

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

YUGOSLAVIA: chapter 1980-1991





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YUGOSLAVIA: **chapter** **1980-1991**

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CONTENTS

Publisher's note	7
A Word from the Editors	9

Latinka Perović

Prolegomena	13
Introductory Study	15

I FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Božo Repe

Yugoslav People's Army: Claims to the Status of the Last Guardian of Tito's Yugoslavia.	101
--	-----

Božo Repe

The Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: The Place of Confrontation of All Major Conflicts	128
--	-----

Božo Repe

The Presidency of the SFRY: Without Authority and Charisma	171
---	-----

Božo Repe

Yugoslav Governments: (In)surmountable Different Interests	198
--	-----

Aleksandar R. Miletić

The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and The Breakup of The SFRY, 1988–1991.	239
---	-----

Vlaho Bogišić

Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute: exiting through the main, encyclopedic door.	257
---	-----

II THE SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES

<i>Drago Roksanđić, Slobodan Bjelica, Dušan Janjić, Memli Krasniqi, Dragan Markovina, Božo Repe, Radenko Šćekić, Trajkovska Novomoski</i> The Socialist Republics And Autonomous Provinces For/Against Yugoslavia	271
---	-----

III INTER-REPUBLIC RELATIONS

*Husnija Kamberović, Milivoj Bešlin,
Aleksandar R. Miletić, Adam Prekić*

Relations Between the Yugoslav Republics and Provinces321

IV CRISIS AND DISINTEGRATION

Vladimir Gligorov

Wrong Political Responses to Economic Crisis 393

V A BRIEF TIMELINE

The Key Events of the Eighties in Pictures 425

VI SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMACY, SMALL RESULTS

Tvrtko Jakovina

The SFRY and the World from Tito's Death

Until the Death of Yugoslavia451

VII SOCIETY

Vesna Pusić

Social Changes: Enviably Dynamism and Creativity 507

Alemka Lisinski

Journalism and Media: The Challenges of Freedoms Won 547

Dejan Kršić

Squaring The Eighties.579

Zlatko Gall

Yugoslav music – Between the New Wave

and New “Turbo-Folk”621

VIII INTELLECTUALS

Nadežda Čaćinović

The Role of Intellectuals: Between

the *Power of Truth* and the *Truth of Power* 663

Aleksandra Đurić-Bosnić

Responses of Intellectuals to the Social

and Political Crisis in Serbia.677

<i>Vera Katz</i>	
An Attempt to Marginalize Intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina	689
<i>Vladimir Milčin</i>	
Macedonia: Unfinished Past.	721
<i>Marko Zajc</i>	
Slovenian Critical Intellectuals and the Yugoslav Public	745
<i>Marko Zajc</i>	
“Nova Revija” and Relations with Serbia	767
<i>Dr Radenko Šćekić</i>	
Montenegrin Intellectual Attitudes Towards Yugoslavia During The Last Decade Of The SFRY	772
IX RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES	
<i>Srđan Barišić</i>	
Traditional Religious Communities and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia	791
X CULTURE	
<i>Nenad Makuljević</i>	
Ideological and Cultural Contexts of Art and Culture	845
<i>Tomislav Marković</i>	
Cultural Pluralism And Monism	871
XI HISTORIOGRAPHY OF YUGOSLAVIA	
<i>Šerbo Rastoder</i>	
Historiography and Yugoslavia	905
XII EPILOGUE	
<i>Mitja Velikonja</i>	
Poetry After Srebrenica? Cultural Reflection of the Yugoslav Eighties	947
Author Biographies	983
Names Index	1001

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

THE READERS HAVE before them the second book within the project of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia: *Yugoslavia: Chapter 1980-1991*. Almost ten years ago, as part of the conception of the “Yu-Historia” project, the Helsinki Committee gathered a group of authors from all successor states of the former Yugoslavia in an attempt to study the phenomenon of the state union as comprehensively as possible. The interpretations and insights of the authors, primarily historians, but also the relevant experts in other scientific fields, presented in this book, point to the stratification and complexity of the society and the state that lasted 70 years, including its problems as well as the reasons and responsibility for its brutal disintegration.

This book, like the previous one published within the same project “Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective”, has now become part of a rich collection of books and publications by domestic and foreign authors about the country that vanished from the political map 30 years ago, but is still consequential.

Sonja Biserko

President of the Helsinki Committee

A WORD FROM THE EDITORS

MUCH HAS BEEN written about the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia both in the world and the former Yugoslavia. There are different explanations for the causes of the breakup, its dynamics and consequences, as well as the perspectives of the newly created states. Unlike other socialist federations (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union), which ceased to exist peacefully, the breakup of the Yugoslav federation ended in war. Why?

Ten years ago, a group of scholars from all parts of the former Yugoslavia got together at the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. It primarily included historians, but there were also art historians, culturologists, political scientists, sociologists and economists. Their intention was to begin studying the breakup of the Yugoslav state. It was the first such effort, which was also supported by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The group discussed the approach to this topic for a long time. The opinion prevailed that the Yugoslav experience (1918–1941 and 1945–1991) should be considered from national perspectives. Yugoslavia was a complex multinational state. Neither of the two solutions, centralist and unitary, that is, federal and confederal, was successful. The differences between these two concepts posed the central issue in the 70-year history of the Yugoslav state. However, none of them could provide the basis for compromise. So far, many histories of Yugoslavia have been written in favour of one or the other solution. Two interpretations have always reflected the factual situation.

The result of the five-year work of the mentioned group was the book *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi* (Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective), which was published by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, in Serbian and English, in 2017. The authors had no illusions that one book could explain what happened at the end of the 20th century. Their aim was, in particular, to set the orientation towards understanding the Yugoslav experience over the long term. Hence the book is a collection of papers whose authors

have different professions and belong to different generations. Taking into account the intentions of the team of authors and the interest aroused by the first book, it has been decided to continue this work.

Four years later, there appears the second book, *Jugoslavija: poglavlje 1980–1991* (Yugoslavia: Chapter 1980–1991). The death of Josip Broz Tito (1980) and change in the international paradigm (1989) are not only the chronological framework of this book. They also marked the end of a historical epoch. At the internal level – the descent of Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for four and a half decades and the President of the SFRY for three and a half years, from the life and political scene. At the international level – the impact of the scientific and technological revolution, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Eastern European bloc and the end of the communist regimes, as well as the unification of Germany. Like all milestone changes, the changes at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries provoked different reactions. The awakening of great hopes and expectations was accompanied by the illusions about rapid changes for the better. And, at the same time, by uncertainty and fear. The confusion stemmed from the nature of things: insistence on the dogmas that failed the test of time, reconsiderations and seeking alternatives. The old pre-communist situation was returning both spontaneously and in an organized way. The demand for freedom and democracy was accompanied by various kinds of restoration (such as the restoration of the monarchy, retraditionalization and return of the Church to the public sphere and politics) and revanchism (the return of Nazism, fascism and rehabilitation of quislings).

The team of authors tried to research the past events and enter into the spirit of the times. This resulted in the theme enrichment of the second book and thus the expansion of the authors' circle. The research base was also expanded. Apart from primary historical sources, it also includes other important sources such as memoirs, diaries, autobiographies and biographies, emigrant sources, dissident sources, documentation about forgotten people and events, suppressed truths and views of anonymous people (graffiti). The second book has more

texts about the national cultures and their permeation at the Yugoslav level (joint ventures in the fields of publishing, film, theatre and lexicography, as well as joint cultural events). The tendencies of an undoubtedly modern society were also identified: media, non-governmental organizations, women's movements, entrepreneurship and, above all else, openness to the world. At the same time, it is a patriarchal and closed society characterized by the agrarian origin and mentality of the first generations of industrial workers, high illiteracy and small traditions of democratic political culture. These two parallel insights warn historians to be cautious. Did the conflict of 1948 mean that the Soviet model of socialism was definitely rejected and what was possible for a small country between East and West after World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War?

The responses to the new challenges in the society and the state were also researched. The failure of economic and party reforms is evident. In this context, the role of critical intelligentsia was also analyzed. However, as it returned to the authentic principles of state socialism, it was more dogmatic than revisionist.

So far, the subject of perhaps the most comprehensive research has been the governing political system at all levels, including political life in the republics and provinces and their mutual relations, the Yugoslav party and state leadership, and the Yugoslav People's Army in the role of political arbiter.

The recognizable core of the book *Yugoslavia: Chapter 1980–1991* focuses on the conflict between the two mentioned concepts of the Yugoslav state. It did not break apart because there was no solution, but because the 1974 Constitution, as a compromise solution, was unilaterally rejected by Serbia, as the largest republic. In the name of resolving the Serbian question as the state question in Yugoslavia which, in essence, was a Serbian state inhabited also by other nations, or an ethnic state within the borders encompassing all Serb-populated regions. After the breakup of the Yugoslav state, all international arbitrations recognized the internal borders that were established during the liberation war, 1941–1945. From the viewpoint of Greater

Serbian nationalism, these borders were administrative and became subject to change after 1980.

The authors of *Yugoslavia: Chapter 1980–1991* present this book to the public in the hope that it will contribute to understanding the essence of the breakup. And in the belief that this research should be continued to go back to the decades preceding the one in the title of the book and the subsequent ones. Namely, the further we move away from the essence of the breakup of Yugoslavia in war, the further we move away from a successful confrontation with the past and transition.

Belgrade, September 2021

Latinka Perović

PROLEGOMENA

HISTORIANS TODAY LIKE to say that in the 1980s *history exploded in our face*. But unless they had been betrayed at the time by their own understanding of both history and historical science – they would have to be the last ones to have the right to say so.

In my introductory study I do not view the 1980s in Yugoslavia as *a small slice of history*. I approach these years from afar. I try to reconstruct what preceded them, as well as to point out what they intimated. In other words, I view them in the context of a single historical process.

I move along a road that has multiple access paths. The Introduction thus includes the results of my research over the years of Serbian history during the second half of the 19th century with emphasis on social ideas (early socialism, radicalism and liberalism). It includes, furthermore, my studies of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and later Yugoslavia, with primary focus on the relation between nation [in the ethnic sense]¹ and state. Included too is research of Western European pre-Marxist socialist teachings and Russian revolutionary “commune-populism” [narodnjaštvo], and their influence on the development of social thought in Serbia. As well as the insights gathered from the voluminous historiography on these topics. And of course the knowledge gained from the works of the co-authors of this book, as well as its predecessor – *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi* / Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective (2017).²

In the Introduction I also include the knowledge I gained as an *insider*, through my personal participation in the youth and women’s

1 Throughout this translation the text in round brackets – () – is by the author and belongs to the original Serbian text; while the text in square brackets – [] – has been added by the translator for the purpose of providing background explanation, context, clarity of meaning and consistency of style in English and has been kept to a minimum as much as possible.

2 *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi*, (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2017)

movements in Yugoslavia (1950–1960). That participation provided me, like the entire political generation to which I belonged, with the opportunity to get to know Yugoslavia in its diversity, defining us as consistent *federalists*. And then, it includes the part I played in the League of Communists of Serbia (second half of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s). This helped me – crisscrossing Serbia with both *head* and *foot* – to get to know its limitations, but also its potential. For example, the uniqueness of its regions, or as [historian] Sima M. Ćirković would say, the *advantages of its divisions* (the influence of Austro-Hungarian Serbs on the development of the Principality of Serbia).

Scientific knowledge and knowledge gained through experience differ in both method and technology of acquisition. But they complement more than they exclude each other. In my earlier works, the knowledge gained through experience was implicit. In the Introduction, I make some of this knowledge explicit. First and foremost this refers to depictions of certain situations and events, or the human dimension of certain individuals. A number of these portrayals are known only to a narrow circle of people, some of whom are no longer alive. Others, due to circumstance, were known only to me. In most cases – they are verifiable. I cite them in the conviction that their loss from memory would lead – both consciously and unconsciously – to *simplification* and *erroneous conclusions*. Indispensable, first-order sources do not always describe the atmosphere and state of mind in a society. Therefore, *I cite personal experience in the sense of its general significance*. Or, as Sima M. Ćirković paraphrased, *nothing that happened in the past is alien to a historian*.

INTRODUCTORY STUDY

It is not our job to avoid valuation, to not declare ourselves about values... but to consciously and methodically establish criteria... We should also refrain from falling into moral nihilism about what is good and evil. There are certain general and fundamental values such as respect for life and the person, the pursuit of freedom and truth, which deserve to be placed above the partial values of individual societies and epochs.

—SIMA M. ĆIRKOVIĆ,

O istoriografiji i metodologiji (2007)

[On Historiography and Methodology]

1.

WHY YUGOSLAVIA IN THE 1980s

During the past 30 years many books have been written – an entire library – about the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The internal war, its manifestations (ethnic cleansing, mass crimes; primary, secondary and tertiary graves; genocide), the immediate and long-term consequences, have all made the *case of Yugoslavia* unique. It has been compared to other socialist federations (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) in which there was a peaceful breakup and the subsequent creation of independent nation-states. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's attempt to preserve the state framework of the Soviet Union, in order to implement reforms of the economic and political system, the federation and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [KPSS], failed. As a result, about 20 million Russians remained outside Russia, and yet there was no war.³

The case of Yugoslavia was also viewed in the light of the different histories of Yugoslav peoples in international settings after the First World War and after the Second World War. They included those that

3 Veljko Vujačić, *Nacionalizam, mit i država u Rusiji i Srbiji*, (Beograd: Clio, 2019)

have, by that time, already formed as nations in the modern sense (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), and those whose constitution was still under way [Muslim-Bosniaks, Macedonians], as well as some national minorities, some of which made up a high percentage of the total population (Germans, Albanians, Hungarians). However, [history as] event history, which by and large had been followed by the historiography of the Yugoslav state, has been unable to reconstruct the historical process that connects the experience of the first Yugoslavia (1918–1941) with the experience of the second Yugoslavia (1945–1991). It is in the interconnection of these two experiences, and not in their opposition, that the constants of the common state of different peoples are reflected.

The unity of the state created at the end of the First World War, and then renewed at the end of the Second World War, regardless of the form of government, was the condition for its survival. Both the first and the second Yugoslavia were dictatorships: one personal, and the other a class, i.e. party dictatorship, both instituted in order to level historical, religious, cultural and linguistic differences. Through the resistance to this effort – which varied in intensity but was constant – it has been clearly demonstrated that peoples place their own freedom above the imposed unity of the state, even when such a state provides them with opportunities for development, but without guarantees of freedom as a collective.

2.

EFFECTS OF THE DEATH OF JOSIP BROZ TITO

The death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, represents, both chronologically and historically, the end of a half-century epoch. Tito was at the head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [KPJ], later the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [SKJ], from 1937 until his death; and at the head of the Yugoslav state from 1945, also until his death. He died as its lifelong president. It was not difficult to predict the effects of his biological death. Entire generations belonged ideologically, politically and psychologically to *Tito's age*. Individuals, members of

different social strata and different ethnic groups may have felt differently, but they all belonged to that same age. Of course, their perspectives were different. The perspective of the victors in the Second World War was nevertheless prevalent. This perspective was perhaps best expressed by Edvard Kardelj⁴ in 1952, after yet another victory – in 1948 [against Stalin]: “It is an honor and a source of pride to live in Tito’s time, because it means being a part of something that will never die.” At the time of the formation of Tito’s charisma, all his closest associates were younger than him, and he was for them “Stari” – the “Old man”. In the final months of his treatment in Ljubljana, there was widespread anxiety... The already celebrated film director Dušan Makavejev, who returned to Belgrade from the US at the time, noticed that everyone was “speaking softly”. There was hope for his recovery: “miracles happen in medicine.” This hope was fueled by the party and state leadership. Its members were on [24 hrs.] duty at the Clinical Center in Ljubljana in shifts. But in secret, a tomb was being built. The state was a party-state: a party based on the principle of democratic centralism, with a pyramid-like organization topped by a secretary general. Tito and the system were indivisible. If, during his lifetime, objectively different interests were harmonized by his arbitration, without him, the paralysis of the whole occurred, and inevitably the door was opened for partial decision-making in the republics and [autonomous] provinces. This was not a consequence of slacking discipline, nor merely the egoistic interests of individuals and social groups, but an inevitability.

In the spirit of *Titoism without Tito*, the 12th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [SKJ] was held (1982) without indication of change. The state leadership formed commissions for changing the economic and political system. Their work lasted a long time due to difficulties in harmonization, and provided hybrid documents, which

4 Edvard Kardelj, 1910–1979, was a top-ranking Yugoslav politician from Slovenia, Tito’s close associate from WW II days and author of various innovative Yugoslav reforms, including “self-management socialism.”]

both enabled and blocked reforms. This encouraged partial solutions in the republics and provinces.

Josip Broz Tito outlived – politically and biologically – other historical leaders, but his word was crucial even when they were still around. This was not only a consequence of his personal authority, but also of the system: the leader was a symbol of the unity of the country. Foreign diplomats and historians, Tito's biographers, did not separate his personality and the ruling system. Explaining the usefulness of Tito's visit to the United States in 1977, American ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger wrote to the State Department that the regime in Yugoslavia was "repressive", but "by no means very repressive". For the historian Jože Pirjevec, Tito was a dictator, but not a despot.

In the last years of Tito's life, his closest associates belonged to the middle and younger generation of the party nomenclature. They were promoted as bearers of a *new line* in the Party. At Tito's personal initiative, an about-turn was made in 1972. Returning to the doctrines prior to the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1952), when its name was changed to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [SKJ], its new role was intimated in the slogan: from *steering* [rukovodeće] to *leading* [vodeće] role in society. In order to enable the re-Bolshevizing of the Party, mass *purges* were instituted. Party leaderships at all levels – the administration, economy, culture, media – were all affected. Even though branded as *nationalists, technocrats, petty-bourgeois opportunists, anti-Titoists, Sovietophobes, [pro]-Westerners* – it was precisely those that had represented the critical mass for change that had been removed. Proponents of economic and political reforms, people of dialogue, [mutual] understanding and compromise had been expelled from all republic-level leaderships. Those who took over the helm still during Tito's lifetime, after his death considered every call for *reassessment, criticism and search for an alternative* – an attack on the legacy of the revolution. Initiatives along the same lines that came from within the Party itself were, from the point of view of its "firm unity", considered even more

dangerous. A drastic example was the Letter sent (1984) by Veterans of the Spanish Civil War to the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia [CK SKJ]. They warned of the dangerous consequences of the crisis in the country and the need for its democratization. In exhaustive talks with them, members of the SKJ Central Committee Presidency accused the Spanish Civil War Veterans of violating unity at a critical moment and of being tied with the West. The epilogue was the resignation of the Spanish Civil War Veterans [from their positions] and their withdrawal from public life.⁵

However, there was an *informal opposition* on the rise, which was formed in Belgrade around the writer and politician Dobrica Ćosić ever since 1966, when [high-ranking Serbian politician in charge of national security] Aleksandar Ranković had been removed from political life. Ćosić's critique of establishment politics in the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists, CK SKS (1968), of which he was a member; his novel *Vreme smrti* [A Time of Death], a saga of the First World War; advocacy of cultural unity from the position of president of the Serbian Literary Guild (SKZ) and from the platform of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) (accession speech) – all these brought him the honorific of “father of the [Serbian] nation” amongst the Serbian intelligentsia. With the authority he wielded in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts⁶, Dobrica Ćosić initiated (1985) the drafting of a document that would analyze the causes of the Yugoslav crisis and offer solutions. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (1986) emerged from the commission formed to perform this task. Due to the way it reached the public (it was first leaked in the Belgrade newspaper *Vecernje novosti*/Evening news) and the reactions it provoked throughout Yugoslavia (after that, nothing was the same in the country), the Serbian

5 Olga Manojlović-Pintar, *Poslednja bitka. Španski borci i jugoslovenska kriza osamdesetih*, (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2019)

6 Darko Hudelist, *Moj beogradski dnevnik. Susreti i razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosićem 2006–2011*, (Zagreb: Profil, 2012)

Academy never stopped claiming that the version published represented only a draft, and not the final version verified by SANU bodies. Even if this were true, it is unlikely that the fundamentals and meaning of the document could have been essentially different in the final version.

Belgrade, as the capital of the Yugoslav state, in which it had really only just begun to develop as a modern city⁷, was at the same time the center of state, scientific and cultural institutions of the Republic of Serbia. The Yugoslav leadership, especially the party leadership, followed the events in Belgrade with special interest, and not only because they were “close at hand”. From the capitals of the other Yugoslav republics, Belgrade was viewed with keen attention, especially after Tito’s death. What was similar in all of them, and what was different in relation to Belgrade? There were *topical* books everywhere, but also ones that were not written overnight. The latter were the result of long reassessments and reflections. Their authors seemed to be waiting for the moment when, without fear for their personal safety, they could make their thinking, including their thoughts about Tito’s historical role, public. And that moment came just after his death.

3.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REASSESSMENT OF TITO’S HISTORICAL ROLE

Vladimir Dedijer’s three-volume work *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Contributions for the Biography of Josip Broz Tito] began publication in the year of Tito’s death (1980, 1981 and 1984).⁸ Of course, it could not have been written overnight: the author needed years of research, study and writing. After the contrived making of

7 Predrag J. Marković, *Beograd i Evropa 1918–1941. Evropski uticaji na modernizaciju*, (Beograd: Savremena administracija, 1994)

Predrag J. Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948–1965*, (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1996)

8 Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, (Beograd: Rad, I 1980, II 1981, III 1984)

Tito's charisma (Milovan Đilas), in which Vladimir Dedijer himself participated (*Prilozi za biografiju druga Tita* / Contributions for the Biography of Comrade Tito, 1951)⁹, *New Contributions for the Biography of Josip Broz Tito* marked the beginning of a reassessment of his role in the history of Yugoslav peoples and the Yugoslav state. Historical leaders in other countries are also subject to this same process. Their place shifts on the historical ladder until it stabilizes, depending on the criteria that have been formed in social consciousness. In Russia, for example, Stalin is still one of the greatest statesmen on the historical ladder, because – after Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – he created the largest Russian state. The reformers, both of Tsarist Russia (Alexander II), and the Soviet Union (Mikhail Gorbachev), are absent from the list of great statesmen. Based on that same criterion, the role of Tito was evaluated differently among Yugoslav peoples. In the minds of the Serbian people, Tito was the restorer of the Yugoslav state in which all Serbs lived together, but he was also responsible for its disintegration. For the other Yugoslav peoples, the priority was *what kind of state*, not *how big a state*. In their social consciousness, Tito played a decisive role in the creation of a common state on the federalist principle, but he was also responsible for its centralization, which was compatible with the interests of the [largest] majority nation [Serbs]. It was only in their own nation-states that they saw the possibility of preserving their identity, as well as the freedom of the individual. In any case, the *Law on the Use of the Name and Image of Josip Broz Tito* (1986) could no longer prevent the reassessment that began immediately after his death. It came from different sides and the motives were different.

Charisma builders, like Vladimir Dedijer, felt the need for a more objective approach to Tito's historical role, but also for revenge for "betrayed" expectations. Along with the condemnation "for his criminal role" by the representatives of all military formations defeated in the Second World War, and by political and social losers after 1945,

9 Vladimir Dedijer, *Prilozi za biografiju druga Tita*, (Beograd: Kultura 1953)

came the revenge of those from the internal conflicts in the Party (pro-Stalinists, members of the State Security Service). Tito's real personality "defied" simplifications, and especially reductions to the banal (*womanizer, hunter, fisherman*). The first breakthrough [in historiography] occurred at a three-day international conference of historians in Belgrade (May 2011). The gathering – organized by the Institute for Modern History of Serbia, the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Südost Institute from Regensburg – brought together some 70 [historians and social] scientists from 70 countries. The intentions of the organizers were expressed in the title of the proceedings from the conference: *Tito – viđenja i tumačenja*.¹⁰

*

After Tito's death, different perceptions of his role manifested themselves in the former Yugoslav republics, now already independent states. But different perceptions also appeared within each of the republics. These differences were the greatest in Serbia and Croatia. They do not permeate only historiography, literature and journalism. They are also reflected in public space: changes in names of cities, squares and streets; the demolition of monuments.¹¹ Nevertheless, in addition to condemning communism as totalitarianism, overlooking the historically conditioned nature of communism, denying and rejecting all of its legacies, at the same time all the while after Tito's death there was an attempt to view his [historical] person as complex. Such an approach was not unique to historians. Aleksandar Tišma, the most translated Serbian writer in the last two decades of the 20th century, a Central European intellectual of liberal orientation, otherwise critical of Tito, considered the balance between Serbs and Croats, achieved in the Yugoslav federation, to be Tito's great merit.

10 *Tito: viđenja i tumačenja* (zbornik radova), (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011)

11 Desimir Tošić, *Demokratska stranka 1920–1921*, (Beograd: Fond "Ljuba Davidović", 2006)

Croatian historians (Dušan Bilandžić, Ivo Goldstein, Tvrtko Jakovina, Ivana Peruško Vindakijević), and especially memoirists (Slavko Goldstein, General Ivan Mišković, diplomat Budimir Lončar), all warn of the possible [detrimental] fate of Croatia and the Croatian people had they not participated in the People's Liberation Struggle [NOB] led by Tito. They do not see the root of the modern Croatian state in the NDH¹², but in ZAVNOH¹³, that is – in the Yugoslav federation as the basis for the renewal of Yugoslavia. And according to some of them, without Tito's resistance to Stalin in 1948, the very identity of the Croatian people would have been called into question.¹⁴

Communism as *anti-Serbianism* was ever present in Serbian émigré circles after the Second World War. Covert in the country, it emerged on the public scene in 1987 (8th session of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists, CK SKS). This was the policy of adjustment, by force or under the pressure of circumstances (historian Branko Petranović believed that, after 1945, there was nothing that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ, could not impose on Serbia). In essence, the policy of Josip Broz Tito and Serbia's interests were compatible.

The policy of *brotherhood and unity* in the war led to the renewal of the Yugoslav state in which all Serbs lived together, and Serbia – under that name – “emerged” for the second time in history as one of the republics in the Yugoslav federation. In addition, Tito “leaned” both ideologically and politically on the Soviet Union, that is, on the Russian people (“Russian man”), on whose friendship the Serbian people always counted. In the anti-fascist war (1941–1945), a strong army

12 NDH – Independent State of Croatia, the World War II era puppet state of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

13 ZAVNOH – State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia, the chief Croatian political representative body in World War II Axis-occupied Croatia, allied with the Tito-led Communist Party of Yugoslavia

14 Ivana Peruško Vindakijević, *Od Oktobra do otpora. Mit o sovjetsko-Yugoslavs-kome bratstvu u Hrvatskoj i Rusiji kroz književnost, karikaturu i film (1917.-1991.)*, (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2018)

was created, a thing which Serbia always depended on in its struggle for the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. In his biography of Tito¹⁵, Slovenian historian Jože Pirjevec quotes German sources in which the Germans declared in writing, even before the Second Session of AVNOJ¹⁶, that if they managed to apprehend Tito they would treat him as a marshal. And for two main reasons: he was restoring a state and creating a strong army. Of no less importance for the aforementioned compatibility was the model of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This model had its roots in the Russian revolutionary populism of the second half of the 19th century: a close-knit organization of critically thinking individuals in a broad people's movement.¹⁷ Based on that model, the supporters of the Russian educated Svetozar Marković (1881–1882) created the first political party in Serbia – the People's Radical Party. Both Tito and Serbia favored a centralized unitary federation over a decentralized federation, and especially over a confederation. It was not until the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, SKJ (1964) that Tito declared himself as a Croat. This caused consternation among the Yugoslavs, who saw themselves as an emerging nation.

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Tito himself was aware of the key importance of Serbia for the reconstruction of Yugoslavia. Particularly, from 1941, and after the collapse of the Užice Republic (1941) – following which there were no more Partisan units in Serbia, except in the very south – until the final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia (1944–1945). When rumors started in Belgrade that Tito was behind the 10th Session of the Croatian League of Communists Central Committee, CK SKH (1970), at which the “federalization of the federation” (Vladimir Bakarić) was

15 Jože Pirjevec, *Tito in tovariši*, (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2011)

16 AVNOJ – Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia i.e. the wartime provisional Yugoslav government led by Tito.

17 Latinka Perović, *Ruske ideje i srpske replike (Uvodi u čitanja istorijskih izvora)*, (Sarajevo: University Press, 2019)

called for, Tito angrily retorted in a meeting with the top leadership of the Republic of Serbia (before Karadžević in 1971): “You permit these things to be said about me now, but [you know] I came here in 1941 and I started from here.” Only to return to Serbia in 1944. Finally, in the change of course in 1972, Tito supported the pro-centralization current in the League of Communists of Serbia.

The awareness of the compatibility of Tito’s interests and the interests of Serbia was mutual. This was not an unknown to the other interested parties in Yugoslavia either. At the time of the sharp internal struggles over the 1971 constitutional amendments, which paved the way for the Constitution of 1974, Edvard Kardelj (angrily) told the leaders of the League of Communists of Serbia, SKS: “Serbs have always resisted change.” And, when questioned in return “Only Serbs?” He replied: “Tito too”. In view of the above mentioned compatibility of interests, the issue of Tito’s “successor” had been important since the early sixties. There was no democratic procedure for Tito’s election; he was elected among the closest ranks of the top party leadership, which could also have meant on the basis of the momentary balance of power in it. “Federal Serbians” (Koča Popović, Milentije Popović and Mijalko Todorović), who after 1945 worked mostly in federal bodies, were, along with Vladimir Bakarić [from Croatia], the closest to the orientation represented, after 1948, by Edvard Kardelj [from Slovenia]; while Aleksandar Ranković, the organizational secretary of the Party, the head of the State Security since the war and the representative of the Republic of Serbia in the highest federal bodies, was closer to Tito himself. Kardelj undoubtedly had great power on the ideological front and Ranković at the level of operative power in the Party and the state. Both were needed by Tito until the question of the choice of Yugoslavia’s orientation in its development after 1960 arose.

After being wounded while hunting in 1960 (Jovan Veselinov, secretary of the Serbian League of Communists, allegedly by accident), Kardelj was away for a long “treatment” abroad, but in fact – isolated. The struggle over Tito’s “successor” was, in essence, a struggle over the choice of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy after him. It did not

take place past Tito, but also not without the struggle of various factions to win him over. This explains the forming of a coalition within the Yugoslav party leadership to remove Aleksandar Ranković from political life (the famous 4th Plenum of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee, CK SKJ, in Brioni in 1966). The affair over the clandestine wiretapping of Tito served as a pretext. This was never accepted in Serbia. Those directly involved in shedding light on the affair now write that they did not find evidence of Tito having been wiretapped, something that was allegedly organized by Aleksandar Ranković, and believe that the affair served to resolve conceptual struggles in the Yugoslav leadership (General Ivan Mišković, head of the [military] Counterintelligence Service). Yet again, the end had justified the means.

In addition to many works about Josip Broz Tito after his death in Slovenia and Croatia, two biographies of Tito [by historians] were also written there: Jože Pirjevec, *Tito in tovarisi* (2011, Tito and Comrades)¹⁸ and Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, *Tito* (2015).¹⁹ In Serbia there is still no scholarly study of Tito from the pen of a Serbian historian. However, in the books published so far, there are two opposing interpretations. In his book *Tito* (1998)²⁰, Todor Kuljić, a professor of sociology at the University of Belgrade, views Tito in the context of the Serbian autocratic tradition and affirms the compatibility of his ideological interest and the Serbian national interest for a centralized, unitary Yugoslavia. The most prolific *Titologist* after the death of Josip Broz Tito was journalist Pero Simić. According to him, Tito spearheaded a policy contrary to the national and state interests of the Serbs. This interpretation is reflected even in the very titles of his books: *Kada Tito, kako Tito, zašto Tito* (1983, When, How and Why Tito); *Tito – agent Kominterne* (1990, Tito – Agent of the Comintern); *U krvavom krugu – Tito i raspad Jugoslavije* (1993, In the Bloody Circle – Tito and

18 Jože Pirjevec, *Tito in tovariši*, (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2011)

19 Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, *Tito*, (Zagreb: Profil, 2015)

20 Todor Kuljić, *Tito. Sociološko-istorijska studija*, (Beograd: Institut za političke studije, 1998)

the Disintegration of Yugoslavia); *Slom Titovog carstva* (1999, The Collapse of Tito's Empire); *Ode vožd* (2001, The Leader is Gone).

