Municipal TO Staff Podravska Slatina to SRS Belgrade, 12 October 1991 (0116-9412-0016-9412).
- ⁵⁶² Report of Marko Lazović, 23 December 1991 (0608-4173-0608-4175, at 0608-4174).
- ⁵⁶³ Report of Marko Lazović, 23 December 1991 (0608-4173-0608-4175, at 0608-4175).
- ⁵⁶⁴ MUP Serbia, SDB, Information on the Development of Events in Western Slavonia (0608-4176-0608-4183).
- ⁵⁶⁵ MUP Serbia, SDB, Information on the Development of Events in Western Slavonia (0608-4176-0608-4183, at 0608-4182). See also report from Momir Rauković, Assistant Chief of the 2nd

had misappropriated funds and material assistance sent to the area. The report opined that the JNA did not grasp the gravity of the situation and that the military was therefore insufficiently aiding the local Serb population.⁵⁶⁶

310. On 24 December 1991, the Assembly of the SAO Western Slavonia decided to merge with the SAO Krajina.⁵⁶⁷
311. On 13 January 1992, the Security Administration of the SSNO sent a letter to the SDB of MUP Serbia regarding allegations of abuses by the police in Okučani in Western Slavonia towards Croat civilians and prisoners.⁵⁶⁸ Some of the abuse had allegedly been committed by volunteers stemming from Serbia and by persons wearing Chetnik symbols.⁵⁶⁹
312. Even after the formation of the Republika Srpska Krajina in January 1992, the SAO Western Slavonia continued to convene as late as May 1992.⁵⁷⁰ According to an October 1992 report by the State Security Service of MUP Serbia, the Western Slavonian area continued to be characterized by a high degree of political factionalism and power struggles.⁵⁷¹

B. The Unification of the SAOs and the Establishment of the Republika Srpska Krajina

313. By the end of 1991, the representatives of the SAO Krajina, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO SBZS moved to create one unitary political entity. On 19 December 1991, the Constitutional Assembly of the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) promulgated a constitutional law enabling the passage of a new constitution for the RSK.⁵⁷² The Constitutional Assembly proclaimed the new constitution on the same day.⁵⁷³ Milan Babić was elected as the first president of the RSK.⁵⁷⁴
314. On 2 January 1992, the presidents of the assemblies of the SAO Krajina, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmia jointly proclaimed

Administration of SDB SSUP on displaced persons from Western Slavonia, 17 December 1991 (0608-4166-0608-4172).

⁵⁶⁶ MUP Serbia, SDB, Information on the Development of Events in Western Slavonia, 24 December 1991 (0608-4176-0608-4183, at 0608-4182-0608-4183).

⁵⁶⁷ Decision of the Assembly of the SAO Western Slavonia, 24 December 1991 (0280-8841-0280-8841).

⁵⁶⁸ SSNO Security Administration to MUP Serbia, SDB, 13 January 1992 (0608-4184-0608-4185).

⁵⁶⁹ SSNO Security Administration to MUP Serbia, SDB, 13 January 1992 (0608-4184-0608-4185, at 0608-4185).

⁵⁷⁰ MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195).

⁵⁷¹ MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195). It should be noted that the source for this RDB report is one "D.Ž.V.," which are the initials of Veljko Džakula.

⁵⁷² Decision on the Proclamation of the Constitutional Law for the Promulgation of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 19 December 1991 (0219-6002-0219-6002).

⁵⁷³ Decision on the Proclamation of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 19 December 1991 (0219-6000-0219-6000).

⁵⁷⁴ Časlav OČIĆ, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 423 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6149).

the Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina.⁵⁷⁵ Article 78 of the Constitution placed the president of the RSK in command of the armed forces of the RSK in times of both peace and war.⁵⁷⁶ Article 102 defined the armed forces as the Territorial Defence of the RSK.⁵⁷⁷

315. On 16 February 1992, President Milan Babić was removed from office by the Assembly of the RSK because of his opposition to the Vance Plan.⁵⁷⁸
316. On 26 February 1992, the Assembly of the RSK enacted several amendments to the Constitution.⁵⁷⁹ Amendment I effected the unification of the SAO Krajina, the SAO Western Slavonia and the SAO SBZS. Amendment V reiterated that the neither the Constitution nor other laws of the RSK could be in disagreement with the Constitution and relevant laws of the SFRJ. It should be noted that the SSUP in Belgrade had advance notice of these changes.⁵⁸⁰
317. On 26 February 1992, Goran Hadžić was elected President of the RSK.⁵⁸¹ Hadžić served as President of the RSK until the election of Milan Martić to that post on 23 January 1994.⁵⁸² Two days before Martić was elected, he stated he did not expect to remain president for long, but would instead “hand over the batton [*sic*] to the President of all Serbs, Slobodan Milo[š]evi[ć].”⁵⁸³
318. According to the Constitution of the RSK, the President of the Republic represents the RSK and expresses its state unity.⁵⁸⁴ Articles 78 through 83 of the Constitution describe the functions, authorities and responsibilities of the President of the Republic.⁵⁸⁵ According to Article 78, the President:

⁵⁷⁵ Decision on the Proclamation of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4413); Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424).

⁵⁷⁶ Article 78, Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424, at 0036-4418-0036-4419).

⁵⁷⁷ Article 102, Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424, at 0036-4418-0036-4421).

⁵⁷⁸ Decisions Reached at the Sessions of the Assembly of the RSK on 9, 16 and 25 February 1992 (0207-8204-0207-8205). For the Vance Plan, see Report of UN Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), 11 December 1991 (0031-3261-0031-3282).

⁵⁷⁹ Amendments to the Constitution of the RSK, 26 February 1992, *SGRSK*, No. 2/92 (0216-6106-0216-6107).

⁵⁸⁰ SSUP, The Basis of the Organization of the Service of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina, undated (0280-4616-0280-4622).

⁵⁸¹ Decision on the Election of the President of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 26 February 1992, published in *Službeni Glasnik RSK* on 22 May 1992 (0043-5064-0043-5064).

⁵⁸² Tanjug, “Martić Elected Serb Krajina President,” 25 January 1994 (FBIS) (R033-7607-R033-7607).

⁵⁸³ European Community Monitoring Mission, Daily Monitoring Activity Report, 22 January 1994 (ZA00-5587-ZA00-5589, at ZA00-5587).

⁵⁸⁴ Article 8, Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424, at 0036-4414).

⁵⁸⁵ Articles 78-83, Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424, at 0036-4418-0036-4419).

- proposes members of the government and the Constitutional Court to the Assembly;
- proclaims laws by decree;
- conducts foreign relations;
- commands the armed forces in war and peace, prepares the defence of the Republic, and orders mobilizations;
- in consultation with the President of the Government, proclaims a state of war or imminent threat of war if the Assembly cannot convene;
- during a state of war or imminent threat of war takes decisions from the jurisdiction of the Assembly (such decisions can include restrictions on human rights and can affect the functioning of other government institutions), submitting these for the Assembly's proposal once it can convene;
- can at the suggestion of the Government proclaim a state of emergency;
- grants pardons;
- gives awards and recognitions;
- creates professional and other services necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Presidency;
- performs other activities compatible with the Constitution.

319. The President was elected for a term of five years, with a maximum of two terms permitted. The term could be extended in cases of a state of war or imminent threat of war. Conversely, the term could be brought to an earlier end in cases of impeachment or resignation.

320. On 25 or 26 February 1992, Milan Martić was elected as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska Krajina.⁵⁸⁶ RSK President Goran Hadžić awarded Milan Martić an extraordinary promotion to the rank of General-Colonel of the Serb Army of the Republika Srpska Krajina on 16 July 1992.⁵⁸⁷

321. As previously noted, even after the establishment of the RSK, the previously existing parliaments of SAO SBZS and SAO Western Slavonia sought to preserve a form of continuity in the form of regional government.⁵⁸⁸ The regional differences within the RSK led to political tensions that also affected the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

322. Although the merger or unification of the RSK with Serbia and the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was never attained, the leadership of the RSK continued to nurture hope that this would materialize. On 23 February 1994, Milan Martić wrote to

⁵⁸⁶ Decision on the Election of Milan Martić as Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 25 February 1992 (0280-4830-0280-4830). See also the Decision on the Election of the Prime Minister of the Government and Minister[s] in the Government of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 26 February 1992, published in the *Službeni Glasnik RSK*, 22 May 1992 (0333-3315-0333-3315).

⁵⁸⁷ Promotion of Milan Martić, signed by Goran Hadžić, 16 July 1992 (0207-7680-0207-7680).

⁵⁸⁸ Official Note of MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195).

Mirko Marjanović, who had been given the mandate to form the next government in Serbia.⁵⁸⁹ Martić expressed his desire for a unified state.

XI. The Emergence and Performance of Serb Police Structures in Croatia (1991)

A. SAO Krajina

323. In July 1990, a number of police officers from Knin sent an open letter to Petar Gračanin, the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs, informing him that they did not wish to serve in the police of Croatia.⁵⁹⁰
324. On 7 November 1990, the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Knin endorsed the establishment of a municipal secretariat for internal affairs, thereby placing control of the police at a more local level.⁵⁹¹ The Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Knin informed the Croatian government of this decision and sought its agreement.⁵⁹² In its letter, the Executive Council stated that such a decision was in the legal remit of the government: The Executive Council claimed that it had taken its decision due to the government's refusal to do so despite repeated requests. The Executive Council also asserted that it had at one point received an oral commitment to the establishment of the municipal secretariat for internal affairs from the Croatian minister of internal affairs, Josip Boljkovac. The Executive Council further roundly criticized the attitude and actions of the Croatian government and Ministry of Internal Affairs towards the police and the population of the territory of Knin municipality, which had allegedly aggravated the already tense interethnic situation.
325. On 4 January 1991, the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina passed a decision founding a Secretariat for Internal Affairs (*Sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove*, SUP) with its seat in Knin.⁵⁹³ According to Article 2 of the decision, "This Secretariat alone is responsible for and authorized to carry out all affairs from the area of internal affairs and public security on the territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina."⁵⁹⁴ The SUP

⁵⁸⁹ Letter of Milan Martić, 23 February 1994 (0207-7590-0207-7590).

⁵⁹⁰ Časlav Očić, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 393 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6134).

⁵⁹¹ Letter of the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Knin, 7 November 1990 (0280-9363-0280-9363). See also Časlav Očić, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 404-405 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6140).

⁵⁹² Letter of the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly of Knin to the Government of Croatia, 7 November 1990 (0280-9364-0280-9366).

⁵⁹³ Decision on the Establishment of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2055-0217-2055); Minutes of the Session of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2061-0217-2061); SAO Krajina Executive Council, Notice of the Formation of the SUP of the SAO Krajina, 5 January 1991 (0291-8682-0291-8682).

⁵⁹⁴ Decision on the Establishment of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2055-0217-2055).

encompassed the police stations of Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gračac, Titova Korenica, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni, Glina, Kostajnica and Vojnić. The SUP was tasked to take care of all matters relating to internal affairs, ensuring “all human and civil rights without regard to the religious, racial and national affiliation of the population.”⁵⁹⁵ Coordination with the MUP of Croatia was to occur as needed, but the jurisdiction of the MUP of Croatia and its orders were pronounced null and void for the area of the SAO Krajina. Notification of this change was sent to internal affairs organs in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to the President of the Presidency of the SFRJ.

326. On the same day, Milan Martić was appointed as the head of the SUP in Knin.⁵⁹⁶
327. Article 7 of the SAO Krajina Executive Council decision on the establishment of the SUP for SAO Krajina dictated that the Executive Council would be responsible for elaborating the structure of the SUP and the manner of its work.⁵⁹⁷ On this basis, the Executive Council on 19 January 1991 issued a decree on the internal organization and work of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs.⁵⁹⁸ It should be noted that the actual text of the decree referred to a *Ministry* of Internal Affairs, a shift in terminology that mirrored developments elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Likewise, the organs of internal affairs henceforth adopted the term Public Security Stations at the municipality level, in accordance with a contemporary shift in methodology in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
328. Simultaneously with the establishment of the SUP in Knin, the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina appointed Milan Martić the secretary (i.e. head) of the SUP in Knin.⁵⁹⁹
329. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina was tasked to cover three areas: affairs of state security, affairs of public security, and other internal affairs.⁶⁰⁰ While the SAO Krajina did not accept the remit of MUP Croatia on the territory of SAO Krajina, Article 2 of the Decree made it clear that federal Yugoslav laws and regulations remained in force. In performing its work, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina was to report to the Executive Council of SAO Krajina. Article 6a permitted the minister of internal affairs to create special units of the police (*posebne jedinice milicije*) in cases of an imminent threat of war, a state of war or other extraordinary circumstances. According to Article 7, the minister of internal affairs was responsible to the President of the Government and the Government of SAO Krajina. The minister of internal affairs was further authorized to elaborate the internal organization of the ministry and its activities.

⁵⁹⁵ SAO Krajina Executive Council, Notice of the Formation of the SUP of the SAO Krajina, 5 January 1991 (0291-8682-0291-8682).

⁵⁹⁶ Decision on the Appointment of the Secretary for Internal Affairs of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2060-0217-2060).

⁵⁹⁷ Decision on the Establishment of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2055-0217-2055).

⁵⁹⁸ Decree on the Internal Organization and Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 19 January 1991 (0280-3846-0280-3850).

⁵⁹⁹ Minutes of the Session of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, 4 January 1991 (0217-2061-0217-2061).

⁶⁰⁰ Decree on the Internal Organization and Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 19 January 1991 (0280-3846-0280-3850).

According to Article 14a, the SAO Krajina and the municipalities would finance the ministry.

330. The MUP of the SAO Krajina had its seat in Knin.⁶⁰¹ A public security station (*Stanica javne bezbjednosti*, SJB) was to be established for each municipality in the SAO Krajina. The minister of internal affairs would appoint the heads of these stations in agreement with the Executive Committee of the SAO Krajina.
331. The SAO Krajina MUP, like all other ministries of internal affairs in the former Yugoslavia, had both a public security service (*Služba javne bezbjednosti*) and a state security service (*Služba državne bezbjednosti*, SDB). As early as February 1991, the SAO Krajina was operating its own "State Security Service."⁶⁰²
332. In March 1991, two violent altercations occurred between forces representing the police of the Republic of Croatia and the police of the SAO Krajina. The first of the two incidents took place at Pakrac in Western Slavonia on 3 March 1991, and led in Belgrade to calls from the Serb Radical Party for more assertive assistance to the Serb population of Croatia.⁶⁰³
333. On 31 March 1991, an incident took place at the Plitvice National Park in Croatia between the police of Croatian MUP and the police of the SUP of the SAO Krajina.⁶⁰⁴ Already on 15 February 1991, Martić had written to the SFRJ Presidency, the SSUP, the SSNO and the MUPs of both Croatia and Serbia, stating that he regarded a special police unit of MUP Croatia as "a paramilitary formation on this territory."⁶⁰⁵
334. According to a contemporaneous Yugoslav military report, the incident resulted from the "gradual unification" of predominantly Serb municipalities and the preparation of the armed defence of the SAO Krajina in reaction to Croatian moves towards independence.⁶⁰⁶ "The immediate cause for the armed conflict at Plitvice is the decision of the municipal assembly of Titova Korenica to proclaim the Plitvice lakes a public enterprise of the so-called SAO Krajina, and the expressed readiness to defend this territory even at the price of armed conflict."⁶⁰⁷ On the Croatian side, forces of MUP

⁶⁰¹ Decree on the Internal Organization and Work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 19 January 1991 (0280-3846-0280-3850).

⁶⁰² Dispatch of SAO Krajina SUP to SFRJ Presidency, SSUP, SSNO, the MUP of Croatia and the Republican SUP of Belgrade, 15 February 1991 (0217-0646-0217-0646).

⁶⁰³ USDB, Belgrade, Third Department, Official Note, 3 March 1991 (0632-6341-0632-6344).

⁶⁰⁴ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6296-0184-6297); Časlav Očić, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 418 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6147). See also proclamation of SDS Zagreb, 2 April 1991 (0101-9525-0101-9525).

⁶⁰⁵ Dispatch of SAO Krajina SUP to SFRJ Presidency, SSUP, SSNO, the MUP of Croatia and the Republican SUP of Belgrade, 15 February 1991, 15 February 1991 (0217-0646-0217-0646).

⁶⁰⁶ JNA(?) Analysis of Actions of MUP Croatia on the Wider Territory of Plitvica, 31 March 1991 (?) (0608-4199-0608-4207).

⁶⁰⁷ JNA(?) Analysis of Actions of MUP Croatia on the Wider Territory of Plitvica, 31 March 1991 (?) (0608-4199-0608-4207, at 0608-4205).

Croatia were dispatched with the goal of reasserting control over the area, and arguably preparing for a direct armed confrontation with Knin.⁶⁰⁸ The military report concluded that, despite pressure from the JNA for both parties to cease and desist, there was a significant danger of a full-scale “civil war of broader measures which would result in numerous human victims and migrations of people accompanied by the creation of ethnically pure areas.”⁶⁰⁹

335. During the incident at Plitvice, the Croatian authorities arrested several persons, including Goran Hadžić.⁶¹⁰ At a press conference of MUP Croatia, the police stated that there were indications that Hadžić and his colleague from the SDS, Borivoje Savić, had spent the night at Plitvice, and that they were forced by circumstances to join the armed struggle “on the side of the extremists.”⁶¹¹ MUP Croatia had discussed this with “the members of the main leadership of the SDS for Slavonia and Baranja [*sic*] – Ilija Šašić, Veljko Džakula and Duško Ećimović, who offered assurances that the greater part of the SDS was of the position that all disagreements should be resolved through negotiations, and not with violence. This is also testified to by a comment in the notes of Goran Hadžić (which was found on him during the arrest).”⁶¹² Hadžić and Savić were released on 3 April.⁶¹³
336. On 31 March 1991, in a dispatch sent to the SFRJ Presidency, Milan Martić characterized the incident as an act of “armed aggression” by MUP Croatia.⁶¹⁴ Martić reiterated this view on 25 April 1991 in a dispatch sent to the SFRJ Presidency, SSUP, the Federal Secretariat for People’s Defence (*Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu*, SSNO) and the MUPs of Croatia and Serbia.⁶¹⁵
337. On 1 April 1991, Babić ordered the mobilization of the TO of the SAO Krajina and of volunteer units.⁶¹⁶
338. On 12 April 1991, Milan Tepavčević, the Assistant Chief of the SDB of MUP Serbia, noted that two convoys with weapons, ammunition and military equipment had been sent to Knin with the approval of Minister of Internal Affairs Sokolović.⁶¹⁷

⁶⁰⁸ In justifying their actions, the Croatian authorities referred to acts of disturbance of “public order and peace” and to “terrorist violence” on the part of the Serbs at Plitvice. Press conference of MUP Croatia in *Vjesnik*, 3 April 1991 (0266-8405-0266-8407A).

⁶⁰⁹ JNA(?) Analysis of Actions of MUP Croatia on the Wider Territory of Plitvica, 31 March 1991 (?) (0608-4199-0608-4207, at 0608-4199).

⁶¹⁰ Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005), (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6568 and 0624-6570).

⁶¹¹ Press conference of MUP Croatia in *Vjesnik*, 3 April 1991 (0266-8405-0266-8407A).

⁶¹² Press conference of MUP Croatia in *Vjesnik*, 3 April 1991 (0266-8405-0266-8407A).

⁶¹³ FBIS, “Two Serb Democratic Party Members Released,” 3 April 1991 (0274-0234-0274-0234).

⁶¹⁴ Dispatch of Milan Martić, 31 March 1991 (0217-0655-0217-0655). See also comments of Milan Babić to Radio Knin, 3 April 1991 (R108-7429-R108-7432).

⁶¹⁵ Dispatch of Milan Martić, 25 April 1991 (0217-0645-0217-0645).

⁶¹⁶ Order of Milan Babić, President of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, 1 April 1991 (0217-2109-0217-2109).

339. Of the 15 ministries established pursuant to Article 5 of the Law on Ministries promulgated on 29 May 1991, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was listed second, following the Ministry of Defence.⁶¹⁸ According to Article 7, “the Ministry of Internal Affairs performs the affairs of administration related to: the security of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina and other affairs of discovery and prevention of activities directed towards the subversion or destruction of the constitutionally confirmed order; protection of life, security of persons and property and other affairs of security of the citizens of the Serb Autonomous Region Krajina.”⁶¹⁹
340. On 29 May 1991, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina also passed the Law on the Application of Legal Regulations of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina.⁶²⁰ In this respect, the Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia implicitly became the relevant law for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina until the adoption of its own law on internal affairs. At the time of the establishment of the SAO Krajina Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 1989 Law on Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was still in effect;⁶²¹ this was superseded by the new Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia enacted on 17 July 1991.⁶²² The application of the new law on the territory of the SAO Krajina was made explicit with retroactive force in a decree of the SAO Krajina Government on 1 August 1991.⁶²³ This was done concurrently with a blanket decision to apply the structure of political organizations of Serbia and the Law of Defence of Serbia to the SAO Krajina.⁶²⁴
341. On 29 May 1991, the SAO Krajina Assembly authorized the establishment of special purpose police units.⁶²⁵ These units were separate from both the public security and state security services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although formally within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the special purpose police units were in practice under the control of the Ministry of Defence, a practice facilitated by the dual-hatting of Milan Martić

⁶¹⁷ Milan Tepavčević, Assistant Chief of the SDB, MUP Serbia, Official Note, 12 April 1991 (1D04-1220-1D04-1220).

⁶¹⁸ Article 5, Law on the Ministries of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1900-0214-1905, at 0214-1901).

⁶¹⁹ Article 7, Law on the Ministries of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1900-0214-1905, at 0214-190).

⁶²⁰ Law on the Application of Legal Regulations of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0364-6115-0364-6116).

⁶²¹ Republic of Serbia, Law on Internal Affairs, 20 July 1989, published in *Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije*, 22 July 1989 (0293-1436-0293-1452).

⁶²² Republic of Serbia, Law on Internal Affairs, 17 July 1991, published in *Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije*, 25 July 1991 (0046-1930-0046-1944).

⁶²³ Decision on the Application of the Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia on the territory of the Serb Autonomous District Krajina, 1 August 1991 (0217-2066-0217-2066).

⁶²⁴ Decision on the Application of the Law on Political Organizations of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 1 August 1991 (0217-2184-0217-2184); Decision on the Application of the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 1 August 1991 (0217-2185-0217-2186).

⁶²⁵ Decision on the Formation of Units for Special Purposes of the MUP of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina under the Name “Police of Krajina” [*Milicija Krajine*] Which Are Placed under the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, 29 May 1991 (0214-1921-0214-1921).

as Minister of both Internal Affairs and Defence. As such, they were also referred to colloquially as “Martić’s men” (*Martićevci*).⁶²⁶ According to Article 2 of the 29 May 1991 decision establishing the special purpose units, “the task of ‘the police of Krajina [*milicija Krajine*] is the defence of the territorial integrity of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina, the protection of vital buildings, district institutions and other tasks from the domain of internal affairs.”⁶²⁷ Personnel data on the members of the special purpose police units indicates that similar units – or a previous version of the same unit – existed before 29 May 1991.⁶²⁸ On 2 August 1991, President Milan Babić issued a decree on the insignias members of the SAO Krajina armed forces, which included the SAO Krajina MUP units for special purposes.⁶²⁹

342. According to Article 5 of the Decision on the Application of the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, “the Territorial Defence and the units for special purposes of Ministry of Internal Affairs constitute the armed forces of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina.”⁶³⁰ In an interview with the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* in July 1991, Martić accepted that the police of SAO Krajina could be seen as the nucleus of a Serb army.⁶³¹ Martić explained that the police had a regular (active) and a reserve staff, as well as special units. He acknowledged the existence of the special police colloquially known as the “*Knindže*” commanded by a “Captain” whose name Martić would not reveal. Martić referred to the ongoing training of various types of military units and the availability of assault helicopters. The most significant material assistance had been received from Serbia.

343. During an approximately month-long interlude in June 1991, Dušan Vještica replaced Milan Martić as Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK. According to a contemporary report by the SDB of the SAO Krajina MUP, the appointment of Vještica by Babić energized a conflict between him and Martić.⁶³² The rank and file of the MUP refused to acknowledge the new minister, who was allegedly compromised by economic and criminal affairs. The SDB reported that it was engaged in gathering more compromising material on Vještica. On 27 June 1991, Martić was (re)appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina.⁶³³

⁶²⁶ Speech of Brigade Commander of 24th TO Brigade, 1 November 1992 (0280-7884-0280-7888, at 0280-7886).

⁶²⁷ Decision on the Formation of Units for Special Purposes of the MUP of the Serb Autonomous District of Krajina under the Name “Police of Krajina” [*Milicija Krajine*] Which Are Placed under the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, 29 May 1991 (0214-1921-0214-1921).

⁶²⁸ Letter of SUP Knin to RSK MUP, 12 September 1991 (0400-4236-0400-4241).

⁶²⁹ President of the Government of the SAO Krajina, Decree on the Insignias of Members of the Armed Forces (Territorial Defence, Units for Special Purposes) of the SAO Krajina, 2 August 1991 (0217-2074-0217-2074).

⁶³⁰ Decision on the Application of the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 1 August 1991 (0217-2185-0217-2186).

⁶³¹ Interview with Milan Martić, *Politika*, 7 July 1991 (0364-6122-0364-6122).

⁶³² Report of SAO Krajina SDB, 11 June 1991 (0280-8770-0280-8771).

⁶³³ Decision on the Election of Milan Martić as Minister of Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina, 27 June 1991 (0214-1944-0214-1944).

344. By the end of July 1991, the MUP of the SAO Krajina had with extensive assistance from Serbia established a “unit for special purposes” (*jedinica za posebne namjene* or JPN), which was participating in combat operations.⁶³⁴ This unit included a person referred to as “the Montenegrin” (*Crnogorac*), which was a reference to Živojin Ivanović.⁶³⁵ In combat reports filed at the end of July 1991, multiple members of the unit identified the JPN of the SAO Krajina as belonging to the Republic of Serbia.
345. On 1 August 1991, the President of the SAO Krajina government Milan Babić informed municipal leaders and commanders of the municipal TO of SAO Krajina that he was the commander of all armed forces of the SAO Krajina.⁶³⁶ On 8 August 1991, a working group of the Association of Serbs from Croatia in Belgrade drafted a detailed report about the organization of the police and the military in the SAO Krajina.⁶³⁷
346. In the context of the power struggle between Milan Martić and Milan Babić, the latter in August 1991 attempted to disband the SAO Krajina MUP SDB and replace it with an agency for national security under the direct control of the SAO Krajina government.⁶³⁸ Although this proved unsuccessful, the SDB remained a point of contention and was repeatedly criticized for lacking professionalism and for incompetence.⁶³⁹ In March 1992, a Chief Inspector of the SSUP SDB wrote that “the security service of the SAO Krajina,

⁶³⁴ Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Nikola Pupovac, 26 July 1991 (0468-8162-0468-8162); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Damir Vladić, 26 July 1991 (0468-8164-0468-8165); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Nikola Simić, 26 July 1991 (0468-8166-0468-8167); Report of Stevo Vukša, 26 July 1991 (0468-8168-0468-8168); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina, Report of Dragan Olaić, 26 July 1991 (0468-8169-0468-8169); Report of Borjan Vučković, 26 July 1991 (0468-8170-0468-8170); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina, Report of Saša Medaković, 26 July 1991 (0468-8163-0468-8163); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Zoran Herceg, 31 July 1991 (0468-8171-0468-8174); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Neven Laka, 26-27 June 1991 (0468-8175-0468-8175); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Rade Božić, 26 July 1991 (0468-8177-0468-8178); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Boža Novaković, 26 July 1991 (0468-8179-0468-8179); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina, Report of Goran Komazec, 26 July 1991 (0468-8180-0468-8181); Republic of Serbia [*sic*] SAO Krajina JPN, Report of Mišo Popović, 26 July 1991 (0468-8182-0468-8183); SAO Krajina, TO Staff of SAO Krajina to “Frenki” and other recipients, 27 July 1991 (0419-0548-0419-0549). See also SAO Krajina TO Glina Brigade Command, Information on Tasks of the Unit of Special Purposes in Glina, 13 February 1992 (0218-9139-0218-9139). In this report, a “unit for special tasks” was referred to as “Šilt’s group” (*Šiltova grupa*). This was a reference to Siniša Martić-Šilt. See letter of Siniša Martić-Šilt, 22 November 1991 (0218-9138-0218-9138).

⁶³⁵ Report of Stevo Vukša, 26 July 1991 (0468-8168-0468-8168); Report of Radio Knin, 31 July 1991 (0113-3911-0113-3919, at 0113-3914).

⁶³⁶ President of Government of SAO Krajina, Notification on the Enactment of the Decision on the Application of the Law of Defence of the Republic of Serbia on the Territory of the SAO Krajina, 2 August 1991 (0207-7903-0207-7903).

⁶³⁷ Draft of the Association of Serbs from Croatia in Belgrade, 8 August 1991 (0217-0888-0217-0894).

⁶³⁸ Decision on the Disbanding of the State Security Service on the Territory of the Serb Autonomous District Krajina, 1 August 1991, published in *Glasnik Krajine* on 26 August 1991 (0214-1950-0214-1950).

⁶³⁹ See Operational Information of SAO Krajina MUP SDB, Benkovac Department, 11 November 1991 (0217-2068-0217-2068).

headed by [Dušan] Orlović, is in principle at the amateurish level of hearsay and is incapable of more serious opposition to the security services of Croatia.”⁶⁴⁰

347. On 9 September 1991, police in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrested Milan Martić on a Croatian arrest warrant.⁶⁴¹ His release was secured through the efforts of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, chief of the Serbian State Security Service Jovica STANIŠIĆ, President of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadžić and others.⁶⁴²
348. On 18 October 1991, Milan Martić, acting in his capacity as the Minister of Defence of the SAO Krajina, sent a joint request for ammunition and military equipment with TO Commander Savo Radulović to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia.⁶⁴³
349. On 9 October 1991, the President of the SAO Krajina government Milan Babić ordered that all police units be subordinated to the Territorial Defence for the purposes of planning and executing combat activities.⁶⁴⁴ Babić based this decision upon Article 104 of the SFRJ Law on All People’s Defence which provided for the use of police for combat activities in a state of imminent threat of war or a state of war.
350. On 30 November 1991, the Government of the SAO Krajina promulgated a Law on Defence.⁶⁴⁵ According to Article 10, the Ministry of Internal Affairs “1. organizes and implements preparations for defence and for work in the case of an imminent threat of war and in war; 2. organizes, prepares and plans the use of the police in war, in a case of imminent threat of war and state of emergency.”
351. On 1 December 1991, the Government of the SAO Krajina enacted a new Law on Internal Affairs.⁶⁴⁶ The law was divided into four sections: 1. basic provisions, 2. the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 3. provisions on employment, disciplinary responsibility and

⁶⁴⁰ SSUP SDB, Third Administration, Newer Intelligence and Observations Connected to the Security Situation on the Territory of the Bihać Region, 23 March 1992 (B003-1440-B003-1452, at B003-1452).

⁶⁴¹ SRBiH MUP report, 9 September 1991 (0323-7669-0323-7672). There is some indication that the internal organization of the RSK MUP State Security Service was only finalized in 1993, and that the Service remained without fully functional analytical and technical services as of April 1994. RSK MUP RDB, Report on the Work of the RDB of RSK MUP for 1993, 25 April 1994 (0280-4700-0280-4702).

⁶⁴² Transcript of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 8 September 1991 (0206-6190-0206-6192); transcript of telephone conversation between Milan Babić and Radovan Karadžić, 8 September 1991 (0219-4704-0219-4707); transcript of intercepted conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 September 1991 (0206-6173-0206-6176) and 20 December 1991 (?) (0092-3187-0092-3189).

⁶⁴³ Main Staff of the TO of the SAO Krajina to Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, 18 September 1991 (0107-5269-0107-5278).

⁶⁴⁴ Order of the President of the SAO Government Milan Babić, 9 October 1991 (0207-7929-0207-7929).

⁶⁴⁵ Law on Defence of the SAO Krajina, 30 November 1991, published in *Glasnik Krajine* on 2 December 1991 (0363-9723-0363-9742).

⁶⁴⁶ Law on Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina, 31 [sic!] November 1991 (0217-2213-0217-2227); Decree on the Proclamation of the Law of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina, 1 December 1991 (0217-2212-0217-2212).

training and equipping of employees, and 4. transitory and closing provisions. The present analysis will only highlight certain aspects of the law.

352. Article 1 of the law defined internal affairs as “affairs confirmed by law, through the performance of which the responsible organs of the SAO Krajina realize the security of the Krajina and its citizens and secure the realization of the other rights of our citizens confirmed by the constitution and laws.” Article 2 provided for the equal protection of all citizens.
353. The Law on Internal Affairs provided relatively little detailed information on the internal structure and work of the Ministry, areas which Article 6 and 7 left the minister to determine. The government was to confirm the structure of the ministry as determined by the minister. According to Article 9 of the law, the minister of internal affairs was obliged to submit a report on the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs upon the demand of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina.
354. Article 11 of the law permitted the detention of individuals who violated public order and peace and thereby threatened the security of other citizens or the defence and security of the SAO Krajina. The law specified that such detentions should occur only if this disturbance or threat could not be remedied by other means. The detention could not exceed 24 hours, and Articles 11 and 12 provided further details on the protection of the rights of detained persons.
355. Article 15 permitted officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in special circumstances such as massive episodes of crime to restrict or forbid the movement of persons on particular public places or other areas. The same article could also be used to confine persons to their residences.
356. Article 17 made the Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for security during a state of emergency, with the Ministry responsible to the President of the Government. Article 23 regulated the use of firearms by employees of the Ministry. Article 27 of the law provided for a reserve staff of police for use in the case of an imminent threat of war or a state of war, while Article 28 regulated the manner in which the Minister could use the reserve staff of the Ministry. The reserve staff was to be constituted from military conscripts who fulfilled the legal requirements for work in the ministry. Articles 30 and 31 prescribed the manner of cooperation with other organs of internal affairs in the “Federation.”
357. On 9 December 1991, a delegation from the SAO Krajina including Milan Babić and Milan Martić, attended a session of the SFRJ Presidency.⁶⁴⁷ At this meeting, the SAO Krajina leadership articulated its opposition to the stationing of UN peacekeepers on the territory of the SAO Krajina, to the withdrawal of the JNA from the SAO Krajina and to the proposed monitoring of the police in the Serb Autonomous Districts by the UN.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁷ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149).

⁶⁴⁸ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149, at 0280-6141-0280-6137).

B. SAO Western Slavonia

358. On 22 February 1991, the Municipal Assembly of Pakrac voted to join the SAO Krajina, and in doing so, placed the police in Pakrac under the control of the SUP of the SAO Krajina.⁶⁴⁹
359. In December 1991, the authorities in the SAO Western Slavonia experienced difficulty retaining staff, as numerous police officers left the area for Eastern Slavonia or Serbia.⁶⁵⁰
360. At the beginning of 1992, Krsto Žarković and Milovan Stevilović were tasked to organize the police of Western Slavonia, with Žarković being appointed as the chief of operational affairs.⁶⁵¹ On 24 January 1992, Milan Martić issued an order forming a regional SUP in Western Slavonia.⁶⁵² This was also ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel General FNU Vuković of the Security Organ of Military Post 4022 in Banja Luka.⁶⁵³ Žarković was on 1 July 1992 appointed as the Assistant Minister of RSK MUP for the area of Western Slavonia.⁶⁵⁴
361. In July 1992, the SUP at Pakrac reported to RSK MUP about significant operational problems.⁶⁵⁵ As of October 1992, the RDB of MUP Serbia reported on persistent political quarrels surrounding the police in Western Slavonia, with substantial disagreements between the leader of the SUP, Krsto Žarković, and the political leadership.⁶⁵⁶ The report indicated that these disagreements were to some extent connected to the larger political struggle between Milan Babić and Milan Martić.

C. SAO SBZS

362. As elsewhere in Croatia, the control of policing was a contested issue in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia. By March 1991, federal authorities were trying to calm tensions between Croat and Serb police and political leaders in Eastern Slavonia. The control of the police in Vukovar was a particular point of contestation.⁶⁵⁷ Serb political leaders accused the Croats of packing the police station with additional Croat police

⁶⁴⁹ Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005), (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6551).

⁶⁵⁰ Information Report of MUP Serbia SDB, First Administration, 6 December 1991 (0608-4163-0608-4164A).

⁶⁵¹ Biographies of Krsto Žarković, undated (0414-2841-0414-2842 and 0414-2770-0414-2770).

⁶⁵² RSK MUP, Decision on the Formation of the Regional SUP, 24 January 1992 (0280-8842-0280-8842).

⁶⁵³ Order of Lieutenant-Colonel General FNU Vuković of the Security Organ of Military Post 4022, Banja Luka, 24 January 1992 (0280-8840-0280-8840).

⁶⁵⁴ Biography of Krsto Žarković, undated (0414-2770-0414-2770).

⁶⁵⁵ Report of SUP Pakrac to RSK MUP, 23 July 1992 (0414-2771-0414-2776).

⁶⁵⁶ MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195). It should be noted that the source for this RDB report is one "D.Ž.V.," which are the initials of Veljko Džakula.

⁶⁵⁷ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6284-0184-6285).

officers. On 26 March, the Serb National Council of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania demanded that half of the police officers at the SUP in Vukovar be Serbs.⁶⁵⁸

363. After the incident at Plitvice on 31 March 1991, the Serb National Council on 1 April called on active and retired police officers of Serb nationality to form a police force.⁶⁵⁹ On that day, representatives of the SDS and the MUP of Croatia met for negotiations.⁶⁶⁰ These negotiations were predicated on the release of Goran Hadžić and Borivoje Savić, which occurred on 3 April.⁶⁶¹
364. On 2 May 1991, an armed confrontation between the MUP of Croatia and the local Serb police took place at Borovo Selo near Vukovar.⁶⁶² As was the case at Plitvice, the Croatian police had attempted to reassert their control over an area when fighting erupted.⁶⁶³ Together with the earlier incidents at Plitvice and Pakrac, the clash at Borovo Selo contributed significantly to a deterioration of the relations between Croats and Serbs in Croatia. In April 1991, the SDB in Niš in Serbia had information about the presence at Borovo Selo of members of the Serb Chetnik Movement from the area of Niš at Borovo Selo in April 1991.⁶⁶⁴
365. After the incident at Borovo Selo, the Serb National Council announced that there was no alternative to the formation of armed volunteer formations and the arming of the Serb nation in the area.⁶⁶⁵ This was viewed as an unfortunate contingency for the case that the JNA could not or would not be able or willing to protect the Serbs.
366. Of the 15 ministries established pursuant to Article 5 of the Law on Ministries promulgated on 25 September 1991 by the Great National Assembly of Ministry of the Serbs of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was listed second, following the Ministry of Defence.⁶⁶⁶ According to Article 7, "the Ministry of Internal Affairs performs the affairs of state administration which relate to the protection of the security of the SO [Serb District] of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, the discovery and prevention of activities aimed against the order of the SO of Slavonia,
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- ⁶⁵⁸ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6296).
- ⁶⁵⁹ FBIS, "Serbs in Borovo Region Form Police Force," 1 April 1991 (0274-0216-0274-0216).
- ⁶⁶⁰ FBIS, "SDS, MUP Officials Hold Talks," 1 April 1991 (0274-0218-0274-0218).
- ⁶⁶¹ FBIS, "Two Serb Democratic Party Members Released," 3 April 1991 (0274-0234-0274-0234).
- ⁶⁶² Časlav Očić, "Hronika srpske Krajine, 28. februar 1989 – 19. decembar 1991," in *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Knin-Belgrade, Srpsko kulturno društvo, 1996), 396-399 (0683-6129-0683-6149, at 0683-6136-0683-6137); Nikica Barić, *Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj, 1990-1995* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2005) (0624-6455-0624-6724, at 0624-6570). On the situation in Borovo selo, see also Provincial SUP AP Vojvodina, Informational Report, 11 April 1991 (Y034-5908-Y034-5916).
- ⁶⁶³ See interview with Goran Hadžić in *Borovo*, 2 May 1996 (0357-7805-0357-7806).
- ⁶⁶⁴ SDB Sector Niš, Annual Report on the Work of SDB Sector Niš in 1991, 12 January 1992 (Y036-7534-Y036-7537, at Y036-7537).
- ⁶⁶⁵ Ilija Petrović, *Srpsko nacionalno vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srema* (Novi Sad: Galeb, 1994) (0184-6231-0184-6498, at 0184-6309).
- ⁶⁶⁶ Law on Ministries, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0427-0089-0429).

Baranja and Western Sylvania, the protection of the lives and personal and property security of citizens” and a range of other matters related to internal affairs.⁶⁶⁷ The Great National Assembly chose Borislav Bogunović as Minister of Internal Affairs on the same day.⁶⁶⁸

367. In a report in mid-October 1991, the intelligence and security organ of the SSNO reported on allegations that Bogunović was selling weapons to inhabitants of the SAO SBZS, as well as food that had arrived as humanitarian donations.⁶⁶⁹
368. During the autumn of 1991, the SAO SBZS hosted a variety of Yugoslav and Serb armed formations, including the JNA, the TO of the SAO SBZS, the police of the SAO SBZS and paramilitary groups.⁶⁷⁰ On 1 October 1991, in a military informational report Colonel Stevan Mitrevski described the presence of Željko Ražnatović “Arkan” at Erdut. According to the information gathered by Mitrevski, JNA personnel in the area believed that Arkan “works with the full support of the SDB of Serbia.” Mitrevski proposed that the JNA take “appropriate measures” towards Arkan in order that the JNA distance itself from his activities. A military intelligence report of 18 October 1991 indicated that Arkan and his “Serb Voluntary Guard” (*Srpska dobrovoljačka garda*) had personally claimed that he received weapons, ammunition and other material from both the MUP and the Ministry of Defence of Serbia.⁶⁷¹ Ražnatović claimed to be redistributing this assistance to the TO staffs in Erdut, Sarvaš and Borovo Selo.
369. A subsequent report of the Centre of the State Security Division at Novi Sad discussed the presence of paramilitary forces of the Serb Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, or SRS) of Vojislav Šešelj in eastern Slavonia and other areas of what became the Republika Srpska Krajina.⁶⁷² According to this report, these forces had been present since the outbreak of armed hostilities, later joining the regular formations of the armed forces of the RSK. In August 1991, Šešelj publicly welcomed the creation of the SAO SBZS, calling

⁶⁶⁷ Law on Ministries, 25 September 1991, published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0427-0089-0429).

⁶⁶⁸ Decision on the Election of Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and Ministers in the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 25 September 1991 published 19 December 1991 in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 1, No. 1 (0089-0422-0089-0457, at 0089-0430).

⁶⁶⁹ Report of Intelligence and Security Organ of the SSNO, 13 October 1991 (0608-2331-0608-2335).

⁶⁷⁰ Informational Note of the Logistics Sector, 1 October 1991 (0340-4868-0340-4869); letter of thanks from SAO SBZS Local Community Mirkovci to Serb Radical Party, 11 August 1991 (0339-4974-0339-4974).

⁶⁷¹ Informational Note of the 1st Military District Security Organ, 18 October 1991 (0340-4872-0340-4873).

⁶⁷² Report of CRDB Novi Sad, April 1995 (0632-2076-0632-2089). See also the official magazine of the SRS, *Velika Srbija*, No. 12, Year 3, February 1992 (0041-3135-0041-3202) and *Velika Srbija*, No. 11, Year 2, 11 September 1991 (0065-3126-0065-3131). On paramilitary formations linked to the SRS, see undated (1993?) report of the VJ on paramilitary formations created by opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro (0214-1307-0214-1317).

it and the SAO Krajina the legitimate representatives of the Serb nation in Croatia.⁶⁷³ In November 1991, Šešelj gave an interview in which he spoke of excellent cooperation between his forces and the police and other authorities of the SAO Krajina.⁶⁷⁴

370. On 23 September 1991, Željko Čizmić, the Commander of the police station (*stanica milicije*, SM) Dalj, reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs of SAO SBZS that the "President of the AO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania" had come to SM Dalj accompanied by Željko Ražnatović "Arkan" and twenty of his men.⁶⁷⁵ According to Čizmić, Hadžić and Ražnatović released two men from detention, while Ražnatović and his men removed eleven other persons from the prison. No explanation or documentation was provided by Hadžić for this.

371. On 2 October 1991, Željko Čizmić ceased to be the Commander of SM Dalj. According to the decision ending his tenure in that post, "Commander of SM Dalj Željko Čizmić has already for a long time expressed his desire not to be commander, and to return to [his] work as an operative, because he did this earlier and would be able to give the most as an operative."⁶⁷⁶ Until a new commander could be named, Čizmić's deputy was to function as interim commander. Nonetheless, in an official note of SM Dalj on 5 October 1991, Čizmić continued to sign as Commander. This official note was composed in respect of an incident on the previous evening when Arkan and a group of his men had again appeared at SM Dalj, surrounding the station. Arkan had presented himself as the commander of the TO. According to the note, Arkan and his men had later removed 12 dead prisoners and 3 living prisoners from the police station and taken them to an unknown location.⁶⁷⁷

372. Events in Dalj also drew the attention of the State Security Service in neighbouring Vojvodina (Serbia). In an official note of the SDB Department at Sombor on 15 October 1991, the situation at Dalj was described by a confidential, reliable source.⁶⁷⁸ According to this source, Željko Ražnatović "Arkan" led a group of 40-50 persons based at Erdut.

About 20 days ago, he together with Goran Hadžić, the President of the Government of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania and a group of his own men removed from the prison at Dalj controlled by the police of Slavonia 13 persons and shot them at the Danube. On 3 October Ražnatović with his people in the same prison killed 15 imprisoned persons, and on Saturday 5 October he killed 13, and on Sunday 6 October one person. About 10 days ago, he seized the truck owned by some private person from Slovenia who was transporting leather jackets. The

⁶⁷³ Informational Note of SDB Serbia, Belgrade, Third Department, 15 August 1991 (0632-6347-0632-6349).

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with Vojislav Šešelj in *Pogledi*, 29 November 1991, reprinted in Vojislav Šešelj, *Politika kao izazov savesti* (0335-4376-0335-4380, at 0335-4379).

⁶⁷⁵ SM Dalj Commander Željko Čizmić to the Minister of Internal Affairs of SAO SBZS, 23 September 1991 (0081-7062-0081-7062).

⁶⁷⁶ Decision of the MUP of SAO SBZS, 2 October 1991 (R109-3092-R109-3092).

⁶⁷⁷ Official Note of SM Dalj, 5 October 1991 (0200-0609-0200-0609). See also note of 5 October 1991 signed by Milorad Stričević (0081-7525-0081-7525).

⁶⁷⁸ Official Note of SDB Department Sombor, 15 October 1991 (0632-1488-0632-1490).

jackets were sold on the black market, and Ražnatović gave the truck to Pavle Milovanović –Paja, the commander of the defence of Dalj.

373. The same note of the SDB Department at Sombor identified Milorad Stričević as a repeated criminal offender leading a group of the “security organ” attached to the defence staff at Dalj.⁶⁷⁹ The official note made mention of violent and cruel behaviour by Stričević in the course of “investigations” carried out by him and his men. People in the area referred to Stričević and his men as “the space police” (*svemirska policija*). Another person active in Dalj, Bora Berković (aka Boško Orlović) was a criminal who had allegedly been offered money by Bora Milinković, the SAO SBZS Minister for Religious Matters, to kill a source. Berković had allegedly worked for the Yugoslav State Security Service in Germany and had acquired a new identity through the Service.
374. According to another official note composed by the SDB Department at Sombor on 15 October 1991, a group of 300 TO members from Dalj had on that date confronted members of the TO staff, ministers of the SAO SBZS and Arkan with a petition on the unacceptable conditions that these TO members allegedly faced.⁶⁸⁰ Among the grievances of the TO members was the behaviour of the “space police” which was alleged to be arresting prisoners without cause and torturing them. The document implicitly indicated that the arrests were focused on inhabitants of the area who were not Serbs, although this police force had also begun to target Serbs. Milorad Stričević was identified as the leader of this police force. The TO members accused Arkan of killing 40 arrested persons. Arkan admitted this, and added that he had killed “not just those 40 but also hundreds of others.” Arkan claimed that the only matter in dispute was “the manner of liquidation and nothing else.” The official note of SDB Department Sombor made reference to several other related notes, indicating that the SDB of Serbia was well aware of events in Dalj.
375. The dissatisfied TO members at Dalj gave a 48-hour ultimatum to “Badža,” the “commander of the defence” to solve these pressing problems. If this ultimatum were not met, the TO members stated that they would set up their own military court martial to try those committing war crimes or stealing from houses.⁶⁸¹ Furthermore, the TO members threatened that they would “liquidate” anyone carrying out further killings and would in the case of further killings also level the “school centre” in which Arkan’s people were stationed. The TO members also indicated their readiness to arrest members of the SAO SBZS government if they did not meet their demands.
376. An informational note of the 12th Corps of the JNA of 18 October 1991 confirms that Željko Ražnatović – Arkan and his men were stationed at the training centre at Erdut.⁶⁸² The report noted that Arkan disposed over large quantities of weapons and money, and that the presence of his men at the training centre met with the criticism and displeasure of the local population and members of the JNA.

⁶⁷⁹ Official Note of SDB Department Sombor, 15 October 1991 (0632-1488-0632-1490).

⁶⁸⁰ Official Note of SDB Department Sombor, 18 October 1991 (0632-1491-0632-1493).

⁶⁸¹ Official Note of SDB Department Sombor, 18 October 1991 (0632-1491-0632-1493).

⁶⁸² Information of JNA 12th Corps, 18 October 1991 (0340-4888-0340-4889). See also Information of Security Organ of 1st Military District, 29 October 1991 (0340-4874-0340-4875).

377. In a report on the same day from the Security Organ of the 1st Military District, Arkan and Milorad Stričević were described as carrying out the unauthorized killing of imprisoned members of the ZNG and arrests of Croats.⁶⁸³ Stričević was referred to as a “self-styled ‘colonel’ who leads a ‘special police’ with the direct assistance of ‘Arkan’.”
378. On 25 October 1991, another report from the Security Organ of the 1st Military District based on an interview with a person who had volunteered to join Arkan’s unit indicated that members of the unit were trained to kill everyone when entering “Croat houses.”⁶⁸⁴ Training was carried out by an instructor Dragan LNU. The source also indicated that Arkan killed prisoners at the training centre.⁶⁸⁵
379. On 16 October 1991, Goran Hadžić removed the chief of the SUP in Vukovar, Janko Milaković.⁶⁸⁶ The decision on his removal was based on the Law of Government of the SAO SBZS.
380. As of November 1991, the armed forces of the TO in the SAO SBZS were under the command of the armed forces of the SFRY, per an earlier decision by the Great Assembly of the SAO SBZS. However, the Government of the SAO SBZS insisted on asserting its authority above that of the JNA on the territory of the SAO SBZS.⁶⁸⁷
381. In a document of the CRDB Belgrade dated 27 May 1992, the Security Service of the JNA, the SUP of the SAO SBZS (after March 1992 RSK MUP) and CRDB Novi Sad are said to be investigating jointly the killings of 16 mainly Croat civilians at the village of Antin in Vukovar municipality on 6-7 November 1991.⁶⁸⁸
382. On 29 November 1991, the government of the SAO SBZS discussed the problem of crime in the SAO, which had been aggravated by the “liberation” of Borovo Selo and Vukovar.⁶⁸⁹ The government discussed whether the minister of internal affairs should also be one of the vice presidents of the government. At the same meeting Goran Hadžić and Časlav Očić were designated to participate in a joint delegation of the SAOs regarding questions pertaining to the presence of peacekeeping forces.
383. On 9 December 1991, a delegation from the SAO SBZS including Goran Hadžić and Borislav Bogunović, attended a session of the SFRJ Presidency.⁶⁹⁰ At the meeting,

⁶⁸³ Information of Security Organ of 1st Military District, 18 October 1991 (0340-4864-0340-4865).

⁶⁸⁴ Information of Security Organ of 1st Military District, 25 October 1991 (0340-4876-0340-4878).

⁶⁸⁵ See also the French television report from September 1991 in which Ražnatović indicated that his policy was not to take any prisoners. (V000-1274-V000-1274).

⁶⁸⁶ Decision of Goran Hadžić, President of the SAO SBZS Government, 16 October 1991 (0081-7060-0081-7060).

⁶⁸⁷ Minutes of the 17th Session of the Government of the SAO SBZS, 20 November 1991 (Y034-5366-Y034-5367).

⁶⁸⁸ CRDB Belgrade, Analysis, 27 May 1992 (0607-9018-0607-9021).

⁶⁸⁹ Minutes of the 18th Session of the Government of the SAO SBZS, 29 November 1991 (0296-3503-0296-3506).

⁶⁹⁰ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149).

Hadžić opposed a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and argued that a “genocide” was “occurring every day” against the Serbs.⁶⁹¹

384. On 19 December 1991, Borislav Bogunović left the post of minister of internal affairs to take up the function of vice-president of the government of the SAO SBZS government.⁶⁹²
385. From the very limited amount of relevant documentation available, it can be inferred that the SAO SBZS operated a Service of National [i.e., State] Security as of February 1992. On 10 February 1992, Minister Stevo Bogić sought financing for the continued functioning of this agency, which was approved on the recommendation of Goran Hadžić.⁶⁹³
386. It may be inferred that as of February 1992, the minister of internal affairs of the SAO SBZS was Predrag Radlović.⁶⁹⁴
387. On 18 February 1992, the SAO SBZS government met at Erdut and discussed amendments to a previously discussed suggestion on a law on internal affairs.⁶⁹⁵
388. At the beginning of 1992 the MUP of the SAO SBZS established a Department of State Security at Vukovar, with a temporary seat at Dalj.⁶⁹⁶ The Department had initially been located within SUP Vukovar, but was thereafter separated from the SUP. The report described difficult working conditions in terms of personnel, infrastructure and communications, including communications with the SDB of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia, departments of which “should for understandable reasons be interested in the work and activities of the Department of the SDB Vukovar.” The report further referred to the cooperation of the Department of State Security with the TO, the JNA as well as the local commands, the public police, prosecutors and courts. The Department of State Security deplored that others in the SAO SBZS had, instead of placing their confidence in the work of the Department, instead “established security services such as: the Serb National Security and Security Services in the TO Staffs, and for this purpose is also used the unit of Željko Ražnjatović-Arkan.” This contributed to a sense of revulsion among employees of both public and state security in the SAO SBZS MUP. “The culmination of this

⁶⁹¹ Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149, at 0280-6069).

⁶⁹² Decision on the Dismissal from Duty of the Minister of Internal Affairs, 19 December 1991 and Decision on the Election of the Vice-President of the Government of the Serb District of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sarmia, 19 December 1991, published in *Službeni Glasnik Srpske Oblasti Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem*, Year 2, No. 2 (0280-9356-0280-9357).

⁶⁹³ Request for funds, Minister Stevo Bogić, 10 February 1992 (0087-1893-0087-1894).

⁶⁹⁴ Invitation to the SAO SBZS Minister of Internal Affairs Predrag Radlović, 18 February 1992 (0296-3511-0296-3511).

⁶⁹⁵ Minutes of the 31st Session of the SAO SBZS Government, 16 February 1992 (0296-3507-0296-3510).

⁶⁹⁶ RSK SAO SBZS MUP, Department of State Security Vukovar, Report for Reporting Period January-February, 5 March 1992 (0280-4739-0280-4746). See also RSK MUP RDB, CDB Vukovar, Report for First Six Months of 1992, 6 July 1992 (0280-4747-0280-4753). This report noted that the departure of some Croats from area of Vukovar had been accomplished “in an extremely inappropriate manner.”

dissatisfaction was provoked by the knowledge that the work of the Assembly of the Krajina on 25 February 1992 was guarded by the Serb National Security and the Unit of Željko Ražnjatović-Arkan.” The presence of members of the “security service” of the Serb Radical Party from Vojvodina had also been observed on the territory of the SAO SBZS.

D. Republika Srpska Krajina

389. According to paragraph 5 of Article 78 of the Constitution of the RSK, the President of the RSK “commands the armed forces in peace and in war, national resistance in war; he orders general and partial mobilization; he organizes preparations for defence in accordance with the law.”⁶⁹⁷
390. On 26 February 1992, the Assembly of the RSK promulgated a Law on Internal Affairs.⁶⁹⁸ As with the previous Law on Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina,⁶⁹⁹ the new law was divided into sections, in this case five: 1. basic provision(s), 2. the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 3. duties and authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 4. terms of employment and, 5. transitional and final provisions. In most cases, the RSK Law on Internal Affairs adopted and expanded in more detail upon previous provisions of the SAO Krajina Law on Internal Affairs.
391. Article 1 of the law defined the ambit of the ministry, including matters pertaining to state security, public security and administration.
392. Article 3 of the Law established district centres of security for five areas:
1. Knin – for Northern Dalmatia and Lika
 2. Glina – for Banija and Kordun
 3. Pakrac (temporarily located in Okučani) – for Western Slavonia
 4. Vukovar (temporarily located in Dalj) – for Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmia
 5. Beli Manastir – for Baranja
393. Each district centre of security had several subordinate public security stations (*stanice javne bezbjednosti*, or SJBs). Beyond specifying the existence of SUPs and SJBs, the law did not provide a detailed internal structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
394. Article 4 provided for the creation of a “Special unit of the police for the struggle against terrorism and security.” The minister was charged with the preparation of a document on the internal organization of the ministry which would be promulgated with the agreement of the government of the RSK. The minister was further authorized to

⁶⁹⁷ Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 2 January 1992 (0036-4413-0036-4424, at 0036-4419).

⁶⁹⁸ RSK Law on Internal Affairs, 26 February 1992, published in the *Službeni Glasnik RSK* on 27 February 1992 (0036-4427-0036-4433). See also SSUP, The Fundamentals of the Organization of the Service of Internal Affairs in the RSK, undated (Y034-9057-Y034-9067).

⁶⁹⁹ Law on Internal Affairs of the SAO Krajina, 31 [sic!] November 1991 (0217-2213-0217-2227); Decree on the Proclamation of the Law of Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina, 1 December 1991 (0217-2212-0217-2212).

establish special units of the police (*posebne jedinice milicije*), operational groups or other special units if circumstances required this. The act of establishing such new units would require the designation of the tasks, deadlines, duties, authorities and rights of members of such units, which could be formed from the active and reserve staff of the ministry.

395. Article 6 placed the minister in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the assistance of a deputy minister and assistant ministers.
396. Articles 11 to 14 pertained to the reserve staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
397. Article 15 provided for cooperation with the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and with organs of internal affairs of other republics. Article 70 noted that all previously existing laws on internal affairs on the territory of the RSK ceased to be valid with the promulgation of the new law.
398. On 21 March 1992, this law was supplemented by the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs.⁷⁰⁰ Article 1 of this law substituted the term “secretariats of internal affairs” (SUPs) for the “regional centres of security” in the February 1992 law. Two new SUPs were created: one at Korenica for Lika, and one at Vojnić for Kordun. Lika was thus removed from the SUP at Knin, and Kordun was removed from the SUP at Glina. Compared to the February 1992 law, the March 1992 changes and amendments strengthened the position of the minister. Article 3 gave the minister of internal affairs the authority to appoint the heads of the regional SUPs, whereas this power had been vested with the government in the February 1992 law. And whereas the February 1992 law had permitted the secretaries who headed the SUPs to report directly to the government, this was now only possible if the minister permitted it.
399. On 21 March 1992, the Assembly of the RSK passed a Law on Measures in the Case of a State of Emergency.⁷⁰¹ Article 1 stated that the president of the RSK could proclaim a state of emergency at the suggestion of the Government. Article 2 noted that causes of the state of emergency could be attacks or threats to the security of the RSK, or natural disasters. Under Articles 1, 5 and 6, the president was responsible for issuing orders to ensure that measures were taken to remove the cause of the emergency. Article 10 permitted the president, on his own initiative or at the suggestion of the Government, to suspend the state of emergency.
400. On 21 March 1992, the Assembly of the RSK also promulgated a Law on Defence.⁷⁰²
401. According to Article 5 of the Law of Ministries of the RSK of 23 March 1992, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was constituted as an organ of the RSK.⁷⁰³ Article 7 outlined

⁷⁰⁰ Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, 21 March 1992, published in *Službeni glasnik RSK* on 23 March 1992 (0333-2730-0333-2731).

⁷⁰¹ Law on Measures in the Case of a State of Emergency, 21 March 1992, published in *Službeni glasnik* on 23 March 1992 (0036-4811-0036-4812).

⁷⁰² Law on Defence of the RSK, 21 March 1992, published in *Službeni glasnik* on 23 March 1992 (0363-9743-0363-9755).

⁷⁰³ Law on Ministries of the RSK, 23 March 1992 (0364-6103-0364-6105).

the ambit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Compared to the analogous Article 7 in the Law on Ministries of the SAO Krajina,⁷⁰⁴ the new Article 7 was more specific in its definition of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

402. On 7 April 1992, the RSK government established an “expert consultative council” consisting of 24 members, including Goran Hadžić.⁷⁰⁵
403. On 14 April 1992, the RSK MUP issued a Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which was approved in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs by the government of the RSK. This can be inferred from amendments and changes to this rulebook made in September 1993,⁷⁰⁶ and from other documents that refer to the April 1992 Rulebook.⁷⁰⁷ Also on 14 April 1992, the RSK MUP issued a Rulebook on the Systematization of Jobs in in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁷⁰⁸ On 6 May 1992, Milan Martić sent instructions on the employment of new employees in RSK MUP to all SUPs, making reference to the Rulebook.⁷⁰⁹ The instructions specified that the minister was responsible for giving final authorization for employment of all employees in the ministry.
404. On 27 and 28 April 1992, the RSK government convened and discussed the security situation in the RSK and numerous other issues.⁷¹⁰ At this government session, Minister Milan Martić briefed the government and provided a written report. In addition, Mile Paspalj, the President of the RSK Assembly, suggested the formation of a Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. This proposal was accepted, and the Council was constituted with 8 members, with President Goran Hadžić as the president of the Council. Milan Martić was also a member of the Council.
405. At its session held on 11 and 12 May 1992, the RSK government moved to put the former prison at Stara Gradiška at the disposal of the RSK MUP and the Ministry of Justice.⁷¹¹ Milan Martić had requested that this be done. The government also established prisons at Knin, Glina and Beli Manastir, though the minutes of the session did not provide any further information on these prisons.⁷¹² The following week ministers Vojin ŠUŠA and Dušan JOVIĆ reported that the prisons in Glina and Stara Gradiška were suitable for the

⁷⁰⁴ Law on the Ministries of the SAO Krajina, 29 May 1991 (0214-1900-0214-1905).

⁷⁰⁵ Minutes of the 8th Session of the Government of the RSK, 7 April 1992 (0280-9541-0280-9551, at 0280-9543).

⁷⁰⁶ RSK MUP, Rulebook on the Change and Amendment of the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 30 September 1993 (0280-4871-0280-4874).

⁷⁰⁷ The approval of the Rulebook on Systematization of Posts in the MUP and the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the MUP was listed on the agenda for the 9th session of the RSK Government, held on 14 April 1992 (0280-7507-0280-7507). See also RSK MUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Jobs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 1992 (0280-4932-0280-4996).

⁷⁰⁸ RSK MUP, Rulebook on the Systematization of Posts in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 14 April 1992 (0280-4932-0280-4996).

⁷⁰⁹ Letter of Milan Martić to all SUPs, 6 May 1992 (0400-4739-0400-4740).

⁷¹⁰ Minutes of the 11th Session of the RSK Government, 27 and 28 April 1992 (0281-1470-0281-1471).

⁷¹¹ Minutes of the 13th Session of the RSK Government, 11 and 12 May 1992 (0280-6150-0280-6159, at 0280-6152-0280-6153).

⁷¹² Minutes of the 13th Session of the RSK Government, 11 and 12 May 1992 (0280-6150-0280-6159, at 0280-6158).

use of the ministries of internal affairs and justice.⁷¹³ The government concluded that these buildings should be renovated and that the municipalities of Stara Gradiška and Glina should put the buildings at the disposal of the RSK.⁷¹⁴

406. In the course of late 1991 and 1992, the SAO Krajina and the RSK as its successor had come under international pressure to demilitarize its territory in accordance with internationally-brokered peace negotiations. The Vance Plan signed on 23 November 1991 by President Franjo Tuđman of Croatia, President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and the SFRJ Secretary for People's Defence Veljko Kadijević, provided for the insertion of a United Nations peacekeeping force and called for a process of demilitarization.⁷¹⁵
407. At a meeting of the SAO Krajina MUP on 12 December 1991, the Ministry took the stance that any stationing of UN peacekeepers on the territory of the SAO Krajina was unacceptable, as this would "practically mean the occupation of the Krajina."⁷¹⁶ The document summarizing the conclusions of the meeting was signed by Milan Martić and emphasized the trust of the MUP on the TO and the JNA, and the role of the MUP as part of the armed forces. The MUP appealed to "citizens who belong to Croat paramilitary formations to return all weaponry under their control, all means of communications and uniforms to the public security stations of the municipalities in which they reside. The MUP guarantees it will undertake everything towards the goal of protecting all citizens who cooperate and properly carry out the obligations stemming from this appeal."
408. Efforts were made by the RSK to circumvent demilitarization and also to compensate for the later withdrawal of the JNA from the RSK through the transformation of TO units into RSK MUP units.⁷¹⁷ Such a strategy was explicitly discussed at a meeting of the RSK leadership and the SFRJ Presidency on 3 January 1992.⁷¹⁸
409. The transformation of TO units into RSK MUP units included, in late April 1992, the formation of an Administration of Special Units of the Police (*posebne jedinice milicije*,

⁷¹³ Minutes of the 14th Session of the RSK Government, 19 May 1992 (0281-1477-0281-1483, at 0281-1482).

⁷¹⁴ However, as late as May 1993, the issue of the prison at Stara Gradiška had still not been adequately resolved. Minutes of the 44th Session of the RSK Government, 4 May 1993 (0414-3396-0414-3402, at 0414-3399).

⁷¹⁵ "The Vance Plan," in B.G. Ramcharan, *The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers*, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) (0114-5409-0114-5415).

⁷¹⁶ SAO Krajina MUP, Summary of Meeting, 12 December 1991 (0280-5276-0280-5277). At the meeting of the SFRJ Presidency attended by Martić three days earlier, Branko KOSTIĆ, the Vice President of the Presidency criticized the use of the term "occupation of the Serb Krajinas with the engagement of the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations." Stenographic Records of Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRJ, 9 December 1991 (0280-6031-0280-6149, at 0280-6066).

⁷¹⁷ See dispatch of 9th Corps, 22 April 1992 (0400-6412-0400-6412); order of Major General Mile Novaković on the transformation of the TO and special police units into the Serb Army of the RSK, 27 November 1992 (0207-6245-0207-6261). See also the comments of Milan Martić regarding the "transformation" of the forces of the RSK at the expanded session of the SFRJ Presidency, 2 March 1992 (0294-2750-0294-2904, at 0294-2794-0294-2796).

⁷¹⁸ Stenographic Records of Conversation of Members of the SFRJ Presidency and Representatives of the RSK, 3 January 1992 (Y009-7856-Y009-7934, at Y009-7873, Y009-7876, Y009-7878, Y009-7891).

or PJM) subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, with brigades at Knin, Korenica, Vojnić, Petrinja, Okučani, Vukovar, Beli Manastir and Benkovac.⁷¹⁹ Major General Borislav Đukić was appointed as the commander of the Administration.⁷²⁰ On 2 June 1992, Goran Hadžić, Zdravko Zečević and Milan Martić jointly wrote to the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to recommend that Borislav Đukić be promoted.⁷²¹ In their letter, they noted that Đukić had been appointed as assistant minister of RSK MUP and that he was also commander of the special purpose units of the police.

410. During the same period, the JNA was gradually transformed into the Army of Yugoslavia (*Vojska Jugoslavije*, or VJ). Portions of the JNA and the TO formed the Serb Army of Krajina (*Srpska Vojska Krajina*, or SVK), while other portions of the TO were as noted transformed into RSK MUP units.
411. On 19 May 1992, Milan Martić expressed his disagreement with the subordination of the Administration of Special Units of the Police to the Ministry of Defence, requesting instead that these brigade be under the command of RSK MUP in peace.⁷²² Martić stated that the brigades could be put under the command of the SVK and constitute a part of the armed forces of the SVK during wartime. Yet Martić wished that the RSK MUP retain control of a special battalion even during wartime. Eventually, on 16 October 1992, as a result of a joint meeting of the RSK military and police with the Presidency, a decision was made to put all those PJM brigades constituting the “A echelon” of the defence of the RSK under the command of the Main Staff of the SVK.⁷²³
412. On 20 May 1992, Milan Martić issued a detailed set of “Binding Instructions on Reporting and Informing in the Organs of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina.”⁷²⁴ As indicated in Article 2, these instructions were intended to ensure timely, correct and comprehensive reporting on the state of security and all other matters relevant to internal affairs. The instructions referred to numerous kinds of documentation to be produced at various levels of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the production of periodical analytical reports.

⁷¹⁹ Letter of SSNO General Staff, 3rd Administration to Main Staff of the RSK TO, 28 April 1992 (0201-1673-0201-1677).

⁷²⁰ Personnel documents pertaining to Major General Borislav Đukić, 30 September 1992 (0414-2892-0414-2893).

⁷²¹ Letter of Goran Hadžić, Zdravko Zečević and Milan Martić to the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 June 1992 (0280-4252-0280-4252).

⁷²² Letter of Milan Martić, 19 May 1992 (0280-5183-0280-5185).

⁷²³ Decision signed by the Commander of the RSK TO Milan Torbica, Minister of Defence Stojan Španović and Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martić, 16 October 1992 (0419-3367-0419-3368).

⁷²⁴ RSK MUP, Binding Instructions on Reporting and Informing in the Organs of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina, 20 May 1992 (0280-3828-0280-3845). This document contains an error in the title which has been corrected by hand. As reflected in Article 1 of the document, the instructions refer to reporting (*izvještavanje*), not execution (*izvršavanje*).

413. On 5 June 1992, Milan Martić ordered the formation of volunteer companies at each SUP and at the level of the MUP special brigade.⁷²⁵ These companies were to carry out tasks “of interest to the Republika Srpska Krajina and the Serb nation as a whole.”
414. On 9 June 1992, Assistant Minister of RSK MUP Dušan Orlović reported to the government on the current military and political situation. At the same session the RSK government authorised the RSK MUP to do “everything that it can to open a corridor” towards Serbia.⁷²⁶ On 10 June, the aforementioned units were deployed towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷²⁷ These units participated in the military operation known as “Koridor 92” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷²⁸
415. At a subsequent government session at the end of July, General Borislav Đukić of the RSK MUP reported on the “Koridor 92” operation.⁷²⁹ He also reported on the “tasks of the MUP regarding the organizing of assumption of the defence of the RSK, as well as cooperation with Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina and the filling of the special units of the police and tasks of the judicial organs.” The same government session also concluded that representatives of the MUP, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance should form a commission that would jointly draft a unified plan of defence for the RSK.⁷³⁰
416. In June 1992, the Crisis Staff of Glina Municipality reported on lacking coordination between the police and judicial organs, and also noted that the activities of paramilitary organizations continued to present a problem for security.⁷³¹ The Crisis Staff requested that the government act urgently to monitor the work of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the SJB, and to remove the relevant officials if necessary.
417. In August 1992, Milan Martić suspended the work of the State Security Service of RSK MUP, citing a worsening of the “political-security situation” in the RSK.⁷³² However, the order specified that it did not relate to the State Security Service on the territory of Slavonia, Baranja, Western Sarmia and Western Slavonia. The State Security Service in those regions was to continue working, sending their reports directly to the minister.

⁷²⁵ Dispatch of Milan Martić, 5 June 1992 (0414-2974-0414-2974).

⁷²⁶ Minutes of the 18th Session of the RSK Government, 9 June 1992 (0280-6175-0280-6182, at 0280-6176).

⁷²⁷ Dispatch of Milan Martić, 10 June 1992 (0414-2975-0414-2976).

⁷²⁸ War Diary of VRS 1st Krajina Corps Command, 24 June – 30 August 1992 (0130-4491-0130-4768, at 0130-4506 and 0130-4512). See also Report on the Work of the Special Unit of the Police of Krajina in the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 18 June 1991 to 7 April 1992, Dvor na Uni (0365-3557-0365-3562); Order of Main Staff of RSK TO, 13 November 1992 (0207-8184-0207-8186); SUP Pakrac, Payment of Daily Allowances to Participants in “Koridor,” 21 August 1992 (0280-1771-0280-1776); biographies of Krsto Žarković, undated (0414-2841-0414-2841 and 0414-2770-0414-2770).

⁷²⁹ Minutes of the 25th Session of the RSK Government, 28 and 29 July 1992 (0280-6298-0280-6307, at 0280-6299).

⁷³⁰ Minutes of the 25th Session of the RSK Government, 28 and 29 July 1992 (0280-6298-0280-6307, at 0280-6301).

⁷³¹ Report of Crisis Staff of the Assembly of Glina Municipality, 6 June 1992 (0280-7889-0280-7889). See also Combat Report of 21st TO Brigade, 21 June 1992 (0280-7895-0280-7895).

⁷³² Order of Milan Martić, 23 August 1992 (0280-0765-0280-0765).

418. According to a later report by the RDB of MUP Serbia, the performance of the police was heavily criticized by members of the RSK Assembly at its session in Vukovar on 28 September 1992. "The most frequent attacks on Martić and his colleagues were from deputies from Eastern Slavonia, connected to illegal acts of the police, who are accused of theft and crimes."⁷³³ A decision was taken by the Assembly to reduce by 50% the size of the police from 30,000 personnel, while increasing salaries by 50%. The training centre at Erdut was to be placed under the control of RSK MUP, "and as such the government gave Martić the support to disband the unit there." According to the source used for this report of the RDB of MUP Serbia, he had heard from Martić that "Badžo" (i.e. Radovan Stojičić of MUP Serbia) "stood behind" the police of Eastern Slavonia. Documents from November and December 1991 identified Stojičić as being the commander of the Supreme Staff of the Territorial Defence for the SAO SBZS.⁷³⁴
419. As of 1993, RSK MUP State Security Centres (CDBs) existed at Knin, Glina, Vukovar and Beli Manastir.⁷³⁵
420. In October 1993, Milan Martić notified the State Security Service Centre in Vukovar that he was aware that the former head of the MUP RSK RDB Slobodan Pecikozić continued to use the facilities of the RDB despite having been dismissed.⁷³⁶ Martić demanded that Pecikozić turn in his keys, weapon and official ID, and that the office he was using be put at the disposal of the State Security Service Centre in Vukovar.
421. The term "police brigade" seems to have been used prior to the establishment of the RSK MUP special police brigade in the context of brigades of units of special police units (*posebne jedinice milicije*, or PJMs) as early as March 1992.⁷³⁷ These special police units undertook combat operations together with the Territorial Defence of the RSK, as illustrated by a 16 October 1992 joint agreement on such cooperation.⁷³⁸ The thrust of this agreement was to integrate the PJMs into the defensive forces of the RSK, where the TO was being transformed into the Army of the RSK. This agreement included a conclusion that the PJMs needed to be "cleansed" of all those members whose behaviour

⁷³³ MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195). It should be noted that the source for this RDB report is one "Dž.V.," which are the initials of Veljko Džakula.

⁷³⁴ Command of 12th Corps, Letter of Major General Andrija Biorčević, 23 November 1991 (Y034-5357-Y034-5358); SAO SBZS Supreme Staff of the TO, Confirmation, 13 December 1991 (0063-6946-0063-6946). See also undated confirmation of the Defence Staff of Borovo Selo (BG01-9339-BG01-9339).

⁷³⁵ RSK MUP RDB to CDBs at Knin, Glina, Vukovar and Beli Manastir, 10 March 1993 (0217-0935-0217-0936).

⁷³⁶ Letter of Milan Martić to CRDB Vukovar and RSK MUP Department Borovo Naselje, 25 October 1993 (0414-2999-0414-2999).

⁷³⁷ See Letter of Command of 8th Operational Group to Command of 10th Corps, 19 March 1992 (0419-0123-0419-0123) and dispatch of Milan Martić to SUP Vojnić, 28 April 1992 (0419-3204-0419-3204). See also RSK Command of Special Units of the Police, Suggestion for Promotion of Rajko Novaković, 4 September 1992 (0414-2878-0414-2881); forwarded dispatch of RSK MUP PJM Command, Vukovar, 10 December 1992 (0296-3514-0296-3515).

⁷³⁸ Decision signed by the Commander of the RSK TO Milan Torbica, Minister of Defence Stojan Španović and Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martić, 16 October 1992 (0419-3367-0419-3368).

was inappropriate and presented an obstacle to the use of these units for the preservation of law and order.

422. By the end of 1992, the RSK MUP embarked upon the establishment of a special brigade of the police. On 30 December 1992, Minister Milan Martić announced a competition for candidates for the special brigade, which would have its headquarters at Knin.⁷³⁹ The special brigade would have 500 members in brigades devoted to reconnaissance, sabotage, counter-sabotage and other police activities, and would be under the direct control of the minister of internal affairs of the RSK. The minister could deploy the special brigade throughout the territory of the RSK or outside the RSK. The special brigade was named in honour of a deceased RSK MUP employee, Milivoj Rašuo.⁷⁴⁰
423. On 22 January 1993, President Goran Hadžić proclaimed a state of war for the entire territory of the RSK.⁷⁴¹ This decision was transmitted to the Main Staff of the military as well as to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as was an order for mobilization in accordance with the RSK Plan of Defence.⁷⁴² The proclamation of a state of war accompanied by a variety of presidential regulations to ensure the continued functioning of state institutions during the state of war.⁷⁴³
424. In February 1993, President Goran Hadžić ordered the RSK MUP to take over the guarding of all buildings belonging to the company Radio Television RSK.⁷⁴⁴
425. On 16 February 1993, an attempt was made to forcibly remove the leadership of the SUP in Vukovar. Between 120 and 150 armed members of the reserve staff of the SVK occupied the SUP building. According to a report that was sent to Jovica STANIŠIĆ, the building was subsequently surrounded by members of the RSK MUP.⁷⁴⁵ The SVK members justified their move citing lacking cooperation by the police with the army. In this the army was supported by Željko Ražnatović "Arkan" and Milan Milanović "Mrgud," the

⁷³⁹ Letter of Milan Martić, 30 December 1992 (0207-7678-0207-7678).

⁷⁴⁰ Milivoj Rašuo is in some other documents identified as Milivoj Rašula. RSK MUP overview of structure of the RSK MUP Special Brigade, 1992 (0280-5198-0280-5261); RSK MUP overview of structure of the RSK MUP Special Brigade "Milivoj Rašuo," 3 March 1993 (0414-2920-0414-2973). On the special brigade, see also letter signed for Milan Martić by Nebojša Pavković, 7 September 1993 (0414-2995-0414-2995); recommendations for promotion of Rajko Novaković, Momčilo Bogunović and Božidar Košutić, 4 September 1992 (0414-2878-0414-2887).

⁷⁴¹ Decision on the Proclamation of a State of War, 22 January 1993 (0214-0169-0214-0169).

⁷⁴² Letter of President Goran Hadžić, 22 January 1993 (0214-0170-0214-0170 and 0280-4259-0280-4261).

⁷⁴³ Examples of such regulations include: Regulation on the Jurisdiction of Judicial Organs in Conditions of a State of War or Imminent Threat of War, 22 January 1993 (0216-9513-0216-9513); Regulation with the Force of Law on the Application of the Law on the Execution of Penal and Misdemeanour Sanctions during a State of War or in Case of an Imminent Threat of War, 22 January 1993 (0216-9505-0216-9512); Regulation with the Force of Law on the Application of the Law on Criminal Procedure during a State of War or in Case of an Imminent Threat of War, 22 January 1993 (0214-1086-0214-1088); Regulation with the Force of Law on the Organization, Work and Jurisdiction of Regular Courts in the Case of War or Imminent Threat of War, 22 January 1993 (0214-1078-0214-1080).

⁷⁴⁴ Order of President Goran Hadžić, 12 February 1992 (0682-2887-0682-2887).

⁷⁴⁵ Report of CRDB Novi Sad, 18 February 1993 (0608-4422-0608-4226).

Assistant Minister of Defence of the RSK, who both arrived at the scene. However, Stevo Bogić, the RSK Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the MUP, insisted that the matter had to be resolved by the government. The meeting ended with the demand that the RSK government convene within three days to discuss personnel changes in the MUP. In the assessment of the CRDB in Novi Sad, it was “indicative that the dismissal of persons who work on matters of theft and registration of vehicles is sought.”

426. A few days later, a source of the CRDB in Novi Sad reported about the clash in Vukovar between the SUP and the “non-existent Vukovar TO.”⁷⁴⁶ This report was also sent to Jovica STANIŠIĆ. The source spoke about tensions between the local inhabitants of Vukovar and Serbian State Security, problems in the work of the police in Vukovar and allegations of smuggling. According to the source of CRDB Novi Sad, the Chief of RDB Serbia Jovica STANIŠIĆ bore responsibility for this development. STANIŠIĆ had allegedly supported one faction in the local power struggle, which involved disputes about lumber, oil and other goods. The source believed that the security situation in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania was very precarious and that there was a threat of “complete chaos.” The source concluded that it might be necessary to resort “even to the physical liquidation of individual persons in order to prevent a total erosion and collapse of the entire system.”
427. By 28 April 1993, the CRDB in Novi Sad concluded that the situation in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania had stabilized.⁷⁴⁷ Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martić launched a formal investigation of those responsible for the incident at the SUP in Vukovar. However, a subsequent report indicated the situation remained volatile and characterized by a considerable degree of factionalism, with a constant risk of armed altercations.⁷⁴⁸ At a session of the RSK government held on 9 June 1993, Milan Martić stated that the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania had slipped out of the control of the RSK government.⁷⁴⁹ Martić referred to divisions in the police and in the military, and stated that he had received information that preparations were underway for a referendum to merge the region with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The RSK government concluded that it was necessary to convene urgently a meeting with representatives of the region and to inform President Hadžić of this.
428. On 20 April 1993, the Assembly of the RSK promulgated a new Law on Defence.⁷⁵⁰ On the same day, the Assembly of the RSK also enacted Amendment XIV to Article 102 of the Constitution, establishing the Supreme Defence Council consisting of the president of the RSK, the president of the government, the minister of defence, the minister of internal affairs and the commander of the SVK.⁷⁵¹ The Supreme Defence Council had the authority to declare a state of war or imminent state of war if the

⁷⁴⁶ CRDB Novi Sad Report on Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, 23 February 1993 (0608-4148-0608-4151).

⁷⁴⁷ CRDB Novi Sad Informational Report, 28 February 1993 (0608-4429-0608-4430).

⁷⁴⁸ CRDB Novi Sad Informational Report, 15 March 1993 (0608-4431-0608-4433).

⁷⁴⁹ Minutes of 51st Session of the RSK Government, 9 June 1993 (0280-6505-0280-6516).

⁷⁵⁰ Law on Defence, 20 April 1993, published on 22 April 1993 in *Službeni Glasnik RSK* (0363-9756-0363-9766).

⁷⁵¹ Decision on the Proclamation of Amendments XII, XIII and XIV to the Constitution of the Republika Srpska Krajina, 20 April 1993, published on 22 April 1993 in *Službeni Glasnik RSK* (0216-6103-0216-6103).

Assembly could not convene. The Council could also proclaim a state of emergency and take decisions on the readiness, mobilization and use of the SVK.

429. On 18 August 1993, Goran Hadžić ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs to arrest all dealers and resellers (of narcotics) on the entire territory of the RSK and to transfer them for mobilization to the command of the 92nd Motorized Brigade of the SVK. This order was transmitted by Minister Milan Martić to all SUPs in the RSK.⁷⁵²
430. In August 1993, the CRDB in Novi Sad reported that large numbers of staff were leaving the RSK MUP. Those leaving were described as “experienced and uncompromised persons,” who were dissatisfied with the conditions in the MUP, “above all the impossibility of implementing the measures and activities envisaged by law.”⁷⁵³ By contrast, other impromptu “security services” including the SDG, persons from the Ministry of Defence and persons “from the immediate security detail of President Hadžić” continued to function. According to the source of the CRDB in Novi Sad, “the activities of these ‘services’ function exclusively towards covering up their own criminal activities and their close connections.”
431. On 14 September 1993, RSK MUP Minister Milan Martić proclaimed a state of emergency in the Ministry and in the SUPs as a reaction to Croatian military actions.⁷⁵⁴
432. According to a report of the CRDB in Novi Sad in December 1993, there were significant political and military tensions among the Serbs in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁷⁵⁵ This was allegedly linked to moves by Goran Hadžić to remove this territory from the RSK.
433. On 6 June 1994, the DB Centre at Glina sent a report on the political and security situation in Banija and Kordun to RSK President Milan Martić, President of the Government Borislav Mikelić, Commander of the SVK General Staff Milan Čeleketić, the Chief of the RSK RDB Aco Drača and to Jovica STANIŠIĆ as the Chief of the RDB of Serbia.⁷⁵⁶
434. On 5 July 1994, Jovica STANIŠIĆ sent a dispatch to Minister Ilija Prijić of RSK MUP congratulating RSK MUP on the occasion of “the Security Day of Republika Srpska Krajina.”⁷⁵⁷ In closing his dispatch, STANIŠIĆ wrote that “we are entering the decisive phase of the struggle for the realization of the joint goals of all Serb lands.”⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵² Order of Milan Martić to all RSK SUPs, 18 August 1993 (0400-6498-0400-6498).

⁷⁵³ CRDB Novi Sad Informational Report, 5 August 1993 (0608-4538-0608-4540).

⁷⁵⁴ Dispatch of SUP Okučani, forwarding proclamation of Minister Milan Martić, 14 September 1993 (0280-1849-0280-1849).

⁷⁵⁵ Report of CRDB Novi Sad, 24 December 1993 (0608-4196-0608-4198).

⁷⁵⁶ Dispatch of DB Centre Glina, 6 June 1994 (0608-4665-0608-4668).

⁷⁵⁷ Dispatch of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to RSK MUP, 5 July 1994 (0280-5504-0280-5504). See also intercepted communications involving Ilija Kojić (CF00-0169-CF00-0171).

⁷⁵⁸ Dispatch of Jovica STANIŠIĆ to RSK MUP, 5 July 1994 (0280-5504-0280-5504).

XII. Cooperation between the Police of Serb-Controlled Entities in Croatia and MUP Serbia

435. Throughout their existence, the SAOs and the RSK remained heavily dependent on financial and material support from Serbia and Yugoslavia.⁷⁵⁹ This dependency applied to the entire functioning of these entities, from republican, district and municipal governments to the equipping and operating of the police, territorial defence and military. This section of the report analyses available documentation on the assistance that the police of the Serb-controlled entities in Croatia received from Belgrade. A subsection focuses specifically on the role of Željko Ražnatović “Arkan.”
436. In March 1991, Slobodan Milošević told local politicians in Serbia that he had ordered the mobilisation of the reserve police force, and that new police forces would soon be formed and deployed. To this end, the Serbian government was taking relevant security measures, in order “we can defend the interests of the republic, and indeed the also the interests of the Serb nation outside Serbia.”⁷⁶⁰
437. On 1 April 1991, Milan Babić, the President of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, demanded that the government of Serbia order the MUP of the Republic of Serbia to extend “technical and personnel assistance” to the SUP of the SAO Krajina.⁷⁶¹
438. On 1 November 1991, the Serbian Defence Minister Tomislav Simović provided the government of Serbia with a report detailing assistance provided to date to “Serb districts in Croatia.”⁷⁶² On 10 February 1992, Milan Martić wrote to the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Zoran Sokolović, asking him to pressure Minister of Finance Jovan Zebić to distribute to RSK MUP funds previously destined for the SAO Krajina TO.⁷⁶³
439. On 22 January 1992, representatives of the RSK met with federal Yugoslav officials to discuss the economic and financial system in the RSK.⁷⁶⁴ The meeting also included a discussion of policing in the RSK in light of the Vance Plan. Branko Kostić, the Vice President of the Presidency, spoke of the “justified fear” among the population of the Krajina and argued that the police forces there should be substantially strengthened.⁷⁶⁵ This was, however, directly linked to the question of the financing of police forces. Operating on the assumption that the RSK was not capable of paying for the police alone,

⁷⁵⁹ “Yugoslavia” refers here both to the SFRJ and to SRJ.

⁷⁶⁰ Slobodan Milošević on 16 March 1991, quoted in *NIN*, 12 April 1991 (0214-4020-0214-4022, at 0214-4020).

⁷⁶¹ Order of Milan Babić, President of the Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, 1 April 1991 (0217-2109-0217-2109).

⁷⁶² Letter of Serbian Defence Minister Tomislav Simović to the Government of Serbia, 1 November 1991 (0212-9683-0212-9690).

⁷⁶³ Letter of Milan Martić to Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Zoran Sokolović, 10 February 1992 (0207-6692-0207-6692).

⁷⁶⁴ Stenographic Records of Meeting of Representatives of Federal Yugoslav Organs and RSK Representatives, 22 January 1992 (0466-3992-0466-4045).

⁷⁶⁵ Stenographic Records of Meeting of Representatives of Federal Yugoslav Organs and RSK Representatives, 22 January 1992 (0466-3992-0466-4045, at 0466-3997).

and that such an increased police force would contribute to a stabilization of the security situation, Kostić regarded it as a federal obligation to contribute with the necessary funds. Doing so, stated Kostić, would be much less expensive than a “war option, which would mean the financing of war and war conflicts [*sic*] for a good long series of years, with a thoroughly indefinite outcome.”⁷⁶⁶ Kostić therefore recommended that the details be worked out together with the SSUP. From the RSK’s side, Risto Marković, the Vice-President of the Government, agreed that policing was important but stated that it should not be discussed at that meeting because the necessary representatives from the RSK were not present.⁷⁶⁷

440. As of February 1992, MUP Serbia had a training camp called Pajzoš near Ilok.⁷⁶⁸ This same training camp was in a separate document from June 1992 identified with the Unit for Special Purposes of the RSK MUP, with Predrag Baklaić listed as its commander.⁷⁶⁹ Baklaić, who stemmed from Croatia, had until 15 February 1992 been the platoon commander of a special unit which had been stationed at Golubić.⁷⁷⁰ He joined the JPN of MUP Serbia on 20 April 1992, although he was as of March 1992 under criminal investigation for murder and other crimes by the authorities in the RSK.⁷⁷¹ He died near Zvornik in 1993.⁷⁷²
441. On 10 February 1992, the Department of State Security in Korenica wrote to the RDB in Serbia requesting that an employee be trained to work with cryptography.⁷⁷³
442. On 20 February 1992, the Presidency of the SFRJ decided to establish a working group in the SSUP tasked to assist the organization of organs of internal affairs in the RSK.⁷⁷⁴ The working group consisted of representatives of the RSK MUP as well as experts from the SSUP. With a view to the constitutional amendments due to be adopted on 26 February, the working group was of the opinion that internal affairs should be centralized in order to ensure a uniform execution of internal affairs in the RSK. However, the disjointed geography of the RSK also necessitated some level of autonomous operation. These regional organs “would in a functional sense be firmly connected to the Republican

⁷⁶⁶ Stenographic Records of Meeting of Representatives of Federal Yugoslav Organs and RSK Representatives, 22 January 1992 (0466-3992-0466-4045, at 0466-3998).

⁷⁶⁷ Stenographic Records of Meeting of Representatives of Federal Yugoslav Organs and RSK Representatives, 22 January 1992 (0466-3992-0466-4045, at 0466-4002-0446-4003).

⁷⁶⁸ Autobiography of Davor SUBOTIĆ, 14 February 1992 (0558-8935-0558-8935).

⁷⁶⁹ RSK MUP JPN, Report of Commander Predrag Baklaić, 6 June 1992 (2D00-0639-2D00-0639). See also SUP Knin, Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 18 March 1993 (0400-4789-0400-4791); Autobiography of Predrag Baklaić, 20 April 1992 (0558-7776-0558-7777).

⁷⁷⁰ Predrag Baklajić, Summary of Available Information, undated (0706-4843-0706-4844). Both variants, “Baklaić” and “Baklajić” appear in the available documentation.

⁷⁷¹ MUP Serbia JPN, Request for Entrance into Service, 20 April 1992 (0706-4854-0706-4854); RSK MUP to SJB Korenica, 18 March 1992 (0400-4999-0400-5000).

⁷⁷² MUP Serbia JPN, Request for Entrance into Service, 20 April 1992 (0706-4854-0706-4854); Record of Payment for Funeral of Baklaić, 23 March 1993 (0632-8567-0632-8567).

⁷⁷³ RSK MUP, Department of State Security Korenica, Letter, 10 February 1992 (0280-4723-0280-4723).

⁷⁷⁴ SSUP, Basic Organizations of the Service of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina, undated (0280-4616-0280-4622).

ministry of internal affairs, but would simultaneously...have a certain autonomy in the sense of their openness and connectedness towards organs of government in the individual districts of the Republic." The working group took into account the effects on security of the presence of UN forces, concluding that RSK MUP should focus on "concentrating on purely police tasks." However, the working group also noted that tasks of state security and "the struggle against terrorism," which necessitated the formation of special units of the police.

443. The working group recommended that the ministry be composed of four administrations: 1. a police administration (including a police staff and responsibility for the special units of the police), 2. an administration for the suppression of crime and terrorism, 3. an administration for travel documents, citizenship and other administrative affairs, 4. an administration for joint affairs (including matters related to personnel, finances, communications, legal questions, etc., but also include the cabinet of the minister and the duty officer service).⁷⁷⁵ The working group suggested that the personnel size of RSK MUP be 3,719 persons without the police staff, which would probably number approximately 10,000 persons. This number was subject to final legal determinations in the RSK and financial considerations. The working group prepared a draft law on internal affairs based on the law of internal affairs of Serbia, and hoped that this law would be adopted by the Assembly of the RSK. After the promulgation of the law, the minister would be responsible for ensuring the drafting and acceptance of the many additional internal regulations necessary for the proper functioning of the ministry. Finally, the working group underlined that the continued assistance of the SSUP and the SSNO would be necessary in the coming period.
444. In terms of the geographical organization of the ministry, the working group proposed that four district centres of security be established: at Knin (for northern Dalmatia and Lika), Glina (for Banija and Kordun), Pakrac (temporarily located at Okučani, for Western Slavonia) and Vukovar (temporarily located at Dalj, for Eastern Slavonia, Western Sylvania and Baranja).⁷⁷⁶
445. Also on 20 February 1992, the police force of the RSK was discussed at a session of the SFRJ Presidency. The lengthy discussion of the RSK police makes it evident that the SFRJ both played – and was expected by Milan Martić and others in the RSK – to play a major role in financing, equipping and advising the RSK MUP. Blagoje Adžić, the acting Federal Secretary for People's Defence, severely criticized the state of affairs in the RSK, stating that "Only the police exists there, there are no ministries. The ministries mean nothing. Some foresters and forest guards have become ministers – they have no idea about anything. They simply sit in their chairs and have the name [i.e., the title of minister]. Accordingly, nothing functions, no kind of legal system is functioning."⁷⁷⁷ Speaking directly of the police, Adžić said that he had the same day met with Milan Martić,

⁷⁷⁵ SSUP, Basic Organizations of the Service of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina, undated (0280-4616-0280-4622).

⁷⁷⁶ SSUP, Basic Organizations of the Service of Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska Krajina, undated (0280-4616-0280-4622).

⁷⁷⁷ Stenographic Records of the 187th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 20 February 1992 (0466-4355-0466-4453, at 0466-4436-0466-4437).

who wanted a police force of 20,000 people. Adžić thought that Martić must be misunderstanding some things, as this was larger than any European police force. "He asks me for helicopters, 150 all-terrain vehicles. I would have to empty an entire army, with personnel, to give him that. But I will give everything that I can, just so that we are clear."⁷⁷⁸ However, Adžić insisted that the SSUP and MUP Serbia should check to see how large a police force was really needed in the RSK.⁷⁷⁹ Lastly, Adžić also noted that Martić fervently demanded the extension of food assistance to the RSK, which Adžić agreed was necessary.⁷⁸⁰

446. After Adžić had spoken, Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs Petar Gračanin then spoke about his information on the police in the RSK. According to Gračanin, there were 8,000 personnel in uniform in the RSK MUP.⁷⁸¹ Gračanin thought that the police was best organized in the area of the erstwhile SAO Krajina, with Eastern Slavonia in second place, followed by the weakest police in Western Slavonia.

447. On 9 March 1992, the RSK Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martić met in Belgrade with representatives of the SDB of the SSUP to discuss cooperation in the light of the deployment of UN forces to Croatia.⁷⁸²

448. On 13 March 1992, representatives of the SSNO, the 2nd Military District, the Main Staff of the RSK TO and of RSK MUP met to discuss material assistance to be delivered to the TO and to the police.⁷⁸³ Documents of the JNA appear to make reference to a standing order of the SSNO of 20 April 1992 to provide material assistance to the RSK MUP.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁸ Stenographic Records of the 187th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 20 February 1992 (0466-4355-0466-4453, at 0466-4437).

⁷⁷⁹ Nonetheless, at the following session of the SFRJ Presidency, Adžić claimed that the RSK was now demanding a police force of 34,000 armed officers. Adžić considered this to be unacceptable and renewed his demand that the SSUP and MUP Serbia ascertain the objective need for police in the RSK. Stenographic Records of the 188th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 25 February 1992 (0466-4511-0466-4538, at 0466-4514).

⁷⁸⁰ Stenographic Records of the 187th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 20 February 1992 (0466-4355-0466-4453, at 0466-4438-0466-4439).

⁷⁸¹ Stenographic Records of the 187th Session of the SFRJ Presidency, 20 February 1992 (0466-4355-0466-4453, at 0466-4441).

⁷⁸² Official Note on Meeting between Milan Martić and SSUP SDB, 12 March 1992 (0608-4640-0608-4642).

⁷⁸³ Letter of Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 9th Corps, 7 April 1992 (0089-1583-0089-1583).

⁷⁸⁴ Dispatch of SSNO 608th Independent Tank Battalion to Command of 2nd Military District, 23 April 1992 (0018-4153-0018-4153); dispatch of SSNO 608th Independent Tank Battalion, 23 April 1992 (0018-4135-0018-4135); Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 405th Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0018-4134-0018-4134); letter of Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 9th Corps, 26 April 1992 (0106-5862-0106-5862); Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 503rd Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0089-1614-0089-1614); Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 530th Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0089-1610-0089-1610); Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 405th Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0018-4128-0018-4129); Command of 2nd Military

449. On 3 April 1992, Colonel Vladan Šljivić requested the transfer of JNA assets to the SAO Krajina TO and to the RSK MUP.⁷⁸⁵
450. At a RSK government session on 7 April 1992, the minister of finance spoke of a difficult financial situation and observed that the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council had not displayed “enough understanding.”⁷⁸⁶ He suggested that a meeting with representatives of Serbia, Montenegro and the JNA was necessary to ensure the financing of the TO and the police. The government agreed to push for such a meeting, which would be attended by the president, the president of the government and the president of the Assembly, as well as ministers Martić, Peurača, Španović and Suša.
451. On 8 April 1992, the SDB in Knin reported directly to the SDB (RDB) of MUP Serbia regarding events at SJB Benkovac.⁷⁸⁷
452. As of October 1992, the RDB of MUP Serbia received information that Milan Martić was not satisfied with the level of support provided by Serbia and MUP Serbia to the RSK and the RSK MUP.⁷⁸⁸
453. On 12 November 1992, representatives of the RSK and of Serbia met at the office of the President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević to discuss assistance to the RSK.⁷⁸⁹ At this meeting, the RSK was represented by President Goran Hadžić, President of the Government Zdravko Zečević, Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martić, Minister of Defence Zoran Španović, Minister of Finance Vojin Peurača and Vice President of the Government. They met with the Milošević, the President of the Serbian Government Radoman Božović and the Governor of the National Bank of Serbia. At the meeting, agreement was reached on financial assistance from Serbia to the RSK until the end of 1992. Milošević accepted a defence plan for the RSK that would include approximately 23,000 police officers, of which 5,000 would be in regular service, with the remainder in brigades which would constitute the peacetime core of the Army. The participants at the meeting also agreed that the defence ministries of Serbia and the RSK would discuss the financing of the RSK Army and the police for the coming year. Nonetheless, indications exist that Milan Martić was dissatisfied with the level of support provided by Serbia.⁷⁹⁰
454. The financial cost of ensuring the existence of the RSK was an enormous expenditure for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the 10 February 1993 meeting of the Supreme Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Prime

District to Command of 503rd Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0018-4131-0018-4131); Command of 2nd Military District to Command of 530th Logistics Base, 25 April 1992 (0018-4133-0018-4133).

⁷⁸⁵ Order of Colonel Vladan Šljivić to the Command of the 2nd Military District, 3 April 1992 (0106-5887-0106-5887).

⁷⁸⁶ Minutes of the 8th Session of the Government of the RSK, 7 April 1992 (0280-9541-0280-9551, at 0280-9549).

⁷⁸⁷ SDB Knin, Letter, 8 April 1992 (0280-4385-0280-4386).

⁷⁸⁸ MUP Serbia, RDB, 2nd Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195). It should be noted that the source for this RDB report is one “D.Ž.V.,” which are the initials of Veljko Džakula.

⁷⁸⁹ Official Note of Conversation of Representatives of the RSK Government with President Slobodan Milošević, 12 November 1992 (0207-7285-0207-7285).

⁷⁹⁰ Official Note of MUP RS RDB Second Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195).

Minister Radoje Kontić noted that the RSK had for an undefined period asked for 341 million dinars.⁷⁹¹ This amount was more than the 320 million dinars that constituted the monthly budget of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kontić noted that the only way to generate so much cash was through inflationary primary emissions of currency.⁷⁹² President Momir Bulatović of Montenegro observed that the cost of supporting the RSK had already earlier exceeded the amount that Montenegro received from the federal budget, and was now poised to eclipse the entire federal budget.⁷⁹³

455. On 30 March 1993, Milan Martić, acting in his capacity as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK, wrote to all SUPs in the RSK asking them to provide lists of the personnel and vehicles who and which were involved in the execution of official duties so that these lists could be provided to MUP Serbia.⁷⁹⁴ The reason for this was the increased difficulties encountered at border crossings.
456. On 1 April 1993, Milan Martić, acting in his capacity as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK, requested that MUP Serbia send 20-30 inspectors to the RSK for 1-2 months in order to assist with the investigation of property crime and violent crimes.⁷⁹⁵ Both types of crime were on the increase and the RSK MUP did not possess sufficient personnel to deal with this phenomenon.
457. On 28 April 1993, Milan Martić, acting in his capacity as the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK, wrote to the President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Government of Serbia, Nikola Šainović and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Zoran Sokolović.⁷⁹⁶ Martić noted the insufficient “material-financial situation in which this Ministry, as well as the Republika Srpska Krajina find themselves.” In order to improve this situation and increase the motivation of the police of the RSK, Martić requested financial assistance from Serbia.
458. In June 1993, Milan Martić and Major-General Mile Novaković, the Chief of Staff of the Serb Army of the Krajina wrote a joint letter to the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, requesting that he use his influence on the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) to secure

⁷⁹¹ Federal Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council, Stenographic Records of Session of 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7179).

⁷⁹² Federal Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council, Stenographic Records of Session of 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7180).

⁷⁹³ Federal Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council, Stenographic Records of Session of 10 February 1993 (0345-7152-0345-7183, at 0345-7180).

⁷⁹⁴ Letter of Milan Martić to all RSK SUPs, 30 March 1993 (0280-1580-0280-1580). See also RSK MUP Administration of Public Security to MUP Serbia, Administration for Border Affairs, 5 November 1993 (0207-6722-0207-6722).

⁷⁹⁵ Letter of Milan Martić to MUP Serbia, 1 April 1993 (0280-4576-0280-4576).

⁷⁹⁶ Letter of Milan Martić to the President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Government of Serbia, Nikola Šainović and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, Zoran Sokolović, 28 April 1993 (0280-4575-0280-4575).

ammunition and spare parts for the armed forces of the RSK.⁷⁹⁷ In the same month, Goran Hadžić also wrote twice to Milošević asking for assistance to the SVK.⁷⁹⁸

459. On 29 April 1993, Milan Martić wrote to the Chief of the VJ General Staff Momčilo Perišić asking for assistance with respect to the transport of fuel for motor vehicles.⁷⁹⁹

460. There are indications in the documentation of MUP Serbia that they received reports on allegations of crimes against the civilian population of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania. In April 1992, the SSUP SDB notified Milan Tepavčević, the Deputy Chief of the SDB in MUP Serbia, of information received about the forcible removal of Croat and Slovak families from the territory of Western Sylvania in the period lasting since at least 17 October 1991.⁸⁰⁰ This included forcing those who were being removed to sign declarations that they were forfeiting all of their property. The report also included information on allegedly illegal actions taken by the police in Western Sylvania, who were allegedly tolerating violence and other criminal acts towards Croats, Slovaks and Serbs who protested against these actions. Particularly problematic were those members of the police who came from the ranks of those who had fled to Srem from Western Slavonia. The report further described a proliferation of paramilitary and irregular units in the area. The plaintiffs from Western Sylvania who delivered this information demanded that the SSUP protect them and others in the area and intervene to re-establish order in the police, as the local authorities had stated that federal regulations applied to Western Sylvania. The SSUP recommended that this information be forwarded to Milan Martić, and also recommended that concrete steps be taken to ensure that those recruited to serve in the police in areas such as Western Sylvania and Baranja adhere to the legal requirements for service in the police.

461. In May 1992, the section of the State Security Division of MUP Serbia located in Ruma in Vojvodina reported on persons linked to the area of the SAO SBZS. State Security officials reported about Mihajlo Ulemek from Stara Pazova, who purported to be a security officer from the SAO SBZS.⁸⁰¹ The report found reason to believe that Ulemek had been involved in crimes against the civilian population of the SAO SBZS while acting as the commandant of a camp in Erdut. Another report provided information on the paramilitary organizations "Dušan Silni" from Nova Pazova and the White Eagles, both of which had "committed criminal acts of crimes against the civilian population as participants in combat on the territory of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania."⁸⁰²

⁷⁹⁷ Letter of Milan Martić and Mile Novaković to Slobodan Milošević, 9 June 1993 (0207-7288-0207-7289).

⁷⁹⁸ Letter of Goran Hadžić to Slobodan Milošević, received 4 June 1993 (0207-7287-0207-7287).

⁷⁹⁹ Letter of Milan Martić to Momčilo Perišić, 29 September 1993 (0207-8144-0207-8144).

⁸⁰⁰ Report of the SSUP SDB, 2 April 1992 (0608-4331-0608-4336).

⁸⁰¹ Report of CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, Ruma Section, 2 June 1992 (0607-6186-0607-6188). On the acquaintance of Ulemek and Hadžić, see Report of CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, 27 February 1995 (0608-4020-0608-4022).

⁸⁰² Report of CRDB Sremska Mitrovica, Ruma Section, 2 May 1992 (0607-6222-0607-6226).

462. Also in May 1992, the SSNO produced a report on crimes carried out against the civilian population of the RSK by paramilitary and volunteer formations.⁸⁰³ These included reports that the paramilitary group "Dušan Silni" had on 18 October 1991 at Lovas forced Croat civilians to clear a minefield and had killed several of them. This incident was reported by the SSNO to the chief of the SDB of Serbia. Another reported incident involved the killing of several civilians in November 1991 near Beli Manastir by members of a special unit of the SUP of Beli Manastir. Also mentioned was the killing of 16 people, 15 of them Croats in Antin near Vukovar on the night of 6-7 November 1991. The scene of the crime was investigated by a team from "the SUP of the SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania." This information concerning the incident at Lovas was later confirmed in a report of CRDB Sremska Mitrovica in October 1995.⁸⁰⁴
463. On 3 August 1992, Milan Martić wrote to Radovan Stojičić, the Chief of the Public Security Division of the MUP Serbia.⁸⁰⁵ In his letter, Martić asked Stojičić for assistance with the training of the police of the RSK MUP.
464. MUP RSK and its subordinate SUPs at Knin, Korenica, Vojnić, Glina, Okučani, Beli Manastir and Vukovar maintained radio communications with MUP Serbia and the Security Services Centre (CSB) in Banja Luka.⁸⁰⁶ SUP Beli Manastir maintained an account at the Social Accounting Service at Odžaci in Vojvodina.⁸⁰⁷
465. The RSK MUP sent personnel to Serbia where they received training under the auspices of MUP Serbia.⁸⁰⁸
466. From the available documentation, there are indications that a significant number of employees in the RSK MUP were in fact also employees of MUP Serbia. The case of Branko Pavić, who simultaneously worked for the RSK MUP and also for MUP Serbia, was treated earlier in this report. Another example of this practice is Radoslav Kostić. Kostić had worked in the police in Croatia since the late 1960s but had been involuntarily removed from his position after the multiparty elections in Croatia.⁸⁰⁹ As a result, he applied for employment with the police in Serbia. According to his personnel file, Kostić, who like Pavić stemmed from Croatia, was employed since December 1990 as an operative of MUP Serbia with the qualification of advisor in the Fourth Administration of the SDB.⁸¹⁰ In April 1991, Kostić sent two reports to the First Administration of the SDB of MUP Serbia regarding developments in Eastern Slavonia.⁸¹¹ In June 1991, Kostić was

⁸⁰³ Report of the SSNO Security Administration, 26 May 1992 (0607-9012-0607-9017).

⁸⁰⁴ Report of CSDB Sremska Mitrovica, 11 October 1995 (0608-1286-0608-1291).

⁸⁰⁵ Letter of Milan Martić to Radovan Stojičić, 3 August 1992 (0280-8651-0280-8651).

⁸⁰⁶ Undated cryptographic communications diagram (B007-0795-B007-0795).

⁸⁰⁷ SDK Odžaci, Letter, 23 January 1992 (0087-0698-0087-0702, at 0087-0700).

⁸⁰⁸ Minutes of Meeting of the Council of the Training Centre "17 August," 30 September 1992 (0280-1189-0280-1193).

⁸⁰⁹ Letter of Radoslav Kostić, 12 November 1990 (0641-4632-0641-4634).

⁸¹⁰ MUP Serbia, Administration for Joint Affairs, Certification, 22 November 1994 (0641-4623-0641-6423); MUP Serbia, Administration for Personnel and Work Relations, Decision, 3 December 1990 (0641-4638-0641-4638).

⁸¹¹ MUP Serbia SDB, First Administration, Official Note, 12 April 1991 (0608-4135-0608-4135); MUP Serbia SDB, First Administration, Official Note, 12 April 1991 (0608-4136-0608-4136).

transferred to the First Administration from the Fourth Administration.⁸¹² In January 1992, Kostić submitted a report to the Second Administration of the SDB regarding Baranja.⁸¹³ In June 1992, Kostić was qualified as a Senior Advisor with a decision signed by Jovica STANIŠIĆ.⁸¹⁴ A work evaluation for 1992 identifies Kostić's job as an "instructor in intelligence affairs."⁸¹⁵ The evaluation form for 1993, signed by Franko SIMATOVIĆ, does not list a specific function.⁸¹⁶ In October 1994, Milan Martić identified Rade Kostić as an employee of the RDB of MUP Serbia, accusing him and others under his command of having kidnapped the RSK Minister of Internal Affairs Ilija Prijić.⁸¹⁷

467. It is apparent that the RDB had its own network of intelligence gathering on the territory of the various Serb-controlled political entities existing in Croatia from 1990 onwards.⁸¹⁸ In some cases, the RDB maintained frequent contacts with highly-placed sources in the political and police structures of the SAOs and the RSK, with these sources not only reporting on the political situation, but also seeking instructions and advice from their contacts in the RDB. One example of such a relationship is that of Veljko Džakula of Western Slavonia.⁸¹⁹

468. According to open sources, including the investigative reporter Miloš, Radoslav Kostić had during his period of employment for MUP Serbia simultaneously been minister of internal affairs for the area of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania.⁸²⁰ Kostić died on 21 November 1994 in Vojnić "during the execution of his official duty."⁸²¹ A separate document, signed by Dragan Filipović, stated more specifically that Kostić "died carrying out affairs and tasks from the purview of the work of the RDB."⁸²²

469. Dušan Orlović was mentioned earlier in this report. According to documentation from MUP Serbia, Dušan Orlović was from 1 September 1992 employed in MUP Serbia as an operative.⁸²³ In August 1993, Milan Martić wrote to Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Milan Tepavčević regarding alleged embezzlement committed by Dušan Orlović.⁸²⁴ The letter

⁸¹² MUP Serbia SDB, Letter, 21 June 1991 (0641-4640-0641-4640).

⁸¹³ MUP Serbia SDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 7 January 1992 (0608-4137-0608-4138).

⁸¹⁴ MUP Serbia RDB, Decision, 5 June 1992 (0641-4643-0641-4643).

⁸¹⁵ MUP Serbia, RDB, Second Administration, Work Evaluation for 1991 and 1992, 25 January 1992 and 25 January 1993 (0641-4672-0641-4675).

⁸¹⁶ MUP Serbia RDB, Work Evaluation for 1993, 9 February 1994 (0641-4676-0641-4677).

⁸¹⁷ Letter of Milan Martić, 7 October 1994 (0280-6502-0280-6504, at 0280-6503).

⁸¹⁸ Official Notes by MUP Serbia, RDB 1st Administration, 12 April 1991 (0608-4135-0608-4136).

⁸¹⁹ MUP Serbia, RDB, 2nd Administration, 12 October 1992 (0608-4188-0608-4195). It should be noted that the source for this RDB report is one "D.Ž.V.," which are the initials of Veljko Džakula.

⁸²⁰ Miloš Vasić, *Atentat na Zorana Đinđića* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 2005) (0365-0391-0365-0708, at 0365-0365-4038).

⁸²¹ BIA, Letter, 17 April 2006 (0641-4646-0641-4646).

⁸²² MUP Serbia, RDB, Letter, 21 September 1998 (0641-4648-0641-4648). The death certificate shows that the cause of death was a gunshot wound. Death Certificate, 22 November 1994 (0641-4666-0641-4666).

⁸²³ MUP Serbia, Department for Personnel and Labour-Legal Affairs, Certificate, 21 October 2003 (0641-4555-0641-4555).

⁸²⁴ Letter of Milan Martić to Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Milan Tepavčević, 28 August 1993 (0207-6703-0207-6703).

did not specify which function Orlović had. On 14 December 1993, Orlović submitted a report to the Second Administration of the RDB of MUP Serbia in his capacity as an operative for that service.⁸²⁵ On 17 May, 23 June, 27 October and 27 December 1994, and on 8 March and 3 October 1995 Orlović submitted official notes, also to the Second Administration.⁸²⁶

470. Dušan Momčilović had worked for the MUP in Croatia prior to 1991. At the beginning of that year, he transferred to Belgrade and commenced employment with the Fourth Administration of the SDB. On 1 May 1994, he became the commander of the department for anti-terrorist activities, and later he served as the deputy commander of the Unit for Special Operations.⁸²⁷ In addition, according to CRDB Belgrade, he

during his work in the RDB several times stayed in the field, so that he on 14 June 1992 was wounded at Cer near Derventa, where he was on official duty in the capacity of a volunteer of the Special Police of the Krajina as a member of MUP Serbia. And on that occasion he received a severe injury of the left upper arm from a mortar shell.⁸²⁸

471. Momčilović considered himself to have been in the Unit for Special Operations since 1991. He noted that he had been the chief of SUP Glina from 1991 to 1993. In 1994 and 1995 he had served with the VRS, and in 1995 he had been commander of the Special Unit of the RSK MUP.⁸²⁹

472. In May 1997, both Momčilović and Orlović were among those who greeted President Slobodan Milošević at the Kula awards ceremony.⁸³⁰

473. Ilija Kojić, who in the second half of 1991 was the Minister of Defence of the SAO SBZS, and later served as an assistant minister of the RSK MUP, was also an employee of MUP Serbia from November 1991 until December 2001.⁸³¹ According to Kojić, after

⁸²⁵ MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Information about the Activities of the Croatian Army, 14 December 1993 (0608-4379-0608-4381).

⁸²⁶ MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 17 May 1994 (0608-4462-0608-4463); MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 23 June 1994 (0608-4472-0608-4472); MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 27 October 1994 (0608-8452-0608-8453); MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Report of Informant, 27 December 1994 (0608-4492-0608-4494); MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 8 March 1995 (0608-4495-0608-4495); MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note, 3 October 1995 (0608-4530-0608-4531).

⁸²⁷ Letter of CRDB Belgrade, Fourth Department, 26 September 2001 (0558-8415-0558-8417, at 0558-8415).

⁸²⁸ Letter of CRDB Belgrade, Fourth Department, 26 September 2001 (0558-8415-0558-8417, at 0558-8415). See also application to Captain Dragan Fund by Dušan Momčilović, 26 June 1992 (BG03-2792-BG03-2794), and personnel file of Dušan Momčilović (0706-5308-0706-5363).

⁸²⁹ Autobiography of Dušan Momčilović, undated (0558-8429-0558-8429).

⁸³⁰ Kula Awards Ceremony, 4 May 1997 (V000-3533).

⁸³¹ Work Book of Ilija Kojić (0641-4506-0601-4508); SAO SBZS Minister of Defence, Order, 19 December 1991 (0296-3483-0296-3483); CRDB Novi Sad, Official Note, 26 May 1993 (0608-4656-0608-4657); CRDB Novi Sad, 18 February 1993 (Y038-9383-Y038-9391); *Politika*, "Varoš muškaraca," 13 July 1991 (Y039-5415-Y039-5415); *Politika*, "Baranja gotovo oslobođena," 29 August 1991 (Y039-5737-Y039-5737); Order of Ilija Kojić, 21 December 1991 (0350-2763-0350-2763); Dispatch of Milan

having served in MUP Croatia from 1977 until 1991, he transferred to MUP Serbia, where he was formally listed as a police officer in the Public Security Service. However, he in fact worked for the State Security Service as an operative and was as such subordinate to Jovica STANIŠIĆ.⁸³²

474. Intercepted communications indicated that Ilija Kojić was active in eastern Slavonia in the period. In September 1995, Kojić was called to a meeting at the "SSUP" in Belgrade along with other officials from Eastern Slavonia.⁸³³
475. Several documents from the VJ reported about intensive smuggling and other criminal activity in the area of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania. Among the actors implicated were Ilija Kojić, Milan Milanović "Mrgud," Željko Ražnatović "Arkan," Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Franko SIMATOVIĆ.⁸³⁴
476. In a February 1993 informational report, a source run by CRDB Novi Sad reported that the president of the municipal assembly in Vukovar had blamed the authorities in Serbia for personal conflicts in Eastern Slavonia.⁸³⁵ According to the president of the municipal assembly, Jovica STANIŠIĆ, FNU Ivković, Radoslav Kostić, Ilija Kojić and others were making a "twilight zone" out of Krajina.⁸³⁶
477. Uroš Pokrajac, who in October 1993 was a special advisor to Milan Martić, was as of June 1991 and February 1993 identified as an employee of MUP Serbia.⁸³⁷ In a dispatch of CJB Banja Luka from May 1995, Pokrajac was identified as "an employee of the SDB of Serbia."⁸³⁸ Similarly, the RS MUP RDB at Drvar described Pokrajac as a long-time

Martić, 24 February 1993 (0419-0088-0419-0088); Order of the President of the RSK Government, 21 April 1992 (0280-9398-0280-9398).

⁸³² RS MUP, Statement of Ilija Kojić, 15 February 2008 (0671-4164-0671-4169). According to the RDB, they were in 2000 unable to find any information in the personnel file of Ilija Kojić. MUP RDB, Eighth Administration, Official Note, 19 December 2000 (0681-9513-0681-9514, at 0681-9514). However, see personnel file of Kojić, showing that Kojić worked for the SUP in Belgrade from 1 November 1991 and for MUP Serbia from 1 April 1993 (0641-4504-0641-4525).

⁸³³ Intercepted communication, May-September 1995 (CF00-0169-CF00-0171); intercepted telephone conversation, 17 February 1993 (0401-0476-0401-0476); intercepted telephone conversation, 7 July 1995 (0415-0997-0415-0997); intercepted telephone conversation, 22 July 1995 (0401-1061-0401-1061).

⁸³⁴ VJ 1st Army Military Security Informational Report, 18 November 1992 (0340-4860-0340-4861); VJ Intelligence Report, undated (0214-3972-0214-3978); VJ Explanatory Note, 8 June 1995 (0340-4900-0340-4901); VJ, Explanatory Note, 21 January 1996 (0214-3992-0214-3993).

⁸³⁵ MUP Serbia, CRDB Novi Sad, Informational Report, 22 February 1993 (Y035-2655-Y035-2661, at Y035-2660). See also CRDB Novi Sad, Informational Report, 18 February 1993 (Y037-7511-Y037-7516).

⁸³⁶ See also Report on Indications of Destructive Activity of Goran Hadžić, 15 December 1993 (C000-1834-C000-1835). However, it should be noted that the source of this report is unknown.

⁸³⁷ Letter of SRBiH MUP Minister Alija Delimustafić, 17 June 1991 (Y035-0912-Y035-0916); Letter of Special Advisor Uroš Pokrajac, 7 October 1993 (0414-3001-0414-3001); RSK MUP, Permit Issued for Uroš Pokrajac, 16 February 1993 (0414-3008-0414-3008); RSK MUP, Dispatch of Special Advisor Uroš Pokrajac, 12 November 1993 (0280-6573-0280-6573). See also summaries of telephone conversation between Uroš Pokrajac and Dr. Laktović, 28 August 1993 (0401-0750-0401-0750).

⁸³⁸ Dispatch of CJB Banja Luka, 26 May 1995 (0359-0870-0359-0870).

employee of MUP Serbia who was engaged in matters concerning the involvement of a special unit of MUP Serbia on the territory of Grahovo municipality.⁸³⁹

478. In February 1993, the Intelligence Security Organ of the Fifteenth Corps Command of the SVK observed that 12 individuals with official identification cards of the MUP Serbia had arrived on the territory of Korenica “with the intention of forming paramilitary groups.”⁸⁴⁰
479. In May 1993, the District Council of the Assembly of the District of SBZS, with Goran Hadžić in attendance, discussed the “problem of Red Berets, who are not under the command of the MUP of the RSK.”⁸⁴¹ The Assembly concluded that the issue would be discussed at an upcoming meeting with the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Sokolović and the Chief of the Public Security Division Stojičić. The notes of this meeting also included discussion of the status of the District of SBZS and its police force, suggesting that these had still not been completely resolved.⁸⁴² On 10 June 1993, Hadžić, Minister of Internal Affairs Martić and others from the RSK met in Belgrade with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, Minister of Internal Affairs Zoran Sokolović, and the respective chiefs of MUP Serbia’s state and public security divisions, Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Radovan Stojičić.⁸⁴³
480. In November 1993, CRDB Kragujevac received information from a source that Tomislav Nikolić and other leaders of the SRS were collecting written statements about the activities of MUP Serbia.⁸⁴⁴ This particularly concerned MUP Serbia’s role in training and sending Serb volunteers to combat areas in the RSK and the RS, as well as the compensation the Serbian state provided for this engagement.
481. In the annual report on the work of the MUP RSK RDB for 1993, the Chief of the RDB Aco Drača, concluded that “the foundation has been formed for serious work and for the final preparations for the merging of the RDB with the MUP of the Republic of Serbia.”⁸⁴⁵ The same report also noted that 118 different documents had been provided to the 2nd Administration of the RDB of the Republic of Serbia by MUP RSK RDB in 1993, and that considerations were being made of forming special police units within the RDB. The

⁸³⁹ RS MUP, ORDB Drvar, Official Note, 6 May 1995 (B006-7721-B006-7722). See also RS MUP, CRDB Banja Luka, Official Note, 10 May 1995 (B003-5931-B003-B003-5933); RS MUP, ORDB Drvar, Official Note, 12 May 1995 (B006-7779-B006-B006-7784).

⁸⁴⁰ Intelligence Security Organ of the Fifteenth Corps of the SVK, State of Security in Mobilized Units, 16 February 1993 (0207-6719-0207-6721, at 0207-6721).

⁸⁴¹ Minutes of Meeting of the District Council of the Assembly of the District of SBZS, 28 May 1993 (0087-0770-0087-0790, at 0087-0773).

⁸⁴² Minutes of Meeting of the District Council of the Assembly of the District of SBZS, 28 May 1993 (0087-0770-0087-0790, at 0087-0775).

⁸⁴³ Minutes of Meeting in Belgrade (incomplete), 10 June 1993 (0364-7737-0364-7737).

⁸⁴⁴ Report of CRDB Kragujevac, 15 November 1993 (0632-1423-0632-1424).

⁸⁴⁵ RSK MUP RDB, Report on the Work of the RDB of RSK MUP for 1993, 25 April 1994 (0280-4700-0280-4702).

structure of the MUP RSK RDB was based on that of the RDB of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia.⁸⁴⁶

482. The links between the RSK leadership and the RDB in Serbia persisted until the fall of the RSK in August 1995. In March 1995, the acting RSK Minister of Internal Affairs Nebojša Pavković wrote to MUP Serbia Deputy Minister Stojičić referring to sabotage training that a unit of the RSK MUP Special Brigade was completing with anti-terrorist units of MUP Serbia.⁸⁴⁷ In April 1995, Milan Martić wrote to Slobodan Milošević and requested that 2,000 members of the VJ and of MUP Serbia be sent to garrisons in the RSK.⁸⁴⁸ At the end of June 1995, Slobodan Jarčević, an advisor to the President of the RSK and Senior RSK RDB inspector Momčilo Grčić wrote to both the RSK civil, police and military leadership as well as to Jovica STANIŠIĆ about the need to acquire equipment and weaponry from Russian sources.⁸⁴⁹ On 31 July 1995, the Chief of the Administration of Special Units in the RSK MUP wrote to the Police Administration of MUP Serbia to report that five members of MUP Serbia had been severely injured in the RSK.⁸⁵⁰

XIII. The Disintegration of the SRBiH MUP and the Establishment of the RS MUP

483. Control of the police forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted an integral and key element in the attempt of the Bosnian Serb leadership to achieve their primary goals. Throughout 1991 and during the first three months of 1992, Bosnian Serb police officials developed a negative view of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH MUP). The Serbian Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka*, or SDS) and its representatives in the governing structures and in the police regarded the Ministry as a flawed and biased institution. In their view, Bosnian Croats and Muslims were attempting to marginalise Bosnian Serbs within the police. They came to believe that if firm pre-emptive action were not taken, the Serbs would ultimately find themselves dominated – and even existentially threatened – by the Croats and the Muslims. At the outset of this crisis, the only practical and acceptable answer to the Serbs was the restoration of ethnic parity in the ranks (and particularly in the upper hierarchy) of the SRBiH MUP. However, this solution was increasingly abandoned in favour of demands for the outright establishment of an openly Serbian MUP.

484. The development of this view has to be understood in the overall context of Bosnian Serb ideology in 1991-1992. Namely, the SDS consistently expressed dissatisfaction with the steps taken by Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat politicians on

⁸⁴⁶ RSK MUP RDB, Overview of the Internal Organization of the RDB, undated (1994) (0280-4714-0280-4715).

⁸⁴⁷ RSK MUP, Letter of Acting Minister Nebojša Pavković to MUP Serbia, Deputy Minister Radomir [sic] Stojičić, 22 March 1995 (0207-6704-0207-6704).

⁸⁴⁸ Letter of RSK President Milan Martić to President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, 6 April 1995 (0280-4221-0280-4221).

⁸⁴⁹ Letter to RSK President Milan Martić, SVK Commander General Mrkšić, RDB Chief Aco Drača and Chief of MUP Serbia RDB Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 30 June 1995 (0280-7552-0280-7558).

⁸⁵⁰ RSK MUP Administration of Special Units, Letter, 31 July 1995 (0280-4407-0280-4407).

the SRBiH's path to independence. The participation of the SDS and of ethnic Serbs in the legally existing SRBiH police, both at the central and local levels, continued even as the SDS and the Bosnian Serbs within the police initiated the establishment of parallel central organs of authority beginning in October 1991.

485. The SDS and Bosnian Serbs in the SRBiH MUP frequently asserted that the presence of Croatian and Muslim extremism, along with repeated calls for increased professionalism in the Ministry, was part of a conscious strategy. As in the overall political scene, the Bosnian Serbs in the SRBiH MUP held to the perception that they were the sole preservers of integrity in policing, and the real defenders of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Yugoslavia).
486. The aim of this section of the report is to provide an analysis of the establishment and operation of the of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska (RS MUP), and its links with police and state security service structures in Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The report takes the November 1990 elections as its chronological point of departure. These multi-party elections led directly to a multi-party agreement on the distribution of posts within the SRBiH MUP. This process, in turn, eventually contributed to the breakdown of the SRBiH MUP and contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report devotes special attention to the activities and organizational structure of the RS MUP from April 1992 until the end of 1992. Inasmuch as Bosnia and Herzegovina was in a state of what the RS Assembly called "interethnic and interfaith war" throughout this period, this report focuses on the role of the RS MUP in this conflict.⁸⁵¹ Although this section of the report concentrates mostly on the period from November 1990 until the end of 1992, a limited analysis of relevant events after 1992 will also be included.
487. This section of the report attempts to describe the *de jure* and *de facto* structures of the RS MUP, and the command and control relationships among the Bosnian Serb military, police and the SDS in 1992. The report addresses the cooperation among the MUP, the Army of Republika Srpska (*Vojska Republike Srpske*, or VRS), the SDS, and, beginning in April 1992, the RS Government. It also shows the rivalry and breakdown in relations among these three organizations.
488. Given that the first minister of internal affairs of the RS was named Mićo Stanišić, all references to "Stanišić" in this section of the report refer to him, while "STANIŠIĆ" refers to Jovica STANIŠIĆ.

A. The Fragmentation of the SRBiH MUP

489. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina*, or SRBiH), geographically the most centrally located republic in Yugoslavia, was also the most ethnically diverse republic. According to the 1991 census, the last conducted in Yugoslavia, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of 43.7%

⁸⁵¹ See Art. 1 of "Declaration on the End of the War," No. 02-1954/92, 17 December 1992, *SGRS*, I, No. 19 (18 December 1992), 781 (0044-7231-0044-7231).

Bosnian Muslims,⁸⁵² 31.3% Serbs and 17.2% Croats.⁸⁵³ The remainder of the population was made up of those declaring themselves as Yugoslavs and various ethnic minorities.⁸⁵⁴ Political posts and leading jobs in the country's political system and economy were apportioned according to continuously adjusted formulas in order to maintain a sense of equality and ethnic proportionality.

490. Under strong authoritarian rule, positions in government, the military, police, schools and state-owned enterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina were carefully apportioned in an attempt to prevent discrimination against anyone. Nevertheless, the legacy of the Second World War, during which significant large massacres of the civilian population were perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a brutal internecine war, must be noted. The Second World War in Yugoslavia featured crimes committed not only by fascist occupying forces from Germany, Italy and their allies but also by domestic warring parties. The extensive fighting and war crimes that occurred in the concurrent civil war among fascist Croats, royalist Serb forces and communist Partisans, remained alive in the collective memory long after the war was over. Combined with an increasingly fractious political environment as communism collapsed, memories of past episodes of intercommunal mass violence contributed to a dramatic rise in tensions and to general apprehension and fear on all sides.

491. In November 1990, multi-party elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Three ethnically defined parties – the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) emerged as the main victors. In the elections, the SDS won absolute victories in 37 municipalities and shared power in many others. After the elections, these parties took steps to reach an agreement on the division of government posts among their nominees.⁸⁵⁵ Although the three nationalist parties ran on anti-communist platforms, in victory they proceeded to emulate precisely the previous party-state system of apportioning public sector posts.

492. By 22 December 1990, a specific agreement had emerged on the division of municipal posts and departments. Within the SRBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, leading positions were divided so that the Minister of Alija Delimustafić was a SDA appointee, the Deputy Minister Vitomir Žepinić was a SDS appointee, and the Undersecretary for the State Security Service Branko Kvesić was a HDZ appointee.

⁸⁵² Bosnian Muslims are today more commonly referred to as Bosniaks. However, as this name was only officially adopted during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the report refers throughout to Bosnian Muslims.

⁸⁵³ 1991 Bosnia and Herzegovina census figures cited in SRBiH MUP, "Information on Activities for Change of Leading Personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Need for Further Alignment of the National Structure of Employees with the National Structure of the Population," 24 June 1991 (0204-8166-0204-8212, at 0204-8187).

⁸⁵⁴ 1991 Bosnia and Herzegovina census figures cited in SRBiH MUP, "Information on Activities for Change of Leading Personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Need for Further Alignment of the National Structure of Employees with the National Structure of the Population," 24 June 1991 (0204-8166-0204-8212, at 0204-8187).

⁸⁵⁵ See List of Government and Assembly posts, notation: January 1991 (SA03-2086-SA03-2096).

493. The regional organization of the SRBiH MUP was based on nine Security Services Centres (CSBs). These CSBs were based in Bihać, Banja Luka, Doboj, Tuzla, Livno, Mostar, Zenica, Sarajevo and Goražde. Each CSB included a State Security Service Sector (SSDB) and a Public Security Service Sector (SSJB). There were accordingly three top posts in each CSB: the chief of the CSB itself and the heads of the subordinate SSDB and SSJB. The SDS received three CSBs (Banja Luka, Doboj and Goražde), three SSDBs (Banja Luka, Bihać and Livno) and four SSJBs (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar and Goražde). The SDS was thus most strongly represented in Banja Luka and Goražde. On the other hand, it had no leading official at the CSB in Zenica. The SDS was also allotted the position of head of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SUP) for the city of Sarajevo, which was subordinate to the CSB in Sarajevo and had responsibility for the ten municipalities that together constituted the city. The CSBs were particularly important because “the State Security Service and the Public Security Service are united in them and they are in charge of directing and co-ordinating functions with regards to the public security stations.”
494. In principle, all three parties agreed that it was desirable for the ethnic composition of the police in any given municipality to match the ethnic composition of the population of that municipality.⁸⁵⁶ Although nominations were made by the three parties, this did not necessarily mean that those appointed were members of a political party. Generally speaking, the politicized nature of the appointment process meant that political loyalty was prioritised over professional qualifications. In practice, the party-controlled appointment system for posts in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and other ministries) meant not only that the three parties prioritized the ethnicity of appointees, but also their political loyalty. Professional experience was by comparison a less relevant criterion.
495. Following the November 1990 elections, all three parties attempted to maximise the numbers and importance of their appointees in the SRBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs. This jostling for positions led to constant friction and acrimony among the three parties. Moreover, by prioritising political backing rather than professional police experience, the multi-party agreement came into conflict with the role played by the Ministry’s personnel administration. This was especially significant from the SDS’s point of view, because this particular administration was controlled by the SDA and the HDZ.
496. In the course of 1991, Serbs employed in the SRBiH MUP and the SDS leadership expressed particular unhappiness with the development of “personnel questions” in the Ministry. This predominantly concerned disagreements regarding the appointment and dismissal of Serbs in the Ministry. In a letter sent to the Council of the SDS in Sarajevo in July 1991, Goran Zečević, a Bosnian Serb and a former employee of the SRBiH MUP, presented a litany of grievances.⁸⁵⁷ The SDA and the HDZ, he averred, had succeeded in marginalising Serbs in the Ministry through a mixture of new appointments and reorganization of responsibilities. Of particular concern was the “loss” of SUP Sarajevo and control over the police, which was now in the hands of Avdo Hebib of the SDA.

⁸⁵⁶ SRBiH MUP, “Information on Activities for Change of Leading Personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Need for Further Alignment of the National Structure of Employees with the National Structure of the Population,” 24 June 1991 (0204-8166-0204-8212).

⁸⁵⁷ Goran Zečević, signed letter regarding Serbs in the SRBiH MUP, 22 July 1991 (SA03-0861-SA03-0864; also at SA04-1011-SA04-1014 with handwritten note).

497. These tensions regarding personnel appointments in the SRBiH MUP were apparent on the regional and the municipal level. On 19 September 1991, the chief of CSB Banja Luka, Stojan Župljanin, wrote to the chief of SJB Prijedor regarding recent personnel appointments at that SJB.⁸⁵⁸ Župljanin protested against the recent appointment of employees by the SJB without prior consultation and approval from CSB Banja Luka. Župljanin reminded the chief of the SJB that personnel policy was controlled by the chief of the CSB. Of the five employees (four Bosnian Muslims and one Bosnian Serb) mentioned in the dispatch, Župljanin stated that he would only allow the latter to be retained, as the proper checks had been conducted for that employee.

498. In his letter, Zečević proposed remedies that provided ample hints of the attitude that the Bosnian Serb leadership would adopt towards the SRBiH MUP. He noted with approval that barricades had been formed in some areas of the republic. He then offered a specific recommendation on personnel policy.

It is necessary to hire people who do not personally have any professional or political stains, regardless of whether they have formally joined the SDS. In my opinion, insofar as it is desirable to parry the aggressive policy of domination of the SDA and the HDZ in MUP, it is necessary to also hire people who until recently led the service of the organs of internal affairs and are of Serb nationality, regardless under which circumstances they left the service. They have valuable experience and knowledge, have information of inestimable value [and] possess the right experience in the organization and operationalization of the service.

499. Zečević suggested that, for the SDS, it was of greatest importance to have Serbs – if possible, qualified Serbs – as employees in the SRBiH MUP, regardless of whether they were actually members of the SDS. Zečević thought that a large intake of Serbs was urgently needed to counter the alleged formation of a covert Muslim police force composed of 1,000 men from Sandžak.

500. In the summer and autumn of 1991, the head of the SDS, Radovan Karadžić, spoke frequently with SDS appointees in the SRBiH MUP concerning personnel issues. His most important interlocutors were Deputy Minister Vitomir Žepinić⁸⁵⁹ and Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić.⁸⁶⁰ Karadžić took a strong interest in SRBiH MUP personnel policy, and he regularly attempted to micromanage the appointments of Serbs to posts. By

⁸⁵⁸ CSB Banja Luka to SJB Prijedor, 19 September 1991 (0063-5560-0063-5560).

⁸⁵⁹ Significant conversations between Vitomir Žepinić and Radovan Karadžić on SRBiH MUP personnel issues include: 21 May 1991 (0322-3402-0322-3406), 17 June 1991 (0323-6121-0323-6131), 24 June 1991 (0322-3522-0322-3528), 24 July 1991 (0322-6330-0322-6338), 27 August 1991 (0322-6021-0322-6023), 2 September 1991 (0323-2817-0323-2830), 16 September 1991 (0323-3159-0323-3165), 18 September 1991 (0323-3175-0323-3180).