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The narrative of writer and national ideologue Dobrica Ćosić carried special significance in the interpretation of Tito's role. His influence was also salient on its interpretation in Serbia as such. In deconstructing the myth about Tito and *Titoism*, Ćosić tended to lose sight of the fact that his attitude towards Tito had several phases and that these corresponded to his attitude towards the Serbian people: from adulation to hatred. As a delegate to the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ (1950), Ćosić spent sleepless nights because five delegates did not vote for Tito. A companion, by Tito's choice, on the voyage of the [presidential] ship "Galeb" [Seagull] to African countries (1961). Writer of the foreword for the book of Tito's compiled writings on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Partisan uprising, published by the Serbian Literary Guild [SKZ]. Author of the letter to Tito, in which he protested the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, warning him that he, Tito, would also no longer be what he was when Ranković was around. And later, his accession speech at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [SANU], *Dobitnik u ratu, gubitnik u miru* [Winner in War, Loser in Peace], about the [fate of the] Serbian people (1977), to which Tito, among others, reacted publicly. Only, in his *Dnevnici* [Diaries] and in the book *Promene* [Changes], after Tito's death, to compare his "supreme commander", as he liked to call him, to Caligula, finally branding him as "the greatest enemy of the Serbian people".

Mutually identified, Tito and Yugoslavia shared the same fate. With the victory of Slobodan Milošević, in the League of Communists of Serbia ("Even after Tito – Tito") it was a given that at the 8th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (1987), the answer to the question "Who will be the new Tito?", that is, what will Yugoslavia be like after him, had been provided. At the same time, in the informal opposition in Serbia, the debates over the 1915 Treaty

of London were renewed. Despite the already established results of [historical] research²¹, claims were made that this treaty allows for the possibility of creating a Greater Serbia. Political scientists²² and sociologists²³ cited research conducted on the eve of the [Yugoslav] wars. By far the largest number of respondents in the entire country was in favor of the survival of Yugoslavia as a democratic federation. At the same time, new legitimacy was sought through the denial of Yugoslavia's achievements and in its rejection due to the "betrayed expectations" of its peoples, which were different in each case. Falsification of facts and deliberate lying returned as "divine punishment", in the form of an internal war at the end of the 20th century, and the protracted (still unfinished) and difficult dissolution of Yugoslavia.

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For generations born after the Second World War, Yugoslavia was a stable and, after 1948, increasingly open country. For older generations – it provided the longest period of peace. For Serbia, which fought several wars for the liberation and unification of its people (eight, in a span of 117 years) – it was a break. Constant preparations for war, human losses (1.2 million casualties in World War I alone; 53 percent of men between the ages of 18 and 55; 264,000 disabled) and post-war frustrations, have never allowed for a reexamination of war as a way to achieve unification. This didn't take place even after Tito's death, at a time of a deep crisis of the Yugoslav state and intimations of a new paradigm in international relations. On the contrary, the tacit understanding of the Yugoslav state as an enlarged Serbia, which had also lived through the formula of brotherhood and unity, in changed historical circumstances became explicit. Based on this

21 Đorđe Đ. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje*, I–II, (Beograd: BIGZ, 1995); Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, Srpska književna zadruga, 1986)

22 Dejan Jović, *Država koja je odumrla*, (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003)

23 Srećko Mihailović, "Odnos prema demokratiji u istraživanjima javnog mnjenja", *Sociološki pregled* 1/1995.

view, a broad unity of politics, science, literature and the masses was manifest in Serbia. Thus, the President of the Serbian republic-level Presidency (General Nikola Ljubičić, who was State Secretary for National Defense for 15 years), stated: “Yugoslavia will be defended by Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s Army, the JNA”.²⁴ For the historian, “Yugoslavia was a state of the Serbian people inhabited [also] by Croats and Slovenes”.²⁵ For the novelist, “Serbia was a winner in war and a loser in peace” (Dobrica Ćosić). At mass rallies after 1980, there was singing of: “Serbia has fought three times and will fight again if luck will have it.” Avoiding mobilization was considered *treason* and treated as a punishable offense. War was being announced and widely propagated. And traditional Serbian allies were counted on: the Soviet Union was still in existence. For the other peoples of Yugoslavia, the choice was narrow: to agree to this or to resist it: first by offering an alternative, and then by arms.

4.

GLOBAL CHANGES: REACTIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA

The world in the 1980s was different from what it was at the beginning of the Cold War, when it was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. The results of scientific and technological revolutions were measurable. Production was modernized. The end of colonialism brought new countries to the world stage – the countries of the Third World. By way of non-aligned policy and opposition to neo-colonialism and imperialism, these countries became a factor that both blocs had to reckon with. Nuclear weapons still threatened the planet. At the same time, the danger of war was bringing the world together. Ideological differences were becoming relative while coexistence was more and more acceptable. The arms race, in which the Soviet Union was increasingly

24 Ivan Stambolić, *Koren zla*. Urednik i priređivač Latinka Perović, (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002)

25 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Srbi i Jugoslavija: prostor, društvo, politika (pogled s kraja veka)*, (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 1998)

lagging behind, led to détente; which in turn led to a reduction of the arms race that marked the Cold War. A new paradigm in international relations had become the imperative of the times.

Part of this process was also the crisis of “real socialism”, that is, the international communist movement. Criticism of Stalin’s personality cult at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the unmasking of state terror in the Soviet Union, to which literary narratives (Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago* and “Gulag literature” in general) had greatly contributed, compromised the Soviet model of socialism. The opening of debates on Stalinism: was it an aberration of Leninism or was it systemic? Uprisings in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and their suppression by intervention of Warsaw Pact troops.²⁶ Attempts [at reform] made by N. S. Khrushchev and his stopping short at the ideological barrier. Stagnation and decay during L. I. Brezhnev. The theory of “limited sovereignty” deepens the crisis in the socialist camp. Attempts at reform are halted by intervention of Warsaw Pact troops. It becomes increasingly clear that the Soviet model of socialism cannot be reformed without being called into question. At its center, in the Soviet Union, a policy of *new thinking* (the *glasnost* and *perestroika* of Mikhail Gorbachev) emerged. The disintegration of the Eastern European bloc through peaceful surrender of power, and the shift towards European integration. The door to a better future appeared to be wide open. In the general euphoria, only a few individuals, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Leszek Kolakowski in Poland, remained cautious. They took experience into account. They knew, as Jürgen Kocka says, that “the past refuses to retreat.”

Always and everywhere, revolutions, dynastic coups and radical changes of political regimes were labeled by their protagonists as a “new beginning”. This meant setting up firm boundaries toward previous periods. Yugoslavia in the 1980s couldn’t evade this rule either. How did it react to these changes? The shortest answer would be: in

26 Zdeněk Mlynář, *Mraz dolazi iz Kremlja*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1985)

different ways, but only under the condition that the answer is not sought from a supra-national (Yugoslav), but from a national (republic-level) perspective. In addition, generational differences must be kept in mind, especially when it comes to elites.

Elites whose members were born before the Balkan Wars and before the First World War lost their legitimacy at the end of the Second World War. The elites (communists), whose members were born after the First World War – and who acted underground, fought in the national liberation war and carried out a revolutionary change of government – had legitimacy after 1945. They started to lose it before the 1980s, only to maintain it by force and inertia during that decade. There were already elites on the social and political scene in Yugoslavia whose members were born after the Second World War. However, they were not as yet institutionalized. Their members belonged to the communist party, but not all shared its ideological values. The elites whose members were born after the Second World War were especially responsive to the above mentioned global changes. A small number (born between 1950 and 1970), mostly artists in various fields of artistic endeavor, were critical of the situation in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, but their orientation was modern and transnational. The larger and by far more influential part evolved rapidly: from communist party membership to anti-communism and nationalism.²⁷ There was no time, no readiness, or even ability, to reflect on the socialist period. Branded as communist, it was rejected wholesale.²⁸ The situation in the Yugoslav state and society, which had been provoking revolt and calling for a revolution since the 1920s, was being overlooked. “All this and probably much more is lost,” as Hannah Arendt says in her work *On Revolution*, “when the spirit of revolution, which is also the spirit

27 Vladimir Gligorov, “Ratnici i trgovci. Pragmatizam i legalizam”, u: *Zoran Đinđić: etika odgovornosti. Zbornik radova*, ur. Latinka Perović, (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006)

28 Dubravka Stojanović, “Traumatični krug srpske opozicije” u: *Srpska strana rata. Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju*, (Beograd: Republika – Zrenjanin: Građanska čitaonica, 2002)

of a new beginning, does not find suitable institutions. That failure cannot be compensated by anything other than to prevent that loss from becoming final by remembering and thinking about what happened.” In thinking about the decade in which the untenable nature of socialist Yugoslavia became certain, because the solution in the wake of the “new beginning” was brought into question (the confederate form of sovereign peoples and its appropriate form of governance), lies also the meaning of the book *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* and the motives and approach of its authors.

5.

**POST-TITOISM: BETWEEN LIBERATION FROM DOGMAS
AND TABOOS AND DENIAL OF ACHIEVEMENTS**

The key question regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia still remains – why did it take place in such a brutal way? The war of “all against all”; mass war crimes on ethnic and religious grounds; planned ethnic cleansing; genocide – this was all contrary to the spirit of the times. It also ran against the achievements of modern civilization – the demolition of cities and memorial architecture and the devastation of cultural institutions. These were all manifestations of brutality, but from what kind of policy, from what ideas and goals did the brutality itself arise?

In all nations [i.e. peoples] there is a boundary that divides them from one another and, at the same time, leads to divisions within each of them. On one side there are freedom and independence, on the other – imposed subservience and dependence. It was precisely this truth that was recklessly relativized in the 1980s. Irrespective of methodology, hierarchy of knowledge, arguments and experience – all opinions became equally relevant in choosing the future. Confusion was generated, but there was also conscious denial of scientific knowledge, even in natural sciences (the theories of Charles Darwin and Giordano Bruno). This created the conditions for the return of historiographical romanticism, as well as various restorations (monarchist, clerical). For its part, the theory of totalitarianism leveled the

differences between socialist countries in how the political monopoly of communist parties was established, and in the degree of its acceptability. Differences were erased between those countries which, by agreement of the representatives of the great powers at the end of the Second World War, became part of the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, and into which communism rolled in on Soviet tanks. And those countries in which communism was established as a result of their own national liberation struggle and revolution. For the first, for example for Czechoslovakia, communism was an aberration imposed by occupation. For the others, like Yugoslavia, communism was, in the given historical circumstances, an alternative. This difference, along with the common characteristics of the system (property relations and political monopoly) influenced a greater or lesser degree of dependence on the Soviet Union. And in the Cold War division of the world, that meant having greater or lesser maneuvering space for change.

“Every time has a history deserving of itself,” Serbian historian and politician Stojan Novakovic used to say. What is the “deserving of itself” history of the Yugoslav state (1945–1991)? That question cannot be answered without viewing that history in continuity (establishment, duration, crisis and disintegration). So, from this point of view, what do the 1980s look like? What do, therefore, the Yugoslav 1980s look like from this point of view?

The road to [historical] scientific knowledge is long since it implies the “crystallization” of historical processes. In the meantime, various interpretations emerge, most often from the standpoint of the *winners* and the *losers*. From 1945 to 1991, Yugoslavia was dominated, as we have said, by the interpretation of the *victors* in the Second World War and the revolution. At the same time, among the Yugoslav émigrés – who were ethnically, ideologically and politically diverse – an interpretation by the *defeated* emerged. The collision of these two parallel interpretations took place precisely in the 1980s, when doubt was already beginning to erode the ruling interpretation. History became popular, “entering into every home” (Dobrica Ćosić).

Previously unavailable works were being published and read. Historiography began to “serve” national policies and enjoyed state support. There was a return to national romanticism, for which it was thought, already in the 19th century, to have been surpassed in historiography in favor of critical historiography: 1878 (Ilarion Ruvarac) and 1879, and later the debate among Serbian historians (1989). There was also a “real downpour of para-historiography” (Andrej Mitrović). The media provided its own contribution to the falsification of facts and to *raising lies to the level of a means of survival for the Serbian people*.²⁹ And the people are cajoled and flattered: they become victims and an object of conspiracies. It was as if Herzen’s thought was being ignored, if it was known at all: “The people are not good because they are nice, but rather the people are nice because they are good.”³⁰

The resistance put up by the profession to this conservative shift in Serbian historiography was without wider effect in the short run, but it nevertheless had long-term significance. During the history of Serbian historiography (S. M. Ćirković, R. Mihaljčić), its development towards critical historiography was clearly outlined. A distinction was made between *historical consciousness* and *historical knowledge* (Ivan Đurić). The consequences of the shift in Serbian historiography in the 1980s were not unpredictable to all historians: “Serbian historiography does not exist on the world stage today. We have not been present at world congresses since 1985 ...” Serbian historians are divided, above all, “in their views on historiography”³¹

There were responses from the other side as well. Numerous memoirs, diaries and anthologies of previously unknown documents were published. The crisis and the collapse of communism, seemingly paradoxically, also had a liberating effect on members of the communist movement: the participants in the People’s Liberation Struggle [NOB]

29 Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)*, (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 2000)

30 A. I. Hercen, *Ruski narod i socijalizam*, (Podgorica, CID, 1999)

31 Latinka Perović, *Dominantna i neželjena elita. Beleške o intelektualnoj i političkoj eliti u Srbiji (XX–XXI vek)*, (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2015)

and revolution, the restorers of the Yugoslav state and the activists of a *new society*. Many of the dilemmas they had held back speaking about publicly because of ideological unity, or political opportunity (the phenomenon of *supervised historiography*, after 1945), they would nevertheless confide privately into their diaries and memoirs. Many of them started publishing these after 1980. This was also their reaction to the simplification of the truth and its political use. To shed light on the truth from their point of view, many of these authors in the process wrote their first and only book.

The emergence of this type of source (Ana Miljanić cites 400 diaries and memoirs of this kind in her doctoral dissertation) was a reaction to the availability of sources from the point of view of truth of the defeated or vanquished side. One could almost say that in these sources the conflict between *revolution* and *counter-revolution* continued – only by other means. These parallel interpretations, however, added a human dimension to event history. In addition, parallel interpretations also resulted in opening up of repressed issues (the Ravna Gora i.e. Chetnik movement; Partisan negotiations with the Germans; compulsory redemption of agricultural products; Goli otok / Barren Island internment camp; political confrontations within the Party). This influenced radically different answers to the question: whether socialist Yugoslavia – [having previously been] one of the most backward countries in Europe on the eve of World War II, and which, due to conflicting national interests, in the time from 1918 to 1941 failed to find a formula for its own sustainability; and in 1941 was occupied and divided; having also gone through a civil war that left deep divisions within each of the Yugoslav peoples – and then in international relations (1937–1941; 1941–1945; 1945–1950; 1950–1989); and a country which was “at the edge of East and West” during the bloc division of the world³² – was it, then, possible in a country with such a heritage to have done things differently and better

32 Tvrтко Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar. Od Preka do vrha svijeta*, (Zaprešić: Faktura, 2020)

after 1945? What was the *reality*, and what the *possibility* between 1945 and 1960, and what after 1960?

6.

**OPPOSING POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING THE YUGOSLAV
CRISIS: THE FATE OF YUGOSLAVIA ON THE MAP**

In the period between 1960 and 1980, within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, SKJ, that is, within the ranks of its top leadership, three possibilities took shape. The first was to preserve the monopoly of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia utilizing the ideological and political unity of the Party, and on the basis of past achievements (industrialization, urbanization, education). The second, to avoid stagnation through further emancipation: modernizing and democratizing, including introducing changes to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself. In the Party, which was no longer a narrow cadre but a mass party, the principle of democratic centralism was, above all, a way of disciplining the leaderships, especially at the republic and provincial levels. The unity of the Party was the condition for the unity of the country. Finally, different views emerged within the Party on the further development of Yugoslavia after 1960. Reconciliation with the Soviet Union removed the foreign policy threat; the country's own path to socialism influenced neutrality in a bloc-divided world; growth rates were not as high as between 1955 and 1960; the demands and expectations of citizens who could no longer find satisfaction only within *administrative socialism* increased; differences in development could no longer be reduced by centralized planning, something that was to the detriment of the more developed parts of the country as the engines of growth for the entire country; opening up to the West led to increased financial assistance for modernizing the economy, but it opened the possibility of comparison as well.

At the top of the Party, differences emerged about the further strategy of development. They also expressed themselves as conceptual differences at the very top of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Their informal advocates were one Serb and one Slovene, but the differences were not ethnic: to a greater or lesser extent they ran across all the [six] republics and both provinces. Around Aleksandar Ranković [a Serb] were gathered the supporters of consolidating the state through reinforcing centralism and unitarism and defending the privileges acquired during [the period of] *administrative socialism*. Any manifestation of idiosyncrasy or any demand for greater autonomy was treated as separatism and irredentism. On the other hand, proponents of further modernization of the country, its decentralization and democratization gathered around Edvard Kardelj [a Slovene]. Having equally in mind Tito's charisma, but also his objective role in the one-party system, advocates of both views at the Party's top vied to win him over. These differences remained covered-up in the party leadership because its unity was a condition for the unity of the Party as a whole, and it, in turn, was a condition for the unity of the state. But, as [these differences were] objective, they [inevitably] broke into the public [domain] through a debate between Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić and Slovenian literary historian Dušan Pirjevec³³ about, on the one hand, *Yugoslavism* as a form of integration in which the republics or [even ethnic] nations will cease to exist; and, on the other, *Yugoslavism* as an interest-based and voluntary association of peoples that also presupposes broader European integration. The latter was not a novel view among Slovenes. Previously, Slovenian communists in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes spoke about this possibility (Dragotin Gustinčič).³⁴ This was the reason why the *Osvobodilna fronta* [Liberation Front] in Slovenia was part of the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia.³⁵ Dobrica Ćosić and Edvard Kardelj (1956), but also Slovenian intellectuals (1980), had

33 Taras Kermauner, *Pisma srbskemu prijatelju*, (Celovec: Drava, 1989)

34 Videti u: Latinka Perović, *Od centralizma do federalizma*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1984)

35 Aleš Bebler, *Kako sam hitao: Sećanja*, (Beograd: Četvrti jul, 1982)

different views about this. Only to have Milan Kučan³⁶ say the following in 2019: “You can’t change your state like you change a shirt – after all, we Slovenes invested a lot in Yugoslavia. It was our state too, and as long as the country could change in the direction we wanted, every effort had to be made to do so. The moment it was understood that this is not possible, an alternative had to be sought. I do not believe anyone in Slovenia who says they were born with the ambition for Slovenia to be an independent state. My commitment was that everything possible should be done to preserve the country as a democratic, European-oriented country with modern internal relations, while this was possible, while we could recognize [Yugoslavia] as our state.” What was novel, however, was that these different views, for the first time in socialist Yugoslavia, were expressed in the form of a debate between a Serbian and a Slovenian intellectual. Backing each of them was the party elite in their respective republics.³⁷ A similar alliance was formed in Croatia in 1970, and in Serbia in 1986. The division between these alliances was not about the question of *whether Yugoslavia*, but about *what kind of Yugoslavia*. Insurmountable differences in the answer to this question made every kind of Yugoslavia unsustainable and determined the way of its departure from the historical scene, and its disappearance from the map of European states.

In Serbia, the vacuum was filled with dreams of the future as a renewed past. The Guslar movement³⁸ in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina celebrated the Serbian medieval past and glo-

36 Milan Kučan – top Slovenian politician in the period just before and during the break-up of Yugoslavia.

37 Latinka Perović, “Kako su se izražavali različiti politički interesi u Jugoslaviji. Polemika između Dobrice Ćosića i Dušana Pirjevca 1961/62. godine”, *Dijalog povijesničara – istoričara*, (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Naumann, 2005); Aleš Gabrič, “Slovene Intellectuals and the Communist Regime”, *Slovene Studies*, vol 23, n. 1–2, 2001.

38 The gusla or lahuta is a single-stringed folk musical instrument traditionally played in the Balkans with a bow and usually accompanied by singing, musical folklore or epic poetry.

rified Tsar Dušan's empire which, after all, was not a state of Serbs only.³⁹

The [Serbian Orthodox] Church, as an institution, but also individual members of the intellectual elite, looked back to the Middle Ages as a starting point for the reconstruction of their "lost" [Serbian] identity. *New – old* foundations had to be laid on the ruins of the legacy of the modern age, including the legacy of socialist Yugoslavia. This was not only metaphorical. In the [Yugoslav] wars of the 1990s, cities were demolished (Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Mostar). The statement of Božidar Vučurević (truck driver before the war, local leader of Radovan Karadžić's party, and mayor of Trebinje during the war) is well-known: "If necessary, we will build an even prettier and older Dubrovnik".⁴⁰ A small group of intellectuals in Serbia, mostly critical historians, publicly protested against the destruction of Dubrovnik. In that barbaric act, they saw the breakdown of modern civilization in Serbia as well. And Bogdan Bogdanović (professor of architecture at the University of Belgrade, world renowned builder of memorial architecture and at one time also the mayor of Belgrade) saw in the demolition of cities a conflict with civilization itself. "It is not clear to me," he said, "what kind of military doctrine dictates that one of the first goals, perhaps the very first, should be the destruction of cities. The civilized world will, sooner or later, shrug off with indifference our mutual carnage. But they will never forgive our destruction of cities. We will be remembered – and that means us, the Serbian side – as the destroyers of cities, the new Huns. The horror of Westerners is understandable. For hundreds of years now already, they have

39 Tsar Dušan – Stefan Dušan, or Dušan the Mighty, reigned as tsar over an empire of Serbs and Greeks from 1346 to 1355. This was the largest Serbian controlled territory in history that stretched from the Danube in the north to the Gulf of Corinth in the south, with its capital in Skopje.

40 Trebinje is a Serb-majority town in Bosnia-Herzegovina located in the hills just above Dubrovnik, which is in Croatia. Trebinje and its location were used by Yugoslav Army and Serbian forces to shell and lay siege to Dubrovnik in 1991 and 1992 during the Yugoslav wars.

not distinguished, even etymologically, between the terms “city” and “civilization”. They cannot, and should not, understand the senseless demolition of cities as anything else but a manifest bullying opposition to the highest values of civilization.” It should also be noted that part and parcel of this same doctrine was the political and physical removal of the leading people with a modern orientation, that is, the removal of the *inner West* [in Serbia]. Both – the destruction of the material legacy of civilization and the political and physical elimination of people – result from isolation and parochial self-sufficiency. Serbian archaeologist Dragoslav Srejović (professor at the University of Belgrade, world-renowned for the discovery of Lepenski Vir archaeological site) warned during the 1980s that the loss of the ability to communicate with the world and to compare with others leads to the historical decline of peoples.

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From a distance of 30 years, it becomes clearer that the changes that affected the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 were differently anticipated in different parts of Yugoslavia. Related to this were the differences in views on Yugoslavia in 1980 and in 1989. During this decade, essentially two different responses to internal and external challenges took shape: one in Slovenia, the other in Serbia. Both responses were initiated in the intellectual elites of the two republics. After 1980, Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals conducted talks and corresponded publicly. As no compromise was reached in the dialogue, two different national programs were drafted (the Serbian, in the Academy of Sciences and Arts’ Memorandum of September 1986; the Slovenian, in the Ljubljana periodical *Nova revija*, No. 37, February 1987). Without a consensus in their mutual dialogue, Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals then reached a consensus with their respective political elites, including party elites, in their own republics.

If, as Ivo Banac says, in resistance to centralism, unitarism and Serbian hegemony in the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs / Yugoslavia, Croatia had the role of an *admiral ship*, that role in the

socialist federation was taken over by Slovenia. This was undoubtedly also influenced by the fact that the Slovene Edvard Kardelj was the main theorist of the *Yugoslav road to socialism*, that is, of self-management, that last modern utopia.⁴¹ And the architect of all constitutional changes in socialist Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1974. Edward Kardelj saw a Yugoslav federation which included the right of peoples [nations] to self-determination as the most important legacy of the 1941–1945 revolution. At the same time, he was well aware of its deep contradictions and its fragility. Just as he was aware of the balance of power in the international communist movement whose center was the Soviet Union, and in international relations in a bloc-divided world. In order for the Yugoslav state framework not to be called into question, Kardelj was prepared to retreat before the various challenges of democratization, and especially, liberalization of society as a whole. This was true both in affairs of domestic politics (the Milovan Đilas case in the 1950s; the Croatian Spring in the 1970s; the reformist current in the League of Communists of Slovenia; the Serbian liberals in the 1970s), as well as in foreign policy (events in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968). For his supporters in the Party, this was not only political opportunism, but also ideological dogmatism. On the other hand, both his own personal and his generational experience were informing him that the past had not yet receded completely: neither the one from 1918–1941 nor the one from 1945–1948. When he read the *Propositions for the Reorganization of the League of Communists*, drafted by a special committee after the Brioni Plenum in 1966 (Tito disavowed the committee's work as an attempt to abolish the Party), Kardelj said: "This is the best proposal so far, but if 'push comes to shove,' a party like this one [that we already have] will be good enough." And in a conversation with the leaders of the Serbian League of Communists, on the eve of Tito's conversation with the political leaders from Serbia (October 1972), in which they would be

41 Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Nastanek, razvoj in razpad Karađorđevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije*, (Koper: Lipa, 1995)

under attack for spreading “liberalism” in the Party, Kardelj would say: “You do not understand the balance of power.” And, when asked to explain it to them, Kardelj said: “Either we will squeeze them, or they will squeeze us”.⁴² For Kardelj the choice was always tight for several reasons, including his own ideological limitations: he was certainly not a liberal democrat. Nevertheless, within the top leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, he was the person around whom – frequently in opposition to Tito – the faction that sought to abandon the Soviet model of socialism and the Bolshevik type of party gathered. To be honest, however, this was a faction, in which it was clearer what to stay away from than what to move towards. Kardelj feared what was *worse*, but without him it would surely have been *worse*. His frequent reforms did not lead to a radical change of the *existing order*, but they were always slightly different from the existing order. Perhaps the most accurate assessment is that [his reforms] made it difficult for the most rigid characteristics of the one-party system to take hold.

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Of course, it is easy enough to reconstruct events chronologically. It is much harder to describe the atmosphere, and especially to penetrate into the state of mind [characterizing historical events]. Both are, of course, also the subject of literary narratives. But, without the efforts of historiography to reveal the meaning of events, given to them by people, history loses its meaning.⁴³ However, one cannot, only on the basis of one type of historical sources, draw conclusions about the atmosphere and state of mind in a society. On the contrary, it is precisely the need to know what event history does not reveal that has led historians to different kinds of sources. For example, historian Mitja Velikonja has used his analysis of graffiti [“graffitology”]

42 Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga. Ishod političkog rascjepa u CKJ 1971/1972*. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991)

43 Novica Milić, *Politička naratologija. Ogled o demokratiji*, (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2020)

to reveal a world of anonymous but highly motivated people.⁴⁴ Usually at night, with paint and brush, or with spray, they come in front of facades of various buildings and write *graffiti* on them. These graffiti are, in fact, summaries of their thoughts on [for example] the time before and after 1980. Their assessments, warnings and messages. No less important than their content is the way graffiti come into being. Why do these people want to remain anonymous: out of fear, lack of other opportunity to express their opinions, or for some other reason? In any case, graffiti are a great panorama of views that reflect the atmosphere and spirit of a time.

A number of authors, most of them historians (Holm Sundhausen, John Lampe, Srđan Milošević, Igor Duda, Vesna Pusić), talk about *Yugoslav society* as something that should be a synthesis of diversity and unity. Some, however, see only its surface. A number of parallel worlds lived together in Yugoslav society: rural and urban, agrarian and industrial, patriarchal and modern. And several generations lived in each of these worlds: the past and the present simultaneously. They are divided by different mentalities and belong to different cultures – whole spheres of civilization divide them. Is there a point where they nevertheless intersect and touch and is this point the same before and after 1980?

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The general feeling was that with the death of Josip Broz Tito, one era had ended and a new one had begun. The old was a certainty. As the longest period of peace and of relatively successful development of the country, it provided, at least seemingly, a form of security. The new was an uncertainty: a political and psychological void which fueled fears of the future. Ill forebodings were also aroused by the economic crisis of that time. This crisis was partly the echo of the international oil crisis, but also of abandoning economic reforms in

44 Mitja Velikonja, *Politički grafiti iz postjugoslovenskih država Balkana i Srednje Evrope*, (Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2020)

the country.⁴⁵ Initiated by the party leadership, the two economic reforms – of 1961 and 1965 – were both suspended by that very same leadership (Tito’s speech in Split in 1962 and Tito’s speech to students in 1968). Boris Krajger, a reform-oriented Slovenian politician, used to say: “Reform is war.” War against the established way of doing business and the established way of thinking, against acquired privileges and social parasitism. However, the most difficult thing was to overcome the ideological barrier. President of the Federal Assembly, Milentije Popović, spoke at the time of the *conspiracy against economic reform*. However, the revolt of young people and the support Tito gave them both have an anthropological and ideological dimension. *Equality* was a substantive element of communist ideology which – in contrast to the reforms of capitalism – sought to *speed up history* and *skip* capitalism through revolution. This explains the resonance communist ideology had in underdeveloped agrarian countries, that is, among proletarian peoples in relation to countries in the developed industrial West. Part of the communist ethos, *equality* had become an instrument for maintaining the political monopoly of communist parties in these countries. Hence attempts at economic reforms, which necessarily led to social stratification and inequality, failed in all countries of state socialism, including Yugoslavia. In order to succeed, the Party had to go against the current and question its own ideology, that is, itself as a historical subject.⁴⁶

Theoretically speaking, the possibilities for economic reforms were greater after 1980. They were the imperative of the time, and Tito was no longer around to declare – with strong resonance in the population, the working class and the communist intelligentsia – their abandonment in the name of more socialism.

The global student uprising of 1968 was, in its essence, anarchist. Rebellious students rejected both the Western European state with its capitalism and liberal democracy, and state socialism with

45 Vladimir Gligorov, “Ratnici i trgovci. Pragmatizam i legalizam”

46 Veljko Stanić, *Parče velikog života: Mitra Mitrović o tridesetim godinama 20. veka*

the dominance of ideology and politics over the economy. But in each specific country the 1968 student uprising also had its specific characteristics.

At the University of Belgrade social issues were dominant. This was a reaction to some of the consequences of the 1965 economic reforms: increased social inequality, reduced employment, people going abroad to find work, the emergence of private initiative in the economy. This was not unpredictable. In talks within the Yugoslav party leadership ahead of the 1961 economic reform, Veljko Vlahović – speaking of resistance to economic reform – said it would cause shock among young people. While the leading figure of the Belgrade group around the [Yugoslav Marxist] journal *Praxis*, Professor Mihailo Marković, said: “We managed to bring down the reform.” The student uprising at the University of Belgrade in 1968 was, in essence, the *swan song* of the socialist left in Serbia going back to the time of the middle of the 19th century. It strengthened Tito’s authority, who in turn, through a public address to students, strengthened his alliance with students.