⁸⁶⁰ Significant conversations between Momčilo Mandić and Radovan Karadžić on SRBiH MUP personnel issues include: 4 June 1991 (0322-3131-0322-3136), 17 June 1991 (0322-3279-0322-3283), 24 June 1991 (0322-3522-0322-3528), 24 June 1991 (0322-3483-0322-3485), 22 July 1991 (0322-6229-0322-6235), 23 July 1991 (0322-6266-0322-6269), 23 July 1991 (0322-6347-0322-6348), 26 August 1991 (0322-5951-0322-5954), 27 August 1991 (0322-5955-0322-5957), 28 August 1991 (0322-6024-0322-6026), 17 September 1991 (0323-3121-0323-3124).

the end of May 1991 at the latest, Karadžić had decided that personnel decisions affecting Serbs in the SRBiH MUP had to be taken by the SDS centre (the Main Board).⁸⁶¹

501. In the course of discussions regarding the personnel situation in the SRBiH MUP, Karadžić told Žepinić that the SDS should be allowed to nominate 35.65% of the posts in the SRBiH MUP.⁸⁶² This was the percentage of Serbs that Karadžić believed lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Karadžić was particularly worried about the allotment of posts within the State Security Service. On 17 June 1991, Mandić told Karadžić that the issue of posts in the State Security Service had to be resolved soon. "Otherwise we will be ruined."⁸⁶³
502. In all likelihood, the Bosnian Serbs were particularly concerned about the State Security Service because this branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had expansive powers to monitor and prevent any activity that could be construed as undermining the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. These powers included the ability to monitor and intercept postal and telephone communications, as well as to install and use electronic surveillance equipment. Since the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims controlled the leading posts in the State Security Service, the Bosnian Serbs felt particularly vulnerable, and suspected correctly that their leaders' conversations were being recorded and analysed.
503. On 18 September 1991, Karadžić told Žepinić that Karadžić had finally realised that even if 90% of the employees in the SRBiH MUP were Serbs, it would not make much of a difference. Karadžić argued that the Serbs followed the Law on Internal Affairs and the internal regulations of the SRBiH MUP too much for their own good.⁸⁶⁴
504. Simultaneously, Karadžić's conversations with Bosnian Serbs in the police showed that his demands were evolving, and that nothing short of a separate Bosnian Serb police force might be able to satisfy his plans. In numerous telephone conversations related to SRBiH MUP personnel issues, Karadžić demonstrated a quickness to anger when matters were not being resolved to his liking. His anger was frequently accompanied by outbursts, including references to preparations for violent alternatives. In July 1991, Karadžić told Žepinić that "not even one appointment" should be made in the SRBiH MUP "without the full agreement of all Serbs there."⁸⁶⁵ Karadžić insisted that Žepinić meet with the Steering Council (*stručni kolegij*) of the SRBiH MUP every day in order to resolve

⁸⁶¹ Conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Vojo Krunić, an SDS member from Goražde, 29 May 1991 (0322-3567-0322-3568).

⁸⁶² Conversation between Vitomir Žepinić and Radovan Karadžić, 17 June 1991 (0323-6121-0323-6131). There is discrepancy in the dating of this conversation; the correct date may be 13 October 1991.

⁸⁶³ Conversation between Momčilo Mandić and Radovan Karadžić, 17 June 1991 (0322-3279-0322-3283). Cf. conversation between Vitomir Žepinić and Radovan Karadžić, 24 July 1991 (0322-6330-0322-6338).

⁸⁶⁴ Conversation between Vitomir Žepinić and Radovan Karadžić, 18 September 1991 (0323-3175-0323-3180).

⁸⁶⁵ Conversation between Vitomir Žepinić and Radovan Karadžić, 24 July 1991 (0322-6330-0322-6338). A shorter version of this same conversation appears dated as 8 July 1991 (0322-4664-0322-4666).

outstanding issues. If the Muslims and Croats refused to accept the SDS appointments, Karadžić warned that “we have prepared an alternative that will be horrible.” Karadžić informed Žepinić that a meeting had taken place the previous evening between Karadžić and Adil Zulfikarpašić of the Muslim-Bosniak Organization (MBO) and Alija Izetbegović of the SDA.

I told them to their faces that we will form a parallel government, we will form a parallel police force. We will pull out our people and the government will have to pay them. We will pull out all our men under arms. We will completely form a parallel state, if you continue to fuck around. And they only watched and blinked, because we will do that. God our father cannot prevent us from doing that, because they have started against us in a way that they are fucking us and fucking us over. And there is no question, we will do this in a week. Well, let there be war, yes let there be war, but we will finish the job once and for all.

505. In the same conversation, Karadžić made it absolutely clear that the only acceptable Serbs in the SRBiH MUP were those who had been directly approved by the SDS and by the other Serbs in the SRBiH MUP.⁸⁶⁶ Karadžić further demanded that the leading Serbs in the SRBiH MUP meet for coffee every morning to discuss personnel decisions, and Žepinić agreed. Karadžić reiterated this stance repeatedly in subsequent conversations. Karadžić also insisted that those Serbs who were appointed hold important positions.⁸⁶⁷

506. As Deputy Minister of the SRBiH MUP, Vitomir Žepinić outranked Momčilo Mandić, who was the Assistant Minister for the Prevention and Detection of Crime. As time passed, however, Karadžić began to doubt the effectiveness of Žepinić.⁸⁶⁸ On 2 September 1991, Karadžić accused Žepinić of letting Avdo Hebib and the other Muslims make a Muslim army out of the SRBiH MUP behind the Serbs' backs.⁸⁶⁹ As a result, Karadžić placed increasing trust in Mandić. Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1991, Karadžić continued to treat Žepinić publicly as the top Bosnian Serb in the SRBiH MUP. In

⁸⁶⁶ Karadžić told Žepinić to instruct Dragan Devedlaka, a Serb SRBiH MUP SDB operative, not to nominate anyone for any posts without prior approval from the SDS. In a separate conversation on the same day, Karadžić made the same point to Devedlaka directly. Conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Dragan Devedlaka, 24 July 1991 (0322-6339-0322-6340).

⁸⁶⁷ On 2 September 1991, Karadžić told Žepinić that it was insignificant that 5 of 7 leading posts in the Administration of Police were held by Serbs because a Muslim, Avdo Hebib, headed the Administration. Conversation between Karadžić and Žepinić, 2 September 1991 (0323-2817-0323-2830).

⁸⁶⁸ On 2 September 1991, Karadžić rebuked Žepinić with reference to a controversial personnel appointment that had finally been resolved. “Vito, you have told me hundreds of times that this is so, and then it wasn’t.” Žepinić countered by accusing Karadžić of listening to others instead. Žepinić also told Karadžić to appoint someone else if Karadžić was dissatisfied with Žepinić’s performance. Conversation between Karadžić and Žepinić, 2 September 1991 (0323-2817-0323-2830).

⁸⁶⁹ Conversation between Karadžić and Žepinić, 2 September 1991 (0323-2817-0323-2830).

December 1991, Žepinić was appointed to the Council of Ministers created by the Bosnian Serb Assembly. This was, in effect, a “shadow cabinet” created by the SDS.⁸⁷⁰

507. Besides being briefed by Mandić and Žepinić, Karadžić received information about the situation in the SRBiH MUP from at least one SDS municipal board. These boards could suggest the appointment of specific individuals to posts in SJBs and CSBs.⁸⁷¹

508. Only a few days after Goran Zečević sent his letter to the SDS Council, Stojan Župljanin, the head of CSB Banja Luka, wrote to Biljana Plavšić, the Bosnian Serb member of the SRBiH Presidency, in her capacity as the President of the Council for the Preservation of the Constitutional Order of SRBiH.⁸⁷² Župljanin claimed that Avdo Hebib, Assistant Minister for the Police and Hilmija Selimović, Assistant Minister for Legal and Administrative Affairs and Foreigners, were conspiring to form a purely Muslim “army” out of the police. Župljanin wrote that he and his Serbian colleagues had suggested that the SRBiH MUP hire either former (Serbian) members of Croatian MUP or former (Serbian) employees of the SRBiH MUP who had allegedly been driven out of the service with the use of “perfidious methods”. These persons would be hired instead of training new recruits, thereby saving the Ministry money. Yet Župljanin claimed that Hebib and Selimović instead insisted on 400 new candidates, of whom 80% stemmed from the Sandžak. Župljanin attached a statement by the brother of a Muslim police officer who claimed that, exacerbating the situation, Muslims were being sent to receive training in Croatia.⁸⁷³ Župljanin pleaded with Plavšić to put an end to this “perfidious game” in which “Serbian cadres and the Serbian people” were the victims. Several phone calls made between Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić confirm that Plavšić raised the matter at a meeting of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order on 26 July 1991, and that Karadžić was also aware of the matter.⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷⁰ Decision on the Formation and Selection of the Council of Ministers of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 02-70/91, 21 December 1991, *SGSNBiH*, I, No. 1 (15 January 1992), 10 (0040-7988).

⁸⁷¹ SDS Municipal Board, Čelinac, to SRBiH MUP, with copy to Radovan Karadžić, 10 June 1991 (SA02-2708-SA02-2708).

⁸⁷² Letter of Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin to President of Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of SRBiH Biljana Plavšić, 25 July 1991 (SA04-0284-SA04-0285).

⁸⁷³ Official Note taken at CSB Banja Luka by Vojislav Pećanac, 25 July 1991 (SA04-0286-SA04-0286).

In June 1991, rumours circulated that Muslims were training in Croatia and also participating in combat actions against Serbs in Croatia. These rumours were proven false, as it was clarified that the Muslim police officers were present in Croatia as a part of routine training. Nonetheless, the rumours served a propagandistic purpose for the SDS. Conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Žika, 20 June 1991 (0322-3359-0322-3361), conversation between Radovan Karadžić and unknown male, 20 June 1991 (0322-3364-0322-3366).

⁸⁷⁴ See the three telephone conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić on 26 July 1991 (0321-9593-0321-9603). In the course of these conversations, Karadžić and Plavšić appear to consider whether to unveil some new tactic towards SRBiH MUP. However, they fear that it might not succeed, and do not want to try it unless they can be certain of success. Karadžić suggests inviting Delimustafić and Žepinić to come to a meeting convened by Plavšić after Sunday (28 July 1991), where they will be told that the preservation of ethnic proportionality in SRBiH MUP is imperative.

509. The war in Croatia impacted on the SRBiH MUP and relations between Serbian and Muslim police officers in north-western Bosnia. By early July 1991, Župljanin was requesting urgently that the police be fully mobilised in the AOR of CSB Banja Luka.⁸⁷⁵ He asserted this was necessary due to the deteriorating security situation and the risk of spill-over from the war in Croatia. When Delimustafić refused to approve Župljanin's repeated requests, Župljanin reacted by staging a "practice mobilisation" of the entire active and reserve police staff under his jurisdiction.⁸⁷⁶
510. On 9 September 1991, a group of "leading employees of Serb nationality in SRBiH MUP" issued a public statement criticising the Ministry's reaction to a recent *Oslobođenje* commentary on Radovan Karadžić.⁸⁷⁷ The statement claimed that the Steering Council of the SRBiH MUP had not been properly consulted regarding this matter. Taking the opportunity to list other grievances, the drafters of the statement argued that the Deputy Minister of SRBiH MUP – Vitomir Žepinić, a Serb and an appointee of the SDS – was being circumvented regarding important personnel decisions. The appointment and rotation of personnel in the State Security Service was a particularly sore point. The Serbs complained that the position of Deputy Under-secretary of SDB, which the inter-party agreement had allocated to the Serbs, had been eliminated. Moreover, whereas the SDS claimed to be the sole arbiter of personnel decisions related to Serbs in the SRBiH MUP, the statement alleged that "servile Serbs" (*poslušni Srbi*) were being appointed without SDS consultation. Other complaints regarded the allegedly improper use of the SRBiH MUP special police unit, the presence of a pronounced "anti-army" (i.e., anti-JNA) sentiment and the allegedly illegal issuance of SRBiH MUP identification cards. The statement concluded that "such one-sided and irregular moves damaging the Serb nation lead to divisions in the Ministry. This can only have incalculable consequences, and the Serbian cadres cannot bear responsibility for that."
511. In the late summer and autumn of 1991, the comments of the Bosnian Serb leadership and leading Bosnian Serb officials in the SRBiH MUP continued to be characterised by complaints about cadre issues.⁸⁷⁸ At the beginning of October 1991, a

⁸⁷⁵ CSB Banja Luka, "Information on the Current Security Situation and on the Circumstances of the Mobilisation of the Reserve Staff of the Police," 11 July 1991 (SA04-0532-SA04-0536).

⁸⁷⁶ CSB Banja Luka, "Information on the Current Security Situation and on the Circumstances of the Mobilisation of the Reserve Staff of the Police," 11 July 1991 (SA04-0532-SA04-0536).

⁸⁷⁷ Public Statement of Leading Employees of Serbian Nationality of MUP – BiH," 9 September 1991 (0216-7017-0216-7017). The article in *Oslobođenje* (0291-8677-0291-8678) was published on 7 September and reacted to comments made by Karadžić at a 5 September press conference in Sarajevo. According to the article, entitled "Incitement to War," Karadžić had accused the SRBiH MUP of constituting the "core" of a new armed force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Karadžić had also alleged that the Serbs in some areas no longer trusted the SRBiH MUP. The published SRBiH MUP statement pleaded with Karadžić, as the leader of one of the main parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be more responsible in his public statements.

⁸⁷⁸ See for example the discussion on 4 August 1991 between Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadžić regarding a telex that Plavšić had received from Župljanin (0207-8945-0207-8946). This concerned a new vacancy in State Security at CSB Banja Luka, which Karadžić and Plavšić wanted Nedeljko Kesić to take. Karadžić complained that the existing agreement to divide SRBiH MUP among the three nationalist parties did not cover deputies. This had to be included in the agreement as soon as possible. Karadžić promised to discuss the matter with Alija Izetbegović and Stjepan Kljuić.

dispute broke out in Srebrenica over the allocation of police posts.⁸⁷⁹ Senior Serbian officials in the SRBiH MUP also reported on alleged Muslim and Croatian terrorist activities aimed against the safety and well-being of the Serbian people.⁸⁸⁰

Simultaneously, in some areas, such as in the Prijedor region, non-Serbian police officials reported on “problematic” and tense relations with military (JNA and TO) authorities.⁸⁸¹ Tensions rose still further when Milan Martić, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSK, was arrested on a Croatian arrest warrant by the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 September 1991.⁸⁸²

512. Radovan Karadžić and other top Bosnian Serb leaders continued to contemplate – albeit among themselves – the formation of a separate Ministry of Internal Affairs. On 9 September 1991, Karadžić told both Nikola Koljević and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević that the Serbs were being pushed into a corner and would have to react by forming their own police.⁸⁸³ On 17 September 1991, Plavšić asked Karadžić to inform Izetbegović that the Serbs would carry out a cantonization of SUP Sarajevo as a result of their dissatisfaction with the ethnic distribution within the SRBiH MUP.⁸⁸⁴

513. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Alija Delimustafić, took some attempts to clamp down on the most egregious abuses.⁸⁸⁵ His efforts were apparently in vain. The impression garnered from a review of documents related to the MUP in 1991 is one of growing fragmentation of the ministry and its personnel. Increasingly, individuals at all levels of the ministry transferred their loyalty to specific parties and even persons. Information was unevenly shared and distributed, both among government organs and the MUP or within the MUP itself.⁸⁸⁶ Similarly, the MUP found itself accused of not

⁸⁷⁹ See also 1 October 1991 conversation of Karadžić and Slavko regarding problems with the distribution of positions in MUP in Srebrenica (0321-9763-0321-9767). Cf. Complaint of SDA to Izetbegović, Delimustafić, Žepinić, Hebib, Selimović and Mandić, 8 October 1991 (SA00-8550-SA00-8552).

⁸⁸⁰ See, for example, the report of Stojan Župljanin, dated 20 September 1991, sent to Biljana Plavšić, Miodrag Simović, Vitimir Žepinić and Nikola Uzelac on 23 September 1991 (SA02-0124-SA02-0132).

⁸⁸¹ Report on situation and problems in the area under the jurisdiction of Prijedor SJB, 6 September 1991 (P002-3979-P002-3990); letter from Hasan Talundžić, Prijedor SJB Chief to MUP SRBiH Minister Delimustafić and Banja Luka CSB Chief Župljanin, 23 September 1991 (0063-5837-0063-5837).

⁸⁸² The arrest is recorded in a SRBiH MUP report dated 9 September 1991 (0323-7669-0323-7672).

⁸⁸³ Conversation of Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević, 9 September 1991 (0212-8664-0212-8668).

⁸⁸⁴ Conversation of Plavšić and Karadžić, 17 September 1991 (0207-8969-0207-8971).

⁸⁸⁵ He may not, however, have been immune to manipulation of SRBiH MUP for personal and political gain. Unconfirmed reports in the Bosnian media allege that Delimustafić owed his rise to minister to illicit dealings. See, for example, *Slobodna Bosna*, 3 October 1998 (0065-5932-0065-5939).

⁸⁸⁶ Thus the SRBiH Presidency, at the 6th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, in the first half of 1991 felt it necessary to complain about a lack of information provision by MUP. 6th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, n.d. (but first half of 1991) (SA04-0977-SA04-0979). In September 1991, Delimustafić reported that he was dissatisfied with the reporting of certain regional and municipal police organs. Delimustafić to all CSBs, SJBs, and SUP Sarajevo, 20 September 1991 (P002-2378-P002-2379).

following well-established legal guidelines for cooperation with other republican and federal government organs.⁸⁸⁷

514. On 10 July 1991 Delimustafić sent a warning to all SJBs and CSBs warning against the illegal engagement of reserve police forces and provided a copy of legal provisions regulating the circumstances permitting the engagement of reserve police forces. According to those regulations, the SRBiH MUP deployed reserve police forces in a state of emergency.⁸⁸⁸ Another indication of the splintering of the MUP came on 20 September 1991 when Delimustafić sent instructions to all branches of the CSB and SJB noting that they were obliged to report to the Ministry all important security events and measures undertaken as a consequence. This apparently had not been done in certain cases.⁸⁸⁹
515. In mid-August 1991, Radovan Karadžić spoke with Nenad Stevandić of the SDS. Stevandić informed Karadžić that something “like Golubić” had been formed, and that Karadžić should visit it.⁸⁹⁰ Stevandić very likely meant to refer to a training centre such as that which has been established earlier that year in Croatia.
516. On 23 September Delimustafić attended the 10th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order.⁸⁹¹ Others present included Biljana Plavšić, Miodrag Simović and Zijad Kadić. The first topic discussed was the security situation in the republic, which had particularly been influenced by events in Croatia and the presence of JNA reservists from Montenegro on the territory of Herzegovina. The Council supported the efforts of the SRBiH MUP to maintain peace and decided to continue to support the SRBiH MUP. A proposal was made that during the mobilisation of the reserve police attention should be paid to the national composition of the reserve units, and that in the course of patrols by regular and reserve police the multi-national composition of patrols should be ensured in order to reassure the population. The Council also agreed to propose to the political parties that they intensify their activity to reduce inter-ethnic tension and mistrust. Furthermore, the Council discussed incidents in Čapljina involving the SJB and the distribution of weapons. Another topic was information about activities at home and abroad aimed at violent changes to the constitutional order. The Council proposed that the SDB increase its work in this area and cooperate with the JNA’s security service. Finally, the organization and assignment of the Detachment for Special Purposes (special police) in the MUP was debated. Delimustafić did not participate in this discussion. According to the discussion the Detachment for Special Purposes should only be used by decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The Council did instruct that account should be taken of the national composition of MUP organs, especially management staff.

⁸⁸⁷ See for example the minutes of the 8th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, 24 June 1991 (SA02-0554-SA02-0559).

⁸⁸⁸ Dispatch, dated 10 July 1991, of SRBiH MUP Minister Alija Delimustafić (P003-1451-P003-1451).

⁸⁸⁹ Minister Alija Delimustafić to chiefs of all CSBs and SJBs and to the Secretary of SUP Sarajevo, 20 September 1991 (P002-2378-P002-2379).

⁸⁹⁰ Telephone conversation of Nenad Stevandić and Radovan Karadžić, 17 or 18 August 1991 (0206-6348-0206-6351). See also telephone conversation of Nenad Stevandić and Radovan Karadžić, 31 August 1991 (0304-0910-0304-0918).

⁸⁹¹ Minutes of 10th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, 23 September 1991 (SA04-0469-SA04-0475).

517. On 26 September 1991 Delimustafić issued instructions to the SRBiH MUP concerning the mobilisation of the reserve police. This had been ordered by the Presidency. The reserve would be considered as accredited police while carrying out duties. Delimustafić added that reservists sometimes did not act in accordance with the law or regulations, for example, in uniforms or handling of weapons, and also in reporting on activities. As a consequence Delimustafić ordered that all branches of the MUP ensure that the reserve police act in accordance with regulations and that proper command and control of the reserve police was exercised.⁸⁹²
518. In a dispatch sent to all SDS municipal boards a few days before Delimustafić's instructions, the Party's President, Radovan Karadžić, expressed concern about the purpose of the mobilisation of the reserve police force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸⁹³ Nevertheless, he instructed all municipal boards to ensure that Serbs reported for mobilisation.
519. Delimustafić claimed later that the mobilisation was not fully successful because the republic lacked the money with which to pay its reserve police.⁸⁹⁴ According to an undated order by Delimustafić, the MUP stressed that the reserve police force "must not be used and engaged in ways and situations that are not stipulated by the law." Failure to respect these provisions would carry legal sanctions against persons responsible. Subordinate entities were instructed that reserve forces could be engaged in professional training programmes. In addition, these forces could, with the prior consent of the SRBiH MUP, be used to carry out special security jobs and tasks and to provide necessary help in cases of natural disasters. In exceptional circumstances the SRBiH MUP could engage the reserve forces in accordance with the Law on All People's Defence.⁸⁹⁵
520. In late October 1991, the SRBiH MUP cooperated with JNA Military Security, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SSUP) and the JNA in a joint action entitled "Punkt '91." (Point '91). This action aimed to control all traffic in and out of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to prevent the illegal trade of goods and weapons, and the movements of armed individuals and paramilitary groups.⁸⁹⁶ At the same time, however, the SRBiH MUP SDB was receiving reports that certain Serbs in the SRBiH MUP – such as those at SJB Pale – were engaged in covert attempts to acquire arms and assist the formation of Serb Autonomous Districts (*Srpske autonomne oblasti*, SAOs) in Bosnia and

⁸⁹² Dispatch of Minister Alija Delimustafić, 26 September 1991 (P002-2353-P002-2355). See also dispatch of Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić, 26 September 1991 (0063-7158-0063-7161).

⁸⁹³ Radovan Karadžić, "Instructions to all SDS Municipal Boards," 21 September 1991 (SA03-0386-SA03-0386).

⁸⁹⁴ Lidija Soldo, "I Will Negotiate Until Judgement Day: Interview with BiH Internal Affairs Minister Alija Delimustafić," *NIN*, 20 December 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU-92-004, 7 January 1992 (0365-6745-0365-6746).

⁸⁹⁵ Dispatch of Minister Alija Delimustafić, 10 July 1991 (P003-1451-P003-1451).

⁸⁹⁶ "Information on activities and observed problems in the functioning of the Point 91 action," 15 November 1991 (0323-7719-0323-7722).

Herzegovina.⁸⁹⁷ The SAOs were formed beginning in September 1991, and their creation was inspired by the precedent of the SAOs in Croatia.⁸⁹⁸

1. The SDS and the “Decentralization” of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

521. For the SDS and for Serbian cadres in the SRBiH MUP, the autumn of 1991 was marked by cautious steps in the direction of a consolidation of their position within MUP. In order to understand this process, one must view it in the greater context of the SDS’s political moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. The SDS and leading Serbs in the SRBiH MUP demanded “professionalism” in the police.⁸⁹⁹ Among the grievances aired by Serbian police officers in 1991 were deficiencies in training, understaffing, and, most importantly, an imbalance in the ethnic structure of police cadres in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

522. Before proceeding further, it bears noting that, already by February 1991, the SDS had clearly begun to Milošević what might happen were the SRBiH to cease functioning.⁹⁰⁰ These documents claimed that the SDS organs would not “impair the work of already organised services,” but would rather increase the “efficiency of legal organs.”⁹⁰¹

523. As a result of their continued dissatisfaction with the personnel situation in the SRBiH MUP, the SDS and leading Serbs in the SRBiH MUP at some point in the late summer

⁸⁹⁷ Official note of CSB Sarajevo, SDB Sector (RO SDB Pale), 21 October 1991 (0323-7827-0323-7831).

⁸⁹⁸ SAO Herzegovina was formed on 12 September 1991. “Decision of the Assembly of the Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina /:/ SAO Herzegovina Formed”), *Javnost*, 14 September 1991, p. 3 (0089-6735-0089-6735). On 16 September 1991, the Autonomous Region of Krajina was proclaimed in Banja Luka. Excerpt from the Minutes of the 7th Session of the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, 16 September 1991 (0040-3584-0040-3585). On 19 September 1991, a SAO North-eastern Bosnia was established. “Bijeljina /:/ Regionalisation – Will of the People,” *Javnost*, 28 September 1991, p. 2 (0089-6736-0089-6736). Also in mid-September, a SAO Romanija was formed. “Bosnia and Herzegovina /:/ Life as an SAO,” *Javnost*, 21 September 1991, p. 5 (0089-6731-0089-6731). On 4 November 1991, a SAO Northern Bosnia Assembly met for the first time. Excerpt from the Minutes of the Founding Assembly of the Serb Autonomous District of Northern Bosnia, 14 November 1991 (0051-6372-0051-6374). In early November, SAO Birač was formed. “Life as an SAO /:/ Serbian Northern Bosnia Constituted” and “Birač Has Chosen,” *Javnost* 9 November 1991, p. 2 (0089-6737-0089-6737). See also undated letter of Radovan Karadžić to Milan Babić (SA04-1935-SA04-1935).

⁸⁹⁹ Plavšić touched on the issue of “professionalism” in a phone conversation about MUP on 19 June 1991 (0212-8426-0212-8431). In a conversation with Momčilo Mandić on 8 October 1991, Radovan Karadžić said that Serbs, “above all”, had to respect the law. “Let the Serbs and Muslims compete to see who can respect the law. And not who can break it” (0212-8909-0212-8914).

⁹⁰⁰ The 23 February 1991 SDS confidential position paper, “Modus Operandi of Municipalities in the Conditions that Republican Organs Cease to Function,” argued that power would devolve to municipal agencies which would cooperate with federal agencies if republican organs ceased to function (SA02-8819-SA02-8822). The same document also foresaw the use of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and security forces in this situation. See also the working document produced by the SDS regarding the organising of Civilian Protection. “Civilian Protection,” February 1991 (SA02-9148-SA02-9152).

⁹⁰¹ “Civilian Protection,” February 1991 (SA02-9148-SA02-9152; citation at SA02-9149).

of 1991 began to contemplate a decentralization of internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outbreak of armed conflict in Croatia in June 1991 between the newly independent Croatian state and Serbs in Croatia who wished to remain in Yugoslavia also served as an impetus to Bosnian Serbs.

524. In theory, decentralization would allow the Bosnian Serbs more discretion in terms of how they implemented decisions of the republican authorities in Sarajevo with which they disagreed. At the same time, decentralization would provide a platform for a variety of foundational activities. The move towards decentralization manifested itself as the Bosnian Serbs began to establish Serb Autonomous Districts (*Srpske autonomne oblasti*, or SAOs) in September 1991.⁹⁰² The SAOs drew on a model previously used by the Serbs of Croatia, who implemented a political strategy designed to ensure that Croatian Serbs would be ruled only by Serbs. This strategy included the establishment of a separate, ethnically Serb police force. The Croatian Serbs had leveraged the SAOs as the foundation for their self-proclaimed republic, and the Bosnian Serbs realized that this could provide a useful template for them. Hence, in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the formation of the SAOs must be seen as an expression of the reluctance of Serbs to reside in political entities in which they would be an ethnic minority.
525. A working paper prepared within the SRBiH MUP SDB in September 1991 discussed the possibility of decentralizing internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁰³ A decentralization was seen as having negative consequences for the Bosnian Serbs. According to this working paper, implementing a decentralization of internal affairs “in conditions of civil war in the country” was “illusory.” In this context, decentralization of internal affairs would lead to negative consequences, including the formation of ethnically segregated police forces and their involvement in armed conflicts. These forces would “very quickly and easily be transformed into paramilitary units and formations, and that means the road to fratricidal war in these areas.”
526. The author(s) accused the Muslims and Croats of already pursuing the formation of ethnically based police forces. The Serbs therefore had to take appropriate steps. This involved, *inter alia*, cooperating closely with the JNA. The more nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders harboured doubts about the extent to which they could rely on support from

⁹⁰² SAO Herzegovina was formed on 12 September 1991. “Decision of the Assembly of the Municipalities of Eastern and Old Herzegovina [:] SAO Herzegovina Formed”, *Javnost*, 14 September 1991, p. 3 (0089-6735-0089-6735). On 16 September 1991, the Autonomous Region of Krajina was proclaimed in Banja Luka. Excerpt from the Minutes of the 7th Session of the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, 16 September 1991 (0040-3584-0040-3585). On 19 September 1991, a SAO North-eastern Bosnia was established. “Bijeljina [:] Regionalisation – Will of the People,” *Javnost*, 28 September 1991, p. 2 (0089-6736-0089-6736). Also in mid-September, a SAO Romanija was formed. “Bosnia and Herzegovina [:] Life as an SAO,” *Javnost*, 21 September 1991, p. 5 (0089-6731-0089-6731). On 4 November 1991, a SAO Northern Bosnia Assembly met for the first time. Excerpt from the Minutes of the Founding Assembly of the Serb Autonomous District of Northern Bosnia, 14 November 1991 (0051-6372-0051-6374). In early November, SAO Birač was formed. “Life as an SAO [:] Serbian Northern Bosnia Constituted” and “Birač Has Chosen,” *Javnost* 9 November 1991, p. 2 (0089-6737-0089-6737).

⁹⁰³ Undated SRBiH MUP SDB paper on the possibilities of decentralizing internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (0323-7660-0323-7668).

communist JNA officers indoctrinated and sworn to defend “brotherhood and unity.” At a minimum, the armed might of the JNA had to remain neutral with respect to the Bosnian Serbs’ ambitions, and there was an affinity between the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs’ goal of keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia. Therefore, “the current state of security of the Serb nation will to a great extent continue to depend on successful cooperation between MUP and the JNA, and especially in those municipalities where the Serb nation is a minority.”

527. In order to protect Bosnian Serb interests, the author(s) believed that new CSBs could be formed to correspond with the SAOs. “With the establishment of CSBs for the territory of the SAOs, ministries of internal affairs of those regions would be created *de facto*.” In other words, if certain municipalities with significant Serb populations were currently subordinated to a CSB located in a region in which Serbs were a minority, then a new CSB should be created around a gerrymandered Serb majority area. This would essentially harmonize the structure of policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the political structures being unilaterally established by the Bosnian Serbs. Existing or new CSBs could be established covering the territory of the SAOs, and thereby creating an explicit connection between political decentralization and decentralization of the police. Any other kind of decentralization was not in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs, because such a decentralization “assumes the establishment of organs of internal affairs only in the municipalities with a majority Serbian population.” In other words, the Bosnian Serbs did not accept that a portion of the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be “stranded” in municipalities in which they would constitute an ethnic minority and would be policed mainly by Croats or Bosnian Muslims.

528. Next, the author(s) posed a rhetorical question. “How and in what manner can the full security of the Serbian population be secured in those municipalities in which the Serbs are in a minority?” The answer given was that “only an expert body at the level of the Republic” could perform such a function. This meant the creation of a “Serb MUP.” This, in turn, begged the question of the relationship between a “Serb MUP” and the existing SRBiH MUP. In addition, any new MUP would need to be financed from some source. This was hardly a minor issue, since internal affairs consumed huge financial resources – 60% of the SRBiH budget, in the case of the SRBiH MUP.

529. Given that the political situation, the security situation, and the financial prerequisites for decentralizing internal affairs did not obtain, the working paper proposed four steps, all in the context of the maximum use of federal institutions:

1. The continuation of cooperation with the JNA and SSUP, and the support of this cooperation by the SAOs;
2. The active engagement of Serbian deputies in the SRBiH Assembly regarding the proposed law on changes and amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, especially with an eye towards the establishment of CSBs that would meet the needs of the SAOs;
3. The active engagement of Serbs in the SRBiH Government regarding the drafting of a new Rulebook (*Pravilnik*) on the Internal Organization of the

SRBiH MUP, the emphasis being on the establishment of police stations and posts in areas of majority Serbian settlement within municipalities with Serbian minorities;

4. The active engagement of Serbs in both the SRBiH Government and Assembly regarding the passage of a new SRBiH MUP Rulebook on Wartime Organization, with the emphasis on an increase of reserve police officers in police stations in areas with a Serbian majority.⁹⁰⁴

530. Should these four steps be blocked or prove impossible to implement, the working paper proposed an alternative, more drastic path of action:

- Establish municipal secretariats of internal affairs (OSUPs) or, respectively, transform the SJBs into OSUPs;
- For the areas of the SAOs, establish CSBs which will have a State Security and Public Security Sector and which will carry out the most complicated operational tasks and co-ordinate the work of the OSUPs in the municipalities;
- Establish a Serbian MUP at the republican level.

531. As is evident from the foregoing options, the Bosnian Serbs resented the abolition of the OSUPs, a step that had been an integral part of the pre-1990 SRBiH Law on Internal Affairs. Yet even the authors of this paper admitted that the OSUPs had been abolished because the municipalities proved unable to finance them from the municipal budgets. This, and not any attempt to centralize control of internal affairs in Sarajevo, had been the prime factor underlying this reform.

532. If the second, more drastic path were taken, the author(s) of the working paper expected vociferous opposition from the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. In fact, a worsening of the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would likely result. "In these conditions, the assistance of federal institutions, and above all from the JNA and SSUP, as well as MUP of Serbia and Montenegro will be necessary for the Serbian security service" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "It is therefore necessary that we establish contact with those organs regarding this question and that they contemplate concrete measures and possibilities for their assistance regarding personnel and equipment."⁹⁰⁵ In order to staff any new CSBs or indeed a new Ministry, the author(s) suggested relying upon both reliable active Bosnian Serb SRBiH MUP employees and on retired employees.

533. Perhaps the most important step taken in 1991 with regards to the police force was the production, in October 1991, of a "strictly confidential" document entitled

⁹⁰⁴ A document moving in this direction was circulated by SRBiH MUP Deputy Minister Vitomir Žepinić on 26 September 1991 (0063-7282-0063-7288).

⁹⁰⁵ The working papers contains precise contemplation of the type and manner of such cooperation. For this, see the section of the present report entitled "Cooperation of RS MUP with S(F)R] and Serbian Authorities."

“Possibilities of Organising a Serbian Ministry for Internal Affairs.”⁹⁰⁶ The October 1991 paper envisioned four alternative ways of doing this:

534. First, the Assembly of the Serbian People and the “Serbian Government” (not yet established by the Assembly) would name a Serbian minister and assistants, who would then appoint Serbian personnel to all other key positions in the ministry; the Serbian MUP would then work in cooperation with the existing MUP on questions of mutual interest, such as use of office space, vehicles and funds; this alternative was described as not dividing the existing MUP organizationally and amounted to creating a “shadow” Serbian MUP within the BiH MUP.
535. The second alternative was similar to the first but involved the physical separation of the two organizations, which would have their own premises, vehicles, equipment and financing; they would still have contact with respect to “disputed issues” and joint operations.
536. The third alternative was the organizational separation of certain components of MUP, such as the CSBs in Banja Luka, Doboј and Goražde, into independent units by decision of the Serbian Assembly and Government; these CSBs would then have to secure a source of financing; the paper noted that over 3,000 employees would work in these three CSBs plus a new one in Trebinje, a bill for the creation of which was then before the SRBiH Assembly.
537. Finally, the Serbian Assembly and Government could declare void the 1989 amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs; this would restore the old municipal secretariats of internal affairs (SUP— *Sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove*), which had been much more independent from the republican MUP and were responsible to the municipal assemblies rather than the ministry.⁹⁰⁷
538. It should be noted that the first two alternatives presumed the cooperation of the existing SRBiH MUP, while the last two were based on totally independent initiatives of the Serbian Assembly and “Government.” In the event, it was the latter path which the SDS followed, albeit not precisely as outlined in the October paper. The first major step was taken when the Assembly of the Serbian People named its “Council of Ministers” on 21 December 1991.⁹⁰⁸ Vitomir Žepinić and Mićo Stanišić, high-level officials of the SRBiH MUP, were both named to the Council, the former as “minister of internal affairs” and the latter as “minister without portfolio.”⁹⁰⁹ Stanišić’s appointment resulted from the

⁹⁰⁶ “Possibilities of Organising a Serbian Ministry for Internal Affairs,” 17 October 1991 (SA02-3707-SA02-3711).

⁹⁰⁷ “Possibilities of Organising a Serbian Ministry for Internal Affairs,” 17 October 1991 (SA02-3707-SA02-3711).

⁹⁰⁸ “Decision on the Formation and Selection of the Council of Ministers of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina), No. 02-70/91, 21 December 1991, *SLUŽBENI GLASNIK SRPSKOG NARODA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI*, I, No. 1 (15 January 1992), 10 (0040-7988-0040-7988).

⁹⁰⁹ “Decision on the Formation and Selection of the Council of Ministers of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” No. 02-70/91, 21 December 1991, *SLUŽBENI GLASNIK SRPSKOG*

objections of two delegates to Žepinić's appointment. These delegates were dissatisfied with the work of Žepinić as Deputy Minister of the SRBiH MUP.⁹¹⁰ One of the delegates, FNU Bjelošević, advocated removing Žepinić from his post in the SRBiH MUP and also expressed the wish that a Serbian police force would soon be established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bjelošević nominated Stanišić instead. At that point, Momčilo Krajišnik, as President of the Assembly, suggested that both Žepinić and Stanišić be appointed.

539. As has been indicated above, the plans for the division of the SRBiH MUP or the establishment of a "Serbian MUP" were mirrored in other seminal documents produced by the Bosnian Serb leadership and by Bosnian Serbs working in the SRBiH MUP during this period. In the autumn of 1991, a highly confidential working paper was prepared by an employee or set of employees within the SRBiH MUP SDB.⁹¹¹ Although the report was undated and anonymous, the tone, context and thesis of the argument make it highly plausible that it stemmed from September 1991 and that it was written by Bosnian Serbs in the SRBiH MUP SDB. In both its tone and content, this working paper bore a close resemblance to and, indeed, presaged the October 1991 SDS document on internal affairs.

540. The working paper on the possibility of decentralization of internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided a virtual template for subsequent events. It had most probably been read and endorsed by those who drafted the 17 October 1991 SDS paper on the possibility of organising a Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the reasoning of the working paper, and in particular its suggestion that different courses of action would need to be taken depending on whether a municipality had a minority or majority Serbian population, anticipated later SDS instructions.

541. Throughout the second half of 1991, the political and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to deteriorate. At a controversial session of the SRBiH Assembly on 14-15 October 1991, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb deputies clashed over the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat deputies voted for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was anathema to the Bosnian Serbs. At the session, Karadžić reacted very negatively to this vote.

I ask you to please realize seriously, this is not good what you are doing. This is the road on which you wish to put Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same highway of hell and suffering which Slovenia and Croatia have travelled. Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and the Muslim nation maybe into extinction. Because the Muslim nation cannot defend itself if there is war here!"⁹¹²

NARODA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI, I, No. 1 (15 January 1992), 10. Stanišić was also, at this time, a member of the SDS Crisis Staff for Sarajevo (SA02-6744-SA02-6744).

⁹¹⁰ Stenographic Record of the 4th Session of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 December 1991 (0224-1743-0224-1850).

⁹¹¹ Undated SRBiH MUP SDB paper on the possibilities of decentralizing internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (0323-7660-0323-7668).

⁹¹² Transcript of Speech of Radovan Karadžić in the SRBiH Assembly, 15 October 1991 (V000-0270).

542. After this parliamentary crisis, the SDS withdrew unilaterally from the SRBiH Assembly. On 24 October 1991, they formed their own "Assembly of the Serb People."⁹¹³ Simultaneously, they also declared that they wished to remain in "the joint state of Yugoslavia, with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sylvania, as well as with others who declare that they wish to stay."⁹¹⁴ In November 1991, the Bosnian Serbs held a referendum in which they voted to remain in Yugoslavia.⁹¹⁵
543. The assumption of control over local organs of internal affairs was also an integral part of the 19 December 1991 SDS "Instructions for the Organization and Activity of Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances." The Instructions in effect contemplated a top-down policy of dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines.⁹¹⁶ The Instructions provided for the municipalities currently dominated by the Bosnian Serbs or SDS (referred to as Variant A municipalities) to cease abiding by SRBiH laws. These municipalities would also ignore other parties and their representatives, and would only heed the orders of parallel Serbian authorities. In each municipality, the SDS would immediately form a "crisis staff," the membership of which would include the local chief of SJB or SM. In the Serbian-minority municipalities (referred to as Variant B municipalities) they would strive to establish Serbian institutions and thus divide the existing municipalities. The crisis staffs established in these municipalities would include the SDS candidates for chief of SJB or SM.⁹¹⁷
544. The implementation of these instructions would necessarily provoke political conflict. All of the institutions contemplated in the Instructions would be completely controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, and in particular by the SDS, which was establishing (parallel) political structures at the local, municipal, regional and republican level. Yet the Instructions assumed that an actual order for implementation would not be issued until later. Such implementation would involve mobilisation of the police and the TO and JNA.
545. Significantly, these decisions and events took place in a deteriorating security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was particularly the case in areas bordering conflict zones in Croatia. The monthly report of CSB Banja Luka covering the period from 30 December 1991 to 30 January 1992 spoke of increased tensions, and frequent but small-scale incidents involving firearms in nearly every municipality in the jurisdiction of that CSB.⁹¹⁸ Many of these incidents involved JNA reservists.

⁹¹³ Decision on the Foundation of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24 October 1991, *SGSNBiH*, I, No. 1, 15 January 1992 (SA01-0629-SA01-0629).

⁹¹⁴ Decision of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Remaining in the Joint State of Yugoslavia, 24 October 1991, *SGSNBiH*, I, No. 1, 15 January 1992 (SA01-0629-SA01-0630).

⁹¹⁵ Serb Deputies' Club "Decision on the Implementation of the Plebiscite of the Serb People," 18 October 1991 (SA00-6144-SA00-6144).

⁹¹⁶ "Instructions for the Organization and Activity of Organs of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances," Sarajevo, 19 December 1991 (numbered copy 100), hereafter: 19 December 1991 Instructions (0018-4274-0018-4283).

⁹¹⁷ 19 December 1991 Instructions (0018-4274-0018-4283).

⁹¹⁸ CSB Banja Luka, Monthly Information, 30 January 1992 (P005-6504-P005-6504).

546. On 23 September 1991, CSB Banja Luka began issuing a weekly report every Monday compiling information of significant crimes and security-related incidents occurring on the territory of CSB Banja Luka.⁹¹⁹ The steering council of the CSB issued these reports on the basis of Article 124 of the Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the SRBiH MUP. The first report included information on the spill-over of the conflict in Croatia into northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also included details on increasingly violent attacks on businesses, places of worship, public infrastructure and private individuals, using firearms and explosive devices. The chief of CSB Banja Luka, Stojan Župljanin, concluded that “the increased activity of the ever more numerous paramilitary groups in uniforms and in civilian clothing is particularly worrying. Through their illegal activities they seriously menace the security situation, with dangers for the outbreak of armed conflicts with the reserve and active staffs of the police and with citizens.” The report referred to negative activities of Veljko Milanković, “who is, on his assertion, the commander of a detachment of the police of SAO Krajina.” Numerous paramilitary groups whose members stemmed entirely or in part from Serbia were active in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹²⁰
547. On 23 September 1991, Župljanin also sent a detailed report about the activities of armed groups, including that of Milanković, in northwestern Bosnia to Biljana Plavšić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Miodrag Simović, Vitomir Žepinić and General Lieutenant Colonel Nikola Uzelac.⁹²¹ Župljanin wrote a subsequent report about Milanković in December 1991.⁹²²
548. In December 1991, the SRBiH MUP produced an analytical report entitled “Information on Activities in the Country and Abroad Directed at the Violent Change or Endangerment of the Constitutionally Confirmed Order.”⁹²³ At the outset, this report identified ethnically based organizations as the main threats to law and order in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These organizations manifested themselves as “civilian guards,” “volunteer groups” and other types of formations. Whereas such organizations had existed earlier, they had in the second half of 1991 become increasingly sophisticated and were now engaged in the formation of “parallel (national) authorities.” The use of illegal weapons was widespread and on the rise.⁹²⁴ As had been seen already in Srebrenica, in some municipalities, the ethnic distribution of posts in the police stations contributed to a

⁹¹⁹ CSB Banja Luka, “Weekly Information (for the period 16 to 23 September 1991)” (0061-9485-0061-9491).

⁹²⁰ Main Staff of the VRS, Information on Paramilitary Formations on the Territory of the Serb Republic of BiH, 28 July 1992 (0362-9736-0362-9741).

⁹²¹ CSB Banja Luka, Informational Report, 23 September 1991 (SA02-0124-SA02-0132).

⁹²² CSB Banja Luka, Information on the Criminal Activity and Other Illegal Activity of Veljko Milanković and Other Members of Paramilitary Formations from the Territory of Prnjavor, 2 December 1991 (0531-6068-0531-6076).

⁹²³ SRBiH MUP, “Information on Activities in the Country and Abroad Directed at the Violent Change or Endangerment of the Constitutionally Confirmed Order,” December 1991 (0323-7723-0323-7739). This particular version of the report appears to include hand-written comments critical of the report’s findings. See also CSB Banja Luka, SDB Sector, “Information and Intelligence Connected to the Existence and Doings of Paramilitary Formations and Other Current Events of Intelligence Interest,” 29 December 1991 (B004-7574-B004-7581).

⁹²⁴ The report identified 155 incidents of explosions in 45 different municipalities.

rise in tensions.⁹²⁵ The report argued that the activities of armed Serb groups were closely coordinated with political attempts by the Serbs to regionalise and ethnically homogenise power in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

549. Many of the organizations identified in the December 1991 report had emerged on the Bosnian scene after the outbreak of armed conflict in Croatia. These included the Serbian Chetnik Movement of the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj, which had also been involved in provocations in the Srebrenica and Bratunac municipalities. Some of the groups cooperated with and received equipment from the JNA. In this way, the leaders of such paramilitary groups attempted to “legalise” their activities. A list of armed Serbs allegedly existed and would be presented to the JNA Command in Sarajevo by the SRBiH MUP. In some areas, “Serbian territorial defence forces” had appeared. These Serbian armed groups were intent on provoking a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the frequent movement of JNA convoys in Herzegovina had fostered the impression that the JNA was “‘carrying out an occupation of BiH’ and that it was aiding ‘the arming of the Serbian population’.”
550. The report argued that the activities of armed Serbian groups were closely coordinated with political attempts by the Serbs to regionalise and ethnically homogenise power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SAO Romanija was singled out as a particular centre of subversive activities. Although the new, armed groups directed their hostility predominantly at non-Serbs, they also harassed Serbs who did not openly support the establishment of “new Serbian districts.” The report further noted that some regional SDB centres, such as SDB CSB Banja Luka, had stopped sending relevant information to Sarajevo. This made it difficult to assess the situation properly.
551. The report also noted activities of Croatian paramilitary formations, such as those of the Croat Party of Right (*Hrvatska stranka prava*, or HSP). With respect to the Bosnian Muslims, the report stated that the only recent activities of “Muslim extremists” had occurred in reaction to the proclamation of the SAOs and to the formation of Serbian paramilitary formations.
552. A similar report, filed by the SRBiH MUP SDB in response to a 26 December 1991 request, agreed with the above conclusions.⁹²⁶ It noted that attempts were underway to legalise the armed formations of the three major political parties (SDA, SDS and HDZ). In addition, the TO and police forces had in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina had come “completely” under party influence. This second report concluded that

on the whole, organisers of paramilitary organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are found in the political structures and in the existing authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of these, the formations of the HDZ and the SDA are negatively

⁹²⁵ In Sanski Most municipality, some police officers openly joined nationalist parties before the war. SJB Sanski Most, “Report on the Work of SJB Sanski Most for the [First] Six Months of 1992,” 20 July 1992 (0049-3712-0049-3729).

⁹²⁶ Undated SRBiH MUP SDB or JNA Military Security report (0323-7740-0323-7745). The first sentence of this report states that it is a response to a dispatch (Strictly Confidential 30-156) of 26 December 1991.

predisposed towards the JNA, while the paramilitary formations of the SDS support the JNA.

553. The report concluded that it was at present impossible to disarm the Muslim and Croat groups holding negative attitudes towards the JNA. This could only be done if a “forcible” approach to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina were adopted and if the Army ranks were purged of persons holding dual loyalties.
554. On 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People proclaimed the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹²⁷ In the period after this proclamation, a series of concrete steps were taken to establish a political entity with all the characteristics of a state, including its own police force. This entity existed in parallel with the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the months until the outbreak of armed conflict. The proclamation noted that the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina amongst its constituent people remained to be determined. However, the Bosnian Serbs claimed Sarajevo as the capital of the Serb Republic. Bearing in mind the deteriorating security situation, the prospects of a peaceful political settlement were increasingly remote.
555. At the beginning of February 1992, Radovan Karadžić wrote a long complaint about the position of Serbs in the SRBiH MUP.⁹²⁸ He circulated his letter, dated 6 February 1992, to a broad group of recipients, including the SRBiH Presidency, the SRBiH Government, the SRBiH Assembly, the SRBiH MUP, Tanjug and RTV Sarajevo. Among the long list of grievances Karadžić cited were the absence of a CSB in Trebinje, the tapping of phone lines by Munir (“Munja”) Alibabić of the SRBiH MUP SDB and the lack of Serbian cadres in a host of positions that were allegedly reserved for Serbs. Significantly, Karadžić authorised Momčilo Mandić to “participate, in the name of the Serbian Democratic Party, in the resolution of cadre and organizational questions in Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP.” This announcement merely confirmed an accomplished fact, as Karadžić had consulted regularly with Mandić on MUP personnel issues since at least the summer of 1991.
556. A further important step was taken at a meeting of Serbian MUP officials held in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992.⁹²⁹ Stojan Župljanin opened the meeting, which was attended by both Mandić and Stanišić. Almost all of the remaining participants later came to possess important functions in the RS MUP: Ćedo Kljajić, Slavko Drašković, Stanko Stojanović, Andrija Bjelošević, Nenad Radović, Vladimir Tutuš, Krsto Savić, Goran Žugić, Dragan Devedlaka, Goran Radović, Milan Krnjajić, Neđo Vlaški, Malko Koroman, Predrag Ješurić, Nedeljko Kesić, Igor Velašević and Vaso Škondrić.

⁹²⁷ “Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 02-72/92, 9 January 1992, *SGSNBiH*, I, No. 2 (27 January 1992), 13/14 (0040-7993-0040-7994).

⁹²⁸ Letter of Radovan Karadžić, 6 February 1992 (SA02-4201-SA02-4202).

⁹²⁹ Minutes of Meeting Held in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992 (SA00-6590-SA00-6597). Karadžić knew by 13 February 1992 at the latest of the meeting, and of Mandić’s attendance. Župljanin came a few days later to a meeting of the SDS in Sarajevo on 14 February 1992. Telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Jovan Čizmović, 13 February 1992 (0324-5475-0324-5480).

557. Župljanin emphasised the need to provide employment within MUP for an estimated 600 Serbian police officers from Croatia. Stanišić told the participants that the “Council of Ministers” wanted Serbian power to be felt in those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were under Serbian control, complained of Muslim domination of the SRBiH MUP and said that it was necessary to establish a Serbian MUP going from municipal and regional organizations all the way up to a Serbian ministry. Tellingly, Stanišić and several other speakers insisted that the Muslims, not the Serbs, were spearheading the attempt to split the SRBiH MUP. Allegations were made of Muslim involvement in illegal arms deals.
558. Kljajić complained that there had been appointments of inspectors and the deployment of these inspectors in the field without his knowledge. Kljajić thought that it should be publicly announced that the SRBiH MUP was not united. He believed that only the Serbs were obeying the law. He believed that the SDA and the SDS could not work together with respect to the SRBiH MUP and threatened to resign unless a Serbian MUP were established within a week. Another participant, Nenad Radović, informed the meeting that the Assembly of the Serbian People had already taken a decision on the formation of a Serbian MUP. Furthermore, Goran Žugić, who worked in the State Security Service in Tuzla told those present that “before adopting the Law on Internal Affairs people working in the field should be consulted first. Laws should be drafted as if we were in wartime and they should be applied to war conditions.”⁹³⁰ Predrag Ješurić from Bijeljina noted that he had been in contact with MUP of Serbia with respect to “material assistance.”
559. The key conclusions from the 11 February meeting in Banja Luka related to the creation of a “Serbian Council Board” within the SRBiH MUP under the direction of Mandić. In the words of the minutes of the meeting, “It is incumbent upon the Serbian Steering Council of the SRBiH MUP to carry out all preparations necessary for the functioning of the Serbian MUP after the adoption of the constitution of the Serbian Republic of BiH.”⁹³¹ Vitomir Žepinić did not attend this meeting, nor was he represented in the new Steering Council. Andrija Bjelošević from Doboj criticised Žepinić at the meeting for allegedly favouring Muslims. Clearly, Žepinić’s position was insecure.⁹³²
560. At the end of the meeting on 11 February, a long list of points was adopted. These included naming Mandić as the head of the Serbian Steering Council in the SRBiH MUP and several proposals geared towards the establishment of a Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further confirming their drive towards their own ministry, the participants at the meeting referred to the “activities and decisions of the Serbian MUP,” although it had not yet been formally established.

⁹³⁰ “Minutes of Meeting Held in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992” (SA00-6590-SA00-6597).

⁹³¹ “Minutes of a Meeting Held in Banja Luka, 11 February 1992” (SA00-6590-SA00-6597).

⁹³² Strong evidence suggests that Mandić and other top Serbian officials had doubts about Žepinić as early as the summer of 1991. In a conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić on 17 June 1991, Plavšić expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of Žepinić (0207-8935-0207-8936). See the conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Mandić, and between Radovan Karadžić and Vitomir Žepinić, cited in footnotes 17 and 18.

561. Two days after the meeting in Banja Luka, Mandić sent a dispatch to Župljanin (Banja Luka), Bjelošević (Doboj), Stojanović (Goražde), Savić (Nevesinje/Trebinje), Cvjetić (Sokolac), Ješurić (Bijeljina) and Stanišić (SUP Sarajevo) asking them to arrange meetings with leading personnel in their areas.⁹³³ The purpose of the meetings was to implement the conclusions reached at the 11 February meeting. On 14 February, Karadžić apparently gave the signal to SDS members to initiate the second stage of preparations anticipated in the 19 December 1991 Instructions.⁹³⁴ Further indicating that plans were proceeding apace, in early March 1992 Župljanin delivered a report on the security situation in his AOR to the (SDS-dominated) Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK).⁹³⁵ SRBiH MUP regulations did not provide for reporting to these self-declared regional assemblies. Such reporting was, however, envisaged in the Law on Internal Affairs passed by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.⁹³⁶

562. At the end of February 1992, the SRBiH authorities in Sarajevo held a referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The referendum, which was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, resulted in a vote for independence. The vote contrasted with the plebiscite that the Bosnian Serbs had held in November 1991 on remaining in Yugoslavia.

563. The SDS Crisis Staff also gave voice to discontent surrounding personnel policy in the SRBiH MUP. Indeed, the Crisis Staff appeared to view the disputes in the SRBiH MUP as the main cause of problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. On 2 March 1992, the SDS Crisis Staff issued a list of “conditions for negotiations,” which included a demand for a “cadre transformation” within 24 hours.⁹³⁷ This followed a crisis begun when a guest at a Serbian wedding in the old town of Sarajevo had been shot dead. The Serbs responded by erecting barricades around Sarajevo. The men manning these barricades were armed, in some cases with heavy weapons such as machine guns and rocket launchers. In some cases, the men at the barricades had a criminal background. Motorists encountering the barricades were subjected to searches.⁹³⁸ On 2 March 1992, the SDS Crisis Staff issued a list of “conditions for negotiations,” which included a demand for a “cadre transformation” in the Ministry of Internal Affairs within 24 hours.⁹³⁹ The crisis was eventually peacefully resolved, with the barricades being removed by 4 March 1992.

⁹³³ Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić to Župljanin, Bjelošević, Stojanović, Savić, Cvijetić, Ješurić and Stanišić, 13 February 1992 (0063-7176-0063-7176).

⁹³⁴ With respect to the substance of the 14 February 1992 meeting, see the journal notes apparently taken by an SDS municipal functionary from Bosanski Petrovac, Jovo Radojko (or an associate), who attended the meeting in an unknown capacity, dated 14 February 1992 (0059-2512-0059-2646; 0059-2531, specific page). Compare with the minutes of the SDS Municipal Board in Prijedor’s meetings of 13 and 17 February 1992 (P003-7444-P003-7550; P003-7530-P003-7536, specific pages), and with the minutes of a meeting of the Bratunac SDS Municipal Board, 24 February 1992 (0219-2723-0219-2725, specific pages; full range of minutes of meetings, 1991-95: 0219-2709-0219-2806).

⁹³⁵ Summary of Banja Luka Radio *Dnevnik*, 5 March 1992 (B002-2344).

⁹³⁶ See the section of this report on the RS Law on Internal Affairs.

⁹³⁷ “Conditions for Negotiations,” Crisis Staff of the Serbian People in BiH, 2 March 1992 (SA04-1161-SA04-1161).

⁹³⁸ SRBiH MUP SDB report, 6 March 1992 (0323-7746-0323-7757).

⁹³⁹ “Conditions for Negotiations,” Crisis Staff of the Serb People in BiH, 2 March 1992 (SA04-1161-SA04-1161).

Nonetheless, the episode highlighted the brittle nature of the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

564. On 3 March 1992, the Banja Luka newspaper *Glas* reported that the chief of CSB Banja Luka, Stojan Župljanin, stated that “we are afraid of uncontrolled processes which could arise in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁴⁰ For now we are in control of the situation on the territory of the region. However, in the case of a destruction of peace and security, it would be very difficult to re-establish order.” Župljanin further stated that “our strategic goal is to preserve peace.” On the following day, Župljanin reiterated that the goal of the residents of Bosanska Krajina was to preserve peace “at any cost.” He demonstrated his familiarity with the goals of the Assembly of the Serbian People. “Asked by journalists whether the CSB in Banja Luka would in the future carry out the orders of MUP BiH, Župljanin answered that the Centre in his jurisdiction would not carry out any kinds of orders of BiH MUP which might eventually be directed against the interests of the Serb nation.”⁹⁴¹
565. On 6 March 1992, the SRBiH MUP SDB presented an analysis of the events in Sarajevo of 1-4 March to the SRBiH Presidency, Assembly, Government and to the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order.⁹⁴² The first barricades had been erected by “persons of Serb nationality,” which provoked “persons of Muslim nationality” to react by establishing their own barricades. Taking into consideration the high degree of co-ordination visible in the establishment of the barricades, and the fact that those Serbs guarding the barricades were equipped with weapons, communications equipment and food, the report concluded that the barricades were not spontaneous in nature. The report found that the leadership of the SDS Crisis Staff had played a significant and guiding role in the barricades episode. These included Rajko Dukić, Danilo Veselinović, Jovan Tintor, Dragan Vučetić, Jovo Jovanović, Ratko Adžić and others. “In addition, much available information indicates that a number of active and reserve employees of Serb nationality of the SRBiH MUP were directly involved in the organising of the barricades and other activities.” A subsequent internal SRBiH MUP study of the barricades incident concluded that 24 employees of the SRBiH MUP had participated directly in the incident. Mandić and Stanišić were among those named.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴⁰ “Peace – [A] Strategic Goal,” *Glas*, 3 March 1992 (0202-9654-0202-9654).

⁹⁴¹ “Peace – [A] Strategic Goal,” *Glas*, 5 March 1992 (0202-9664-0202-9664).

⁹⁴² SRBiH MUP SDB report, 6 March 1992 (0323-7746-0323-7757).

⁹⁴³ Letter with attached report from Under-secretary of SDB, Branko Kvesić, to Minister of Internal Affairs Delimustafić, 13 March 1992, attaching information on MUP workers (19) who took part in Sarajevo barricades, both Muslim and Serbian, including: Momčilo Mandić, Čedo Kljajić, Dragan Devedlaka, and Malko Koroman. In addition, five people, including Mandić and Mićo Stanišić, were identified as having been present at the SDS Crisis Staff meeting, giving instructions to the field (0063-7355-0063-7359). The contents of Kvesić’s letter were apparently leaked to *Slobodna Bosna*, which published a summary of the report’s findings on 19 March 1992 (0208-3566-0208-3567). The same article noted that “Momčilo Mandić is once again coming to the attention of the public in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the March unrest in Sarajevo. In the course of this, he had very hefty tasks given to him by the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party - from the establishment of barricades to the recruitment of seasoned criminals to go out with weapons to the barricades. Let us also state by the way that an analysis of the March events, undertaken by MUP BiH for its own needs, established that a total of 24 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs participated in organising and functioning of

566. Biljana Plavšić told Rajko Dukić on 2 March 1992 that the Muslims had agreed to the demands related to the SRBiH MUP.⁹⁴⁴ These included that the distribution of positions in the SRBiH MUP be in accordance “with agreements reached immediately following the [November 1990] elections.” In addition, the SDS demanded that no actions be taken by the SRBiH MUP against the persons manning the barricades that had been set up or against any other Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁴⁵
567. A hasty meeting of the Presidency and representatives of the JNA and the SRBiH MUP convened on 3 March to resolve the crisis. One of the practical consequences that flowed from this (short-lived) defusing of tensions was the formation of patrols composed of a mixture of Serbs and Muslims and drawn from both the police and the army in the Sarajevo area.⁹⁴⁶ On 12 March, the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order convened and agreed to undertake urgently to place the paramilitary groups existing “in all three peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the joint control of SRBiH MUP and the JNA. These groups would then be dissolved.⁹⁴⁷ The Council highlighted the need for continued cooperation between the SRBiH MUP and the JNA, and called for all important decisions in the SRBiH MUP to be reached by consensus among the representatives of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. The Council also noted that the “depoliticisation” of all government organs was essential if the state were to function properly.
568. On 12 March 1992, Delimustafić ordered all CSBs and SJBs to update their statistics on personnel.⁹⁴⁸ This included ensuring that the ethnic composition of the police force matched the ethnic distribution of the population in the respective area of operation. It should be noted that these instructions were accompanied by the observation that numerous irregularities had been observed in recent SRBiH MUP personnel policies. However, in the meantime Serbian police in at SJB Stari Grad in Sarajevo continued to express dissatisfaction with their situation.⁹⁴⁹

the barricades in Sarajevo. Without even once denying his participation in the blockade around Sarajevo, Momčilo Mandić, after the situation has calmed down, continues his media activities, pointing to the need for a reconstruction of MUP. This should be done in concord with the protection of the interests of Serbian cadres in MUP, whose interests are, in Mandić's opinion, threatened.”

⁹⁴⁴ Conversation between Biljana Plavšić and Rajko Dukić, 2 March 1992 (0207-9054-0207-9057).

⁹⁴⁵ Undated document by the “Crisis Staff of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Conditions for Negotiation” (SA04-1161-SA04-1161).

⁹⁴⁶ “Plan for Work on Mixed Patrols of MUP BiH and JNA on the Territory of BiH,” signed by Colonel-General Milutin Kukanjac and Minister Alija Delimustafić, 8 March 1992 (0063-7344-0063-7345). See also the treatment of the “3 March” crisis in “And Now Every One Goes to Sleep!,” *Slobodna Bosna*, 5 March 1992 (0210-0563-0210-0566).

⁹⁴⁷ Minutes of 13th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, 9 March 1992 (SA02-0671-SA02-0675).

⁹⁴⁸ Delimustafić to chiefs of all CSBs and SJBs, 12 March 1992 (0063-3199-0063-3208).

⁹⁴⁹ For example, Serbian personnel serving at SJB Stari Grad in Sarajevo complained that the situation for them had deteriorated continuously since the November 1990 elections. They further accused their Muslim colleagues and their Muslim commander, Ismet Dahić, of supporting the “Green Berets” and other Muslim paramilitary formations. Letter of Serbian Employees of SJB Stari Grad to SRBiH MUP, CSB Sarajevo and SUP Sarajevo, 5 March 1992 (0084-5078-0084-5082).

569. Documents published in *Slobodna Bosna* on 12 March alleged that Dragan Kijac and Momčilo Mandić were the main SRBiH MUP figures involved in the barricades, and that Kijac had regularly called the SDS at the Holiday Inn to report on the situation.⁹⁵⁰ In an article entitled “Why Is Delimustafić Protecting Žepinić?”, the authors (identified only under the collective title of the magazine) accused “high-ranking police officials” of Serb nationality, including Momčilo Mandić and Dragan Kijac (the head of police in Sarajevo) of organising the blockade of Sarajevo at the beginning of the month. The centrepiece of the article was a photocopy of a document purported to be a list of phone calls received by Rajko Dukić at the Holiday Inn during the blockade. The authors accused Delimustafić of providing Žepinić (and other Serbs in the SRBiH MUP) with protection. Ridiculing the concept that Žepinić and Delimustafić represented the “Boro and Ramiz” tandem holding the SRBiH MUP – and, by extension Bosnia and Herzegovina – together, the authors forthrightly blamed these two for impending disaster.⁹⁵¹ In an accompanying article, the authors further accused Momčilo Mandić of masterminding the 5 March letter of grievances of Serbian employees in SJB Stari Grad.⁹⁵² The same article stated that Delimustafić had formed a three-member commission to investigate the reasons underlying the complaints of Serbs in the SRBiH MUP.

570. In reaction to the dispute at SJB Stari Grad, the Serbian police officials at SJB Pale and SJB Sokolac demanded on 23 March that all Muslim police officers return their weapons and uniforms and cease to work at these stations. According to the complaint filed by the Muslims, the Serbs took these steps in concert with the crisis staffs of the “Serbian District of Pale” and SAO Romanija. As a result of the incidents at Pale and Sokolac, the SRBiH MUP formed a commission to investigate.⁹⁵³

571. Contemporaneously with these developments, Serbs serving in the police in the Sarajevo area had begun to prepare actively for armed conflict. In a nomination for commendation written in September 1993 by SJB Ilidža, the former Commander (and later Chief) of SJB Ilidža, Tomislav Kovač, was commended for having organised “illegal meetings” in 1991 in his capacity as Commander of SJB Ilidža. “At those meetings which were held in Dobrinja, Ilidža and Blažuj, in addition to the obligations of gathering Serbs and their preparations for war, it was agreed to work intensively on the arming of citizens of Serb nationality. The supplying of weapons was carried out from Ravna Romanija, Pale, Sokolac, Kalinovik, Nedavići village, Trnovo[,] Tošići village, Hadžići, Jusuf Džonlagić Barracks, Lukavica and Nedjarići [*sic*]. On 3 March 1992, the MUP armoury at Donji Potok was blockaded and taken into control and weapons and munitions were distributed to the Serbian people.”⁹⁵⁴ The document further described prewar preparations. “One of the priority tasks was the strengthening of the reserve police stations Centar-Ilidža, Lužani

⁹⁵⁰ “Zašto Delimustafić štiti Žepinića” (Why Is Delimustafić protecting Žepinić?), *Slobodna Bosna*, 12 March 1992 (0210-0549-0210-0552).

⁹⁵¹ “Boro and Ramiz” was a reference to an old Partisan story featuring the partnership between a Serb (Boro) and an Albanian (Ramiz).

⁹⁵² “Stanice milicije [*sic*] Stari Grad: Da li Srbi hoće podjelu? Ko koga ugrožava?” *Slobodna Bosna*, 12 March 1992 (0210-0551-0210-0552).

⁹⁵³ Statement of Police Officers of Muslim Nationality about Their Dismissal from SJB Pale and SJB Sokolac,” 24 March 1992 (0204-8150-0204-8151).

⁹⁵⁴ SJB Ilidža, 20 September 1993 (0297-0064-0297-0072).

and Blažuj, which covered the urban portion of the municipality, which had the greatest strategic importance, and also the expulsion [*protjerivanje*] of Muslims from the SJB. Those were the preconditions for the creation of a Serb SJB.”⁹⁵⁵ According to a RS MUP nomination for commendation of RS MUP officers at SJB Ilidža written in 1993, this particular SJB had been in the vanguard of preparations for a Bosnian Serb MUP.⁹⁵⁶

572. The aforementioned “illegal” meetings organised in Ilidža were held in cooperation with local SDS representatives and acted on the directives of the SDS.⁹⁵⁷ Under Kovač’s direction, the Serbian police officers in Ilidža disarmed Muslim “Green Berets” and then distributed the seized weapons to SDS members.⁹⁵⁸ Local Serbs in Ilidža provided safe houses for storage of weapons transported to the Sarajevo area.⁹⁵⁹
573. Commendations of Tomislav Kovač’s role as prewar Commander at SJB Ilidža, and wartime Chief of SJB Ilidža, shed additional light on the establishment and early operation of the RS MUP in the Sarajevo area. One commendation described Kovač as having made a “particular contribution to the preparation of the Serb nation for defence” through “the formation of the Serb Public Security Station, organising illegal work [and] the arming of the Serbian people.”⁹⁶⁰ Another commendation referred to Kovač as “the person on whom the entire Region of Sarajevo leaned. [...] The ability of Mr. Kovač was demonstrated in April 1992 when he cleansed the SJB of Muslims and clearly informed Alija’s clique that we would not and could not live together.”⁹⁶¹ A third commendation highlighted personnel policy at SJB Ilidža during the period from September 1991 to April 1992. “On the orders of Tomislav Kovač, the number of police officers of Muslim nationality decreased every day, while the number of employees of Serb nationality increased, so that the war began with only Serbian police officers and two police officers of Croatian nationality.”⁹⁶²
574. The “illegal” arming of Serbs was not confined to the Sarajevo area. In Prijedor, the 1992 annual report stated that the Serbian police officers in the municipality had organised themselves “in strict illegality” in order to “prepare personnel for the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.”⁹⁶³ The work centred on the area known as Ćirkin Polje. “The main thrust of the work was on the illegal organising and formation of a shadow police station, as well as on the arming and material-technical equipping of personnel. In that

⁹⁵⁵ SJB Ilidža, 20 September 1993 (0297-0064-0297-0072). The word “*protjerivanje*” is spelled incorrectly in the text as “*protjevanje*,” but is clearly identifiable as such.

⁹⁵⁶ RS MUP nominations for commendation, 1993 (0297-0050-0297-0062).

⁹⁵⁷ RSM Blažuj, 11 September 1993 (0297-0039-0297-0047).

⁹⁵⁸ Undated commendation for Sreto Samardžija (0297-0034-0297-0036).

⁹⁵⁹ Undated commendation for Sreto Samardžija (0297-0034-0297-0036).

⁹⁶⁰ SJB Ilidža, 20 September 1993 (0297-0064-0297-0072).

⁹⁶¹ RSM Lužani, nominations for commendation, 1993 (0297-0074-0297-0076).

⁹⁶² RSM Centar Ilidža, nominations for commendation, 1993 (0297-0028-0297-0031). On the basis of this and the aforementioned nominations for commendation, Radovan Karadžić in 1993 awarded Tomislav Kovač the Nemanjić Order, the highest order in the RS. (The other recipients of the Nemanjić Order were RS MUP, Mićo Stanišić, Momčilo Mandić and Milenko Karišik.) RS Presidential Decree on Distribution of Awards, 1993 (0296-9857-0296-9871).

⁹⁶³ SJB Prijedor, Report on the work of the Prijedor Public Security Station during the last nine months of 1992, January 1993 (0063-3747-0063-3762).

manner, 13 police stations with approximately 1,500 members were formed. Weapons, munitions and other material-technical means were gathered from various sources, but mainly from the army. These were obtained secretly, mainly at night, transported, stored and distributed to personnel for storage and use at home.”

575. In the course of July 1991, SJB Bosanski Petrovac distributed weapons to the “reserve staff of the police in reserve [police] stations in which there were no Muslims, even though an explicit order of the Ministry, and especially the [Security Services] Centre in Bihać, insisted that weapons not be distributed to the reserve staff until an order arrived from them.”⁹⁶⁴ During the autumn of 1991, Bosnian Serbs at SJB Bosanski Petrovac suspected CSB Bihać of “transporting Ustaše to Travnik in an organised manner through our territory.”
576. A strictly confidential paper prepared in March 1992 by Serbs in the SRBiH MUP SDB gave articulation to their grievances.⁹⁶⁵ The paper argued that Serbs were being systematically marginalised in the State Security Service. Non-Serbs “and “servile Serbs” advanced while Serbs favoured by the SDS languished or were pushed out of the SDB. Investigations on anti-state activities were allegedly overwhelmingly focused on activities by Serbs, and in particular by the SDS. “The activity of extremists from non-Serbian ethnic groups is presented only as a reaction to Serbian extremism.” The Serbs also claimed that the alleged Serbian extremist activities were not well-documented and that inappropriate conclusions were reached. Interestingly, after enumerating a long list of other grievances, the authors of the paper concluded that the “most directly responsible” individual for these problems and illegalities was the Deputy Minister of SRBiH MUP, Vitomir Žepinić, a Serb and an appointee of the SDS.
577. In its conclusions, the March 1992 paper sought the use of well-trained Serbs in SDB who would “struggle without compromise for the interests of the Serb nation within constitutional and other legal restrictions.” This had to be taken into consideration when the SDS made recommendations for appointments for MUP and SDB. Reliable Serbs already in SDB should be consulted when SDB appointments were made.
578. At the tenth session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on 11 March 1992, the Assembly unanimously called for the implementation of the new Law on Internal Affairs by the Council of Ministers.⁹⁶⁶
579. At the eleventh session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on 18 March 1992, Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of the Assembly, referred specifically to the need for

⁹⁶⁴ SJB [Bosanski] Petrovac, 30 September 1993 (0059-2427-0059-2431).

⁹⁶⁵ “Information on Abuses, Illegalities and Manipulations by SDA and HDZ Cadres in the State Security Service of SRBiH MUP in Personnel Policies, the New Organization and Systemisation and in the One-Sided Use of Methods and Means of the Work of the Service in the Interest of the SDA-HDZ Alliance to the Damage of the Serbian Nation and the Politics of the SDS – Suggestions for the Overcoming of These Problems,” March 1992 (0323-7758-0323-7764).

⁹⁶⁶ Stenographic minutes of 10th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SA02-5626-SA02-5709).

“ethnic separation on the ground.”⁹⁶⁷ Miroslav Vještica, an SDS delegate from Bosanska Krupa referred to the need for the establishment of a Serbian police force and a “Serbian MUP” so that the Serbs could seize control of “their territories.” Interestingly, Vještica noted that the Bosnian Serbs of Bosanska Krupa had to some degree already *de facto* established control over their territory during the past half year.⁹⁶⁸

580. At the end of the eleventh session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Karadžić alluded to the fact that the Bosnian Serbs would soon announce that they were withdrawing from the SRBiH MUP. Indeed, he made it clear that the appropriate insignia for a new MUP had already been ordered. According to Karadžić, “our police will have to behave legally. No one will be allowed to have a hair missing, regardless of religious faith, nation. Everyone must feel completely safe.”⁹⁶⁹ Krajišnik asked the deputies to think seriously before the next Assembly session about the best candidates in their regions for a Serb MUP.

581. On 23 March, Radovan Karadžić, in his capacity as the President of the SDS, sent a dispatch out to all SDS municipal presidents.⁹⁷⁰ Karadžić noted that an operations centre had been established at the republican level. At the municipal level, he ordered that the SDS duty officer’s desks cooperate with their relevant SJBs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

582. During the twelfth session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on 24 March 1992, several speakers, including Radovan Karadžić, made a number of statements related to the nascent Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to Karadžić, the police force was of great interest. He pointed out that no international agreement limited the size of a regular and reserve police force. Referring to the new RS Law on Internal Affairs, Karadžić stated that:

we have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs, we also have badges and at in that moment to come – and this will be very soon – we can form what we wish to. There are reasons why this will come in two-three days, such are the estimates, I cannot give you the reasons now. At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the old ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control over the entire territory of the municipality concerned. Zvornik municipality put under [its] control everything that constitutes the Serbian municipality of Zvornik. Then, at that moment, for the next three-four days, there will be a unique methodology and you will be able to apply it in the municipalities you represent. This includes the things that must be done as well as the method of work: How to

⁹⁶⁷ Stenographic minutes of 11th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SA02-5710-SA02-5780).

⁹⁶⁸ At the 6th Session of the Assembly, held on 26 January 1992, Vještica had cited the need to coordinate the drafting, promulgation and implementation of legislation both at the level of the autonomous regions and the Assembly “so that we can both in the field and in the SDK [Service of Social Accounting] and in the SUP and the People’s Defence, etc. take power.” Tape transcript of 6th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SA02-5232-SA02-5305).

⁹⁶⁹ Stenographic minutes of the 11th Session of the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SA02-5710-SA02-5780).

⁹⁷⁰ Radovan Karadžić to (SDS) municipal presidents, 23 March 1992 (0018-4272-0018-4273).

separate the police force, take the funds that belong to the Serbian people and establish control.

583. At the end of his comments, Karadžić made one final, but crucial point: “The police must be under the control of the civilian authority, it must obey it; there is no discussion about that – that is the way it must be.”⁹⁷¹ In other words, the SDS and the nascent political organs of the Bosnian Serb republic, presided over by Karadžić, would exercise command and control over the police. The desire for control over the police also revealed lingering doubts and suspicions among the Bosnian Serb leaders about the extent to which they could rely on the TO and JNA for support in the event of armed hostilities.
584. Earlier in the day, the President of the SDS, Radovan Karadžić, had strongly hinted that the establishment of a Bosnian Serb police force was imminent. Miroslav Vještica complained that the formation of the police force of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had already been agreed for that day. He saw no reason why this had to be postponed once again. Vještica insisted that the Assembly should work all night if necessary to achieve the formation of a Serbian police force and the appointment of a Minister of Internal Affairs. “We could then go home with homework: to take over power in our Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Krajišnik confirmed that the formation of a Serbian police force had indeed been on the agenda.
585. The thirteenth session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly was held on the same day as the twelfth session, 24 March 1992.⁹⁷² Mićo Stanišić was nominated as the Minister of Internal Affairs, and accepted. The Assembly accepted him with only one dissenting vote. In his speech accepting his nomination, Stanišić repeated all of the standard Bosnian Serb grievances about the SRBiH MUP. He also alleged that the SRBiH MUP had been used to distribute weapons to a new Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that the Serbs had not received any ammunition or weapons at all. Stanišić asserted that he would head a professional police force, a “state administration that will in fact protect property, life, body and other riches which it will be of interest to protect.”
586. The activation of the Serb MUP did not take place until after the ceremonial promulgation of the Bosnian Serb constitution on 27 March. Meanwhile, Serbs such as Vitomir Žepinić and Biljana Plavšić continued to participate in Bosnian republican decision-making. For example, they attended the 13th Session of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order of the SRBiH presidency, where the principles of professionalism in the work of the SRBiH MUP was further endorsed. “The Council has estimated that all decisions, means and activities of the MUP need to be the result of

⁹⁷¹ Radovan Karadžić quoted in stenographic minutes of 12th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, 24 March 1992 (0089-6856-0089-6902). Karadžić’s reference to a “unique [*jedinstven*] methodology” is likely a reference to the implementation of the 19 December 1991 Instructions. “*Jedinstven*” can also be translated as “unified,” in the sense of a single methodology.

⁹⁷² Stenographic minutes of 13th Session of Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SA01-1109-SA01-1120).

agreements by the most responsible officials in the MUP, especially the representatives of all three nations."⁹⁷³

587. In mid-March 1992, the eruption of a major corruption scandal had compounded the already extremely tense situation in the SRBiH MUP. An internal report on corruption alleged that DM 20 million had been laundered. An assertion was also made that weapons had been illegally sold and distributed.⁹⁷⁴ Delimustafić ordered the establishment of a commission to look into the dealings of Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić. However, Mandić refused to cooperate with the commission.⁹⁷⁵ In addition, Mićo Stanišić, in particular, stood accused of selling weapons to Serbs at Pale.⁹⁷⁶ Moreover, the Sarajevo media reported that Vitomir Žepinić, one of the instigators of the report, had been offered DM 1 million to abort investigations into corruption.⁹⁷⁷

588. Numerous telephone conversations between Momčilo Mandić and various interlocutors during the second half of March 1992 reveal that Mandić reacted privately with fury to these allegations. Particularly noteworthy are the conversations between Mandić and "Samir" on 13, 17, 18, 19, 24 and 29 March.⁹⁷⁸ It is not clear who "Samir" was, or even whether he was a Serb or a Muslim. However, it is clear that he worked in the SRBiH MUP at a high level. On 13 March, Mandić and "Samir" agreed that there was no way that the SRBiH MUP could continue to operate if Žepinić remained in his position. Mandić thought that Žepinić was making a public laughing-stock out of the Ministry. Mandić also repeatedly accused Delimustafić of involvement in corruption and the sale (and use) of narcotics. On 17 March 1992, Mandić menacingly told "Samir" that the two of them would show Delimustafić and Žepinić who the real "Boro and Ramiz" were. On 18 March, Mandić told "Samir" that the Assembly of the Serbian People would soon initiate a procedure to distance themselves formally from Žepinić. Mandić believed that the Assembly would choose Mićo Stanišić as the replacement for Žepinić. On 19 March, "Samir" met with Delimustafić and openly threatened him, telling him that this was his last chance to escape defeat. Delimustafić countered by claiming that he had evidence that

⁹⁷³ "Transcript of 13th Session of the Council of the SRBiH Presidency for the Protection of the Constitutional Order," Sarajevo, 9 March 1992 (SA02-0671-SA02-0675).

⁹⁷⁴ A summary of the contents of the report was published on 1 April 1992 in *Oslobođenje*. The report had 69 pages and "more than 400 documents" in an appendix. It described the laundering of funds, as well as the wholesale destruction of money (estimated value 27.7 million dinars in damage).

⁹⁷⁵ "Mandić Will Fall, Who Will He Take With Him?!", *Slobodna Bosna*, 19 March 1992 (0208-3566-0208-3567). The scandal involved the alleged inappropriate confiscation of citizens' money and property for personal use by Mandić. He had allegedly converted many of these funds into hard currency, while at the same time claiming that these monies had been incinerated.

⁹⁷⁶ Stanišić was at one point in March 1992 purportedly detained, and weapons were found in his car. "Division in MUP," article of unknown date and origin (0210-0221-0210-0222). See also "Serbian MUP Nevertheless," *Večernje novine*, 1 April 1992 (0210-0212-0210-0213).

⁹⁷⁷ S. Hodžić, "20 Million Marks Laundered," *Oslobođenje*, 24 March 1992 (0291-8787-0291-8788).

⁹⁷⁸ Conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 13 March 1992 (0111-3407-0111-3416); conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 17 March 1992 (0111-3426-0111-3435); conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 18 March 1992 (0111-3446-0111-3457); conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 19 March (0111-3458-0111-3468); conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 24 March 1992 (0111-3477-0111-3480); conversation between Momčilo Mandić and "Samir," 29 March 1992 (0111-3426-0111-3435).

Mandić was provoking Serbs in the police into rebellion. Most provocatively, on 29 March 1992, “Samir” asked Mandić when Mandić would be “opening.” This was apparently a reference to the imminent unveiling of a Bosnian Serb MUP. Mandić noted that last-ditch efforts to entice Žepinić to cross over to the Serbian side had failed. Mandić then stated that he would meet that evening with Rajko Dukić or Radovan Karadžić in order to see how to proceed. According to Mandić, the allegations levelled against him were false and served as a foil for the real culprits - Žepinić and Delimustafić. Mandić worried that he and his allies would become “isolated” within the SRBiH MUP. Mandić signalled that it was time to move decisively towards the formation of a separate MUP.

589. Publicly, Mandić also denied the allegations and countered with charges that that the SDA and Delimustafić had been busy arming Muslim paramilitaries. He accused Mirsad Srebrenković, who had replaced Hilmija Selimović as Assistant Minister for Personnel, of being the main culprit.⁹⁷⁹ Mandić further argued that the commissions founded within the SRBiH MUP to clear up disputes amounted only to window-dressing. On 18 March 1992, Mandić sent a dispatch to all CSBs and SUP Sarajevo complaining that Žepinić had improperly abused his authority in circumventing Mandić in a request for documentation on corruption.⁹⁸⁰ By the end of the month, in an interview given to the SDS newspaper *Javnost*, Mandić said that there was no future for a unified MUP. Mandić stated that he would accept a decision of the Assembly of the Serbian People to form a Serbian MUP. In the same interview, he directly labelled Žepinić as a traitor to the Serb nation.⁹⁸¹

2. The Demise of the SRBiH MUP

590. On 27 March 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the constitution of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina and established a National Security Council chaired by the Republic’s President, Radovan Karadžić.⁹⁸² “While the [National Security Council] was supposed to be an advisory body concerning itself with issues of interest to the security of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it acted as a *de facto* expanded Presidency and exercised the powers of the Presidency.”⁹⁸³ This included civilian control of the police.

591. By the end of March 1992, SRBiH was clearly nearing dissolution. The few attempts to keep it united proved ineffective.⁹⁸⁴ On the diplomatic front, the European Community and the United States both worked to achieve a peaceful, political solution to

⁹⁷⁹ The dismissal of Srebrenković was one of Karadžić’s demands in his letter dated 6 February 1992 (SA02-4201-SA02-4202).

⁹⁸⁰ Momčilo Mandić to all CSBs and SUP Sarajevo, 18 March 1992 (0063-7180-0063-7180).

⁹⁸¹ “A Unified MUP – The Past,” *Javnost*, 28 March 1992 (0210-0210-0210-0211).

⁹⁸² “Decision on the Formation of the Council for National Security,” 27 March 1992 (SA00-6125-SA00-6126).

⁹⁸³ Patrick J. Treanor, “The Bosnian Serb Leadership, 1990-1992,” Research Report Prepared for the Case of Krajišnik and Plavšić (IT-00-39 & 40), 30 July 2002, Paragraph 258. The National Security Council faded out of existence in May 1992 and civilian control of the police was henceforth exercised through the expanded presidency.

⁹⁸⁴ Independent Union of Workers of MUP of SRBiH, “Report from the 4th Session of the Republican Board, Held on 17 March 1992,” 29 (26) March 1992 (P004-4315-P004-4318).

the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although negotiations continued until the very end of March, with further rounds of talks planned for April, no diplomatic solution was achieved.

592. The situation in the Bosnian Krajina was still deteriorating, and relations between the Ministry in Sarajevo and CSB Banja Luka had been severely strained. On 31 March 1992, *Glas* reported that Stojan Župljanin had announced “energetic measures” against those destabilising the situation in northwestern Bosnia. Župljanin stated that he was “sorry that the Ministry of Internal Affairs in BiH has turned into a political organization and that because of [its] negative relationship towards the Bosnian Krajina does not permit that the material, personnel and technical problems in our centre are solved.”⁹⁸⁵ In the interval between the passage of the law on the new Serbian MUP and its entry into force on 31 March, the SDS withdrew Vitomir Žepinić from the SRBiH MUP after the Serbian Assembly selected Stanišić as the first actual Minister of Internal Affairs.⁹⁸⁶ On 4 April 1992, Žepinić wrote to the President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and resigned from his position.⁹⁸⁷
593. On 31 March Mandić sent a circular to all MUP central and field offices informing them that pursuant to the action of the Assembly of the Serbian People four days earlier, the Serbian Internal Affairs Act would be applied as of 1 April and that Stanišić had been named minister.⁹⁸⁸ Although Vitomir Žepinić had been offered a position as “co-ordinator” in the new ministry, he did not accept this. He therefore held no position in the new “Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.”⁹⁸⁹
594. Upon reading Mandić’s telex, Delimustafić reacted by dispatching a note to all offices of the SRBiH MUP. Delimustafić called Mandić’s move illegal and regrettable. Delimustafić asked all offices to continue to obey only the SRBiH MUP.⁹⁹⁰
595. A first-hand account of the collapse of the SRBiH MUP was provided by Vitomir Žepinić to interviewers from the RS National Security Service (SNB) – the RS MUP’s state security service – at the end of August 1992.⁹⁹¹ As was already noted, although he was a Bosnian Serb and had been Deputy Minister of the SRBiH MUP, Žepinić did not accept a function in the RS MUP. Žepinić told the SNB about a meeting on 5 April 1992. Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of the Assembly of the Serbian People called the meeting at his office, and Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, Aleksa BUHA, Branko Đerić, Miodrag Simović, Momčilo Mandić, Mićo Stanišić and Milenko Karišik were all in attendance. At the meeting, Žepinić was attacked for having agreed to pay a visit to the base of the SRBiH

⁹⁸⁵ “Critical in Sanski Most,” *Glas*, 31 March 1992 (0202-9734-0202-9734).

⁹⁸⁶ “Žepinić Withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP,” *Glas* (Banja Luka), 31 March 1992 (SA04-6954-SA04-6954).

⁹⁸⁷ Vitomir Žepinić to President of Bosnian Serb Assembly, 4 April 1992 (SA02-6813-SA02-6813).

⁹⁸⁸ Telex message by Momčilo Mandić, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, SRBiH MUP UZSK, No. 02-2482, 31 March 1992 (0049-0125-0049-0125).

⁹⁸⁹ “Žepinić Withdrawn from BiH MUP,” *Glas* (Banja Luka), 31 March 1992 (SA04-6954-SA04-6954).

⁹⁹⁰ Delimustafić telex, 31 March 1992 (0049-0126). The statements of Mandić and Delimustafić were both published in *Večernje novine* on 1 April 1992 (0210-0212-0212-0213).

⁹⁹¹ Statement of Vitomir Žepinić, 27 August 1992 (0323-8738-0323-8749).

MUP special police unit together with Alija Delimustafić. Žepinić argued that the special police unit could not be split along ethnic lines. He offered his resignation.⁹⁹² The rest of the persons present then asked Žepinić to call the top Bosnian Serbs in the special police unit and get them to agree to the formation of a Bosnian Serb special police unit. Žepinić agreed to this. A second meeting took place at Krajišnik's office on the same day. Žepinić was informed that the seat of the SDS would be moving to Pale "for security reasons," but that the SDS would be in touch regarding Žepinić's move to an advisory post in SSUP.

596. The disintegration of the SRBiH MUP did not take place overnight. Mandić did not manage to persuade all Serbs to join the new, Serbian MUP. At SJB Zvornik, for example, the employees called for calm and professionalism. They professed not to want any ethnic division of the police.⁹⁹³ On 3 April 1992, the RS Minister of Internal Affairs, Mićo Stanišić wrote to all CSBs and SJBs on the territory of the "Serbian Republic" to remind them that they were to obey only the orders issued by the RS MUP.⁹⁹⁴ On the other hand, some municipalities such as Pale and Sokolac, had already expelled all non-Serbs from their police forces. Similar action was undertaken at SJB Ilijaš on 31 March.⁹⁹⁵ Dragan Vikić, a Bosnian Croat and the head of the SRBiH MUP special forces refused to comment publicly on the dissolution of the SRBiH MUP. The same position was taken by the two senior Croats in SRBiH MUP, Bruno Stojić and Branko Kvesić.⁹⁹⁶

597. The SRBiH MUP and the Bosnian government desperately tried to resist the formation of the Bosnian Serb MUP. At the beginning of April 1992, Ejup Ganić, a member of the SRBiH Presidency, warned that any employees who left the SRBiH MUP should consider themselves permanently fired.⁹⁹⁷ On 5 April, the SRBiH MUP formally fired Momčilo Mandić.⁹⁹⁸ The same day, the RS MUP issued an announcement in which it accused the Bosnian Muslims of the "former Ministry of Internal Affairs" of trying to take control of the ministry and the Krtelj building in which the SRBiH MUP special unit was based.⁹⁹⁹ The Muslim "Green Berets" had allegedly expelled all Serbian police officers from the Ministry and launched an armed attack on Krtelj. The Muslims, led by Jusuf Pušina, then allegedly seized the weapons and equipment of the special unit. The RS MUP announcement concluded by asking "the Serb nation and all well-intentioned citizens of Sarajevo" not to surrender their weapons or believe the "propaganda" spread by the SDA about the Serbs.

⁹⁹² It should be noted that Žepinić's memory in this statement puts his resignation a day later than his resignation letter of 4 April 1992.

⁹⁹³ SJB Zvornik to SRBiH MUP, 31 March 1992 (SA04-0273).

⁹⁹⁴ Stanišić to all CSBs and SJBs, 3 April 1992 (P004-4288). Stanišić was responding to an apparent attempt by SRBiH MUP to send out a telex in Mandić's name asking all persons to return to their regular posts.

⁹⁹⁵ "The SAOfication of the Police," *Oslobođenje*, 1 April 1992 (0210-0215-0210-0218)

⁹⁹⁶ "Clearer – Later," *Oslobođenje*, 1 April 1992 (0210-0219-0210-0220). The same article reported on rumours that the Croats would follow the Serbs in forming a separate MUP on 5 April.

⁹⁹⁷ "Clearer – Later," *Oslobođenje*, 1 April 1992 (0210-0219-0210-0220).

⁹⁹⁸ Dispatch of Delimustafić, 8 April 1992 (P004-4267-P004-4267).

⁹⁹⁹ RS MUP Announcement signed by Minister Mićo Stanišić, 5 April 1992 (0324-6514-0324-6515).

598. The measures taken by the SRBiH MUP to prevent the formation of a Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs were in vain. On 6 April 1992, Momčilo Mandić, the new Deputy Minister of RS MUP, organised the take-over of the police academy at Vraca.¹⁰⁰⁰ This building became the first seat of the RS MUP.¹⁰⁰¹ This operation was coordinated and led by Milenko Karišik, a Serb who had until recently served as the second-in-command in Dragan Vikić's special police unit.¹⁰⁰² In retrospect, Mandić stated that "when we set out for Vraca to take the police academy, we knew that we would be shot dead as terrorists if we failed. We knew that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be recognised on 7 April. If I and Karišik's special police had not raided, we would certainly have been proclaimed terrorists and the Bosnia and Herzegovina state would have executed us."¹⁰⁰³ Mandić was very eager to keep weapons from falling into the hands of Vikić's unit and called General Kukanjac and Colonel Vukota Vukotić regarding this matter.¹⁰⁰⁴ The 6 April assault on Vraca came to be seen by Bosnian Serbs as the birth of the RS MUP, and was celebrated as such later.

599. On 6 April 1992, the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized internationally. However, the Bosnian Serbs refused to recognize the state's independence, and moved politically and militarily to secure and expand the territory controlled by the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so, the Bosnian Serbs relied upon the methodology developed in the previous months, and in particular on the 19 December 1991 Instructions. The Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs played a key role in this process.

B. The RS MUP Law on Internal Affairs

600. The RS Law on Internal Affairs passed on 28 February 1992 formally established the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, elaborated its structure and sphere of activity, and defined the powers and duties of its minister.¹⁰⁰⁵ On the same day, the Assembly adopted the Constitution.¹⁰⁰⁶ On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The RS Law on Internal

¹⁰⁰⁰ See Mandić's account of this action in his April 1998 interview with *Slobodna Bosna* and in his contribution to *Rat u Bosni: Kako je počelo* (0047-7534-0047-7534), 76-78.

¹⁰⁰¹ Order of Mićo Stanišić, 19 May 1992 (0324-6100-0324-6100), refers to Vraca as the seat of the RS MUP. It appears, however, that the Hotel "Košuta" at Jahorina was used as the seat of the Ministry by late June 1992. See order of Mićo Stanišić, 28 June 1992 (0324-6098-0324-6098). In October, the Ministry moved partly to Bijeljina, with some parts remaining at Jahorina. CSB Banja Luka to chiefs of subordinate SJBs, 23 October 1992 (P004-3428-P004-3428).

¹⁰⁰² Karišik's initial rank in RS MUP was as "Commander of the Police Detachment." Order of Momčilo Mandić, 13 April 1992 (0324-6105-0324-6105).

¹⁰⁰³ Interview with Momčilo Mandić in *Slobodna Bosna* published on 10 April 1998 (0215-5571-0215-5576).

¹⁰⁰⁴ Conversation between General Milutin Kukanjac and Momčilo Mandić, 18 April 1992 (0322-0216-0322-0218); conversation between Colonel Vukota Vukotić and Momčilo Mandić, 18 April 1992 (0322-0214-0322-0215).

¹⁰⁰⁵ "Law on Internal Affairs," *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, I, No.4 (23 March 1992), 74-88 (0018-4319-0018-4333).

¹⁰⁰⁶ "Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 28 February 1992, *SGSNBiH*, I, No. 3 (16 March 1992) (0035-9816-0035-9825; 0040-8005-0040-8015).

Affairs was published in the *Official Gazette of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina* on 23 March 1992.¹⁰⁰⁷

601. The new Law on Internal Affairs was based to an overwhelming extent on the expurgated 17 April 1990 SRBiH Law on Internal Affairs.¹⁰⁰⁸ The Minister of Internal Affairs was a member of the Government, and in the new Law on Government (also enacted on 28 February 1992) his ministry was listed first among the thirteen Government ministries.¹⁰⁰⁹ He had the same general responsibilities as other ministers.¹⁰¹⁰
602. The RS Law on Internal Affairs provides a preview of the type of state and law enforcement agencies desired by the Bosnian Serb leadership. Its provisions are in line with the comments of Goran Žugić, a Bosnian Serb working in the State Security Service in Tuzla, who told a meeting of Bosnian Serb police officials in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992 that “before adopting the Law on Internal Affairs people working in the field should be consulted first. The law should be drafted as if we were in wartime and they should be applied to war conditions.”¹⁰¹¹
603. Before commencing analysis and comparison of these two laws, two important points are in order. First, the 1990 SRBiH law and the 1992 RS law are to a very large extent identical in their wording. In drafting this and other laws, the RS authorities facilitated their work by adopting the pre-existing SRBiH legislation as the basis for RS legislation. One can hence infer that, in cases where the language of the RS law omits, adds or modifies the SRBiH law, this marks an intent to alter the organization and functioning of internal affairs from the situation that had existed in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, in considering the laws on internal affairs, it must constantly be borne in mind that these laws contained but a small portion of the rules and regulations concerning the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its employees. For example, while the laws can be used to determine the legal organizational structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a much more detailed outline of the Ministry’s organizational structure can be found in the Ministry’s Rulebook on the Internal Organization of MUP in Conditions of the Imminent Threat of War and War.¹⁰¹²

¹⁰⁰⁷ “Law on Internal Affairs,” *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, I, No.4 (23 March 1992), 74-88 (0018-4319-0018-4333).

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Law on Internal Affairs,” *Službeni list SRBiH*, XLVI, No. 18 (29 June 1990), 491-506 (P003-5093-P003-5108).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Article 6 of “Law on the Government,” *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, I, No. 4 (23 March 1992), 53-55 (0018-4298-0018-4299).

¹⁰¹⁰ Article 13 of “Law on the Government,” *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, I, No. 4 (23 March 1992), 53-55 (0018-4298-0018-4299). Article 39 of “Law on State Administration,” *Službeni glasnik srpskog naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini*, I, No. 4 (23 March 1992), 55-60 (0018-4300-0018-4305).

¹⁰¹¹ “Minutes of Meeting Held in Banja Luka on 11 February 1992” (SA00-6590-SA00-6597).

¹⁰¹² The Rulebook was issued in September 1992 (0324-3783-0324-3984). This will be dealt with in the subsequent section.

604. One of the main and most obvious differences between the two laws concerns terminology. Whereas the 1990 law refers to the Republican Secretariat of Internal Affairs (*Republički sekretarijat unutrašnjih poslova*, RSUP) as the highest instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 1992 law speaks of a Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova*). Analogously, the 1992 law refers to the top official as the Minister, not the Republican Secretary. The 1992 law also replaces all references to “the working people” (*radni ljudi*) with “citizens” (*građani*). In addition, whereas the 1990 SRBiH law refers to “state security,” the 1992 RS law refers to “national security.”
605. Article 2 of the RS law retains reference to mutual relations with the Federal Secretariat (*savezni sekretarijat*). This was in line with the public claims of the RS leadership that they wished to maintain relations with the Yugoslav state and federal officials based in Belgrade. On 30 December 1991 the Executive Board of the SDS BiH had resolved to cooperate with “corresponding ministers, ministries and other state agencies and institutions in the Government of the Republic of Serbia” and to make communication with those agencies “obligatory.” Contacts should be made “on joint plans and programs.” This decision was communicated to the “Serbian Ministries in the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina” on 15 January 1992.¹⁰¹³
606. Articles 3 and 4 define the parameters of internal affairs. They encompass the fields of public security and state/national security. Specifically, these fields also include “affairs pertaining to identification cards, personal names, temporary and permanent residence, registry books, public gatherings, citizens’ personal numbers [JMBs] and other legally determined matters.”¹⁰¹⁴
607. The Public Security Division (*Resor javne bezbjednosti*) is established to deal with all questions of public security delineated in Articles 15 and 16. The 1992 RS law appoints an Under-secretary (*podsekretar*) of Internal Affairs to direct this Division. He is also known as the Head of the Public Security Division (*Rukovodilac resora javne bezbjednosti*). This function did not exist in the 1990 law, which envisioned only an Under-secretary for State Security. By creating the post of Under-secretary for Public Security, the RS law moved into alignment with the Republic of Serbia’s 1991 Law on Internal Affairs.¹⁰¹⁵
608. Articles 15 and 16 describe the competencies of the Public Security Service. These include the immediate protection of the constitutional order, protection of life and personal security of citizens, prevention and detection of criminal acts, the tracking down

¹⁰¹³ Letter from Rajko Dukić to Serbian Ministries in the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Executive Board, No. 9-02/92, Sarajevo, 15 January 1992 (SA04-5235-SA04-5236).

¹⁰¹⁴ By way of comparison, a recent official dictionary used by police academies in Serbia defines internal affairs as “security and other affairs of administration which relate to the protection of the security of the state and the constitutional order (state security) and to the protection of the security of citizens (public security) and other legally determined matters.” Slobodan Miletić, *Dictionary of Police Law: The Meaning of 650 Terms from the Area of Internal Affairs* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2001), 94.

¹⁰¹⁵ “Law on Internal Affairs,” *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije*, no. 44 (25 July 1991) (0046-1930-0046-1970).

and apprehension of perpetrators, the maintenance of law and order, the protection of certain individuals and buildings, crime-detection investigations, traffic safety and specified safety activities in other fields of communication, state-border controls, the monitoring of the temporary residences and movement of foreigners, passport control, control of weapons and ammunition, fire protection, transportation and storage of dangerous materials, and assistance in cases of natural disasters and epidemics. Article 16 stipulates that officers will wear uniforms and carry arms in the course of duty. However, the Secretary/Minister or an official authorised by him can order that police officers perform certain tasks in civilian clothes.¹⁰¹⁶ During periods when constitutional order and law and order may be jeopardised, the Secretary/Minister or a person appointed by him may issue an order whereby other authorised officials shall execute certain public security duties in uniform.

609. Article 17 of the 1990 law allows the Executive Council of the SRBiH Assembly to determine the total number of police officers, their organization, the total number of reserve police officers, and the criteria for their replenishment. In the 1992 RS law, this function is executed by the RS Government.

610. The State Security Division (*Resor državne bezbjednosti*) is established to deal with all questions of state security delineated in Article 19. In the 1990 law, a Under-secretary for State Security runs this division and reports to the Secretary, as explained in Article 20. In the 1992 law, the service is renamed the National Security Service (SNB). The Under-secretary for National Security reports to the Minister. The State/National Security Service gathers information aimed at detecting and preventing activities of individuals, groups and organizations who conspire to violate the constitutional order and State security.¹⁰¹⁷

611. Article 22 of the 1990 law requires the Secretariat to report in a timely manner to the appropriate republican organs as well as federal organs on events of interest to the security of the country. Crucially, the 1992 law retains this language, thereby providing a legal basis for continued reporting on such issues to Belgrade. Similarly, Article 23 remains virtually unaltered and therefore ensures that the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs will work in harmony and accordance with federal organs.

¹⁰¹⁶ One of the most frequently used terms in the various laws on internal affairs is "*ovlašćeno službeno lice*," a term that is only approximately translatable as "authorised official." The *Dictionary of Police Law* defines this as "a policeman, a professional member (worker, official) of the ministry of internal affairs, who in the implementation of internal affairs has particular obligations and authorisations foreseen in the laws on criminal procedure, the law on internal affairs and other regulations." From this, as well as from the definition given for "police officer," it emerges that every "authorised official" in the Secretariat/Ministry is considered to be a "police officer." Miletić, 49, 60. See also RS MUP, "Suggestion for a Resolution of the Confirmation of Which Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Are Regarded as Authorised Officials," 1 October 1992 (0324-7286-0324-7287).

¹⁰¹⁷ The *Dictionary of Police Law* defines state security as "the protection of the security of the state and the discovery or prevention of acts aimed at the undermining or destruction of constitutional order." Miletić, 16.

612. In both the 1990 and 1992 laws, Article 24 separates the employees of the State/National Security Service from the employees in the Public Security Service. As such, Article 25 notes that the State/National Security Service will operate in accordance with its own Regulations (*Pravilnik*). The Secretary/Minister will draw up these Regulations in consultation with the Executive Council of the SRBiH Assembly, or, in the 1992 RS law, with the Government. The same applies to the work plan of the Division of State/National Security. In the 1992 RS law, it is further stipulated that the President of the Republic will evaluate the performance of the Division of National Security based on the Minister's report. The President will then inform the National Assembly of his assessment.
613. Article 28 names the specific locations of the CSBs. In the 1990 law, there are 9 CSBs: Banja Luka, Bihać, Doboj, Goražde, Livno, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica. By contrast, the 1992 law provides for 5 CSBs: Banja Luka for the territory of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Trebinje for the territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Herzegovina, Doboj for the territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Northern Bosnia, Sarajevo for the territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Romanjia-Birač, and Bijeljina for the territory of the Serb Autonomous District of Semberija. The establishment of a CSB in Trebinje was, of course, one of the Bosnian Serbs' basic demands before April 1992.¹⁰¹⁸
614. Article 30 establishes local police stations (*stanice milicije*, SMs) and a reserve police force. If made necessary by extenuating circumstances, the police stations may establish departments at a location other than their geographical seats. These will be referred to as station squads (*stanična odjeljenja*).
615. The 1992 law did not significantly modify the provisions contained in the 1990 law for cooperation with other organs of internal affairs outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 64 provides for cooperation between the Secretariat/Ministry and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Article 65 allowed authorised officials of the Federal Secretariat and internal affairs agencies in other republics and autonomous provinces to take measures and initiate activities on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (or, in the 1992 law, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) directed at tracking down perpetrators for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, preventing perpetrators or accomplices from hiding or escaping, detecting or securing traces of criminal acts and objects that can be used as evidence, and gathering information that could be used in criminal proceedings. The 1992 law stated that such cooperation could take place with the permission of the Minister. The 1990 law exceptionally allowed for such cooperation in cases where the prevailing circumstances did not permit previous notification of the Secretary. This clause was dropped from the 1992 law.
616. Article 66 notes that officials from other organs of internal affairs who are invited to come to the assistance of the Secretariat/Ministry have the same duties and responsibilities as the regularly authorised officials of the Secretariat/Ministry.

¹⁰¹⁸ On the establishment of CSB Trebinje, see CSB Trebinje, "Report on the Work of CSB Trebinje for the Period from 4 April to 31 December 1992," 13 January 1993 (0297-1649-0297-1653).

617. Toward the end of the 1992 law, Articles 126-130 deal explicitly with the establishment of a Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the nascent Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 126 stipulates that CSBs and SJBs will cease cooperating with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of SRBiH. They will henceforth cooperate only with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
618. Article 127 makes reference to the ethnic composition of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Article's text invites "employees of Serb nationality and other employees who so desire" to take employment in the new Ministry of Internal Affairs.
619. Article 128 considers that fixed assets, equipment, office furniture and equipment, files and other documents, as well as instruments of work used by former SRBiH MUP public security services centres and public security stations, shall be transferred to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, fixed assets, equipment, inventory and other objects, archives and other documentation, as well as instruments of work which were used by SRBiH MUP Security Services Centres and Public Security Stations shall be transferred to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fixed assets, inventory and other objects, archives and other documentation, as well as instruments of work and the assets or funds of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are transferred for the use of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in proportion to the percentage of the representatives of the Serbian people within the Assembly of SRBiH. Fixed and movable assets as described by previous paragraphs used by Security Services Centres and Public Security Stations, and the Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sarajevo and which were distributed to districts, parts of which now constitute Serbian autonomous regions and districts, shall be transferred to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in proportion to the size of the parts separated from the aforementioned districts.
620. Article 129 stipulates that "general acts on the internal organization of the Ministry and the Public Security Service shall be enacted within 15 days from the day this law enters into effect."
621. The final article of the 1992 law, Article 130, notes that the law will enter into effect 8 days after its publication in the *Official Gazette of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. It should be noted that, although this would signify 31 March 1992 as the date on which the law enters into effect, in practice the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs began functioning on 1 April 1992.¹⁰¹⁹
622. In sum, the 1992 RS Law on Internal Affairs is in most respects a slightly modified version of the 1990 expurgated SRBiH Law on Internal Affairs. The 1992 Law retained *all* of the language found in the 1990 SRBiH Law on Internal Affairs on cooperation between the top organ of internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. the

¹⁰¹⁹ In late March 1992, SRBiH MUP Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić sent a circular announcing that new MUP law would take effect on 01.04.1992, and that Mićo Stanišić would head the new "Serbian" MUP: Momčilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP Minister Alija Delimustafić, 31 March 1992 (0049-0125-0049-0125).

RS Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, respectively) and the federal authorities located in Belgrade. The retention of this language was in harmony with the RS leadership's desire to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as an integral part of the Yugoslav state. In practice it provided a legal basis for continued cooperation between the police in Belgrade and police in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the RS MUP and the MUP of Serbia were brought into closer organizational harmony with the establishment of an under-secretary for public security services in the RS MUP. This post had not existed previously in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

C. The RS MUP Rulebook on Internal Organization

623. As seen in the preceding section, the primary legislation governing the operation and structure of the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs was the RS Law on Internal Affairs of 28 February 1992. However, the Law on Internal Affairs could not itself adequately encompass all aspects of work and organization in the Ministry. As had been the case in the SRBiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, these more specific matters were covered by a "Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the Ministry" (*Pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji ministarstva*).¹⁰²⁰ This Rulebook consisted of approximately 200 hundred pages of descriptions of functions, tasks, duties, and standard operating procedures. According to Article 1 of the January 1990 Rulebook, it dealt with the organizational units of the Ministry and their names and areas of activity. It also stipulated the numbers of employees in various units and listed their functions. The Rulebook further provided instructions on the hiring and authorisation of employees, and described many other matters.
624. It can safely be stated that the Ministry of Internal Affairs could not operate without a rulebook. However, given the exigencies of the war that began in April 1992, the RS MUP was forced to rely on the January 1990 Rulebook until a new one could be formulated. It is not surprising that, when the draft of a new, wartime rulebook was completed in September 1992, it bore a striking resemblance to the January 1990 rulebook. Large passages remained identical, although the September 1992 rulebook was significantly shorter. RS MUP authorities clearly based their drafts of a new rulebook, as had been the case with the RS Law on Internal Affairs, on pre-existing documents.
625. In June 1992, the RS Government ordered all government institutions, including the RS MUP, to systematise their work in line with "war organization."¹⁰²¹ This entailed using the minimum amount of staff necessary to work in wartime conditions. In addition, the RS MUP was required to prepare a "Rulebook on the Internal Organization of MUP in

¹⁰²⁰ RS MUP Rulebook on Internal Organization in Conditions of War and Imminent Threat of War, September 1992 (0324-3783-0324-3984). The Rulebook was issued in accordance with the Law on State Administration. The last such rulebook for SRBiH MUP was dated 29 January 1990 and was entitled the "Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs." (0113-7039-0113-7520). As late as February 1992, CSB Banja Luka stated that it was basing its work plan for 1992 on the January 1990 rulebook. "Work Plan of CSB Banja Luka for 1992," February 1992 (B010-4647-B010-4685).

¹⁰²¹ RS Government, "Operational Program: Measures for the Prevention of Disruptions of Social Transactions in Conditions of a State of War," 17 June 1992 (0324-5983-0324-6003).

Conditions of War" (*Pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji MUP-a u ratnim uslovima*). The rulebook would define and regulate the operation of the RS MUP in accordance with the RS Law on Internal Affairs. On 9 September 1992, the RS MUP Steering Council considered the draft Rulebook.¹⁰²² The same body debated the draft Rulebook two months later, at which time Minister STANIŠIĆ pressed for its urgent adoption.¹⁰²³

626. In the interim, and in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the Ministry, RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić issued a document entitled "Some Basic Principles of the Functioning of MUP in Conditions of a War Regime" on 6 July 1992.¹⁰²⁴ Stanišić stated that the "state of war," appearance of new types of crime (including "war crimes" and "war profiteering"), the inability to regulate firearms and explosives, as well as numerous other factors, justified the issuance of new guidelines. Stanišić reiterated his 15 May 1992 reorganization of the Ministry into "war units," as well as the importance of cooperation and joint action with the VRS.

627. The structure of the new Rulebook set out for the Ministry reflected a shift towards centralisation that was decided by the RS MUP in July 1992. Whereas Article 28 of the February 1992 RS Law on Internal Affairs made explicit the association between the SAOs and the CSBs, this association did not appear in the Rulebook. Each of the five CSBs (Banja Luka, Doboj, Bijeljina, Sarajevo and Trebinje) had its complement of subordinate SJBs. Article 5 noted that the Ministry numbered 11,240 workers at the time of the Rulebook's promulgation – this compared with 10,195 workers in all of the SRBiH MUP in January 1990.¹⁰²⁵ Article 9 stated that the work of the National Security Service was regulated by a separate rulebook.

628. The Ministry itself had nine main administrative units:

1. Police Administration
2. Administration for the Prevention and Discovery of Crime
3. Inspectorate for Protection from Fires and Explosions
4. Administration for Analytical-Informational Affairs and the Functioning of the Information System
5. Administration for Communications and Crypto-Protection
6. Administration for Legal and Personnel Affairs and the Affairs of Foreigners
7. Middle School for Internal Affairs
8. Administration for Material-Technical Means and Technical Affairs
9. Office of the Minister.

¹⁰²² Minutes of Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 9 September 1992 (0324-7328-0324-7332).

¹⁰²³ Minutes of Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 5 November 1992 (0324-6041-0324-6051).

¹⁰²⁴ RS MUP, "Some Basic Principles of the Functioning of MUP in Conditions of a War Regime," 6 July 1992 (0360-5768-0360-5770).

¹⁰²⁵ Article 7 of SRBiH MUP "Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs." (0113-7039-0113-7520).

629. Article 8 of the *Pravilnik* stipulated that the first three of the aforementioned administrative units fell within the purview of the Public Security Service, while the remainder were “for the implementation of other internal and joint affairs.”
630. The Office of the Minister organised the work of the Minister of Internal Affairs. It liaised with other government offices.¹⁰²⁶ This included monitoring any dealings of the National Assembly, the Presidency, and the RS Government having to do with internal affairs. This would ensure that the relevant decisions and orders of these institutions were implemented.
631. The Office of the Minister included an Information Bureau for public relations issues and also a helicopter unit.¹⁰²⁷ As of September 1992, 37 employees worked in the Office.¹⁰²⁸ These included the *Chef-de-Cabinet*, two advisors for national security and two advisors for public security.
632. Article 10 described the structure of the Police Administration. At the pinnacle of the RS police forces stood the Special Brigade of the Police (*Specijalna brigada milicije*, or SBP). The SBP was divided into five detachments, located at Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo and Trebinje. In addition, it included the Company for Special Activities, the Company for Protection of Persons and Buildings and a logistical unit. It was led by a Commander, who had one Deputy Commander and four Assistant Commanders.¹⁰²⁹
633. In addition to the SBP, the Police Administration encompassed the Department for General Affairs of the Police, the Department for Organizational-Mobilisation Affairs, the Department for the Security of Roads, and the Department for Border Affairs.
634. Whereas the Police Administration in the SRBiH MUP employed 195 persons, the same administration in the RS MUP employed 3,111 persons in September 1992.¹⁰³⁰ The Chief of the Administration was an Assistant Minister.¹⁰³¹ His deputy was the Chief of Police, who exercised command over police stations and units. In addition, there were two Chief Inspectors of Police.
635. Each CSB was headed by a Chief of the Centre.¹⁰³² Each CSB contained the following organizational units:¹⁰³³
- Sector of the National Security Service
 - Sector of the Public Security Service

¹⁰²⁶ Article 44 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰²⁷ Article 45 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰²⁸ Article 46 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰²⁹ Article 24 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984). The Assistant Commander for Security was charged with cooperating with the SNB and Military Security Service, in addition to cooperation with the Public Security Service.

¹⁰³⁰ Compare Article 34 of the 1990 Rulebook to Article 24 of the 1992 Rulebook.

¹⁰³¹ Article 24 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰³² Article 49 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰³³ Article 19 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

- Department for Communications
- Department for Foreigners, Legal, Administrative and Personnel Affairs
- Department for Material-Financial and Technical Affairs
- Public Security Station

636. The Public Security Sector was headed by a Chief for that Sector. In addition, in each CSB, the special police detachment of the Special Brigade of the Police was led by a Commander.¹⁰³⁴ Each Commander had two Assistant Commanders.¹⁰³⁵

637. Each CSB's Public Security Service Sector encompassed a number of departments and sections. These roughly paralleled the internal administrations of the Ministry.¹⁰³⁶

D. The RS MUP and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

638. In the course of April 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina plunged into armed conflict. In the first week of April 1992, the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated dramatically, and armed conflict spread rapidly. On 8 April, the SRBiH Presidency proclaimed that an imminent threat of war existed.¹⁰³⁷

639. On 15 April, a joint session of the RS National Security Council and the Government decided to request that the Presidency of the Republic proclaim an imminent threat of war.¹⁰³⁸ On the same day, Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević mobilised the TO.¹⁰³⁹ On 15 May, Mićo Stanišić, the RS Minister of Internal Affairs, implemented this decision.¹⁰⁴⁰

640. The RS MUP played a major role in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, both as a combatant and as the prime security presence in the daily lives of the population of Republika Srpska. Until the establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska (*Vojska Republike Srpske*, or VRS) on 12 May 1992, the "armed forces" within the RS MUP were the only armed forces exclusively and directly controlled by the RS leadership. RS MUP officials were proud of this fact and did not hesitate to emphasise it in their later reports

¹⁰³⁴ Article 24 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰³⁵ These were the Assistant Commander for Security and the Assistant Commander for Logistics. The former was charged with cooperating with the SNB and Military Security Service, in addition to cooperation with the Public Security Service.

¹⁰³⁶ Article 48 of RS MUP Rulebook (0324-3783-0324-3984).

¹⁰³⁷ Minutes of 65th Session of the SRBiH Presidency, 8 April 1992 (0093-1968). At the 66th Session of the Presidency (now of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), held on 9 April 1992, the Presidency took note of the resignations of Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić. Minutes of 66th Session of the RBH Presidency (0093-1971-0093-1974).

¹⁰³⁸ Minutes of Joint Session of RS National Security Council and Government, 15 April 1992 (0124-5291-0124-5293).

¹⁰³⁹ Decision of Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević, 15 April 1992, *Službeni Glasnik Srpskog Naroda u BiH*, 12-17 May 1992 (0040-8070-0040-8070).

¹⁰⁴⁰ Order of Mićo Stanišić, 15 May 1992 (0323-8857-0323-8858).

on operations in 1992.¹⁰⁴¹ As Biljana Plavšić had stated in the Assembly of the Serbian People already on 26 January 1992, “[t]hese are the times, until the referendum, when the Serbian people must make a state out of its own areas. It is known what the making of a state means. First, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will do whatever necessary to have its own army[.]”¹⁰⁴² Throughout the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was considered part of the armed forces (*oružane snage*) of Republika Srpska.¹⁰⁴³

641. During the first half of April 1992, the police of the fledgling RS MUP took shape. The RS MUP adopted new, Serbian symbols.¹⁰⁴⁴ Working on the basis of the new RS Law on Internal Affairs, RS MUP CSBs were established.¹⁰⁴⁵ Simultaneously, members of the police in Serbian-controlled areas were ordered to sign loyalty oaths. Those refusing to do so were put on “annual leave” from the new Bosnian Serb MUP and ordered to hand in their service weapons and other equipment.¹⁰⁴⁶ (None of these employees were subsequently allowed to return to service. In effect, they were fired retroactively, effective 1 April 1992, the day the loyalty oaths were first announced.¹⁰⁴⁷) At a press conference on 3 April 1992 in Banja Luka, Stojan Župljanin said unambiguously that CSB employees had to sign a loyalty oath by 6 April 1992.¹⁰⁴⁸

642. On 9 April 1992, it was announced that the deadline for the signing of oaths of loyalty to the RS MUP would be extended until 15 April.¹⁰⁴⁹ However, it remained the case that employees refusing to take the oath were dismissed from their posts.¹⁰⁵⁰ According to

¹⁰⁴¹ Report on the Analysis of the Work of SJBs in 1992 on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka,” March 1993 (0324-6151-0324-6167); Draft RS MUP Annual Report for 1992, January 1993 (FI20-1276-FI20-1319).

¹⁰⁴² See records of the 6th Assembly session, 26 January 1992 (SA02-5232-SA02-5305, at SA02-5240).

¹⁰⁴³ For example, Karadžić included the Minister of Internal Affairs as a member of the Supreme Command of the VRS, formed at the end of November 1992. “Decision on the Establishment of the Supreme Command of the Army of Republika Srpska,” 30 November 1992 (0076-7954-0076-7954).

¹⁰⁴⁴ “From Today On - New Emblems,” *Glas*, 8 April 1992 (0202-9743-0202-9743).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Banja Luka *Dnevnik*, 8 April 1992 (B005-2396-B005-2396).

¹⁰⁴⁶ Župljanin to RS MUP and all SJBs and SMs on the territory of CSB Banja Luka, 16 April 1992 (P004-4242-P004-4242). However, the fledgling RS MUP required all of its employees to take oaths to Republika Srpska. SRBiH Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs Momčilo Mandić to SRBiH MUP, 31 March 1992 (0049-0125). These oaths had to be taken “without any pressure by 15 April 1992.” Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin to SRBiH MUP, RS MUP and all SJBs, 10 April 1992 (P004-4255-P004-4255).

¹⁰⁴⁷ This was admitted in a later CSB dispatch, dated 28 May 1992 (P004-3558-P004-3558). On 5 June 1992, Simo Drljača observed that the service of those who had not taken the loyalty oath was severed effective 31 March 1992. However, these individuals had received a portion of their April 1992 salaries: Drljača to CSB Banja Luka, 5 June 1992 (P000-3455-P000-3455).

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Peace in the Interest of All Three Peoples,” *Glas*, 4 April 1992 (0095-1932-0095-1934).

¹⁰⁴⁹ “Deadline for Loyalty Extended,” *Glas*, 9 April 1992 (0202-9748-0202-9748).

¹⁰⁵⁰ “The Demands of SOS Are Adopted,” *Glas*, 4 April 1992 (0095-1933). Župljanin contended in his letter of 3 April 1992 that everyone had the possibility to stay in their positions (P004-4289-P004-4289a). A dispatch from SJB Prijedor dated 16 April 1992, citing a 10 April 1992 dispatch of CSB Banja Luka, stated that the deadline for taking the oath was 15 April 1992: Hasan Talundžić, Chief of SJB Prijedor, 16 April 1992 (P000-3932).

a later report, 304 employees of CSB Banja Luka did not sign loyalty oaths.¹⁰⁵¹ Delimustafić's assertions that the oath – and the RS MUP as a whole – were illegitimate and illegal were in vain.¹⁰⁵² It should be noted that in some areas of the RS, Muslim police officers were not offered an opportunity to take a loyalty oath.¹⁰⁵³

643. Those who do not sign the statement [of loyalty], will be without employment, said Župljanin. The chief of the CSB stated that he was personally a great optimist with respect to the peaceful transformation of the MUP, and that up until now a large number of employees of all nationalities had signed the solemn statement which, actually, did not differ from the statement from the old law on internal affairs.¹⁰⁵⁴
644. Župljanin insisted that he wanted to maintain a “national representation of employees in public security stations that is adequate to the national structure of the population of the territory of the municipalities.”¹⁰⁵⁵ By contrast, Bajazid Jahić, the chief of the public security sector of the CSB, stated that “already yesterday in the Banja Luka SJB there was pressure on people to sign the statement, which is not in order, because no one needs pressure.”¹⁰⁵⁶ Jahić expressed his hope that the emblem worn on the uniforms would nonetheless be the Yugoslav rather than the Serbian tricolour. He believed that far fewer employees would join the RS MUP if the latter were the case. Jahić also questioned whether, if the Serbs declared a Serbian municipality of Bihać, whether the Bosnian Muslims would declare a Muslim municipality of Banja Luka, and if such solutions were workable. Župljanin asserted, meanwhile, that he would not allow the harassment of any one within the police.
645. In a report filed in August 1992, CSB Banja Luka stated that “almost all members of non-Serb nationality” left the police on the territory of CSB Banja Luka.¹⁰⁵⁷ RS MUP inspectors visiting from Sarajevo discovered that in SJB Banja Luka, the few remaining Bosnian Muslim employees had been put on leave. No one knew what to do with them.¹⁰⁵⁸
646. As evidenced by the minutes of the 14 April 1992 meeting of the RS MUP Steering Council, all of the leading officials of the new Ministry had served in the SRBiH MUP.¹⁰⁵⁹ At the meeting, the participants confirmed material cooperation with the SSUP and MUP

¹⁰⁵¹ CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Work of CSB Banja Luka from 4 April to 31 December 1992,” January 1993 (B009-8119-B009-8147).

¹⁰⁵² Delimustafić dispatch on RS MUP oaths, 10 April 1992 (P004-4254). On the same day, Stojan Župljanin issued a dispatch contradicting Delimustafić. Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin to SRBiH MUP, RS MUP and to all SJBs, 10 April 1992 (P004-4255-P004-4255).

¹⁰⁵³ A document from SJB Nevesinje dated 4 May 1992 stated that Muslim employees in Bileća and Kalinovik were not allowed to express their loyalty to the RS (FI20-1967-FI20-1968).

¹⁰⁵⁴ “Deadline for Loyalty Extended,” *Glas*, 9 April 1992 (0202-9748-0202-9748).

¹⁰⁵⁵ “Deadline for Loyalty Extended,” *Glas*, 9 April 1992 (0202-9748-0202-9748).

¹⁰⁵⁶ “Deadline for Loyalty Extended,” *Glas*, 9 April 1992 (0202-9748-0202-9748).

¹⁰⁵⁷ CSB Banja Luka, “Information on the Formation and Performance of the Special Detachment of the Police of CSB Banja Luka,” approximately 5 August 1992 (0360-5790-0360-5791).

¹⁰⁵⁸ “Report on Completed Inspection of the CSB and Public Security Stations on the Territory of AR Krajina,” 5 August 1992 (0360-5785-0360-5789).

¹⁰⁵⁹ “Minutes from a Session of the Steering Council of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Held on 14 April 1992,” 14 April 1992 (0113-6674-0113-6676).

Serbia. Reflecting some concern about the extent to which the military burden was falling on the RS MUP, Čedo Klajić, the Under-secretary for Public Security, stated that an agreement should be reached with the Ministry for National Defence so that the police would not have to go to war. Along with Klajić, Nenad Radović, Dragan Kezunović and Miodrag Repija were charged with organising the work of the Ministry.

647. At the outset of the war, the leadership of the RS MUP perceived that the ministry enjoyed an advantage in armed strength. This was evident in telephone conversations of leading officials of the RS MUP in Sarajevo. On 17 April, RS MUP Deputy Minister Momčilo Mandić told Antun Talajić that the Serbs could level Sarajevo in an hour using the weapons in their possession.¹⁰⁶⁰

648. The RS MUP was involved in and had direct knowledge of the expulsion of non-Serbs from Serbian-held portions of Sarajevo. On 5 May 1992, Petar Mihajlović, a co-ordinator from Federal SUP, called Belgrade from the seat of the RS MUP at Vraca.¹⁰⁶¹ Mihajlović informed the "Secretary" in Belgrade that the Bosnian Serb TO and the police were "cleaning individual parts of the city. In general, they are concentrating on the cleansing of Dobrinje." On 26 May 1992, the Justice Minister, Momčilo Mandić discussed the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from Ilidža with Tomislav Kovač, the commander of SJB Ilidža. Mandić attempted to intervene on behalf of a Muslim judge whom he apparently knew personally and wished to protect. Mandić stated that this judge would declare himself a Serb and needed to be shielded from harm. Kovač did not seem to be able to help. He claimed that the civilian authorities had declared a general policy of expelling Muslims from Ilidža. This, and an almost open rift between the VRS and the RS MUP forces in Ilidža, made it difficult if not impossible to provide security for some of the Muslims in that section of Sarajevo.¹⁰⁶²

649. In considering the activities of the RS MUP in 1992, it is useful to consider the political context created by the Bosnian Serb leadership. At the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, held on 12 May 1992, President Radovan Karadžić enumerated the "strategic goals" of the Bosnian Serbs.¹⁰⁶³ These goals included the separation of ethnic communities, the division of Sarajevo, the achievement of access to the sea, the elimination of the Drina river as a border, the establishment of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina and the establishment of a border on the rivers Una and Neretva. Yet it also bears noting that these strategic goals were not officially published until November 1993.¹⁰⁶⁴

¹⁰⁶⁰ Telephone conversation of Momčilo Mandić and Antun Talajić, 17 April 1992 (0111-3550-0111-3551).

¹⁰⁶¹ Conversation of Petar Mihajlović and "Secretary," 5 May 1992 (0025-5556-0025-5557).

¹⁰⁶² Conversation of Tomislav Kovač and Momčilo Mandić, 26 May 1992 (0321-9265-0321-9268).

¹⁰⁶³ Minutes of the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 May 1992 (0084-7711-0084-7761).

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Decision on the Strategic Objectives of the Serbian People, 02-130/92 (12 May 1992)," *SGSNBiH*, III, No. 22 (26 November 1993), 866 (0210-0267-0210-0268).

650. Together with the JNA and the TO, and later the VRS, the RS MUP worked to disarm non-Serbs in the spring and summer of 1992. The campaign to find “illegal weapons” and remove them from the possession of the non-Serbian population evolved into the harassment, detention and eventually expulsion of large portions of that population from the RS. This policy was formulated by the central Bosnian Serb leadership for implementation by the police and the military. On 16 April, the RS Minister of National Defence, Bogdan Subotić, declared that a state of imminent danger of war existed and ordered a full mobilisation. Subotić’s order allowed the authorities to take “all necessary measures appropriate to the situation.”¹⁰⁶⁵ As regional and municipal authorities controlled by the Bosnian Serbs began to function, the nature of these measures became clearer. On 4 May, the ARK National Defence Council, referring back to Subotić’s order, decreed a general mobilisation, introduced a curfew, and set 11 May 1992 as the deadline for the surrender of illegal weapons.¹⁰⁶⁶ Some municipal crisis staffs had undertaken similar initiatives already in late April.¹⁰⁶⁷
651. When, on 4 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff ordered a general mobilisation, the imposition of a curfew and the hand-over of all weapons held by paramilitary formations, Župljanin disseminated the order to all SJBs subject to CSB Banja Luka and held the SJB chiefs personally responsible for the implementation of ARK’s decision.¹⁰⁶⁸ On 5 May 1992, Župljanin was named as a member of the newly-formed ARK War Staff.¹⁰⁶⁹ On 6 May, the Council of CSB Banja Luka concluded that “in all our activities, we are obliged to observe all measures and apply all procedures ordered by the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region.”¹⁰⁷⁰ On 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff declared that “the Crisis Staffs are now the highest organ of authority in the Municipality,” thereby effectively declaring that the municipal Crisis Staffs (containing RS MUP representatives) were in a superior position with regards to the SJBs.¹⁰⁷¹
652. In mid-May 1992, Župljanin and the personnel of CSB Banja Luka assisted in implementing the confiscation of “illegal” weapons ordered by the ARK War Staff.¹⁰⁷² CSB

¹⁰⁶⁵ RS Ministry of National Defence decision, 16 April 1992 (0057-4584-0057-4585).

¹⁰⁶⁶ ARK Republic Secretariat for National Defence decision, 4 May 1992 (0034-9522-0034-9523).

¹⁰⁶⁷ Conclusions of Session of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 28 April 1992 (0047-1852-0047-1853).

¹⁰⁶⁸ Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 4 May 1992 (0063-3791-0063-3792). See also the Conclusions of the Meeting at CSB Banja Luka, 6 May 1992 in which Drljača states that SJB Prijedor must implement all decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff (0063-3793-0063-3794).

¹⁰⁶⁹ “Decision on the Establishment of the War Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina,” 5 May 1992 (B000-0434-B000-0434).

¹⁰⁷⁰ Conclusions Reached at the Meeting of the Expanded Centre Council Held on 6 May 1992 (0063-3164-0063-3168).

¹⁰⁷¹ Conclusions of Session of ARK Crisis Staff held on 18 May 1992, cited in Official Gazette of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (*Službeni glasnik ARK*), No. 2, 5 June 1992 (0038-8981-0038-8982).

¹⁰⁷² Conclusions of Session of ARK War Staff, 9 May 1992 (B005-4695-B005-4696); Conclusions made at the ARK Crisis Staff meeting, signed by Brđanin, 11 May 1992 (0091-4682-0091-4683); Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 11 May 1992 (P004-3255-P004-3255). According to the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff, the deadline was extended to 15 April 1992 because all nationalities had asked to be able to hand in their weapons without police intervention. At the end of July 1992, Župljanin asked all subordinate SJBs to report on the amount of weapons and ammunition confiscated by them. SJB Prijedor dispatch,

Banja Luka distributed specific instructions on this on 14 May 1992.¹⁰⁷³ On 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff ordered CSB Banja Luka to formulate instructions for the disarming of paramilitary formations.¹⁰⁷⁴ A similar situation obtained in SAO Semberija and Majevisa.¹⁰⁷⁵ These operations continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1992.¹⁰⁷⁶

653. In several municipalities, the municipal Crisis Staffs charged the relevant SJBs with the implementation of decisions on the disarming of the non-Serbian population.¹⁰⁷⁷

31 July 1992 (P004-3073-P004-3073). SJB Prijedor responded on 2 August. SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 2 August 1992 (P004-3051-P004-3051).

¹⁰⁷³ CSB Banja Luka to chiefs of all SJBs, National Security Divisions, Departments for the Affairs and Tasks of the Police, Departments for the Affairs and Tasks of Prevention and Detection of Crime, and RS MUP, 14 May 1992 (0063-3227-0063-3227). SJB Šipovo distributed these instructions on the following day. SJB Šipovo, "Concrete Plan on the Removal of Illegally Possessed Weapons, Munitions and Explosive Means," 15 May 1992 (B006-9083-B006-9084). On 25 May, Župljanin requested information on the implementation of the 14 May instructions. Župljanin to heads of all SJBs, 25 May 1992 (0063-3225-0063-3225). On 10 July, SJB Sanski Most reported to CSB Banja Luka regarding the amount of weapons confiscated. SJB Sanski Most to CSB Banja Luka, 10 July 1992 (0049-3302-0049-3304).

¹⁰⁷⁴ ARK Crisis Staff Conclusions, 18 May 1992 (0049-7823-0049-7824).

¹⁰⁷⁵ Presidency of Assembly of SAO Semberija and Majevisa, "Decision on Temporary Hand-Over of Legal Weapons," 22 May 1992 (0045-6182-0045-6182).

¹⁰⁷⁶ Report of CSB/SJB Banja Luka to Executive Board of Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka regarding confiscation of illegal weapons from January 1992 to 21 September 1992, 30 September 1992 (0324-6140-0324-6147). Although the report cited only 58 criminal charges brought against individuals on illegal weapons charges, it failed to mention that numerous individuals had been detained without charges at various detention centres operated by the RS authorities. Responses to later operations to collect "illegal" weapons include: SJB Teslić to CSB Banja Luka, 6 November 1992 (B003-0582-B003-0583); SJB Drvar to CSB Banja Luka, 9 November 1992 (B003-8584-B003-8584); SJB Kneževo to CSB Banja Luka, 12 November 1992 (B003-8546-B003-8548); SJB Kneževo to CSB Banja Luka, 14 December 1992 (B003-8549-B003-8549); SJB Srbac to CSB Banja Luka, 19 November 1992 (B003-8577-B003-8577); SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 20 November 1992 (B003-8601-B003-8601); SJB Gradiška to CSB Banja Luka, 23 November 1992 (B003-8675-B003-8576); SJB Bosansko Grahovo to CSB Banja Luka, 24 November 1992 (B003-8534-B003-8534); SJB Banja Luka to CSB Banja Luka, 24 November 1992 (B003-8554-B003-8554); SJB Kotor Varoš to CSB Banja Luka, 1 December 1992 (B003-8550-B003-8552); SJB Novi Grad to CSB Banja Luka, 3 December 1992 (B003-8555-B003-8573); SJB Petrovac to CSB Banja Luka, 9 December 1992 (B003-8540-B003-8545); SJB Bihać to CSB Banja Luka, 10 December 1992 (B003-8553-B003-8553); SJB Krupa na Uni to CSB Banja Luka, 11 December 1992 (B003-8578-B003-8578). SJB Kneževo noted, however, that all of the weapons confiscated were legally registered and had been confiscated in the course of confiscation of weaponry from non-Serbs. On 1 December 1992, Župljanin sent out a reminder asking for responses to his dispatch requesting this information. Dispatch of Župljanin, 1 December 1992 (B003-8511-B003-8511). See also undated summary by CSB Banja Luka of weaponry confiscated (B003-8506-B003-8509).

¹⁰⁷⁷ Examples of this phenomenon include:

ARK: ARK Crisis Staff orders confiscation of weapons by 14 May 1992. Conclusions of Session of ARK Crisis Staff, 11 May 1992 (0057-5138-0057-5138).