Objectively, the opportunities for economic reform were fewer after 1980. The three federal governments of the 1980s (Branko Mikulić, Milka Planinc, Ante Marković) found themselves not only facing an ideological barrier, but also confronted with opposing economic interests of the republics and provinces.⁴⁷ The Yugoslav party and state leadership became the battleground for conflicts of partial interests. Without the decisive role of Josip Broz Tito and with the rejection of decision-making by consensus, paralysis ensued. In that context, two radically opposed possibilities of resolving the Yugoslav crisis came to the fore, one in the Republic of Slovenia, the other in the Republic of Serbia. They differed in both objectives and means.

47 Vladimir Gligorov, “Ratnici i trgovci. Pragmatizam i legalizam”

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As early as the 1980s, the League of Communists of Slovenia began advocating three types of reforms: economic (market economy), of the political system (political pluralism, democratization and decentralization) and of the Party (abandoning the principle of democratic centralism). The immediate goal was inclusion into European integrations – [epitomized under the slogan] “Europa zdaj!” [Europe now!] This predilection met with strong resistance in the Yugoslav party leadership. Especially in Serbia, where the Slovenian course was objectively opposite to its own orientation. Slovenia was to be “disciplined” (Yugoslav political and military leadership), or “expelled” from Yugoslavia (the intellectual and political elite in Serbia). Research shows (Božo Repe) that the war against Slovenia, of course by other means, both in federal institutions and in Serbia, was fought long before the armed conflict between the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Slovenian Territorial Defense actually began (June 27, 1991). Pressure on Slovenia was exerted from within (preparations for a coup d’état, the “trial of four” in Ljubljana in the Serbo-Croatian [instead of Slovenian] language). This induced a mobilization of the Slovenian public and the withdrawal of Slovenian representatives from federal institutions (the Federation of Yugoslav Writers, the Yugoslav Youth Association, the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Constitutional Court).

A broad anti-Slovenian campaign was orchestrated in Serbia. The Slovenes were accused of ingratitude in the case of Serbia accepting Slovenian refugees during the Second World War. Claims were made they should be denied the right to statehood, because “they never had a state.” They were called [a nation of Austrian] “stable boys”. While the president of the Serbian Veterans Association, Mihailo Švabić, called them out from a rally: “If they don’t like it [Yugoslavia], they can leave.” Janez Stanovnik, a Slovenian scholar and politician, former director of the Institute for International Economics and Politics, rebutted – “no one will force Slovenians off of the territories they have always lived on”. The culmination was a gathering in Cankarjev dom

(February 1989), the first ever meeting between the government and the opposition in Slovenia. It was held in support of a strike by [Kosovo Albanian] miners in Trepča, who demanded the lifting of the state of emergency in Kosovo and the ending of the trial of Azem Vllasi, the Albanian political leader in Kosovo. In response, Serbia severed economic ties with Slovenia.

All the while the Slovenian leadership worked on two tracks. In federal institutions, which they considered as also being their own, they defended their platform, their own national interest. They advocated for the preservation of the Yugoslav state framework (a confederate union of Yugoslav peoples, an asymmetric federation – which was neither more nor less than what was allowed under the 1974 Constitution). At the same time, the Slovenian leadership carried out internal reforms: introduction of the multi-party system, the first multi-party elections (April 1990), preparation for independence. At the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, SKJ (January 1990), the reformist, essentially European, orientation of the Slovenian League of Communists was rejected. The Slovenian delegation walked out of the congress. The Croatian delegation followed. Although the reformist Prime Minister Ante Markovic stated at the congress that the *Yugoslav state still remains*, this was really the beginning of the end of the state as well. Thus, after the death of Tito, with the disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, yet another, second factor of its integration disappeared. The third and final still remained – the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA]. However, its role, as well as the role of the international community in the Yugoslav crisis, cannot be understood without the impetus given to events after 1980 by the Serbian platform which was, in fact, an expression of the broadest consensus reached in its recent history.

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In Serbia, after 1980, the resolution of the *Serbian question as a question of statehood (all Serbs in one state)* was set as a priority. Not only did that not exclude war, but war had been intimated at ever

since the removal of Aleksandar Ranković from political life. In his diaries from the 1960s, Dobrica Ćosić talks about the possibility of war, even in exactly the same order in which it will actually take place: “We will be at war with Croats, Muslims and Albanians.” However, state socialism (property relations and political monopoly) was not being called into question [in the Serbian platform]. After everything that transpired [in the Yugoslav wars], the two leading Serbian intellectuals, writer Dobrica Ćosić and philosopher Mihailo Marković, have written that they would choose the same path again. The 1974 Constitution, that is, [the issue of choosing between] the federal or the confederate form of the Yugoslav state, was subjected to criticism. Conceived as the basis for the continued unity of the Yugoslav state after Tito, the 1974 Constitution was adopted on the basis of the balance of power [in Yugoslavia]: Serbia, through its representatives in the constitutional commission, was against its provisions, while all other republics and both [Serbian autonomous] provinces supported the provisions. In Kosovo, the ethnic factor was decisive: according to the 1981 census, 77 percent of Kosovo inhabitants were Albanian and 15 percent were Serb. In Vojvodina, its multiethnicity was not without significance: 54.42 percent were Serbs and 43 percent national [ethnic] minorities, of which the largest was the Hungarian minority – 19 percent. However, Vojvodina’s economic and general developmental lagging behind after the Second World War was of no less, if not even greater importance (Ranko Končar, Dimitrije Boarov, Živan Marelj). This was the reason for constant tension in the relationship between the [Serbian] republic and the province [of Vojvodina], between centralism and the right to autonomy, including autonomy based on historical reasons [as in the case of Vojvodina]. There were even attempts to abolish the province (Miloš Minić, 1961) and to change its province-level leadership.

The fact that the autonomous provinces became constitutive elements of the Yugoslav federation under the 1974 Constitution was a cause of frustration in Serbia. In addition, the republics had the status of [ethnic based] nation-states, while a large number of Serbs

lived outside the Republic of Serbia. They considered Yugoslavia as their own state and with its possible disappearance they would turn to Serbia as their parent state. In this scheme of things, Serbia felt *unequal* and *humiliated*, and the Serbian people deceived: *winners in war, losers in peace*.

Even after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, Serbia had not reconciled itself to the status of the [two autonomous] provinces. All the more so since relations in the Republic of Serbia were not normatively spelled-out: the province-level authorities influenced decisions of the Republic [as a whole], while the decisions of republic-level authorities essentially had no bearing on the decisions of the provincial authorities. The Republic of Serbia was reduced to Central or *Rump Serbia*, which was irately referred to as 'UŽA-S' ["Rump-Serbia as Horror-Serbia"].

Even during Tito's lifetime, a request had been made in the legislative bodies of the Republic of Serbia for change in the status of the provinces via the publication of the *Blue Book* (1977). The balance of power in the Republic [after 1980] was more favorable than in 1971, when the constitutional amendments that were the basis for the 1974 Constitution were passed. The party leadership at that time, which did not identify Yugoslavia with Serbia, and which sought dialogue and compromise, was removed in 1972. But the anticipated moment came only after Tito's death. However, the change in the constitutional position of the provinces was to serve only as the first step in the revision of the 1974 Constitution as a whole. It was an overture, first by the intellectual elite through the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, SANU (1986), and then by the ruling elite itself – [this was the meaning of] the 8th Session of the League of Communists of Serbia, in which Slobodan Milošević's faction won, while he himself was elevated to the status of *leader of the Serbian nation*.

After the SANU Memorandum and the 8th Session of the Serbian League of Communists, others in Yugoslavia no longer ruled out the possibility of war. In Serbia war was talked about with certainty. In

the general population, this possibility was being received with ease, almost joyfully. Serbia had fought eight wars in 117 years. Material resources had been ruthlessly spent: it is not possible to wage war and engage in rebuilding and development at the same time. Foreigners who came to Serbia after the First World War had said that it left the impression of a country that was more given to war than to building. Living in constant preparation for war – the militarization of society, warring itself and post-war frustrations – had created a habitual culture of war for entire generations. However, the motto “If you want peace, prepare for war” – was also present in socialist Yugoslavia. It was reflected in the creation of a strong armed force, and it permeated propaganda and popular arts such as film. Generations born after 1945 did not have war as part of their experience, but it was part of their upbringing. Hence it was not unexpected that a song resounded from the mass rallies in the 1980s [with these lyrics]: “Serbia has gone to war three times and will again if luck would have it.” Kosovo served as the detonator. Not only personal, but also political differences were set aside. The President of the Serbian National Assembly, who was also the Serbian representative in the Federal Constitutional Commission, Dragoslav Draža Marković, and writer Dobrica Ćosić, wrote down in their diaries, independently of each other and later published, the very same sentence: “There is no Serbian hand that will be the signatory to [the creation of] *Kosovo Republic*.” Unlike the Slovenian primary objective “Europe Now”, Slobodan Milošević (July 7, 1988) announced a different priority: first statehood, then Europe. “Serbia,” he said, “after almost two centuries of peace and socialism, deserves to be at peace and free and not to have to enter a peaceful and strong Europe of the 21st century fighting for its territory, language, and even the very freedom of thousands of its citizens.”

In achieving *equality of Serbia with other republics*, the starting point was its centralization, that is, changing the constitutional status of the provinces. In the political and legislative bodies of Serbia this request had been made even before the SANU Memorandum and the 8th Session of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee.

Less than a year after the death of Tito, Kosovo became politically radicalized. Mass student demonstrations were held in Pristina (March 1981), which also spread to other cities in Kosovo, under the slogan: “Kosovo – Republic”. The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] and the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists acted in unison. The demonstrations in Kosovo were qualified as a “counter-revolution”. The Presidency of Yugoslavia declared a state of emergency in Kosovo, while the Serbian League of Communists began a debate on the constitutional status of the provinces (April 1981), in preparation for raising the issue of migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo at the next party congress (February 1982). The first organized arrivals of Serbs from Kosovo to Belgrade began the same month. They were received by state and party officials, but also by leading intellectuals. Dobrica Ćosić who, after his appeal at the 1968 session of the Serbian Communist Party Central Committee to change the existing policy on national [ethnic] relations, was dubbed “the father of the nation”, became “Grandpa” for the Kosovo Serbs. Some Serbian state and party officials opened the rostrum of the Federal National Assembly for them and promised solutions to old and new problems. This tactic came under criticism in the City Committee of the Belgrade League of Communists. Its qualification – “recklessly promised speed” (Dragiša Pavlović) – will act as the trigger for staging the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee 8th Session and a showdown with the faction which also advocated a change in the constitutional status of the provinces, but tried to avoid confrontation and strained relations with the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Ivan Stambolić).

A new twist in the strained relations between the Republic of Serbia and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo came about with the visit of Slobodan Milošević to Kosovo. At a rally of Serbs in Kosovo Polje (August 1987), organized with the help of the invisible but powerful State Security Service (Miroslav Šolević), itself brimming with revanchist feelings ever since the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, Slobodan Milošević uttered the famous sentence – “No one dare beat

you” – and was instantly catapulted into the role of “protector” of all Serbs, in stark contrast to the moderate “opportunists” in the leadership of Serbia.

Shortly after the 8th Session of the League of Communists of Serbia Central Committee, the Yugoslav League of Communists Central Committee (December 1987) reviewed the constitutional status of Serbia, that is, the relations between Serbia and its provinces. The other republics in Yugoslavia perceived this issue as an internal Serbian affair. In the hope that concessions to Serbia might stem the dangerous tide that has risen in it, they treated Serbia like nitroglycerin in the palm of their hand. And Serbia, with Slobodan Milošević already at its helm, utilized this to accelerate the changes in the constitutional status of the provinces. The Presidency of Serbia launched an initiative to change the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. “Kosovo Truth rallies” were first held in Serbia, and then they were “exported” to Vojvodina and Montenegro. The slogans and the arms came from Serbia. Since these rallies led to the fall of the leaderships in Vojvodina (Đorđe Stojšić) and Montenegro (Marko Orlandić, Radivoje Rade Brajović), they were stopped at the borders of Slovenia. In Serbia, there was a strong mobilization of the masses (one million people had gathered at a rally at Ušće in Belgrade, November 1988). The whole country was in dramatic turmoil. Albanian miners were on strike at the Stari trg mine in Kosovo (February 1989); the gathering at Cankarjev dom in Slovenia took place (February 1989); students organized demonstrations in Belgrade (February 28 – March 1, 1989) demanding the arrest of Kosovo leader Azem Vllasi and Slobodan Milošević promised to oblige; in Belgrade amendments to the constitution of Serbia were proclaimed (March 1989); Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo announced their intention to stage a rally in Ljubljana and the Slovenian leadership banned it, going public with their readiness to prevent the rally by force if necessary. Serbia responded by severing economic ties with Slovenia. I was in Ljubljana at the time at a conference of historians. Upon my return to Belgrade, I told inquiring friends that this is how I imagined Prague before its invasion

by Warsaw Pact troops. The streets were deserted, the windows shuttered, people were speaking softly – but this time it was happening in Ljubljana.

At the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists in Belgrade (January 20 – 22, 1990), the conflict between the Slovenian and Serbian responses to the Yugoslav crisis intensified to the point of irreconcilability. All proposals by the Slovenian delegation were rejected by Serbian delegates. The Slovenians left the 14th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists. But this was no longer just a clash between Slovenia and Serbia. The crisis in the country was deepening. In Kosovo, student demonstrations again broke out demanding the lifting of the state of emergency and termination of Azem Vllasi's trial. The military took to the streets in several [Kosovo] cities. In clashes with the police 27 protesters were killed and 54 were injured, while one policeman died and 43 were injured. In response, students of Belgrade University gathered in front of the Federal Assembly with the slogan: *We're not giving up Kosovo*. The Presidency of Yugoslavia then activated Yugoslav Army units in Kosovo. War was no longer only possible: it had already begun.

At the general assembly of the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ (February 24–25, 1990), Franjo Tuđman stated: “The Independent State of Croatia [NDH] was not merely a quisling creation and a fascist crime, but also an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people.” A rally of Serbs in Croatia was held at Petrova Gora under the slogan “This is Serbia” and threats were addressed to “Ustasas” Franjo Tuđman and Ivica Račan [top Croatian communist official at the time].

The first multi-party elections [in modern-day Yugoslavia] were held in Slovenia (April 8, 1990) and in Croatia (April 22, 1990). A referendum was held in Serbia at which it was decided to first adopt a new constitution of Serbia, and then hold multi-party elections. The National Assembly of Slovenia adopts a *Declaration on full state sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia*. In front of the building of the Kosovo Assembly, Albanian delegates from that Assembly adopt a

Constitutional Declaration proclaiming Kosovo a republic. The Serbian Assembly carries a decision to dissolve the Assembly of Kosovo. The Yugoslav Presidency supports Serbia's measures for Kosovo. In Foča [Bosnia-Herzegovina] – hostilities break out between Serbs and Muslims. The Serbian Assembly adopts a new *constitution of the Republic of Serbia* (September 28, 1990). The Croatian Parliament adopts a new *constitution of the Republic of Croatia* (December 22, 1990). A plebiscite was held in Slovenia (December 23, 1990), at which 86 percent of voters were in favor of an independent Slovenian state, and then, on December 26, 1990, the Slovenian Assembly declared the independence of the Republic of Slovenia. A mass rally organized by the opposition was held in Belgrade against [Milošević's] media censorship (March 9, 1991). It ended with a bloody confrontation between police and protesters until finally tanks were brought out into the streets of Belgrade. The Federal Executive Council [Yugoslav Federal Government] determines that the decisions of the assemblies of Croatia and Slovenia on independence are illegal. And it issues an order banning the establishment of border crossings within the territory of the entire Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY]. The Federal Secretariat [Ministry] of the Interior and the Yugoslav People's Army are authorized to remove such crossings and to establish control over the state borders of the SFRY occupied by the state authorities of Slovenia. The delegates [MPs] of Slovenia and Croatia leave the Federal National Assembly: it is no longer their body of representation. In Omarsko and Jezersko [in Slovenia], armed skirmishes break out between Yugoslav Army units and Slovenian Territorial Defense. The Slovenian Presidency characterized these actions as aggression and calls on its population to resist. The Presidency of the Croatian Parliament issued a statement saying that "the Yugoslav Army is no longer the people's army and... the events in Slovenia are the continuation of a year-long effort to overthrow the democratic order in Croatia".

The war in the country also brings about the dissolution of the multinational [multi-ethnic] character of the Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA. The military leadership looks for foreign policy support: in March

1991, State Secretary [Federal Minister] for National Defense Veljko Kadijević and his deputy go to Moscow for a secret meeting with the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Dmitry Yazov. Ante Marković, Federal Prime Minister, at a session of the Federal Government (September 18, 1991), asks for the resignation of the Federal Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadijević. Aleksandar Mitrović, the representative of Serbia in the Federal Government, retorts that it is he, Marković, who should resign, and not General Kadijević.⁴⁸

There exist situations in history when the very dynamic of events encapsulates all of their drama.⁴⁹ This is precisely the case with the sequence of events that lead to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state in its internal war at the end of the 20th century. An almost casual abandon of decision-making by consensus that was the very essence of the 1974 Constitution occurred, along with the occupation and degradation of institutions of the federal state, using armed force. The JNA was the common army, financed by all the republics in proportion to their national income. But it was also an ideological army. In an interview (December 3, 1990), following the multi-party elections in Slovenia, General Kadijević spoke out in favor of a *unified and socialist Yugoslavia*. In other words, in favor of its defense not only from external but also internal enemies. Yugoslavia was thus, according to this view, to be defended by the JNA and the Serbs from the other peoples of Yugoslavia.

From Belgrade (September 19, 1991), rows of tanks move out towards Sid [Serbian town on the border with Croatia]. The JNA conquers Vukovar (November 20). Ante Marković, the Federal Prime Minister, resigns (December 20, 1991), citing as his reason his objection to the 1992 budget proposal, characterizing it as a “war-time budget.” Before him, Budimir Lončar, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, does the same: “I am horrified and distressed by the victims and the destruction in Croatia and in my own particular homeland, which

48 Radivoje-Rade Brajović, *Sjećanja*, (Podgorica: CID, 2019)

49 Putnik Dajić, Slobodanka Kovačević, *Hronologija jugoslovenske krize: 1942–1994*, (Beograd: Institut za Evropske studije, 1 – 1995, 2 – 1996)

I carried with me all over the world and without which I would not be what I am. My resignation is, therefore, both a protest against the war in Croatia and an expression of my personal responsibility and bitterness that the federal government, whose member I had been, failed to prevent the tragedy”.⁵⁰ Is there anyone who still believed in the survival of Yugoslavia?

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With its program of a “greater state” (1986–1987), which enjoyed the broadest consensus, Serbia came into conflict with all the other members of the Yugoslav federation. They perceived Slobodan Milošević’s ultimatum-like proclamation – “Serbia will [either] be a state or it will cease to exist” – as a direct threat. Nevertheless, even after the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, no one was prepared to renounce Yugoslavia as the state framework for internal change. As was already said, the priorities were different, but in 1990, various forms were still sought both *internally* and *externally*. These two levels intersect, and demonstrate to what extent the 1974 Constitution anticipated both the possibilities and the limitations of maintaining the state framework of Yugoslavia: this framework was, from the outset, infused by different content stemming from the concepts of nation [ethnicity] and state.

At the internal level, contrary to the formula of a centralized and unitary Yugoslavia, which ensures the unity of the entire Serbian people, that is – the unity of all territories inhabited by Serbs, the principle of the state as a community of Yugoslav peoples [nations] was advocated, with the right of each [republic] to self-determination. On the basis of this second formula, several proposals emerged during the crisis of the Yugoslav state (the proposal of Slovenia and Croatia for a loose confederation – October 1990; the Izetbegović – Gligorov proposal – January 1991; and the Tuđman – Gligorov proposal, February 1991).

50 Tvrтко Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar. Od Preka do vrha svijeta*, (Zaprešić: Faktura, 2020)

Political and social agents in Serbia, personified after 1986 by Slobodan Milošević, were in favor of preserving a “Serbianized” version of Yugoslavia. They did this by mobilizing Serbs living within the territories of other republics (Zoran Đinđić: “an irreparable mistake”). At their rallies throughout the country the participants would shout [the slogan]: “This is Serbia.” But Serbian leaders had also perpetrated it by destroying the bodies of the federal state with the intent of taking them over. To that end the provisions of the 1974 Constitution were manipulated (Serbia received three votes [out of eight] in the collective Presidency of the federal state, taking advantage of the fact that, with the provinces whose autonomy it had abolished, it had three pre-assigned seats that it filled according to its needs).

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Reactions from abroad, from the countries of the then European Community and the United States, went hand in hand with the events within Yugoslavia, and shifted depending on the phases that these events went through, in which their true essence was gradually revealed. After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the socialist bloc, as well as the support shown for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, which the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs had persisted in up until the war in Croatia and the occupation of Vukovar, it was not unexpected that there was interest shown by the US and EC countries in the Yugoslav crisis and its resolution in a peaceful manner including the preservation of its Yugoslav state framework (Tvrtko Jakovina). Due to the popularity of “conspiracy theories” in Belgrade media during preparations for the war, during the war itself and in current interpretations of the causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia – the policy of the international community from 1980 to the end of 1992 has yet to be fully analyzed. From today’s perspective it is clear that representatives of the international community also needed time to understand the specific *case of Yugoslavia*.

The dynamic of that understanding determined the dynamic with which the Yugoslav crisis unfolded. As long as the conflict revolved

around the principles of the 1974 Constitution, there was an expectation that Yugoslavia would embark on the path of internal reforms, which had already taken over the countries of the former Eastern European bloc, and that the Yugoslav crisis could be resolved peacefully. Foreign economic aid was being conditioned on this (State Department *Instruction*, November 1990). After the centralization of Serbia, the unrest in Kosovo, mass rallies in Serbia and the overthrow of the leaderships in Vojvodina and Montenegro, as well as the reaction of Slovenia and Croatia by initiating the process of independence, the European Council delegation proposed Yugoslavia's entry into the Council of Europe (February 6, 1991). The Council of Foreign Ministers of the EC countries adopts the *Declaration on Yugoslavia* and decides to send Jacques Poos, Gianni De Michelis and Hans van den Broek to Yugoslavia (April 4, 1991). In talks with representatives of Yugoslavia, they state they are committed to "preserving Yugoslavia" and express "their desire for the crisis in Yugoslavia to be resolved peacefully." The US State Department expresses concern over the situation in Yugoslavia (April 17, 1991) and expects from the US President to immediately suspend military-technical benefits in the event of a military coup in Yugoslavia. At the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC countries (May 13, 1991), it was decided that Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors would travel to Yugoslavia.

However, the crisis in Yugoslavia continued to deepen. At the session of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (May 18, 1991), the president of this collective head of state, Stjepan Mesić, the representative from Croatia, was not elected – the constitutional procedure had been violated. The US State Department enforces the decision to cancel economic aid to Yugoslavia, citing "the behavior of the Republic of Serbia, which continues to apply repressive measures in Kosovo." The EC Council of Ministers (June 9, 1991) sets conditions for aid and support to Yugoslavia. New support for the unity of Yugoslavia is voiced by the CSCE Council of Ministers on 19 June 1991. The armed conflicts between the Yugoslav Army and the Slovenian Territorial Defense (June 27, 1991) lead to a reversal in the attitude of the international

community towards the deepening crisis in Yugoslavia. The EC summit decides to send the ministerial “troika” to Yugoslavia and to freeze economic aid. At the summit of EC foreign ministers in The Hague (July 5, 1991), German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposes an embargo on arms deliveries and the freezing of economic aid. The formation of the CSCE Special Commission for Yugoslavia (July 5, 1991) speaks of the comprehension of the seriousness of the Yugoslav crisis. The European Parliament adopts a *Resolution on Yugoslavia* (July 9, 1991) which states that “unilateral acts of secession are not supported.” Armed conflicts break out in Croatia. Croatia demands the unconditional withdrawal of Yugoslav Army troops to garrisons, and Franjo Tuđman says at a press conference: “The population should prepare even for an all-out general war to defend Croatia.” Despite calls of the Yugoslav Presidency for an immediate and absolute ceasefire, the cessation of further hostilities and the separation of forces, the conflict in Croatia continues to escalate. A new EC *Declaration* on Yugoslavia was adopted in The Hague and the convening of a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was announced (September 3, 1991).

The Hague Peace Conference (September 7, 1991) was the international community’s last attempt to preserve the Yugoslav framework. It was held under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other high-ranking EC officials. At the session of the Yugoslav Federal Government (September 18, 1991), Prime Minister Ante Markovic raised the question of the Yugoslav Army’s role in the war in Croatia. The US State Department expresses concern (September 21, 1991) regarding the “escalation of the intervention”, while Germany seeks the urgent intervention of the United Nations in Yugoslavia. At the conference for human rights in Moscow (September 23, 1991), serious accusations were leveled against Serbia and the Yugoslav Army.

At the Peace Conference in The Hague, four drafts [‘opinions’] of the *Declaration on Yugoslavia* were produced; all were in line with Yugoslavia’s preservation as a confederate community, allowing those republics that declare themselves to want to remain in Yugoslavia to

do so, but without the right to claim international subjectivity [legal personhood] of Yugoslavia as a whole. Slobodan Milošević called the document an *ultimatum*. The Yugoslav Presidency sends a letter to the UN Security Council requesting the urgent deployment of UN peacekeepers to Croatia (November 9, 1991). The Yugoslav Army conquers Vukovar (November 20, 1991). Armed conflicts continue. *Security Council Resolution 727* on the need to send UN peacekeepers to Yugoslavia is adopted in the UN (27 November 1991). The EC Council of Ministers decides on sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (December 2, 1991), while the US government imposes economic sanctions on all Yugoslav republics (December 6, 1991). The EC Council moves to recognize the independence of all Yugoslav republics and sets a date by which they should declare their position on the issue (17 December 1991). Without comprehending what actually transpired and not reconciling itself with the EC decisions which it viewed as support for unconstitutional acts and as an attempt to abolish Yugoslavia as the sole subject of international law – the Yugoslav Presidency requests UN assistance in the interest of preserving Yugoslavia's integrity and sovereignty (December 18, 1991). And then the Serbian Assembly decides to address the UN with a request to take over the future organization of the Conference on Yugoslavia (December 19, 1991). Germany recognizes the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Attempts to preserve the Yugoslav state framework have failed both from *inside* and the *outside*. New wars were in the making: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Despite the present reality, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, only in another way, with the use of different means, is still ongoing. But this too was described as a new version of an old paradigm (Dobrica Ćosić in his speech at the Republic of Srpska Assembly, after the presentation of the Vance-Owen peace plan).

7. IN SUMMARY: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1919-1952) / LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA (1952-1990) IN THE HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE (1918-1941 AND 1945-1991)

The end of the 70-year existence of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ, that is, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, SKJ (1919–1990), was part and parcel of the global collapse of communism. This, in turn, was tantamount to the collapse of the revolutionary party that emerged in Russia and its model of revolution in the 20th century and of socialism in the Soviet Union. But it was not without its distinct characteristics, all the more pertinent as they were the exception which proves the rule. In the historiography of the KPJ / SKJ⁵¹, it is unequivocal that it, as a revolutionary party, evolved to become the historical force behind both the first and the second Yugoslavia.

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The emergence of the Communist Party on the political scene of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia

The creation of the Yugoslav state at the end of the First World War had a strong influence on the social-democratic parties in the Yugoslav territories, which were both program-wise and in finance dependent on the Second International (*correspondence of Serbian socialists with Karl Kautsky*). At the initiative of the social-democratic parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, the social-democratic parties of the Yugoslav territories were united (with the exception of the Yugoslav Social-Democratic Party in Slovenia) and the Socialist Workers Party of Yugoslavia (communists) – the SRPJ (k) – was established. Within it, there was a *reformist* and a *revolutionary* faction. However, the effect of the Russian October Revolution was enormous. A global phenomenon in scope, the October Revolution was hailed as a “new

51 *Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, Narodna knjiga, Rad, 1985)

beginning” of history. Historians have calculated that during one hundred years about 20,000 books had been written about the October Revolution, which means that, if we exclude the summer months, one book had been printed every working day in that period (Milan Subotić). It is therefore understandable that the rivalries between the *reformist* and the *revolutionary* factions in the SRPJ (k) ended with the victory of the latter. The post-World War I circumstances (economic, social, frustrations due to enormous human casualties) favored a revolutionary orientation throughout Europe, including in the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [short: *Kingdom of SHS*]. At its Second Congress (June 1920), the SRPJ (k) changed its name to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [KPJ] and as such joined the Communist International (Comintern). For the Karađorđević dynasty, ever relying on Russia, the collapse of tsarism was a catastrophe. For the leading politician in Serbia, and later Yugoslavia, Nikola Pašić, the victory of the revolution in Russia was equal to a personal tragedy (Rastislav Jovanović). Every political group in the Kingdom of SHS which considered the ideals of the October Revolution as its own ideals was seen as a communist agency by both King Alexander and Nikola Pašić. In the Kingdom of SHS too, the nature of the government also determined the nature of the opposition. To the government’s violence against it the KPJ responded with its own violence. Through that hand-to-hand struggle, the KPJ was already in its formative period shaped into a revolutionary party.

At the municipal elections in the Kingdom of SHS (1920), the KPJ carried 27 cities, including Belgrade. And, with the 200,000 votes it garnered next year in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly (1921), it became the third strongest party in parliament. The regime initially reacted to these successes of the KPJ with the Proclamation (1920), which banned all its organizing, propaganda and newspapers. In response to the regime’s *white terror*, the communist’s *red terror* ensued. The Law on Protection of Public Security and State Order followed (1921). Outlawed, the KPJ went underground, where it remained for the next 20 years. Few politicians of a democratic orientation

reacted to these acts of violence as fatal (in Serbia – immediately Dragoljub Jovanović, from a historical perspective – Desimir Tošić).

In the circumstances of the great world crisis and with the unalleviated consequences of the First World War, and in the as yet unconsolidated new state, the economic and social living conditions of the majority of the population deteriorated. In addition, relations between the Yugoslav peoples became increasingly strained, as they were only beginning to discover their particular national traits and interests in the newly created state. This was especially pronounced after the adoption of the first constitution (Vidovdan / St. Vitus Day Constitution) in the National Assembly by a simple majority (1921); and the assassination of Croatian political leaders in the National Assembly (1928), as a pretext for the dictatorship of King Alexander (the January 6 dictatorship, 1929).

Milan Stojadinović (Prime Minister from 1935) in his memoirs *Ni rat ni pakt / Neither War nor Pact* (1963) says that the January 6 dictatorship “was one in ‘iron gloves’, but not bloody”. From the perspective of the small, banned and persecuted KPJ, the January 6 dictatorship looked different: persecutions, arrests, numerous trials, murders, including the murder of KPJ Secretary Đuro Đaković. During the years of the January 6 dictatorship, a new generation of communists matured, one that will become the core of the uprising and revolution after the occupation and division of the country.