Bratunac: "Decision on the Disarming of Citizens Who Possess Weapons on the Territory of Bratunac Municipality," 19 April 1992 (0083-5779-0083-5779).

Sanski Most: "Report for the SJB Bosanski Novi," 15 August 1992 (B003-2565-B003-2573).

The police forces' own hierarchy made it clear that both the local and the regional Crisis Staffs could issue orders to the police.¹⁰⁷⁸ Actions to implement decisions regarding disarmament frequently evolved into larger actions including the expulsion of non-Serbian civilians from Serbian-controlled municipalities. The police cited attacks on Serbs and on the JNA, TO and the VRS as factors necessitating the disarmament of non-Serbs.¹⁰⁷⁹ Yet these were largely small and isolated incidents that stood in stark contrast to the military and police operations undertaken against non-Serbs in the course of the disarmament drive.

654. In addition to issuing orders, the Crisis Staffs enabled the creation of Serbian police forces in the municipalities, including the firing of non-Serbs from the police.¹⁰⁸⁰ Once purely Serbian police forces were created, Crisis Staffs controlled or closely coordinated with their municipal police.¹⁰⁸¹ In each municipality of Republika Srpska, the

¹⁰⁷⁸ Evidence that the Ministry of Internal Affairs expected local police forces to carry out Crisis Staffs' orders includes:

Order from CSB Banja Luka indicates that local police stations had been accepting and carrying out orders issued by municipal and regional Crisis Staffs, 30 July 1992 (0045-1835-0045-1840); SJB Prijedor dispatch refers to ARK Crisis Staff order, 5 July 1992 (0063-3273-0063-3273)

¹⁰⁷⁹ SJB Prijedor dispatch of 5 July 1992 refers to attack on a vehicle with military conscripts at Hambarina on 21 May 1992 (0063-3273-0063-3273).

¹⁰⁸⁰ Examples of Crisis Staff ordering the creation of Serbian police and firing non-Serbs from police include:

Brčko: "With the start of military action and the same day as the take-over of the Public Security Station the War Presidency appointed the head of the Public Security Station (Dragan Veselić) and began filling the ranks of the station with Serbs previously employed there." "Summary of Events and Situation in Brčko" (0074-1394-0074-1411).

Ključ: Crisis Staff announced the formation of Serbian police force and change of insignia. Public Announcement of the Crisis Staff, 8 May 1992 (0091-4749-0019-4750).

Pale: Muslim policemen were "informed of the decision by the Crisis Staff of Pale Municipality and the Government of the Romanija SAO that all policemen of Muslim nationality must hand in their weapons and equipment issued to them." Statements by policemen of Muslim nationality, 24 March 1992. (0204-8150-0204-8151).

Prijedor: Simo Drljača, the Chief of SJB Prijedor, informed CSB Banja Luka on 5 July 1992 that the SJB was carrying out disarming in accordance with a decision of the municipal crisis staff (0063-3273-0063-3273; see also 0063-3274-0063-3274).

¹⁰⁸¹ Evidence of the Crisis Staff control of the police includes:

Bosanska Krupa: "Order to activate reserve police forces," 30 December 1991 (0091-4269-0091-4270). The War Presidency ordered how the police were to function in times of war. "Decision on Organization and Manner of Work of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa under Wartime Conditions," 7 May 1992 (0059-0289-0059-0291)

Bosanski Petrovac: Police asks for Crisis Staff advice on the issue of prisons. Minutes of 36th Session of Crisis Staff of Petrovac Municipality, 18 June 1992 (0094-6832-0094-6833). Police charged with implementation of curfew. Public Announcement of Petrovac Municipal Crisis Staff, 23 June 1992 (0091-6093-0091-6093). Crisis Staff charges TO and police with arrest of militarily capable Muslim males. Minutes of 41st Session of Crisis Staff of Petrovac Municipality, 30 June 1992 (0094-6846-0094-6846). Crisis Staff decides that all "registered Muslim extremists" and individuals possessing illegal

weapons should be detained. Decision of Crisis Staff of Petrovac Municipality, 28 October 1992 (0039-1083-0039-1083).

Foča: "With the commencement of combat activities in Srbinje /Foča/ on 8 April 1992, all activities and work of the Station were in agreement with the Crisis Staff of the Municipality, which gave the guidelines for particular actions." CJB Srbinje, "Information on the Work of SJB Srbinje for the Period April 1992 to April 1994," June 1994 (0297-2044-0297-2061).

Ključ: SJB collected weapons "according to the decision of the Crisis Staff." "Information on the Work and Activities of SJB Ključ during Combat Operations on the Territory of Ključ Municipality), no. 9/92, July 1992. (0048-9819-0048-9838).

Kotor Varoš: Crisis Staff requests that Chief of SJB discuss matters with CSB Banja Luka. Excerpts from the Minutes of the 31st Session of the Crisis Staff, 21 June 1992 (0041-5625-0041-5625). Crisis Staff reviewed the work of the SJB. The Crisis Staff requests that police and army undertake security and create conditions for full security on the municipal territory. "Bulletin of Crisis Staff," no. 1/3, 26 June 1992 (0041-6213-0041-6216). War Presidency decides that all companies are obliged to finance the police and the Army. Excerpt from Minutes of the 9th Session of the War Presidency, 11 July 1992 (0041-5546-0041-5547) War Presidency increases the size of the reserve police force and asks CSB Banja Luka for additional resources. Excerpt from Minutes of 22nd Session of the War Presidency, 18 July 1992 (0041-5544-0041-5544). War Presidency tasks police and military with the drafting of a list of persons to be expelled from the territory of the municipality. Excerpt from Minutes of 133rd Session of War Presidency, 4 December 1992 (0041-5638-0041-5638).

Prijedor: See the "Summary of Conclusions, Orders and Decisions Adopted by the Crisis Staff/War Presidency Relating to the SJB and the Regional Command from 29 May to 24 July 1992" (0063-3784-0063-3786); also Professional Service of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, "Information on the Implementation of Conclusions of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor Municipality," 13 July 1992 (P000-7104-P000-7108). The Crisis Staff asks for information confirming SJB compliance with Crisis Staff instructions, orders, decisions and resolutions and conclusions. Technical Service of Prijedor Municipal Assembly to Simo Drljača, 23 June 1992 (0063-3804-0063-3804). The police reported to the Crisis Staff on their execution of Crisis Staff orders. Report of SJB Prijedor, 1 July 1992 (0063-3809-0063-3810).

Sanski Most: Crisis Staff makes decisions concerning police finances and equipment. Conclusions of Municipal Crisis Staff meeting, 21 April 1992 (0047-1864-0047-1867); police are charged with implementing a curfew and with organising a checkpoint together with the military police. Conclusions of Municipal Crisis Staff meeting, 24 April 1992 (0047-1860-0047-1861). Crisis Staff named member of Crisis Staff as new Chief of Police. "Conclusions," no. 11/92, 27 April 1992 (0047-1858-0047-1859). Crisis Staff takes decision concerning financing of municipal reserve police force. Conclusions of Municipal Crisis Staff meeting, 7 May 1992 (0047-1342-0047-1344). Crisis Staff orders SJB Sanski Most to undertake an analysis of the personnel structure of the police. Conclusions of Municipal Crisis Staff meeting, 21 May 1992 (0047-1324-0047-1327). Crisis Staff orders issued to police include: Crisis Staff Order, 6 June 1992 (0047-1232-0047-1233). Crisis Staff orders TO and SJB to undertake disarming operation "and other operations from the purview of the SJB." Crisis Staff Conclusions, 8 June 1992 (0047-1270-0047-1273). Crisis staff stipulates that SJB will issue documents confirming the permanent departure of persons from the municipality. Decision on the Criteria for Possibilities of Departure from the Territory of the Municipality," 2 July 1992 (0047-1756-0047-1759). Crisis staff orders the formation of joint patrols of the military and police if the TO is dissolved and the 6th Brigade is reorganised. Minutes meeting of Co-ordination Board of the Municipal Assembly, 4 November 1992 (0049-1745-0049-1748).

Šipovo: Crisis Staff ordered Chief of Police and TO Commander to carry out disarming of Muslims. Minutes of meeting of Šipovo Crisis Staff, 19 May 1992. (0219-4132-0219-4141). Crisis Staff asserted the authority to solve the problems of the local police command, and name the police commander and Chief of Police. Minutes of meeting of Šipovo Crisis Staff, 9 June 1992. (0219-4110-0219-4115).

Chief of the local SJB was a member of the Crisis Staff.¹⁰⁸² In Sanski Most, for example, the members of the Crisis Staff included the Commander of 6th Krajina Brigade, the Commander of the Serbian TO, the Chief of Police, and President of SDS Deputies' Club. The deputy President of the Crisis Staff was responsible for "the realisation of the ideas of the leadership of the SDS on the level of the Republic, the region, and the municipality."¹⁰⁸³ In Prijedor, Simo Drljača, the Chief of the SJB, sent a list of municipal and regional crisis staff decisions implemented by the police to the Municipal Crisis Staff on 1 July 1992.¹⁰⁸⁴ In Bosanski Petrovac, Dragan Gaćeša, the Chief of the SJB, participated in Crisis Staff meetings and helped to establish a detention centre.¹⁰⁸⁵ And in Ključ, the Crisis Staff claimed that "no significant and important questions from the military and police domain were resolved without the Crisis Staff."¹⁰⁸⁶ At the regional level, Župljanin was a member of the ARK Crisis Staff.¹⁰⁸⁷

655. The Instructions for the Work of Crisis Staffs stated that "the command of the Territorial Defence and the police forces is exclusively the responsibility of the professional staff. Therefore it is necessary to prevent any interference with the command of the territorial defence or the use of the police force."¹⁰⁸⁸ It is important to note, however, that the relationship between the crisis staffs and the police varied somewhat from municipality to municipality. There is some evidence that some Crisis Staffs did not control the military or police. In Novo Sarajevo, the Crisis Staff stated that it had not, nor did it intend indeed to deal with police matters.¹⁰⁸⁹ In Kotor Varoš, the Crisis Staff reviewed the work of the SJB. Yet the Crisis Staff concluded that it did not have the right to interfere in the professional work of the police and army, nor did it wish to do so.¹⁰⁹⁰

¹⁰⁸² President of the Government Branko Đerić, "Extract from the Instructions for the Work of Crisis Staffs of the Serbian Nation in the Municipalities," 26 April 1992 (0027-0617-0027-0618). On 30 April 1992, Đerić issued an urgent order telling the recipients to ignore this version of these Instructions because they had not been fully completed (0124-6815-0124-6815). However, subsequent documents from the municipalities give no indication that the Instructions were, in fact, regarded as being invalid. Letter by the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the SDS BiH addressed to three presidents of regional crisis staffs, Number 578-02/92, 31 May 1992 (0108-8782-0108-8782).

¹⁰⁸³ Conclusion of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 30 May 1992 (0047-1742-0047-1745).

¹⁰⁸⁴ Simo Drljača to Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, 1 July 1992 (P004-2965-P004-2966). Cf. Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, "Instructions on the Formation, Composition and Tasks of the Local Crisis Staffs on the Territory of Prijedor Municipality," June 1992 (0063-3737-0063-3746).

¹⁰⁸⁵ Minutes of 35th Session of Crisis Staff of Bosanski Petrovac, 16 June 1992 (0094-6864-0094-6865).

¹⁰⁸⁶ In Ključ, the "VRS commanders regularly participated in Crisis Staff sessions, and had very good cooperation and co-ordination with the Crisis Staff. No significant and important questions from the military and police domain were resolved without the Crisis Staff." "Report on the Work of the Crisis Staff /War Presidency/ of Ključ Municipal Assembly," July 1992 (0034-9532-0034-9536).

¹⁰⁸⁷ List of ARK War Staff members, 6 May 1992 (0048-9901-0048-9901).

¹⁰⁸⁸ President of the Government Branko Đerić, "Extract from the Instructions for the Work of Crisis Staffs of the Serbian Nation in the Municipalities," 26 April 1992 (0027-0617-0027-0618).

¹⁰⁸⁹ Report on Work of the Crisis Staff, 5 June 1992 (0084-5158-0084-5162). On the work of the police in Novo Sarajevo see SJB Novo Sarajevo, "Report on the Work of SJB Novo Sarajevo from 1 April to 25 December 1992," 27 December 1992 (0296-9582-0296-9585).

¹⁰⁹⁰ "Bulletin of Crisis Staff," no. 1/3, 26 June 1992 (0041-6213-0041-6216).

656. The crisis staffs and the RS MUP cooperated closely in accordance with Stojan Župljanin's order. The crisis staffs evolved out of the SDS party structure and the SDS had exercised great influence on Serbs in the MUP prior to April 1992, although not all RS MUP employees were SDS members. While the police occasionally expressed resentment of political interference, the strategic interests of the SDS and RS MUP members aligned. According to a report on the work of CSB Banja Luka in 1992, "employees of the organs of internal affairs realised that this was a struggle for the creation of a state of the Serb nation. They gave their all, accepting the SDS Program, even though the greatest number of them were not members of any political party."¹⁰⁹¹
657. A radio report in Banja Luka on 16 April 1992 stated that preliminary statistics showed that 80% of the employees of CSB Banja Luka had taken the new oath, including 70% of the Muslim employees, 87% of the Croat employees and all of the Serbian employees.¹⁰⁹² At SJB Prijedor, the report on activities during the first half of 1992 claimed that "all workers of Muslim and Croat nationality refused to sign the statement of loyalty."¹⁰⁹³ A list from SM Prijedor dated 29 May 1992 indicates that those signing the loyalty oath were Serbs, and that those refusing to sign were non-Serbs.¹⁰⁹⁴ Yet documents from SJB Prijedor clearly demonstrate that at least one non-Serb had signed the oath.¹⁰⁹⁵ In many CSBs and SJBs non-Serbs were being asked to take a loyalty oath in an intensely hostile context, often immediately after armed take-overs of their places of residence or employment had occurred.
658. By 22 June 1992, in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, a regional Crisis Staff decision demanded a further step toward exclusively Serbian control of the police. The decision, signed by ARK President Radoslav Brđanin, required that the police, like all other important agencies, institutions and organizations in the RS, be led exclusively by Serbs who also supported the SDS.¹⁰⁹⁶ On 1 July 1992 Župljanin circulated this decision to all SJBs and explained specifically how to implement it.¹⁰⁹⁷ Overall, the result was clear. By the end of June 1992, according to the findings of the RS MUP, only six Muslim employees could be found in all of the RS MUP – all other employees were Serbs.¹⁰⁹⁸ 5 Muslims

¹⁰⁹¹ Report on the Analysis of Work of SJBs in 1992 on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka," March 1993 (0324-6151-0324-6167).

¹⁰⁹² Banja Luka Radio *Dnevnik*, 16 April 1992 (B005-1979-B005-1979). This broadcast also included information on the fact that CSB Banja Luka was still receiving dispatches and orders from both the RS and RBiH Ministries of Internal Affairs. Župljanin apparently gave a statement about this state of affairs.

¹⁰⁹³ SJB Prijedor, "Report on Work for the First Half Year of 1992," June 1992 (P003-3215-P003-3226).

¹⁰⁹⁴ "List of Employees of SM Prijedor Who Signed the Oath and of Those Who Did Not," 29 May 1992 (P004-3563-P004-3564). According to the semi-annual report of SJB Prijedor, "other national parties" [i.e. the SDA and the HDZ] "prevented employees of the SJB of non-Serb nationality from signing statements on loyalty. Together with other strong paramilitary formations, [the SDA and the HDZ] pushed them into a bloody and hopeless conflict." "Report on Work for the First Half Year of 1992," June 1992 (P003-3215-P003-3226).

¹⁰⁹⁵ See signed oath of Senada Jakupović at SJB Prijedor, 14 May 1992 (P000-3192-P000-3192).

¹⁰⁹⁶ ARK Crisis Staff decision, signed by Brđanin, 22 June 1992 (P005-4023-P005-4023).

¹⁰⁹⁷ CSB Banja Luka to chiefs of all subordinate SJBs, 1 July 1992 (0063-3175-0063-3176).

¹⁰⁹⁸ RS MUP, "Report on Work for the Period from April to June 1992," 29 June 1992 (0324-6791-0324-6809).

worked for the RS MUP in Kalinovik and 1 in Ljubinje. The annual report on the work of SJBs subordinate to CSB Banja Luka stated that “it is worth noting that over 300 employees (mainly of Muslim and Croat nationality) who refused work in the RS MUP have left the CSB since 4 April 1992.”¹⁰⁹⁹

659. The evolution of events in CSB Banja Luka bears closer examination because it is similar to that which occurred throughout the RS during the first three months of its existence. At a meeting held at CSB Banja Luka on 6 April 1992, the Council decided to accept the legitimacy and legislation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹¹⁰⁰ CSB Banja Luka’s jurisdiction included all municipalities in which the (Serbian) municipal assemblies had declared their intent to join the Autonomous Region of Krajina.¹¹⁰¹ Employees of CSB Banja Luka and its subordinate units were ordered to accept instructions only from CSB Banja Luka. In keeping with the long-standing demands of the Serbs in the SRBiH MUP, the meeting also decided that vacancies would be filled by, among others, former (Serbian) employees of Croatian MUP. The wording of the conclusions made it clear that CSB Banja Luka expected the imminent arrival of dismissed workers from other jurisdictions and that they, too, could expect to receive employment.

660. In some areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the east and north-east, forces loyal to the newly proclaimed Serbian Republic took over control of the police at the beginning of April 1992.¹¹⁰² And, as seen earlier, at other police stations such as Pale, the Bosnian Serbs had attempted to expel non-Serbian officers even before the outbreak of armed conflict. In Bijeljina, the RS MUP participated in the establishment of the authority of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early April 1992. SJB Bijeljina severed its contacts with CSB Tuzla, to which it had been subordinate in the SRBiH MUP. This was reported to Minister Mićo Stanišić, as was the participation of the TO, the Serbian National Guard and the Serbian Voluntary Guard in armed actions to “deblockade” Bijeljina in early April 1992.¹¹⁰³ The chief of SJB Bijeljina, Predrag Ješurić, assured Stanišić that he would be regularly informed about all activities in Bijeljina, in conformance with the latter’s instructions.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Report on the Analysis of Work of SJBs in 1992 on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka,” March 1993 (0324-6151-0324-6167).

¹¹⁰⁰ “Conclusions from the Meeting of the Council in Enlarged Composition of the Centre Held on 6 April 1992,” 10 April 1992 (P004-4256-P004-4261).

¹¹⁰¹ At a press conference in Banja Luka on 8 April 1992, Župljanin stated that a meeting of the expanded Steering Council of CSB Banja Luka held on 6 April had unanimously decided “to organise the Centre in accordance with the Constitution and Law on Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All Public Security Stations whose Assemblies have joined the Autonomous Region of Krajina as well as 11 more Stations which are not yet in its [ARK’s] composition will compose the Centre.” The deadline for the loyalty oath was set as 15 April 1992. Banja Luka *Dnevnik*, 8 April 1992 (B005-2403-B005-2405).

¹¹⁰² For a description of the take-over of SJB Zvornik, see undated report of SJB Zvornik (0074-9761-0074-9764).

¹¹⁰³ See partly illegible dispatch from SJB Bijeljina to Minister Mićo Stanišić (sent after 13 April 1992) (0074-9558-0074-9558). This dispatch also notes that the new CSB in Semberija and Majeveca would be established in Bijeljina, not in Ugljevik, as was mistakenly indicated in the new Law on Internal Affairs.

661. However, not all SJBs immediately fell under the control of the RS MUP. This was the case, for example, in several municipalities— Brčko, Prijedor, Kotor-Varoš and Sanski Most. On 8 April 1992, at a press conference Stojan Župljanin stated that an expanded meeting of the Steering Council of CSB Banja Luka held two days earlier had unanimously decided to organise the Centre “in accordance with the Constitution and the Law on Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” SJBs in municipalities in which the Assemblies had already decided in favour of joining ARK would be under the jurisdiction of CSB Banja Luka, as would 11 additional SJBs not currently in ARK.¹¹⁰⁴ On 16 April 1992, Stojan Župljanin stated that employees of all the SJBs subject to the jurisdiction of CSB BL were required to wear new badges, except for the employees of SJB Kotor Varoš and SJB Prijedor. According to Župljanin, the “situation” in these municipalities still required “clarification.”¹¹⁰⁵ On 21 April, Župljanin reported to the RS MUP that “activities are underway regarding the transformation of the Security Services Centre Banja Luka in the structure of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will provide you with a separate written information about this, because we are organising information from the field.”¹¹⁰⁶ On 29-30 April, forces controlled by the SDS seized power in Prijedor.¹¹⁰⁷ This take-over had been secretly prepared by the Serbs in SJB Prijedor.¹¹⁰⁸ Following the take-over, the Muslim Chief of the SJB, Hasan Talundžić, was replaced by the Serb Simo Drljača. The National Security Sector within CSB Banja Luka would later argue that Talundžić had, in co-ordination with the SDA, tried to create an exclusively Muslim police force.¹¹⁰⁹ And SJB Sanski Most did not split fully apart along ethnic lines until 15 May 1992.¹¹¹⁰

662. In a letter sent to the Sarajevo media on 18 April 1992, Minister Stanišić claimed that over 4,000 active police officers and “several tens of thousands of reserve police officers”, and that these forces controlled “nearly 70% of the territory of the former BiH.”¹¹¹¹ In private telephone conversations, present and former MUP officials complained of a lack of assistance from the JNA.¹¹¹² In these conversations, they also

¹¹⁰⁴ Župljanin also stated that employees of these SJBs had to sign loyalty oaths by 15 April 1992. Banja Luka *Dnevnik*, 8 April 1992 (B005-2403-B004-2405).

¹¹⁰⁵ Župljanin to RS MUP and all SJBs and SMs on the territory of CSB Banja Luka, 16 April 1992 (P004-4242).

¹¹⁰⁶ CSB Banja Luka, “Information on the State of Security on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka for the Period from 13 to 20 April 1992,” 21 April 1992 (B010-7990-B010-7994).

¹¹⁰⁷ See article on the assumption of power in Prijedor in 1992 in *Bilten Centra javne bezbjednosti Prijedor*, November 1994 (0045-5624-0045-5628). See description of take-over in SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 30 April 1992 (P004-3151-P004-3151).

¹¹⁰⁸ See the reference to secret preparations in SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 29 May 1992 (P004-3158-P004-3158).

¹¹⁰⁹ Report of National Security Service Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Newer Information Obtained in the Course of the Clarification of the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the Military Patrol and Surrounding the Paramilitary Organization and Illegal Arming on the Territory of Kozarac, Prijedor and Other Nearby Places,” June 1992 (B003-4301-B003-4306).

¹¹¹⁰ SJB Sanski Most, “Report on the Work of SJB Sanski Most for the [First] Six Months of 1992,” 20 July 1992 (0049-3712-0049-3729).

¹¹¹¹ Letter of Mićo Stanišić to TV Sarajevo, Radio Sarajevo, 18 April 1992 (0208-9510-0208-9513).

¹¹¹² For example, in a conversation between Mladen Mandić and Momčilo Mandić on 21 April 1992, Mladen Mandić complained that the JNA would not participate in the defence against a purported

discussed military operations, including explicitly mentioning areas that were to be targeted and shelled. On 23 April 1992, RS MUP Deputy Minister Momčilo Mandić and the head of SJB Ilidža Tomislav Kovač discussed the military situation in Sarajevo. Mandić said that the Serbs should respond with an attack on Sokolović Kolonija if the Bosnian government forces resumed attacking Ilidža. Kovač and Mandić agreed that Sokolović Kolonija should be completely levelled.¹¹¹³ Mandić also took a direct interest in the activities of paramilitary forces operating in Sarajevo. For example, on 21 April 1992 he became directly involved in the extraction of a group of Vojislav Šešelj's paramilitary fighters from Sarajevo.¹¹¹⁴

663. Indications exist that the RS MUP drew extensively on persons with criminal backgrounds in forming reserve police forces. At the 22nd Assembly session, Stanišić stated that "because there was a reserve element at the beginning, we wanted the country to be defended, they took thieves and criminals, because I ask you, no doctor of science emerged with a rifle in his hands to defend this country, nor any intellectual. That was our priority task, we had good intentions, perhaps we erred in this respect, I allow for that." Stanišić further argued that the VRS also employed persons with criminal backgrounds, but that this did not mean that the VRS was a criminal organization.¹¹¹⁵

664. At the outset, the RS MUP relied on armaments from police stations they controlled as well as on supplies of weapons supplied by the JNA, the TO, and by the Federal SUP. On 15 April 1992, Stanišić ordered all TO Staffs on the territory of SAO Romanija to form a commission that would compose a list of all "material-technical means" possessed by them at the Faletići barracks, the largest depot of arms and ammunition in Sarajevo. All of these weapons were to be put at the disposal of RS MUP.¹¹¹⁶

665. Command-and-control became a major issue for the RS MUP. Even before the establishment of the VRS, the forces of the RS MUP cooperated to a large extent with the JNA and the TO. On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić ordered that all employees of the RS MUP be organised formally into "war units" (*ratne jedinice*).¹¹¹⁷ The order formalised the

Bosnian government offensive operation. Telephone conversation of Mladen Mandić and Momčilo Mandić, 21 April 1992 (0322-0300-0322-0304).

¹¹¹³ Telephone conversation of Tomislav Kovač and Momčilo Mandić, 23 April 1992 (0322-0086-0322-0090).

¹¹¹⁴ Telephone conversation of Momčilo Mandić and Igor Velašević(?), 21 April 1992 (0324-9691-0324-9693). Mandić called Igor at the RS MUP, who said that some of Šešelj's men were surrounded by "Palma." Mandić told Igor to send some TO personnel to help Šešelj's men. According to Mandić, Šešelj had called about this from Belgrade. He threatened to withdraw all of his units from all parts of Bosnia unless his men were helped out from Sarajevo. On the same day, Mandić had spoken to his brother, Mladen Mandić, who also worked for the RS MUP, about Šešelj's forces. Conversation of Mladen Mandić and Momčilo Mandić, 21 April 1992 (0322-0300-0322-0304).

¹¹¹⁵ Stenographic records of 22nd Session of RS Assembly, 23 and 24 November 1992 (0214-9632-0214-9749).

¹¹¹⁶ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 15 April 1992 (0324-7405-0324-7405).

¹¹¹⁷ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 15 May 1992 (0323-8857-0323-8858). For an example of the practical deployment rules affecting such units, see CSB Banja Luka to Chief of SJB Prijedor, 25 August

cooperation of the RS MUP with the military by explaining how RS MUP units would cooperate with the VRS.¹¹¹⁸ Owing to the difficult communications situation, Stanišić authorised the heads of the CSBs to implement this organization. An exception was made for Sarajevo, where the Police Commander would be in charge of implementation. These units could receive orders from the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Police Commander of the Ministry (for CSB Sarajevo) and the heads of the CSBs. The Police Commander and the heads of the CSBs had to report to the Staff of the Ministry (*Štab Ministarstva*) when they used their combat units. The Staff commanded the collective forces of the Ministry and was composed of:

- Minister of Internal Affairs [Mićo Stanišić]: Commander;
- Under-secretary for Public Security – Deputy Commander [Čedomir Klajić],
- Under-secretary for National Security – Member [Slobodan Škipina];
- Assistant Ministers for Criminal Affairs [Dobro Planojević]; Police [Vlastimir Kusmuk]; Communications and Data Protection [Dragan Kezunović] and for Material-Financial Matters [Bogdan Košarac]– Members;
- Commander of Police Detachment [Milenko Karišik] – Member;
- Deputy Commander of Police Detachment – Member;
- Heads of the CSBs – Members;
- Chief of the Minister’s Office – Secretary.¹¹¹⁹

666. In the course of combat, the units were subordinate to the “command of the armed forces,” although with the caveat that “the units of the Ministry are directly commanded by the respective employees of the Ministry.”¹¹²⁰ Strict obedience of the Law on Internal Affairs and other legal and military regulations was emphasised. “Each violation of regulations and failure to implement ordered tasks will be most strictly punished, and the relevant disciplinary and criminal sanctions will be taken.” Already two days later, on 17 May, Stanišić requested that all CSBs provide reports on their implementation of the 15 May order.¹¹²¹

667. RS MUP units participated frequently in combat operations.¹¹²² This necessarily led to a severe decline in the amount of resources that could be devoted to ordinary policing. In his comments at a meeting of the RS MUP held in Belgrade on 11 July 1992, Minister Mićo Stanišić noted that the RS MUP was at times entirely engaged in combat, rather than police, activities and that At least 80 RS MUP officers had already lost their

1992 (P005-4230-P005-4237). Stanišić duly appointed himself as the head of the Staff. Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 15 May 1992 (0324-1805-0324-1086).

¹¹¹⁸ This was the interpretation RS MUP gave to the order in its 17 July 1992 document, “Information on Some Aspects of Work to Date and on Impending Tasks,” 17 July 1992 (0324-6855-0324-6867).

¹¹¹⁹ Individual names are taken from RS MUP Ministerial Payroll for May 1992 (FI20-0986-FI20-0986)

¹¹²⁰ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 15 May 1992 (0323-8857-0323-8858).

¹¹²¹ Letter of Minister Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs, 17 May 1992 (0323-8854-0323-8854).

¹¹²² In the period from July to September 1992, CSB Sarajevo described the participation of its police officers in combat operations as their main activity. Most of this was conducted in cooperation with the VRS. CSB Sarajevo, “Report on Work for the Period from July to September 1992,” October 1992 (0297-0877-0297-0883). See also the RS MUP “Report on Work for the Period from July to September 1992,” October 1992 (0359-0674-0359-0699).

lives in combat by this point in time.¹¹²³ He emphasised the need to strictly follow laws and regulations pertaining to internal affairs.

1. The Origins of the Special Brigade of the Police and CSB Special Police Units

668. In SRBiH, the republican MUP included only one special police unit. As seen above, the dissolution of this unit was an important step in the dissolution of the SRBiH MUP. Equally importantly for the RS MUP, given the combat operations in which it came to be involved, was the establishment of special police units, armed with weaponry up to and including 120 mm mortars, indicating that these units anticipated involvement in much more than mere special police operations.¹¹²⁴

669. As was seen above, the first armed operation conducted by the RS MUP – and considered by future generations of RS MUP police officers as its formal debut – was the seizure of the SRBiH MUP Police Academy at Vraca on 6 April 1992. This action was led by Momčilo Mandić, the new Deputy Minister of RS MUP, and Milenko Karišik.¹¹²⁵ The latter, a veteran of the SRBiH MUP special police unit, became the commander of the first special police force of the RS MUP.¹¹²⁶

670. In 1992, Karišik's unit, simply referred to as the "Police Detachment" (*Odred milicije*), acted more as a combat unit than as a police unit.¹¹²⁷ The Detachment equipped itself with heavy weapons and specialised equipment. On 21 May 1992, an overview of the RS MUP payroll for April 1992 listed two special units.¹¹²⁸ One was identified as the special unit – Pale," with 28 members. The other one was identified as the "special unit of SMUP [Federal SUP], with 43 members." By May 1992, the payroll for Karišik's unit had grown to include 170 members.¹¹²⁹ Another special police unit, known as the "Special Platoon in the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs", existed in April 1992 under the command of Duško Malović.¹¹³⁰ At the end of June, the RS MUP noted the presence of special police units at Sokolac and Pale.¹¹³¹ By September 1992, the Special Brigade of the

¹¹²³ Short review of work of RS MUP with suggestions for future work - report based on meeting of leading RS MUP officials on 11 July 1992, July 1992 (0324-1848-0324-1879).

¹¹²⁴ The special police unit at SJB Ilidža was one of the units possessing heavy weaponry. SJB Ilidža dispatch to Minister Mićo Stanišić, 5 August 1992 (0323-8499-0323-8505).

¹¹²⁵ See video V000-1977-V000-1977, in which Milenko Karišik discusses orders issued by Momčilo Mandić in the operation at Vraca.

¹¹²⁶ See video V000-2435-V000-2435, in which Mićo Stanišić introduces Karišik and other members of the RS MUP special police unit.

¹¹²⁷ The Police Detachment later became known as the Special Brigade of the Police. See discussion of the Special Brigade of the Police in Minutes of Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 5 November 1992 (0324-6041-0324-6051).

¹¹²⁸ RS MUP, Overview of April 1992 Payroll, 21 May 1992 (FI20-1643-FI20-1644).

¹¹²⁹ RS MUP, Overview of Payroll for May 1992 for "CSB – Special Unit – Police Detachment" (FI20-1076-FI20-1079). Although the term CSB is used, this unit was responsible to the Ministry, not to any CSB.

¹¹³⁰ RS MUP Payroll for April 1992 for the Special Platoon in the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (FI20-0877-FI20-0877).

¹¹³¹ RS MUP, "Report on Work for the Period from April to June 1992," 29 June 1992 (0324-6791-0324-6809).

Police had five detachments, with one based at each of the five CSBs. In addition, some SJBs such as SJB Ilidža and SJB Novo Sarajevo had their own special police units.¹¹³²

671. Besides deploying them in battle, the Minister of Internal Affairs could call upon the special units of the police to carry out a variety of tasks. On 15 June 1992, Stanišić ordered the Sokolac detachment of the special police to mobilise military conscripts in Novo Sarajevo municipality, in accordance with the 20 May order of the Bosnian Serb Presidency.¹¹³³
672. Beginning in April 1992, the CSBs in the RS also established their own special police units. Rather than participate in mere standard policing, these units were designed and equipped as light combat units, including armoured vehicles and heavy machineguns. Stojan Župljanin, the head of CSB Banja Luka, pioneered this effort. On 15 April Župljanin announced that special units were being formed which were highly trained and equipped for anti-terrorist action.¹¹³⁴ The standard term used by the police in referring to “terrorist groups” was “sabotage-terrorist groups” (*diverzantsko-terorističke grupacije*). On 21 April, Župljanin asked commanders of subordinate SJBs to nominate candidates for a new special police unit. Candidates should have specialised expertise in martial arts, marksmanship, mountaineering and/or be members of previous special units.¹¹³⁵ On 23 April, Župljanin sent a request to General Milutin Kukanjac, the Commander of the 2nd Military District for equipment for a “unit for special purposes, which is being formed at the Security Services Centre in Banja Luka.” The requested equipment included military helicopters, armoured vehicles, weapons, ammunition and uniforms.¹¹³⁶ Kukanjac, in turn, forwarded the request to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO) with a recommendation that it be granted.¹¹³⁷

¹¹³² SJB Ilidža dispatch to Minister Mićo Stanišić, 5 August 1992 (0323-8499-0323-8505); Official note of SM Vraca, 31 May 1992 (0324-7382-0324-7383).

¹¹³³ Order of Mićo Stanišić, 15 June 1992 (0324-6099-0324-6099).

¹¹³⁴ “Preserve Peace with Preventive Measures and Agreement,” *Glas*, 15 April 1992 (0202-9780-0202-9780). In the same article, Župljanin sought the financial assistance of the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly because CSB Banja Luka no longer received funds from MUP of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹¹³⁵ In the 29 April 1992 issue of *Glas*, Župljanin was quoted as stating that the majority of those hitherto serving in the paramilitary Serbian Defence Forces (*Srpske odbrambene snage*, or SOS) would probably serve in the special unit under the control of CSB Banja Luka. The same article noted that the SOS had been placed by the ARK Assembly under the control of CSB Banja Luka and would cease to exist. “Soon a Special Detachment,” *Glas*, 29 April 1992 (0095-1922-0095-1922). See also CSB Banja Luka to all subordinate SJBs, 21 April 1992 (0088-1659-0088-1659).

¹¹³⁶ Letter from Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin to General Kukanjac, Commander, 2nd Military District, 23 April 1992 (SA00-8162-SA00-8165); Memo from Kukanjac to Župljanin, 24 April 1992 (0018-3324-0018-3328). The request included a note by Božo Novaković of CSB Banja Luka. This stated that Novaković had visited General Talić, who had agreed that the requested equipment should be given to CSB Banja Luka.

¹¹³⁷ 2nd Military Command to SSNO, 24 April 1992 (0018-3524-0018-3527). It should be noted that, in a telephone conversation on 19 May 1992, the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs, Petar Gračanin discussed with Mićo Stanišić the delivery of equipment to Stojan Župljanin, the head of the Banja Luka CSB, as well as the delivery of equipment to Sarajevo and other places. Conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Petar Gračanin, 19 May 1992 (0203-0519-0203-0520).

673. On 27 April 1992, the ARK Assembly approved a proposal that CSB Banja Luka form a “police detachment for special purposes [*odred milicije za posebne namjene*], which would number 157 + 3 members.”¹¹³⁸ On 28 April it was reported in *Glas* that the Special Units had been established in accordance with a decision of the Assembly and that Župljanin was responsible for personnel and organization.¹¹³⁹ On 29 April, *Glas* reported that Župljanin had announced that the requested equipment had arrived and that “the CSB had at its disposal equipment ranging from automatic rifles to armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft artillery and helicopters.”¹¹⁴⁰ The same article noted that the paramilitary Serbian Defence Forces (*Srpske odbrambene snage*, or SOS) had been placed by the ARK Assembly under the control of CSB Banja Luka.¹¹⁴¹ On 6 May Župljanin informed members of the CSB Council and heads of SJBs in the region that “he had established a special counter-sabotage and counter-terrorist police unit of about 150 to be deployed in the regions in the most complex security operations.”¹¹⁴² The unit later participated in battles for the “liberation of Serbian territory.”¹¹⁴³
674. The CSB in Banja Luka was aware that there were criminal elements within the paramilitary Serbian Defence Forces (*Srpske odbrambene snage*, SOS). Živko Bojić, chief of the sector for crime in CSB Banja Luka, stated that the police were working with the leadership of the SOS to “identify and arrest those criminals who infiltrated into the ranks of the Serbian Defence Forces and committed some criminal acts.”¹¹⁴⁴
675. The CSB Banja Luka special unit was commanded by Ljubomir (aka Ljuban) Ećim and Mirko Lukić and quickly gained notoriety for its callous behaviour in the field.¹¹⁴⁵ On

¹¹³⁸ Dispatch of “Miloš,” 27 April 1992 (B008-0474-B008-0474).

¹¹³⁹ “Special Unit,” *Glas*, 28 April 1992 (0095-1920-0095-1920).

¹¹⁴⁰ “Soon a Special Detachment,” *Glas*, 29 April 1992 (0095-1922-0095-1922).

¹¹⁴¹ One of the earlier demands of the SOS when they appeared in Banja Luka was the adoption of the RS Law on Internal Affairs. “Proclamation of the Serbian Defence Forces,” *Glas*, 3/4 April 1992 (0095-1932-0095-1934).

¹¹⁴² “Conclusions Reached at the Meeting of the Expanded Centre Council Held on 6 May 1992”, 20 May 1992 (0063-3164-0063-3168).

¹¹⁴³ SNB Sector Banja Luka to Executive Board of Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka, 18 December 1993 (B001-1271-B001-1271).

¹¹⁴⁴ “Deadline for Loyalty Extended,” *Glas*, 9 April 1992 (0202-9748-0202-9748). See also “We Guarantee Peace,” 12 May 1992 (0202-9932-0202-9932).

¹¹⁴⁵ SJB Bosanski Novi Report to CSB Banja Luka, “Information on the Work and Behaviour of the Detachment for Special Purposes on the Territory of This SJB,” 21 May 1992 (B007-8680-B007-8681). This report concerns complaints filed by citizens of the Bosanski Novi municipality regarding the special police detachment led by Mirko Lukić and Ljuban Ećim. It was stated that members of the special unit had on 15 May 1992 stolen DM 18,000 and other items from Fadil Ometlić and had on 18 May 1992 beaten the Muslim cleric Ramiz Aljović. Dragomir Kutlija, the Chief of SJB Bosanski Novi, wrote to CSB Banja Luka and Ljuban Ećim that “we request that the conduct of this unit be reviewed because disagreement with the manner in which the unit works also exists among citizens of Serb nationality [in] Bosanska Kostajnica.” See also SJB Prijedor to Chief of CSB Banja Luka, 13 June 1992 (0063-3256-0063-3256). Notwithstanding complaints directed at the conduct of his unit, Ljuban Ećim advanced to positions of greater responsibility. He later began to work for the SNB Sector in Banja Luka as an inspector. SNB Sector Banja Luka to Executive Board of Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka,

26 June 1992, the Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff met to discuss, *inter alia*, complaints about the behaviour of this unit.¹¹⁴⁶ Both the local representatives of the VRS and members of the Crisis Staff asserted their dissatisfaction with the conduct of members of the unit. The Crisis Staff members had in vain sought VRS intervention against the CSB Banja Luka special unit. Savo Tepić, the Chief of SJB Kotor Varoš stated that the unit worked with a mind of its own and that any admonitions directed toward the unit were repaid with threats. The Crisis Staff would discuss the matter with Župljanin. On 2 July, the Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff resolved to call Ećim and Župljanin for a consultation.¹¹⁴⁷

676. Later in July 1992, the special police detachment at CSB Banja Luka was involved in a public debacle. When two members of the unit were arrested by regular police officers for driving a stolen vehicle in Laktaši, the unit demanded the release of its members.¹¹⁴⁸ Predrag Kojić, a commander of the detachment, claimed that the arrested individuals were “honourable” officers who had already fought for “15 months” in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Vladimir Tutuš, the Chief of SJB Banja Luka, refused to release the two officers from prison, the members of the detachment threatened to storm the prison. At this point, Župljanin personally guaranteed that the officers would be released. When the release did not immediately occur, approximately thirty members of the detachment surrounded the prison and threatened to storm it. The prison authorities, faced with a possible attack, decided to release the two individuals. In the aftermath of the incident, Tutuš complained that the incident damaged the rule of law in the RS. He stated that the “state cannot be built on violence.”¹¹⁴⁹ In May 1993, SJB Banja Luka produced a report on crimes allegedly committed by many members of this unit during 1992. These crimes included theft and killings of civilians, including the “massive plundering of deserted Muslim homes.”¹¹⁵⁰

677. Despite such incidents and complaints from other authorities about the conduct of the RS special police units, there is no evidence of attempts to discipline those responsible. No use was made of the provisions for disciplining officers for misconduct found in the RS Law on Internal Affairs. Although Minister Mićo Stanišić stated in several orders that his subordinates would be held responsible for carrying out his orders, and also expressed an awareness that RS MUP employees had been involved in the

18 December 1993 (B001-1271-B001-1271). See also CSB Special Detachment payroll, August 1992 (B007-7456-B007-7462).

¹¹⁴⁶ Excerpt from Minutes of 40th Session of Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff, 26 June 1992 (0041-5614-0041-5614). Savo Tepić, the Chief of SJB Kotor Varoš, also inquired about the status of approximately 73 prisoners. He was told that “this was a police matter.”

¹¹⁴⁷ Excerpt from Minutes of 53rd Session of Kotor Varoš Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992 (0041-5600-0041-5600).

¹¹⁴⁸ “Who Decides on Release?” and “Special Police vs. the Police,” *Glas*, 23 July 1992 (0095-1946-0095-1947). SJB Banja Luka to CSB Banja Luka and RS MUP, 21 July 1992 (B006-0581-B006-0583); SJB Banja Luka to CSB Banja Luka and RS MUP, 21 July 1992 (B006-0575-B006-0576).

¹¹⁴⁹ “New Details on the Violent Release of the Two Members of the CSB Banja Luka Special Detachment: An Unprecedented Case” and “Vladimir Tutuš, Chief of SJB Banja Luka, on the Incident Involving the Release of the Arrested Members of the Special Detachment of the CSB: The State Cannot Be Built on Violence,” *Glas*, 24 July 1992 (0211-2712-0211-2712).

¹¹⁵⁰ SJB Banja Luka, “Information on Proven Illegal Measures of Members of the Former Police Detachment for Special Purposes of CSB Banja Luka,” 5 May 1993 (B004-3531-B004-3541).

commission of illegal acts such as theft and plunder, no disciplinary committees or courts were established.¹¹⁵¹ Instead, on 23 July 1992, Stanišić issued a strictly confidential order addressing this issue Stanišić wrote:

678. Take legal steps to remove from our ranks and put at the disposal of the VRS all employees of MUP who have committed criminal acts (except political and verbal misdemeanours) earlier or since the commencement of combat activities or, respectively, the formation of MUP of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
679. The chiefs of administrations at the seat, the Commander of the Police Detachment and the chiefs of the CSBs are responsible for implementing the order.
680. Provide (by 31 July 1992) information on measures taken, stating the concrete number of employees who have been dismissed, the types of criminal acts that they have committed, etc.
681. On 24 July 1992, a paraphrased version of the order was sent to the chiefs of all CSBs.¹¹⁵² In ARK, Župljanin forwarded the order to his subordinate SJBs on 29 July 1992, and in Prijedor Drljača circulated the order the following day.¹¹⁵³
682. On 12 September 1992, CSB Sarajevo wrote to all subordinate SJBs reminding them that all RS MUP employees who had committed criminal acts were to be put at the disposal of the VRS.¹¹⁵⁴ On 16 December 1992, RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić informed all CSBs that the Ministry's Steering Council on 12 December 1992 had decided that all suspended employees of the Ministry would be put at the disposal of the VRS at the time of suspension, "not awaiting the termination of the disciplinary procedure."¹¹⁵⁵
683. In August 1992, the CSB Banja Luka special police unit was integrated into the special police structure of the RS MUP special police. This decision, taken by the RS MUP at the urging of the RS Assembly, was not well received in Banja Luka. CSB Banja Luka acknowledged at this point that the special police unit had contained persons who "did not fulfil the criteria and who through their behaviour caused damage to the detachment and to the service as a whole. The Security Services Centre and the command of the detachment undertook and is energetically undertaking proscribed measures."¹¹⁵⁶ This included the suspension of some members of the unit and the initiation of criminal

¹¹⁵¹ At the 22nd Session of the Assembly, the Vice-President of the RS Government, Milan Trbojević, complained about the inability or unwillingness – and even participation – of the RS police to stop what he described as the "plundering" of the RS. Stenographic records of 22nd Session of the RS Assembly, 23-24 November 1992 (0214-9632-0214-9749).

¹¹⁵² RS MUP to chiefs of all CSBs, 24 July 1992 (0323-8843-0323-8843).

¹¹⁵³ Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 29 July 1992 (P004-3127-P004-3128); Drljača dispatch, 30 July 1992 (P004-3129-P004-3129).

¹¹⁵⁴ CSB Sarajevo to all subordinate SJBs, 12 September 1992 (0360-9823-0360-9823).

¹¹⁵⁵ Minister Mićo Stanišić to chiefs of all CSBs, 16 December 1992 (0360-6600-0360-6600).

¹¹⁵⁶ CSB Banja Luka, "Information on the Formation and Performance of the Special Detachment of the Police of CSB Banja Luka," 5 August 1992 (0360-5790-0360-5791).

proceedings against them.¹¹⁵⁷ Some of the members of the unit had also been transferred to the VRS, in accordance with earlier instructions from the RS MUP on problematic members of the police.

684. Outside of ARK, there were also attempts to establish special police units. On 4 June 1992, the President of the Government of SAO Semberija and Majevisa, Đojo Arsenović, asked the RS MUP for permission to form a temporary centre for special unit training.¹¹⁵⁸ It is not clear whether his request was approved.¹¹⁵⁹ However, on 28 June, CSB Bijeljina made reference to the “Special Platoon of the Bijeljina Police Station.”¹¹⁶⁰
685. In eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, SJB Zvornik employed a special police unit armed with automatic weapons.¹¹⁶¹ This unit participated in combat activities. On 21 April 1992, SJB Zvornik telephoned CSB Bijeljina to report the “cleansing” of Zvornik by police forces.¹¹⁶² This was reported to both Minister Mićo Stanišić and Deputy Minister Momčilo Mandić. SJB Vlasenica established a special police unit after the commencement of armed hostilities in that municipality on 21 April 1992.¹¹⁶³ The unit was formed in agreement with the government of SAO Birač and Romanija. On 10 August 1992, SJB Vlasenica decided to disband the unit, in conformity with RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić’s order of 17 July 1992.¹¹⁶⁴
686. In Herzegovina, CSB Trebinje also established a special police unit.¹¹⁶⁵ However, it was dissolved at the end of July 1992. This was done at the request of the War Presidency of Trebinje Municipality.¹¹⁶⁶
687. On 14 August 1992 Župljanin disbanded the CSB Banja Luka special police unit. He did this based on an order issued by the President of the Serbian Republic and a demand of the Assembly of the Serbian People made at the session of 24-26 July 1992.¹¹⁶⁷ The RS MUP thereupon issued an order on 27 July 1992 for the “dissolution of the CSB

¹¹⁵⁷ “Report on Completed Inspection of the CSB and Public Security Stations on the Territory of AR Krajina,” 5 August 1992 (0360-5785-0360-5789).

¹¹⁵⁸ SAO Semberija and Majevisa Government to RS MUP, 4 June 1992 (0075-8449-0075-8450).

¹¹⁵⁹ The 4 June request carries a hand-written note “answer negative,” and an illegible signature.

¹¹⁶⁰ CSB/SJB Bijeljina, “Information on Some Measures and Actions Undertaken by Employees of SJB Bijeljina,” 28 June 1992 (0324-5843-0324-5845).

¹¹⁶¹ Undated (probably April 1992) report of SJB Zvornik (0074-9761-0074-9764).

¹¹⁶² CSB/SJB Bijeljina to Minister (Stanišić) and Deputy Minister (Mandić) of RS MUP, 21 April 1992 (0074-9568-0074-9571).

¹¹⁶³ SJB Vlasenica to CSB Sarajevo (Romanija-Birač), 10 August 1992 (0360-9753-0360-9753).

¹¹⁶⁴ SJB Vlasenica to CSB Sarajevo (Romanija-Birač), 10 August 1992 (0360-9753-0360-9753).

¹¹⁶⁵ CSB Trebinje, Payroll of Special Unit, 26 June 1992 (FI20-1930-FI20-1931).

¹¹⁶⁶ CSB Trebinje to RS MUP, 30 July 1992 (0323-8104-0323-8104).

¹¹⁶⁷ At the 17th Session of the RS Assembly, held on 24-26 July 1992, Radovan Karadžić stated that the special police needed to be “under the unified command of republican MUP, and under no circumstances under the command of some local princes.” Transcript of 17th RS Assembly Session, 24-26 July 1992 (0214-9496-0214-9600).

special police unit.” The personnel and equipment of the unit would henceforth belong to the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps.¹¹⁶⁸

688. Approximately two and a half months later, Župljanin issued an order, dated 27 October 1992, for the formation of a police unit to be led by Brane Pećanac. The unit was to be subordinated to the 1st Krajina Corps.¹¹⁶⁹ The new unit would be composed of police officers from the SJBs in Jajce, Ključ, Šipovo, Sanski Most, as well as from CSB Banja Luka. It was conceived that the unit would initially contain 158 members. On 16 November SNB Sector Banja Luka referred to the existence of a “special battalion of the police” under the control of the Chief of CSB Doboje, Andrija Bjelošević.¹¹⁷⁰

689. At least one special police unit came into conflict with the military. In July 1992, the VRS complained about the conduct of a special police unit commanded by Mićo Davidović (who was an employee of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs).¹¹⁷¹ According to the Command of the East Bosnia Corps, the RS MUP unit had exceeded its mandate vis-à-vis the military. This included theft of equipment and vehicles belonging to the military and the unauthorised arrest of VRS officers. As a result of the complaint of the East Bosnia Corps, Mićo Stanišić ordered the transfer of the arrested soldiers to the custody of the VRS Military Police.¹¹⁷² Stanišić reminded the Chief of CSB Bijeljina that the rule of law obtained, and that the RS MUP was bound to co-operate with the military in cases affecting military personnel.

2. System of Reporting with the RS MUP

690. Within a few weeks of its establishment, the RS MUP began to address the collection and centralisation of information on events affecting security matters in the field. On 16 and 18 April 1992, Stanišić ordered that a bulletin of daily events and “other more significant security information be sent” by CSBs to the RS MUP via fax.¹¹⁷³ The first such bulletin appeared on the following day.¹¹⁷⁴ On 20 April, Stanišić sent out a reminder regarding the daily bulletin.¹¹⁷⁵ On the same day, he ordered all the CSBs and the SJBs to acquire fax machines in order to facilitate communications.¹¹⁷⁶ “I note once again that you are bound to submit a Bulletin of Daily Events from the territory of your Centres to the

¹¹⁶⁸ Stojan Župljanin to Chiefs of all SJBs, Krajina Corps Command, and Chief of Intelligence-Security Organ of Krajina Corps, 14 August 1992 (0063-3182-0063-3182).

¹¹⁶⁹ Order of Stojan Župljanin, 27 October 1992 (0104-8843-0104-8843).

¹¹⁷⁰ Official Note of SNB Sector Banja Luka, 16 November 1992 (0084-9992-0084-9993).

¹¹⁷¹ Colonel Zdravko Tolimir to RS President Radovan Karadžić and RS MUP Minister Stanišić, 4 July 1992 (0074-1378-0074-1379; see also copy of same at 0324-2027-0324-2027). It is interesting to note that Momčilo Mandić had request in July 1991 that Davidović be transferred to SRBiH MUP. Mandić to SSUP, 16 July 1991 (0063-7152-0063-7152).

¹¹⁷² Mićo Stanišić to Chief of CSB Bijeljina, 5 July 1992 (0324-2024-0324-2024). See also Mićo Stanišić to East Bosnia Corps Command, 5 July 1992 (0324-2025-0324-2025) and Mićo Stanišić to VRS Main Staff, Administration for Intelligence Affairs, 5 July 1992 (0324-2026-0324-2026).

¹¹⁷³ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs, 16 April 1992 (0323-8867-0323-8867). Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs, 18 April 1992 (0323-8863-0323-8863).

¹¹⁷⁴ RS MUP Daily Bulletin, No. 1, 19 April 1992 (0324-6666-0324-6667).

¹¹⁷⁵ RS MUP Order 01-51/92, signed by Minister Mićo Stanišić (0324-6628-0324-6628).

¹¹⁷⁶ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs, 20 April 1992 (0323-8861-0323-8861).

Ministry each day by 1200 hours.” The heads of the CSBs were charged with familiarising the heads of their subordinate SJBs with this order. On 22 April, an expanded meeting of the National Security Council and the RS Government directed the RS MUP to report daily on the situation on the territory of the RS.¹¹⁷⁷ In a report on the work of the RS MUP produced at the end of June, the Ministry noted that the President of the Government had received almost 60 Bulletins of Daily Events.¹¹⁷⁸ On 16 May 1992, Stanišić noted that the CSBs had to report daily to RS MUP. He specifically highlighted the need to collect and forward information on “war crimes against Serbs. It is understood that in all cases of crimes against Serbs an investigation with a full team [will be carried out], and we especially emphasis to not omit the report of the physician, as well as adding photos, video documentation, witness statements, etc. in accordance with the Law on Criminal Procedure.” A copy of this material was to be sent to SSUP in Belgrade.¹¹⁷⁹ On 17 July 1992, Stanišić once again reminded the CSBs to submit daily reports to the Ministry.¹¹⁸⁰

691. Indications exist to suggest that top officials in RS MUP were not always satisfied with the quality and quantity of reports they received from the field. For example, on 26 May 1992, the Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin reprimanded his subordinates for submitting poor daily reports in an untimely manner.¹¹⁸¹
692. In general, however, the regular nature of reporting in place in the RS in the spring and summer of 1992 demonstrates not only that the police in Banja Luka were well organised, but also their high level of organization. Similarly, the holding of a large police parade in Banja Luka on 13 May 1992 in honour of Security Day (*Dan bezbjednosti*) indicated that the general situation was under control and safe for Serbs.¹¹⁸² At the parade, Župljanin had the opportunity to advertise publicly the formation of his powerful new special police unit. Press treatment of the parade noted that this unit would “in the future carry out the most complicated tasks, independently or in co-ordination with the Army.”¹¹⁸³ Local newspaper coverage in Banja Luka showed an array of armed men, helicopters and armed vehicles.
693. On Security Day, Župljanin also commented on the functioning of CSB Banja Luka. The jurisdiction of the CSB had expanded from the previous 17 SJBs to encompass 26 SJBs. This included SJBs that were previously subordinate to CSB Livno, CSB Bihać and CSB Dobož. Predrag Radić, the mayor of Banja Luka, used the opportunity to speak about

¹¹⁷⁷ Minutes of 4th Joint National Security Council and Government Session, 22 April 1992 (0124-5299-0124-5301). Somewhat redundantly, the joint session ordered the RS MUP to report daily on the security situation *and* to report on the situation in the field.

¹¹⁷⁸ RS MUP, “Report on Work for the Period from April to June 1992,” 29 June 1992 (0324-6791-0324-6809).

¹¹⁷⁹ Dispatch of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 16 May 1992 (0323-8855-0323-8856).

¹¹⁸⁰ Minister Mićo Stanišić to chiefs of all CSBs, 17 July 1992 (0323-8115-0323-8115).

¹¹⁸¹ Župljanin, Chief of CSB Banja Luka, to Chiefs of all SJBs except Jajce, 26 May 1992 (P004-3234-P004-3235). Župljanin’s dispatch made reference to an order of the RS MUP dated 16 May 1992 (0323-8855-0323-8856).

¹¹⁸² Both the 13 and 14 May 1992 issues of *Glas* carried coverage of the parade. It seems possible, therefore, that two parades were held.

¹¹⁸³ “Review of Police Forces,” *Glas*, 13 May 1992 (0202-9936-0202-9936).

“another war” that the police were fighting in Banja Luka, away from the military front. Radić was accompanied by other top ARK and RS officials, including the ARK Assembly President Vojo Kuprešanin, Minister of Internal Affairs Mićo Stanišić, RS President Radovan Karadžić and RS Assembly President Momčilo Krajišnik.¹¹⁸⁴

694. In an interview in *Glas* on Security Day, Župljanin cited personnel problems and financial policies as the two main reasons for the collapse of the SRBiH MUP. To some, he said, the SRBiH MUP had been a mother, while to others it had been a (cruel) stepmother. Repeating his earlier assertion of optimism, Župljanin characterised the area encompassed by his CSB as “the most secure part of the former Socialist Republic of BiH.” According to Župljanin,

in a lot of municipalities of mixed national composition, progressive forces have realised that this is already a surrounded [or integrated (*zaokružena*)] territory, in which it cannot be like the old folk saying ‘one people, two masters.’ Rather, one nation must have one rule must submit to this rule. On the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there can only be the rule of the Serb nation. The problem with Prijedor was solved this way, with Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi and Ključ as well, and only the question of Jajce and Kotor Varoš remains. I hope that there will not be any bigger problems here, either. I believe that we will succeed peacefully in arriving at the assumption of rule by the one to whom it belongs.¹¹⁸⁵

695. Župljanin observed that CSB Banja Luka followed orders issued by the ARK Crisis Staff, and that it was possible that the ARK Crisis Staff would finance CSB Banja Luka.¹¹⁸⁶ With respect to the increase in attacks on places of worship, Župljanin stated that “we do not have enough forces to protect all such buildings, but we have enough forces to oppose all such groups and individuals.”

696. In the same interview, Župljanin spoke about the establishment of a special police unit within CSB Banja Luka.¹¹⁸⁷ He emphasised that the unit would contain persons with previous combat experience and would enjoy access to the most state-of-the-art weaponry and equipment. Župljanin stated that the unit would be led by experts and would be under “full control.” “If it proves necessary that the detachment act jointly with the Army, it will be put at [the Army’s] disposal.” Asked about the SOS, Župljanin stated that it no longer existed, but that certain distinguished members of the SOS had been incorporated into the special police unit of CSB Banja Luka. Župljanin disagreed with General Momir Talić’s characterisation of the members of the SOS as military deserters

¹¹⁸⁴ “Decisiveness in the Defence of Peace,” *Glas*, 14 May 1992 (0202-9947-0202-9947).

¹¹⁸⁵ “We Guarantee Peace,” *Glas*, 12 May 1992 (0202-9932-0202-9932). The enormous geographical area of CSB Banja Luka was criticised as unwieldy in August 1992 by RS MUP inspectors. The formation of a separate CSB in Prijedor was proposed and later implemented. See “Report on Completed Inspection of the CSB and Public Security Stations on the Territory of AR Krajina,” 5 August 1992 (0360-5785-0360-5789).

¹¹⁸⁶ On this point, see also Župljanin’s statement about implementation of ARK Krajina “War Staff” decisions in “Bloody Epilogue of a Robber-Like Attack,” *Glas*, 18 May 1992 (0202-9973-0202-9973).

¹¹⁸⁷ “We Guarantee Peace,” *Glas*, 12 May 1992 (0202-9932-0202-9932).

and people of suspect moral quality.¹¹⁸⁸ A number of the persons recruited into the special unit had also undergone special police training in Belgrade.¹¹⁸⁹

These are really good people, above all based on character, and also on those who have combat experience. We don't have any problems with them. The problem is with those who pretend to be members of the SOS, with individuals who were those red berets and who give themselves the right to establish peace and take certain forbidden measures and activities. So, the SOS fulfilled its task. A part of its forces has been taken over by the CSB, and the rest have been publicly told that the SOS no longer exists.¹¹⁹⁰

697. As late as 5 August 1992, however, a member of SJB Banja Luka referred to the special police unit of CSB Banja Luka as the "SOS."¹¹⁹¹

698. In a bid to regularise reporting within the RS MUP, the Ministry in October 1992 drafted "Instructions on Urgent, Ongoing, Occasional and Statistical Reporting in the Organs of Internal Affairs."¹¹⁹² This proposal was adopted by the RS MUP Steering Council on 5 November 1992.¹¹⁹³

3. The Relationship between the RS MUP and the VRS

699. After the establishment of the VRS on 12 May 1992, the RS MUP was called upon to co-operate with the new Army. On 28 May 1992, CSB Banja Luka informed its subordinate offices that the chiefs of the SJBs were not allowed to order "any armed police activities without the prior approval of this CSB and the respective corps commander of the Serbian armed forces."¹¹⁹⁴ This referred especially to the dispatching of police to the territory of SJBs other than their own. Župljanin's 28 May dispatch represented an attempt to prevent the unauthorised and unorganised use of police units in combat activities.

700. The VRS and the RS MUP cooperated to establish "order" in areas controlled by the RS. On 2 July 1992, VRS Military police reported to the War Presidency of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa regarding the "massive" involvement of military

¹¹⁸⁸ On this point, see also Župljanin's statement about implementation of ARK Krajina "War Staff" decisions in "Bloody Epilogue of a Robber-Like Attack," *Glas*, 18 May 1992 (0202-9973-0202-9973).

¹¹⁸⁹ CSB Banja Luka, "Information on the Formation and Performance of the Special Detachment of the Police of CSB Banja Luka," approximately 5 August 1992 (0360-5790-0360-5791).

¹¹⁹⁰ "We Guarantee Peace," *Glas*, 12 May 1992 (0202-9932-0202-9932).

¹¹⁹¹ "Report on Completed Inspection of the CSB and Public Security Stations on the Territory of AR Krajina," 5 August 1992 (0360-5785-0360-5789).

¹¹⁹² RS Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Instructions on Urgent, Ongoing, Occasional and Statistical Reporting in the Organs of Internal Affairs," October 1992 (0090-3518-0090-3630). See also SJB Banja Luka, "Reminder of Orders Instructions [*sic*] on Urgent Reporting in Organs for Internal Affairs," 22 September 1992 (B008-5800-B008-5801).

¹¹⁹³ Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 5 November 1992 (0324-6041-0324-6051).

¹¹⁹⁴ CSB Banja Luka dispatch 11-1/01-48, 28 May 1992 (P004-3229-P004-3229). This dispatch is quoted in dispatch of Simo Drljača, SJB Prijedor, 28 May 1992 (0063-3237-0063-3237).

conscripts in plundering.¹¹⁹⁵ The dispatch noted that the local SJB was cooperating with the military to resolve this problem.

701. As the President of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadžić issued an order on 20 May 1992 for the VRS's Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to coordinate with the RS MUP in order replenish military police units.¹¹⁹⁶ On 21 May 1992, the President of the Government, Branko Đerić, directed that the RS MUP and the VRS coordinate with respect to movements of military conscripts.¹¹⁹⁷ On 30 May 1992, it was concluded that there needed to be an immediate joint meeting between MUP, the Ministry of Defence and the Main Staff of the VRS. The meeting would focus on the division of jurisdiction among them and attempt to achieve an agreement on future cooperation and synchronisation of activities.¹¹⁹⁸

702. Although the RS MUP and the VRS cooperated in combat activities, the VRS did not always condone the conduct of the RS MUP. On 17 June, Colonel Tomislav Šipčić of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS described the treatment of the civilian population in the Sarajevo area by the RS MUP in negative terms. According to Šipčić, the RS MUP was

sorting civilians on a national basis, such that they together separate Serbs and Croats, and especially Muslims. Members of MUP are stating that the losses of the Muslims are massive. We have not looked into that completely. We ask that, through the government and the presidency, an effort be made to protect the civilian population. Massive losses can seriously compromise us and undo all military successes, as well as the political positions in the further negotiations with international organizations. We take this question seriously.¹¹⁹⁹

703. Šipčić also noted that RS MUP units in Ilidža were using volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party who were under RS MUP command.

704. On 6 July 1992, Colonel Tomislav Šipčić reiterated his consternation with the performance of the RS MUP in Ilidža owing to the police's "inadequate protection of the property of citizens and disrespect for the decision regarding the control of movement of citizens."¹²⁰⁰ Šipčić deplored that theft, war profiteering and "the non-functioning of the state of law" was still widespread on the territory in his area of responsibility. On 18 August 1992, Šipčić stated that his troops had been unable to disarm paramilitary formations. "The disarming of these formations will not be possible without serious armed conflicts with them, above all because some organs of the local authorities and the

¹¹⁹⁵ Military Police Company Bosanska Krupa to War Presidency of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, 2 July 1992 (0059-0135-0059-0135).

¹¹⁹⁶ Order of Radovan Karadžić, 20 May 1992 (0360-5771-0360-5771 and 0531-9962-0531-9962).

¹¹⁹⁷ Order of the President of the Government Branko Đerić, 21 May 1992 (0360-5772-0360-5772).

¹¹⁹⁸ Minutes of Session of the Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Held on 30 May 1992 (0124-5330-0124-5334).

¹¹⁹⁹ Dispatch of Colonel Tomislav Šipčić, Sarajevo-Romanija Command to VRS Main Staff, 17 June 1992 (0528-8804-0528-8804).

¹²⁰⁰ Dispatch of Colonel Tomislav Šipčić, Sarajevo-Romanija Command, 6 July 1992 (0528-8843-0528-8845).

police support and form them.”¹²⁰¹ On 12 September 1992, the commander of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Colonel Stanislav Galić, emphasised the need to “secure absolute harmony and unity on all levels with the civilian authorities and the forces of the MUP, eliminate the creation of any paramilitaries and parapolitical [entities] and forbid any kind of friction, because our goals are the same.”¹²⁰² Galić further called for the RS MUP and the VRS’s Administration for Intelligence-Security Affairs develop a joint plan for the establishment of a “war regime of security” in his corps’s AOR. Galić a few days later wrote negatively of a paramilitary formation “which hides under the label of MUP.”¹²⁰³

705. On at least one occasion, the VRS found it necessary to act against renegade police officers. On 6 June 1992, Colonel Stanislav Galić ordered the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps to arrest a group of criminals linked to the police in Donji Vakuf.¹²⁰⁴
706. On 18 August the VRS Main Staff Administration for Intelligence-Security Matters claimed that SJB Drvar members had looted and burnt houses.¹²⁰⁵
707. In order to clarify the steps that the civilian police could take place with regard to military officers who committed crimes, the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps issued an order in early September 1992. This was forwarded by CSB Banja Luka to SJB Prijedor on 8 September 1992.¹²⁰⁶ The order specified that all SJBs on the territory covered by the 1st Krajina Corps were obligated to co-operate at all times with Military Security to maintain security in the region. In the case that criminal acts were committed by members of the military, Military Security had to be informed immediately and appropriate judicial measures had to be initiated.
708. As has been indicated previously in this report, RS MUP officials throughout the year complained about the impact of frequent and extensive combat engagements on policing. This complaint was articulated by Minister Mićo Stanišić and by numerous other RS MUP officials along the chain of command.¹²⁰⁷
709. Military and police officials tried to reach a compromise on the matter. On 18 September, 1992 CSB Banja Luka informed its subordinate SJBs and the RS MUP that an

¹²⁰¹ Dispatch of Colonel Tomislav Šipčić, Sarajevo-Romanija Command, 18 August 1992 (0528-898?-0528-898?).

¹²⁰² Colonel Stanislav Galić, Sarajevo-Romanija Command to 4th LAP PVO, 12 September 1992 (0528-8775-0528-8777).

¹²⁰³ Colonel Stanislav Galić, Sarajevo-Romanija Command to VRS Main Staff, 21 September 1992 (0528-9047-0528-9050).

¹²⁰⁴ Colonel Stanislav Galić to 1st Krajina Corps Command, 6 June 1992 (0095-4685-0095-4685).

¹²⁰⁵ Colonel Zdravko Tolimir VRS Main Staff Administration for Intelligence-Security Matters to RS Presidency and to Minister Mićo Stanišić, 18 August 1992 (date is partly illegible, may be 18 June 1992) (0324-6684-0324-6685).

¹²⁰⁶ CSB Banja Luka to SJB Prijedor, 8 September 1992 (0063-3191-0063-3192).

¹²⁰⁷ See SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 15 September 1992 (P004-3493-P004-3493).

agreement had been reached with the regional VRS representatives concerning police participation in combat missions.¹²⁰⁸

710. In late October 1992, Mićo Stanišić ordered all CSBs and SJBs located in municipalities without active military activities to put their reserve police officers at the disposal of the VRS.¹²⁰⁹ The number of reserve police officers was in general to decrease. After this was accomplished, the local and regional military commands were to be informed that the CSBs and SJBs would no longer have to deploy police officers to the front. Combat deployment of police officers would occur only on the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs or if a given municipality were under an imminent threat of war.

4. The RS MUP and the Rule of Law in the RS

711. Already in mid-April 1992, indications emerged that the RS MUP was not fully succeeding in its attempts to maintain law and order on the territory under its control. On 15 April, Stanišić ordered the identification and disciplining – up to and including arrest – of persons carrying out looting, theft and “other unauthorised activities.”¹²¹⁰ Two days later, on 17 April, Stanišić wrote to the heads of all CSBs, complaining about unlawful looting of properties and illegal appropriation of properties.¹²¹¹ Indeed, according to the Ministry, some of the plundering was undertaken by members of the police. Stanišić informed the heads of the CSBs that such actions would not be tolerated. He held them personally responsible for the enforcement of these instructions. If any further incidents came to their attention, they were asked to report this to the RS MUP. It should be noted, however, that the content of Stanišić’s message was apparently not disseminated among police organs in the jurisdiction of CSB Banja Luka until 29 April.¹²¹²

712. By the second half of May 1992, the RS Government had become seriously concerned with the dramatic rise of crime in the RS. On 24 May, the RS Government asked the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prepare as soon as possible for the use of the Government “complete and exhaustive information on the security situation and the state of public order and peace in the Serb Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹²¹³ On 25 May, Branko Đerić, the President of the Government, requested that the Minister of Internal Affairs “gather information and deliver a report to the Government on the security of people and property in the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially in relation to facts relating to vehicles from the courtyard of TAS, oil from

¹²⁰⁸ CSB Banja Luka to chiefs of all subordinate SJBs, RS MUP and commands of 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, 18 September 1992 (P002-3591-P002-3591).

¹²⁰⁹ Order of Mićo Stanišić, 23 October 1992 (0104-8852-0104-8852).

¹²¹⁰ Order of Mićo Stanišić, 15 April 1992 (0324-7406-0324-7406). See also SJB Banja Luka to subordinate SMs, 20 April 1992 (B006-2781-B006-2781).

¹²¹¹ Minister Stanišić to all chiefs of CSBs, 17 April 1992 (0208-9524). This dispatch quoted the 15 April order.

¹²¹² CSB Banja Luka dispatch, 29 April 1992 (P004-3264-P004-3264), quoting Stanišić’s dispatch of 17 April 1992.

¹²¹³ Minutes of Government Session Held on 24 May 1992 (0124-5325-0124-5326).

Ilidža, and so forth).¹²¹⁴ The Government's letter to the RS MUP made no specific request for information concerning violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.

713. Acting on the Government's request, Stanišić on 26 May 1992 sent all five CSBs instructions on the compilation of data for a report. Per the government's request, Stanišić asked for specific information on the theft of vehicles from TAS and oil from Ilidža. In addition, Stanišić requested that information be provided on serious crimes committed against Serbs in territories controlled by the "MUP of the former SRBiH."¹²¹⁵

714. In response to Stanišić's instructions, CSB Bijeljina on 30 May responded that crime had indeed risen dramatically in north-eastern Bosnia. This was especially the case in municipalities directly affected by the war.¹²¹⁶ The tenuous security situation required that the police spend time on the battlefield that would normally be spent combating crime.¹²¹⁷ However, in an attempt to counter large-scale plundering in Zvornik municipality, the police had set up checkpoints run jointly with the military and paramilitary formations (e.g. the "national guards").

715. In November 1992, CSB Sarajevo, in a report on the work of SJB Vogošća, concluded that the police had failed to prevent the theft of well over 1,000 passenger vehicles from the motor vehicle factory TAS at Vogošća during the summer of 1992.¹²¹⁸ "Notwithstanding warnings from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and this Centre, the Public Security Station in Vogošća did not undertake, or was not able to undertake, appropriate measures of protection of state property [*društvena imovina*]. On the contrary, the larger part of the police, mainly from the reserve staff, did not stand by in this theft but rather even participated in the criminal activities." Those participating in the theft included the chief and the commander of SJB Vogošća. In addition to the aforementioned role of the police, the theft and removal of the motor vehicles was indirectly or directly aided and abetted by paramilitaries, military officials, local government officials and members of the close protection of the president and the government of the RS. The report of CSB Sarajevo indicated that those who were tasked to investigate the incident at TAS were threatened with "a massacre" by paramilitaries, while SJB Vogošća members passively watched.¹²¹⁹

¹²¹⁴ President of the Government Branko Đerić to Čedo Kljajić, RS Ministry of Internal Affairs, 25 May 1992 (0324-7415-0324-7415).

¹²¹⁵ Stanišić instructions to all CSBs, 26 May 1992 (0324-6692-0324-6694).

¹²¹⁶ CSB Bijeljina to RS MUP, 30 May 1992 (0324-6688-0324-0324-6689).

¹²¹⁷ As late as mid-August 1992, CSB Sarajevo reported to the ministry that the task of "discovering and pursuing sabotage-terrorist groups and Muslim outlaws is still treated as the basic job of the police." CSB Sarajevo, "Evaluation of Political-Security Situation and the Work of the Centre for the Period from 1 July to 15 August 1992," 17 August 1992 (0074-9687-0074-9700).

¹²¹⁸ CSB Sarajevo, "Information on the State of Affairs and Work of SJB Vogošća," 12 November 1992 (0358-8232-0358-8235).

¹²¹⁹ CSB Sarajevo, "Information on the State of Affairs and Work of SJB Vogošća," 12 November 1992 (0358-8232-0358-8235). On the continuing complicate security situation in the Sarajevo-Romanija region, including detailed comments on paramilitary groups, civilian authorities and the relationship between RS MUP and the VRS, see CSB Sarajevo, "Some Political-Security Aspects on the Territory of the Romanija-Birač Centre of Security," 15 November 1992 (0528-9541-0528-9544).

716. In mid-April 1992, CSB Banja Luka reported that the security situation in Banja Luka was very serious, and that criminal acts, especially those committed by armed criminal groups, was overwhelming the police.¹²²⁰ CSB Banja Luka appended a list of such incidents to its report, as well as a list of robberies committed by uniformed persons. By late May 1992, an operational plan was conceived to investigate such incidents.¹²²¹
717. On 31 May 1992, SM Vraca filed an official note regarding an increase of crime in its AOR.¹²²² This report placed responsibility for this on

persons who were earlier predisposed towards the commission of criminal acts. Now, they are doing this under the protection of the uniform, as members of the police, TO or the uniform of military conscripts. In addition, there are persons, a certain number from the ranks of the police, the TO and other members of military formations who are engaged in the theft of public and private property.
718. CSB Banja Luka filed its response to Stanišić's 26 May 1992 order on 12 June.¹²²³ Its report included information on crimes committed against the Serbian civilian population. Like CSB Bijeljina, CSB Banja Luka noted that paramilitary formations had contributed significantly to the dramatic increase in crime.
719. On 31 May 1992, the RS Government received information about the security situation from the RS MUP.¹²²⁴ The Government declared itself unsatisfied with the amount of information provided by the RS MUP and demanded to be informed regularly by RS MUP, the RS Ministry of Defence and the Main Staff of the VRS.
720. In June 1992, the Analytical-Informational Service of the RS MUP completed a strictly confidential report on the security situation in the RS.¹²²⁵ Although the report does not specifically reference any previous documents, it seems plausible that this report was the end result of the 25 May 1992 RS Government request for a report. In the introduction to the report, the Ministry stated that an exhaustive report could not be filed because the situation in the RS was in a high state of flux. Personnel were over-committed and communications with various regions was not always regular.
721. The report noted that war profiteering and looting constituted a serious problem. Many of these crimes were committed by paramilitary formations. In sum, this led to "dissatisfaction" and to a reduction of combat morale in both the population and the armed forces. In the sections of the report devoted to the security situation in the various regions of the RS, it was observed that citizens continued to possess illegal weapons that were occasionally used for the commission of crimes, including looting.

¹²²⁰ CSB Banja Luka, "Information on Security Incidents and the Increase in Crime on the territory in April 1992," 17 April 1992 (0531-6706-0531-6720).

¹²²¹ CSB Banja Luka, "Operational Work Plan," 25 May 1992 (0531-6712-0531-6716).

¹²²² Official note of SM Vraca, 31 May 1992 (0324-7382-0324-7383).

¹²²³ CSB Banja Luka to RS MUP, 12 June 1992 (0324-7416-0324-7416).

¹²²⁴ Minutes of RS Government Session, 31 May 1992 (0124-5335-0124-5338).

¹²²⁵ RS MUP Analytical-Informational Service, "Some Elements of Security Evaluation in the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina," June 1992 (0324-6810-0324-6822).

722. On 5 June 1992, Dobro Planojević, the Assistant Minister for Matters of Preventing and Discovering Crime encouraged all CSBs to adopt robust approaches towards crime.¹²²⁶ Good cooperation with the judicial organs and the military police was required. Planojević advised on the best ways to document war crimes. He also noted that the police had to comport themselves in accordance with international humanitarian law where prisoners of war and the civilian population were concerned.
723. On 8 June 1992, the Ministry observed that the number of property crimes had risen significantly, and that war crimes were being committed.¹²²⁷ The employees of the RS MUP were reminded to act energetically to prevent and punish the perpetrators of these acts. Cooperation with the judicial authorities and the military police was urged. The police were particularly asked to identify and arrest the perpetrators of war crimes and to document the activities of individuals and groups committing war crimes. When encountering sites of alleged war crimes, the police were to photograph or videotape corpses and, where possible, conduct autopsies. Overall, the police were instructed to act in *strict accordance* with the international laws of war towards the civilian population.
724. The Ministry's observations were corroborated by at least two further reports at the regional level. The six-month report of CSB Banja Luka highlighted large-scale disciplinary problems, including involvement in looting, in the ranks of the police.¹²²⁸ The annual report of CSB Banja Luka also observed a dramatic increase in crime after April 1992.¹²²⁹ In line with these observations, in mid-June 1992, the Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff ordered SJB Prijedor to form a special platoon in order to prevent "looting and other criminal activities."¹²³⁰
725. This increase was linked in part to the presence of Serbian paramilitary units and their cooperation with the RS MUP. A summary dispatch covering events at SJB Bijeljina for the period from 26 June to 25 July 1992 noted that "false" members of the SJB, as well as members of Arkan's units, had stolen equipment from the station.¹²³¹ The report noted that the SJB had briefly cooperated with Arkan's units, and that the latter had illegally taken materials from the station with the knowledge of the then head of SJB Bijeljina, Predrag Ješurić. In addition, very large numbers of automobiles had been stolen during the initial round of armed hostilities in Bijeljina, Brčko and Zvornik. Some of these had

¹²²⁶ Assistant Minister Dobro Planojević to all CSBs, 5 June 1992 (0324-7374-0324-7374).

¹²²⁷ Dispatch of RS MUP, distributed by CSB Banja Luka to Chiefs of all SJBs, 8 June 1992 (0063-3254-0063-3254).

¹²²⁸ CSB Banja Luka, "Report on the Work of CSB Banja Luka for the Period 1 January to 30 June 1992," July 1992 (0324-6764-0324-6790). See also CSB Banja Luka, "Report on the Work of CSB Banja Luka from 4 April to 31 December 1992," January 1993 (B009-8119-B009-8147).

¹²²⁹ CSB Banja Luka, "Report on the Analysis of the Work of SJBs in 1992 on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka," (0324-6151-0324-6167).

¹²³⁰ Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff Order, 17 June 1992 (P004-8598-P004-8598).

¹²³¹ SJB Bijeljina report covering 26 June to 25 July 1992, July 1992 (0074-9751-0074-9755). On 29 June 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff concluded that measures needed to be taken against persons who had donned (military or police) uniforms without authorisation. ARK Crisis Staff Conclusions, 29 June 1992 (0057-3848-0057-3850). It is noteworthy that these same Conclusions charge Župljanin with carrying out certain orders, and refer to him as the Chief of "the Security Services Centre of the Autonomous Region of Krajina."

been sold outside the RS, while others had been illegally registered by new “owners” in Bijeljina.

726. A report from 29 July 1992 sent to the President of the Presidency Karadžić stated that “members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard even entered the Public Security Station, pretending to be instructors, using this as a pretext to engage, on a massive scale, in various kinds of abuse and flagrant violation of the law.”¹²³² It was further noted, that on 27 June 1992 an expert group from the RS MUP arrived in Bijeljina to prevent criminal activities carried out by paramilitary formations. This group established that “a prison existed, allegedly set up in cooperation with the military authorities, but in fact a concentration camp belonging to the paramilitary groups and used also to store stolen goods.” These paramilitary groups included the “Red Berets” and “groups of Captain Dragan [Vasiljković].” The entire report assign blame for crimes in Bijeljina to paramilitary formations.
727. In a report on the functioning of SJB Brčko, SJB Bijeljina and SJB Zvornik filed on 17 June 1992, inspectors of the RS MUP wrote about problems faced because of paramilitary formations.¹²³³
728. Paramilitary formations (formations of Captain Dragan, self-proclaimed Chetnik units from the territory of Bijeljina, led by a certain Goran Jelisić [as written] and self-proclaimed units from the territory of Ugljevik) put pressure on the Public Security Station in Brčko, and armed attacks have been attempted twice on SJB Brčko. The reasons for such behaviour by the paramilitary formations is their dissatisfaction with personnel decisions in SJB Brčko, as well as the normal functioning of patrol service and entry-exit points in the city where the taking away of stolen goods was prevented (at the point towards Bijeljina on 7 and 8 June 1992 alone, stolen goods worth 200,000 DM were discovered in two military trucks).
729. The inspectors further noted that the local police felt threatened and intimidated by the paramilitary groups, which did not hesitate to use heavy armed force against the police. These groups had also committed serious, violent crimes, including “murders of innocent Muslim inhabitants.” The inspectors assessed that all paramilitary formations would have to be removed from the area in order to secure the proper functioning of SJB Brčko.
730. In the same report, the inspectors commented on the continued operation of paramilitary formations in Zvornik.¹²³⁴ Despite a ban on paramilitary training camps

¹²³² CSB Bijeljina, “Information on the Engagements and Activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of BiH in Establishing Authority and the Rule of Law on the Territory of CSB Bijeljina,” 29 July 1992 (0074-1296-0074-1305). Another copy of the same report is available (0084-5558-0084-5562). This copy of the report contains a cover letter showing Karadžić as the sole addressee. The last page of the report carries the hand-written remarks of Karadžić. “Keep enforcing order and the rule of law.”

¹²³³ RS MUP, “Report on Completed Supervision and Inspection into the State of SJB Brčko, SJB Zvornik and the Partial State at SJB Bijeljina,” 17 June 1992 (0360-5816-0360-5821).

imposed by the municipal government, Captain Dragan persisted in training paramilitaries in Divič near Zvornik until July 1992.¹²³⁵ The municipal police described the people undergoing such training as “persons inclined to robbery, terror, rape, etc. They had participated in the robbery, rape and “even murders” of Muslims who “were ready to be exchanged” (presumably with Serbs from areas not under the control of the RS). The paramilitaries had also on several occasions threatened employees of Zvornik municipality, including the president of the municipal government. In a subsequent report by SJB Zvornik, its chief stated that the SJB had not been able to operate in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs until 30 July because of interference from paramilitaries.¹²³⁶

731. As in the case of the paramilitaries from Brčko, the inspectors of the RS MUP recommended that the paramilitaries in Zvornik be removed from the municipality. However, they also recommended that persons from Captain Dragan’s formation stemming from Zvornik municipality be permitted to “return to regular units of the Serbian Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹²³⁷

732. At the fourth session of the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia on 31 July 1992, Federal Minister of Internal Affairs Pavle Bulatović stated that five men from “Captain Dragan’s unit” had arrived in Brčko in February as instructors. Three of them had in the meantime “created a reign of terror [*zulum*] towards the Serb people in that area.”¹²³⁸ Nothing was said about any consequences for the Croat or Bosnian Muslim population in that area. According to Bulatović, these men had possessed IDs issued by “the MUP of Krajina.” Bulatović reminded his colleagues that he had earlier showed them permits issued to “uniformed people from Tikveš and Ilok,” which had been signed by “some kind of commanders of units for special purposes.”¹²³⁹ In May 1997, Franko SIMATOVIĆ stated that “the unit” had been involved in the corridor operation that encompassed Brčko.¹²⁴⁰ Payment documents also indicate their involvement at Doboj in April 1992.¹²⁴¹

¹²³⁴ RS MUP, “Report on Completed Supervision and Inspection into the State of SJB Brčko, SJB Zvornik and the Partial State at SJB Bijeljina,” 17 June 1992 (0360-5816-0360-5821).

¹²³⁵ Command of Eastern Bosnia Corps to VRS Main Staff, 29 July 1992 (0620-0798-0620-0798).

¹²³⁶ SJB Zvornik, “Report on the Work of SJB Zvornik for the Months of July, August and September 1992,” undated (0360-9134-0360-9139); SJB Zvornik, “Report on the Work of SJB Zvornik in 1992,” (0176-9097-0176-9110, copy at 0360-9140-0360-9153).

¹²³⁷ RS MUP, “Report on Completed Supervision and Inspection into the State of SJB Brčko, SJB Zvornik and the Partial State at SJB Bijeljina,” 17 June 1992 (0360-5816-0360-5821).

¹²³⁸ Tape Recording of Fourth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 31 July 1992 (0345-7005-0345-7046, at 0345-7021).

¹²³⁹ Tape Recording of Fourth Session of the SRJ Supreme Defence Council session of 31 July 1992 (0345-7005-0345-7046, at 0345-7021-0345-7022). See also SAO Semberija and Majeвица, JPN, Certification signed by Commander Živojin Ivanović, 9 July 1992 (DA00-6011-DA00-6011).

¹²⁴⁰ V003-3533 Transcript, p. 9.

¹²⁴¹ CSB Doboj, Payroll for Special Group, April 1992 (FI20-0022-FI20-0022);

733. RS MUP inspectors observed a similar situation in Bijeljina to that which they had seen in Brčko and Zvornik.¹²⁴² A “relentless struggle for power” was taking place in Bijeljina between the SDS and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). “According to our information, the Radicals are dissatisfied with the distribution of ‘functions’ in SJB Bijeljina, and have therefore on several occasions tried, also with armed force, to carry out personnel changes in SJB Bijeljina as well as CSB Bijeljina.” The inspectors themselves witnessed 550 members of a Chetnik formation, “led by a certain duke Mirko [Blagojević], who with ground-to-ground rockets and other infantry and light artillery weaponry destroyed the security building in Bijeljina.” In that situation, the inspectors stated that CSB Bijeljina was not capable of functioning properly, and that the very existence and jurisdiction of the CSB was the subject of struggle. In addition, the CSB lacked adequate teleprinter and other communications equipment. Nonetheless, the inspectors concluded that the basic conditions for the work of the CSB had been met. They proposed that inspectors from Sarajevo be based in Bijeljina until the CSB was functioning properly. A meeting was proposed with the VRS to discuss the resolution of the paramilitary presence in the area.
734. A VRS report sent to the command of the Eastern Bosnian Corps on 22 June 1992 concurred that the security situation in Bijeljina was “unstable.”¹²⁴³ This was ascribed to the presence of paramilitary formations and “the uncritical support of individuals from the government organs.” Paramilitary formations in the Bijeljina area had ignored a decree of the municipal assembly on 11 June 1992 to submit to VRS control. The report concluded that “it is clear to everyone that no order will, except with the use of force, be able to bring this paramilitary organization [the Serbian National Guard] into line with the proscribed norms of behaviour of the Army of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor remove them from the barracks.” The report recommended that the paramilitaries be prosecuted and punished, that all paramilitaries come under military command or be made “to leave the barracks as a paramilitary formation.” Furthermore, the commander of the guard, Ljubiša Savić “Mauzer” should be removed from his post as the deputy chief of security-intelligence affairs in the Corps.
735. A 7 July 1992 report, submitted by the SJB Bijeljina, on inspection of the building known as “the New Slaughterhouse.” reported that the building of was used as a storage place for stolen material and technical supplies, foodstuff and vehicles. Police officers from the Bijeljina SJB conducted an investigation and arrested members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard who had been guarding the building. These paramilitaries were transferred to the custody of the VRS. During the inspection the police also found 5 Muslims detained in “the New Slaughter House.”¹²⁴⁴

¹²⁴² RS MUP, “Report on Completed Supervision and Inspection into the State of SJB Brčko, SJB Zvornik and the Partial State at SJB Bijeljina,” 17 June 1992 (0360-5816-0360-5821).

¹²⁴³ Artillery Brigade Command to Command of VRS Eastern Bosnian Corps, 22 June 1992 (0366-0042-0366-0044).

¹²⁴⁴ SJB Bijeljina, “Information on the Search Carried Out of the New Slaughterhouse – Velika Obarska,” 7 July 1992 (0074-1336-0074-1341).

736. On 18 July 1992, CSB Bijeljina reported that the security situation in its AOR was improving, partly owing to the deployment of the RS MUP's special police unit.¹²⁴⁵ Paramilitary formations claimed that they had placed themselves under unified command as ordered, "but in reality they have never submitted to the command of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
737. On 6 September 1992, Stanišić issued an order pertaining to the confiscation of property by members of the RS MUP.¹²⁴⁶ Authorised officers of the RS MUP were only to confiscate "objects, things, etc." in accordance with the Law on Internal Affairs and other legal regulations and instructions. Each confiscated item had to be properly documented. Confiscated property could not be given to municipal assemblies or other municipal organs. Rather, confiscated items were in the custody of the RS MUP and had to be treated in accordance with the "Instructions on Mandatory Surrender of War Booty and Booty Acquired by Other Means to the Reserves of Goods."¹²⁴⁷ Those found to have violated the order would face disciplinary and legal consequences and would be temporarily suspended for the duration of the disciplinary or legal procedure. In justifying the order, Stanišić referred specifically to previous incidents in which property had been illegally confiscated. Such unlawful actions damaged the image of the RS MUP and could, in his opinion, cast doubt on the ability of the RS MUP to carry out its other legal functions and obligations. In ARK, the order was forwarded by CSB Banja Luka Chief Župljanin on 19 September 1992.¹²⁴⁸ On 21 October, Župljanin reminded his subordinate SJBs to follow these instructions.¹²⁴⁹
738. On 22 October 1992, the RS Minister of Justice and Administration, Momčilo Mandić wrote to the RS MUP regarding items confiscated and seized items.¹²⁵⁰ Mandić reminded the RS MUP that all such items were to be turned over to the republican goods reserves within 24 hours of confiscation.
739. A report filed at the end of September 1992 on the work of SJB Prijedor showed few signs of a stabilising situation.¹²⁵¹ In the report, Drljača noted that almost every person in the municipality capable of carrying weapons did so, often with disastrous consequences. Plunder also continued to occur regularly.

¹²⁴⁵ CSB Bijeljina to RS MUP, 18 July 1992 (0360-5847-0360-5848). See also 0360-5857-0360-5857, which seems to be a different draft of the same report. The local police in Bijeljina held a meeting on 19 August 1992 to protest what they saw as the incorrect use of the RS MUP special police unit while the personnel of SJB Bijeljina were sent to the front. Minutes of Meeting of 19 August 1992 (0360-5852-0360-5853). RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić later denied any wrongdoing by the RS MUP special police unit in Bijeljina. Interview with Mićo Stanišić, *Javnost*, 30 October 1992 (0365-9864-0365-9864).

¹²⁴⁶ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 6 September 1992 (0324-6097-0324-6097).

¹²⁴⁷ The order cited the *Official Gazette of the Serbian Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, No. 8, 8 June 1992.

¹²⁴⁸ Župljanin to all subordinates SJBs, 19 September 1992 (0091-5308-0091-5308).

¹²⁴⁹ CSB Banja Luka dispatch, 21 October 1992 (P002-3693-P002-3693).

¹²⁵⁰ Minister Momčilo Mandić to RS MUP, 22 October 1992 (0360-5764-0360-5765).

¹²⁵¹ SJB Prijedor, "Report on the Work of Public Security Station Prijedor for the Third Quarter," 29 September 1992 (P004-2819-P004-2826).

740. The third quarter report filed by CSB Banja Luka also cited continuing problems related to armed groups.¹²⁵² It noted that members of armed groups “often present themselves as members of the police” and used this false representation to extort or steal from civilians. These groups had “stolen everything that they could get,” and had not hesitated to use armed force, even against law enforcement officers. The report further noted that a “halo of untouchability” surrounded these groups because of their participation in the war. This put members of “the public security service in a very delicate situation and does not leave them much room for effective protection of security and civilian property.”

741. In October, SJB Ilidža, reporting on the past quarter, noted that the number of crimes committed had steadily increased in the municipality.¹²⁵³ Despite the urgings of the Ministry, the police remained almost fully devoted to combat rather than policing activities. As a result, crime was rampant. The property of Muslims suffered the most damage, as this “property was unprotected.” The report noted that crimes against the property of Muslims were often not documented, as the affected persons were no longer present in the municipality.

742. Repeated assertions by high-ranking officials about the need for discipline in the RS MUP apparently did not lead to significant improvement. As late as November 1992, Minister Mićo Stanišić asserted that the ranks of MUP had to be purged of those elements who were committing acts incompatible with work in the Ministry.¹²⁵⁴

5. The RS MUP and Operation of Detention Facilities in the RS

743. On 31 May 1992, the Chief of SJB Prijedor, Simo Drljača, acting in accordance with a decision of the Crisis Staff, ordered the establishment of a “temporary collection centre” at the Omarska mines complex.¹²⁵⁵ SJB Prijedor would provide the necessary number of policemen for guard duty around the centre.¹²⁵⁶ The order concluded that “the implementation of this Order shall be supervised by the Chief of Police Dušan Janković in collaboration with the Banja Luka Security Services Centre and with the support of the authorised executive personnel.” Moreover, the Prijedor Crisis Staff specified that the Chief of the SJB had the “exclusive right to sign orders to release any imprisoned

¹²⁵² CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Work of the Public Security Centre Banja Luka for the Period from 1 July to 30 September 1992,” October 1992 (0074-9601-0074-9650).

¹²⁵³ SJB Ilidža, “Report on the Work of the Public Security Station Ilidža for the Period from July to September 1992,” 11 October 1992 (0074-9665-0074-9685).

¹²⁵⁴ Minutes of Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 5 November 1992 (0324-6041-0324-6051).

¹²⁵⁵ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, Crisis Staff, Co-ordinators of Security Services, Chief of Police et al., 31 May 1992 (0063-3763-0063-3766).

¹²⁵⁶ The police station at Omarska, which was subordinate to SJB Prijedor, provided a large number of personnel for the Omarska “collective centre.” The chief of the police station at Omarska was Željko Mejakić. See the list dated 21 June 1992 (P005-0758-P005-0759). This list also shows that the police station at Omarska was responsible for the issuing of entry permits to the camp.

person.”¹²⁵⁷ On 2 July, the Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff ordered SJB Prijedor to implement the formal dismissal of detained persons from their places of employment.¹²⁵⁸

744. All officials working at Omarska were under strict orders to disclose no information about activities at the camp, except to the Chief of SJB Prijedor, to whom they had to report at least daily.¹²⁵⁹ By the end of June 1992, approximately 3000 persons had “gone through” Omarska, according to the estimates of SJB Prijedor.¹²⁶⁰ This included the interrogation of every person.
745. In June 1992 a report on the activities of the SJB referred to the establishment of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje. The report stated that security at the Omarska and Keraterm reception centres was provided “around-the-clock by police officers, who every day arrest more people of interest to security and about whose hostile activities information was obtained from investigating people arrested earlier.”¹²⁶¹
746. In all, three collection centres were established on the territory of SJB Prijedor: Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje.¹²⁶² Several thousand people passed through these centres and about 6000 “informational interviews” were conducted with them by teams consisting of police from the military, Public Security, and National Security sectors.¹²⁶³ After interring persons at Omarska and Keraterm, SJB Prijedor supplied details to the local authorities so that these persons could be dismissed from their jobs.¹²⁶⁴ More than 5,500 persons were fully processed. Of these, 1,502 were subsequently transferred to a prisoner-of-war camp in Manjača.¹²⁶⁵ In the period until 21 August 1992, 187 police employees were involved in guard duty in these centres. Except for Trnopolje, the other reception centres were dismantled on 21 August 1992 and there were no further security

¹²⁵⁷ Decision of Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992 (0063-3780-0063-3780).

¹²⁵⁸ Order of Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992 (0063-3805-0063-3805).

¹²⁵⁹ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, Crisis Staff, Co-ordinators of Security Services, Chief of Police et al., 31 May 1992 (0063-3763-0063-3766).

¹²⁶⁰ SJB Prijedor, “Report on Work for the First Half Year of 1992,” June 1992 (P003-3215-P003-3226).

¹²⁶¹ SJB Prijedor, “Report on Work for the First Half Year of 1992,” June 1992 (P003-3215-P003-3226).

¹²⁶² According to SJB Prijedor, Keraterm was established by a decision of the Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, under the “supervision of employees of SJB [Prijedor] and the Military Police.” Undated report of SJB Prijedor, referencing CSB Banja Luka decision of 14 August 1992 (B003-2556-B003-2564). This document also describes the establishment and operation of Keraterm and Trnopolje.

¹²⁶³ For a description of the way in which these interrogations were conducted, see SJB Sanski Most to CSB Banja Luka, 2 July 1992 (0049-1518-0049-1518); also SJB Sanski Most, “Report on the Work of SJB Sanski Most for the [First] Six Months of 1992,” 20 July 1992 (0049-3711-0049-3729). Undated report of SJB Prijedor, referencing CSB Banja Luka decision of 14 August 1992 (B003-2556-B003-2564).

¹²⁶⁴ Order of Prijedor Municipality Crisis Staff, 2 July 1992 (P004-8542-P004-8542).

¹²⁶⁵ SJB Prijedor, Report on the work of the Prijedor Public Security Station during the last nine months of 1992, January 1993 (0063-3747-0063-3762). Although Manjača was under VRS control, the police were asked to assist in the processing of prisoners there. On 6 August 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps wrote to the Chief of SNB Prijedor to ask for help in processing prisoners. The letter noted that the conclusion had been reached that large numbers of prisoners at Manjača were innocent. Urgent action had to be taken regarding these prisoners because of international media attention focused on camps in the RS. 1st Krajina Corps to Chief of SNB Prijedor, 6 August 1992 (P004-8620-P004-8620).

requirements for them.¹²⁶⁶ The Trnopolje reception centre remained in place until November. In addition to women and children, there was a large concentration of Muslim men fit for military service there, including persons who had spent time in Omarska and Keraterm because of their direct or indirect involvement in “armed rebellion.” Policemen took part in escort and security details provided for prisoner convoys.¹²⁶⁷

747. The 1992 annual report produced by SNB Prijedor noted that the SNB ROs in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Novi Grad (formerly known as Bosanski Novi) and Kozarska Dubica (formerly Bosanska Dubica) had conducted a total of 8660 “informational interviews” with a total of 5740 persons.¹²⁶⁸ Beginning on 25 May 1992, SNB employees had participated together with employees from SJB Prijedor and SJB Sanski Most in “work” in the “investigative centres such as Omarska, Keraterm and Krings.” This lasted until August. “In the course of September and October, intensive work was done to organise the documentation which was composed in the course of the investigative procedure in the cited investigative centres.” However, a total of only 4 criminal complaints had been filed by these ROs during the year. The same report showed that Muslim employees had “been removed from employment” the SNB when the war commenced.

748. Inspectors of the RS MUP participated in the interrogation of “prisoners of war” detained in the Manjača detention facility.¹²⁶⁹ Approximately 300 employees of SJB Prijedor participated in guarding the Keraterm, Omarska and Trnopolje detention facilities.¹²⁷⁰

749. On 8 July 1992, an “operational team” at Manjača complained that “the great majority” of prisoners brought to Manjača possessed no weapons, “nor did they participate actively in the organization and execution of armed rebellion.”¹²⁷¹ On 7 July 1992 alone, 560 detainees had arrived from Sanski Most. 24 of them had died en route to Manjača,

and the probable cause of death was a lack of oxygen, because they were transported in refrigerator trucks. This approach of the organs from Sanski Most is extremely inhumane [*neljudski i nehuman*] and unprofessional. The dead were not accepted [into the camp], and they are therefore not regarded as prisoners of war of LRZ Manjača. Earlier observed lapses are recurring in that prisoners of war younger than 18 years of age and older than 60 years of age are still being brought.¹²⁷²

¹²⁶⁶ According to SJB Prijedor, Trnopolje was established by the military. Undated report of SJB Prijedor (B003-2556-B003-2564).

¹²⁶⁷ SJB Prijedor, “Report on the work of the Prijedor Public Security Station during the Last Nine Months of 1992, Prijedor, January 1993, Chief of Public Security, Simo Drljača (0063-3747-0063-3762).

¹²⁶⁸ CSB Banja Luka, SNB Sector, “Report on the Work of SNB Prijedor Detachment for the Period from 1 January to 31 December 1992,” 20 January 1993 (B009-8095-B009-8102).

¹²⁶⁹ SJB Ključ to Command of Manjača, 24 June 1992 (0531-6302-0531-6302).

¹²⁷⁰ “Report on Completed Inspection of the CSB and Public Security Stations on the Territory of AR Krajina,” 5 August 1992 (0360-5785-0360-5789).

¹²⁷¹ Operational Team, Manjača, 8 July 1992 (0531-6629-0531-6629).

¹²⁷² See also SJB Sanski Most, “List of Persons Turned Over to Military Investigative Organs from the Territory of Sanski Most Who Are Located in Manjača,” August 1992 (0531-6474-0531-6496).

750. A separate list of Bosnian Muslims detained by SJB Donji Vakuf, dated 12 July 1992, included five persons older than 60 years of age.¹²⁷³ "All the aforementioned persons were taken prisoner in the zone of combat activities and are members of enemy formations and their partners."
751. On 7 August 1992, Captain 1st Class Dane Lukajić of the Manjača detention facility reported to the Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs in the 1st Krajina Corps Command that Manjača had received
- prisoners of war from Omarska camp. Their reception was accomplished in an organised manner but with many difficulties given that no documentation whatsoever was provided with the prisoners of war, not even up-to-date lists. The lists were not up-to-date in the sense that it is unknown whether a person came from Omarska camp. During the transportation of prisoners from Omarska to Manjača 8 prisoners died, of which some (3) were probably killed because they had visible traces of force. We did not receive the deceased prisoners but rather insisted that they take them back to Omarska and bury them there in the proscribed manner. However, it is very possible that the dead were unloaded and thrown somewhere in the forest between Manjača and Banja Luka.¹²⁷⁴
752. The personnel at Manjača characterised the behaviour of those in charge of the prisoner transport from Omarska as "very incorrect, inhumane and violent." When one VRS member tried to prevent those carrying out the transport from killing a "half-dead prisoner," he [the VRS member] was told that "if you behave like that, you will end up like him." Captain Lukajić concluded that international criticism of the situation was not without justification, "because we ourselves provide them with arguments." He asked that all necessary measures be undertaken to prevent a repetition of this incident.
753. Although Captain 1st Class Dane Lukajić was filing a daily report, he wrote that the behaviour that he had reported was part of a pattern of a "non-deliberate approach of the organs in Prijedor and of the superficial work of the organs of the police and the SUP [i.e., the SJB]."¹²⁷⁵ Whereas the police inspectors from Prijedor insisted that all of the transferred detainees were "serious extremists," their military counterparts asserted that this was baseless. "In the course of the reception, we encountered people who were not even capable of holding a rifle in their hands, not to speak of running and shooting. We encountered minors (born in 1977) who neither had weapons nor had participated in combat, nor even bringing water to enemies."

¹²⁷³ SJB Donji Vakuf, "List of persons brought in and detained in SJB Donji Vakuf from 27 May to 12 July 1992," 12 July 1992 (0531-6524-0531-6526).

¹²⁷⁴ Daily Report of LRZ Manjača to Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs, 7 August 1992 (0531-6630-0531-6631).

¹²⁷⁵ Daily Report of LRZ Manjača to Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs, 7 August 1992 (0531-6630-0531-6631).

754. On 7 August 1992, Captain 1st Class Dane Lukajić had observed that there was no room for additional detainees in Manjača.¹²⁷⁶ However, on 10 August 1992, Lukajić wrote Manjača had been notified in the preceding days of the need to bring 1000 prisoners from Omarska.¹²⁷⁷ The staff at Manjača took the necessary preparatory measures before the convoy arrived belatedly. Those escorting the prisoners from Manjača became angry when the staff at Manjača refused to accept the prisoners without any procedures. Lukajić personally intervened when he observed personnel in the convoy beating prisoners to death.
755. On 22 October 1992, Colonel Stanislav Galić, the commander of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, ordered that persons detained in combat be transferred after interrogation to the Kula prison near Sarajevo.¹²⁷⁸ There they would be transferred to the custody of the RS MUP and exchange commissions. Galić specified that the transport and treatment of the prisoners be in conformance with international conventions.
756. By mid-July 1992 at the latest, all leading officials of the RS MUP were fully aware of the Ministry's involvement in the operation of detention camps. Moreover, they had knowledge that appalling conditions existed in some camps. On 11 July, at a meeting of the leading RS MUP officials held in Belgrade, Stojan Župljanin noted that crisis staffs and the VRS in the ARK area had demanded the "collection" of large numbers of Muslims and established "undefined camps" which had been placed under MUP control.¹²⁷⁹ He claimed that conditions in these camps were very bad.
757. Župljanin further asserted that the problem of the detention camps was but one example of the constant meddling by civilian authorities in the work of MUP.¹²⁸⁰ At the same time, the RS MUP on the territory of ARK was dependent on funds from the ARK authorities. Communications were difficult at times. The courts were not functioning well, and crime was widespread.
758. As with the involvement of the RS MUP in combat operations, the role of the police at these "investigative or collection centres," as they were known, consumed many man-hours and detracted from the police's performance of other tasks. On 20 July, Župljanin wrote about this in a letter to Minister Mićo Stanišić.¹²⁸¹ Župljanin noted that the processing of the detainees had resulted in the emergence of three categories. The first was comprised of persons suspected of commission of criminal acts. The second was comprised of persons suspected of aiding and abetting those from the first category. The third category was comprised of "adult males concerning whom the Service has not to

¹²⁷⁶ Daily Report of LRZ Manjača to Department for Intelligence and Security Affairs, 7 August 1992 (0531-6630-0531-6631).

¹²⁷⁷ Captain 1st Class Dane Lukajić, 10 August 1992 (0531-6633-0531-6633).

¹²⁷⁸ Colonel Stanislav Galić to all units of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, 22 October 1992 (0529-0014-0529-0014).

¹²⁷⁹ Short review of work of the RS MUP with suggestions for future work - report based on meeting of leading RS MUP officials on 11 July 1992, July 1992 (0324-1848-0324-1879).

¹²⁸⁰ On a similar point, see the interview of Simo Drljača in *Kozarski vjesnik*, 9 April 1993 (0147-0203-0147-0203).

¹²⁸¹ Župljanin to Stanišić, 20 July 1992 (0324-6719-0324-6721).

date, gathered any security-relevant data on the basis of which these persons may be treated as hostages.” Župljanin asked the Minister to consult “with the highest authorities of the Serbian Republic” in order to develop a “unitary stance” with regards to several important issues. Župljanin recommended that charges be pressed against detained suspects and that they be transferred to the relevant judicial organs. He asked that a decisive stance be taken regarding elderly, invalid and minor prisoners. Significantly, regarding detainees not suspected of criminal acts, Župljanin proposed the exchange of military-age males in the aforementioned third category for Serbs being held under similar circumstances by the Muslim-Croat forces. Finally, Župljanin recommended that VRS personnel should take over the operation of detention facilities until this entire issue was finally resolved. However, the military and the police would continue to co-operate in interrogating detainees.

759. On 22 July 1992, two days after Župljanin sent his letter to Mićo Stanišić, the issue of prisoner exchange was discussed at a Government session.¹²⁸² On 23 July, Radovan Karadžić issued an order on the treatment of non-Serbs, stressing adherence to the Geneva Conventions.¹²⁸³
760. On 24 July 1992, the War Presidency of the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor ordered a reduction in the number of reserve police and requested that the military take over the security operations for Keraterm, Trnopolje and Omarska by the end of the month.¹²⁸⁴ However, the Chief of SJB Prijedor, Simo Drljača, reported that the military refused to accept this obligation. As a result, the approximately 300 police officers involved in the guarding of these camps continued to work in this role until it was dismantled in mid-August.
761. By August, owing to increasing international complaints, the RS authorities found it necessary to deal with the issue of the aforementioned detention centres. In late July 1992, the ICRC and foreign journalists became aware of the existence of the camps and requested the RS authorities to allow inspection of the camps.¹²⁸⁵ Prior to allowing the ICRC and foreign journalists to inspect the camp in Omarska the police arranged for prisoners to be moved from Omarska to Manjača.¹²⁸⁶
762. On both 5 and 6 August 1992, the RS Presidency discussed the treatment of prisoners-of-war.¹²⁸⁷ The minutes of the latter session of the Presidency used language

¹²⁸² Minutes of RS Government session, 22 July 1992 (0124-5447-0124-5454).

¹²⁸³ Order of President Radovan Karadžić, 23 July (0084-5369-0084-5369).

¹²⁸⁴ Simo Drljača to RS MUP, VRS, and CSB Banja Luka, 1 August 1992 (0063-3812-0063-3812).

¹²⁸⁵ Roy Gutman, “Death Camps,” *Newsday*, 2 August 1992 (0063-6013-0063-6017).

¹²⁸⁶ Chuck Sudetic, “Conflict in the Balkans: Serbs in Bosnia Allow Red Cross to Visit Camps,” *New York Times*, 9 August 1992 (0063-6057-0063-6059). The *Times* reported that the ICRC would begin visits to camps around Banja Luka on Wednesday (August 12). The article noted that Serbian leaders closed Keraterm and “wound down” operations and improved conditions at Omarska before opening the camps to foreign reporters.

¹²⁸⁷ RS Presidency minutes, 5 August 1992 (0076-7907-0076-7909) and 6 August 1992 (0076-7904-0076-7906).

similar to that employed by Župljanin in his 20 July letter to Stanišić.¹²⁸⁸ On 6 August, the Presidency ordered the RS MUP and the RS Ministry of Justice to examine the issue and report to the Presidency within ten days.¹²⁸⁹ Two days later, Tomislav Kovač, in his new capacity as the Assistant Minister for the Affairs and Tasks of Police, sent a letter to the RS President and the RS President of the Government regarding this matter.¹²⁹⁰ Kovač argued that not enough had been done in the way of sorting detainees into separate categories. Unlike Župljanin, Kovač felt that persons in the aforementioned third category could “only have the status of refugees.” Kovač did not treat them as “hostages” or as potential subjects of an exchange with the Muslim or Croat forces.

763. On 8 August 1992, the RS Presidency decided that all elderly and seriously wounded prisoners should be released from detention.¹²⁹¹ The following day, the RS Government established two commissions, consisting of representatives of the RS Ministry of Justice and the RS MUP, to look into conditions in detention centres.¹²⁹² The commission was headed by Vojin Lale, Assistant Minister of Justice and Administration, and Mirko Erkić, Police Inspector in the RS MUP.

764. On 17 August, the Commission filed a report on the situation regarding detainees in ARK.¹²⁹³ The Commission had visited Trnopolje, Omarska, Keraterm, Manjača, Krings (Sanski Most) and the Middle School Centre in Bosanski Šamac. The report’s positive description of the conditions in the camps contrasted starkly with earlier reports and internal comments made by RS MUP officials. In addition to the Commission’s report, on 22 August, the RS Government received a report from the RS Ministry of Justice regarding detainees on the territory of SAO Herzegovina. That report was co-authored by Goran Sarić of the RS MUP and Slobodan Avlijaš of the RS Ministry of Justice.¹²⁹⁴

765. Throughout August 1992 CSB Banja Luka and the Ministry of Internal Affairs requested and received a number of reports in relation to the operation of the camps. On 5 August 1992, Chief of SJB Prijedor, Simo Drljača, reported to the Chief of CSB Banja Luka and the Minister of Internal Affairs that the VRS and SJB Prijedor had concluded the processing of prisoners of war.¹²⁹⁵ 1466 persons had been found to bear criminal responsibility and would be transferred under armed escort to Manjača. The remainder would be transferred to Trnopolje. On 8 August, CSB Banja Luka sought details from SJB

¹²⁸⁸ Župljanin to Stanišić, 20 July 1992 (0324-6719-0324-6721).

¹²⁸⁹ Conclusion of RS Presidency, 6 August 1992 (0049-5344-0049-5344).

¹²⁹⁰ Assistant Minister Kovač to RS President and RS Prime Minister, 8 August 1992 (0124-5167-0124-5168).

¹²⁹¹ RS Presidency minutes, 8 August 1992 (0076-7899-0076-7900).

¹²⁹² Minutes of RS Government session, 9 August 1992 (0124-5481-0124-5486). Decision on Establishment of Collective Centres and Other Buildings for Prisoners in the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina (0124-6762-0124-6762).

¹²⁹³ Report of RS Government Commission for the Inspection of Collective Centres and Other Locations with Detainees in the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 August 1992 (0124-5060-0124-5067).

¹²⁹⁴ RS Ministry of Justice Report to RS Government, received on 22 August 1992 (0124-5058-0124-5059).

¹²⁹⁵ Simo Drljača to Minister Mićo Stanišić and Chief of CSB Banja Luka Stojan Župljanin, 5 August 1992 (0063-3298-0063-3298).

Prijedor with respect to prisoners remaining in Omarska. On 9 August, Drljača responded that 175 prisoners of war remained at Omarska.¹²⁹⁶ Drljača claimed that the police were fulfilling all of their legal obligations with regards to the remaining prisoners. He also noted that the same obligations were being observed at the Trnopolje centre, which was guarded by the VRS. On 17 August, Drljača sent a list of 402 prisoners to the commandant of Manjača.¹²⁹⁷ These prisoners were in the process of being transferred to Manjača. On 19 August, Župljanin ordered the establishment of dossiers for each prisoner sent to Manjača by SJBs in his jurisdiction.¹²⁹⁸ This was done on the request of the “highest organs” of the RS. On 22 August, Drljača responded that a selection of prisoners had been made at Manjača and that they had been moved to Trnopolje.¹²⁹⁹ On the same day, the authorities in Prijedor announced that they had closed Omarska and put Trnopolje under Red Cross authority.¹³⁰⁰ On 23 August, Drljača confirmed that he had sent the necessary dossiers to the Manjača commandant.¹³⁰¹ On 27 and 28 August, similar information was sent by SJB Sanski Most to Manjača.¹³⁰² Already at the beginning of August, SJB Sanski Most had reported that the military was detaining Muslims and establishing detention centres without proper co-ordination with the police. Military and civilian judiciary organs were not operating properly. In general, co-ordination between the military and the police was lacking. The Chief of SJB Sanski Most, Mirko Vrućinić, accordingly recommended that steps be taken to ascertain which institution was responsible for the various detention centres. Vrućinić also recommended the establishment of a prison at the “level of the AR Krajina.”¹³⁰³

766. In the meantime, on 14 August 1992, Stojan Župljanin, in his capacity as the Chief of CSB Banja Luka, had established a commission that would investigate all camps, investigative centres, detention centres and other similar facilities in the municipalities of Prijedor, Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most.¹³⁰⁴ The commission was ordered to file a report by 17 August. The president of the commission was Vojin Bera, a Chief of a section of SNB in CSB Banja Luka.¹³⁰⁵

767. Citing Župljanin’s decision, SJB Bosanski Novi filed a report on 15 August.¹³⁰⁶ It described in detail the manner in which detention facilities had come about and their subsequent operation. SJB Sanski Most presented a report to the commission on 18 August.¹³⁰⁷ The report noted that 90% of the persons brought to the facilities in Sanski

¹²⁹⁶ Simo Drljača to Chief of CSB Banja Luka Župljanin, 9 August 1992 (0063-3300-0063-3300).

¹²⁹⁷ Simo Drljača to Commandant of Manjača, 17 August 1992 (P000-2176-P000-2187).

¹²⁹⁸ Stojan Župljanin to chiefs of all CSBs, 19 August 1992 (0063-3185-0063-3185).

¹²⁹⁹ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 22 August 1992 (0063-3308-0063-3308).

¹³⁰⁰ Press Release, Prijedor, 22 August 1992 (0209-0032-0209-0032).

¹³⁰¹ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 23 August 1992 (0063-3309-0063-3309).

¹³⁰² SJB Sanski Most to Military-Investigative Organ Manjača, 27 and 28 August 1992 (0207-2642-0207-2643).

¹³⁰³ SJB Sanski Most to CSB Banja Luka, 5 August 1992 (0047-8745-0047-8746).

¹³⁰⁴ Decision of Župljanin, 14 August 1992 (B003-2587-B003-2587).

¹³⁰⁵ “Conclusions Reached at the Meeting of the Expanded Centre Council Held on 6 May 1992”, 20 May 1992 (0063-3164-0063-3168).

¹³⁰⁶ SJB Bosanski Novi report to CSB Banja Luka, 15 August 1992 (B003-2565-B003-2573).

¹³⁰⁷ SJB Sanski Most report to SNB Division of CSB Banja Luka, 18 August 1992 (B003-2543-B003-2546).

Most were brought by the military. The guard force was a mix of military and police personnel, but the military element was later replaced by the police after the Crisis Staff intervened. Of the 1655 persons brought to the investigative centres in Sanski Most, 1528 were Muslims, and 122 were Croats. SJB Prijedor also submitted a response to the commission.¹³⁰⁸

768. Bera's commission filed its report on 18 August.¹³⁰⁹ The report collated information from the three reports filed by the Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi and Prijedor municipalities. It argued that the camps in Prijedor had been established in order to deal with the large number of persons detained in VRS operations commencing on 24 May. These persons included both those who had been detained on suspicion of criminal or terrorist activity and those who had "left their homes and apartments to search for food and protection." These persons were almost exclusively of Muslim or Croat ethnicity.
769. The commission claimed that persons housed at Trnopolje could leave when they wanted, to destinations of their own choosing. The report also claimed that the Red Cross and other organizations delivered regular assistance to the persons in Trnopolje, who were not subject to interrogation. The report also referred to large numbers of non-Serbs who had "voluntarily" left Prijedor municipality. The report claimed that the majority of those leaving departed out of sympathy for Muslim and Croat extremist elements.
770. On 19 August 1992, Karadžić ordered the VRS and MUP to treat all prisoners in accordance with international norms and to co-operate with international organizations.¹³¹⁰ This order was issued as a reiteration of a Presidential order of 6 June 1992, suggesting that that order had not been fully implemented.
771. Also on 19 August 1992, Župljanin forwarded ministerial orders of 10 and 17 August mandating that good sanitary conditions be maintained in detention centres.¹³¹¹ Stanišić stated that police serving at detention centres should be put at the disposition of the military. On 20 August, Župljanin forwarded a ministerial dispatch of 19 August to the chiefs of all subordinate SJBs.¹³¹² In the dispatch, Stanišić ordered that all RS MUP personnel dealing with detainees obey the relevant domestic and international laws. The existence of any "wild," i.e., illegal camps or detention centres was to be reported immediately to the Minister. Criminal charges would be filed against those individuals failing to comply. On 21 August, Župljanin told all subordinate SJBs to facilitate the return of detainees to their homes, and to provide security for them upon arrival.¹³¹³ On 22

¹³⁰⁸ Undated report of SJB Prijedor, referencing CSB Banja Luka decision of 14 August 1992 (B003-2556-B003-2564).

¹³⁰⁹ CSB Banja Luka report, 18 August 1992 (B003-2527-B003-2542).

¹³¹⁰ Order of President Karadžić, 19 August 1992 (0049-5341-0049-5342).

¹³¹¹ Župljanin to chiefs of all subordinate SJBs, 19 August 1992 (0047-8798-0047-8798); Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs, 17 August 1992 (0370-1693-0370-1693).

¹³¹² Župljanin to chiefs of all subordinate SJBs, 20 August 1992 (P004-2990-P004-2990); SJB Prijedor dispatch, 21 August 1992 (P004-2991-P004-2991).

¹³¹³ Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 21 August 1992 (0047-8799-0047-8799).

August, Župljanin ordered that persons whose detention at Manjača could not “be confirmed by any material evidence” be released.¹³¹⁴

772. On 24 August 1992 Mićo Stanišić forwarded a request to all CSBs and to all SJBs requiring details of the location of the collection centres, information on the authorities who had ordered their establishment, and those authorities who had administered them.¹³¹⁵ He also requested information on the number of prisoners and persons arrested. The information had to be submitted to the Ministry by 30 August. The order was distributed by Župljanin to his subordinate SJBs on 27 August, with an added request for information on Serbs detained by Muslim forces.¹³¹⁶

773. Stanišić’s request for information coincided with actions aimed at reducing the number and size of detention facilities in ARK. This allowed RS MUP officials to take a narrow perspective in formulating their responses. From Prijedor, Drljača reported that there were no detention facilities except for Manjača.¹³¹⁷ He thus eluded any mention of the previously existing facilities. From Ključ, Vinko Kondić replied that there were no camps, prisons or detention centres in that municipality. All detainees were being sent to Manjača.¹³¹⁸

774. On 28 August 1992, the RS MUP wrote to CSB Sarajevo, Bijeljina and Trebinje to inform them of the arrival of an CSCE delegation. The delegation was to visit prisons at Pale, Bijeljina, Bileća, Trebinje and Foča. The dispatch noted that it was necessary to co-operate with the VRS during this visit and noted that “the prisons were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.”¹³¹⁹ On 31 August, CSB Banja Luka reported that the CSCE delegation had visited Manjača and Trnopolje.¹³²⁰ At the beginning of September, a delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross also visited Banja Luka to discuss Manjača and Trnopolje. Župljanin attended the meeting in his capacity as the “Minister of Internal Affairs of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.”¹³²¹ On 29 September 1992, the National Defence Council of the Prijedor Municipal Assembly recommended the closing of the Trnopolje centre, “as the departure of all registered persons from this collection centre effectively makes it unnecessary.”¹³²² However, that as late as mid-

¹³¹⁴ Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs and Command of 1st Krajina Corps, 22 August 1992 (0047-8797-0047-8797).

¹³¹⁵ Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs and all SJBs, 24 August 1992 (0063-3311-0063-3311).

¹³¹⁶ Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 27 August 1992 (0063-3312-0063-3312). See also SJB Prijedor, 28 August 1992 (0063-3313-0063-3313).

¹³¹⁷ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 28 August 1992 (0063-3310-0063-3310).

¹³¹⁸ SJB Ključ to CSB Banja Luka, 29 August 1992 (0057-4997-0057-5029).

¹³¹⁹ RS MUP to CSB Sarajevo, Bijeljina and Trebinje, 28 August 1992 (0324-7335-0324-7335).

¹³²⁰ CSB Banja Luka to RS MUP and President Karadžić, 31 August 1992 (0323-8486-0323-8486).

¹³²¹ Colonel Milutin Vukelić, 1st Krajina Corps, to VRS Main Staff and General Major Talić, 2 September 1992 (0102-9839-0102-9840); Župljanin to RS MUP, all subordinate SJBs, CSB Banja Luka (SNB), 4 September 1992 (B006-5584-B006-5584).

¹³²² Minutes of Session of National Defence Council of Prijedor Municipal Assembly, 29 September 1992 (P005-2895-P005-2895).

October, some police officials were still ignoring orders to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹³²³

775. In addition to its activities connected with the aforementioned centres run by the police, the RS MUP coordinated its work with the VRS authorities running detention centres such as Manjača. This included the participation of police officers in the guarding of prisoners.¹³²⁴ On 6 June, the Acting Chief of SJB Sanski Most, Mirko Vrućinić, sent a letter to the Commander of Manjača.¹³²⁵ Basing his letter on a previously reached agreement with the Commander of the Banja Luka Corps, Colonel Stevilović, Vrućinić stated that a group of prisoners were being sent to Manjača. The SJB was supplying accompanying documentation about the prisoners. Further prisoners would follow once their interrogation had been completed at SJB Sanski Most. Vrućinić's dispatching of prisoners to Manjača was in direct accordance with an order of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff of 6 June 1992.¹³²⁶

776. In some cases, the police asked the civilian authorities for assistance in matters related to detention. On 17 June 1992, SJB Sanski Most asked Župljanin to consult with the ARK authorities in order to clarify the status of prisons. At issue was a large number of Muslim prisoners detained at SJB Sanski Most and other SJBs as a result of "combat and disarming operations and other operations and activities regarding interrogation and operational processing."¹³²⁷

777. On occasion, SJB personnel participated in interrogations conducted in detention centres and camps, even when such facilities were operated by the VRS. On 24 June 1992, Vinko Kondić, the Chief of SJB Ključ, wrote to the Commandant of Manjača to inform him that two police inspectors would be arriving to carry out interrogations of prisoners detained in the Manjača camp.¹³²⁸ In the case of Keraterm, several dozen police officers from the Prijedor Reserve Police Station received permits to enter the centre.¹³²⁹ In Bosanski Novi, the police participated in the operation of an impromptu detention centre for mostly Muslim males even though SJB Bosanski Novi disagreed with the manner in which this centre had been established.¹³³⁰ Only those Muslims who were not suspected of crimes and were also willing to leave the municipality were released.

¹³²³ Radovan Karadžić to General Colonel Ratko Mladić, Mićo Stanišić and Momčilo Mandić, 22 October 1992 (0049-5345-0049-5345).

¹³²⁴ On 27 July, the 1st Krajina Corps Command ordered the continued participation of police officers in securing Manjača. 1st Krajina Corps Command Order, 27 July 1992 (0102-9846-0124-9848).

¹³²⁵ Mirko Vrućinić, Acting Chief of SJB Sanski Most, to VRS Commandant, Manjača, 6 June 1992 (0106-1776-0106-1776).

¹³²⁶ Order of Sanski Most Crisis Staff, 6 June 1992 (0047-1232-0047-1232).

¹³²⁷ Chief of SJB Sanski Most to Župljanin, 17 June 1992 (0049-3278-0049-3278).

¹³²⁸ Vinko Kondić, Chief of SJB Ključ, to VRS Commandant, Manjača, 24 June 1992 (0057-4811-0057-4811).

¹³²⁹ List of Members of the Police Who Will Receive Special Permits for Entry into the Reception Centre Keraterm, signed by Commander Živko Knežević (P005-0757-P005-0757). The document is undated, but a hand-written note confirms that 54 permits were issued on 25 June 1992.

¹³³⁰ "Report for the SJB Bosanski Novi," 15 August 1992 (B003-2565-B003-2573). The same report contains information on the collection of weapons by the police.

778. A report from SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, forwarded on 13 June 1992, asserted that the special detachment set up by the Ministry and placed under the Command of the CSB had been involved in the attack on Prijedor and that they had committed crimes. The report stated that a special unit had been involved in “looting during mopping up operations” and some of its members had abused prisoners in the Omarska detention camp. Although Simo Drljača expressed his gratitude for the assistance lent by the special detachment from CSB Banja Luka, he noted that their presence in Prijedor and at Omarska had become a nuisance.¹³³¹

779. On 11 September 1992, the Command of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps rendered a decision amnestying 48 Bosnian Muslims held at Manjača from criminal prosecution.¹³³²

6. Deportations/Expulsions

780. As indicated above, in the summer of 1992 many non-Serbs could leave detention facilities only if they agreed to leave their homes “voluntarily.” The police would in such cases certify that these individuals were not suspected of committing crimes. In addition, in accordance with regulations imposed by the ARK Crisis Staff, the police put strict limits on the belongings that departing individuals could take with themselves. On 5 July, SJB Prijedor made reference to Croats and Muslims who wanted to leave ARK “voluntarily.”¹³³³ The police would regulate such departures in cooperation with the Municipal Secretariat for National Defence. On 4 August, the police in Ključ announced that CSB Banja Luka had received a decision of the ARK War Presidency. According to this decision, persons leaving ARK could take only DM 300 with them, and the police were responsible for ensuring that this was not violated.¹³³⁴ Even before the decision of the ARK War Presidency, the War Presidency of Ključ Municipality had instructed the police to issue certificates to those individuals departing permanently from the municipality.¹³³⁵ In other municipalities similar decisions had been made even earlier. In Bosanska Krupa, the War Presidency issued an order already on 22 May. This mandated the “evacuation” of the remaining Muslim population by the civilian and military police. According to the reasoning of the War Presidency, recent statements by the RBiH President of the

¹³³¹ Simo Drljača, SJB Prijedor, to Stojan Župljanin, CSB Banja Luka, 13 June 1992 (0063-3256-0063-3256).

¹³³² Decision of 1st Krajina Corps, 11 September 1992 (0531-6504-0531-6504). See also “List of Persons Who Were Released from LRZ Manjača after 21 October 1992,” (0531-6502-0531-6503).

¹³³³ SJB Prijedor to Chief of CSB Banja Luka, 5 July 1992 (0063-3274-0063-3274).

¹³³⁴ Radio Ključ broadcast, 4 August 1992 (0059-5252-0059-5252). In at least one case, a municipal war presidency objected to the police’s confiscation of funds. On 28 July 1992, the Kotor Varoš municipal War Presidency claimed that the police were confiscating money from those leaving the municipality without permission. Rather than recommend the return of the money, the War Presidency stipulated that the money should be used for families of those who had died fighting “or for other necessary expenditures of the Municipality.” Excerpt from Minutes of Kotor Varoš War Presidency session, 28 July 1992 (0041-5564-0041-5564). However, on 31 July 1992, CSB Banja Luka issued a statement clarifying the instructions of the ARK Crisis Staff. CSB Banja Luka to all subordinate SJBs, 31 July 1992 (0063-3177-0063-3178).

¹³³⁵ Decision of War Presidency of Ključ Municipality, 30 July 1992 (0048-9849-0048-9850).

Presidency Alija Izetbegović made it impossible to guarantee the safety of Muslims in Bosanska Krupa municipality.¹³³⁶

781. Although the senior members of the RS political and security leadership made repeated claims to the effect that the RS, through its governing organs and security services, intended to protect all citizens, available documents nevertheless do not support the claim that the RS MUP in general conscientiously attempted to ensure that equal protection was provided to all citizens. For example, on 21 July 1992, the RS MUP Daily Bulletin noted that an entire Muslim family in Sokolac municipality had been killed by “unknown perpetrators.”¹³³⁷ This occurred even though the family, the last remaining Muslim family in the area, had expressly declared its loyalty to the RS authorities. The same bulletin noted that “all Muslim houses” in the village had been plundered.
782. On 5 July 1992 SJB Prijedor forwarded a report to CSB Banja Luka noting that they were, in accordance with a dispatch from the CSB dated 4 July 1992, “checking all persons of Muslim and Croat nationality, as well as those of Serb nationality who do not have a registered address or place of residence.”¹³³⁸ The dispatch further stated that “A large number of Croats and Muslims wish voluntarily to leave” the region. On 18 July, SJB Prijedor forwarded a dispatch from CSB Banja Luka advising that it had been arranged that a convoy of 5 buses depart from Trnopolje to Skender Vakuf.¹³³⁹ (It is not clear whether the 18 and 19 July documents both refer to the same group of people as the 4 July document.) In addition, on 24 August, CSB Banja Luka expressed concrete concerns about violence against those released detainees who might decide to go home.¹³⁴⁰ The employees of SJB Prijedor were asked to prevent any eventual attacks against those returning home from the detention centres.
783. The assertion by SJB Sanski Most on 17 August 1992, that Muslims and Croats would be allowed to make loyalty oaths if they wanted to remain, must be understood in this context.¹³⁴¹ On 20 August, the War Presidency of Kotor Varoš Municipality discussed the topic of emigration of detainees. It was decided that SJB Kotor Varoš would be involved in deciding who would be allowed to leave the municipality.¹³⁴²
784. On 22 August 1992, the “war presidency” of the Municipal Assembly of Ključ wrote to CSB Banja Luka about the possible return of detainees from Manjača to Ključ. According to the municipal authorities in Ključ, “we are absolutely not able to secure the protection of eventually returned prisoners of war from the camp Manjača, nor can we set up a reception centre for the same. We do not have even the most elementary material criteria [for this].”¹³⁴³

¹³³⁶ Order of War Presidency of Bosanska Krupa, 22 May 1992 (0049-2539-0049-2539).

¹³³⁷ RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 21 July 1992 (0324-6489-0324-6489).

¹³³⁸ SJB Prijedor to Chief of CSB Banja Luka, 5 July 1992 (0063-3274-0063-3274).

¹³³⁹ SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 18 July 1992 (0063-3287-0063-3288).

¹³⁴⁰ Dispatch of SJB Prijedor, 24 August 1992 (0063-3188-0063-3188).

¹³⁴¹ SJB Sanski Most to Chief of CSB Banja Luka, 17 August 1992 (0047-8714-0047-8714).

¹³⁴² Excerpt from Minutes of 58th Session of Kotor Varoš Municipal War Presidency, 20 August 1992 (0041-5736-0041-5736).

¹³⁴³ War Presidency of the Municipal Assembly of Ključ, 22 August 1992 (0531-6310-0531-6310).

785. On 31 August 1992, Radio Ključ carried a report on the first bus of “emigrants” from Ključ municipality.¹³⁴⁴ The bus left Ključ for Belgrade, with Canada as the final destination. The radio announcement was carried on the behalf of SJB Ključ so that “other interested persons” could take advantage of the same opportunity. In early September, an auditor noted that SJB Prijedor had issued several thousand permits to Muslims who wanted to leave the municipality.¹³⁴⁵ On 29 September, SJB Prijedor reported that it had received and processed 15,280 applications for emigration from the municipality.¹³⁴⁶
786. Vinko Kondić, the Chief of SJB Ključ, reported in late September 1992 that the Muslim inhabitants of the municipality had been inculcated with fear and that pressure had been put on them to leave the municipality.¹³⁴⁷ Although Kondić argued that the Muslims had started an armed rebellion in Ključ on 27 May, he observed that they had been the objects of a campaign of terror, including violent attacks on their lives and property. There had also been “monstrous crimes,” including the murder of 4 Muslims. “Massive theft” had been observed in the homes of those Muslims who had already left the municipality. The intensity of armed conflict had meant that few perpetrators of these crimes were apprehended. In those few instances, the only punishment meted out had been the dispatch of the perpetrators to the frontline. Kondić argued that the situation was such that the continued occurrence of such crimes might prompt the international community to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. He therefore requested that clear instructions be issued on how to proceed in such cases.
787. As indicated earlier in this report, the RS MUP on several occasions ordered investigations to be made of war crimes.¹³⁴⁸ In at least one case, the RS MUP became directly aware of a large-scale massacre of non-Serbian “refugees” in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 31 August, Stanišić ordered an investigation into the deaths of “approximately 150 Muslims” at Koričanske stijene in Skender-Vakuf municipality on 21 August.¹³⁴⁹ According to a VRS report, the refugee convoy carrying, among others, detainees from Trnopolje, was moving from Skender Vakuf via Mount Vlašić.¹³⁵⁰ The VRS report characterised the ensuing massacre as an act of “genocide” and noted the

¹³⁴⁴ Radio Ključ report, 31 August 1992 (0059-5227-0059-5227).

¹³⁴⁵ Minutes of inspection of work of SJB Prijedor, 4 September 1992 (B003-8610-B003-8610).

¹³⁴⁶ SJB Prijedor, “Report on the Work of Public Security Station Prijedor for the Third Quarter,” 29 September 1992 (P004-2819-P004-2826).

¹³⁴⁷ Dispatch of SJB Ključ, 28 September 1992 (0206-1515-0206-1516).

¹³⁴⁸ See also the RS Presidential order for CSBs to investigate war crimes committed against Serbs. Order of RS Presidency, 25 September 1992 (0047-8730-0047-8731). On 8 October 1992, Stojan Župljanin made reference to a Presidential order request urgent submission of data on war crimes against Serbs. Župljanin to all subordinate SJBs, 8 October 1992 (P004-3516-P004-3516). Cf. dispatch of SJB Prijedor, 9 October 1992 (P004-3518-P004-3518); CSB Banja Luka to SJB Prijedor, 16 October 1992 (0063-3339-0063-3339).

¹³⁴⁹ Order of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 31 August 1992 (0105-6505-0105-6505). At a press conference in November 1992, General Major Talić noted that the convoy involved persons from Trnopolje (V000-2840-V000-2840; transcription 0300-2802-0300-2804).

¹³⁵⁰ VRS Lieutenant Colonel Boško Peulić to Command of 1st Krajina Corps, 21 August 1992 (0105-6506-0105-6506). Video interview of General Major Talić on ABC News, 2 November 1992 (V000-2840-V000-2840; transcription 0300-2802-0300-2804).

participation of police officers in the “liquidation.”¹³⁵¹ The VRS suggested that CSB Banja Luka carry out an investigation immediately. Yet it was not until 11 September that Župljanin forwarded this order to Drljača.¹³⁵² On 14 September, Drljača responded that an investigation could not be carried out because the officers who had participated in the convoy on 21 August were currently deployed on the battlefield.¹³⁵³ On 7 October, Župljanin once again sought information from Drljača regarding the killings.¹³⁵⁴ On 13 October, SJB Prijedor provided a small amount of additional information about the incident.¹³⁵⁵

788. The available documentation does not show that anyone was charged with participating in the massacre at Koričanske stijene. VRS officials continued to report on the massacre but the 1st Krajina Corps also expressed relief that the full details of the matter had not become internationally known.¹³⁵⁶

789. On 17 July 1992, RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić ordered the chiefs of all CSBs to collect information on crimes committed by Croatian military and paramilitary forces by 30 July 1992.¹³⁵⁷ “This concentrated documentation can serve not only in military and operational, but also for political purposes.”