If the party historiography heroically glorified the period from 1929 to 1941, the anti-communist historiography completely ignored it. Even if the history of the KPJ / SKJ was only a history of violence, and violence *sui generis* at that, without its study there can be no understanding of its history. What is lost sight of is that revolutions, including the Yugoslav one, “are not incidents of history that can simply be rejected and forgotten, or reduced to a history of violence”.⁵²

In the second half of the 1930s, the KPJ overcame all the problems of its formative period and grew into an agent of historical

52 Stanić, Veljko, *Parče velikog života: Mitra Mitrović o tridesetim godinama 20. veka*

significance. Even though acting from the underground, partly also due to the new policy of the Comintern (1935), it itself went “deeper into the masses”. It suppressed factional struggles, the leadership was transferred from Vienna into the country and it became financially independent. Josip Broz Tito was given the mandate of the Comintern to implement a new policy (oriented towards a Popular Front kind of movement), and in 1937, he was elected Secretary General of the KPJ. Even his comrades-in-arms who would later become his serious critics (Milovan Đilas, Koča Popović), did not question the decisive role he played in the consolidation of the KPJ and its preparation for the events of 1940–1941. This is acknowledged by foreign historians as well.⁵³ In the period 1929–1937, the KPJ grew into a party with a strict code characterized by tight organization, strong ideological unity, solidarity and willingness to make sacrifices.

For critics, and especially for ideological and political opponents, Tito’s role in the liquidation of several prominent Yugoslav revolutionaries in the Soviet Union, including his predecessor as Secretary General of the KPJ, Milan Gorkić, was suspect. That shadow would follow Tito in the Party itself. Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein in their biography *Tito* state that they did not find anything in the archives of the Comintern (material handed over to the United States in the exchange of material after the Second World War) that would point to Tito as having “set-up” the Yugoslav revolutionaries who died [in the Soviet Union]. However, they also note that the imprimatur [for such matters] was given by the NKVD⁵⁴, whose archives have yet to be opened to the public.

Tito’s rise to the helm of the KPJ is considered a turning point in the historiography of the Party. But could the new party leader, with a rejuvenated membership, discard the entire revolutionary legacy of the period 1919–1937, or did he also have to rely on something

53 Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*, (Beograd: Clio, 2013)

54 NKVD – People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs – the interior ministry and state security i.e. secret police of the Soviet Union

from that legacy? In other words, was the KPJ a mere instrument of the Comintern, or was it a reflection of the conditions in the Yugoslav state and society, with a claim to a historical role? How, then, would one explain the sympathies of the democratic public towards it (Belgrade University, literary papers and periodicals, membership of youth from bourgeois families)?

The divisions within the KPJ also arose concerning questions of strategy of revolutionary struggle after October 1917 in Russia. However, after the possibility of revolution in Western Europe, especially Germany, diminished, in March 1921 the Comintern made major changes in its global strategy of revolutionary struggle. Communists were required to fight for the creation of a “united front of workers, farmers and nationally oppressed masses”.⁵⁵ As one of the branches of the Comintern, the KPJ was obliged to implement its strategy. But could it ignore the reality of the country in which it operated? And even if it could – as some authors claim – could it have done so without reservation? How, again, can one explain the fact that a small, banned and persecuted party, with a program imposed on it from outside regarding the national issue – the key issue of the Yugoslav state – was the only pan-Yugoslav political force in 1941?

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We can also discern some of the general beliefs present after December 1, 1918 reflected in the policy of the KPJ. It saw the creation of the Yugoslav state itself as being in the line of progress, but questioned the way it was established. For a long time, it accepted the view of the national [ethnic] unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [as belonging to “South Slavs” i.e. Yugo-slavs]. Deprived of the status of a parliamentary party, it sought support from the Comintern. In matters of theory, it shared the views of the revolutionary parties in Austria and Russia. Both of these schools of thought were, in fact,

55 *Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, Narodna knjiga, Rad, 1985)

rationale for policy. Until the end of the First World War, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party (Austro-Marxist) defended, in the interest of the unity of the class struggle, the integrity of the [Austro-Hungarian] multinational state. It approached the issue of organizing the Habsburg monarchy as a federation only when it was already too late (Radoslav Ratković, Predrag Vranicki, Latinka Perović). The Russian Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks) viewed the national movements of non-Russian peoples as the main instrument for breaking up the Russian empire. The issue of a federation came up only after the October Revolution, when the issue of the relationship between the *center* and the *periphery* arose. In the first half of the 1920s, still during Lenin's lifetime, debates were underway on this issue in the Central Committee and at the congresses of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks), when the federal form was adopted as a framework for preserving the integrity of the state (after 1922 – the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics). All this was not unknown to the Yugoslav communists, who, at the same time, sought a solution to the national question in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

In the Independent Workers' Party – through which the banned KPJ operated – in the newspapers "Radnik-Delavec" [Laborer], "Borba" [Struggle], "Glas svobode" [Voice of Freedom], and in the theoretical journal "Borba" – a protracted debate was organized from May 31 to December 30, 1923 on the national question [in the Kingdom of SHS].⁵⁶ Through the debate, a new policy on the national issue was reached: the theory of national unity was rejected, and the right of peoples to self-determination in a federation was recognized. It was, as France Klopčič says, a "Preroško nakazana prihodnost" (A prophetically anticipated future). The results of the debate formed the basis for the Resolution on the National Question, which was adopted at the Third National [Country-wide] Conference of the KPJ (January 1924). The Party also convened a referendum on the Resolution, which was adopted by the said Third National Conference of the KPJ. Out of

56 Latinka Perović, *Od centralizma do federalizma*

the 84 votes against the Resolution, 81 were from Serbia, 2 from Vojvodina, and 1 from Slovenia. This division of membership from Serbia was a constant, and only under certain specific conditions would it abate (the “Bolshevization” of the Party in the 1930s; its iron-clad unity in the liberation war – whose goal was the renewal of the Yugoslav state – and in the revolutionary change of government).

In Yugoslav historiography of the KPJ, the role of the Comintern in the development of its national policy (before and after 1948) was viewed with differences. Post-communist authors (politician Borisav Jović⁵⁷ and journalist Ratko Dmitrović) emphasized the importance of the 4th Congress of the KPJ (Dresden, 1924). At this congress, the view that the establishment of the Yugoslav state was in keeping with social progress and in the interest of the unity of the class struggle was disputed. Yugoslavia was treated as a product of an imperialist war, “in which the Serbian nation appears as the ruling nation which oppresses other nations in Yugoslavia.” The right of peoples i.e. oppressed nations to self-determination meant a call to break-up the country. But why such a long introduction to the national policy of the KPJ?

Even after the conflict with Stalin in 1948, the KPJ / SKJ demonstrated ideological consistency: move away from the Soviet Union as much as was necessary to preserve the independence of the state, but not so far as to cross the Rubicon – the boundary that separates real socialism (state property and party monopoly) from Western civilization (liberalism and capitalism). Its national policy was much more pragmatic. With it, the KPJ was prepared to meet the events after 1941: as early as 1940 (5th KPJ National Conference in Zagreb), it decided to defend the country as a whole. Under the slogan of *brotherhood and unity* [bratstvo i jedinstvo] in the [liberation and] civil war, it grew into the only pan-Yugoslav force. After 1945, through constant constitutional changes, it sought a formula of sustainability for the multifaceted Yugoslav state, on the borderline between East and West. It

57 Borisav Jović, *Kako su Srbi izgubili vek. Tragična sudbina Srba u Jugoslaviji*, (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2016)

ultimately evolved into a confederate community of Yugoslav peoples [or nations] (the 1974 Constitution), that had achieved national integration via a *federation* after the Second World War. In the economic and political system, the KPJ / SKJ always remained on the ideological borderline. However – through a real and not just formal right to self-determination – it enabled those [Yugoslav] nations that, in changed international circumstances (1989), wanted to cross the ideological barrier to actually do so. *Yugoslavia did not enter the 1980s without a solution, but the existing solution – the confederate one – was unilaterally rejected.* Nevertheless, it was confirmed in two ways. The international community, which from the beginning had been in favor of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, advocated the preservation of the common state framework, with equal nations and with internal reforms. In its last attempt (the Peace Conference in The Hague, chaired by Lord Carrington), it itself came up with a confederate option. This option was also confirmed through the negative legacy left behind by war as a way of disintegrating the Yugoslav state and resolving relations between the Yugoslav peoples. Reconciliation is difficult. And the precondition for reconciliation is the conviction that the “greater state policy” in the name of which the war for new borders had been fought had been abandoned: not only in the interest of others, but also in one’s own interest.

KPJ as organizer of uprising against occupation forces and their abettors, and as the other side in the civil war and the bearer of revolutionary change

The call for an uprising after the Third Reich attacks the USSR. The decision to lead a Partisan-type [guerrilla-type] war: specifics in the various parts of Yugoslavia. “Left-wing wrong turns” – learning from dearly-paid mistakes, especially after the withdrawal of Partisans from Užice. Parallel to the spread of the National or People’s Liberation Struggle [NOB], changes in the order and form of government were being charted (First and Second Sessions of AVNOJ, November 1942 and November 1943). The struggle for international

recognition. The efforts of Great Britain and Winston Churchill personally to reach a compromise between the royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London and the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, NKOJ⁵⁸. The agreement between Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Josip Broz Tito, which envisaged a power sharing scheme in the country after the war. In reality, the federal organization of the country after the war was also accepted by the government-in-exile (1944). Removal of Dragoljub Draža Mihailović from the position of Supreme Commander of the Royal Army in the Homeland. The king's invitation to members of this army to join the units of the People's Liberation Army. This was a symbolic gesture of reconciliation. What was then, after all of this, 50 years later, the meaning of the laws of the new authorities in Serbia on equating the role of Chetniks and Partisans during WW II [2004]? For new generations who were born after the Second World War, and did not have the divisions of that war in their experience, this was more than mere confusion. But this was, in reality, the rehabilitation of those who had cooperated with the occupation forces (Ustashas, Chetniks, Domobrans i.e. Home-guards). This political revanchism was given legitimacy by revisionist historiography, which, mostly through history textbooks, *wrote a new history of the Second World War*. Without exception – and Yugoslavia was obviously no different – the collapse of communism did not lead only to the study of the Second World War from different historical perspectives, but also to the falsification of historical facts established, and still verifiable, through primary historical sources. This intellectual violence begot other kinds of violence. There came about a disruption in the system of values: the relativization of mass crimes and indifference to human suffering. [Belgrade sociology professor] Todor Kuljić characterized this atmosphere as *anti-anti-fascism*. But there was also resistance to this phenomenon. The biggest came – and still continues to this day – from new generations, which, leaving the territories

58 NKOJ – the provisional wartime Yugoslav government in the country headed by Tito

of the former Yugoslavia in order to emigrate, demonstrate that for them life is not only about mere survival.

Liberation struggle enthusiasm and revolutionary terror after 1945

Revolutionary power was consolidated in what were objectively still wartime conditions. The Department for the Protection of the People (OZNA)⁵⁹ was established. In discontinuity of the legal system, reprisals without trial occur with real and only potential opponents. There is a chaotic force of events, political revanchism and personal revenge. Reactions bring about threats to the legitimacy of the KPJ. Expropriation of the bourgeoisie under the guise of abolishing class divisions in the interest of *equality* takes place. Collapse of the agreement on power sharing with Ivan Šubašić. The first elections, proclamation of the Republic and the election of Josip Broz Tito as its first president. Constitution of the Yugoslav federation after the Soviet model.

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In the period from 1945 to 1948 the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia did not differ from other countries in the Eastern bloc. All of them applied the Soviet model of socialism. Historian Marie-Janine Calic has traced the ideology on which this model was based. All of them, like Russia before the October Revolution, were agrarian countries in which modernization had been delayed. The revolutionary minority, especially in Russia, sought to "accelerate history: by combining faith in progress, the euphoria of planning, and the terror of modernization, these agrarian societies were to be transformed into modern industrial states in a short time." This colossal endeavor, which has also been branded as engineering, was managed from one ideological, political and military center. Representatives of 30

59 Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda – this department later grew into the Yugoslav and republic-level state security i.e. secret police departments

communist parties and left-wing groups attended the founding congress of the Third Communist International in Moscow (March 1919). As the first country of socialism on one-sixth of the globe, the Soviet Union offered all communist parties a model of revolution and the post-revolutionary state. After the Second World War, it added military and political prestige to its ideological prestige. The state terror of the 1930s and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) were suppressed from memory. For the defeat of Hitler the joining of forces was crucial. Winston Churchill reportedly said that he was prepared to join forces with *the blackest devil* for the victory over German Nazism. The “Big Three”, which at conferences in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam had decided what the world would look like after the Second World War, consisted of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. In the agreement between Churchill and Stalin, Europe was divided into two spheres of interest. Southeast Europe was aligned with the Soviet Union. As the international center of communist parties in Eastern Europe, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (Cominform) was created (September 1947). At its founding assembly, the theory of two camps or blocs was presented for the first time (in a paper by Andrei Zhdanov): there was the imperialist anti-democratic camp connected with the US and the anti-imperialist democratic bloc led by the Soviet Union. It was an announcement for the nascent Cold War.

This historical process in all the countries of the Eastern bloc had a double role with an equally high price for each. Concentration on the development of heavy industry in these predominantly agricultural countries had led to large investments and high growth rates. A revolution in education took place as well. There was migration of the agricultural population towards the cities and an improvement in the legal status of women. A mass society was established. There was a change of elites. The strengthening of authoritarianism and the cult of leaders in all these countries was not a mere imitation of Stalin: it was a completion of the pyramid of the governing communist party.

At the same time, in spite of all the mental and physical terror emanating from one center, it was not easy to impose the Soviet model as a universal model. Passive resistance arose out of national tradition. Active, but veiled resistance also came from the communist nomenclature, which therefore revealed real differences in national interests. After Stalin's death, this resistance grew to the scale of great uprisings (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). But the first rift was created by the conflict between Stalin and Tito in 1948. Yugoslavia was not a country that had to be *forced to shift to the victorious side* in 1945: the KPJ spearheaded the liberation movement and revolutionary changes had already begun during the war. In preparations for the Cold War, Stalin wanted to discipline the Eastern bloc: Yugoslavia, as the weakest link in the chain, of necessity found itself under attack.

Then came the letters from Stalin and Molotov to the Central Committee of the KPJ – it was accused of turning to the West and to capitalism. The KPJ was expelled from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. Threats to state independence [from the outside] and persecution of Stalinists in the Party [in the country] followed. Establishment of internment camps (Goli otok/ Barren Island) with the objective of isolating pro-Stalinist elements. This cruel procedure is given varied interpretation – as an example of the repressive apparatus belonging to the NKVD school; as a confrontation among the faithful; as part of the Balkan tradition of violence, and as a form of careerism. A police regime prevails in the country: there is a threat to the domestic government, but also to state borders. In the clash between *David and Goliath* – which is the way the West perceived the conflict between Tito and Stalin – the West tolerated the harsh internal clampdown. In a country just out of one war, and faced with the possibility of a new one, the KPJ manages to preserve unity in the state, using the legitimacy it acquired in the People's Liberation War. It abandons the tactic of trying to prove loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union. The instinct of self-preservation forces it to seek out new allies. It is faced with the question: how to remain true to the idea of communism, that is, to one model of society, and yet still preserve the independence of the

state? The answer to this question brings to a conclusion the issue of KPJ's existence as a historical factor. Did that also have to mean the end of the Yugoslav state in the wars of the 1990s?

Necessity changes the law: from proving loyalty to Soviet socialism (1949), to seeking one's own path to socialism (1950-1953). How to differ from the Soviet Union, the ideological matrix, and still not change?

The late 1940s and early 1950s were the most dramatic period in post-war Yugoslavia. The independence of the state was threatened: people were dying on its borders. Support for Stalin came from some party leaderships (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) and from the Army (General Arso Jovanović). "Fear begets huge eyes". Suspicion and denunciation were widespread. Punishment was dealt out summarily. Only rare individuals like Veljko Mićunović⁶⁰ suggest lawful trials take place.⁶¹ Countries of the East European bloc, to which Yugoslavia was economically tied, impose an economic blockade. Fierce propaganda against the KPJ and Yugoslavia is set in motion. The country is hit by a great drought. In order to feed the population, compulsory redemption is carried out with the use of force.

Even in these conditions the Soviet model of socialism was not abandoned: the collectivization of the country was carried out (creation of farmer's labor cooperatives) and force was the *modus operandi*. The policies of the Popular Front and widespread cooperation were gradually abandoned, and opposition deputies were removed from the National Assembly. The political monopoly of the KPJ was fully consolidated.

In these conditions, a turnabout occurs in the KPJ. At its 6th Congress in Zagreb (1952) it changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [SKJ – Savez komunista Jugoslavije], which was intended to express the change of its role from a steering [rukovodeće]

60 Veljko Mićunović – high-ranking Yugoslav security official and diplomat.

61 Tamara Nikčević, *Goli otoci. Jova Kapičića*, (Podgorica: Daily Press, 2009)

one in the operational exercise of power, to a leading [vodeće] force in the ideological sense. One of the results of this turnabout was that rule of law was introduced in the confrontation with political opponents, especially supporters of the Inform-bureau [Cominform] Resolution.

At the Congress of Yugoslav Writers in Ljubljana (notable for the famous speech by leading Yugoslav writer Miroslav Krleža), socialist realism in literature was abandoned. Recent research shows that the reception of socialist realism in the literatures of Yugoslav peoples was varied: in Croatia, only two novels were written inspired by its tenets.⁶²

At a gathering of philosophers in Ljubljana, the possibility of different interpretations of Marxism is allowed, that is, the prospect of different paths to socialism is opened up. New journals are established (“Nova misao” / New thought) that encourage discussion and debate about various issues of theory and practice.

Leading European intellectuals visit the country. Students and scholars from all Yugoslav republics (the principle of equal national representation was strictly respected) go to Western European countries for education and professional training.⁶³ Ties were being established with socialist and social-democratic parties in Western Europe, which were on the rise after World War II. After twenty years of being underground, four years of war and then undergoing a state of emergency after the Inform-bureau Resolution in 1948, this opening leads [the SKJ and Yugoslav society] to new knowledge and various reassessments. The death of Stalin (March 1953) further intensified the dynamic of these changes. It appeared that for the KPJ /

62 Ivana Peruško Vindakijević, *Od Oktobra do otpora. Mit o sovjetsko-Yugoslavskome bratstvu u Hrvatskoj i Rusiji kroz književnost, karikaturu i film (1917.-1991.)*, (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2018)

63 Miroslav Perišić, *Od Staljina ka Sartru: formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958*. (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008)

SKJ, these circumstances (1950–1954) had brought about, as was precisely defined by a Serbian historian of the new generation, a *turning point*.⁶⁴

The appearance of cracks in the ideological dogma of Yugoslav communists

Milovan Đilas, one of the four individuals who was part of the Yugoslav party leadership since the 1930s, went from being a fanatical believer to a radical critic of *Stalinism*. This process took place gradually in the KPJ: Milovan Đilas was the first to articulate it and make it public. Đilas was influenced, among other things, by the experience he had gained in foreign policy missions that he had been undertaking on behalf of the Yugoslav party leadership since the war (negotiations with the Germans in 1943; visit to Moscow and talks with Stalin in 1944; member of the Yugoslav delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1949 and 1951). But also the fact that in addition to several duties he performed in the war and in the organization of the state after the war (war commander; minister for Montenegro; head of Agitprop; vice president of the Republic; president of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia) he was president of the KPJ Central Committee for Foreign Affairs. From that position he worked to establish links between the KPJ / SKJ and the socialist and social-democratic parties of Western Europe. The closest ties were formed with the Labor Party of the UK, but also with the Socialists of France, Belgium, as well as all the Scandinavian countries. The German Social-Democratic Party was at that time in the opposition – ties were weaker, but they existed. The KPJ was not admitted into the Socialist International. However, the members of the latter had unhindered cooperation with the KPJ.

Up until the very latest research there was a view in historiography that Milovan Đilas had arrived at the reassessment of the Yugoslav, but in fact really Soviet, model of socialism under the influence of the

64 Aleksandar V. Miletić, *Prelomna vremena. Milovan Đilas i zapadnoevropska levica 1950–1954*, (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2019)

Western European socialist and social-democratic left, especially the UK Labor Party. In reality, however, his “break” began before those ties were formed, back in 1949. At the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the KPJ, building upon the authenticity of the Yugoslav revolution, he presented his views on the necessity of freedom of thought, democratization and “de-statization”. In the booklet *Savremene teme* (Contemporary Themes, 1950), in criticizing the Soviet Union (its imperialist foreign policy; state-run capitalism at home that generated a bureaucratic caste), he implicitly also spoke about the Yugoslav system. The 6th Congress of the KPJ in 1952 was convened under the influence of these views. Nevertheless, that orientation was nipped in the bud at the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee of the now already League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the SKJ (summer 1953).

Đilas continued his reappraisals. He published a number of articles in the newspaper “Borba” and in the journal “Nova misao”. In reaction to this activity the 3rd Extraordinary Plenum of the SKJ Central Committee was convened (January 1954). Đilas was removed from all positions, excluded from the party leadership, and then banished from public life.

The ties of the Yugoslav Communists with the Western European left were based on mutual interests. After 1948, the Yugoslav communists sought new allies, and found them in their former “enemies”: the Western European socialist and social-democratic left. For its part, on the other hand, the European left saw Yugoslavia as an interesting experiment, hoping that, in time, it could sway it into its camp.

However, Đilas’ writings for the foreign press were of multifaceted significance. In this way, he internationalized his own “case” and simultaneously testified to the nature of the regime in Yugoslavia. And because of it, he was sentenced to prison terms twice (1957–1961, and 1962–1966).

In the country, Đilas had no followers. In the Party – the more liberal communists, *post festum*, thought that he “spoke out too early”. History has shown, however, that such “speaking out” is always both too early and too late. Even after the fall of communism, politicians were

not interested in his experience, perhaps because Milovan Đilas was not a revanchist but a person who had, as an agent in history, gained inner equilibrium. He represented an alternative to both communism and anti-communism: “I am neither a communist nor an anti-communist”, he said. Of the wars of the 1990s, he said: “I would not lie on behalf of my nation.”

At the same time, Milovan Đilas was one of the most famous dissidents in the world. His book *The New Class* is considered to be one of the most relevant books of the 20th century. He has been widely studied: several doctorates and books about him have been published in various languages.

In Yugoslavia too books by him as well as books about him have been published since the end of the 1980s. However, as a critic of Stalinism in both the USSR and Yugoslavia (1950–1954), he remained neglected. His “break” during those key years has been studied least of all. Perhaps because his “case” formulated a paradigm that the SKJ could not fully accept: either in attempts at reform during Tito’s lifetime, or after his death. This will take place only in parts of the SKJ, for which the disintegration of the single ideological and organizational whole was necessary (14th Congress of the SKJ in 1990).

Self-management as the *differentia specifica* of the Yugoslav path to socialism

In its critique of the Soviet model of socialism, the KPJ’s starting point was the authenticity of the National or People’s Liberation Struggle and Revolution in Yugoslavia (1941–1945). But it equally saw Stalinism as a deviation from Marxism and Leninism.

Arnold Toynbee believed that there is no state without a strong central government. However, if the central government absorbs autonomous and local interests, and thus the rights and opportunities of the individual to influence affairs of general importance – it will necessarily degenerate into autocracy, dictatorship and despotism.

Up until the 1960s, everything in Yugoslavia moved from the Yugoslav party or state leadership downwards. This direction does not

change even after the 1960s, but the currents from the bottom up are much more present, and increasingly reflect what is a very complex reality.

Each of these directions has its own dynamic and form, but they also intertwine and intersect. Life is simply stronger than any doctrine. At the normative level, since 1950, de-statization, decentralization and self-government had been promoted. The Law on workers' management of the economy followed that thread (1950). Historians (Branko Petranović) assess that this law was "ahead of existing social relations in Yugoslavia at the time". However, its political, and especially symbolic significance, was enormous. Its influence on the economy was complex (the party character of the state; a working class recruited from the countryside; management and technology), but the changes in state administration and local communities (commune as the "basic cell of society") that followed were in accordance with its intentions. Finally, there was the Constitutional Law from 1953.⁶⁵

Theorists of Yugoslav self-management believed that they were on the trail of Marx's thinking. Indeed, their primary reading was not of Bakunin's works (*Statism and Anarchy*), nor of Proudhon's federalism, nor of Kropotkin's mutualism. Nevertheless, elements of all of these were to be found in the doctrine of Yugoslav self-management. One should also not lose sight of self-management as the basis for unity in the 19th century concept of "people's socialism". In Russia, above of all, and then in Serbia (Svetozar Marković) and in other Balkan countries. For agrarian societies, the self-government of people is a substitute for the unity provided by capital and the market in industrial societies.

65 A series of constitutional amendments subsumed under one constitutional law with the objective of introducing *self-management* into the then current 1946 Yugoslav Constitution.

A new climate in Soviet-Yugoslav relations but with different expectations

As early as the end of 1954, the campaign against the KPJ was suspended in the Soviet Union and the other communist bloc countries, and the papers of the communist emigration and its organizations were banned. The visit of a Soviet state and party delegation to Yugoslavia was organized (May 25 – June 3, 1955). The Soviets wanted Yugoslavia back in the socialist camp. The Yugoslav communists, on the other hand, wanted to reaffirm their policies after 1948: sovereignty and independence, the right to their own path to socialism, peaceful coexistence among nations regardless of ideological differences and different social orders, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs.

The *Belgrade Declaration*, which emerged from the first Soviet-Yugoslav meeting after 1948, was said to be: “A *Magna Carta* for Yugoslav relations with socialist and other states” (Edvard Kardelj). But there was also a grain of doubt. Yugoslav diplomat Veljko Mićunović, in his books on his two terms [as Ambassador] in Moscow, saw this first meeting of Soviet-Yugoslav delegations as the beginning of the SKJ’s somewhat defensive stance on the emancipation of Yugoslavia from the Soviet model of socialism.

Khrushchev’s secret paper at the 20th Congress of the KPSS (1956), that is, his critique of Stalin’s “cult of personality,” brought a new sense of satisfaction for the Yugoslav communists. There followed a further collapse of the Soviet monolith (events in Hungary and Poland in 1956). However, it will soon become clear that the “cult of personality” is inseparable from the system: it is Stalinism without Stalin.

New aggravations in relations towards Yugoslavia also followed. The trigger was the new SKJ program (April 22–26, 1958 in Ljubljana). The first after the party program adopted at the Vukovar Congress – almost 40 years before. It contained the views that the KPJ had formed after 1948, and it opened up a new perspective: “Nothing that we have created should be so sacred to us that it cannot be surpassed, and that cannot give way to what is even more progressive,

more purposeful, more human.” However, all of this did not mean the same thing to everyone in the SKJ.

**Triumph of the KPJ / SKJ in its double victory:
in the Second World War against fascism and
Nazism and in the conflict with Stalin in 1948**

Among Yugoslav communists, and especially in the Yugoslav party leadership with Tito at its helm, there was a belief that they were building a society “without precedent”. Different from the society in the Soviet Union and the other “people’s democracies”. But also different from the societies in the West: capitalist, politically plural and parliamentary.

Although Yugoslavia was just only overcoming the economic and political consequences of the Second World War, of being a poor and backward country, with many internal differences (ethnic-national, traditional, developmental), the Yugoslav communists were *far from the truth that one learns only through defeat* (even generations after the collapse of communism would not learn this lesson). Victorious triumphalism prevailed in the KPJ / SKJ. Tito too was personally very self-assured. Talking about the venue for the meeting of the Soviet-Yugoslav delegations, he resolutely said: “Let them come here!” He identified with his own charisma, with the myth that was created about him: the undisputed leader of the Yugoslav peoples in war and peace, a leader of the international communist movement, a man with a mission. He told Marko Nikezić, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister [1965–1968], how during his first visit to the USSR after the reconciliation, at a huge rally in the former Stalingrad, he heard a cry from the crowd: “Comrade Tito, save us.” He aspired to a role in global international relations. Mirko Tepavac, his other Minister of Foreign Affairs [1969–1972], said of him: “Even Yugoslavia was too small for him”.⁶⁶ Through the Non-Aligned Movement (first conference in Belgrade in

66 Aleksandar-Saša Nenadović, *Mirko Tepavac. Sećanja i komentari*, (Beograd: Radio B92, 1998)

1961), he obtained the status of a world leader. The movement itself, of course, was not the result of only his personal ambitions, nor did it have merely a pragmatic significance in a bloc-divided world. Otherwise critical of Tito, Slovenian historian Joze Pirjevec points out that Tito was the first [European] politician to address the colored [non-European] man as an equal agent of history.

In any case, after 1945, and especially after 1948, Tito always heard only what he was used to hearing, and what he wanted to hear. At a lunch in Karadordevo [Vojvodina], he told visiting Palmiro Togliatti, the Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, that, during his visit to Great Britain, the shouts of Chetnik émigrés “Tito – murderer!” resounded in his ears as “Tito – hero!”

At the threshold of the modern age

The triumphalistic mood of Yugoslav communists, which also reverberated throughout society, and the strengthening of Tito’s leadership position in the international communist movement, was in part supported by the impressive results of Yugoslavia’s development from 1955 to 1960.

Historians assess that Yugoslavia had never changed as much as during the 20-year period after 1945. The society was not as yet industrial, but neither was it any longer agrarian. The impulse for modernization came from above, encountering resistance both in the KPJ and in society, but it also interacted with tradition. Due to high growth rates, foreign historians⁶⁷ believe that an “economic boom” occurred in Yugoslavia, and due to the overall development of society, they designate the period 1955–1960 as the “golden age” of socialist Yugoslavia. The atmosphere in society had changed. For the first time since 1941, one could breathe more easily.

There was a boom in culture, science and art as well. Writer and film director Živojin Pavlović, otherwise critically inclined, has

67 Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*

evaluated the entire period of the second Yugoslavia as the “Age of Pericles” in culture.

Magazines and journals devoted to culture, art and science were published in all the republic-level centers. Publishing houses were established. Literary works were being translated, but also works in history, philosophy and sociology. Annual Yugoslav cultural festivals were established (Pula Film Festival, Dubrovnik Summer Games, Sterija’s Theatre Stage, Ohrid Poetry Evenings, and later – Bitef [Belgrade International Theatre Festival] and Bemus [Belgrade Musical Festivities], all in Belgrade).

Significant books were published in all [Yugoslav] national cultures. In Slovenia – Dušan Pirjevec, *Ivan Cankar*. In Croatia – Stanko Lasić, *Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928–52* / Conflict on the Literary Left 1928–52 and his entire *Krleziana*. In Serbia – Miodrag Popović, *Vidovdan i časni krst* / St. Vitus Day and the Holy Cross; Radomir Konstantinović, *Filosofija palanke* / Small Town Philosophy, *Biće i jezik 1–8* / Being and Language 1–8; Danilo Kiš, *Čas anatomije* / Anatomy Class; Bogdan Bogdanović, *Krug na četiri ćoška* / Circle on Four Corners.

Great progress had been made in historiography too (Mirjana Gross, Bogo Grafenauer, Sima M. Ćirković, Andrej Mitrović, Branko Petranović and Ivan Đurić). Theoretical discussions in philosophy and history flowered, but also virulent polemics (Mirjana Gross – Milorad Ekmečić). Radio Belgrade’s Third Program catered solely to the intellectual public.

To varying degrees, all [Yugoslav] national cultures were turned towards the international cultural scene, and eventually become part of it (Nobel Prize for Literature to Ivo Andrić; Oscar to Dušan Vukotić for best animated film; awards at international film festivals to directors Aleksandar Petrović, Emir Kusturica, Dušan Makavejev and Želimir Žilnik).

Relative international recognition for results in sports came with the awarding of the Winter Olympic Games to Sarajevo, which

changed the image of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the “dark Oriental province” [tamni vilajet].

The most prominent artists were commissioned to initiate this cultural revival. Ivo Andrić’s social engagement was broad.⁶⁸

The work of Miroslav Krleža on the encyclopedia of Yugoslavia was also of fundamental significance.⁶⁹ Both Andrić and Krleža were contemporaries of the rise of fascism and Nazism, the Moscow trials, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and then World War II, the Independent State of Croatia, and Serbia under the quisling rule of the ultra-chauvinist and anti-communist General Milan Nedić (Andrić was one of four Serbian intellectuals – along with professor Miloš Đurić, writer Isidora Sekulić and first Serbian philosopher Ksenija Atanasijević – who refused to sign Nedić’s Appeal to the Serbian People Against Communists).