7. The Centralization of Internal Affairs in the RS

790. The SDS had originally used the decentralization of internal affairs to dismantle the SRBiH MUP from within. Conversely, by July 1992, top officials in the RS MUP had reached the conclusion that the level of everyday political interference in the work of the new Ministry had become intolerable. This view continued to be expressed elsewhere later during the year.¹³⁵⁸ The suggested remedy was a strong (re-)centralization of the RS MUP.

791. As has been seen above, at the 11 July meeting of RS MUP officials in Belgrade, several CSB chiefs drew attention to problems in policing. Stojan Župljanin of CSB Banja Luka complained that local governments were interfering improperly in the work of the

¹³⁵¹ VRS combat reports also assigned responsibility for the massacre to RS MUP. 1st Krajina Corps regular combat reports, 21 August 1992 (0105-6506-0105-6506), 22 August 1992 (0086-2880-0086-2883; 0086-2884-0086-2887).

¹³⁵² Župljanin to Drljača, 11 September 1992 (0105-6504-0105-6504).

¹³⁵³ Drljača to Župljanin, 14 September 1992 (0063-3335-0063-3335).

¹³⁵⁴ Župljanin to Drljača, 7 October 1992 (0208-1174-0208-1174).

¹³⁵⁵ SJB Prijedor to Župljanin, 13 October 1992 (0063-3338-0063-3338).

¹³⁵⁶ 1st Krajina Corps report on the state of morale for August 1992, 3 September 1992 (0124-2302-0124-0311). This report specifically mentioned Simo Drljača (although identifying him incorrectly as Stevo Drljača.)

¹³⁵⁷ Minister Mićo Stanišić to all chiefs of CSB, 17 July 1992 (0360-9741-0360-9742).

¹³⁵⁸ The third quarter report of CSB Banja Luka made frequent allusions to political intervention in the work of the RS MUP at the municipal level. CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Work of the Public Security Centre Banja Luka for the Period from 1 July to 30 September 1992,” October 1992 (0074-9601-0074-9650).

police.¹³⁵⁹ Andrija Bjelošević, the Chief of CSB Doboj, also drew attention to problems with financing of the RS MUP by the municipal civilian authorities. "He who pays wants to give the orders." This led to interference by municipal authorities in the work of the RS MUP. According to Bjelošević, the VRS had made a habit of bringing large numbers of prisoners to the RS MUP without any supporting documentation on the reasons for their arrest. Both Serbian military and police officials had committed crimes, especially theft. Zoran Cvijetić, the head of CSB Sarajevo, agreed with Župljanin's comments and thought them applicable for all CSBs.

792. After these comments at the meeting in Belgrade, Mićo Stanišić emphasised that the RS Government was working on a new distribution of power. This, he argued, would reduce the powers of the SAOs, and hence the aforementioned problems. Both the RS MUP and the VRS had to work harder to prevent their employees from committing crimes. At present, VRS members committing crimes were not punished at all, Stanišić said. The impact of politics on the RS MUP had to be reduced drastically: the RS MUP had to be a professional, not a political police force. Stanišić pointed out that the Presidency had formally banned "party activities" in wartime conditions. He called for multiparty rule after the war. In the meantime, cooperation with the VRS was essential.

793. Others agreed with Mićo Stanišić. Vlasto Kusmuk, Assistant Minister for the Police, called for all financing of the RS MUP to take place through the state budget. Questions and problems concerning camps and detention centres had to be resolved in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice.

794. On 17 July a highly confidential document entitled "Information on Some Aspects of Work to Date and on Impending Tasks," was circulated by the RS MUP.¹³⁶⁰ It essentially represented a paraphrased version on the internal RS MUP minutes of the 11 July meeting in Belgrade. A copy of this document was sent to the President of the Presidency and to the President of the Government. The document emphasised the extensive involvement of RS MUP employees in combat activities.¹³⁶¹ Notwithstanding this fact, the RS MUP had to redouble its efforts at professional policing. The present situation, in which the military was "on the streets directing traffic" while the police were "in the trenches," was unsustainable. Similarly, the police could not operate in an environment in which "the military and the crisis staffs, or respectively the war presidencies, are demanding the collection, or the military collects, or respectively imprisons, as much of the Muslim population as possible, leaving such undefined camps to the organs of internal affairs. The conditions in some of these camps are bad – there is no food, sometimes individuals do not respect international norms, etc." RS MUP was also concerned with the expulsions of the civilian population. "The question of how to resolve the emigration of certain inhabitants, villages, etc. needs especially to be discussed because it is not in the competency of MUP and they [the army and crisis staffs] wish to impute this to MUP." The document also

¹³⁵⁹ Short review of work of the RS MUP with suggestions for future work - report based on meeting of leading RS MUP officials on 11 July 1992, July 1992 (0324-1848-0324-1879).

¹³⁶⁰ RS MUP, "Information on Some Aspects of Work to Date and on Impending Tasks," 17 July 1992 (0324-6855-0324-6867).

¹³⁶¹ Police participation in combat activities was particularly heavy in Herzegovina, where "all employees" of the RS MUP regularly participated in combat.

stated that RS MUP complained that the judicial organs were not functioning properly in much of the RS.

795. The 17 July 1992 document resolved to crack down on theft and looting, including such activities conducted by members of RS MUP. The police should therefore be relieved from combat duty insofar as their presence at the frontline was not essential. War crimes also had to be investigated – even if they were committed by Serbs. RS MUP had to maintain a professional rather than a party function. The role of RS MUP was to build the rule of law and open the path for a multi-party system.

796. On 19 July 1992, Minister Mićo Stanišić ordered the chiefs of all CSBs to implement the main conclusions of the 11 July meeting in Belgrade.¹³⁶² By 25 July, each CSB had to deliver a report including the following information:

(a) Problems regarding the activities of some paramilitary formations, especially if there have been cases in which crimes have been committed, large-scale destruction of public order and peace, problems regarding joint command and opposition to government authorities, positive or negative connotations on the psychological-propaganda plane, possibilities of confrontation and other relevant facts and information, as well as suggestions for means for the solution of problems. We ask for more detailed facts and information because a conclusion has been made to inform the Presidency and the Government confidentially;

(b) Facts and information regarding the inclusion of the police in combat activities when that is not necessary;

- number of police included in combat activities (given by month – April, May, June and July) as well as corresponding indications about the number of police officers who were in the same period included in regular activities from the competency of MUP;
- problems regarding cooperation and command;
- number of police officers killed in combat engagements with the enemy

(c) Problems regarding the prevention and discovery of illegal acts and their perpetrators, the functioning of mixed checkpoints, confiscation of vehicles which are suspected of (or facts exist regarding) being illegally acquired or registered, protection of borders (expert matters, combat security, etc.);

(d) Approach and competence related to the treatment and guarding of prisoners, persons who have left zones of combat activities, collective centres in which the Military brings the Muslim population without documents regarding the reasons and leave such undefined camps to the organs of internal affairs;

(e) Work of military judicial organs (questions under points d and e will be raised at the meeting with the judicial organs, which are also being prepared);

(f) Exchange of information – supply the number of reports given to the Military and to the organs of military security;

¹³⁶² Order of Mićo Stanišić to chiefs of all CSBs, 19 July 1992 (0045-1848-0045-1849).

(g) Other questions and suggestions for the solution of problems that have emerged.¹³⁶³

797. Notwithstanding the claims made in the 17 July document and the orders issued by Mićo Stanišić on 19 July, RS MUP continued during this period to operate and engage in the operation of detention centres and in the implementation of operations to expel the non-Serbian population of the RS. Actions were undertaken by the end of July against some paramilitary groups, presumably as a result of the conclusions of the 11 July meeting. These actions were explicitly undertaken in order to assert the control of the RS authorities over the territory of the RS. Other documents were also issued regarding an implementation of the 11 July meeting, and on 20 August, a meeting was scheduled at CSB Trebinje to discuss progress regarding this point.¹³⁶⁴

798. On 30 July 1992, Stojan Župljanin complained about criminal activities and lack of professionalism in the area of operation of CSB Banja Luka.¹³⁶⁵ In Župljanin's opinion, part of the problem originated with local authorities, who were putting undue pressures and tasks on the police. This, he pointed out, was in contravention of the RS Law on Internal Affairs. Accordingly, Župljanin ordered all of his subordinate SJBs not to accept

orders, decisions, conclusions, suggestions, etc. from Crisis and Regional Staffs and other organs and legal entities which have not passed through the regular procedure and been forwarded to police stations in written form or which do not refer to the tasks and duties of the Service or are not in accordance with the law and general regulations. This also applies to various political decisions which have not become law and may not be directly implemented by the Service.

799. In an interview given in April 1993, Simo Drljača complained about extensive interference in the work of the police in Prijedor municipality. In particular, Drljača was incensed that several members of the municipal SDS had attempted to intervene on behalf of Croats or Muslims whom they had wanted released from detention facilities in the municipality.¹³⁶⁶ Drljača's comment was a bit disingenuous, at least for the period after 1 June 1992. Namely, as seen above, on that day the Prijedor Crisis Staff had specified that the Chief of the SJB had the "exclusive right to sign orders to release any imprisoned person."¹³⁶⁷

¹³⁶³ Responses by the CSBs and SJBs to the 19 July order of Mićo Stanišić include: CSB Sarajevo, 25 July 1992 (0324-7361-0324-7363); CSB Doboj, 27 July 1992 (0324-1970-0324-1972); SJB Prijedor, 4 August 1992 (0063-3294-0063-3296); CSB Trebinje, 4 August 1992 (0074-1280-0074-1288); SJB Sanski Most, 5 August 1992 (0047-8745-0047-8746). On 30 July 1992, CSB Banja Luka had circulated the 19 July 1992 order of STANIŠIĆ. On 3 August, Župljanin complained of not receiving timely responses to the order. Župljanin to chiefs of all SJBs, 3 August 1992 (P004-3072-P004-3072).

¹³⁶⁴ RS MUP to chiefs of all CSBs and to all Ministry administrations, 17 August 1992 (0324-7326-0324-7326); CSB Sarajevo, Report on Implementation of Conclusions from the Meeting of Leading Employees of MUP on 11 July 1992," August 1992 (0324-1739-0324-1741). RS MUP, "Report from Meeting of Leading Employees of MUP Held on 20 August 1992 in Trebinje," August 1992 (0370-9564-0370-9580).

¹³⁶⁵ Župljanin to Chiefs of all CSBs, Command of 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps and Minister Stanišić, 30 July 1992 (0045-1835-0045-1840).

¹³⁶⁶ Interview of Simo Drljača in *Kozarski vjesnik*, 9 April 1993 (0147-0203-0147-0203).

¹³⁶⁷ Decision of Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff, 2 June 1992 (0063-3780-0063-3780).

800. On 9 September 1992, the RS MUP held a meeting of its expanded Steering Council.¹³⁶⁸ At the outset of the meeting, Mićo Stanišić repeated his often made assertion that the RS MUP had, until then, been primarily engaged on the battlefield. He hoped that this would soon change. At the same meeting, Stanišić demanded that all employees of the RS MUP who did not fulfil the criteria for employment be dismissed.

8. The RS National Security Service

801. As stated above, the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs was divided into two main services: the Public Security Service and the National Security Service. The latter, the SNB, was the descendant of the SRBiH State Security Service (*Služba državne bezbjednosti*, or SDB). Accordingly, the SNB modelled its structure heavily on that of the SDB. It should be noted that, although the SRBiH MUP ceased to exist at the beginning of April 1992, documents indicate that Serbian employees in the SRBiH MUP SDB had stopped cooperating with the SRBiH MUP as early as the end of 1991.¹³⁶⁹

802. An Undersecretary for National Security headed the RS MUP SNB. Slobodan Škipina was the first Under-secretary of the SNB.¹³⁷⁰ As of 6 August 1992, the Undersecretary for SNB was Dragan Kijac.¹³⁷¹ He remained in this position until at least the end of 1995.¹³⁷² At the beginning of 1994, the SNB was officially renamed the RDB, bringing its name into conformity with the similar service in the Republic of Serbia.¹³⁷³

803. The SNB was charged with the gathering of intelligence related to dangers against the RS.¹³⁷⁴ According to a 17 July 1992 action program sent to the RS Government and RS Presidency, the SNB would “use its powers, means and methods” predominantly for the “collection and documentation of the activities of the enemy.”¹³⁷⁵ It sought to strengthen the grip of the RS on its territory while weakening the hold of the enemy over its territory. It also aimed specifically at preventing Serbs in Muslim- or Croat-controlled areas from working against the interests of the RS.

¹³⁶⁸ Minutes of Expanded Session of Steering Council of the Minister for Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic, 9 September 1992 (0324-7328-0324-7332).

¹³⁶⁹ The report of the Banja Luka SNB Sector (Line 01) for April 1992 - April 1993 indicated that the break had taken place “already at the end of 1991.” Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Overview of Activities of the SNB Banja Luka Sector for Line 1 for the Period April 1992 - April 1993,” 12 April 1993 (B003-6980-B003-6988).

¹³⁷⁰ RS MUP Ministerial Payroll for May 1992 (FI20-0983-FI20-0984).

¹³⁷¹ Appointment decision, signed by Mićo Stanišić, 6 August 1992 (FI20-0591-FI20-0591). See also RS MUP SNB to all chiefs of SNB Sectors in CSBs, 12(?) August 1992 (0296-9606-0296-9606).

¹³⁷² RS MUP RDB, Dispatch of Chief of RDB Dragan Kijac, 27 July 1995 (0678-7467-0678-7467).

¹³⁷³ Law on the Changes and the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, 30 December 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/27, 31 December 1993 (0354-1153-0354-1215, at 0354-1214-0354-1215).

¹³⁷⁴ On 17 August, RS MUP’s Administration for Analytical-Informational Matters sent information on intelligence activities aimed against the RS to SNB. RS MUP Administration for Analytical-Informational Matters to SNB, 17 August 1992 (0324-8494-0324-8495).

¹³⁷⁵ RS MUP, “Information on Some Aspects of Work to Date and on Impending Tasks,” 17 July 1992 (0324-6855-0324-6867).

804. The 1992 annual report on the work of the SNB stated that the Service strove to contribute to the rapid creation of the “legal and territorial completeness of Republika Srpska.”¹³⁷⁶ Although the report emphasised the “modest” personnel resources available to SNB at the outset of the war, it also noted that Serbs in the SRBiH MUP SDB had begun “much earlier” to prepare the ground for SNB.
805. Generally speaking, all documents related to the SNB or produced by it had a higher level of confidentiality and more restricted circulation than those related to the Public Security Service. A separate, secret rulebook (*pravilnik*) existed for the SNB. This rulebook was drafted in the course of 1992, but a copy of it is not available for analysis.¹³⁷⁷ The strict confidentiality of the work of the SNB was enforced and supported by the Minister of Internal Affairs. On at least one occasion, Minister Stanišić found it necessary to advise all employees of the Public Security Service that they had no authority to intervene in or inquire about the work of the SNB.¹³⁷⁸ In addition, only the SNB had the right to be in direct contact with the Intelligence Service of the VRS. The SNB, for its part, had to provide the chiefs of SJBs with relevant information.
806. At the outset of the war, the SNB was organised into five regional sectors. Each CSB housed one “sector” of the SNB. Beneath each of these sectors were a collection of “detachments.” This paralleled the earlier internal organization of the SRBiH MUP SDB, which had also proceeded along a hierarchical line: administrations – sectors – departments – sections – detachments.¹³⁷⁹ During 1992, the SNB was further organised geographically into a number of “war departments” (*ratna odjeljenja*, ROs).¹³⁸⁰ According to a report produced by the RS MUP at the end of June 1992, the SNB in ARK had been able to establish and operate significantly better and more easily than, for example, the SNB in the Sarajevo region.¹³⁸¹ This was due to disparities in equipment, personnel and the combat situation. Nevertheless, even the SNB in CSB Sarajevo succeeded in providing a regular stream of intelligence on enemy activities and plans.¹³⁸² This included the submission of numerous reports to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.¹³⁸³

¹³⁷⁶ RS MUP SNB, “Report on the Work of the National Security Service in the Period from 1 April to 31 December 1992,” 30 April 1993 (B001-0776-B001-0789).

¹³⁷⁷ RS MUP, “Information on Some Aspects of Work to Date and on Impending Tasks,” 17 July 1992 (0324-6855-0324-6867).

¹³⁷⁸ Order of Mićo Stanišić to all CSBs and all SNB Sectors, 28 August 1992 (B003-1307-B003-1307).

¹³⁷⁹ SRBiH MUP Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the State Security Service of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 March 1990 (0113-7521-0113-7669).

¹³⁸⁰ SNB War Department Šipovo, 27 July 1992 (B006-8855-B006-8856); SNB War Department Mrkonjić Grad to Public Security Service Mrkonjić Grad, November 1992 (0087-6130-0087-6131). For an example of the organizational schematic of the SNB at the level of the CSB and below, see CSB Sarajevo – Sector SNB, “Report on the Work of the SNB Sector Sarajevo from July to August,” 18 August 1992 (0074-9701-0074-9701).

¹³⁸¹ RS MUP, “Report on Work for the Period from April to June 1992,” 29 June 1992 (0324-6791-0324-6809).

¹³⁸² CSB Sarajevo to RS MUP, 25 July 1992 (0324-7361-0324-7363).

¹³⁸³ Dissatisfaction was however expressed by the SNB in CSB Sarajevo because of the lack of military intelligence being passed to the SNB by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

807. Organizationally, the SNB was also divided into several functional lines, each of which was formally referred to as an Administration or Department. Each of these lines concentrated on specific aspects of police intelligence and had its own reporting system and hierarchy. In the pre-war SDB, there were nine lines:¹³⁸⁴

1. Administration for Affairs and Tasks of the Discovery and Prevention of the Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services
2. Administration for Affairs and Tasks of the Discovery and Prevention of Hostile Activities of Émigrés
3. Administration for Affairs and Tasks of the Discovery and Prevention of Activities of the Internal Enemy
4. Administration for Operational-Technical Affairs and Tasks
5. Administration for Affairs and Tasks of the Security of Certain Persons and Places
6. Administration for Affairs and Tasks of Defensive Preparations
7. Administration for Analytical-Informational Affairs and Tasks
8. Department for Affairs and Tasks of Secret Surveillance
9. Department for General, Legal and Personnel Questions and Tasks.

808. A document produced by the RDB Centre in Banja Luka in March 1994 provided a brief retrospective overview of SDB operations in CSB Banja Luka before and after April 1992.¹³⁸⁵ As of 1 April 1992, 28 Serbs, 5 Croats, 9 Muslims and 1 Yugoslav worked for the SDB Sector in Banja Luka. Between April 1992 and March 1994, 1 Serb left the SNB/RDB, and 1 was killed. Of the Croats, 1 refused to sign the loyalty oath, 3 went to work in the Public Security Service and 1 left the service. Of the Muslims, 6 refused to sign the loyalty oath, 1 left the service, 1 went to work in the Public Security Service, 1 went to work for the RBiH Government. After April 1992, there were 121 posts in the Banja Luka Centre SNB, which covered 25 municipalities.

809. In SNB, the number of functional lines was reduced to six.¹³⁸⁶ In practice, the lines overlapped. This was especially the case after the commencement of armed hostilities in April 1992. However, it should be noted that indications exist that regional SNB Centres lacked adequate direction from the centre. In October 1992, CSB Banja Luka complained about the “non-existence of particular programmatic orientation of the work of the National Security Service.”¹³⁸⁷ This did not mean, though, that the SNB Sector at CSB Banja Luka had remained idle during the period since its establishment. On the contrary, SNB operatives had worked on a variety of issues, including intelligence work and anti-

¹³⁸⁴ SRBiH MUP Rulebook on the Internal Organization of the State Security Service of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 March 1990 (0113-7521-0113-7669).

¹³⁸⁵ RDB Centre Banja Luka, 23 June 1994 (B003-6977-B003-6977).

¹³⁸⁶ RS MUP SNB, “Report on the Work of the National Security Service in the Period from 1 April to 31 December 1992,” 30 April 1993 (B001-0776-B001-0789).

¹³⁸⁷ CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Work of the Public Security Centre Banja Luka for the Period from 1 July to 30 September 1992,” October 1992 (0074-9601-0074-9650). See also SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Fundamental Accents of the Work of SNB Banja Luka in 1992 and Some Problems in the Work,” 9 July 1992 (B003-3221-B003-3227).

terrorist operations. As early as April 1992, SNB operatives in the Banja Luka area had issued reports on the security situation in various ARK municipalities.¹³⁸⁸ In addition, “the Sector, on the invitation of the Public Security Service, and in conjunction with its legal powers, participated together with the public and military security services in the operational processing, i.e. interrogation of persons held in collective centres about illegal arming and military organization.” The SNB could also request to interrogate persons detained in the Manjača camp or suggest their release.¹³⁸⁹

810. In its work, the SNB cooperated closely with Military Security. The report for Line 01 for the period from April 1992 to April 1993 revealed that the SNB in ARK had begun cooperating directly with JNA Military Security at around the same time that cooperation with the SRBiH MUP stopped – i.e. at the end of 1991.¹³⁹⁰ In May 1992, upon the formation of the VRS, the SNB began to exchange intelligence with VRS Military Intelligence.¹³⁹¹ During the first full year of operation, Line 01 of the SNB Sector in Banja Luka calculated that it had participated in the interrogation of “several thousand persons” suspected of anti-constitutional activities. This included interrogations carried out in Manjača.¹³⁹²

811. In addition to reporting regularly on combat activity in their areas of the operation, the National Security Sectors within the CSBs prepared occasional reports on enemy forces and on the “illegal arming” of enemy forces.¹³⁹³ In its review of work in

¹³⁸⁸ SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Current Security Evaluation on the Territory of RO Prijedor,” 15 April 1992 (B004-8007-B004-8008); SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Evaluation of the Current Security Situation on the Territory of RO Bosanska Dubica,” 16 April 1992 (B004-8009-B004-8009); SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Evaluation of Security Situation on the Territory of Bosanski Novi,” 16 April 1992 (B004-8010-B004-8010); SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, “Evaluation of the Current Security Situation on the Territory of Sanski Most,” 14 April 1992 (B004-8011-B004-8011).

¹³⁸⁹ SNB RO Mrkonjić Grad, “Plan for the Application of Operational Measures and Activities towards Persons from the Territory of Mrkonjić Grad who Deserve Operational Interest,” 1 July 1992 (B006-9071-B006-9082); see also SNB RO Mrkonjić Grad, “Plan for the Application of Operational Measures and Activities towards Persons from Mrkonjić Grad,” 25 August 1992 (B006-9085-B006-9085); SNB RO Ključ, “Suggestion for the Release of Prisoners of War from the Camp Manjača,” 9 November 1992 (B008-8566-B008-8567).

¹³⁹⁰ Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Overview of Activities of the SNB Banja Luka Sector for Line 1 for the Period April 1992 - April 1993,” 12 April 1993 (B003-6980-B003-6988).

¹³⁹¹ The report noted, however, that cooperation with the VRS was not without friction.

¹³⁹² Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Report on the Work of SNB Sector Banja Luka for 1992,” January 1993 (B003-1813-B003-1821). See also Official Note of SNB Detachment Mrkonjić Grad, 14 December 1992 (B008-8114-B008-8114). The SNB’s interest in persons detained at Manjača continued after their release from Manjača. On 29 September 1992, SNB RO Ključ requested a list of all former Manjača detainees from the VRS. According to SNB RO Ključ, former detainees now located outside the former Yugoslavia were conducting activities hostile to the RS. Official note of SNB RO Ključ, 29 September 1992 (B008-8582-B008-8582).

¹³⁹³ See the three reports of CSB Banja Luka, “Overview of the State of Security on the Territory of the Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina,” June 1992, “More Information Obtained in the Course of the Clarification of the Circumstances of the Case ‘Kozarac’ and the Attack on Prijedor by Muslim and Croat Extremists,” June 1992, and “Newer Information Obtained in the Course of the Clarification of the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the Military Patrol and Surrounding the Paramilitary Organization and Illegal Arming on the Territory of Kozarac, Prijedor and Other Nearby Places,” June

1992, the SNB Sector at CSB Banja Luka asserted that it achieved great successes in the struggle against “Muslim-Croat extremists.”¹³⁹⁴ The SNB Sector estimated that 10,000 such extremists had been fully equipped and ready to fight against RS forces in the area surrounding Prijedor, Ključ, Sanski Most and Jajce.

812. As a part of the RS MUP, the SNB was aware that large numbers of non-Serbs were departing from the territory of the RS in the summer of 1992. In late October 1992, the SNB noted the “massive departures” of both Muslims and Croats from Prijedor municipality. According to the estimates of the SNB Sector at CSB Banja Luka, 38,000 Muslim and Croat inhabitants had left Prijedor municipality to date.¹³⁹⁵ It was further observed that many villages in the municipality had been partly or wholly destroyed, and that “massive plunder” of these locations had followed. Croat and Muslim property and places of worship had also been attacked.¹³⁹⁶ Although persons in military uniform had abused non-Serbs, the military police had taken few concrete steps to remedy this.
813. Like other parts of the RS MUP, SNB collected materials on war crimes. Again, as with the Public Security Service, this mainly involved the collection of information about crimes committed against Serbs.¹³⁹⁷ From April 1992 until the end of that year, the SNB Sector at CSB Banja Luka pressed charges against only one individual for suspected war crimes. No mention was made in the SNB Sector’s 1992 annual report of the commission of any war crimes against the non-Serbian population in CSB Banja Luka’s AOR.¹³⁹⁸
814. As with the RS MUP Public Security Service, the SNB had knowledge of grave violations of humanitarian law committed in the RS. In addition to the involvement of SNB in the interrogation of non-Serbs in detention facilities, the SNB also reported on occasion

1992 (B003-4287-B003-4306). See also Banja Luka SNB Sector, “New Information on Illegal Arming on the Territory of Banja Luka,” July 1992 (B003-1840-B003-1844) and Banja Luka Sector, “Channel of Illegal Arming of Muslim Extremists in Some Villages in Bosanska Gradiška Severed,” May 1992 (B003-1663-B003-1666).

¹³⁹⁴ Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Report on the Work of SNB Sector Banja Luka for 1992,” January 1993 (B003-1813-B003-1821). On reporting within the SNB, see also SNB Under-Secretary Dragan Kijac to all CSB SNB Sectors, 3 October 1992 (0370-1695-0370-1698); SNB Under-Secretary Dragan Kijac to all SNB Sectors, 22 October 1992 (0370-1700-0370-1700); SNB Under-Secretary Dragan Kijac to all SNB Sectors, 23 October 1992 (0370-1701-0370-1701).

¹³⁹⁵ CSB Banja Luka, SNB Sector, “Security Situation for the Territory of Prijedor Municipality,” 23 October 1992 (0063-3340-0063-3343). See also the May 1993 SNB Sector Banja Luka overview of population changes in the area covered by CSB Banja Luka. CSB Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Overview of Departing and Arriving Citizens on the Territories Covered by the Sector,” May 1993 (B009-8148-B009-8154).

¹³⁹⁶ In a separate case, the SNB in Mrkonjić Grad decided to take measures against Đevad Velić, a Muslim who had filmed the destruction of a Catholic church and mosques in Mrkonjić Grad by “Serbian fighters.” His acts of filming this destruction and distributing the video cassette were defined as being directed “against the Serb nation.” SNB Mrkonjić Grad, 2 November 1992 (B008-8910-B008-8910; see also 0087-6130-0087-6130).

¹³⁹⁷ CSB Trebinje, “Information on the Work and Current Problems of CSB Trebinje,” September 1992 (0074-1262-0074-1278).

¹³⁹⁸ Banja Luka SNB Sector, “Report on the Work of SNB Sector Banja Luka for 1992,” January 1993 (B003-1813-B003-1821).

on attacks on non-Serbs.¹³⁹⁹ The SNB also reported on the departure of large numbers of non-Serbs from territory controlled by Republika Srpska.¹⁴⁰⁰

9. The Relationship between the RS MUP and Paramilitary Organizations

815. At the outset of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, paramilitary organizations comprised of Bosnian Serbs as well as Serbs from Serbia proper were very active in conducting operations against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.¹⁴⁰¹ Their activities often took place alongside or in the wake of RS military or police operations. RS MUP officials, and indeed the RS authorities as a whole, were generally aware of the presence of paramilitary organizations and of their activities.¹⁴⁰² In some areas, the vacuum in everyday policing created because of the combat engagement of the police was filled by

¹³⁹⁹ On 9 October 1992, SNB RO Šipovo reported that Islamic cultural objects had been destroyed. The report also noted that approximately 1,500 Muslims emigrated out of the municipality. Official note of SNB RO Šipovo, 9 October 1992 (B009-0248-B009-0248). On 9 April 1993, SNB RO Šipovo provided the results of a tally of non-Serbs who had left Šipovo municipality in the course of 1992. Of 2,400 Muslims in the municipality at the beginning of 1992, 1,500 had left. Another 900 – the remainder – left in the first three months of 1993. SNB RO Šipovo, “Report on the Work of RO for the Period from 1 January 1993 to 31 March 1993 and an Evaluation of the Security Situation on the Territory of Šipovo Municipality,” 9 April 1993 (B008-8216-B008-8218).

¹⁴⁰⁰ Official note of CSB Banja Luka SNB Sector, 19 October 1992 (B007-9266-B007-9267).

¹⁴⁰¹ As seen earlier in this report, SRBiH MUP SDB had reported on paramilitary activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina already in 1991. On 23 March 1992 SRBiH MUP SDB reported on the arrival of paramilitaries at Ilijaš. The SDS at Ilijaš had allegedly collected money to pay for paramilitary assistance in the “cleansing” of this municipality. SRBiH MUP SDB dispatch, 23 March 1992 (0323-7798-0323-7798).

¹⁴⁰² On 18 May 1992, the Chief of SJB Prijedor, Simo Drljača, reported on the existence of paramilitary groups. He did not comment on the leadership or ethnic affiliation of these groups. SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka, 18 May 1992 (0063-3222-0063-3222). On the same day, SJB Banja Luka reported that it possessed no information regarding paramilitary organizations on the territory of Banja Luka municipality. SJB Banja Luka to CSB Banja Luka SNB Sector, 18 May 1992 (B006-1563-B006-1563). On 3 July 1992, the RS Presidency ordered RS MUP to carry out an investigation regarding the activities of paramilitary groups on the territory of Gacko and Nevesinje in eastern Herzegovina. Order of RS Presidency, signed by Karadžić, 3 July 1992 (0084-6246-0084-6246).

Instances of RS MUP awareness of paramilitary activities include:

17 June 1992: RS MUP orders CSB Banja Luka to erect a commission to investigate paramilitary activities near Drvar at Kulen-Vakuf. RS MUP to Chief of CSB Banja Luka, 17 June 1992 (0324-7398-0324-7399). Also reported in RS MUP Bulletin, 17 June 1992 (0324-6528-0324-6528).

23 March 1993: CSB Banja Luka observes a link between crime and paramilitary groups in 1992. CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Analysis of Work of the SJBs in 1992 on the Territory of CSB Banja Luka,” 23 March 1993 (0324-6151-0324-6167).

July 1992: CSB Banja Luka notes activity of paramilitary groups. CSB Banja Luka, “Report on the Work of CSB Banja Luka for the Period 1 January to 30 June 1992,” July 1992 (0324-6764-0324-6790).

7-8 July 1992: SJB Bijeljina reports on meeting with Ljubiša Savić “Mauzer”, who threatened to blow up all of Bijeljina and complained about the police. Official notes of SJB Bijeljina, 7 and 8 July 1992 (0074-9580-0074-9581; 0074-1372-0074-1373).

11 July 1992: SJB Pale confirms that Voja Vučković of Zvornik received weapons from the police. SJB Pale declaration, 11 July 1992 (0324-7370-0324-7370).

13 July 1992: SJB Višegrad reports frequent arrival of “volunteers” from Serbia proper. SJB Višegrad to RS MUP, 13 July 1992 (0324-6754-0324-6757).

paramilitary groups. However, the activities of these groups in such capacities tended to lead to a deterioration of the security situation.¹⁴⁰³ Although attempts were made by the RS MUP, particularly after July 1992, to eliminate paramilitary activity, the emphasis was put on integrating paramilitary organizations into police or military units rather than on the investigation, arrest and prosecution of these organizations. The recurring phenomenon of direct cooperation between the RS MUP and paramilitary organizations decreased in frequency during the second half of 1992, but was never wholly eliminated.

816. With time the RS authorities took an increasingly negative view of these paramilitary organizations. As the RS began to consolidate control over its territory, the chaos and violence caused by paramilitary organizations came to be seen as a liability to the state. As a result, the VRS and RS MUP attempted to integrate these units into regular units of the VRS or the RS MUP. On 13 June 1992, Karadžić banned “self-organised armed groups and individuals on the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Such groups and individuals had three days to submit to the command of either the VRS or the RS MUP.¹⁴⁰⁴ In ARK, Župljanin had already earlier integrated members of the paramilitary SOS into a new special unit controlled by CSB Banja Luka.¹⁴⁰⁵

817. Notwithstanding Karadžić’s order, a report by the VRS Main Staff in late July 1992 identified approximately 60 active paramilitary groups on the territory of the RS.¹⁴⁰⁶ The report noted that these groups were often composed of criminal and/or pathological elements who had risen to prominence with the outbreak of armed hostilities. They had little military value and concentrated their efforts mainly on looting and war profiteering. These groups often exhibited extreme hatred against non-Serbs. Although the report found that none of the paramilitary groups were directly affiliated with the SDS, it also noted some associations between these groups and the SDS. The number of paramilitary organizations, the scope of their activities and the lack of condemnation of these activities created the impression that the SDS supported them. In addition, the report observed a link between these groups and corruption in government institutions. The VRS therefore concluded that “every armed Serb was to be placed under the exclusive command of the army, or else disarmed and legal measures taken.”¹⁴⁰⁷

818. Despite the Presidential order banning the existence of paramilitary formations outside the structure of the RS MUP or the VRS, these groups continued to operate in the RS until at least the end of July 1992. As seen earlier, the presence of these groups and the

¹⁴⁰³ CSB Trebinje, “Evaluation of Political-Security Situation on the Territory of CSB Trebinje,” 19 August 1992 (0074-9651-0074-9663).

¹⁴⁰⁴ Minutes of 6th Session of RS Presidency, 13 June 1992 (0076-7938-0076-7938); SRNA announcement of presidential decision, 13 June 1992 (0084-6224-0084-6224). In early August, Karadžić referred back to this decision in reporting the recent arrest of “outlaws” in Podrinje and Ključ: Announcement of Karadžić, 6 August 1992 (0048-8944-0048-8944).

¹⁴⁰⁵ “Soon a Special Detachment,” *Glas*, 29 April 1992 (0095-1922-0095-1922).

¹⁴⁰⁶ VRS Main Staff report on the paramilitary formations in the territory of the Serbian Republic of BiH, 28 July 1992 (0094-9847-0094-9852).

¹⁴⁰⁷ On 30 July 1992, General Momir Talić issued an order pursuant to the 28 July Main Staff report. The order offered paramilitary groups the opportunity to join the VRS. 1st Krajina Corps order, 30 July 1992 (0089-0621-0089-0623).

effects of their activities upon morale had been addressed at the RS MUP meeting held in Belgrade on 11 July 1992.¹⁴⁰⁸

819. In those cases where integration proved impossible, operations were undertaken to disable these paramilitary groupings. At the end of July 1992, there was a crackdown against paramilitary forces. On 29 July, the RS MUP Police Detachment (Special Police), together with the VRS Military Police, imposed a complete blockade on Zvornik municipality.¹⁴⁰⁹ This was done in reaction to the continued problems caused by paramilitaries in this area, and especially by members of the "Yellow Wasps." On 20 July 1992, CSB Bijeljina had reported that paramilitary formations were contributing to a problematic security situation in Zvornik municipality.¹⁴¹⁰ Three paramilitary groups – commanded by "Žučo" (the Yellow Wasps), "Pivarski" and "Niški" were operating in the municipality. The first group was the most powerful, and included both local recruits and members from the Republic of Serbia.

820. As a result of the Zvornik operation, the RS MUP apprehended dozens of individuals. They were interrogated about their activities during the preceding period.¹⁴¹¹ A report was also filed concerning the criminal activities of the Yellow Wasps.¹⁴¹² This report noted that both military intelligence officers and the SNB had information indicating that at least one member of the Yellow Wasps had "carried out a massacre-genocide against citizens of Muslim nationality of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Evidence was also uncovered that the Yellow Wasps had, as recently as 11 July, received material assistance from SJB Pale. Of the 65 members who were arrested, criminal investigations were initiated against 11 of them. The remaining 54 were put at the disposal of the armed forces of the RS. However, there is no evidence that these paramilitaries were actually prosecuted in the RS for committing crimes against the non-Serb population of Zvornik municipality.

821. The July 1992 RS MUP operation against the Yellow Wasps did not succeed in permanently subduing that organization. On 5 September 1992, Goran Žugić, the head of RO SNB Birač, reported that Vojin Vučković "Žučo" and his Yellow Wasps had made several recent appearances in Zvornik municipality.¹⁴¹³ Vučković had mentioned that he was preparing to take revenge for the July 1992 humiliation. Accordingly, the police in

¹⁴⁰⁸ Short review of work of RS MUP with suggestions for future work - report based on meeting of leading RS MUP officials on 11 July 1992, July 1992 (0324-1848-0324-1879).

¹⁴⁰⁹ RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 29 July 1992 (0323-8106-0323-8106). See also SJB Zvornik to RS MUP, CSB Bijeljina and CSB Sarajevo, 28 July 1992 (0296-9632-0296-9632).

¹⁴¹⁰ CSB Bijeljina report, 20 July 1992 (0074-1342-0074-1346).

¹⁴¹¹ See official records of statements given by paramilitary members to CSB Bijeljina and SJB Bijeljina, 2 and 4 August 1992 (0076-8088-0076-8098; 0076-8344-0076-8346; 0075-8465-0075-8466; 0075-8467-0075-8470; 0076-6073-0076-6074; 0076-6079-0076-6100; 0076-8090-0076-8091; 0076-8114-0076-8120; 0076-8341-0076-8343; 0076-8116-0076-8118).

¹⁴¹² RS MUP, Administration for the Elimination of Crime, "Information on Activities of MUP in Uncovering Criminal Activities of the Paramilitary Formation "Yellow Wasps" on the Territory of the Serbian Municipality Zvornik," 4 August 1992 (0324-7392-0324-7394); RS MUP, Administration for the Elimination of Crime, 10 August 1992 (0324-2036-0324-2036).

¹⁴¹³ Goran Žugić, Chief of RO SNB Birač, 5 September 1992 (0324-7390-0324-7390).

Zvornik were planning counter-measures. Žugić asked his superior officer, SNB Under-secretary Dragan Kijac for advice on this matter. Kijac replied on the same day, endorsing the approach taken and advising Žugić to keep in touch with Milenko Karišik, the commander of the RS MUP Special Detachment.¹⁴¹⁴ Worries about the Yellow Wasps were repeated in a SNB dispatch to the RS Presidency, Government, MUP and VRS dated 22 September 1992.¹⁴¹⁵

822. On 27 July 1992, CSB Doboj reported about the operations of paramilitary formations in its AOR and sent a long list of suggested remedies to the Ministry.¹⁴¹⁶ There was, however, subsequent information indicating mutual cooperation between paramilitary forces and CSB Doboj. According to a November 1992 report compiled by the SNB Sector at CSB Banja Luka, Andrija Bjelošević, the head of CSB Doboj, had recently arrived at a battlefield in Teslić municipality along with members of a special unit of CSB Doboj.¹⁴¹⁷ With the permission of the local VRS commander, Colonel Slavko Lisica, Bjelošević was cooperating with members of a Bosnian Serb paramilitary organization known as the “Miće.” This group included persons who had already been arrested, and it had been identified earlier by SJB Teslić as being involved in attacks on non-Serbian civilians.¹⁴¹⁸ The SNB reported that such cooperation was contrary to instructions issued by the RS MUP. Given earlier violent encounters with the members of the “Miće” in Teslić, the local Serbian population viewed the cooperation among the VRS, CSB Doboj and the “Miće” with discontent and fear.

823. On 30 July 1992, CSB Trebinje completed a report on the activities of paramilitary organizations on the territory of SAO Herzegovina. CSB Trebinje sent the report to the RS MUP on 4 August.¹⁴¹⁹ According to the report, Serbian paramilitary activity was widespread in Herzegovina. Prominent groups included followers of Arkan and Vojislav Šešelj. Rather than engage in military activity to assist the RS forces, the

¹⁴¹⁴ Under-secretary Dragan Kijac to Goran Žugić, 5 September 1992 (0324-7391-0324-7391). See also SNB Sarajevo to VRS Main Staff and Minister of Internal Affairs, 10 September 1992 (0323-8342-0323-8342).

¹⁴¹⁵ SNB Sarajevo to President of RS Presidency, President of the Government, Minister of Internal Affairs and VRS, 22 September 1992 (0323-8334-0323-8334).

¹⁴¹⁶ CSB Doboj to RS MUP, 27 July 1992 (0324-1970-0324-1972).

¹⁴¹⁷ Official note of SNB Sector, CSB Banja Luka, 16 November 1992 (B007-9607-B007-9607a). In 1993, SJB Teslić produced a retrospective history of events related to the SJB between September 1991 and September 1993. SJB Teslić, 25 September 1993 (B007-9512-B007-9515).

¹⁴¹⁸ SJB Teslić, 8 July 1992 (B001-2326-B001-2327). On the same day and the following day, 16 individuals were turned over to the Basic Court in Teslić by SJB Teslić. SJB Teslić to Investigating Magistrate, Teslić Basic Court, 8 July 1992 (0211-7007-0211-7009), 9 July 1992 (0211-7010-0211-7018). On 1 July 1992, the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps reported in detail on the formation of “Serbian volunteers” as early as October 1991. The same report also noted problems with paramilitary organizations. 1st Krajina Corps Command report to RS President Radovan Karadžić, 1 July 1992 (0324-6748-0324-6753). On 3 July 1992, Marinko Đukić and Predrag Markočević, two employees of SJB Teslić, wrote official notes describing the gross misconduct of the “Miće” in Teslić municipality, as well as the links between this group and CSB Doboj. Official notes of Marinko Đukić and Predrag Markočević, 3 July 1992 (0211-7039-0211-7053). See also SJB Teslić official note, 3 July 1992 (0211-7047-0211-7053).

¹⁴¹⁹ CSB Trebinje to RS MUP, 4 August 1992 (0074-1280-0074-1289).

paramilitary groups generally harassed the local population and committed crimes. Many members of these groups had criminal backgrounds. A report filed by CSB Trebinje in September 1992 claimed that these groups had been drive out of Eastern Herzegovina.¹⁴²⁰ Yet at the same time, a number of problematic persons, including criminals, had managed to “infiltrate” themselves into the police force. This, and the heavy commitment of police officers at the front, made it impossible to carry out the legal tasks of the MUP, especially in places like Bileća.

824. On 5 August 1992, SJB Sanski Most reported that paramilitary groups had been carrying out arson and opportunistic attacks to plunder Muslim and Croat homes in the area.¹⁴²¹ These groups were composed mainly of soldiers operating without permission from their superior officers. Fully 90% of crimes committed in the municipality were committed by “soldiers or, respectively, members of military or paramilitary military groups.” Subsequent actions against paramilitary groups in Sanski Most municipality received commendation from Župljanin.¹⁴²²
825. On 3 August 1992, SJB Milići sent a report to CSB Sarajevo about a paramilitary group known as the “Vukovar detachment.”¹⁴²³ The report noted that, on 21 May 1992, members of that group approached officers of SJB Milići asking where they could “execute” three Bosnian Muslims. The officers told them to contact the nearest military command to clarify this matter. The paramilitaries then proceeded to kill the Muslims once they were slightly outside the range of the police officers. On the same day, members of the same paramilitary detachment again approached police officers belonging to SJB Milići. The paramilitaries asked where they could “blow up thirty Ustaša” so as to avoid “wasting ammunition.” The police officers told the paramilitaries that they could not do this. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter the police heard shots. The paramilitaries had proceeded to shoot 25 Muslims.
826. In filing the above report, the chief of SJB Milići stated that “members of Public Security Station Milići could not protect the people because the ‘Vukovar detachment’ was accompanied by an armoured assault vehicle and 10 members of said detachment.”¹⁴²⁴ By contrast, the police officers had only “infantry weaponry.” In a later incident, in July 1992, the police did succeed in removing another paramilitary formation from the territory of Milići. The chief of SJB Milići assessed that the police officers had acted both times to the best of their abilities.
827. On 14 August 1992, SJB Rogatica reported to CSB Sarajevo that there were no problems with paramilitary organizations in Rogatica.¹⁴²⁵ “All groups of volunteers which

¹⁴²⁰ CSB Trebinje, “Information on the Work and Current Problems of CSB Trebinje,” September 1992 (0074-1262-0074-1278). This report was filed on 17 September 1992. CSB Trebinje to RS MUP, 17 September 1992 (0074-9783-0074-9784).

¹⁴²¹ SJB Sanski Most to CSB Banja Luka, 5 August 1992 (0047-8745-0047-8746).

¹⁴²² CSB Banja Luka to chiefs of all CSBs, 18 August 1992 (P004-3045-P004-3045).

¹⁴²³ SJB Milići to CSB Sarajevo, 3 August 1992 (0360-9769-0360-9770).

¹⁴²⁴ SJB Milići to CSB Sarajevo, 3 August 1992 (0360-9769-0360-9770).

¹⁴²⁵ SJB Rogatica to CSB Sarajevo, 14 August 1992 (0360-9408-0360-9409).

have crossed through our territory and stayed on it have been put under the command of the staff of the Rogatica Brigade” of the VRS.

828. As of August 1992, there could not be said to be a unified RS MUP stance towards Bosnian Serb paramilitary organizations. Although the Ministry had adopted an overtly negative and condemnatory stance towards these organizations and their activities, prominent members of the Ministry continued to co-operate selectively with these organizations without suffering disciplinary consequences.¹⁴²⁶ On 5 August 1992, the Chief of SJB Ilidža, Tomislav Kovač, sent an angry report to Minister Mićo Stanišić personally attacking the lack of courage and commitment shown by VRS units at Ilidža.¹⁴²⁷ Kovač noted that these extenuating circumstances had led him to rely on “Serbian volunteers,” as he had indeed done since the outbreak of the war.¹⁴²⁸ Kovač attached a list of the weaponry and ammunitions distributed to these “volunteers.” The following day, Kovač was promoted to Assistant Minister and Chief of the Administration for the Affairs and Tasks of the Police.¹⁴²⁹

829. On 17 August 1992, CSB Sarajevo reported success in subduing paramilitary activity in the Centre’s area of jurisdiction.¹⁴³⁰ This was done in cooperation with the RS MUP’s Police Detachment. It was noted that reserve police personnel had participated illegally in a number of these paramilitary formations. As of mid-August, CSB Trebinje reported that some paramilitary groups remained active in Bosnian Serb-controlled parts of Herzegovina.¹⁴³¹ The police also observed that these groups were involved in power struggles in the region. On 8 September 1992, CSB Sarajevo stated that paramilitaries, including some from Serbia, were still active in Bratunac municipality. “The Public Security Station is working on the dissolution of such formations using their forces and with the assistance of the military and civilian authorities in order to put them under the command of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska.”¹⁴³²

830. On 10 September 1992, SJB Sarajevo Centre reported on an incident involving members of a “Chetnik organization.”¹⁴³³ The SJB suggested that the negative consequences of this incident were such that the hospitality that had hitherto been

¹⁴²⁶ See RS MUP’s report on the attempt to disband paramilitary organizations or integrate them into the unified command of the RS armed forces. RS MUP, Administration for the Affairs and Tasks of the Police, 3 August 1992 (0296-9730-0296-9735; N.B. This is a fragment of the complete report.). See also, on the same topic, RS MUP, Administration for the Affairs and Tasks of the Police to RS Minister of Internal Affairs, 10 August 1992 (0296-9622-0296-9624) and CSB Sarajevo, “Report on Work for the Period from July to September 1992,” October 1992 (0297-0877-0297-0883).

¹⁴²⁷ SJB Ilidža dispatch to Minister Mićo Stanišić, 5 August 1992 (0323-8499-0323-8505).

¹⁴²⁸ Most likely, these “Serbian volunteers” included units led by Željko Ražnatović “Arkan.” In an interview given in March 1996, Kovač told of inviting Arkan’s forces to Ilidža in 1992. Interview with Tomislav Kovač in *Intervju*, 1 March 1996 (0216-1686-0216-1691).

¹⁴²⁹ Decision of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 6 August 1992 (FI20-0595-FI20-0595).

¹⁴³⁰ CSB Sarajevo, “Evaluation of Political-Security Situation and the Work of the Centre for the Period from 1 July to 15 August 1992,” 17 August 1992 (0074-9687-0074-9700).

¹⁴³¹ CSB Trebinje, “Evaluation of Political-Security Situation on the Territory of CSB Trebinje,” 19 August 1992 (0074-9651-0074-9663).

¹⁴³² CSB Sarajevo, 8 September 1992 (0296-9107-0296-9110).

¹⁴³³ SJB Sarajevo Centre to CSB Sarajevo, 10 September 1992 (0324-2034-0324-2035).

extended to the Chetniks should now be withdrawn. Approximately a month later, CSB Bijeljina noted that armed members of the Serbian Radical Party had attempted to remove two tanks from a military barracks.¹⁴³⁴

831. On 21 November 1992, SJB Ilidža reported to CSB Sarajevo that members of the “Serbian Guard” and “Brne’s Chetniks” had stopped and mistreated a convoy of Croats going from Sarajevo to Split.¹⁴³⁵ This included the interference with the work and threatening of SJB Ilidža personnel. On 23 November 1992, CSB Sarajevo forwarded this complaint to the Command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS.¹⁴³⁶

832. Indications exist that leading RS officials were still concerned by paramilitary activities at the end of 1992. In November 1992, a report from CSB Sarajevo stated that paramilitary formations had presented a “potential danger for the complete organization and discipline in the Serbian military and police” since their initial appearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the outset of the war, these formations had enjoyed “informal legitimacy” with the regular military. With time, however, the paramilitaries “became strong and independent and presented a hindrance and a real object of derision in the overall front of the organization of Serbian forces.”¹⁴³⁷ At a 20 December 1992 meeting of the Supreme Command of the VRS, which Minister Mićo Stanišić also attended, he emphasised the need for all “paragroups” to be put under unified command.¹⁴³⁸

10. The 1992 RS MUP Draft Annual Report

833. In January 1993, the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs produced a report on its activities for presentation to the RS Government.¹⁴³⁹ This report touched on virtually all important aspects of the Ministry’s work from its establishment in April 1992 until the end of the year, and in several locations also included information on activities by Serbian

¹⁴³⁴ CSB Bijeljina dispatch, 7 October 1992 (0323-8178-0323-8178).

¹⁴³⁵ SJB Ilidža to CSB Sarajevo, 21 November 1992 (0339-2156-0339-2156).

¹⁴³⁶ CSB Sarajevo to Command of Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, 23 November 1992 (0339-2155-0339-2155).

¹⁴³⁷ CSB Sarajevo, “Some Political-Security Aspects on the Territory of the Romanija-Birač Centre of Security,” 15 November 1992 (0297-0981-0297-0984).

¹⁴³⁸ Minutes of Meeting of Supreme Command of the VRS, 20 December 1992 (0084-5021-0084-5025).

¹⁴³⁹ Draft RS MUP Annual Report for 1992, January 1993 (FI20-1276-FI20-1319). This draft was presented by the Administration of Analytical-Informational Matters to the RS MUP Steering Council at its following session. It was then submitted to the Government. The introduction to the draft report observed that all administrations of RS MUP would have a final opportunity to review the report, “especially with regard to that which is missing or incomplete.” The incomplete or missing parts included “the report on the work of the Special Brigade,” as well as information on the number of employees at the end of 1992 and numbers of missing vehicles. In an interview given to *Ekstra Magazin* during his tenure as Director of the RS Bureau in Belgrade (i.e. after mid-January 1993), Momčilo Mandić stated that the RS MUP 1992 Annual Report was the only ministerial annual report accepted without reservations. Undated interview with Momčilo Mandić, *Ekstra Magazin* (0208-3700-0208-3701).

police officers in the SRBiH MUP in 1991 and early 1992. As such, an examination of this report marks a fitting point of conclusion for the present analysis of the RS MUP.¹⁴⁴⁰

834. At the outset of the RS MUP Annual Report, several general observations were made. Most importantly, it was observed that “since the very beginning of the war, almost the entire available personnel of the organs for internal affairs have been involved in war activities for the liberation of occupied territories and the protection of liberated Serbian territories. This, in good measure, also persists today.” The RS MUP, and in particular its special police units, had made a “significant contribution in the struggle of the Serb nation.”
835. The first part of the report dealt with the emergence of the RS MUP and its participation in combat activities. All parts of the Ministry, “from the Ministry at its seat to the Security Services Centres and the Public Security Stations,” had participated in these activities. In some areas, the police had been almost constantly engaged in combat. The monthly average of combat activities by RS MUP employees spoke for itself: “14,700 police officers, with over 300,000 man-days participation in combat activities, or 1,451 police officers, on average, every day.” Of all the CSBs, CSB Banja Luka had the greatest participation in combat – 29% of the total. The police from CSB Banja Luka participated “on almost all battlefields of Republika Srpska.” As a result of requests from other government offices, the RS MUP had put 6,167 police officers at the disposal of the VRS, most of them reserve police officers. Excluding casualties at the seat of the Ministry, 297 employees of the RS MUP had died in combat, “which means that every day at least one police officer died.” 776 employees were wounded.
836. The report treated the developments in each region – corresponding to each CSB – in turn. In the “Banja Luka region,” the police went about the task of disarming groups, “joining the Army of Republika Srpska when this proved necessary.” The forces of CSB Banja Luka and the VRS cooperated in the “crushing of the armed resistance of the Muslim-Croat forces.” With the formation of an independent police brigade in November, members of CSB Banja Luka participated in combat actions as far afield as Rajlovac and Orašje. “In addition to participating in armed conflict on the frontlines, the police directly carried out a cleansing [*čišćenje*] of the terrain of the remaining enemy groups and individuals.”
837. The 1992 RS MUP Annual Report described significant and concrete efforts made by Bosnian Serb employees in the SRBiH MUP to undermine that Ministry. These activities included recruitment of Serbian employees of the SRBiH MUP to work on the “illegal organization of Serbian MUP,” as well as “the illegal arming of confirmed active employees for work in Serbian MUP.” In some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs had, with assistance from Serbs in SRBiH MUP, been “illegally” armed in municipalities controlled by the SDS.¹⁴⁴¹ Moreover, unilateral actions by Serbs in the SRBiH MUP went beyond the

¹⁴⁴⁰ Unless otherwise noted, all quotes in this section are from the Draft RS MUP Annual Report for 1992, January 1993 (FI20-1276-FI20-1319).

¹⁴⁴¹ Compare with the language used on cooperation between the SDS and the RS MUP in the annual (April – December 1992) report of CSB Sarajevo produced in January 1993 (0297-0890-0297-0902). “In the organization of the SDS, the bearer of the activities and means for the liberation of the Serb

illegal distribution of weapons. "It is necessary to emphasise that already in October 1991 all SJBs from the territory of Eastern Herzegovina put more than half of their police reserve forces at the disposal of the JNA without the approval of the then SRBiH MUP. A special police unit of SAO Herzegovina was sent to the Dubrovnik battlefield. It later took part in actions in Čapljina and Mostar municipalities." All of this contributed to the "preparation for the final division" of the SRBiH MUP.¹⁴⁴²

838. According to the report, the final act of the preparation for the establishment of the RS MUP had been "the sending of a dispatch to all personnel with the decision to work in Serbian MUP (at the end of March), the preparation of the Law on Internal Affairs and its passage at the Assembly of the Serbian People (mid-March), the division of the special unit, the liberation of the school at Vraca, etc."
839. A separate section of the report described the work of the National Security Service. In addition to lauding the Service's intelligence and counter-intelligence work, the report highlighted the cooperation between the National Security Service and the VRS's intelligence service. However, the report also noted that the SNB had been the object of suspicion and resentment.
840. In analysing the past eight months of the Public Security Service, the report admitted that crime had risen dramatically with the outbreak of war. The report made frank mention of large-scale theft, plunder and "war profiteering." Armed and organised groups often carried out these criminal acts. "Uniformed persons" also appeared in the ranks of the criminals, above all paramilitary groups "but also military reservists and police reservists." "Individual criminals even made use of camouflage uniforms with insignia of the VRS and the police." The police had worked to disarm paramilitary formations.
841. The report stated that financial crime had increased substantially.
842. Finally, the report observed that crimes had been committed against "humanity and international law." 101 such criminal acts had been registered, and 93 criminal complaints had been filed against 321 persons, but the report surmised that the number of such crimes was far higher. No details on these persons or on these acts was contained in the report. The state of documentation on such crimes was characterised as "unsatisfactory." However, the report asserted that a steady stream of requests for investigations into war crimes was emanating from the Ministry.
843. The report observed that occasionally poor communications, exacerbated by the war, had combined with a lack of qualified personnel to impede reporting within the

nation, the organs of internal affairs, so to say, first entered into the battle of the Serb nation for liberation." See also Branko Simić, at the 19th RS Assembly Session, 12 August 1992 (0410-2021-0410-2099, at 0410-2059), where he states that Momčilo Mandić helped to arm Serbs in Herzegovina in early 1991."

¹⁴⁴² See also CSB Trebinje, "Report on the Work of CSB Trebinje for the Period from 4 April to 31 December 1992," 13 January 1993 (0297-1649-0297-1653); Executive Board of SDA Nevesinje, 16 July 1991 (SA02-0588-SA02-0589).

Ministry. Nonetheless, an abundance of internal and external reports related to internal affairs and the security situation had been produced. These included approximately 150 issues of the “Bulletin of Daily Events.” In addition, the President of the Government had received over 90 different documents, and the President and the members of the Presidency had received more than 80 documents in the course of the past 8 months. Regulations and rules on reporting, internal organization of the Ministry and disciplinary responsibility had been promulgated.

844. In discussing the personnel situation in the Ministry, the annual report emphasised that “Serbian patriotism and professionalism” had been the main governing criteria in the implementation of personnel policy. The fluctuation in personnel had been considerable. A total of 210 employees had been dismissed from the RS MUP, and 29 of them faced criminal charges, while 59 individuals were suspended. At CSB Banja Luka, 59 employees of the special police had been fired because of their refusal to engage in combat outside their region.

845. With regards to the special police units in the RS MUP, a centralisation had been accomplished. The CSB special units were dissolved in favour of the formation of a “stronger, unified unit.”

11. Significant Developments in the RS MUP after 1992

846. On 20 January 1993, a new RS government was formed under Vladimir Lukić.¹⁴⁴³ Ratko Adžić replaced Mićo Stanišić as the RS Minister of Internal Affairs.¹⁴⁴⁴

847. On 30 December 1993, Mićo Stanišić was again appointed as the RS Minister of Internal Affairs.¹⁴⁴⁵ On the same day, Živko Rakić was appointed as the RS Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs.¹⁴⁴⁶

848. On the same day, a Law on the Changes and the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs was promulgated in the RS.¹⁴⁴⁷ This law changed key terminology in the RS MUP. In particular, and as noted previously, the SNB was renamed as the RDB of the RS MUP, harmonizing it with the terminology used in MUP Serbia. Also, as in Serbia, CRDBs were established, separating the CSBs into CRDBs and CJBs, thereby separating to a greater extent public security from state security.

¹⁴⁴³ Decision on the Appointment of the President of the Government, 20 January 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/1, 24 February 1993 (0089-7316-0089-7317, at 0089-7317).

¹⁴⁴⁴ Decision on the Election of the Members of the Government, 20 January 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/1, 24 February 1993 (0089-7316-0089-7317, at 0089-7317).

¹⁴⁴⁵ Decision on the Election of a Member of the Government, 30 December 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/26, 30 December 1993 (0353-7940-0353-7991, at 0353-7965).

¹⁴⁴⁶ Decision on the Election of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, 30 December 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/26, 30 December 1993 (0353-7940-0353-7991, at 0353-7965).

¹⁴⁴⁷ Law on the Changes and the Amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs, 30 December 1993, published in *SGRSrp*, No. II/27, 31 December 1993 (0354-1153-0354-1215, at 0354-1214-0354-1215).

849. On 18 August 1994, Dušan Kozić was appointed as the next president of the RS government.¹⁴⁴⁸ In the new government, Živko Rakić was appointed as minister of internal affairs.¹⁴⁴⁹
850. On 29 November 1994, the RS National Assembly passed a Law on the Application of the Law on Internal Affairs During a Time of Imminent Threat of War or State of War.¹⁴⁵⁰
851. On 30 September 1995, Dušan Kozić appointed Tomislav Kovač as minister of internal affairs.¹⁴⁵¹
852. In November 1994, the former head of the RS MUP SNB, Slobodan Škipina, spoke to the chief of the Department of the RDB at Šabac.¹⁴⁵² Škipina informed about a recent meeting of the leadership of the RS MUP RDB attended by Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik. According to Škipina, these two had
- severely attacked the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and the State Security Service of Serbia for interfering in the work of the State Security Service of Republika Srpska. They demanded and ordered that the minister cut all ties and contacts with members of the State Security of the Republic of Serbia, and that all leaders of the Service who are predisposed to or who are connected to the State Security Service of Serbia be immediately replaced. All members of this Service [of the RS MUP] who are known as Milošević's men [*Miloševićevci*] should also be replaced.¹⁴⁵³
853. According to Škipina, nine top officials of the RS MUP RDB, including chief of the RDB Dragan Kijac, resigned. However, the available documentation from the RS MUP suggests that Kijac in fact remained in his position. Škipina further stated Karadžić and Krajišnik continued to support the "war option ... regardless of the pressure of the international community."¹⁴⁵⁴ The report closed by stating that the monitoring of the situation in the RS would continue.
854. MUP Serbia also lent assistance to the VRS. From Ratko Mladić's diary, it appears that in 1993 several meetings took place between top officials from both Republika Srpska and Serbia. On 2 July 1993, General Ratko Mladić met at Mali Zvornik in Serbia with Nikola Šainović, Radovan Stojičić "Badža," FNU – presumably Jovica – STANIŠIĆ, Radovan

¹⁴⁴⁸ Decision on the Appointment of the President of the Government, 18 August 1994, published in *SGRSrp*, No. III/22, 1 September 1994 (0354-1893-0354-1956, at 0354-1893).

¹⁴⁴⁹ Decision on the Appointment of the Members of the Government, 18 August 1994, published in *SGRSrp*, No. III/22, 1 September 1994 (0354-1893-0354-1956, at 0354-1893).

¹⁴⁵⁰ Law on the Application of the Law on Internal Affairs During a Time of Imminent Threat of War or State of War, 24 November 1994, published in *SGRSrp*, Special Edition, 29 November 1994 (0049-7361-0049-7363).

¹⁴⁵¹ Decision on the Appointment of the Minister of Internal Affairs, 30 September 1995, published in *SGRSrp*, No. IV/19, 2 October 1995 (0355-2166-0355-2185, at 0355-2182).

¹⁴⁵² CRDB Valjevo, Official Note, 7 November 1994 (Y036-3525-Y036-3529).

¹⁴⁵³ CRDB Valjevo, Official Note, 7 November 1994 (Y036-3525-Y036-3529, at Y036-3525).

¹⁴⁵⁴ CRDB Valjevo, Official Note, 7 November 1994 (Y036-3525-Y036-3529, at Y036-3526).

Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik. At the meeting, Mladić was told that he could request “the greater part of what we need” through MUP Serbia.¹⁴⁵⁵

855. In November 1993, the RS MUP on the day of its patron saint honoured top officials of the RS MUP, the RSK MUP, and MUP Serbia, including Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Radovan Stojičić.¹⁴⁵⁶
856. At a meeting in Belgrade in December 1993 held at the initiative of the RS, Slobodan Milošević, Momčilo Perišić, Zoran Sokolović, Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Radovan Stojičić, Milan Tepavčević and Mile Mrkšić were present on behalf of Serbia. Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, Ratko Mladić, Milovan Milovanović, Đukić, Miletić, Marić, Salapura, Mićo Stanišić and Tomislav Kovač were present from the RS.¹⁴⁵⁷
857. An undated list of recipients of letters of thanks from the RS MUP – most likely from the end of 1993 – includes Franko SIMATOVIĆ, Milan Prodanić, Radojica Božović, Milan Tepavčević, Radoslav Kostić and Petar Mihajlović.¹⁴⁵⁸

12. The Cooperation of the RS MUP with Authorities of the S(F)RJ and Serbia

858. From at least July 1991 the Bosnian Serbs in the SRBiH MUP collaborated with MUP Serbia in arming the Serbian people on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “In July 1991 [Predrag Radulović] was appointed as the SNB [*sic*] Banja Luka liaison officer to the MUP of Serbia. In that function, aside from collecting intelligence and counterintelligence data on enemy armed forces and intelligence services, he also helped with the arming of the Serbian people on the broader territory of the then-BiH and Slavonia. Collaboration with the MUP of Serbia was judged to be a professional and mutual requirement at that time.”¹⁴⁵⁹ Radulović’s role was mentioned in April 1994 in an official note of the RDB of Serbia.¹⁴⁶⁰
859. Intercepted telephone conversations from 1991 show that Jovica STANIŠIĆ communicated directly with Bosnian Serb leaders including Radovan Karadžić.¹⁴⁶¹ In

¹⁴⁵⁵ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 2 July 1993 (J000-1975-J000-1978, at J000-1976).

¹⁴⁵⁶ “Sretna ti slava, policijo,” *Sarajevske Srpske Novine*, 1 December 1993 (0223-0469-0223-0469).

¹⁴⁵⁷ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 13 December 1993 (J000-4265-J000-4273).

¹⁴⁵⁸ List of Recipients of Letters of Thanks from the RS MUP, undated (0324-5887-0324-5887).

¹⁴⁵⁹ CSB Banja Luka SNB Sector to Undersecretary of SNB, 20 October 1993 (B008-2878-B008-2879). On cooperation between MUP Serbia and the nascent Bosnian Serb MUP in the prewar period, see also CSB Banja Luka, SNB Sector, 21 June 1993 (B008-4259-B008-4263).

¹⁴⁶⁰ MUP Serbia RDB, Eighth Administration, Official Note, 22 April 1994 (0608-3871-0608-3873).

¹⁴⁶¹ Transcript of telephone conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ include: 8 August 1991 (0322-5702-0322-5705 and 0322-5727-0322-5733), 8 September 1991 (0206-6190-0206-6192), 28 November 1991 (0323-7043-0323-7045), 29 November 1991 (0092-3730-0092-3731); 14 December 1991 (0206-6270-0206-6274), 17 December 1991 (0212-9217-0212-9220), 21 December 1991 (0206-6275-0206-6279), 29 December 1991 (0324-4477-0324-4479), 5 January 1992 (0206-6280-0206-6283 and 0206-6284-0206-6288), 6 January 1992 (0206-6289-0206-6290 and 0206-6291-0206-6292), 7 January 1992 (0324-4664-0324-4670), 8 January 1992 (0206-6293-

these conversations, Karadžić briefed STANIŠIĆ on the political situation and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also solicited advice from STANIŠIĆ. In late November 1991, STANIŠIĆ referred to “Frenki” and the “Captain,” expressing the hope that they would have an opportunity to cooperate with Karadžić.¹⁴⁶² On 28 January 1992, Karadžić spoke with Mihalj Kertes and Franko SIMATOVIĆ in addition to STANIŠIĆ.¹⁴⁶³ Slobodan Milošević also spoke frequently with Radovan Karadžić.¹⁴⁶⁴

860. The SDB of MUP Serbia in 1991 assisted the SDS with radio communications.¹⁴⁶⁵

861. In plans for the division of the SRBiH MUP, the Bosnian Serbs specifically contemplated support from organs of the Federation and Serbia, including the JNA, the SSUP, and the MUP of Serbia.¹⁴⁶⁶ The Bosnian Serb leadership anticipated that the SDA

0206-6297), 12 January 1992 (0324-4968-0324-4976), 22 January 1992 (0324-5065-0324-5068 and 0324-5069-0324-5080), 25 January 1992 (0324-5140-0324-5142), 28 January 1992 (0324-5206-0324-5210).

¹⁴⁶² Transcript of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 29 November 1991 (0092-3730-0092-3731).

¹⁴⁶³ Transcript of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Mihalj Kertes and Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 28 January 1992 (0211-6588-0211-6594).