As writers, neither Andrić nor Krleža wanted to adopt socialist realism – they retained their individual creative integrity (Stanko Lasić, *Conflicts on the Literary Left 1928–52*). But they were actively engaged in building the new state and society (Andrić was also a member of the National Assembly, and Krleža a member of the Central Committee of the Croatian League of Communists). In hindsight, attempts were made to fathom the reasons for their demonstrable social activism. In my opinion, they are to be found in the fact that both of them viewed the Yugoslav communists as the propelling force for the emancipation of all Yugoslav peoples. They knew too much to rule out the possibility of [Yugoslav society] regressing back in time, back to its former provincial atavisms.

68 Žaneta Đukić Perišić, *Pisac i priča: stvaralačka biografija Ive Andrića*, (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2012)

69 The Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia – Enciklopedija Jugoslavije – is the national encyclopedia of the SFR Yugoslavia; it was published in Zagreb, the first edition consists of 8 volumes issued from 1955 to 1971; its general editor was Miroslav Krleža.]

In the developing Yugoslav cultures, individuals played an exceptional role: in Macedonia – Blažo Koneski, among Kosovo Albanians – Esad Mekuli.

In the multi-ethnic culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just like in other national i.e. ethnic cultures, there were divisions, which existed also within each ethnic community. In all these cases one could talk about a *dominant* and an *undesirable* elite. The first, traditionalist in nature, had *critical mass* to be dominant. The second, modernist in nature, existed at the level of individuals. They were frequently at odds and argued between each other (they each also had their own specialized journals), but often both expected political and financial support from the state. And this arrangement worked.

There is no doubt that certain artistic endeavors – for example, from *Jeretička priča* / An Heretical Story by Branko Ćopić, through the *Anatomija jednog morala* / Anatomy of a Particular Moral by Milovan Đilas, to the Yugoslav “film noir wave” in cinema (Bata Ćengić, Živojin Pavlović, Dušan Makavejev) – were a cause of perplexity in the ruling party and in Josip Broz Tito personally, due to their critical view of the complex nature of Yugoslav social reality. However, the fact that modern Yugoslav culture became relevant internationally demonstrates that the limits of freedom were much broader in its society than the freedom of creative expression in the countries of the socialist bloc, some of which were [in terms of traditional European culture] culturally much more advanced than Yugoslavia.

Dialogue was nonexistent between the two sides and this contributed to mutual rigidity and exclusivity of both the establishment and the “dissidents”. This is why in Yugoslavia, unlike the other Eastern European countries, there were no “round tables” of the government and the opposition. But, of course, later this would not present an obstacle for their uniting on nationalist programs.⁷⁰

In Serbia especially, in the 1980s the intelligentsia retained its traditional characteristics: politics as development. Every party, from the

70 Dubravka Stojanović, “Traumatični krug srpske opozicije”

first political parties in the 19th century, has always had a program of political liberties, and none of them a program of economic development. Zoran Đinđić was one of the few Serbian intellectuals who understood this (“Our economy is sick to death”). Hence, it is questionable how much Serbia knew about Western society and, indeed, whether it was pro-Western at all (Jorjo Tadić, *Mi i Zapad / We and the West*, 1925). Its society was more ideological than professional. It is as if Serbia followed Vladimir Jovanović, a national romantic (he would explain to his son [historian and politician] Slobodan Jovanovic that his generation glorified the past because: “We had nothing else to begin from”), and the progenitor of liberalism in Serbia (the first book about this was published by American historian Gale Stokes – *Politics as Development*, 1990). After the May Coup in 1903, Vladimir Jovanović believed that “the people had to be led and somewhat tutored by the intelligentsia... with the consent of the people, the intelligentsia was to rule”.⁷¹

Members of the *dissident* generation refused “participation in the system.”

After the economic and general boom from 1955–1960, stagnation ensued. What next?

Stagnation took place after 1960–61. The possibility of further extensive economic development had been exhausted. Central planning could be imposed further only by force. And society was more developed than that. What next? Tito’s speech in Split (1962) was a call for unity, not for reforms whose outcomes would be painful and uncertain for the KPJ government. At the same time, the world was witnessing rapid development in science and technology. In international relations there was détente and coexistence. Far from the public eye the Yugoslav party leadership was looking for answers. On one side was Aleksandar Ranković, who relied on Tito and advocated

71 Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici. I. Vladimir Jovanović*, (Windsor: Avala, 1961)

the unity of the Party and the centralization of the country. And on the other Edward Kardelj, who stood for further decentralization and democratization. A polemical debate was ongoing in the intellectual public between Dobrica Ćosić [Serbia] and Dušan Pirjevec [Slovenia]. According to research by both Serbian and Slovenian historians, their debate also expressed the views of the party leaderships in Serbia and Slovenia at the time.

After talks between the Slovenian leadership and Tito about the fate of Edvard Kardelj, he resumed his work. The result was a new constitution in 1963. The Yugoslav state changes its name: it becomes the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, instead of the previous Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. A series of constitutional changes are initiated: first, the amendments from 1968; then, the amendments from 1971–72, all the way up to the new constitution of 1974. This amounted to a perpetual “search for a formula of sustainability” – which is the way it was seen by foreign experts on the development of Yugoslavia. Two views were clearly delineated: the *centralist* and the *federalist*. [The essence of the first was] centralization with only formal federalism, and of the other, further tangible decentralization towards consistent federalism i.e. confederalism. The Serbian communists were the most divided: “federal Serbs” [those working in Yugoslav federal bodies] were trying to lift the stone of hegemonic pretensions from Serbia's shoulders. In this they saw both the national interest of the Serbian people and the possibility of Yugoslavia's survival after Tito.

The 6th Congress of the SKJ (1964) revisited the national issue in Yugoslavia under new conditions. The processes of national integration were concluded.

The constituent peoples of the Yugoslav federation at the time possess the awareness of national identity and of their specific interests in a complex state. Ever since 1945, in the republic-level constitutions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs had enjoyed the status of constituent peoples [nations] of these republics. The position of national minorities – who were treated as nationalities [narodnosti]

– was improved. Institutions were created in their own native languages (newspapers and journals, publishing houses, departments of language and literature at universities).

A system of bilingual education was introduced in Vojvodina. Muslims, who in every census after 1945 demonstrated that they did not want to be either Serbs or Croats, were granted the status of [an ethnic] nation. In the 1971 census, the declaration of nationality was free. The number of Yugoslavs increased.

Even party officials – declared Yugoslavs – believed that Yugoslavia was not only what the republics agreed it was. But what was it, other than that? These officials reacted to the appearance of Slobodan Milošević, who was heralding a war for new borders, with the expectation that the other republics would remain restrained: “Milošević is not forever.” In a word, they too placed *the unity of the state, its survival, above the freedom of its peoples*. A chronology of equal responsibility of all Yugoslav republics for the wars of the 1990s was established on the basis of this kind of understanding.

Through the experience of the first Yugoslavia, which after the Vidovdan [St. Vitus Day] Constitution [1921], and especially after the assassination of the Croatian political leader in the [Yugoslav] National Assembly [1928], finally came to an arrangement [between the Serbs and the Croats] – the Cvetkovic-Maček Agreement (1939) – whose necessity was pointedly expressed by one of its architects, the liberal professor of law at the University of Belgrade, Mihailo Konstantinović: “Croats want freedom. How else can we satisfy their request and at the same time preserve the unity of the state, than by its federalization.” In essence, this polarization in the intellectual elite of Serbia had existed since Serbia’s independence (1878), when (similar to the division in the Russian intelligentsia) there was a division among Serbs into [pro] *Westerners* and *Slavophiles*. [On the one hand, there were those who favored] the in-depth development [modernization] of the realistically existing Serbian state (Principality of Serbia), following the example of small Western European countries (Stojan Novaković, Milan Piroćanac, Milutin Garašanin, Čedomilj

Mijatović – who Serbian historian Sima M. Ćirković saw as the first intellectuals in Serbia in the modern sense of the word). And on the other, advocates of the liberation and unification of the Serbian people as a priority (Nikola Pašić, on the greater importance of the freedom of the Serbian people as a whole than the freedom of Serbian citizens individually in the existing Serbian state); in domestic politics this [second orientation] meant that development should follow the spirit of Slavic institutions (cooperatives, municipalities and self-government), and in international relations that there should be reliance on Russia as the center of Slavism and Orthodox Christendom. This latter orientation was to be achieved through wars for a “greater state”. The former “continues in defeat, but does not surrender” (Stanko Lasić writing for the publication of the book by [modern-day Serbian liberal politician] Marko Nikezić, *Krhka srpska vertikala / The Fragile Serbian Vertical*). These two orientations are intertwined in the communist movement of Yugoslavia as well. The relationship between them came to a head in the wars of the 1990s.

These two responses cannot be understood without insight into the different national ideologies and the religious differences [of the Yugoslav peoples].

The policy of brotherhood and unity created in the National Liberation War and adopted in order to prevent the mutual extermination of Yugoslav peoples, and which Tito had invoked until the end of his life, was no longer a viable formula for a Yugoslavia that had entered into modern times.

Frequent constitutional changes in the second Yugoslavia were no substitute for changes in the economic system. On the contrary, instead of administrative ties from one center, the constitutional changes accelerated changes in the economic system in the direction of a market economy and integration into a single Yugoslav market.

Economic reform in 1965: the deepest change since 1945

The Serbian historian and legal theorist Slobodan Jovanović thought that in 19th century Serbia, especially after it had gained independence (1878), “modernization was as necessary as it was unpopular”. The same could be said of the 1965 economic reform. When its goals are read today they seem truly revolutionary. It encroached on inherited rights, on the mentality, on the ideology of *equality* and *unity*. Naturally, it encountered resistance. Polish historian Andrzej Walicki says revolutions occur when reforms begin.

Discussions were held about the market economy. Resistance came from the economy created under the conditions of administrative socialism, from the vast differences in development [throughout Yugoslavia], but also from the intelligentsia. A division between technical science experts and humanistic [social sciences] intellectuals became obvious. The first, well educated, with knowledge of new technologies, but also of new trends in world economy, supported economic reform. The social science intelligentsia never really dealt with Marx’s economic theory. After the clash [with Stalin] in 1948, it was divided into dogmatic Marxists and those who focused on studies of the young Marx (collection of essays from the proceedings *Marks i savremenost* /Marx and Modernity; *Savremeni humanizam* /Contemporary Humanism and a critical article by Zoran Đinđić about the Belgrade group of *Praxis philosophers*, as well as his doctoral dissertation *Jesen dijalektike* /The Autumn of Dialectics, which he completed at the German University of Konstanz).

There were also differences between the Belgrade and Zagreb circles of Praxis philosophers: the former were more oriented towards politics, the latter towards philosophy. The history of Marxism in Yugoslavia should also be viewed from this perspective. Based on previous research, the question arises who in fact were the Marxists in, for example, Serbia? From Svetozar Marković in the second half of the 19th century, Marxism had been considered a doctrine suitable for

Western Europe. By and large Serbian socialists sought a viable solution in not repeating the Western European trajectory of development (liberalism and capitalism), that is, they tried to find it in the ideas of Russian revolutionary populism. The ideologues of Serbian socialism sought “the newest in the oldest”.⁷² In traditional institutions such as the Russian *Mir* commune⁷³, that is, the Serbian cooperative, the municipality and self-government. Having in mind the idea of social revolution in Western European countries which Marx spoke about, they found in workers’ associations the same principles that characterize patriarchal economic and political institutions in their agrarian societies. In this they saw an opportunity to “accelerate” history and not repeat the process that Western European nations had gone through. But also preserve their national interest and avoid the “proletarianization” of their own people. In the October Revolution too Marxism had only instrumental value. In reality, it was, as Antonio Gramsci had said, a revolution perpetrated against [Karl Marx’s] *Capital*.

With the exception of a few social-democrats, parties belonging to the Second International, advocating economic development for Balkan countries, advancement of the working class and social legislation in them, as well as federal relations between Balkan states – the left in Serbia remained more or less entrenched in this formula of not repeating the Western European stages of development (liberalism and capitalism). Alongside a state-run economy, it advocated political freedoms – and did not find any contradiction between these two demands. And then, later, along with state socialism it turned to – nationalism.

Reactions to the 1965 economic reform came because of its, as was always said, “painful consequences” (reduced employment, social

72 Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism: From the Enlightenment to Marxism*, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1979)

73 Mir – in Russian history, a self-governing community of farmer households that elected its own officials and controlled local forests, fisheries, hunting grounds, and vacant lands.

inequality, going abroad to find work). The best organized manifestation of this resistance was the student protest of June 1968. It was an echo of the student revolt in Western Europe and the United States (Eric Hobsbawm believed that these found an alternative to the existing establishment in the anarchist teachings of the 19th century). In relation to student movements in the other republic-level centers, the student uprising in Belgrade was principally motivated by the social consequences of the economic reform. This has been repeatedly pointed out by economist Vladimir Gligorov in his works, and is also confirmed by research of historian Milivoj Beslin, as well as several other authors of texts written for the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the student protests.

Student protests played an important role, but the resistance to reforms was synchronous [from several sides]. This is also how the well-known speech by Tito about 90 percent of the [good, legitimate] “socialist youth” and 10 percent of “misled youth” should be understood. And the “Kozara kolo” folk dance by the students in front of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade.⁷⁴ This was, however, soon followed by Tito’s request for sanctions against the “ringleaders” of the student protests – the professors at the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy [mainly the Praxis group of philosophers]. The pressure from this place of highest authority lasted a long time: from 1968 to 1975, when the aforementioned professors were, by the decision of the Serbian National Assembly, removed from their university teaching posts. It is quite certain that Tito did not read the writings of these professors, but rather the secret police reports from their meetings.

However, things were much more complex than that. The latest research shows that there was hesitation, and then departures from the reforms, in the Yugoslav party leadership itself. Successful economic reform would also have radical consequences for the political

74 Protesting students ended their protest after Tito’s speech – in which he conceded that the “vast majority” of students were right to protest and intimated an end to reforms – by organizing a huge “Kozara kolo” folk dance in front of the Belgrade Law Faculty.

system. For ideological, but also pragmatic reasons, the SKJ was not ready to accept that. Not even after the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, as the leading exponent of the conservative faction. Historical sources can be helpful here as well. Tacitly, the dismissal of Aleksandar Ranković in Serbia was received as a blow against Serbia itself, especially in the light of the already existing calculations about Tito's successor (there was an expectation that the position would finally come to belong to Serbia). Very few believed in the "wiretapping" affair directed against Tito himself. For Ranković's removal a coalition was formed between the "federal Serbs", Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić [from Croatia] and reform-oriented individuals in other republics. In stark contrast, an informal opposition was being formed in Serbia around writer Dobrica Ćosić, already widely accepted as the [Serbian] national ideologue.

The last attempts in the SKJ to secure conditions for Yugoslavia's survival after Tito

It seems quite paradoxical that, after the failure of the 1965 reform, but also after the demise of hopes for "socialism with a human face" (entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Prague in August 1968), there was a certain democratization within the SKJ. Republic-level party congresses were held ahead of the federal congress, a change of generations was carried out (along with party officials from the middle level in the nomenclature – younger participants in WW II – there were also representatives of new generations which did not participate in the war, and which were formed during the period of *de-Stalinization*), with multiple candidates on electoral lists and a secret ballot. Free of dogmatic restrictions, the new leaderships ("young lions", Jože Pirjevec called them) began to open up important questions and practice a new method of work: sessions of the leaderships open to the public, more frequent meetings, encouragement of discussions on open issues, engagement of the professional public, tolerance of different opinions. These were the fruits of liberalization that had occurred after the dismissal of Aleksandar Ranković, that

is, after the critique of the State Security Service that had “put itself above society”.

The 10th Session of the Croatian League of Communists [SKH] Central Committee was held in 1970. Issues regarding the federation were opened up, with demands for more “federalization” (Vladimir Bakarić). But the debate was not carried over to the Yugoslav, federal-level institutions. The reaction to the 10th Session of the SKH Central Committee, whose significance was twofold – democratization, but also the liberation of suppressed nationalism – was extremely dogmatic. It was seen as undermining the unity of the Party, and in the final analysis – as a prelude to civil war and the beginning of Yugoslavia’s demise.

In Serbia, the party and state leaderships operated in accordance with their powers: endless consultations, but also autonomy in its work. The split came after the 21st session of the SKJ Presidency in Karadorđevo. The schism encouraged Tito: before striking against the Croatian leadership, he consulted the President of the Serbian National Assembly, Dragoslav Draža Marković. The heads of the Serbian party leadership went to the 21st session of the SKJ Presidency (1971) without knowing that the Croatian leadership would be on the agenda. But it was, in effect, the Serbian party leadership that was on the agenda as well. Not because a necessary balance had to be struck with Croatia, but because there needed to be a critical mass for changes in all the new leaderships.

The pressure was sustained until October 1972.⁷⁵ In the meantime, the Letter from SKJ president and head of the Executive Committee of the SKJ Central Committee [i.e. Tito] arrived. Even before the Letter, Tito emphasized the need to have the SKJ return to its positions before the 6th Congress of the KPJ (1952). The gist of the Letter was that the party still has “a class character”, that is, “a revolutionary role” to play. These events had a huge echo in the Western press. Their

75 Milivoj Bešlin, *Ideja moderne Srbije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1968–1972*, 1–2, (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2021)

assessment was that Tito was abandoning “Titoism” and returning to the fold of the Soviet Union.

After the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, the Yugoslav communists were divided. While some expected changes, primarily of the role of the SKJ, others felt that the process of democratization had gone too far and that a reversal was needed. After the Brioni Plenum of the SKJ Central Committee [1966], a very authoritative commission for the reorganization of the SKJ had been set up. It came up with new solutions. When he read the Propositions for the reorganization of the SKJ, Edvard Kardelj said: “This is the best document so far, but ‘if push comes to shove,’ a party like this one [that we already have] will be good enough.” He obviously had in mind the fact that the Soviet Union was still in existence (Brezhnev’s doctrine of limited sovereignty), but also the still resilient Stalinist legacy lingering in the SKJ itself. In his speech in Maribor, Tito had disparaged the work of the Commission for the Reorganization of the SKJ, declaring the Propositions to be a form of *directorship* (*dirigovština* – a label attached to Milovan Đilas at the 3rd Plenum of the SKJ Central Committee in 1954).

In the “purges” that followed in 1971–72, new people were brought to leading positions in the parties of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia – and much less so in the other republics. And not only party leaders, but also social and state institutions, were “cleansed” of the people who brought about the constitutional amendments of 1971/72, as the basis for the 1974 Constitution. As before, this time too, whenever the KPJ/SKJ was faced with the option of crossing the Rubicon, it returned to the tried and tested Stalinist method of changing the leadership and membership.

In all [republic-level] national historiographies, the period up to Tito’s death has been well researched. It follows from that research that at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, *the process of modernizing the economy and democratizing society, as well as an authentic federalization of the country, had been halted*. The norm was a façade; and after Tito’s death, it too was broken. Serbia had played a decisive role in this. Through its representatives, it put up resistance

to constitutional changes. The 1974 Constitution had been adopted on the basis of a balance of power: Serbia was on one side, and all the other republics and both [autonomous] provinces – on the other. As a realist, Tito accepted this balance of power, even though he was against the confederization of Yugoslavia. As already mentioned, even during his lifetime, Serbia had demanded changes to the 1974 Constitution (*Blue Book*, 1977). After his death, Serbia was freed from his role of final decision maker, which hitherto had established both a seeming and a real balance.

In order to prove that Serbia suffered from a position of inequality [in Yugoslavia], and thus that the Serbian national interest was under threat (Nikola Pašić: “Separated from other Serbian lands [in Croatia and Bosnia], Serbia has no reason to exist”; and Slobodan Milošević: “Serbia will [either] be a state or it will cease to exist”) – the policy of the Serbian party leadership from 1968 to 1972 [i.e. the Serbian liberals] had to be brought into question. That is – the policy of Serbia turning to itself [to tend to its own modernization and democratization]; finding accommodation with other nations in Yugoslavia; reducing the functions of the federation to basic common interests: foreign policy, defense, common market and monetary system; the democratic functioning of Yugoslavia’s parity bodies – all the elements of this policy had to be called into question. Therefore, the achievements of this orientation, expressed in the 1974 Constitution, were undermined (centralization of Serbia through abolishing real powers of the autonomous provinces; export of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” to other republics in order to impose it on Yugoslavia as a whole; creation of Serb entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in order to redraw borders for the greater Serbian state; involving the Yugoslav Army in this project). And in addition to this, the destruction of Yugoslav institutions had to be undertaken (promulgation of Serbia’s “independent” constitution with no obligations to the federal constitution in 1990; raiding the federal monetary system).

It had to be demonstrated that this “engineering” – from the 19th century to the beginning of the 1980s – never even had an alternative.

This is also how the two interpretations of the Serbian liberals 1968–1972 came about. They were removed from power as opportunists who weakened the revolutionary role of the SKJ, as technocrats, nationalists and Sovietophobes – that is – as pro-Westerners. This was systematically elaborated in the two-volume work by Dragan Marković and Sava Kržavac.⁷⁶ After this the liberals were thoroughly forgotten until the beginning of 1989. Then, the editor at [Belgrade weekly news magazine] *NIN*, Stevan Nikšić, published an article in the newspaper *Borba* (February 11–12, 1989) that initiated a different interpretation of the Serbian liberals. His article was a reaction to the book by Aleksandar Nenadović *Razgovori s Kočom / Conversations with Koča*.⁷⁷ Nikšić characterized the period of the liberals as the darkest period in Serbia (bans, arrests, persecutions). According to him, the end of that *reign of terror* was met with “great relief”. However, research into primary sources conducted by Milivoj Bešlin shows that this new round of discreditation against the liberals in Serbia corresponded to Serbia’s secret preparations for war to change [Yugoslav] borders. In his reaction, Koča Popović, as always, was terse: Nikšić had not explained the main reasons for the removal of the liberals. However, the journalist Dragan Belić, in his extensive response to Nikšić, painted a completely opposite picture of the liberals. His assessment was that the period of the liberals was a high point in Serbian culture. According to Belić, their removal caused an exodus of Serbian intellectuals (he mentions the departure of Zoran Đinđić for Germany).

Post-communist historiography (Radina Vučetić) and journalism (Nebojša Popov) established the phrase “so-called liberals”. The book

76 Dragan Marković, Sava Kržavac, *Liberalizam od Đilasa do danas*, 1–2, (Beograd: Sloboda, 1978)

77 Konstantin ‘Koča’ Popović, 1908–1992, was a Yugoslav politician from Serbia, legendary Partisan war commander, close associate of Tito for a long time, Yugoslav Foreign Minister 1953–65, supporter of free-market reforms and politically close to the Serbian liberals who retired after they were dismissed.]

by journalist Slavoljub Đukić⁷⁸, the author of several books about Dobrica Ćosić and Slobodan Milošević, also sought to inquire into the standing of the Serbian liberals after the death of Tito. “A light book about a grave matter” – said Marko Nikezić.⁷⁹ But the author was overcome by the subject matter and the book influenced a return to this suppressed topic. The discussion about the book in the *Borba* editorial office was indicative [1990]. The differences in the interpretation of the [legacy of the Serbian] liberals reflected the differences between Serbian intellectuals in relation to the events of the 1980s, before the wars of the 1990s. The unwillingness of the liberals to engage in revanchism and their understanding that disaster was imminent, consolidated the view about them as being “so-called liberals”, that is, as being some sort of “gendarmes”, especially in culture. This was especially the case at the beginning of political pluralism in Serbia. This was necessary in order to prove that before the numerous political parties [of the multi-party system] and their more or less identical programs (market economy, multi-party system, parliamentary democracy), there had been no alternative in Serbia. Communism was just another face of totalitarianism: always and everywhere.

The first serious discussion about the Serbian liberals was held on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of their fall (*Uzroci i posledice pada srpskih (komunističkih) liberala '72 Prelom / '72 Fracture: Causes and Consequences of the Fall of the Serbian (Communist) Liberals*, 2003). A realistic explication of their rise and political destiny was possible only after the most thorough research so far had been conducted by Milivoj Bešlin (*Ideja moderne Srbije u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1968–1972 / The Idea of Modern Serbia in Socialist Yugoslavia 1968–1972*). Among other things, this research calls into question Dobrica

78 Slavoljub Đukić, *Slom srpskih liberala. Tehnologija političkih obračuna Josipa Broza Tita*, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1990.

79 Marko Nikezić, 1921–1991, was a Yugoslav and Serbian politician. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia and Chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia. Along with Latinka Perović, he was dismissed in 1972 as a leader of the Serbian liberals.

Ćosić's *philosophy* about lying being the main means of survival for the Serbian people. Therefore, the Yugoslav peoples did not just like that, unexpectedly and out of the blue start slaughtering each other like "insects" in the early 1990s. The choice between an imposed *unity of the state* and the *freedom of its peoples*, between an *imperial* and a *modern* state, could not have been the same, and was not the same, for all Yugoslav peoples. The turmoil of the 1980s came to full fruition in the last decade of the 20th century. In the light of this fruition it becomes clearer why the *Serbian liberals of the 1970s* were the only reformist movement among the communist parties of the former socialist bloc, but of the former Yugoslavia also, with which both the *establishment* and the *opposition* rejected any idea of cooperation. The same was true of historiography as well – which first rejected any research [into the movement of the Serbian liberals] and then embarked upon a falsification of its true nature and history.

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FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Božo Repe

YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY: CLAIMS TO THE STATUS OF THE LAST GUARDIAN OF TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY (JNA) originated from the communist-led people's liberation movement and therefore was both a national Yugoslav defence force as well as a partisan army, in defence of the socialist order. Its chief commander was Josip Broz Tito from its founding in 1941 (as the the People's Liberation Army) until his death in 1980. In 1945, the People's Liberation Army and partisan detachments were transformed into the Yugoslav People's Army, and its composition and operations were centralized. During the post-war period, it was reorganized several times. The last reorganization took place from 1986 to 1992, when it formally ceased to exist. At the same time, different interest groups within the leadership of the JNA, which was a strictly closed system, were involved in conflicts and disputes either due to different views on changing military doctrines, or due to political or national reasons (e.g. a conflict between Yugoslav and nationally oriented generals, which especially came to the fore during the so-called Maspok in Croatia) and even moreso due to personal intolerance, jealousy, career reasons and the like. Hence there were major purges from time to time and, naturally, the main arbiter and decision-maker was Tito, who always chose the Defence Minister (all of whom were generals, with the exception of Branko Mamula, who was an admiral).

In order to understand the role of the JNA during the 1980s and the breakup of Yugoslavia, it is significant to point to its reorganization after the attack of the Warsaw Pact forces on Czechoslovakia in 1968. At that time, in the leadership of the army assessed that the JNA would not be able to defend itself from a frontal attack coming from

the East. At the same time, “during the period 1968–1976, Yugoslav generals (...) claimed during their public appearances and privately that Belgrade looked at the Warsaw Pact as the only serious threat to its independence”.⁸⁰ They also assessed that the danger would almost certainly be posed by subversive activities and not an invasion. However, as 38 generals and 2,400 officers were removed from duty in 1968,⁸¹ we can conclude that – even if we take into account the political and personal reasons for the purges – Tito and some generals concluded that the previous doctrine and such assessments were wrong.

This resulted in the introduction of two-component defence: the JNA, as the force to receive and hold back a first strike in case of an attack, and the Territorial Defence (TO) to resist in the situation of occupation. In the latter situation, of external occupation, the Republican Central Committees would assume the responsibility for defence and set up a republican main staff, military staff in municipalities, as well as detachments and battalions. The republican TO forces would be armed with light weapons, but have a good communication system to enable high mobility and rapid response, depending on the situation. “This permanently opened the issue relating to sovereign command competence and the use of the armed forces in the SFRY, if not during Tito’s life, then certainly after his death.”⁸²

The military leadership never reconciled with the formation of TO forces in the republics. As early as the 1970s, there were conflicts with Slovenia, which succeeded in developing its TO most efficiently, looking at it as the embryo of the Slovenian army (which would replace the Slovenian partisan army that was incorporated into the JNA after the war). Slovenia kept buying weapons and equipment abroad using

80 Mile Bjelajac, “JLA v šestdesetih in v prvi polovici sedemdesetih,” in *Slovenija – Jugoslavija, krize in reforme 1968/1988*, edited by Zdenko Čepić (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2010), 89–108, <http://www.sistory.si/publikacije/prenos/?urn=SISTORY:ID:I5562>.

81 Ibid., 89–108

82 Ibid., 89–108

its secret funds, because the JNA either delayed equipping its TO in various ways, or did not want to equip it at all. The military leadership reacted sharply to the purchase of weapons abroad. This case, which dragged on for years – and in which the JNA Counterintelligence Service played an important role and provoked a conflict between the Serbian and Slovenian State Security Services – ended in the removal of key people from the Slovenian TO in 1973. This provided a ground for accusing Slovenia of separatism to which the Slovenian top leadership was allegedly inclined and which the Serbian service tried to prove even by producing some forged documents (Operation Vrh and the so-called Green Book⁸³).

After Tito's death, the collective Presidency of the SFRY formally became the supreme commander. In actual fact, the JNA leadership did not consider it as commander and, through some bodies within the Presidency (especially the Secretariat for National Defence Council), exerted a strong influence on its decisions. The Presidency came in useful whenever the JNA leadership attempted to legalistically cover its intentions by the Presidency's conclusions. The opinion quickly prevailed within the military leadership that, given the rise in interethnic conflicts and the fact that Yugoslav leaders lacked political authority, the JNA remained the only institution that could defend Yugoslavia and socialism. This opinion was derived from its high status in Yugoslav society during the post-war decades. Before Tito's death and for several years afterwards, the JNA – with the motto "clean as a teardrop" and the "forge of brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples" – was practically untouchable. Due to its national liberation tradition and assistance in the construction of large infrastructure projects and, in particular, natural disasters, it enjoyed a high reputation among the majority of the population. In the southern republics, military service was considered an honour and the proof of one's maturity, while officers maintained good relations with local authorities and people in general. The salaries of JNA

83 Božo Repe, *"Liberalizem" v Sloveniji* (Ljubljana: Borec, 1992), 190–198.

officers were not high, but they had numerous fringe benefits, including a special health care system, housing, hotels and other vacation facilities in the most exclusive tourist resorts, their wives were priority hire candidates due to frequent moving and the like. The JNA functioned as the seventh republic – it had its own party organization (communists constituted 98 per cent of the command staff), newspapers and journalists in the media that covered its activities in a propagandistic sense: it was not subject to parliamentary or public control. Until the early 1980s, its budget demands were met without objection. It was the most expensive and largest state institution. It had its own industrial complex, ranging from pig farms to the production of the most sophisticated weapons (mostly under Soviet licences), which had a significant influence on the economic policies of the Yugoslav republics (in Slovenia in 1988 there were 74 companies engaged in the special-purpose production for the JNA, mostly in the technically highly propulsive industries; a considerable number of research institutes also worked for the JNA). It also sold weapons to third world countries without control. Due to large military projects during the 1980s (supersonic aircraft, tanks), backed by more liberal generals, the JNA had to be modernized in order to take a lead in the high-tech sector, thus further strengthening the economic interdependence of the republics and the Yugoslav economy as a whole. This would provide an opportunity for the JNA to preserve or even increase its budgetary resources and, in a new “uniform,” preserve its social power, based previously on ideology and Tito’s protective role. The more conservative members of the JNA leadership also agreed with this concept because it was in favor of preserving Yugoslavia and did not directly contradict the preservation of socialism to which they remained loyal to the end. At the same time, it would enable the preservation of their privileges, especially in the case of senior officers, who were affected by the economic crisis and high inflation. In the second half of the 1980s, the JNA leadership fought bitterly to ensure for the JNA about 5 per cent of Yugoslavia’s GDP directly from contributions and independently from the budget, in which it succeeded during the discussions about

the constitutional amendments in 1988. Thus, a special intervention sales tax for the JNA was introduced – 3 percent of the goods tax and 3,5, that is, 20 percent of the service tax, depending on the type of service⁸⁴. The relevant law remained in effect until the end of 1990. Similar methods were also used by the Yugoslav governments in the past, but in a more covert way (during 1984–1985, for example, the Federal Executive Council – FEC – increased budget readjustment taxes and the bulk of the proceeds went to the JNA).

Until 1968, the military plans of the JNA did not explicitly anticipate internal intervention measures despite its class component and the principled constitutional provision that the JNA, as the leading armed power of Yugoslavia's national defence, was obliged to defend not only the independence, inviolability and integrity of the SFRY, but also its constitutional order. In 1968, the year of student protests and the explosion of ethnic unrest in Kosovo, the JNA was faced, for the first time since the Second World War, with the possibility of having to interfere in the internal affairs and shoot people. This caused significant moral dilemmas among the commanders who had to intervene in Kosovo (the Staff of the 3rd Army in Skopje). At the same time, the influence of the military leadership on Tito and, through him, on political decisions was increased even further because, after a showdown with Aleksandar Ranković, when the State Security Service (SDB) was thoroughly purged and decentralized, Tito increasingly relied on information from the military intelligence and counterintelligence services.

At the time of the so-called Maspok (Mass Movement), the JNA, on Tito's orders, took control over some strategic points in Croatia, demonstrated force and thus blocked or prevented protests. Maspok led to army purges. After this challenge and an incursion by an Ustaša sabotage group (Raduša), the JNA and the Yugoslav leadership

84 Aleš Stergar, "Prometni davek za JLA zvišal tudi cene večine storitev." *Delo*, January 20, 1990, 3, http://www.dlib.si/listalnik/URN_NBN_SI_DOC-5T5GJMHY/2/index.html.

also started to prepare measures against the internal enemy, invoking the 1974 Constitution which stipulated that, in addition to national defence, the armed forces should protect the social order established by the constitution. The term “special war” came into use and anti-sabotage plans were made.

The JNA leadership considered the republican TOs as the greatest internal enemy. The first specific measures were taken against the Kosovo TO during the ethnic riots in 1981. The JNA blocked all weapons and equipment of the Kosovo TO, while its staff was banned to activate any unit.

In the mid-1980s, the JNA was again involved in a dispute with Slovenia, but this time it was a public one. The military leadership denounced Slovenia’s position that – due to the fact that it financially supports the JNA – it has the right to influence defence policy. It also sharply criticized the situation in the Army. The JNA leadership held that the Slovenian authorities were unreliable and that there was no difference between them and the growing opposition. Therefore, it was decided that the Army should act alone. One of the measures was to set up a special staff within the General Staff of the JNA (such a staff already existed in Kosovo). However, as far as it is known, this decision was never carried out. The decision to intervene in Slovenia gradually matured during 1987 and was carried out in the spring of 1988. During 1987, several events followed one after the other, which the JNA understood as a joint attack against it. The continuously critical approach by the Slovenian press to the JNA (especially *Mladina*) and the demands of civil society were supported by *Nova revija* in its February issue No. 57. The JNA also suffered several additional blows from Slovenian politicians who requested the clarification about the resale of weapons and live ammunition to Iran and Iraq. The Federal Directorate for Commodity Reserves, which was under the direct control of the JNA, was buying weapons from Bofors, a Swedish arms company (which, due to the relevant Swedish laws, was not allowed to sell them directly), while at the same time selling Yugoslav ones as well. The Slovenian delegates in the Federal Assembly

asked uncomfortable questions and made demands on it. Generals were especially annoyed with Vika Potočnik. Convinced that Yugoslavia was on the brink of survival and that any new blow could finish it off, as the then Defence Minister Branko Mamula described it, the JNA “was faced with the challenge of stopping the unfortunate events.”⁸⁵ This assessment contained much truth. In early 1988, Alojz Briški, Executive Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia for the Secretariat for National Defence, and Milan Kučan, President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Slovenia, had an exhaustive conversation about the JNA with the members of the Presidency of the Republican Committee of the Slovenian Socialist Youth Union, Srečo Kim, Igor Bavčar and Janez Janša, who and their media (*Mladina*, in particular) were severely critical of it. As Kučan understood it, the basic thesis of the youth was as follows: the Army is the pillar of the social elite and if they wish to overthrow the current elite in the federation and Slovenia (and, as a new generation, replace it, which was their main goal – the author’s note) they must first overthrow the untouchable status of the Army.⁸⁶

The military leadership tried to prepare the political ground at the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in June 1986. In their well-prepared speeches, the delegates demanded that the JNA be recognized the status of an equal and partner social force, which could legally intervene in social relations. As described by General Ivan Dolničar, the essence of the debate was as follows: “If the League of Communists and other socio-political organizations are incapable of leading the country, the Army has every right to take the lead.”⁸⁷ Similar assessments could also be found in some newspaper comments. The JNA representatives and its supporters in the feder-

85 Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica: CID, 2000), 101

86 Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan: Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2002), 202.

87 *Ibid.*, 205.

al bodies (the Federal Assembly, the Presidency, etc.) graded their demands on the basis of which these bodies would take measures against the hostile media coverage of the JNA. They presented the analyses of the texts and statistical data which were supposed to testify about this hostile attitude.

At the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988, the JNA leadership reorganized the armed forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia lost the army commands, while Montenegro, which had no army, but only one autonomous corps in Titograd, was subordinated to Skopje (previously to Belgrade). Instead of the previous six armies, four fronts were formed: the northern and central fronts, which incorporated the previous first and seventh armies headquartered in Belgrade, so that the Bosnian territory came under Belgrade; the northwestern front incorporated the fifth and ninth armies headquartered in Zagreb, and the southwestern front headquartered in Skopje covered all of Macedonia, one part of southern Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. At the request of the JNA, the Presidency of the SFRY renamed the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

Thus, the JNA managed to abolish the autonomous Ninth Army, whose command was in Ljubljana, and move its headquarters to the newly established Fifth Military Region in Zagreb, as well as to reduce the TO competencies and transfer some competencies of the republican leaderships (republican presidencies) to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. This was the goal that was set and mostly achieved by Branko Mamula (Federal Secretary for National Defence from 1982 to 1988, a Serb from Croatia). Otherwise, he found three wrong rules in the 1974 Constitution: the Presidency of the SFRY is composed of the representatives of the republics, who are elected in their republics and thus are accountable to them, instead of being elected in the Federal Assembly and being accountable to it, because the Presidency is the supreme commander of the armed forces; the republics and provinces have the right of consensus decision making concerning defence and commanding the armed forces; the republics

and, partly, autonomous provinces have been given the status of a state and thus the right to organize their armed forces.

In the opinion of military analysts, the reasons for this reorganization were both political and professional. This was already proved by the internal decision of the military leadership during the division into military regions that the army commanders should not be from the republics where the military jurisdiction overlaps with the republican borders and the same nationality as TO commanders in the same area. In addition, at the end of 1987, as compensation it was decided to abolish military districts and sectors, while conscription activities were conferred to socio-political organizations. In this way the JNA lost a direct influence on the conscription of soldiers.

At the end of 1987, the reorganization further fuelled the dispute between Slovenia and the JNA leadership. In the opinion of the Slovenian Presidency, the reorganization implied a fundamental change in the concept of the Secretariat for National Defence and thus was unacceptable. At the same time, the JNA leadership finally decided, as Mamula wrote: "(...) to defend Yugoslavia and self-management socialism even at the cost of military coup." The reason should be sought in the demands of Kosovo Albanians and their riots in Kosovo, which prompted the imposition of a state of emergency. Due to their demand for a change in the status of Kosovo – a republic instead of an autonomous province – behind which there was allegedly their desire for secession – Kosovo Albanians were viewed by the JNA leadership as a kind of internal enemy. Slovenia was quickly catching up with Kosovo on the military leadership's "value ladder" because it was criticized for a counterrevolution. On September 3, 1987, in the military barracks in Paraćin, Aziz Kelmendi, a Kosovo Albanian conscript, armed himself with an automatic rifle and shot dead four soldiers in their sleep, wounded another five and then committed suicide. The Serbian daily *Politika* described the tragedy as a "shot in Yugoslavia," while many other commentators called the JNA inept as it failed to

establish order in its midst and protect soldiers.⁸⁸ The military leadership held that nationalist leaders stood behind such views. At the same time, it felt that the federal leadership (especially the SFRY Presidency) wanted to deprive it of its political function, which it had during Tito's life and retained after his death. The military leadership used the Paraćin massacre to increase the combat readiness of some units in all garrisons, while their officers were acquainted with the orders in the case of a state of emergency. During their military service, Albanians and Slovenes were under particularly strict supervision. They were prevented or hindered from accessing newspapers in their language, while the trials and punishment of soldiers of Albanian and Slovenian origin became more frequent.

It was difficult to carry out a military coup in the whole country, based on the Latin American model, and introduce military administration under the prevailing circumstances, because it would provoke conflicts in the state and party presidencies. The republican leaderships that supported the JNA's policy would also turn against it. Moreover, it would provoke a reaction by Western countries (truly, they considered the JNA's efforts to save Yugoslavia to be justified and grounded in the constitution). Therefore, a realistic option would be to implement the Kosovo-style measures in Slovenia as well. That is why they tried to get support from the federal bodies, first from the Presidency and then the Federal Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. At the session of the Military Council (Council of the Armed Forces) on March 25, 1988, the immediate intervention of military judicial bodies and, if necessary, military units in Slovenia was announced. Truly, the Council was an advisory body of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and, although it had no formal competencies, it was very influential because it consisted of the most influential members of the military leadership – army and TO commanders and some retired generals.

88 Mamula, *Slučaj*, 102.

The Council attributed a counterrevolutionary character to the political liberalization of Slovenia (Mamula was especially infuriated by two articles in *Delo* and *Mladina* about his visit to Ethiopia and the conclusion of an arms sales agreement and an article in *Mladina* where it was written how the soldiers were building his villa in Opatija like Egyptian slaves). The Council also prepared a document titled "Information About the Attacks on the Foundations of the National Defence Council, JNA and State Security Service" and then intentionally released this information to the news media, so that its content reached the public on March 28. The main text about the mentioned session was written by the JNA's political leadership, which then pressured *Borba* to publish it. Zagreb's *Vjesnik* and *Delo* also published it, while *Politika* published not only an article about the session, but also Mamula's introductory speech at it.

It is true that the military leadership also enjoyed the principled support from the federal Presidency for criminal prosecutions against the most prominent critics from civil society. Should there be any unrest in Slovenia, the Presidency and the JNA leadership would conclude that the Slovenian authorities and security forces were not in control of the situation. Thus, they would send tanks on roads, introduce a temporary military administration (which the Slovenian generals in the JNA military leadership would hardly oppose even if they wanted to), demand the change of the leadership and the appointment of the pro-Yugoslav "healthy forces" if they could find them. The ultimate goal was to depose the "separatist" Slovenian leadership and discipline Slovenia.

The Slovenian leadership reacted against the proclamation of a state of emergency and the realization of such a scenario in the two federal presidencies and other federal bodies. General Svetozar Višnjić, Commander of the Ljubljana Military Region, warned them of the measures prepared by the JNA leadership. Namely, he was ordered to raise combat readiness in Slovenia in case of the riots sparked by the arrests made at the request of the military judicial authorities. Višnjić always pleaded for correct relations with the Slovenian

leadership. Moreover, the military bodies were not authorized by law to arrest civilians (however, it would change with the proclamation of a state of emergency).

Immediately after his conversation with Višnjić, Kučan called the top Yugoslav officials and demanded that the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia call a session. At this session, held on 29 March, Kučan and the Slovenian representatives resolutely came forward against the JNA's intentions. The JNA stepped back, while Mamula's order to Višnjić was eventually relativized. Višnjić, however, was criticized for his behavior. In the end, everything remained on the level of discussion in the highest bodies and clearing up the issue with Slovenia – whether it was a question of counter-revolution or not and how much the Slovenian leadership was involved in it. Slovenia was also exposed to media and political criticism by all others in Yugoslavia, which was followed by mass anti-Slovenian and (at the same time) anti-Kosovo rallies.

Kučan's speech at the session of the Presidency of the CC LCY on March 29, 1988, began to circulate in a large number of copies in Slovenia. The State Security Service began an investigation into how the transcript reached the public, during which it secretly searched the premises of MikroAda, a computer company where Janez Janša was employed. This is how the transcript of Kučan's speech and Višnjić's document on the raising of combat readiness were discovered. After a two-week hesitation (they initially thought that it was a setup by the military counterintelligence service) the State Security Service was forced to inform the JNA leadership about it, because Stane Dolanc, a member of the federal presidency, recklessly mentioned this problem to the JNA security service chief, General Ilija Ceranić. The military judicial authorities initiated the procedure for the arrest of four people involved in this affair. The arrests of Janez Janša and David Tasić were carried out by the Slovenian State Security Service; Sgt Maj. Ivan Borštnar was arrested by the military police, while Franci Zavrl took refuge in a hospital to avoid arrest.

In the meantime, the article in *Mladina* titled “The Night of Long Knives” and written on the basis of Kučan’s speech, provoked strong reactions in the public. The Slovenian Prosecutor prohibited the article and it was not published, but its copies quickly began circulating. It was written by Vlado Mihaljek and signed with a pseudonym, that is, the name of national hero Majda Vrhovnik, which was used by the editorial board to protect authors.

The arrests were made in May 1988, and the trial for the revelation of a military secret before the Military Court in Ljubljana began in late July and early August. It was a question of the 8 January 1988 document on the basis of which, due to the situation in Slovenia, the Commander of the Ljubljana Military Region raised the combat readiness of his units. In Slovenia, due to the trial (especially because it was conducted in Serbo-Croatian), there were mass protests and homogenization through the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights.

After this challenge, the JNA, now under the command of General Veljko Kadijević (Federal Secretary for National Defence, 1988–1992, born to a Serbian father and Croatian mother), focused on the Territorial Defence, which might respond with armed resistance. The goal was the absolute subordination of the TO to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and, should things go well, its placement under the direct command of the JNA. This would be followed by the disarmament of the TO forces. In fact, the military leadership wanted to apply the 1981 tactics, when it responded to the Albanian resistance (in Kosovo) by reinforcing military units and disbanding the TO forces in which almost exclusively only the Serbs remained. Mamula had already managed to stop the requests of the Territorial Defence to be supplied with heavy weapons and organized into divisions and corps. In the opinion of the military leadership, this would imply the existence of two parallel armies with the TO being numerically superior (which was prevented by drastically reducing the number of TO members). In April 1989, the JNA wanted to have the document titled “Achievements and Directions for the Further Development of the SFRY Total National Defence Concept” be adopted by the

Federal Presidency Total National Defence Council in order to centralize the TND concept and thus subordinate the TO to the JNA leadership, as well as to introduce control over the weapons of the republican TO forces. Some JNA generals and TO commanders disagreed with this plan, so that it failed.

In the second half of 1989, Kadijević and one part of the military leadership (Chief of the General Staff Blagoje Adžić and some other high-ranking officers) were covertly converging their views with the views of the Serbian leadership. Truly, the pro-Serbian part of the Army was in doubt whether to endorse the centralist Yugoslav or Greater Serbian concept until the summer of 1991 when it became clear that Slovenia could no longer be subordinated to the federation and that due to the EU's mediation in resolving the conflict in Slovenia a better organized military coup was no longer possible (Milošević was also against it, because he already embarked on the realization of the Greater Serbian plan). During the previous years, General Nikola Ljubičić, the long-serving defence minister and politician who held the highest positions in the federation and Serbia (in 1987, he played a decisive role in helping Milošević to assume power in Serbia) and General Petar Gračanin who, during the period 1982–1985, was the Chief of the General Staff of the JNA and, then, like Ljubičić, the President of the Presidency of Serbia, were in charge of maintaining close relations between the League of Communists and the JNA. Finally, at Serbia's insistence, Ante Marković appointed Petar Gračanin as Minister of Internal Affairs. At that time, the Serbs accounted for about 60 per cent of the officer corps,⁸⁹ including mostly the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (where the Serbian "autonomous" regions were formed during 1990–1991).

The mediator was Borisav Jović, who was first a member of the SFRY Presidency and then its President, through whom Kadijević also tried to influence the Presidency's decisions. Otherwise, "Kadijević came during the period 1990-'91 to treat only its members from Serbia

89 Mamula, Slučaj, 115.

and Montenegro as those to whom he had to report and with whom he had to confer over the strategy.”⁹⁰ In the summer of 1989 (that is, since the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo and the debate on the abolition of the state of emergency in Kosovo), Kadjević and Milošević also began meeting directly, although at first Jović doubted that they understood each other well. Due to the common interests, they supported each other from the very beginning. As early as 1988, after Branko Mikulić’s resignation, Kadjević proposed Milošević as the new President of the Federal Executive Council, who refused this position, because he wanted to sort out things at home. Kadjević also had Milošević in mind as the new President of the Federal Executive Council the following year, when Marković’s temporary one-year term of office expired and the Federal Assembly had to confirm the new government. Despite different interests, this contact lasted until the attack on Slovenia. The Army’s most outspoken support for Milošević came in March 1991, when he faced mass protests in Belgrade and the JNA sent tanks on its streets.

In August 1989, Kadjević, Jović, Milošević and Bogdan Trifunović (Vice-President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia) spent the summer together in Kupari. Jović concluded that Kadjević’s position was identical to the Serbian one: the JNA will defend Yugoslavia at all cost; Yugoslavia must be an efficient federal state; its market orientation is necessary; it should struggle against dogmatism and the Army, naturally, should be on good terms with all republics, while it was clear that it enjoyed the strongest support by Serbia.⁹¹

The new alliance was put to test for the first time in September 1989, when the Slovenian Assembly adopted the amendments under which – on the basis of its experience with the attempt to proclaim a

90 Marko Attila Hoare, “Analiza slučaja 3. Kako je JNA postala velikosrpska vojska,” YU historija (2015), https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/ratovi_91_99_txt01c3.html.

91 Borislav Jović, *Zadnji dnevni SFRJ. Odlomki iz dnevnika* (Ljubljana: Slovenska knjiga, 1996), 33.

state of emergency in it – strengthened its competencies, so that the proclamation of a state of emergency was not possible without the Slovenian Assembly’s consent. Jović and Kadijević agreed that “it is necessary to prevent the destruction of the constitutional system of the state and the JNA has a constitutional obligation in that respect, while the Presidency is the supreme commander of the JNA.”⁹²

On Jović’s orders, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence made an analysis of the constitutional amendments. At the meeting of Jović, Marković and Kadijević with the Slovenian leadership, which was organized by Drnovšek on September 21, Jović and Kadijević threatened to take other measures being at the disposal of the federal Presidency should the Slovenian Presidency failed to withdraw the amendments. Despite the new threat of the proclamation of a state of emergency, Slovenia did not give in, while Kadijević began to hesitate, because the federal constitution allegedly did not stipulate the way to legally prevent one republic from overthrowing the constitutional order. The JNA then began flooding the SFRY Presidency Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order with the new information about the attempts of foreign and domestic enemies to overthrow the constitutional order. In addition, it intensified its intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs did the same, but faced problems, because the intelligence officers from the “secessionist” republics did not want to cooperate with it and work against their leaders.

At the end of the 1980s, apart from its Yugoslav homeland (as it was perceived in Tito’s spirit), the ideological homeland of the Yugoslav People’s Army also began to crumble. It was particularly a big blow for it because, during the entire postwar period, it was primarily the army of the “party,” its class policy and the policy of brotherhood and unity. At the 9th Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People’s Army, held in Topčider, November 23–24, 1989, all 200 delegates expressed their absolute unity, which had to

92 Jović, *Ibidem*, 49–50.

influence the forthcoming 14th Congress of the LCY. They opposed a multi-party system, because it would allegedly break up Yugoslavia, demanded the adoption of the federal constitution first and then the republican constitutions, and accused Slovenia of wanting to have its own army, because it was an expression of separatism. The JNA representatives also presented similar views in the media, which, apart from giving general support, also gave much space for interviews with the leading generals.

At the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the delegates from the Organization of the League of Communists in the JNA, headed by Vice-Admiral Petar Šimić (who was given a new mandate at the 9th Conference), also strongly opposed Slovenia's proposals to federalize the LCY ("breaking the LCY into several parties"), transform it into a social democratic party and thus change its name. When the Congress failed, the Organization of the League of Communists in the JNA continued to strive for the continuation of the Congress. In the months to follow, it found itself in an unusual legal position. Namely, it existed only on the basis of the statutory provisions of the LC, which de facto did not exist, and not by law. As the federal law on a multi-party system, which could prohibit its activities, did not exist, it could not be dissolved. Truly, in the late 1980s, the demands for the depoliticization of the JNA by both the public and politicians began to appear (although nobody knew how it could be done, bearing in mind that almost all officers were communists). After the 14th Congress, the newspapers started to write more intensively about its dissolution.⁹³ However, the JNA survived for another few months and convened its last 10th Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the JNA. On December 17, 1990, the delegates adopted the conclusion to join the League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia⁹⁴. The Movement for Yugoslavia was

93 Tamara Indik Mali, "Partija napušta armiju," *Vjesnik*, (June 20, 1990).

94 "ZKJ v JLA prenehala delovati in se priključila ZK-GJ," *Delo* XXXII, no. 293 (December 18, 1990), 2, http://www.dlib.si/listalnik/URN_NBN_SI_DOC-ODUQ3RT7/

invented by the military leadership, while Mira Marković, Slobodan Milošević's wife, also had a significant role. It was supposed to be the successor to the LCY, while communists would still have the leading role in it. It was also meant to be the JNA's political support and the unifier of Yugoslav-oriented parties, groups and individuals. Branko Mamula was chosen to be the main initiator. He organized preparatory meetings at the Guard House in Topčider with the remaining former communists from Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as intellectuals who stayed true to their Yugoslav and communist beliefs. As for the situation in Yugoslavia, even after the 14th Congress the military leadership was in a dilemma as to how to behave and hesitated to make decisions. It continued to look for the legal ground to proclaim a state of emergency and analyze how the world would respond in such a case. It expected support from the Soviet Union and restrained response by the United States, the North Atlantic Alliance and European countries, which favored the preservation of Yugoslavia. Western politicians would likely accept the proclamation of a state of emergency should it be done quickly and efficiently. There might be some harsher statements, but nothing more serious. For the political parties that were formed in some republics the JNA leadership claimed that they were anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist and that their goal was to break up Yugoslavia. The JNA (Supreme Command) called on the Presidency to ensure the functioning of the federation and implicitly asked for the prevention of multi-party elections, because the victory of national parties would lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia. On February 20, 1990, at the session of the Presidency, Defence Minister Kadijević said that Yugoslavia was heading for civil war, which should be prevented. Thus, the Presidency, with Drnovšek abstaining from voting (he subsequently signed the decision), approved that the Army could intervene in Kosovo where the state of emergency was still in effect. At the beginning, the Army will act primarily demonstrationally, occupy the crucial

communications and thus achieve a psychological effect. It will react only in case of an attack. It was also approved to use weapons.

In April 1990, the military leadership began preparations for concrete measures. Meanwhile, Slovenia and Croatia held multi-party elections in which the opposition came out as winner (in Slovenia – the Demos, a diverse coalition, and in Croatia – the HDZ); Kučan became the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, while Tuđman became the President of Croatia. Elsewhere, parliamentary and presidential elections were also held by the end of 1990. In November, in divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović became the President of the Presidency and Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia. In December 1990, Milošević and his Socialist Party won the elections in Serbia, while in Montenegro the winner was the League of Communists of Montenegro with Milošević's loyal supporter Momir Bulatović as President.

When Jović assumed the position as President of the Presidency on May 15, he wanted to realize the agreed plan on the proclamation of a state of emergency together with Kadijević as soon as possible. The first step was the disarmament of the TO. The conclusions of the SFRY Presidency enable the military leadership to gain the formal ground for its actions. On May 17, it began to carry out the order of the Chief of General Staff to collect weapons from civilian depots in Slovenia and Croatia and take them to military depots. In Slovenia this action was partly successful, while in Croatia, where the TO bodies were mostly made up of Serbian officers, it was completely successful. As a result, in the months to follow the Slovenian Territorial Defence became independent, while the Slovenian Presidency took over command. In March 1991, it stopped sending recruits for military service in the JNA and established its own military training centres, in addition to illegally procuring weapons. All this reportedly brought Slovenia on the brink of armed conflict with the Army on a few occasions.

After the multi-party elections, Slovenia was no longer alone (until then, it had obtained the only true support at the last 14th Congress of the LCY in January 1990, when the Congress was also left by the

Croatian Communists of Ivica Račan). Thus, an alliance with Croatia was established, which was more declarative than real (with the exception of weapons smuggling), because Croatia was in a significantly different position due to the Serbian population. However, just for this reason, most of the tensions with the JNA were carried over from Slovenia to Croatia, because the Croats began to strengthen the Croatian part of its police force (the Croatian National Guard, the predecessor of the Croatian army, was formed within the police in April 1991), while paramilitary units also began to emerge. Shortly after the elections, the Serbs began to offer resistance because they viewed Tudman's government as the restoration of the Ustasha Independent State of Croatia. Thus, on 17 August 1990, the Serbs started the so-called Log Revolution by blocking the roads around Knin and then elsewhere in their territory. In this way, they cut off one of the main communications in Croatia. This was followed by the organization of their military forces with Serbia's assistance. On 21 December 1990, they proclaimed political autonomy, that is, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina). The following day, the Croatian Parliament adopted the Constitution, which the Serbs in Croatia were given minority status. In April 1991, the SAO Krajina declaratively (not de facto) joined Serbia.

On January 9, 1991, the Presidency adopted the conclusion on the disarmament of all paramilitary units, including the TO units. The session of the Presidency was extremely tense and filled with mutual accusations as to who started the breakup of Yugoslavia (at that time, the Serbs made an intrusion into the Yugoslav monetary system). The conclusion was adopted by a vote of four in favor, while Drnovšek and Mesić were against it. The paramilitary units had to hand over their weapons to the nearest JNA units within ten days. Thereafter, the JNA was to ensure law and order in the entire territory of Yugoslavia "if other competent authorities are not capable of doing that." On January 20, four ministers from Slovenia and Croatia (in charge of

defence and internal affairs) signed an agreement on joint defence.⁹⁵ In case of an attack by the JNA during the joint secession of the two republics, which was far beyond their jurisdiction, they would defend themselves jointly. Truly, the Croatian leadership was not prepared to do that (which also became evident when the JNA attacked Slovenia), while the Slovenian Presidency rejected that agreement, that is, relativized it in the formula of overall cooperation with Croatia. Some weapons were handed over by Knin Serbs and, in return, the JNA promised to protect them. The Croatian leadership delayed disarmament and, in the end, it was not carried out. The JNA increased its pressure by raising combat readiness, while on January 24 Belgrade TV showed a film about the Croatian purchase of weapons. The central character in the film was Croatian Defence Minister Martin Špegelj. In addition to the purchase of weapons, the film showed how Špegelj prepared terrorists for actions against the JNA, primarily JNA officers and their families in Croatia. The film was edited and prepared by the military counterintelligence service. Despite a strong psychological effect, the JNA's order for Špegelj's arrest (which was never carried out), extensive writing about the Croatian purchase of weapons and even the readiness of the Croatian leadership to "sacrifice some perpetrators of criminal acts,"⁹⁶ the Presidency did not approve the forcible disarmament of paramilitary groups at its session of January 25, 1991. The discussion about the issue in question ended at the meeting of the Croatian and Serbian delegations, which did not agree on anything, but agreed to continue their discussion. And at its session the Presidency adopted the conclusion that the talks about the future of Yugoslavia between the republics and with the federation should begin.

95 "Slovensko-hrvaški sporazum o medsebojni obrambi," *Delo* XXXIII, no. 36 (February 13, 1991), 3, http://www.dlib.si/listalnik/URN_NBN_SI_DOC-WJQ5QI0S/2/index.html.

96 Veljko Kadijević, *Moje viđenje raspada: Vojska bez države* (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), 112; Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika* (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 158.

As there was no support for the declaration of a state of emergency that would be limited to Slovenia and Croatia, the military leadership was ready (with Milošević's support) to carry out a coup in the entire territory of Yugoslavia. As he was not supported by the divided Presidency, Kadijević turned to Ante Marković for his support in the JNA's decision to proclaim a state of emergency. In return, once the situation is resolved and the members of the Presidency are removed, Marković will become the President of the Presidency and at the same time remain the Prime Minister. However, a few months later, on June 25 and 26, when Slovenia declared independence, he sided with the JNA. The government reached a conclusion on the control of the Slovenian border, which was to be carried out by the federal police and the JNA. It also banned setting up the border crossings between the republics.

The JNA intervened in direct armed conflicts even earlier, in Pakrac, where the Serbs set up their own police service, separate from the Croatian police service (Pakrac was ascertained by the Serbs as a big municipality that was to become the centre of the West Slavonian part of the SAO Krajina, but the Croatian Constitutional Court annulled this decision of the separatist Serbian bodies). A conflict ensued between the Croatian special police forces and the Serbian militia and three Croatian policemen were wounded. There were no dead here (although the Serbian media reported on them en masse), while a part of the population fled to the surrounding forests. The JNA intervened by creating a buffer zone between the two sides and, due to the cessation of conflict, it did not attack the Croatian units, although it had planned to do so. After political agreements, the situation returned to normal, that is, to the situation before the separation of the Serbian police force, and thus into the Croatian constitutional system. The creation of buffer zones where the Serbs protested became the regular practice of the JNA.

In March 1991, the JNA leadership tried one more time to convince the Presidency to proclaim a state of emergency. The session of the SFRY Presidency on March 12 was supposed to be dedicated to the

future of Yugoslavia and, at the Army's request, was organized as the session of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SFRY Armed Forces, as if Yugoslavia was at war (the conclusion to activate the Staff of the Supreme Command was allegedly made by the JNA as early as December 1990). That is why the session, that is, its second part, was held on 14 and 15 March in the JNA underground bunkers in Topčider, Belgrade, and was also attended by the General Staff. Slovenian member Janez Drnovšek did not attend the first part of the session. On the first day, Jović and Kadijević demanded the raising of military readiness to the highest level and the conclusion on the proclamation of a state of emergency in the entire territory of Yugoslavia, as well as the suspension of all normative enactments being contrary to the SFRY Constitution and federal laws. This should allegedly be done due to the political situation in Slovenia and Croatia and their paramilitary units. However, the proposal did not receive majority support. The second part of the session, in Topčider, was held in order to intimidate the Presidency. The JNA also recorded the meeting in order to show the "breakers" of Yugoslavia to the public. Between the first and second parts of the session, with Jović's knowledge, Kadijević secretly travelled to Moscow where he did not obtain any concrete support guarantee from Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov.⁹⁷ The minutes of the session were kept by Vuk Obradović, Kadijević's Chief of Cabinet.⁹⁸

During the second part of the session, Kadijević repeated the demands and even sharpened them: he demanded the proclamation of a state of emergency in the country, raising of combat readiness at the highest level, allowing the Army to carry out police surveillance and repealing all provisions being contrary to the SFRY Constitution. The day before, at the meeting with Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević, Kadijević explained how he planned to stage a military coup: the Government and the Presidency will be changed; the

97 Konrad Kolšek, *Spomini na začetek oboroženega spopada v Jugoslaviji 1991* (Maribor: Obzorja, 2001), 98–103.

98 "O tajnoj misiji V. Kadijevića u Moskvi." *Danas*, June 11–July 14, 1997.