¹⁴⁶⁴ Transcripts of telephone conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević include: 29 May 1991 (0212-8389-0212-8391), 4 June 1991 (0212-8400-0212-8405 and 0212-8406-0212-8407), 11 June 1991 (0212-8409-0212-8411), 12 June 1991 (0212-8412-0212-8419), 28 June 1991 (0212-8459-0212-8465), 1 July 1991 (0212-8468-0212-8471), 8 July 1991 (0212-8474-0212-8478), 9 July 1991 (0206-6204-0206-6207 and 0212-8491-0212-8492), 17 July 1991 (0212-8420-0212-8423), 26 July 1991 (0212-8479-0212-8485), 29 July 1991 (0212-8552-0212-8554), 31 July 1991 (0212-8559-0212-8568), 6 August 1991 (0212-8569-0212-8574), 7 August 1991 (0212-8575-0212-8579), 9 August 1991 (0212-8580-0212-8590), 9 September 1991 (0206-6173-0206-6176), 10 September 1991 (0206-6177-0206-6180 and 0212-8685-0212-8688), 13 September 1991 (0212-8695-0212-8696), 18 September 1991 (0212-8719-0212-8720), 19 September 1991 (0212-8721-0212-8725, 0212-8729-0212-8733 and 0212-8734-0212-8736), 20 September 1991 (0212-8739-0212-8741 and 0212-8742-0212-8742), 23 September 1991 (0212-8752-0212-8757 and 0212-8746-0212-8751), 24 September 1991 (0212-8762-0212-8771), 8 October 1991 (0212-8904-0212-8908), 24 October 1991 (0211-6674-0211-6679), 26 October 1991 (0211-6665-0211-6668), 29 October 1991 (0212-9037-0212-9043 and 0212-9044-0212-9047), 1 November 1991 (0212-9067-0212-9073), 11 November 1991 (0206-6164-0206-6166), 14 November 1991 (0212-9109-0212-9111), 15 November 1991 (0212-9112-0212-9114 and 0212-9164-0212-9166), 18 November 1991 (0212-9141-0212-9143), 22 November 1991 (0212-9159-0212-9163), 26 November 1991 (0212-9167-0212-9169), 4 December 1991 (0212-9177-0212-9182), 11 December 1991 (0212-9200-0212-9201), 20 December 1991 (0206-6246-0206-6249 and 0206-6168-0206-6169), 25 December 1991 (0206-6198-0206-6201), 30 December 1991 (0212-9238-0212-9240), 5 January 1992 (0212-9250-0212-9254), 6 January 1992 (0212-9270-0212-9273), 15 January 1992 (0212-9285-0212-9288), 10 February 1992 (0212-9404-0212-9406 and 0212-9407-0212-9408). See also transcripts of telephone conversations between Radovan Karadžić and Mihalj Kertes, 24 June 1991 (0212-8448-0212-8450 and 0212-8441-0212-8447), 28 January 1992 (0211-6588-0211-6594), and transcript of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić, Mihalj Kertes and Franko SIMATOVIĆ, 28 January 1992 (0212-9382-0212-9388).

¹⁴⁶⁵ Statement of Nebojša Savić, 9 September 1992 (0372-0699-0372-0711, at 0372-0701).

¹⁴⁶⁶ Undated paper, “Possibilities of Decentralising Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (0323-7660-0323-7668).

and the HDZ would have a “tumultuous and energetic reaction” to any attempt to decentralize or divide internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs realised that they would, in the initial phase of operations of a Bosnian Serb MUP, be heavily dependent on “federal institutions.” In preparations for the split of the MUP, the Bosnian Serbs thought that it was “necessary to establish contact regarding this question, and with a view to concrete measures and possibilities for their assistance with personnel and equipment.”¹⁴⁶⁷ Furthermore, it was contemplated that direct action by the federal security forces would need to be ordered by the Federal Presidency. It was expected that the JNA and the SSUP would provide material and personnel support as long as security conditions did not allow for the new Bosnian Serb MUP to operate and exist independently. Ultimately, it was contemplated that this support would enable the establishment of Serbian security forces.

862. The Bosnian Serbs knew that an armed conflict was likely during the initial phase of the existence of Bosnian Serb MUP. In order to emerge victorious, the Bosnian Serbs felt that they would have to rely on assistance from Serbia.

Namely, in that manner, the Serbian security services and the JNA will help each other mutually. This is above all the case with respect to mutual implementation of tasks, planning and the execution of joint actions, joint division of labour, the use of the means of communications of the JNA, and other things.¹⁴⁶⁸

863. The RS Ministry of Internal Affairs coordinated and cooperated with SFRJ forces and forces of the Republic of Serbia in the take-over of power and maintenance of power on the territories claimed by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reports prepared by the Federal State Security Service in March 1992 confirm that there was a formal plan for cooperation between the Federal SUP and the Bosnian Serb police in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Petar Mihajlović was appointed the co-ordinator for this operation. This co-ordination plan included the deployment of members of the MUP Serbia and the Federal SUP in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴⁶⁹ On 6 March 1992, the source “Miloš” wrote to ensure that weapons and explosives could be provided, noting that this had been regulated by MUP Serbia.¹⁴⁷⁰ After April 1992, the RS MUP received weapons and other equipment from the SSUP and other sources in Serbia and the SRJ, though there were apparently also some constraints due to international sanctions.¹⁴⁷¹

¹⁴⁶⁷ Undated paper, “Possibilities of Decentralising Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (0323-7660-0323-7668).

¹⁴⁶⁸ Undated paper, “Possibilities of Decentralising Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (0323-7660-0323-7668).

¹⁴⁶⁹ Reports of SDB SSUP, dated 3 March 1992 and 23 March 1992 (B003-1426-B003-B003-1452).

¹⁴⁷⁰ Dispatch of “Miloš,” 6 March 1992 (B008-0533-B008-0533). See also dispatches of “Miloš,” 13 April 1992 (0087-6125-0087-5125); 24 April 1992 (B008-0477-B008-0477).

¹⁴⁷¹ Letter from TO Commander of Skelani Municipality to RS MUP, 26 May 1992 (0216-6864-0216-6864); SSUP, Letter, 6 May 1992 (FI20-0613-FI20-0614); Receipt from company Pandur, 4 August 1992 (FI20-1685-FI20-1685); RS MUP Official Note, 14 December 1992 (FI20-1344-FI20-1344); Agrocentar Prnjavor, Letter, 16 December 1992 (B003-8630-B003-8630); National Bank of Yugoslavia, Receipts, 19 October 1992 (FI20-1481-FI20-1482); 24 November 1992 (FI20-1486-FI20-1487); 27 November 1992 (FI20-1483-FI20-1485); Letter of Branko Đerić, 31 October 1992 (FI20-1527-FI20-1527).

864. After the outbreak of armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperation continued between the newly founded RS MUP on one hand, and the SSUP and MUP Serbia on the other hand. At the aforementioned RS MUP meeting in Belgrade in July 1992, where paramilitary formations, the operation of detention facilities by the RS MUP, and criminal activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina including war crimes were discussed, Petar Mihajlović attended in his capacity as a coordinator of the SSUP.¹⁴⁷²
865. On 15 April 1992, the RS established a political and economic representation office in Belgrade.¹⁴⁷³
866. On 18 April 1992, the RS MUP Under-Secretary for Public Security, Čedomir Kljajić, spoke with Petar Mihajlović of the SSUP. In that conversation, Mihajlović confirmed that military equipment from the Institute of Security in Belgrade, originally ordered in February 1992 for the SRBiH MUP by then Assistant Minister Momčilo Mandić, would be sent to the RS MUP. Mihajlović further claimed that an agreement had been reached with the Federal and Serbian Ministers of Internal Affairs on how to handle cooperation with the RS MUP.¹⁴⁷⁴ The equipment from the Institute of Security was invoiced and sent on 30 April 1992.¹⁴⁷⁵
867. In May 1992, the RS MUP received assistance from a SSUP unit commanded by Milorad (Mićo) Davidović. On 17 May 1992, Milorad Davidović and Mićo Stanišić discussed their cooperation.¹⁴⁷⁶ Two days later, on 19 May, Petar Gračanin and Mićo Stanišić spoke about Davidović's unit.¹⁴⁷⁷
868. In June 1992, the commander of the Eastern Bosnia Corps of the VRS, Colonel Dragutin Ilić wrote to the Main Staff of the VRS regarding problems with the centre for the training of soldiers for special purposes located in the village of Divič in Zvornik municipality.¹⁴⁷⁸ Colonel Ilić noted that the centre was operating under the supervision of Captain Dragan who claimed to have the support of RS President Karadžić and other

¹⁴⁷² Short review of work of RS MUP with suggestions for future work - report based on meeting of leading RS MUP officials on 11 July 1992 (0324-1848-0324-1879).

¹⁴⁷³ Decision on the Establishment of a Political and Economic Representation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade, 15 April 1992 (0124-5632-0124-5632).

¹⁴⁷⁴ Telephone conversation between Čedomir Kljajić and Petar Mihajlović, 18 April 1992 (0322-0229-0322-0233). Receipts for military equipment received by RS MUP from the Institute of Security, 30 April 1992 (FI20-1655-FI20-1659); Receipt for Land Rover from SSUP Belgrade, 14 May 1992 (FI20-0630-FI20-0630); Receipt for fuel from Belgrade to MUP School at Vraca, 14 May 1992 (FI20-0634-FI20-0634); RS MUP registering Ladas bought in Belgrade, 22 July 1992 (FI20-1515-FI20-1516); RS NSC report on transfer of weapons from Pančevo to Sarajevo, 14 May 1992 (0124-5313-0124-5314).

¹⁴⁷⁵ Invoice from Institute of Security in Belgrade, 30 April 1992 (FI20-1655-FI20-1659).

¹⁴⁷⁶ Conversation between Mićo Davidović and Mićo Stanišić, 17 May 1992 (0322-0093-0322-0095).

¹⁴⁷⁷ Conversation between Petar Gračanin and Mićo Stanišić, 19 May 1992 (0212-9514-0212-9519).

¹⁴⁷⁸ Command of Eastern Bosnia Corps to VRS Main Staff, 7 June 1992 (0366-0300-0366-0300).

ministers in the government of Republika Srpska. The centre was disbanded in July 1992.¹⁴⁷⁹

869. The irregularities and security problems observed by the RS MUP in Bijeljina, Zvornik and Brčko in the summer of 1992 were significant enough to require external assistance. On 27 June 1992, the SSUP in Belgrade dispatched a group of 17 police officers led by Milorad Davidović to assist the RS MUP.¹⁴⁸⁰ The report filed on their work described the situation in the Bijeljina area as one of widespread crime, including killings, rapes and theft in an environment of “the abuse and terrorization of the population without regard to national affiliation.” Paramilitary formations presented “one of the most substantial problems,” even though these had “partially participated in the liberation of these areas.”¹⁴⁸¹ One of these paramilitary formations, the SDG, had taken control of the SJB in Bijeljina, and another, affiliated with “Captain Dragan,” had taken control of the SJB in Brčko. The SSUP representatives reported that the activities of the paramilitary organizations took place at least in some cases with assistance from the local police. Upon the arrival of the team from the SSUP, they were joined by “an expert team” from the RS MUP. Together, they worked to stabilize and normalize the situation in Bijeljina, Brčko and Zvornik. On several occasions, Davidović and chief inspector Dragan Andan of the RS MUP were threatened by the paramilitary formations with physical liquidation. Some of the members of these paramilitary formations purported to be employees of the MUP of Serbia.

870. During the first months of the operation of RS MUP, some portions of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs could only be reached through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was the case for SJB Skelani, located in eastern Bosnia. An inspection report on the functioning of SJB Skelani recorded cooperation between the police in Skelani and Bajina Bašta, located immediately across the Drina river in Serbia.¹⁴⁸²

871. Assistance from, and cooperation with, MUP Serbia was expected at the municipal level in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the summer of 1992, a report on the state of affairs at SJB Brčko stated that efforts would be made to increase cooperation with “Military Security, neighbouring SJBs and MUP Serbia.”¹⁴⁸³ A similar position was held by the police at SJB Zvornik.¹⁴⁸⁴

¹⁴⁷⁹ Command of Eastern Bosnia Corps to VRS Main Staff, 5 July 1992 (0620-0789-0620-0789); Command of Zvornik Brigade to Command of Eastern Bosnian Corps, 5 July 1992 (0366-0838-0366-0838).

¹⁴⁸⁰ SSUP, Brigade of the Police, “Report on the Engagement of a Group of Employees of the Brigade of the Police of the Federal MUP to Offer Professional Assistance to the MUP of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 8 August 1992 (Y032-0317-Y032-0325). The report also noted that police from the SSUP had provided assistance to the RS MUP in combat operations in Sarajevo in the period from 16 May 1992 to 20 July 1992.

¹⁴⁸¹ SSUP, Brigade of the Police, “Report on the Engagement of a Group of Employees of the Brigade of the Police of the Federal MUP to Offer Professional Assistance to the MUP of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 8 August 1992 (Y032-0317-Y032-0325, at Y032-3018).

¹⁴⁸² CSB Sarajevo, Report on SJB Skelani, 20 November 1992 (0296-9093-0296-9095).

¹⁴⁸³ Undated report of SJB Brčko, probably June 1992 (0324-1559-0324-1560).

¹⁴⁸⁴ Undated report of SJB Zvornik (0074-9761-0074-9764).

872. Operational information was exchanged between RS MUP and police authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In October 1992, the quarterly report of RS MUP SNB observed that information pertaining to state security had been shared regularly with the State Security Service of MUP of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the State Security Services of the MUPs of Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁴⁸⁵ At the 34th Session of the RS Assembly, which lasted from 27 August until 1 October 1993, Dragan Kijac, the head of the RS MUP SNB, stated that the SNB regularly exchanged information with MUP Serbia, including the RDB. In the course of eight months in 1993, the SNB had provided the RDB with 295 written pieces of information.¹⁴⁸⁶
873. On 24 June 1992, SJB Zvornik wrote to the Republican Command of the TO of Serbia requesting equipment.¹⁴⁸⁷ The list of equipment requested included weaponry, two armoured assault vehicles and standard police equipment. In directing his request to the TO of Serbia, the chief of SJB Marinko Vasilović wrote that his SJB had previously received assistance from MUP Serbia.
874. In August 1992, SNB Under-Secretary Dragan Kijac issued instructions on communications with SSUP, MUP Serbia and MUP Montenegro.¹⁴⁸⁸ Kijac forbade SNB officials at the regional or the municipal level from contacting the SSUP, MUP Serbia or MUP Montenegro directly. All such communication had to pass through the RS MUP.
875. Operational information was exchanged between the RS MUP and police authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In October 1992, the quarterly report of RS MUP SNB observed that information pertaining to state security had been shared regularly with the State Security Service of MUP of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the State Security Services of Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁴⁸⁹
876. On several occasions, the Daily Bulletins produced by the RS MUP were forwarded to MUP Serbia in Belgrade.¹⁴⁹⁰ On 16 May 1992, RS MUP Minister Mićo Stanišić reminded the CSBs that they must file daily reports. Information on crimes against Serbs included in these reports would be forwarded to the SSUP.¹⁴⁹¹
877. In November 1992, Stevan Todorović, the Chief of SJB (Bosanski) Šamac was questioned by the RS MUP regarding recent events in that municipality. The report filed by the RS MUP stated that the Main Board of the SDS in Bosanski Šamac had, prior to the war, suggested that the then commander of TG-17, Stevan Nikolić, could use his SDS and other connections with MUP Serbia. This resulted in the involvement "of Dragan

¹⁴⁸⁵ RS MUP SNB, "Report on the Work of the SNB for the Third Quarter of 1992," 16 October 1992 (0370-9660-0370-9666); see also MUP Serbia, RDB Third Administration, 30 April 1992 (B004-7735-B004-7736).

¹⁴⁸⁶ Stenographic Transcript of the 34th Session of the RS Assembly, 27 August - 1 October 1993 (0215-0741-0215-1073 and 0215-0508, at 0215-0745).

¹⁴⁸⁷ SJB Zvornik to Republic Staff of the TO of Serbia, 24 June 1992 (0360-9181-0360-9181).

¹⁴⁸⁸ SNB Under-Secretary Dragan Kijac to all CSBs, August 1992 (0296-9606-0296-9606).

¹⁴⁸⁹ RS MUP SNB, "Report on the Work of the SNB for the Third Quarter of 1992," (0370-9660-0370-9666).

Đorđević called Crni and Srećko Radovanović called Debeli with a group of about 30 people from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in the conflict in the municipality.¹⁴⁹² Another 18 “volunteers” from Bosanski Šamac who had received training at Ilok joined this group. The report further indicated that several persons of Croat and Muslim nationality who were detained had been killed in the municipality during the summer of 1992, including by Slobodan Miljković “Lugar” and two other unidentified men who were in the group commanded by “Crni.”

878. Only in August was “Crni” arrested, and his group left Bosanski Šamac for Serbia shortly thereafter. However, at that point, the War Presidency of Bosanski Šamac appealed directly to MUP Serbia, with the support of the VRS, arguing that “Crni’s” group was needed to help in combat operations in Orašje municipality. MUP Serbia thereupon allowed the group of “volunteers” commanded by “Crni” to return to Bosanski Šamac, a decision that was confirmed by the Bosanski Šamac War Presidency on 4 October 1992. The RS MUP’s report stated that the cooperation between the War Presidency of Bosanski Šamac with volunteers provided by MUP Serbia was further condoned by the VRS, who had already in the summer of 1992 appointed “Crni” as the head of the Posavska Brigade of the Eastern Bosnia Corps.

879. In July 1993, Slobodan Miljković “Lugar” claimed that he had been trained by the RDB of MUP Serbia.¹⁴⁹³ In December 1993, CRDB Kragujevac proposed that Miljković be placed under operational treatment, which entailed the formalization of surveillance and other measures of the RDB against Miljković.¹⁴⁹⁴ The request of CRDB Kragujevac demonstrated an awareness that Miljković had a criminal past and that he had spent time as a paramilitary in Eastern Slavonia and Bosanski Šamac. Although CRDB Kragujevac credited Miljković for contributing to the “liberation” of Bosanski Šamac, it was noted that Miljković had removed himself and his men from the command structure of the VRS and had demonstrated negative behaviour. In Kragujevac, Miljković had also provoked incidents with local inhabitants and with the police. Miljković and his group were as of December 1993 described as being under the control of the SRS, and their possible violent or terrorist intentions towards the government in Serbia were the main reason for placing

¹⁴⁹⁰ RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 10 September 1992 (0324-1297-0324-1298); RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 11 September 1992 (0324-1289-0324-1289); RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 12 September 1992 (0324-1287-0324-1287); RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 13 September 1992 (0324-1281-0324-1281); see also RS MUP Daily Bulletin, 1 October 1992 (0323-8200-0323-8200) which was sent to MUP Serbia.

¹⁴⁹¹ Dispatch of Minister Mićo Stanišić, 16 May 1992 (0323-8855-0323-8856).

¹⁴⁹² RS MUP, “Information on the State of Affairs in SJB Bosanski Šamac, the Arrest of the Chief of the SJB by Military Organs and the Closing of the Corridor Krajina – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 19 November 1992 (0358-8617-0358-8625). See also statement of Blagoje Simić, 14 December 1992 (0057-2330-0057-2332); statement of Dragan Đorđević, 25 November 1992 (0053-2862-0053-2867); Statement of Slobodan Miljković-Lugar, undated (0063-6948-0063-6950); Judgement of the Military Court in Banja Luka, 6 February 1993 (0057-2182-0057-2200).

¹⁴⁹³ CRDB Kragujevac, Third Administration, Official Note, 20 July 1993 (Y034-5415-Y034-5421, at Y034-5415). See also MUP Serbia, Decision on Surveillance, 20 December 1993

¹⁴⁹⁴ CRDB Kragujevac, Proposal for the Introduction of Operational Treatment, 3 December 1993 (Y035-0293-Y035-0298).

him under operational treatment.¹⁴⁹⁵ In September 1993, CRDB Kragujevac had also expressed concern about indications that Miljković and his group were planning to go to Kosovo to fight against “Albanian extremists and secessionists.”¹⁴⁹⁶

880. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the VRS had “tolerated the behaviour of Slobodan Miljković and his group until October 1992, when they killed one of their [VRS] scouts and arrested and physically abused 5-6 of them. Then they forced Slobodan and his group to surrender and arrested them. Both Slobodan and the members of his group spent several months in investigative detention in the military prison in Banja Luka.”¹⁴⁹⁷
881. In May 1993 a battalion of the VRS at Skelani reported that a “unit of red berets was formed on 8 June 1992, with 20 military conscripts, and the unit was commanded by 3 instructors who had trained said unit.”¹⁴⁹⁸ The unit was identified as a unit for special purposes (JPN) of MUP Serbia, and the members of the unit had subsequently received supplementary training at Tara in Serbia before returning to Skelani. The commander of the unit was FNU (most likely Radojica) Božović.¹⁴⁹⁹ The high salaries of the members of the unit and their frequent leave taken at Tara had attracted attention in the Skelani area. The command of the battalion at VRS reported that the JPN had undoubtedly contributed to the “defence of this area,” but demanded that the unit be subordinated to the battalion.
882. In early May 1993, Colonel Vukota Vuković of TG-1 also complained to the VRS Drina Corps Command that “Frenki” and Božović were commanding a unit of “so-called red berets,” that included 57 military conscripts who, in the opinion of Vuković, should have been serving in the Skelani battalion.¹⁵⁰⁰ On 14 May 1993, the VRS Drina Corps wrote to the VRS Main Staff about the problems VRS units were encountering with respect to units of the RS MUP and MUP Serbia. According to the Drina Corps Command, “in Bratunac and in Skelani a ‘unit of special purpose’ has been created, whose officers and ‘instructors’ are members of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia.”¹⁵⁰¹ The Drina Corps Command relayed the grievances of Colonel Vuković, noting also that some soldiers had deserted military units in order to join the “red berets,” which numbered 57 military conscripts in Skelani, and about 70 in the Bratunac-Srebrenica area. Members of the MUP Serbia units received significantly higher salaries and better food and lodging than VRS soldiers. The unit in Bratunac was commanded by Mijović, who at times behaved

¹⁴⁹⁵ CRDB Kragujevac, Proposal for the Introduction of Operational Treatment, 3 December 1993 (Y035-0293-Y035-0298, at Y035-0294).

¹⁴⁹⁶ CRDB Kragujevac, Official Note, 12 September 1993 (Y035-0343-Y035-0345).

¹⁴⁹⁷ CRDB Kragujevac, Proposal for the Introduction of Operational Treatment, 3 December 1993 (Y035-0293-Y035-0298, at Y035-0294).

¹⁴⁹⁸ Independent Battalion Skelani, Report on the Establishment of a Unit of Special Purposes (Red Berets) of MUP Serbia in Skelani, 15 May 1993 (0406-7547-0406-7549, at 0406-7547). See also

¹⁴⁹⁹ Independent Battalion Skelani, Report on the Establishment of a Unit of Special Purposes (Red Berets) of MUP Serbia in Skelani, 15 May 1993 (0406-7547-0406-7549, at 0406-7547).

¹⁵⁰⁰ Report of Colonel Vukota Vuković of TG-1 to the Command of the VRS Drina Corps, 6 May 1993 (0438-2706-0438-2707).

¹⁵⁰¹ Report of the VRS Drina Corps Command, 14 May 1993 (0426-7762-0426-7764, at 0426-7762).

aggressively both towards VRS officers and towards the local civilian authorities.¹⁵⁰² This hostility culminated in an attack by Mijović's unit on SJB Bratunac on 11 May 1993.¹⁵⁰³ On 13 May 1993, General Mladić ordered that Mijović put all military conscripts as well as all volunteers from Serbia in his unit under the command of the 1st Bratunac Light Brigade.¹⁵⁰⁴ In effect, Mladić wanted to transform Mijović's unit into a sabotage detachment of the 1st Bratunac Light Brigade, integrating it into the VRS command structure and to prevent the RS MUP and MUP Serbia from circumventing the primacy of the VRS. This result appears to have been achieved.¹⁵⁰⁵ Mijović's unit in Bratunac was disbanded by September 1993.¹⁵⁰⁶

883. Milenko Trifunović, who hailed from Skelani, and who served as a commander of the "JPN" at Skelani, had received training at Ilok in May 1992 before returning to Skelani.¹⁵⁰⁷

884. On 25 May 1993, a member of the JPN at Bajina Bašta in Serbia approved the transfer of war booty, including a television and a water heater, from Skelani.¹⁵⁰⁸ However, in June 1993, the authorities in Skelani appear to have put a stop to the transfer of looted property to Serbia by "Frenki's special police officers" (*frenkijevi specijalci*).¹⁵⁰⁹ According to Colonel Rajko Balac of the Skelani battalion, SIMATOVIĆ had retaliated by banning the political and military leadership from entering Serbia.

885. In mid-June 1993, the Skelani battalion command referred to the JPN again. From the point of view of the Skelani battalion command, the "so-called red berets" were a "paramilitary of the RS" – here it is ambiguous whether "RS" referred to Republika Srpska or to the Republic of Serbia – "about whom it is not known whose command they are under because they refuse the orders of the commander of the independent battalion Skelani, and they are bankrolled by Frenki? [*sic*], according to what we know."¹⁵¹⁰ The battalion commander Colonel Rade Rodić reported that he had spoken to Goran Marković, the deputy commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija-Birač detachment of the RS MUP Special Brigade, who did not care about this problem. However, Marković had admitted that 57 military conscripts from Skelani had been gathered in a special platoon which had entered into the aforementioned detachment in a company under the command of Mišo Pelemiš. Marković made a number of demands about this unit, leading Rodić to conclude that "the youngest and best trained part of the independent battalion Skelani would be dispersed

¹⁵⁰² Report of the VRS Drina Corps Command, 14 May 1993 (0426-7762-0426-7764, at 0426-7763). See also Statement of Miomir Popović, 11 August 1999 (0706-5590-0706-5591, at 0706-5590).

¹⁵⁰³ CJB Zvornik, Dispatch, 9 May 1994 (0177-5282-0177-5282).

¹⁵⁰⁴ VRS Main Staff, Order of General Mladić, 13 May 1993 (0426-4356-0426-4356). See also VRS Drina Corps Command, Instructions, 13 May 1993 (0429-4199-0429-4199).

¹⁵⁰⁵ VRS Drina Corps Command, Order, 5 June 1993 (0429-2097-0429-2097). The date of 5 June 1992 in the header is an error.

¹⁵⁰⁶ CJB Zvornik, Dispatch, 9 May 1994 (0177-5282-0177-5282).

¹⁵⁰⁷ Autobiography of Milenko Trifunović, undated (0706-5755-0706-5755).

¹⁵⁰⁸ MUP Serbia, JPN Bajina Bašta, Approval, 23 May 1993 (0216-3263-0216-3263).

¹⁵⁰⁹ Independent Battalion Skelani, 20 June 1993 (0436-7556-0436-7557).

¹⁵¹⁰ Independent Battalion Skelani, Report on Combat Readiness, 17 June 1993 (0436-7554-0436-7555, at 0436-7554).

according to Frenki's recipe."¹⁵¹¹ Rodić disagreed vociferously about the deployment of the unit desired by SIMATOVIĆ and accused SIMATOVIĆ of treating the airport at Skelani as his "endowment." Therefore, Rodić pleaded with the Drina Corps command and the Main Staff of the VRS to intervene and insist on the primacy of the battalion command at Skelani. Rodić closed his report by writing that "it is not clear to me how RS MUP chooses military conscripts and officers, takes possession of towns, has all privileges, carries out episodic actions and ascribes the successes of the VRS to itself."¹⁵¹²

886. In February 1993, General Ratko Mladić met with Slavko Lazarević, who stated that he had permission from STANIŠIĆ to establish the Red Berets at Mt. Ozren near Doboj. It appeared that Radojica Božović would operate the unit as a special unit of the RS MUP at Doboj.¹⁵¹³ Later that month, Mladić met with SIMATOVIĆ and others at Mt. Tara in Serbia to plan an operation called *Udar* (Strike), in which the MUP units were to be integrated in a military tactical group.¹⁵¹⁴

887. The RS MUP SNB on occasion performed background checks for the RDB of MUP Serbia.¹⁵¹⁵

888. On 20 August 1994, the President of the RSK Milan Martić met with the President of the RS Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of the RS Assembly, met to discuss the joint future that they expected for the RS and the RSK.¹⁵¹⁶ During this period, the leadership of both the RSK and the RS were intensely dissatisfied with the lack of support they perceived from Serbia.

889. In an interview published in September 1994, Predrag Ješurić, who had headed the police in Bijeljina for part of 1992 and who was later promoted to be Chief of the Administration for Border Affairs, Foreigners and Travel Documentation in RS MUP, spoke about the relationship between RS MUP and MUP Serbia. Ješurić stated that professional cooperation between RS MUP and MUP Serbia "was never interrupted nor brought into question. All achievements and experiences of the service in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, respectively, have been at our disposal. There is no reason for anything to change in this respect."¹⁵¹⁷

¹⁵¹¹ Independent Battalion Skelani, Report on Combat Readiness, 17 June 1993 (0436-7554-0436-7555, at 0436-7554).

¹⁵¹² Independent Battalion Skelani, Report on Combat Readiness, 17 June 1993 (0436-7554-0436-7555, at 0436-7555).

¹⁵¹³ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 6 February 1993 (0649-0175-0649-0175).

¹⁵¹⁴ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 28 February 1993 (0649-0277-0649-0277).

¹⁵¹⁵ Dispatch of RS MUP RDB Chief Dragan Kijac to MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, 8 March 1994 (0608-8296-0608-8296). The dossiers of MUP Serbia employees who hailed from Bosnia and Herzegovina also include examples of such background checks.

¹⁵¹⁶ RSK Service of the President of the Republic, Transcript of Meeting of the President of the RSK Milan Martić and the President of the RS Radovan Karadžić, 20 August 1994 (0281-1705-0281-1713).

¹⁵¹⁷ Interview with Predrag Ješurić, *Policajac*, September 1994 (0296-9289-0296-9292).

890. In 1995, wounded RS MUP officers continued to be sent for medical treatment at the Military Medical Academy (VMA) and other hospitals in Belgrade.¹⁵¹⁸
891. The RS MUP could obtain material assistance from the State Security Service of MUP Serbia. On 12 May 1995, the RS MUP wrote to Jovica STANIŠIĆ at MUP Serbia regarding the repair of a shortwave radio communications vehicle.¹⁵¹⁹ On 2 June 1995, Goran Sarić, then the commander of the RS MUP Special Brigade of the Police, sent a request for vehicles and ammunition for both light and heavy weaponry.¹⁵²⁰ Sarić justified his request by noting that the war against “the Turks” had increased in intensity during the spring and summer of 1995. In addition, on 12 June 1995, the Special Brigade of the Police received communications equipment from the service centre “Radio-Bobi” in Belgrade.¹⁵²¹ On 22 June 1995, the Acting Minister of RS MUP, Tomislav Kovač, wrote to the General Staff of the VJ requesting weapons and equipment to arm a light infantry brigade under establishment by the RS Special Brigade of the Police. Kovač characterised the request as urgent since the unit was to be deployed “immediately in the struggle for Serbian areas.”¹⁵²² On 2 July 1995, RS MUP wrote to the Main Staff of the VRS requesting infantry and artillery ammunition from production facilities in the RS, as well as “from reinforcements of the VRS Main Staff from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”¹⁵²³
892. On 12 May 1995, Minister Živko Rakić of the RS MUP wrote to his counterpart at MUP Serbia congratulating him on the occasion of “Security Day.” Rakić availed himself of the occasion to express his wish that “our cooperation will also in the coming period be successful.”¹⁵²⁴
893. On 26 May 1995, CJB Banja Luka notified RS MUP that SJB Grahovo reported the presence of Uroš Pokrajac of MUP Serbia SDB in their area. Pokrajac was allegedly preparing to receive materiel and special units from the Republic of Serbia. It was claimed that this had been agreed by the “highest representatives of Serbia with RS MUP and the VRS.”¹⁵²⁵ On the following day, the RS MUP informed CJB Banja Luka that they had not participated in negotiations with MUP Serbia regarding this matter.¹⁵²⁶
894. On 23 June 1995, Kovač notified Karadžić that MUP Serbia had handed over 1586 conscripts to the VRS that day, of which 149 had been transferred to the Staff of MUP at

¹⁵¹⁸ SJB Rogatica, 4 June 1995 (0339-1263-0339-1263); see also RS MUP Special Brigade of the Police, 23 November 1995 (0176-2248-0176-2248).

¹⁵¹⁹ RS MUP to Jovica STANIŠIĆ, 12 May 1995 (0359-0886-0359-0886).

¹⁵²⁰ Goran Sarić, Commander of Special Brigade of the Police, to MUP Serbia, State Security Service, 2 June 1995 (0176-2278-0176-2278).

¹⁵²¹ RS MUP Special Brigade of the Police, 13 June 1995 (0176-2250-0176-2251).

¹⁵²² Deputy (Acting) Minister Tomislav Kovač to VJ General Staff, 22 June 1995 (0359-1015-0359-1015).

¹⁵²³ RS MUP to VRS Main Staff, 2 July 1995 (0359-1096-0359-1096). See receipts for transfers of weapons and ammunition from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to RS MUP and the VRS (0359-1137-0359-1140, 0359-1147-0359-0359-1147, 0359-1158-0359-1159)

¹⁵²⁴ RS MUP Minister Živko Rakić to Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 12 May 1995 (0359-0882-0359-0882).

¹⁵²⁵ CJB Banja Luka to RS MUP, 26 May 1995 (0359-0870-0359-0870).

¹⁵²⁶ RS MUP to CJB Banja Luka, 27 May 1995 (0359-0869-0359-0869).

Jahorina.¹⁵²⁷ Also on 23 June 1995, the RS Staff of Police Forces wrote to the VRS at Sokolac requesting equipment for the newly arrived conscripts from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.¹⁵²⁸ On 13 July 1995, the RS MUP wrote to Karadžić that 43 persons had been erroneously transferred to the RS MUP from Serbia to serve on active duty.¹⁵²⁹ During operations in Srebrenica, four conscripts who had been transferred to the RS MUP by MUP Serbia deserted and apparently attempted to return to Serbia.¹⁵³⁰

895. On 23 June 1995, Miodrag Josipović, the chief of SJB Bratunac, informed CJB Zvornik that a group of 10 men “in the uniforms [of the] special units of MUP Serbia (Frenki)” had crossed over into the RS.¹⁵³¹ These men had earlier been in the area in 1992 and 1993. The leader of the group was a Miko Pilot, most likely a nickname. He claimed that they had the permission of the deputy minister of RS MUP to improve the combat readiness of the air base at Bratunac.
896. In June 1995, Jovica STANIŠIĆ went to Zvornik to arrange for the release of UNPROFOR personnel who had been taken hostage by RS forces. On 4 June 1995, RS Television showed footage of STANIŠIĆ together with RS MUP Acting Minister Tomislav Kovač.¹⁵³²
897. In July 1995, the RS Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Tomislav Kovač dispatched a special police unit, including members of RSK MUP and MUP Serbia, to Srebrenica.¹⁵³³ Prior to the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in mid-July 1995, RS MUP reports indicated the presence of MUP Serbia units and their involvement in combat at the Trnovo battlefield.¹⁵³⁴ 350 men from MUP Serbia and the RSK MUP arrived at the Trnovo front on 26 June 1995.¹⁵³⁵
898. On 30 June 1995, the “Kajman,” “Plavi” and “Škorpija” (Scorpion) detachments from MUP Serbia participated in an attack on the Trnovo battlefield.¹⁵³⁶ On the same day,

¹⁵²⁷ Deputy (Acting) Minister Tomislav Kovač to Radovan Karadžić, 23 June 1995 (0359-1014-0359-1014). On the issue of RS conscripts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see also RS MUP to Ministers of Internal Affairs of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, 12 June 1995 (0359-0861-0359-0861), and 17 June 1995 (0359-0849-0359-0849).

¹⁵²⁸ RS Staff of Police Forces, Pale, 23 June 1995 (0359-1246-0359-1246).

¹⁵²⁹ Deputy (Acting) Minister Tomislav Kovač to Radovan Karadžić, 13 July 1995 (0359-0993-0359-0993).

¹⁵³⁰ RS MUP to Public Security Division, 21 July 1995 (0359-1048-0359-1048).

¹⁵³¹ SJB Bratunac, Informational Report, 24 June 1995 (0177-6694-0177-6694).

¹⁵³² SRT, *Prilog*, 4 June 1995 (V000-4740).

¹⁵³³ It should be noted that the only available signed version of this dispatch is signed by Radomir Nikolić, who was in July 1995 the Chief of Police at CJB Sarajevo. RS MUP, 10 July 1995 (0359-1294-0359-1294).

¹⁵³⁴ Dispatch of IKM Trnovo, 30 June 1995 (0297-0837-0297-0837); dispatch of IKM Trnovo, 1 July 1995 (0324-3495-0323-3495); dispatch from IKM Trnovo, 3 July 1995 (0359-1635-0359-1635); dispatch from Staff of Police Forces, Pale, 6 July 1995 (0211-4887-0211-4887); dispatch of IKM Trnovo, 8 July 1995 (0323-8515-0323-8515).

¹⁵³⁵ Report of Staff of Police Forces, 26 June 1995 (0359-0338-0359-0339).

¹⁵³⁶ Report of Staff of Police Forces, 30 June 1995 (0359-0329-0359-0331).

the JATD of MUP Serbia communicated with the Main Staff of the VRS regarding the treatment of possible wounded soldiers or police officers in the broader Trnovo area.¹⁵³⁷

899. As of 7 July 1995, the RSK MUP and MUP Serbia units at Trnovo continued to number 350 men.¹⁵³⁸ Numerous members of MUP Serbia were wounded at Trnovo and were sent for medical treatment to Foča or to the VMA in Belgrade.¹⁵³⁹ On 10 July, Acting RS MUP Minister Tomislav Kovač ordered Ljubiša Borovčanin, the Deputy Commander of the RS Special Brigade of the Police, to deploy from the Sarajevo area to the Srebrenica area the following day and report to VRS General Krstić.¹⁵⁴⁰ The unit under Borovčanin's command was to include a mixed unit of the "joint forces [*združene snage*] of RSK MUP, MUP Serbia and RS MUP." On 12 July 1995, the chief of CJB Zvornik, Dragomir Vasić sent a dispatch to RS MUP in which he wrote that "the joint forces of the police are advancing towards Potočari with the objective of capturing UNPROFOR and surrounding the entire civilian population, as well as clearing the terrain of enemy groups."¹⁵⁴¹ On 28 July, Vasić indicated that his entire force of police officers continued to be engaged in searching the terrain and setting ambushes for Muslims from Srebrenica. Vasić observed that this ongoing operation was taking place on a "very wide area, in villages, in Zvornik itself, as well as in Serbia."¹⁵⁴²
900. On 19 July, Colonel Vasilije Mijović, identified as the commander of MUP Serbia's Unit for Anti-Terrorist Activities, ordered that that unit withdraw from Trnovo the following day in order to take on "other tasks."¹⁵⁴³ On 20 July 1995, four members of the "Tigers" were reported as being severely wounded.¹⁵⁴⁴
901. On 22 July 1995, RS MUP's forward command post at Trnovo reported that the Scorpions unit from MUP Serbia was leaving the battlefield.¹⁵⁴⁵ On the same day, Tomislav Kovač ordered that the commander of the special units of the police of the RS MUP Savo Cvjetinović take over command of the joint forces of the MUP at IKM Trnovo.¹⁵⁴⁶
902. On 23 July 1995, the command of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps reported that the Scorpions had participated in repelling an enemy attack.¹⁵⁴⁷

¹⁵³⁷ Dispatch of VRS Main Staff Commander Ratko Mladić, 30 June 1995 (0620-1079-0620-1079).

¹⁵³⁸ Dispatch from Staff of Police Forces, Pale, 7 July 1995 (0359-1254-0359-1254).

¹⁵³⁹ Dispatches from CJB Srbinje (Foča), 5 July 1995 (0359-2533-0359-2533), 6 July 1995 (0359-2534-0359-2534), 8 July 1995 (0359-2531-0359-2531), 21 July 1995 (0359-2513-0359-2513), 24 July 1995 (0359-2506-0359-2506), 28 July 1995 (0359-2495-0359-2495).

¹⁵⁴⁰ Dispatch of RS MUP Deputy Minister, 10 July 1995 (0297-0146-0297-0146).

¹⁵⁴¹ Dispatch of Dragomir Vasić, CJB Zvornik, 12 July 1995 (0177-6572-0177-6572).

¹⁵⁴² Dispatch of CJB Zvornik, 28 July 1995 (0359-1826-0359-1826).

¹⁵⁴³ Dispatch of Vasilije Mijović, 19 July 1995 (0359-2198-0359-2198).

¹⁵⁴⁴ SRK Command, IKM-1 Trnovo, Regular Combat Report, 20 July 1995 (0620-1082-0620-1085, at 0620-1082).

¹⁵⁴⁵ Dispatch of IKM Trnovo, 22 July 1995 (0324-3373-0324-3373).

¹⁵⁴⁶ Order of Tomislav Kovač, 22 July 1995 (0297-0084-0297-0084).

¹⁵⁴⁷ SRK Command, IKM-2 Trnovo, Regular Combat Report, 23 July 1995 (0620-1092-0620-1092).

903. On 24 July 1995, the forward command post reported that the Scorpions unit had been relieved.¹⁵⁴⁸ During the month of July 1995, numerous members of MUP Serbia were wounded in combat at Trnovo and were sent for medical treatment in Foča.¹⁵⁴⁹
904. In July 1995, the Scorpions unit executed several prisoners near Trnovo. The execution of the prisoners was filmed by members of the unit.¹⁵⁵⁰
905. After the fall of the Žepa enclave in late July 1995, forces from MUP Serbia participated in the capture of Muslim forces that were attempting to escape. On 30 July 1995, Risto Perišić, the Chief of SJB Višegrad, observed that MUP Serbia forces were already present in the zone of responsibility of the VRS Višegrad Brigade.¹⁵⁵¹ The police from MUP Serbia would assist in “blocking the passage of Muslim groups and in carrying out their liquidation.” “This should be agreed on the highest level of the two MUPs, of the Republic of Serbia and the RS.”
906. In September and October 1995, RS MUP and MUP Serbia cooperated together in combat operations in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁵² It is not known when the aforementioned Joint Staff was established. On 30 September 1995, RS MUP Deputy Minister (and Acting Minister) Tomislav Kovač forwarded to the Public and State Security Services and to the Joint Staff of Police Forces of RS MUP and MUP Serbia a copy of an RS Presidential order regarding mobilisation.¹⁵⁵³ The order showed that President Karadžić was aware that the “Tigers” were a unit of MUP Serbia.¹⁵⁵⁴ The paramilitary group known as the “Tigers,” under the command of Željko Ražnatović “Arkan,” participated in combat actions with regular RS MUP units and were integrated into the tactical command and control structure of the RS MUP.¹⁵⁵⁵ Arkan’s forces were filmed by RS television fighting together with RS MUP forces during this period.¹⁵⁵⁶
907. On 23 September 1995, General-Colonel Ratko Mladić complained that Arkan’s forces had not reported to the VRS Main Staff in order to receive orders from any VRS unit and therefore qualified the “Tigers” as a paramilitary formation.¹⁵⁵⁷ Moreover, Arkan and his “Tigers” claimed to be members of MUP Serbia and to have received permission from Radovan Karadžić to detain, interrogate and imprison military-age males in the RS.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Dispatch of IKM Trnovo, 24 July 1995 (0297-0816-0297-0816).

¹⁵⁴⁹ Dispatches of CJB Srbinje (Foča): 5 July 1995 (0359-2533-0359-2533), 6 July 1995 (0359-2534-0359-2534), 8 July 1995 (0359-2531-0359-2531), 21 July 1995 (0359-2513-0359-2513), 24 July 1995 (0359-2506-0359-2506), 28 July 1995 (0359-2495-0359-2495) and 30 July 1995 (0359-1835-0359-1835).

¹⁵⁵⁰ V000-5095.

¹⁵⁵¹ SJB Višegrad, 30 July 1995 (0359-1835-0359-1835).

¹⁵⁵² Report of Ljuban Ećim, 28 September 1995 (0678-9873-0678-9874).

¹⁵⁵³ Dispatch of RS MUP Deputy Minister Tomislav Kovač, 30 September 1995 (0323-8781-0323-8783).

¹⁵⁵⁴ Authorization of President Radovan Karadžić, 12 October 1995 (Y034-4391-Y034-4392).

¹⁵⁵⁵ Order of RS MUP Minister Tomislav Kovač, 11 October 1995 (P004-6440-P004-6440); order of RS MUP Minister Tomislav Kovač, 12 October 1995 (0678-9404-0678-9404).

¹⁵⁵⁶ V000-1038, V000-1416

¹⁵⁵⁷ General-Colonel Ratko Mladić to RS MUP and President of RS, 23 September 1995 (0359-1026-0359-1027).

“Members of the paramilitary formations of the Serbian Volunteer Guard are forcibly taking into their composition or recruiting members of the VRS, promising them a salary of 600 dinars, a supplement of 10,000 for being wounded and social and health insurance through MUP of the Republic of Serbia.” In addition, Mladić cited rumours that Arkan’s forces had killed “loyal citizens of Muslim nationality” in the Sanski Most area, “presenting that publicly as a liquidation of Muslim sabotage-terrorist groups infiltrated in the village Grdanovići.” Mladić demanded that Karadžić and other RS officials publicly disavow any association with Arkan’s units and that Arkan’s forces be removed from RS territory,” and that RS MUP take action against Arkan’s units because of criminal acts committed by them. If no action were taken against Arkan’s units, the VRS would act to disarm them. Mladić’s dispatch was forwarded to Tomislav Kovač and Milenko Karišik on 23 September by Nenad Radović, Tomislav Kovač’s *chef de cabinet*.¹⁵⁵⁸

a. Sigma

908. This report has provided several examples of how the SDB/RDB of Serbia under the leadership of Jovica STANIŠIĆ monitored and attempted to control significant decisions and operations in Serb-controlled entities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This section briefly describes how the RDB tried to monitor the Bosnian Serb leadership at a later stage in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina through an operation called “Sigma.”

909. On 27 June 1994, Dragan Filipović “Fićo,” the Deputy Head of the 2nd Administration of RDB MUP Serbia wrote an official note about IC Tajfun (Typhoon), an “informational centre” that had played a controversial role in internal political conflicts and intrigues in the RS.¹⁵⁵⁹ In September 1993, an uprising had taken place in Banja Luka, and IC Tajfun was believed by the RS leadership to have been instrumental in this uprising.

910. Filipović’s note demonstrated awareness of IC Tajfun’s existence. Filipović observed that unnamed members of IC Tajfun had decided to take up contact with his administration. Filipović also referred to the “Banja Luka department for narcotics,” where Branko Ratić, an important figure in IC Tajfun, was currently employed. Filipović explained that IC Tajfun was offering henceforth to provide intelligence directly to RDB MUP Serbia. IC Tajfun had been told – and had allegedly received – the approval to do so from Radovan Karadžić and Mićo Stanišić. Filipović proposed to henceforth integrate “this segment of the intelligence structures of Republika Srpska” directly into RDB MUP Serbia. This met with approval, and the group was thereafter designated as “Sigma.” A handwritten note on the top of the first page of Filipović’s 27 June 1994 note reads “Fićo open a dossier,” with the signature of Franko SIMATOVIĆ.¹⁵⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵⁸ Dispatch of Nenad Radović, 24 September 1995 (0359-1025-0359-1025).

¹⁵⁵⁹ MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note Regarding the Group “Tajfun,” 27 June 1994 (0608-4554-0608-4555).

¹⁵⁶⁰ MUP Serbia RDB, Second Administration, Official Note Regarding the Group “Tajfun,” 27 June 1994 (0608-4554-0608-4555).

911. The assurances that such an approval had been secured had apparently not been verified by RDB MUP Serbia. Given the antipathy displayed earlier by Mićo Stanišić towards IC Tajfun, it is likely that he never gave his blessing to the venture that became Sigma.
912. On 26 August 1994, Colonel Stevan Bogojević wrote to the VRS Main Staff to inform them about intelligence obtained from a source named Boro LNU.¹⁵⁶¹ The source had undergone training with Captain Dragan in Knin. According to this source, a new “red berets” unit was to be formed in Banja Luka pending the approval of Slobodan Milošević. Bogojević expressed his concern that the KOS of VJ UB might absorb IC Tajfun, emphasising also Ratić’s “two-sided connection to the RS MUP and MUP Serbia.”
913. A report on IC Tajfun filed by the RDB of RS MUP found that “notwithstanding the decision that a transformation of this Centre be carried out, it has continued to work in somewhat changed conditions, according to the operational data available to us.”¹⁵⁶² IC Tajfun focused on intelligence relevant to the relationship of the RS and the RSK, and their relations with Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
914. In listing the known members of IC Tajfun, the RDB highlighted the fact that many members had non-Serb spouses and/or close relatives in Croatia. Ratić was, in particular, suspected of passing information to the Croatian and Bosnian intelligence services. Paradoxically, Ratić allegedly also possessed a MUP Serbia ID with the name of Marko Marković.¹⁵⁶³ Moreover, when Ostoja Zec had been recruited into IC Tajfun, Ratić had allegedly told him that Ratić “works for the VJ, SDB MUP Serbia and for one foreign service.”¹⁵⁶⁴
915. On 18 July 1994, Dragan FILIPOVIĆ wrote a memo forwarding evaluations of leading RS MUP figures by “Operational Source ‘Sigma’.”¹⁵⁶⁵ The purpose of the information was to identify which persons in RS MUP could be counted upon “in case of an escalation of political conflicts in Republika Srpska” with respect to the relationship with Serbia.
916. A number of reports from June to September 1994 have been obtained which are signed with either the word “Sigma” or the Greek letter Sigma (Σ).¹⁵⁶⁶ These reports were

¹⁵⁶¹ Bogojević to VRS Main Staff, OB Sector, 25 August 1994 (0531-6742).

¹⁵⁶² RS MUP RDB, 17 September 1994 (B003-1562-B003-1572).

¹⁵⁶³ RS MUP RDB, 17 September 1994 (B003-1562-B003-1572). Miroslav Račić stated that Ratić had received a passport from MUP Serbia, which enabled him to travel abroad and collect intelligence on the Croats. Minutes of CRDB Banja Luka Interrogation of Miroslav Račić, 2 October 1994 (B003-8698-B003-8702).

¹⁵⁶⁴ RS MUP RDB, 17 September 1994 (B003-1562-B003-1572).

¹⁵⁶⁵ MUP Serbia, RDB Second Administration, Informational Report, 18 July 1994 (0608-4567-0608-4569).

¹⁵⁶⁶ Sigma Report of 30 June 1994 (0608-4559-0608-4560), 7 July 1994 (0608-4561-0608-4563), 10 July 1994 (0608-4564-0608-4566), 18 July 1994 (0608-4567-0608-4569), 19 July 1994 (0608-4570-0608-4570), 3 August 1994 (0608-4571-0608-4571), 6 August 1994 (0608-4572-0608-4575), 12 August 1994 (0608-4576-0608-4577), 14 August 1994 (0608-4578-0608-4580), and 4 September 1994 (0608-4556-0608-4558). Another report, sent on 26 October 1994 to MUP Serbia RDB Second

to be provided personally to Franko SIMATOVIĆ and contained detailed intelligence on the political and security situation in Republika Srpska and other areas of the former Yugoslavia. The detailed nature of the reporting, combined with the fact that MUP Serbia RDB Second Administration established a dossier for this intelligence cell, suggests that more reports continued to be filed after this period.

917. A report on IC Tajfun filed by the RDB of RS MUP in September 1994 found that “notwithstanding the decision that a transformation of this Centre be carried out, it has continued to work in somewhat changed conditions, according to the operational data available to us.”¹⁵⁶⁷ The RDB reported that IC Tajfun had moved its headquarters to Mladena Stojanovića 4 in Banja Luka, the premises of EKOM-Informatik, a private company owned by Miroslav Jerković. It had previously been based at the company Ambalažerka in Banja Luka. IC Tajfun emulated the classic structure of an intelligence service, and had spread its interests as far afield as Bijeljina.
918. On 22 January 1995, VRS Colonel Bogojević wrote to Generals Talić and Tolimir, informing them that a “para-service” had been formed in the Banja Luka region as a counterweight to the RDB and the VRS OB.¹⁵⁶⁸ On 7 February 1995, Colonel Bogojević counted Milan Zorić, Slavko Crnić and Ranko Pešikan among the members of Sigma.¹⁵⁶⁹
919. On 12 February 1995, Colonel Ljubiša Beara wrote to the Security Department of the VRS 1KK, ordering them to inform General Talić of certain intelligence that had been obtained.¹⁵⁷⁰ However, Beara instructed that neither the source nor the name Sigma, nor the activities of that organization should be mentioned.
920. In March 1995, Radislav Vukić, the first SDS president of Bosanska Krajina, told the Belgrade news magazine *NIN* that Sigma represented a malignant new variant of Tajfun, composed of “retarded terrorists who will kill for 100 marks. ... And I expect new alphas, betas and gammas of outlaws who will start killing me” and other politicians from Bosanska Krajina.¹⁵⁷¹

b. The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and Operation Pauk

921. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslims in northwestern Bosnia split into two factions. One faction continued to support the Bosnian government in Sarajevo and the idea of a unified Bosnian and Herzegovinian state. The other faction, led by Fikret Abdić, proclaimed the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia (*Autonomna*

Administration by source “Gavrilo” is labelled for filing in the Sigma dossier but does not bear the “Sigma” emblem. Note from “Gavrilo” to MUP Serbia RDB Second Administration, 26 October 1994 (0608-4581-0608-4581). “Gavrilo” is identified elsewhere as being comprised of Nedeljko Kesić, who was a high-ranking official in RS MUP RDB. Note of Dušan Orlović to MUP Serbia RDB Second Administration, 27 October 1994 (0608-4582-0608-4583).

¹⁵⁶⁷ RS MUP RDB, 17 September 1994 (B003-1562-B003-1572).

¹⁵⁶⁸ Bogojević to Talić and Tolimir, 22 January 1995 (0531-6008-0531-6009).

¹⁵⁶⁹ Bogojević to VRS Main Staff (Beara), 7 February 1995 (0531-6005-0531-6006).

¹⁵⁷⁰ Beara to VRS 1KK, Security Department, 12 February 1995 (0531-6007-0531-6007).

¹⁵⁷¹ Branko Perić, “An Apple for the Prince,” *NIN*, 17 March 1995 (0032-2863-0032-2864).

Pokrajina Zapadna Bosna, APZB). On 22 October 1993 in Belgrade, the RS president Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić as president of the APZB, issued a declaration on cooperation in the presence of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević.¹⁵⁷²

922. According to a subsequent intelligence report of the SVK, Abdić believed that Milošević had ordered that Abdić had to emerge victoriously from the conflict.¹⁵⁷³ Three meetings took place in Velika Kladuša between Abdić and representatives of the SVK and the VJ, and Jovica STANIŠIĆ was present at these meetings.
923. On 22 July, 4 August, 9 August, 11 August, 18 August, 19 August and 22 August 1994, the Main Staff of the SVK, IKM Muljava, sent operational reports on the situation in the APZB.¹⁵⁷⁴ Jovica STANIŠIĆ was among the recipients of these reports. Although only a portion of the reports sent from IKM Muljava are available, the numbering of the reports shows that they were sent on a nearly daily basis. It is likely that STANIŠIĆ received all of these reports.
924. In approximately November 1994, an operation called “*Pauk*” (Spider) was initiated within the framework of the SVK.¹⁵⁷⁵ The first operational diary of operation Pauk commences on 16 November 1994 and runs until 25 May 1995.¹⁵⁷⁶ The diary contains numerous references to both Jovica STANIŠIĆ and Franko SIMATOVIĆ, showing that they were at times present at the command centre of Pauk and gave orders, including on the choice of targets for military attacks. A combat report from the command of Pauk dated 1 July 1995 was sent to the attention of Jovica STANIŠIĆ.¹⁵⁷⁷
925. During the operational lifespan of operation Pauk, Jovica STANIŠIĆ met with civilian, police, and military officials from the RSK and the RS, both in those territories and in Belgrade.
926. On 7 November 1994, VRS Colonel Stevan Bogojević who was reporting to General Zdravko Tolimir, attended a meeting with General Talić, Nedeljko Kesić of the RS MUP RDB, Franko SIMATOVIĆ and Jovica STANIŠIĆ, who was identified by “Martin” as the “minister of internal affairs of the SRJ.”¹⁵⁷⁸ STANIŠIĆ asked questions about the Bihać

¹⁵⁷² Declaration, 22 October 1993, published in *Službeni list, APZB*, Year 1, No. 2, December 1993 (0162-6609-0162-6610).

¹⁵⁷³ SVK Main Staff Intelligence Report, 30 June 1994 (0118-5686-0118-0118-5689, at 0118-5688).

¹⁵⁷⁴ SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 22 July 1994 (0280-9511-0280-9512); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 4 August 1994 (0280-9526-0280-9529); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 9 August 1994 (0280-9516-0280-9517); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 11 August 1994 (0280-9505-0280-9507); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 18 August 1994 (0280-9513-0280-9515); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 19 August 1994 (0280-9509-0280-9510); SVK Main Staff, IKM Muljava, 22 August 1994 (0280-9532-0280-9534).

¹⁵⁷⁵ SVK Communication, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4254, at 0294-4245). As has been seen earlier, the SDB of MUP Serbia in June 1991 proposed an operation called “Pauk.” It is not clear whether there is a link between these two operations, or whether the operation in the APZB was in some form a continuation of the operation commenced in 1991.

¹⁵⁷⁶ Pauk Command, Operational Diary Number 1 (0209-4543-0209-4640). Reference to “Minister Stanišić» 0209-4552, 0209-4562., 0209-4569

¹⁵⁷⁷ Pauk Command, Regular Combat Report, 1 July 1995 (0469-0635-0469-0635).

¹⁵⁷⁸ Report of Colonel Stevan Bogojević to General Tolimir, 8 November 1994 (0531-5903-0531-5904).

front and stated that it was “high time that we all put ourselves in the function of defending Serb territory and the nation.”¹⁵⁷⁹ STANIŠIĆ stated that he had provided for “sufficiently strong forces which will secure the liberation of Velika Kladuša and the return of Fikret Abdić there.”¹⁵⁸⁰ STANIŠIĆ also asked Kesić to deliver a message to Karadžić, suggesting that Karadžić had better heed STANIŠIĆ’s wishes. STANIŠIĆ further stated that he intended to meet with SVK Major General Novaković and with President Martić. After the meeting, STANIŠIĆ (and most likely also SIMATOVIĆ) drove to Petrova Gora.

927. To the consternation of some officers in the SVK, a “parallel” field command post was formed in the Kordun area of the Krajina including Major General Mile Novaković, retired Colonel Čedo Bulat, Mihajlo Knežević and Jovica STANIŠIĆ.¹⁵⁸¹ Other representatives of the MUP were also present. Colonel Smiljanić of the SVK was concerned about STANIŠIĆ’s presence in the command post and confident that he was supported by President Milošević.¹⁵⁸² On 13 November 1994, RSK President Milan Martić had met with the command of Pauk and asked them to respect the Supreme Command in Korenica. However, there were indications that Novaković and STANIŠIĆ were running their own line of command and communications.¹⁵⁸³

928. On 15 December 1994, Major General Mile Novaković complained of insufficient organization and deficiencies in the command of Pauk.¹⁵⁸⁴

929. On 6 April 1995, General Ratko Mladić, accompanied by General Milan Gvero, met in Belgrade with General Momčilo Perišić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ.¹⁵⁸⁵ At the meeting, STANIŠIĆ explained how he had provided “everything” to Martić. STANIŠIĆ stated that he had sent 150 men from Slavonia to Pauk.¹⁵⁸⁶

930. Milorad Ulemek “Legija” was the commander of Tactical Group 2.¹⁵⁸⁷ As of late July 1995, TG-2 encompassed 2,200 persons. TG-1 had 1,120 persons. The command of Pauk included 180 persons.¹⁵⁸⁸

¹⁵⁷⁹ Report of Colonel Stevan Bogojević to General Tolimir, 8 November 1994 (0531-5903-0531-5904, at 0531-5903).

¹⁵⁸⁰ Report of Colonel Stevan Bogojević to General Tolimir, 8 November 1994 (0531-5903-0531-5904, at 0531-5903). See also Letter of Colonel Rade Rašeta, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4252).

¹⁵⁸¹ SVK Communication, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4254, at 0294-4245). As has been seen earlier, the SDB of MUP Serbia in June 1991 proposed an operation called “Pauk.” It is not clear whether there is a link between these two operations, or whether the operation in the APZB was in some form a continuation of the operation commenced in 1991.

¹⁵⁸² SVK Communication, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4254, at 0294-4245).

¹⁵⁸³ SVK Communication, 6 January 1995 (0294-4245-0294-4254, at 0294-4246).

¹⁵⁸⁴ RSK Pauk Command, Order, 15 December 1994 (Y034-7214-Y034-7215).

¹⁵⁸⁵ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 6 April 1995, meeting with General Momčilo Perišić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ (at 0649-0406).

¹⁵⁸⁶ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 6 April 1995, meeting with General Momčilo Perišić and Jovica STANIŠIĆ (at 0649-0407).

¹⁵⁸⁷ NOZB, TG-2 Command, 26 February 1995 (0209-4750-0209-4750)

¹⁵⁸⁸ NOZB, Supreme Command, Letter, 29 July 1995 (0338-9956-0338-9956).

931. In June 1995, the High Court of Western Bosnia wrote to Fikret Abdić and warned that the command of Pauk constituted a parallel command system.¹⁵⁸⁹
932. On 30 June 1995, Slobodan Milošević, Jovica STANIŠIĆ, Ratko Mladić and others met with Fikret Abdić in Belgrade to discuss the situation in the APZB. STANIŠIĆ noted that he had and could contribute people.¹⁵⁹⁰
933. Wounded soldiers of the APZB were allowed to travel to Serbia to receive medical attention at the military hospital in Belgrade. This was approved by Čedo Bulat in his capacity as chief of the command staff of Pauk.¹⁵⁹¹
934. In 1997, at the Kula awards ceremony, Franko SIMATOVIĆ referred to the presence of the RDB in the APZB, noting that the unit had been “the backbone of the army of Fikret Abdić.”¹⁵⁹²

¹⁵⁸⁹ High Court of Western Bosnia, Letter, 1 June 1995 (0338-9785-0338-9787).


¹⁵⁹⁰ Diary of Ratko Mladić, 30 June 1995 (0649-0539-0649-0540).

¹⁵⁹¹ NOZB, Supreme Command, Letter, 11 July 1995 (0338-9840-0338-9840); NOZB, Supreme Command, List of Wounded Soldiers, 7 July 1995 (0338-9816-0338-9816).

¹⁵⁹² Kula Awards Ceremony, 4 May 1997 (V000-3533).


XIV. Organograms

POSITION OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE RSUP /Republican Secretariat of the Interior/ OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN THE SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ FEDERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERIOR



ET 0606-0111-0606-0111

POSITION OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE RSUP /Republican Secretariat
of the Interior/ IN THE STATE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF THE
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SERBIA




ET 0606-0112-0606-0112

ORGANISATION CHART


OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE OF THE REPUBLICAN SECRETARIAT
OF THE INTERIOR OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

1990-1991



ET 0606-0115-0606-0115

POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE SECURITY MUP /Ministry
of the Interior/ IN THE STATE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF THE
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN 1992-1996



ET 0606-0113-0606-0113

XIV. Curriculum Vitae of Christian Axboe Nielsen

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT

Associate Professor, Aarhus University, School of Society and Culture, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 5, Building 1461, Room 625, DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark

EDUCATION

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences **New York, NY**

Doctor of Philosophy with distinction, East Central European History, May 2002

M. Phil., East Central European History, April 1999

Fields of Concentration for Comprehensive Exam: Habsburg History, 1740-1918, Modern German History, 1918-1989, Modern East Central European History, 1918-1991, Russian and Soviet History, 1905-1991 (minor field)

Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs **New York, NY**

Master of International Affairs, May 1997

Fields of Concentration: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and East Central Europe

Washington University in St. Louis

St. Louis, MO

B.A., in Political Science *magna cum laude* and Germanic Languages and Literatures, May 1995

Honor Thesis: On the Role of the United Nations in the Conflict in the former Yugoslavia

Member, Pi Sigma Alpha (Political Science Honor Society)

Washington University Junior Year Abroad at the University of Tübingen, Germany, 1993-1994

EXPERIENCE

University of Aarhus, School of Society and Culture **Aarhus, Denmark**

Associate Professor of Southeast European Studies and Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian, teaching courses in Southeast European Studies, European Studies and International Studies; member of Danish examination board for Slavic Studies (January 2008-)

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Hague

External Consultant Analyst for Defence Team of Sabra (April 2012-December 2014)

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia **The Hague**

Research Officer and Intelligence Analyst for the Leadership Research Team in the Office of the Prosecutor (June 2002-August 2004); called as Prosecution expert witness in Prosecutor vs. Momčilo Krajišnik (June 2005), in Prosecutor vs. Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin (December 2009 and January 2010), in Prosecutor vs. Radovan Karadžić (July 2011), and in Prosecutor vs. Goran Hadžić (January 2013)

Bavarian High Court

Munich, Germany

Expert witness in the criminal case of Josip Perković and Zdravko Mustač (October 2014-June 2016)

Canadian Department of Justice

Ottawa, Canada

External case consultant for the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section (April 2008-); testified as expert witness for the plaintiff in *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Branko Rogan*, Federal Court, Vancouver (April 2011)

International Criminal Court

The Hague

External consultant for the Investigations Division, Office of the Prosecutor (September 2008-December 2008)

United States Department of Justice

Washington, DC

External consultant for the Office of Special Investigations (June 2008)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Belgrade, Serbia

External consultant for Law Enforcement Department of OSCE Mission to Serbia, advising the Service for War Crimes Investigations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (April 2008)

International Criminal Court

The Hague

Associate Analyst, Investigations Division, Office of the Prosecutor (August 2004-February 2006)

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Various locations

Election Supervisor, general elections, Brčko, Bosnia-Herzegovina (November 11, 2000); Short-Term Observer, Serbian parliamentary elections, Belgrade, Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia (December 23, 2000)

AWARDS

American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Dissertation Fellowship in East European Studies, 2001-2002

International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Fellowship – Central and Eastern Europe: for dissertation research in Croatia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2000-2001

Summer 2000 Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship for Hungarian

Richard Hofstadter Fellow of the Harriman Institute, 1997-2001

1999 Harriman PepsiCo Summer Travel Fellowship

1996-1997 FLAS Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian

Selected Publications – for a Full List of Publications since 2008, please see: <http://pure.au.dk/portal/en/christian.a.nielsen@cas.au.dk>.

Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Aleksandar's Yugoslavia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

“Surmounting the Myopic Focus on Genocide: The Case of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013), 15-39.

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"The Kosovo Precedent and the Rhetorical Deployment of Former Yugoslav Analogies in the Cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, March 2009.

"Policing Yugoslavism: Surveillance, Denunciations and Ideology during King Aleksandar's Dictatorship, 1929-1934," *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, Winter 2009.

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"A Second Munich?" Review of Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2001), June 2002.

"Pregled arhivske građe o šestojanuarskoj diktaturi u arhivima bivše Jugoslavije," (A Summary of Archival Material on the Sixth of January Dictatorship in the Archives of the Former Yugoslavia) *Arhiv* (Belgrade), Year II, No. 2 (2001).

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"Foucault iza željeznog zastora" (Foucault behind the Iron Curtain), *Zarez* (Zagreb), August 30, 2001.

"Objektivnost na balkanski način" (Objectivity the Balkan Way), *Zarez* (Zagreb), July 5, 2001.

"The Bland Balkan Butcher: Slobodan Milošević," *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2001.

"Dissenting Voices," book review, *Transitions Online*, April 2001.

"The Unbearable Lightness of Being Liberal in Serbia," *Transitions Online*, April 2001.

"Normalizing Serbia," *Papeles del Este* (Madrid), January 2001.

“Crnogorac, Srbijanac ili Srbin?” (Montenegrin, Serbian Serb, or Serb?), *Helsinki povelja*, Serbian Helsinki Committee, Belgrade, January 2001.

17 Entries for *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (San Francisco: Academic Press, 2001): Dobrica Ćosić, Miloš Crnjanski, Ilija Garašanin, Kiro Gligorov, Alija Izetbegović, Slobodan Jovanović, Radovan Karadžić, Aleksandar Karađorđević, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Anton Korošec, Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović, Slobodan Milošević, Nikola Pašić, Dragiša Vasić, Montenegrin Nationalism, Serbian Nationalism, and Yugoslav Nationalism.

“DOS Version 2.0, in Serbian,” *Transitions Online*, November 2000.

Reviewed and expanded entries on Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria for 1999 Central European University Press Russian-language edition of *Collier's Encyclopedia*.

Lectures

Frequent lectures and media appearances in Denmark on Balkan history, human rights and international criminal justice, 2008-, see Aarhus University's website.

Languages

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Danish	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
German	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
French	Advanced	Advanced	Advanced
Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
Slovenian	Advanced	Intermediate	Intermediate
Bulgarian	Advanced	Intermediate	Elementary
Russian	Advanced	Intermediate	Intermediate
Macedonian	Advanced	Elementary	Elementary
Hungarian	Elementary	Elementary	Elementary
Dutch	Advanced	Intermediate	Intermediate
Swedish	Fluent	Elementary	Elementary
Norwegian	Fluent	Elementary	Elementary
Turkish	Intermediate	Elementary	Elementary

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Date: 02 January 2018

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