Assembly will be left alone, but will not be allowed to meet; the republican authorities that support the coup will also be left alone, but otherwise they will be deposed. The goal is to have a six-month period to reach an agreement on the future of the country and, until then, stop the chaotic disintegration of the state.

This session, held “in the shadow of bayonets,” ended unsuccessfully for the military leadership and pro-Serbian members of the SFRY Presidency, because the conclusions were not adopted. Jović’s statement after the session that the Presidency was unable to perform its constitutional functions, already pointed to a backup scenario: the resignation of Borisav Jović, namely the Serbian representatives and, thus, the blockade of the Presidency; the vacuum so created will be filled by the JNA. As it no longer has the Supreme Commander, it has the right and opportunity to proclaim a state of emergency. The resignation of Jović and other two Serbian members of the Presidency (the Serbian Assembly did not accept them) opened up such an opportunity for the Army, but it had no enough courage to take the fateful step. Therefore, Milošević set the protection of the Serbian territories in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as the main goal of the JNA, which announced a gradual transition to the Greater Serbian scenario.

The JNA de facto ceased to be the federal army after a ten-day conflict, which took place in Slovenia and lasted from late June to early July 1991, and the conclusion of the so-called Brioni Agreement. Already in Slovenia, due to its multiethnic composition, the JNA began to crumble massively, because the soldiers either surrendered or fled. In October 1991, the Army finally withdrew from Slovenia and its units were deployed on the borders of the so-called Greater Serbia (Karlobag–Ogulin–Karlovac–Virovitica). The conflicts were extended to Croatia, primarily Slavonia, where they escalated into a genuine war between the formally existing JNA and the Croatian army. The fiercest battle was the battle of Vukovar in which Chetnik and other paramilitary units also took part. Mass crimes against the civilian

population were also committed. After the so-called war for barracks, the JNA began to withdraw from Croatia.

In August 1991, Macedonia also announced its secession. The JNA left it without bloodshed. Just like in Slovenia, it took all heavy weapons with it. In this way, the Army finally lost its multiethnic character and was now made up only of Serbs. It began arming various paramilitary groups, which then plundered and killed civilians in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first five Serbian autonomous regions were formed and, on January 9, 1992, merged into the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the paramilitary units were organized into a single army by Ratko Mladić with the help of the JNA and part of its units, and was financed by Serbia.

As for the SFRY Presidency, there remained only the so-called Rump Presidency, comprised of three Serbian members and one Montenegrin member. On October 3, 1991, the Rump Presidency proclaimed itself the Supreme Commander of the JNA, which was accepted by the General Staff.⁹⁹ The JNA formally ceased to exist a few months later, on May 20, 1992, when it became part of the armed forces of the newly established Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which pretended to become the successor state of the SFRY but failed.

In the late 1980s, the JNA had about 180,000 soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers, and was comprised of all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities (of which there were about 100,000 cadets and conscripts). It had huge amounts of weapons and equipment that were largely obsolete (the JNA began introducing modern camouflage uniforms, which have been standard issue in the Western armies for years, sometimes decades, just before the collapse of the state). It did not meet any criteria (the military budget, number of soldiers, weapons...) to be ranked third or fourth army in Europe as it had been in 1945 with nearly one million soldiers, although in the 1990s it was

99 Hoare, *Analiza slučaja* 3, 2015.

still considered as such, especially in Slovenia, Croatia (where Franjo Tuđman had excelled in these claims) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Naturally, the JNA wanted to present itself in the most heroic light possible (and such assessments had been uncritically taken over by numerous foreign authors). According to experts, it was ranked somewhere near tenth in Europe. Nevertheless, its weapons and equipment were sufficient for several years of fighting in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The JNA delivered them or left them primarily to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plans and never-ending attempts to keep Yugoslavia together by force were unrealistic, although they were presented as being correct even years after the disintegration of the state and the end of the wars. In 2012, for example, in an interview with the once most famous journalist and propagandist of the JNA, Miroslav Lazanski, Branko Mamula, the main creator of most coup attempts, said that the military leadership “bears responsibility for not carrying out a coup and allowing the nationalist leaders and the separatist behavior of the two western republics to push the JNA into the hands of Serbian nationalism, which unscrupulously used it in the interethnic war and eventually rejected it.”¹⁰⁰

Seen from today’s perspective, the JNA probably could prevent interethnic conflicts and create the conditions for a peaceful political bargaining, although just this would lead to the country’s disintegration. Instead, during the contradictory processes in the second half of the 1980s, the military leadership decided that the Army should take the side of one people in a multinational state. Thus, instead of preventing wars, the Army only encouraged them. The most responsible members of the armed forces shied away from such a responsibility. In their memoirs and interviews, they distorted the facts, blamed the politicians, separatism of Slovenia and Croatia, the

100 Miroslav Lazanski, “Razgovor nedelje: Branko Mamula, admiral flote u penziji,” *Jugoslavija je razbijena* 1 (2013), <https://www.facebook.com/545449432198096/posts/miroslav-lazanski-ekskluzivno-objavljeno-25122011razgovor-nedelje-branko-mamula-/550133241729715/> (published on November 25, 2012; retrieved: November 2020).

constitutional order, etc. Nevertheless, only a few of them ended up before the Hague Tribunal, because it looked only exceptionally for the culprits shortly before the breakup of the state and wars.

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Božo Repe

THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE PLACE OF CONFRONTATION OF ALL MAJOR CONFLICTS

THE PRESIDENCY OF the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY) was established in 1969, by a decision of the 9th Congress of the LCY. At the previous congress, in 1963, the function of the general secretary of the LCY was abolished, and the function of the president of the LCY was introduced instead. The 9th Congress was part of the process of strengthening federalism, after Ranković was dealt with in 1966. This process also weakened the principle of democratic centralism, i.e., subordination to federal party bodies, and increased the role of the LC republican organizations. For the first time, republican congresses were held before the federal congress. Similar processes took place in the Yugoslav political system, with the changes to the constitution (constitutional amendments), ending with the adoption of the constitution in 1974. This was also a period in which the monolithic nature of the party came to an end, and consequently, to a large extent, the politburo approach to its management, as well as a period in which ideological pluralism was strengthened, expressed by the so-called “party liberalism”. The League of Communists became more open to the public, that is, it determined “the directions of the struggle for socialist relations in the society” publicly. Democratic centralism was formulated in a new way, based on “free expression and confrontation of opinions”, but also on mandatory adoption of common positions and unity in

action. Namely, as it was expressed, without democracy there was no unity, and without unity there was no revolutionary efficiency. This meant that even those who did not agree with positions adopted by the majority, had the obligation to respect them, but they also had the right and duty, when accepting and implementing these positions, to warn of the consequences and present evidence in favor of formulating a possible new (altered) position of the majority. (Such a statutory decision was first made by the League of Communists of Slovenia at its 6th Congress, in December 1968). Substantial changes were also reflected in the reorganization of the LCY. Starting from work organizations, all the way up to the federation, LCY conferences were introduced. The Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia met at least once a year, while some members held permanent positions. The Central Committee was abolished, replaced by the Presidency, which became the highest body between two congresses. It was headed by the president, namely, Tito. The executive body of the Presidency was a 15-member Executive Bureau, composed of two members from each of the republics, one from each of the provinces, and the president. The Executive Bureau was headed by its members, who took turns every two months. All republics were equally represented in the Presidency, as well as, in the appropriate proportion, the provinces and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). Representatives were elected at the republican congresses and the YPA Conference. The Federal Congress only confirmed the composition.¹⁰¹

The confrontation with party liberalism in the first half of the seventies largely limited internal democratization in the party. A letter from President Tito and the Executive Bureau of the LCY Presidency dated September 18, 1972 (the so-called Tito's letter), demanded that the LCY become an "organization of revolutionary action".

101 *Deveti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: Beograd, II-13. III 1969: stenografske beleške*. Knj. 6. Beograd: Komunist, 1970. Janko Pleterski et al., *Zgodovina zveze komunistov Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Komunist: Državna založba Slovenije, 1986), 383–392. Aleksander Kutoš, *ZKJ: ustanovitev in razvoj* (Maribor: Obzorja, 1974), 166–174.

“Bureaucratic mentality”, “petty-bourgeois ideology”, “petty-ownership surge”, “unjustified enrichment”, “opportunism and tolerance towards views contrary to the ideology and policy of the League of Communists”, “ideological and action fragmentation” were criticized. “All those elements that are alien to the ideology and policy of the League of Communists” were to be removed from the LC, and “influence on personnel policy was to be strengthened”.¹⁰² Tito’s letter was discussed in all organizations of the League of Communists, from the federal and republican bodies to the last municipality. It also held a central place in the media. The consequences of this campaign were purges (“ideological and political differentiation”). “We, communists, are in power in this country. Because, if we were not, it would mean that someone else is, which, for now, is not the case, and never will be... We will expel everyone who does not agree with this attitude”, said the main interpreter of Tito’s letter, Stane Dolanc, in Split.¹⁰³ Two LCY conferences, in 1972 and 1973, were dedicated to the restoration of ideological and political unity, after the confrontation with the Croatian, Slovenian and especially Serbian liberal leadership. At the 10th Congress, in May 1974, in Belgrade (in the meantime, in February 1974, a new constitution was adopted, in which the LCY was given a constitutionally guaranteed, leading ideological and political role), a thorough reorganization took place. The Congress reaffirmed the “class essence of socialist self-government”. The independence of republican organizations was limited by a new interpretation of democratic centralism, as “the principle of organizing and operating the LCY as a single revolutionary organization”, rather than a coalition of republican and provincial parties. This was accompanied by a more precisely defined subordination of the republican LCs to federal bodies (which was also meant as a way of correcting the confederative nature of the state bodies, as the League of Communists remained at the center of

102 Kutoš, *ZKJ: ustanovitev in razvoj*, 175–180.

103 Archive of the RTV; Stane Dolanc in a conversation with the political activists of Dalmatia, recording, September 1972.

decision-making). The conferences were abolished, and the republican central committees, as well as the federal central committee (with 166 members), were re-established. The class role was to be strengthened by Marxist centers and political schools in the republics (there were a total of 840 of them, and for two years, from 1975 to 1977, they were attended by a total of 100,000 students), as well as the Josip Broz Tito Political School in Kumrovec, founded in 1975. Marxism gained a pronounced role in schools and faculties, and great emphasis was placed on other forms of ideological and political education, as well as on publishing Marxist literature.¹⁰⁴

In the new constellation, the Presidency became the central body. It had 36 members and elected a 12-member Executive Committee from the ranks of its members and the members of the CC LCY. Tito was elected president of the LCY without limitation of the term of office, and Stane Dolanc became the secretary of the Executive Committee, being thus rewarded for his determination and steadfastness. Dolanc was popularly known as “an exemplary student of Tito” and a “party soldier”, which were only two of his media nicknames during the eighties; during his career he was also senior officer of the Army KOS (Counter-Intelligence Agency) and professor at the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism in Ljubljana. A product of the party school, Dolanc thus came to the position from which, in the last period of Tito’s life and in the first period after Tito, he controlled, from the background, all important political moves in Yugoslavia. In the mid-seventies, the Western media described him as the most serious candidate for Tito’s successor. Therefore, on the eve of the 11th Congress, already in quiet preparations for the period after Tito, Dolanc’s opponents wanted the function of Executive Committee secretary abolished, since it was practically the only function that did not depend on the will of the republics, while Dolanc was considered the last Slovenian “man of the federation”. Tito initially prevented his withdrawal, but after the Congress, and after being persuaded

104 Pleterski et al., *Zgodovina zveze komunistov Jugoslavije*, 393–395.

by influential Slovenian politicians belonging to the older generation, he agreed to it (Popit and Krajger were those who allegedly persuaded him, and Jovanka Broz managed to carry out the removal). Dolanc remained a member of the Presidency until 1982, while the function of the secretary was quietly terminated. Since he spoke without hesitation whatever Tito ordered him to say (or that he thought he should say on Tito's behalf), in simple language and straight to the point, as well as because of his military intelligence career, he was credited with adhering to "harsh principles in politics".

Dolanc did not, indeed, lack determination. During the demonstrations in Kosovo, in 1981, already as a member of the Presidency, he pulled chestnuts out of the fire on behalf of the entire Yugoslav leadership. He communicated with the reporters, spoke about the number of dead (the figures later proved to be incorrect) and described the events as a "counter-revolution". On the other hand, Dolanc was one of the more respected Yugoslav politicians, he spoke several foreign languages (German the best) and traveled a lot as some sort of party foreign minister, both with Tito and without him. He had excellent connections, especially with the leading socialist and social democratic politicians in Europe, and he also gave notable lectures abroad. For example, in 1981, following Tito's death, he gave a lecture at the Karel Renner Institute in Vienna, in front of an auditorium of more than 500, including the entire Austrian political leadership. During the seventies, he was quite popular with the Yugoslav public, due to his interest in football and basketball and high positions in their organizations, as well as due to frequent media appearances and his chubby figure, always with a cigar in his mouth, which was, incidentally, a permanent target for cartoonists.

All his previous popularity faded when, in 1982, he took on the unrewarding "lower" role of interior minister, in order to sort out the situation in Kosovo, and deal with dissident intellectuals.¹⁰⁵ But, even

105 Božo Repe, *Rdeča Slovenija: tokovi in obrazi iz obdobja socializma* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2003), 284–290.

if Dolanc maintained his popularity and high position in the LCY after Tito's death (he still remained one of the most influential politicians and, in May 1984, became the Slovenian member of the Presidency of the SFRY and remained so until 1989, chairing at the same time the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order), it would not come close to making him (or anyone else) rise above the mediocre collective party leadership, as the system itself prevented this from happening.

The 11th Congress, the last one Tito attended (June 20–23, 1978, in Belgrade), did not bring about significant substantive or organizational changes. The presidency of the CC LCY was reduced to 23 members, which was supposed to enable greater efficiency after Tito's death. At the Congress, the impression was being created that the situation in the LCY had stabilized. In his speech, Tito said that it was a Congress of "continuity". The numbers were supposed to confirm that: the number of members had increased by 652,558 since the previous congress, amounting to 1,629,029 members at the end of 1977. After Tito's death, the number increased even more, to 2,117,083 members, or 9.5 percent of the population.¹⁰⁶ The large increase was primarily due to the demand for "moral and political aptness", which became a prerequisite for public services and management positions, and which in practice turned to be a requirement to possess a party membership card. Thus, contrary to the desire to strengthen the working-class component, the LCY became, in reality, a party of members of the middle and upper classes, who, for existential and careerist reasons, adapted to the situation and became members of the party. With a very broad interpretation of workers' professions and by rewarding those who, from direct production, went to additional education of various kinds, statistically they arrived at 35 percent. The Congress adopted Edvard Kardelj's theoretical study, "Directions for the Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-Government", as its key document.

106 Pleterski et al., *Zgodovina zveze komunistov Jugoslavije*, 395–397.

The transition to collective leadership, following Tito's death, despite the general insecurity in the country and the anticipation of what would happen next, did not bring major upheavals. The first president of the Presidency after Tito's death was Stevan Doronjski from Vojvodina, until October 1980, followed by Lazar Mojsov from Macedonia (1980/81), Dušan Dragosavac from Croatia (1981/82), Mitja Ribičič from Slovenia (1982/83), Dragoslav Marković from Serbia (1983/84), Ali Šukrija from Kosovo (1984/85), Vidoje Žarković from Montenegro (1985/86), Milanko Renovica from BiH (1986/87), Boško Krunic from Vojvodina (1987/88), Stipe Šuvar from Croatia (1988/89), and Milan Pančevski from Macedonia (1989/90).

From Tito's death until the end of the eighties, all major conflicts took place at the top of the LCY, and from there, moved to other bodies. Most often, from the Presidency of the CC LCY to the Presidency of the SFRY and its bodies. With the constitutional changes in 1988, this concept of "Siamese twins", which was a kind of successor to the "party state", weakened, and the president of the Presidency of the CC LCY was no longer a member of the Presidency of the SFRY. Some leading officials (Janez Drnovšek, Ante Marković, even Raif Dizdarević) no longer felt obliged to listen to the Presidency of the CC LCY. This was more a consequence of internal disputes in the LC, which practically deprived the Presidency of the CC LCY of any authority, and then a consequence of constitutional changes. However, the connection between the two presidencies persisted until the multiparty elections in the republics, in 1990. Several joint or simultaneous sessions on the same issues were held, and some of the presidents of the state presidency occasionally attended the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY. The blockade of the system and the weakening of the political power of party bodies, which no longer issued clear instructions, resulted in the strengthening of the power of the bureaucratic apparatus, in order for the state to function at all. At the executive level, it is also important to note that there was considerable confusion in the complicated Yugoslav legal system, and in addition to public legislation, since 1980, secret legislation also existed.

After Tito's death, the LCY held three more congresses, only to fall apart during the extraordinary congress, held on January 14, 1990. All three congresses were marked by an unsuccessful search for a way out of the economic and social crisis. At the 12th Congress (June 26–29, 1982), the "Basic premises of the Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilization" was supported, expressed in the unchanged, incomprehensible socialist vocabulary, and persisting in the existing economic model without introducing significant changes. The same was true with the political system of socialist self-government "as a historically new system of direct political democracy", which is "secured by the leading role of the working class", and thus needed only to be strengthened. But the Congress had also shown the first noticeable signs that the LCY was not undermined only by the crisis and weaknesses of the system, but also by growing nationalism and anti-communism. The Congress could not ignore "ideologies alien to self-government", that is, growing anti-communism and, at that time, still heterogeneous criticism of the system coming from the emerging civil society, as well as the first demands for the introduction of a multi-party system and the de-tabuization of historical topics. The appearance of these criticisms and demands was attributed to "the weaknesses of our socialist ideological front", and, above all, to the media and journalism, where the League of Communists failed. The position of the Congress was that the Yugoslav revolution did not need embellishments and myths, although not everything in it had been flawless, nor had it developed in a straight line, like the "Nevsky Prospekt". However, according to this position, socialism was not built by party small talk at social gatherings, but rather by a hard class struggle, with the participation of millions of working people. However, none of this could negate its enduring values. It also maintained that reactionary and nationalist forces tried to harness certain scientific disciplines (history, ethnology, archeology, orthography, etc.) for their "murky goals" and, with their help, exert racist pressure on others, in order to reach ethnically and nationally pure territories, historical justice, and living space.

In interethnic relations, the Congress also insisted on the old definition, that the national question was fundamentally resolved, and that national problems, and consequently, nationalism, were produced by “remnants of classical bourgeois, or bureaucratic-etatist nationalism”, and that the objective causes for this were uneven economic development of republics and provinces, or their parts. Nationalism also penetrated the League of Communists, and since there were no “pure” national borders between the republics and provinces in Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav socialist revolution overcame historical and other classical borders), the most important thing was the consistent implementation of the national policy of the LC. The thesis about the inequality of any republic with others (which referred to Serbia) was rejected, and only Kosovo and the consequences of the counter-revolution were specifically discussed. It was a consequence of the low level of development and, at the same time, stimulated development, which led to the disintegration of patriarchal communities. The dynamic development of education, oriented towards non-economic professions and, consequently, unemployment, led to the situation in which irredentist forces found fertile ground among young people. The Kosovo leadership limited itself to the demands for additional funds, without the mobilization of internal forces, which led to the strengthening of Albanian nationalism. One of the most drastic forms of hostile action was the pressure on Serbs and Montenegrins to emigrate. Successes had been made in stabilizing the situation in Kosovo, “mainly” through political means. The Congress also rejected all requests for constitutional changes, either from the standpoint of relations in the federation or from ideological positions (for example, the request of the Church to obtain a political position and regain lost rights in education, media, marital relations, etc.).

The role of the Presidency of the CC LCY was strengthened by statutory provisions, and the body was given the right to make decisions within the competence of the CC LCY in emergency situations. It still had 23 members, three from each republic, two from each province and one from the LCY organization in the YPA. The president was

elected for a one-year term, the secretary of the Presidency for a two-year term, rotations took place according to the “national key”, and the president and the secretary could not be from the same republic. The Presidency also had executive secretaries, elected among the members of the CC, with a four-year term. They covered specific areas and were subordinate to the Presidency, participating in the sessions if the topics so required, or if the president deemed it necessary.

The familiar rhetoric of the Congress was slightly shaken by the son of the legendary communist Rade Končar, who “publicly uttered the essence of what lay at the heart of the quickly recovering unitarism: the Constitution of 1974, which granted each Yugoslav people its own ‘state’, should be revised”!¹⁰⁷

The Congress aroused great interest of foreign media, and it was followed by more than 200 accredited journalists, who wanted to assess the direction in which Yugoslavia was going after Tito’s death.

The Presidency’s initial answer to the growing social crisis was a kind of “self-governing fundamentalism”, that is, insisting on old models of ideological and political settling of accounts. Namely, criticism from the cultural, journalistic and scientific ranks began immediately after Tito’s death, and by the mid-eighties it had grown rapidly. In the first period, between 1981 and 1983, at the center of discussions, as the 12th Congress of the LCY showed, were primarily the so-called taboo topics, or one-sidedly presented topics from the past: civil war (Chetniks, Ustashas), coming to power of the Communist Party, Informbiro (Goli otok). Dozens of literary works, theatrical and film creations, memoirs, as well as sociological, philosophical, and historical works on these topics appeared, which were then discussed in newspapers, magazines, and electronic media. Very quickly, that criticism was transferred, first to Tito, then to the system established by him and the CP (according to critics, he remained a Bolshevik), followed by the denial of the legitimacy of the government and the system. Various books and articles were used, even misused, in order to create

107 Boris Jež, *Yu, nikoli več?: bela knjiga o razpadu Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Slon, 1994), 28.

public opinion for political purposes. Desirable public opinion in certain national environments was created based on criticism, interviews and statements, as well as interpretations of ideas that certain works contained, or should have contained.

The reactions of the authorities were particularly harsh towards the attempts at organized political action, as shown, for example, in the trial of the “six” in Belgrade in 1982, or the conviction of 13 Muslims in Sarajevo, including Alija Izetbegović, in 1983. Vojislav Šešelj, who later became the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, and a so-called “Chetnik Duke”, was also convicted for expressing nationalist and chauvinist views. In Croatia, among some prominent figures, Franjo Tuđman, Vlado Gotovac and Marko Veselica were convicted in 1981. All of them had already been convicted once during the seventies, during the so-called *maspok* (Croatian Spring). However, Veselica was again sentenced to 11 years in prison in the eighties, as was Dobroslav Paraga, who later became the leader of the nationalist Party of Rights. Administrative measures primarily included dismissals of editors and editorial boards in media which published controversial articles.

In the heterogeneous flood of criticism directed at the government, the system and the position of certain peoples, the Presidency of the LCY did not cope well, at first. That is why Dr. Stipe Šušar, the later President of the Presidency, a truly determined and orthodox advocate of Yugoslavia, and one of the few in the Yugoslav leadership who was able, as Boris Mužević defined it, to offer a “Nostradamus-like” analysis of the processes in Yugoslav society at that time, and predict where they would lead, decided to act on his own. At that time, he was a member of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of Croatia. In the LCC, he was in charge of ideological work and information policy. In October 1983, he organized a conference in Zagreb entitled “Historiography, memoir-publicist and feuilleton production in the light of ideological controversies”. The aim of the conference was to criticize inaccurate writing and talks about the past, especially concerning the Second World War (during 1979–1982, according to rough estimates,

more than 420 conferences were held on that topic only). Šušvar's conference resonated as an accusation of those who attempted to refute the legitimacy of the government by revaluing modern history, with Serbian writers being particularly criticized. Since Šušvar's conference did not cause the reaction he had expected, an extensive dossier was made in the Center for Information and Propaganda of the CC LCC, the so-called "White Book" (citing a total of 159 authors), with quotes and excerpts from books, magazines, works of art and other works, in the period from 1982 to 1984, which allegedly contained "politically unacceptable" messages. On May 23, 1984, the Croatian republican party conference (LCC Commission for Ideological Work and Information) was held, during which mostly Serbian and Slovenian writers were criticized. This led to fierce reactions in the Ljubljana and Belgrade public. Serbs responded in the magazine *Književna reč*, and the debate was transferred to political forums, which led to political conflicts between Serbian and Croatian politicians, as well as public debates between incriminated writers and their supporters, and those who attacked them. The CC LCY therefore requested that the writing about the conference and the "White Book" be stopped, but it lacked the power to calm the situation. At that time, the controversial Šušvar did not receive significant support from the Croatian leadership for his actions.

As a consequence of Šušvar's unsuccessful ideological campaign, the Presidency of the CC LCY stepped in, and numerous attempts at ideological disciplining, at various levels, ensued. Among these, worth mentioning is the session of the Presidency, on September 11, 1984, on ideological issues. During this session, an attempt was made to distribute criticism equally among the civic right, ultra-radical left, nationalism and integral Yugoslavism, and territorially to Ljubljana, Belgrade, and Novi Sad. At the Week of Marxist Debates in Neum, in February 1985, party, that is, left-wing historians from all over Yugoslavia, were supposed to respond to the challenges. The presence of the then president of the Presidency, Ali Šukrija, was supposed to give weight to the conference, but the conference only showed the

heterogeneity and contradictions among ideological, and especially national views. The last serious attempt of the Presidency was the session held on December 17, 1986, in Belgrade, which was attended by about sixty historians from all over Yugoslavia. The discussion was a preparation for the so-called ideological plenum of the CC LCY. Neither the session nor the plenum changed the situation. At the session of the Presidency, everything somehow ended with the statements that politics reacts too quickly, and historians too slowly, that the LC could not be just an observer, but it would also not be good if it took on the role of a judge. At that time, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) came to the focus of political events, and Serbia launched systematic attacks on Slovenia, followed by a media war between the two republics, but also between Serbia and Croatia, especially between the *Politika* and *Vjesnik* publishing house.

Since the party bodies were inefficient, the policy towards the opposition increasingly differed between the republics, and the once unified definitions of “civic right”, “anarcho-liberalism”, “nationalism” and other hostile phenomena, began to gain different content in some republics. The federal authorities tried to re-centralize the security bodies in the way they were before 1966, by proposals to change the legislation and attempts to reorganize them. That was resolutely opposed by the Slovenian political leadership, so the plan failed.

In the second half of the eighties, attempts at leading broad Yugoslav ideological campaigns became less and less frequent, with interests in criticizing a certain environment mostly hidden behind them. Initially, this was masked by formal discussions on the situation in the whole of Yugoslavia and generalized assessments, such as, “in some areas there is ...” etc. Later on, Kosovo and Slovenia, and, in the late eighties, Croatia, became the subject of concrete discussions at the Presidency. The CC LCY and the Presidency, indeed, intervened in the internal affairs of Serbia as early as 1985, with the aim of helping to solve the Kosovo issue. The CC LCY formed a special commission tasked with analyzing the relations in Serbia, led by Kučan. The

commission formed cautious conclusions (in the background was the fear that the practice of interfering in the “internal” affairs of the republics could become common), recognizing that the position of Serbia, due to the autonomous provinces, was unequal, and needed to be changed. In the first half of the eighties, Slovenia’s leading communists did support Serbia’s demands to become “equal” with other republics. The reason for this lay in the fact that, as early as 1981, according to one of Slovenia’s most influential politicians, Mitja Ribičič, “the battle for their republic (is) an ally of our battle, attempting to challenge the constitutional position of the republic in the self-governing and distribution system, as well as regarding the right of the people to have their own state and to dispose of what it produces”. Ribičič added that Serbs should not be forced into a situation in which, like Croats, they would look for allies on an unprincipled basis.¹⁰⁸

The 13th Congress, held from June 25 to 28, 1986, in Belgrade, took place in an atmosphere similar to the 12th Congress, only in an even more aggravated situation. It was attended by 1742 delegates, 533 guests and 177 foreign delegations. In a different situation, the Congress would have been an impressive demonstration of the strength and success of the LCY and Yugoslavia. It was, however, an empty stage, concealing the last period of Yugoslavia’s agony, in a situation when its international power and its role between the two blocs was rapidly melting away. The on-duty president, Vidoje Žarković, began his report by recalling the 45th anniversary of the CPY’s historic call for an armed uprising, on July 4, 1941, “when the communists under Tito’s leadership took responsibility for the fate of Yugoslavia”. The Congress documents were boring, full of worn-out rhetoric about socialist self-governing socio-economic relations. The same was true for numerous debates aimed at combating “etatist bureaucratism”,

108 Tape recording of the 54th session of the SRS Presidency, November 24, 1981, discussion by Mitja Ribičič, Archives of the RS President. See also: Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan: Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2002).

“bureaucratic etatism”, “bureaucratic-etatist, particularist-egoistic, group-ownership and nationalist tendencies”, which were eroding the LCY as well. The main success between the two congresses was to be a long-term program of economic stabilization, as well as a critical analysis of the functioning of the political system.¹⁰⁹ An insight into the almost boundless reporting on the congress in the Yugoslav press shows that the journalists tried to discover – in the discussions in the commissions and at the plenary sessions – at least something that would be concrete and corresponding to reality. Ultimately, they did find something of the kind. Delegates did not try to hide their criticism. The real conflicts were mostly reflected in the discussions about culture, common program contents, and attitude towards the past and the economic situation, in particular about debts. Answers on specific issues were demanded, primarily from the Prime Minister Branko Mikulić, who spoke more about what should be done, than about how it should be done. After the congress, the republican press drew its own points, each for itself, and the Serbian and federal press warned of the danger of federalization,¹¹⁰ seeking encouragement for a “plebiscite declaration for unity, self-government and responsibility”.¹¹¹ On the opposite side stood the argument of Slovenian (and, shyly, Croatian) reports, stating independence as a condition for unity.¹¹² Foreign media, such as the New York Times, noted the core of the YPA’s clear demand to gain a political role and save Yugoslavia, which Defense Minister Branko Mamula bitterly denied.

The Congress elected a “significantly rejuvenated leadership”, as it was branded by *Delo*:¹¹³ Ivan Brigić, Dušan Čkrebić, Radiša Gačić, Georgije Jovičić, Štefan Korošec, Boško Krunić, Milan Kučan, Jakov

109 *Dokumenti: referat, rezolucije, statut ZKJ, završna reč, sastav organa SKJ. Savez komunista Jugoslavije. Kongres (13; 1986; Beograd)*, (Ljubljana: Komunist, 1986).

110 Tamara Indik Mali “Opasnosti federalizacije,” *Vjesnik*, July 11, 1986.

111 Krste Bijelić, Bliže nego što smo bili, *NIN*, June 30, 1986.

112 Nace Grom, “Kongres kritike in poziva na spopade,” *Dnevnik*, July 6, 1986.

113 “13. kongres Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije,” *Delo*, June 30, 1986, 3.

Lazarovski, Slobodan Milošević, Marko Orlandić, Milan Pančevski, Ivica Račan, Miljan Radović, Milanko Renovica, Stanko Stojčević, Đorđe Stojšić, Kolj Široka, Franc Šetinc, Stipe Šušvar, Vasil Tupurkovski, Milan Uzelac, Azem Vllasi, and Vidoje Žarković.

The last party leadership that led Yugoslavia to its collapse, whether by tradition, or just by chance, did not include women. The turnover of male cadre, as befits a testosterone fight, was very high. It was true that the Resolution on ideological-political, organizational, action and training of cadre, i.e., the work of the League of Communists, stated that resignations and dismissals had to become part of the practice of the LC.¹¹⁴ This probably was not meant to be the scenario that happened in reality. Between the last two congresses, the 13th and the 14th, the Presidency went from one crisis to another, and out of 13 “permanent” members elected at the 13th Congress, only five remained until the 14th: Dušan Čkrebic, Štefan Korošec, Ivica Račan, Milan Pančevski and Ivan Brigić. Radiša Gačić, Stipe Šušvar, and Vasil Tupurkovski moved to federal positions. Franc Šetinc withdrew, and Marko Orlandić, Vidoje Žarković, Kolj Široka, Milanko Renovica and Boško Krunic also left, due to affairs or political pressure. Milan Kučan, Stanko Stojčević and Jakov Lazarovski thrived in the “high ranking official” capacity for four years. Due to changes at the head of the republic, provincial and army party bodies, Milan Uzelac, Slobodan Milošević, Azem Vllasi and Georgije Jovičić left, and Miljan Radović and Đorđe Stojšić were dismissed. About 50 people passed through the statutory 23-member Presidency during the last two years before the 14th Congress, and many of its sessions did not formally have a quorum. The 160-member Central Committee had a similar fate, and journalist Vojko Flegar compared it to a local bus station.¹¹⁵ The changes were the consequence of various causes. Among them were different scandals of members of the Presidency: Milanko Reno-

114 “13. kongres Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije”, 6.

115 Vojko Flegar, “ZKJ med kongresoma. Šest strank čaka na Godota,” *Delo*, January 13, 1990.

vica was forced to resign due to the so-called Neum affair, i.e., the illegal construction of a villa in the only Bosnian coastal town, and together with him, about fifty other Bosnian officials had to leave politics. Branko Mikulić was also targeted – a villa was built for him, as well, but, due to public pressure, he never moved into it. Some were swept away by the anti-bureaucratic revolution, often in association with complaints of abuse of office and privileges (for example, Orlandić, Žarković, Kolj Široka, Krunić). As tensions rose, even violence became a reason for resignations and dismissals. After announcing it for a long time, Šetinc resigned in September 1988, when the appellate panel of the Supreme Court in Belgrade rejected the appeals of the so-called “Four”. However, the main reason was Kosovo, that is, the looming war, which he believed he could not prevent. Namely, he was in a special group of the Presidency, which also included Slobodan Milošević, Dušan Čkrebić, Azem Vllasi, Kolj Široka, Ivića Račan, Milan Pančevski, Uglješa Uzelac and Vukašin Lončar, and which, amongst other things, prepared the material for the 9th session of the CC LCY on Kosovo. Šetinc was supposed to lead the group, but he was unable to, due to health reasons. Because of his views (which the Serbian media equated with Kučan’s), he was unscrupulously attacked. He made introductory speeches about Kosovo on two occasions at the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY and once at the session of the CC LCY. At first, the Serbian media favored him, but then they reversed their position, because he allegedly uncritically accepted the assessments of good relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Investigative insinuations, lies and personal attacks started. It was insinuated that he said that Serbs in Kosovo were mindlessly attacking Albanians.

According to his own testimony, during that period, he visited Kosovo five times, and the attitude of Serbs living in the province was becoming increasingly hostile. During one of these visits, people surrounded his car in front of a railway ramp, in the dark. Šetinc and his driver, followed by the police escort vehicle, fled the scene. Then an oncoming car sped towards them, and he, the driver and his associate

survived only thanks to the sobriety of the driver. Confused, he then drank a glass of water at the airport; the glass was cloudy, but the flight attendant, in order to prove that everything was fine, took a sip after him.¹¹⁶ Šetinc's successor, formerly executive secretary Boris Mužević, did not fare much better. He was beaten by Belgrade police as an act of revenge orchestrated by Milošević. Even before the incident, Mužević had been receiving warnings that Serbs did not like him, due to his fierce duels with Milošević in the Presidency (he called him Gramsci, with derision). In August 1989, he was stopped by a police officer in Belgrade. He was in an official car of the CC LCY with a travel order in his name, but he did not have any personal documents with him. Despite the fact that a colleague from the CC LCY administration, who drove by, confirmed his identity, the policeman dragged him into his car and beat him. The media then claimed that he was drunk, unfriendly towards the police, and the like (also, that he was with his mistress, auth. rem.). They called him "The First Beaten". The Presidency of the CC LCY discussed this twice, and, during the session, even the federal secretary claimed that the witness could not see what was happening. Later, all of this turned out to be incorrect, but at that political moment, it didn't matter. The Slovenian Presidency of the CC LCS then publicly announced that Slovenes in Belgrade did not feel safe, which caused a new verbal conflict with Serbia. The only consequence was that, in the debates about the extraordinary congress, there were requests not to hold it in Belgrade, which also did not happen.¹¹⁷

One of the turning points between the two congresses was 1988. During this year, among other key events, republican party conferences were held. Up to then, three options had been formulated within the LCY and its Presidency: reformist (where Slovenes stood alone for a long time); Titoist (continuation, "after Tito – Tito") and Serbian,

116 Franc Šetinc, *Vzpon in sestop* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1988), 298.

117 Boris Mužević, *Prvo pretepeni*, January 27, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPzFUvYY_N0.

which was a mixture of unitary Yugoslavism and Greater Serbianism. All conferences, even the one of the YPA, voted for the abolition of the party monopoly, but this was understood everywhere akin to “glasnost” in the Soviet Union, that is, as the right to express one’s opinion publicly, not the right to political organization. In Slovenia, the maximum ideological formulation of the reformist leadership was the idea of “non-party democracy” within the alliance, under the auspices of the SAWP – Socialist Alliance of Working People (the first such alliance, the Slovenian Peasants’ Union, was formed in May 1988).

Internal relations between LCY leaders began to change in 1987, due to the internal political conflict between the two factions in the LC of Serbia. However, a direct impact of these changes on the federal party leadership was not felt until a year later. The Serbian conflict was resolved at the Eighth Session of the CC of the LC of Serbia, on September 23, 1987, in Belgrade. One of the factions was led by Ivan Stambolić, the then president of the Presidency of SR Serbia, who advocated a more moderate policy towards Kosovo, and the other, nationalist and radical, by the president of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. At the Eighth session, the president of the Belgrade communists, Dragiša Pavlović, who was Stambolić’s protégé, was replaced. This event marked the beginning of Milošević’s rise to power. A struggle for the media followed, in which Milošević’s faction, and the settling of accounts with Stambolić’s supporters, gradually began to prevail. On December 15, 1987, Stambolić was also relieved of duty as President of the Presidency of the SR Serbia. With Milošević, the realization of the policy outlined in the SASA Memorandum, which became public a year earlier, in September 1986, began.

The LCY leadership did not interfere in Serbian factional conflicts. Among the Slovenian communists (and, to some degree, among the Croatian as well), the fear prevailed that – if the federal party leadership discussed relations in Serbia – the same principle could be used in Slovenia, which was, at the time, becoming the main target of criticism in Yugoslavia, due to its alleged separatism. In addition,

Milošević enjoyed the support of a significant number of federal officials, and even officials in the majority of other republics. He was also quite openly supported by the Army. By way of illustration, on the same day the Eighth Session took place, *Politika* published, on its front page, the information shared at the session of the Committee of the LCY Organization in the YPA, at which Branko Mamula presented data that 216 Albanian illegal groups with 1435 members were uncovered in the YPA. According to him, these groups were planning killings of officers and soldiers, food poisoning and joint armed action in Kosovo. At the session, Mamula was strongly supported by the former Minister of Defense and one of the most influential Serbian politicians, General Nikola Ljubičić). On January 7, 1988, the Serbian Presidency unanimously decided to amend the Serbian constitution, which was supported by the CC LCY a few days later. Subsequently, during 1988, an intensive process of aligning the official Serbian policy with the ideas Serbian intellectuals outlined in the SASA Memorandum, took place. With the help of propaganda in the press and on television, Serbs were being prepared for a new policy, and for accepting Milošević as the indisputable national leader. The authorities gained additional strength by organizing mass rallies.

During 1988 and 1989, two main conflicts within the Presidency of the CC LCY, over Kosovo and Slovenia, were taking place. On the occasion of the proceedings against the "Four", in the conflict between Slovenia and the YPA, the Presidency of the CC LCY, the same as the Presidency of the SFRY, sided with the Army. Despite opposition from Slovenian representatives, in March 1988, the Presidency of the CC LCY appointed a special group to gather information on attacks on the YPA in Slovenia. The working group of the Presidency prepared a draft document entitled "Assessments and standpoints on current ideological and political issues related to the attacks on the concept of Total National Defense (TND) and YPA". The draft was sent to the republican presidencies for discussion. At the same time, the working group was supposed to play a mediating role. The president of the federal Presidency, Lazar Mojsov, the president of the Presidency of

the CC LCY, Boško Krunic, and the member of the federal Presidency from Slovenia, Stane Dolanc, met, on March 10, with Franz Popit and Milan Kučan. The goal of the meeting was to prepare the topic for a session which was supposed to be held on April 14, and at which the Slovenian and federal presidencies were to meet, in an attempt to settle misunderstandings between the federation and Slovenia. On March 17, the presidency of the CC LCY discussed the assessments of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (similar discussions were held, until the end of May, in the federal Presidency as well – between secretaries of internal affairs and the federal secretary, as well as between presidents of republican councils for the protection of the constitutional order and the federal president). All the assessments were similar: a counter-revolution was taking place in Slovenia; the authors of the attack on the YPA were nothing but the enforcers of the policy of the Slovenian leadership, and while similar views were expressed by public workers, the Slovenian government did not react, despite YPA's warnings and a joint meeting.

After the YPA raised its combat readiness in Slovenia and prepared measures necessary to carry out arrests, on March 29, the discussion about the attacks on the foundations of TND and YPA was continued by the Presidency of the CC LCY, with Kučan demanding that the army leadership explain the intention of introducing a state of emergency in Slovenia. The Slovenian members of the Presidency rejected the draft assessment (which also included terms such as special war in Slovenia, and the like), prepared by the working group of the Presidency of the CC LCY, as unacceptable (it had previously been analyzed in Slovenia by a special working group of the Presidency of the CC LCS and assessed as being beyond repair). At the session of the Presidency of the CC LCY, mainly the situation in Slovenia was discussed, and requests for taking measures, including arrests, were repeated, which Kučan strongly opposed. Kučan rejected the opinions that a counter-revolution was taking place in Slovenia, that members of the YPA were more at risk in Slovenia, or that there was a coordinated special war, in connection with enemy emigration, and

the like. While Kadrijević persisted in these standpoints, he relativized the opinions of the Military Council and the behavior of the YPA in Slovenia. Their assessments did not go beyond the positions of the Presidency and the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. Other members of the Presidency and participants in the session defended the positions of the YPA and the draft information submitted by the working group of the Presidency of the CC LCY. The President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Raif Dizdarević, was especially resolute, going so far as to advocate criminal prosecutions in Slovenia. The conclusion of the meeting was that the delegation of the Presidency would visit Slovenia, meet with the Slovenian leadership, and try to harmonize the assessments about the attacks on the YPA, regarding the draft information of the Presidency of the CC LCY. This was supposed to be part of the “regular” activity of the Presidency and was not supposed to be directly related to the views on the alleged counter-revolution and special war in Slovenia. Thus, at least along party lines, the Slovenian representatives managed to tone down the planned measures against Slovenia, and without concrete conclusions from the Presidency of the CC LCY, the maneuvering space for the federal Presidency and the army leadership to introduce a state of emergency was significantly reduced.

The delegation of the Presidency of the CC LCY did actually come to Ljubljana on April 8. After a seven-hour discussion on whether the document was needed at all, and several more working meetings in the Presidency of the CC LCY after that, the assessment was adopted only at the session of the Presidency of the CC LCY, on April 12, as an internal party document, in a rather diluted form.

After the arrest and trial of the “Four”, when a mass movement in Slovenia, organized by the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, took place, the Slovenian and federal authorities corresponded, both publicly and secretly, throughout the summer and autumn, followed by numerous telephone interventions and meetings (Kučan and Kadrijević met twice, and, on one of those occasions, on July 5, together with Dizdarević). Several joint sessions of the federal and

Slovenian state presidency, as well as both party presidencies, were held. In the discussions, the Slovenian political leadership referred to the positions of the Serbian state and party bodies on the occasion of the Eighth Session of the CC LCS and the method and scope of “establishing order” in Kosovo, claiming that, by analogy, the political situation in Slovenia could be assessed and regulated only by the Slovenian government. It was difficult to dispute this standpoint. At the same time, the differences in the Presidency of the CC LCY became more and more pronounced: while Ivica Račan, who was in charge of the report on Slovenia, submitted a favorable report (on the session of June 14), Stipe Šušvar (on the session of June 16) spoke about “maspok” in Slovenia and how the YPA was perceived as an occupying army and Yugoslavia as a burden, which was only exploiting (Slovenia). He also spoke about the phobia of “southerners”. Admiral Petar Simić claimed that insults directed towards YPA soldiers in Slovenia were worse than in Kosovo, and also more numerous. Milošević demanded that concrete measures be taken in Slovenia, not just the adoption of assessments, which is why the president of the Presidency of the AC LC of Vojvodina, Boško Krunić, asked whether compulsory administration should be introduced in Slovenia. At the session, it was decided to convene a session of the CC LC of Slovenia, which would be attended by a delegation of the CC LCY and followed by a discussion at the session of the CC LCY. In the same way as the federal Presidency, the party Presidency was divided almost in half, between those who were in favor of more measured treatment, and the “hardliners”, who believed that the “petty-bourgeois” forces in Slovenia and the Slovenian leadership had to be dealt with.

The planned scenario was then changed, insofar as the order of events was different, and the session of the CC LCY was held a day before the session of the CC LCS. Due to that, a federal party delegation led by the president of the Presidency of the CC LCY came to the session of the Presidency of the LL LCS, on June 21. At the session of the CC LCY, on June 26, Kučan chose, in protest, to speak in Slovenian, which he justified by the fact that – given that the Serbo-Croatian

language was spoken in Slovenia at the trial against the “Four” – his mother tongue and his equality were endangered, as well as the sovereignty of the Slovenian people. Slovenes could not consider any state, which did not ensure the free use of the Slovenian language and their equality, as a state where freedom, sovereignty and equality of the Slovenian people were guaranteed. As for the language, interestingly, even Slobodan Milošević gave his support. The session of the CC LCS the next day only confirmed the positions of its leadership. It became clear that the LCY leadership was no longer able to settle relations with either Slovenia or any other republic, and that the so-called democratic centralism had, in practice, long been dead.

Only after these conflicts with Slovenia (and at the same time with the Albanian leadership in Kosovo), in October 1988, did the internal processes in Serbia affect the leadership of the LCY. At the Seventeenth Session of the CC LCY, on October 17, 1988, Slovenes and Croats united against Milošević. At the session, a vote was supposed to verify how much confidence the party leadership still enjoyed, while the proposal of the president of the Presidency of the CC LCY, Stipe Šušvar, to call a vote of confidence in the republic presidents, who were also members of the federal presidency, did not receive support. It was anticipated that Milošević and Kučan would fail to obtain enough votes, which would strengthen the “Yugoslav” orientation in the federal leadership. That was not realistic, because the federal CC did not have the mandate to vote on republic presidents, and in order to remove them from the Presidency, the statute would have had to be changed. A few days earlier, due to the changes in Vojvodina leadership, and the fact that rallies were gaining momentum, Šušvar sharply attacked the Serbian leadership, for allegedly abandoning Tito’s path of brotherhood and unity. Until then, he supported Milošević and spoke out strongly against the Slovenes, stating the following about the rallies: “From the arrival of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo to Novi Sad, on July 9, 1988, to the million-strong rally in Belgrade, on February 28, 1989, we estimated there were about a hundred (we do not have full records) ‘Serbian-Montenegrin rallies’ in

Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. They were attended by five to six million (many individuals were at both million-strong rallies in Belgrade, and at rallies elsewhere, with larger or smaller groups attending all rallies). An extension of these rallies, in terms of similar scenography and iconography, were, in a way, rallies and gatherings of a predominantly clerical and religious character which, in the summer of 1989, marked the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo. In terms of the number of people gathered and the political consequences they left, the most important of these rallies were the one in Gazimestan in Kosovo on Vidovdan, on July 28, 1989, and the gathering on Kosovo Polje near Knin, on July 6, 1989. Until the eve of the Seventeenth Session of the CC LCY, the rallies were mostly initiated by a well-known committee from Kosovo Polje, which then disbanded itself, and after that, the rallies were mostly convened by the leaders and organizations of the Socialist Alliance. In addition to these 'Serbian-Montenegrin' rallies, 'Slavic' rallies were also held... In November 1988, and in February and March 1989, 'Albanian' mass protests, gatherings and demonstrations in Kosovo took place".¹¹⁸ When Boris Mužević asked him, in a private conversation in Kumrovec, before he turned against Milošević, why he was so harsh against the Slovenes, Šušteršič explained that the Slovenian demands were good and democratic, but that the representatives of Slovenia entered into unnecessary conflicts with everyone, so that no agreement could be reached, while Milošević was the one and only genuine communist who was capable of talking to other republics and reconciling interests.¹¹⁹ However, it should not be forgotten that Šušteršič was elected to the Presidency precisely because of his alliance with Milošević. The Croats, being hesitant, proposed two candidates, Šušteršič and the reformist Iviča Račan, and in a secret ballot, votes for Šušteršič were secured by the Serbs. According to Andrija Čolak, Šušteršič was convinced that he could

118 Stipe Šušteršič, *Nezavršeni mandat, drugi tom. Na udaru "antibirokratske revolucije"* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 49–50.

119 Mužević, *Prvo pretepeni*.

transform the LCY into a modern party, which would untangle the Yugoslav knot. At the same time, his criticism of the Slovenes was inspired by the Union of War Veterans and the Army. While Milošević wanted a so-called “firm”, i.e., more centralized state, Kučan sought to move closer to European democracy.¹²⁰

Šušteršič's calculations about a simultaneous removal of Milošević and Kučan failed, so the question as to what would have happened, if the leaders of the Serbian and Slovenian League of Communists ceased to be members of the federal Presidency, remains open. The Seventeenth Session was a direct message to Milošević that his policy would not go smoothly, given that during the vote of confidence in the Presidency of the CC LCY, only the member close to Milošević, Dušan Čkrebčić, failed to receive support (the first opposition voices against Milošević started to emerge in Serbia as well, albeit hushed, but from March 1991, he managed to successfully curb and minimize them). Due to that, Čkrebčić resigned, but – because of Milošević's position that only the base (therefore, in that case, Serbian communists) could participate in the vote of confidence in a member of the Presidency – he revoked his resignation after a month, because the CC LC of Serbia voted in his favor. The session was noted by the media for two events – during his speech, the Slovenian member of the CC LCY, Vinko Hafner, threatened Milošević, raising his finger and saying, “Comrade Milošević, think carefully about the path you have chosen”, and Macedonian Vasil Tupurkovski said after the vote (of confidence): “I am afraid that one republic has lost, and an unprincipled coalition has won”. The phrase about an unprincipled coalition remained, after that, the main objection on the part of all the republics that opposed the re-centralization of Yugoslavia and Greater Serbianism. At the time of the Seventeenth Session, and for a long time after that, such a coalition did not exist, as the voting was rather a combination of circumstances and the result of the current convictions of

120 Andrija Čolak, *Agonija Jugoslavije. Kako su posle Titove smrti republički lideri dokrajčili Jugoslaviju* (Beograd: Laguna, 2017), 23.

certain members of the CC LCY. At the time, Milošević's positions, including his demands for constitutional changes in Serbia, were supported by the Macedonians under the leadership of Milan Pančevski (who acted out of fear of Macedonia's Albanians and their demands, while, at the same time, being an ardent promoter and transmitter of Milošević's views), as well as by Montenegrins led by Vidoje Žarković, and Bosnians.

While the "will of the people" was being expressed at large street rallies, television broadcasts of party plenums began, in order to "show the people who is fighting for truth, justice, and reforms, and with what zeal. But the people are not one, there are many peoples, and each of them creates its own image of who is right in the relentless war between the party leaders of the already divided Yugoslavia".¹²¹ The practice of live television broadcasts of party plenums began with the Sixteenth Session of the CC LCY on Kosovo, on July 29 and 30, 1988. It lasted 20 hours and was watched by millions of people sitting in front of their screens, while Belgrade's NIN called it the "Sleepless night of Yugoslavia". The culmination of this kind of television drama was reached at the time of the adoption of the amendments to the Slovenian constitution, in September 1989. The session of the CC LCY, the day before the adoption of the amendments in the Slovenian Parliament, on September 26, dragged through the entire night and was broadcasted live on television. A dramatic impression was created as if, due to the adoption of the amendments, a state of emergency was beginning in the whole of Yugoslavia. The prevailing opinion at the session was that these amendments were in conflict with the constitution, and pressure on Slovenian members was organized, in an attempt to make the LC of Slovenia declare itself against the amendments, thus postponing or preventing their adoption in the Slovenian Assembly. Apart from Slovenian members, Croatian members also voted against such a conclusion at the session of the CC LCY. The session was without effect, and the adoption of the amendments

121 Čolak, *Agonija Jugoslavije*, 17.

encouraged new rallies; in Titograd about 50,000 people gathered, wielding weapons in a threatening manner. The effect of live broadcasts was also exploited during the 14th Congress, in January 1990. At that time, two republics already had a multiparty system, so despite the fact that the LCY was still “responsible” for Yugoslavia, media attention gradually began to shift towards the new political forces.

In contrast to the CC LCY, the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY remained, for the most part, secret, and only selectively open to journalists, which was decided along the way. Secrecy was not the only issue, but also which messages should be emphasized: who would be presented and cited by the journalists, and who would not, which views expressed in harsh debates would be supported, and which would not. After the first open session, full of mutual accusations, the correspondent of Tanjug said quietly: “Soon we will ask you to close your sessions again”.¹²²

The consequences of Milošević’s political victories started showing results in the Presidency of the CC LCY, as well. At the rallies (they were not, indeed, all nationalistic – on October 5, 1988, several thousand workers from Rakovica protested in front of the Assembly due to the bad situation, and the workers’ strikes began to multiply) the so-called “calling out” of individual members of the Presidency began. In the early autumn of 1988, when the Vojvodina leadership was forced to resign, Boško Krunic resigned from the Presidency. The new leadership of Vojvodina immediately started demanding Šuvar’s resignation (which did not happen). As early as October, despite the support of the Montenegrin leadership, Milošević tried and failed to overthrow Vidoje Žarković and Marko Orlandić, in his attempt to replace them with younger, more loyal politicians. He succeeded a few months later, in January 1989, when, under the pressure of the anti-bureaucratic revolution, they both resigned.

In February 1989, the Presidency of the SFRY faced direct pressure on the streets, precisely because of Kosovo and Slovenian reactions

122 Šetinc, *Vzpon in sestop*, 298.

in relation to this issue. Numerous sessions were specifically dedicated to Kosovo during the eighties, and it was also indirectly the subject of discussions and conflicts on the occasion of almost every other topic. On February 20, the Presidency of the SFRY tried to stop the demonstrations and bloodshed in the Province, with a “certain level of engagement of YPA units in Kosovo”, as it was formulated. At the extraordinary session of the Presidency of the CC LCY, on February 26, 1989, the information that the presence of police in Kosovo had increased, and that the 52nd Corps of the YPA was ready to enter the Province, was thus discussed. A new conflict between Milošević and Mužević occurred at the session. Milošević accused Slovenes of stabbing Serbia in the back, with the support of Kosovo, while Mužević compared Milošević to Stalin. The temperature kept rising over the next two days. In Slovenia, on February 27, a mass gathering was organized in Cankarjev dom, labeled “For peace and coexistence and against the introduction of a state of emergency in Kosovo”. It was organized by various associations and opposition organizations, and Kučan appeared both at the gathering and on TV. On February 28, pro-Milošević students organized demonstrations in front of the SFRY Assembly in Belgrade. It was the response of Serbian politics to the rally in Cankarjev dom. During the day, more than 100,000 people gathered, and workers from factories were also bussed in. The masses demanded the arrest of Azem Vllasi. At around 7 pm, they demanded a statement on the matter by the Presidency of the CC LCY. The frightened Presidency authorized Milošević to formulate five points and read them in front of the protesters. During the day, numerous speakers lined up in front of protesters, including the on-duty president of the Presidency of the SFRY, Raif Dizdarević, who was booed. Milošević triumphantly appeared around 9.30 pm. He promised the arrest of Albanian leaders, which followed (Vllasi was arrested on March 2, his trial began in September, he was eventually pardoned and released from prison in April 1990). Serbia launched an economic war against Slovenia in early March. Slovenia continued to help the miners (in Stari Trg), as well as those who were arrested.

They were helped by Slovenian lawyers, with financial assistance by the republic. At the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY, information was repeatedly requested on the condition the detained Vllasi was in, because this was the first case in 30 years that a political official was imprisoned.

Amendments to the Serbian constitution were announced on March 29, which was celebrated in Serbia with mass rallies, while in Kosovo, demonstrations began. The Presidency of the CC LCY and the Presidency of the SFRY met, as countless times before, at a joint session, in order to appeal to the public for unity. But the session did not go very smoothly, and Dizdarević rejected the joint statement, according to Čolak, with the words: "You do your job, we will do ours".¹²³

Milošević and his new allies took aim at Croatia, discussing, at a session of the Provincial Committee, how Serbs were threatened in Croatia, and the discussion spilled over into the Presidency, as well. There, the debates, indeed, lost some of their sharpness, because Milošević became the president of the Serbian Presidency on May 8, and there was also a pro-Serbian bloc, due to the changes achieved by the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, as well as changes in Kosovo. Milošević began to say publicly what he was previously saying at the sessions of the Presidency, and only a little after taking over the presidential mandate, on May 22, he labeled the events in Slovenia as fascistoid.¹²⁴ On the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle, on June 28, in front of two million Serbs and the state leadership, he issued a threat with the words that became famous for announcing the war and the end of Yugoslavia: "Six centuries later, today, we are again in battles and facing them. They are not armed battles, although such battles are not being excluded".¹²⁵

123 Čolak, *Agonija Jugoslavije*, 344.

124 Jež, *Yu, nikoli več?*, 186.

125 Dragan Štavljanin, "Trideset godina od Miloševićeve najave ratova na Gazimestanu," *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, June 28, 2019, <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-gazimestan-milosevic/30026025.html>.

During the summer, on the occasions of personnel replacements, the same topics were repeated, with the same failure, because Serbs, with seven votes and occasional alliances, directed the topics of discussion. At the end of the summer, it was Slovenia's turn again, this time because it banned the so-called rally of truth, which Milošević tried to use in order to overthrow the Slovenian leadership, as well. As a result, the Serbian SAWP demanded the severing of all relations with Slovenia, and Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo declared Kučan and Janez Kocijančič "unsuitable to be members of the CC LCY, because they allegedly encouraged Serbian nationalists, prompted divisions in the LCY and deliberately created bad interethnic relations". Due to the conflict between Slovenia and Serbia, six members of the Presidency asked the on-duty president Pančevski to convene an urgent session of the CC LCY, but he resisted. In the end, a two-day session was held, which ended on December 28. In the meantime, at the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY, as well as the session of the CC LCY, discussions were held in the context of the preparations for the Congress and its content. The three opposing factions (Serbian, Slovenian-Croatian and "federal") practically did not agree on anything, which was a sign, as public debates and controversies predicted, that the Congress would not yield the much-expected solution but, instead, a collapse.

The efforts for the LCY to convene an extraordinary congress due to the Yugoslav crisis had, indeed, been present since 1988, but Slovenian, as well as some other representatives in the federal party bodies, persistently opposed them. Consequently, the congress was held in a year when it would have regardless been regularly held, but it was marked as "extraordinary", in order to point out the critical situation in the party and Yugoslav society. In January 1989 the Communists of Vojvodina finally had the Congress they officially asked for, at the extraordinary Conference of the LC of Vojvodina.

The Slovenes remained alone in their demand that the LCY be transformed into an alliance of independent organizations, and thus end the so-called democratic centralism. Before the federal ones,

republican congresses and conferences were held. The reform forces in some other republican organizations also proved to be weak and heterogeneous. Democratic centralism, the typical principle of the communist parties, was abolished only at the congresses of the Slovenian and Croatian communists. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was mitigated slightly in relation to minorities, while the Macedonian, Serbian, Montenegrin LCs, and the LC in the YPA, persisted in it. The situation was similar concerning the issue of separating the party from the state. Declaratively, everyone was in favor, but only Slovenian and Croatian communists decided on specific provisions such as, for example, the possibility of “external” supervision over the work of the assembly, government, parliament and presidency by the opposition.

The Slovenian Congress, in December 1989, took place in the shadow of the Romanian revolution, with bold actions of the opposition against the LCS. Kučan stated, among other things, that Yugoslavia was on the brink of civil war, as a result of a ruthless policy of ultimatums which no one, out of opportunism, wanted to oppose. However, the key claim was that the LCS reached its 11th Congress as the only communist party in power which, without the pressure of demonstrations and mass anger of fellow citizens, opted for party pluralism and announced elections. This, despite the fact that, in the federal Presidency, the Slovenes were repeatedly being told that they would be swept away by their own people; the LCS subsequently won the highest number of votes, but due to the pre-election opposition coalition Demos, it failed to retain power. After Kučan, Dr. Ciril Ribičič took over the leadership of the LCS, and a proposal for comprehensive pan-Yugoslav democratic reforms was prepared. The program included guaranteeing human rights, a multiparty system, abolishing verbal offenses and suspending political trials, resolving the situation in Kosovo in compliance with the Yugoslav constitution, direct elections, and reforming both the federation and the LCY into an alliance of independent entities. The Slovenian delegation, despite preserving its name, essentially arrived at the 14th Congress of the LCY representing a social democratic party. At its republican congress,

the LC of Serbia decided, indeed, on free political association, but only on a democratic socialist basis. It advocated for a federal Yugoslavia, to which the republics could not belong “only as much as suits them”, while the federal authorities would be strengthened. The idea of republics as states was rejected. In the LCY, according to the principle of “one man, one vote”, the principle of democratic centralism would be preserved. The Croatian LC, akin to the Slovenian, opted for party pluralism. Yugoslavia could survive only as an alliance of freely united peoples and nationalities, with republics having original sovereignty. The LC of Bosnia and Herzegovina adhered to the principle of democratic centralism, which was to have a more modern interpretation. When it came to interethnic relations, their standpoint was that there should be no outvoting in the LCY. They were against a confederate Yugoslavia and political organizing on a national basis, stating that the citizens were the ones to decide on multipartyism. They supported the principle “one man, one vote” and opposed the depoliticization of the YPA. The Macedonians supported a federal Yugoslavia based on the AVNOJ principles and assessed multiparty pluralism as only one of the possibilities of political pluralism, to be decided by the citizens. At the beginning of 1989, Montenegrins considered multipartyism an unrealistic political option, but already by the end of the year, debates in the Montenegrin LC on this issue had begun. At that time, the already pro-Milošević Kosovo party organization opposed confederalism and the “administrative-bureaucratic” interpretations of the independence of the republics and provinces. The LC of Vojvodina, which was also subordinated to Milošević, opted for a unified LCY, democratic centralism, a single Yugoslav market, political pluralism of a non-partisan type, with the SAWP as the umbrella organization. The LC organization in the YPA opted for a unified and federal Yugoslavia and LCY, as a unified political organization with modernized democratic centralism, against multipartyism and against the depoliticization of the YPA. They also believed that reforms in the country could be carried out solely on the basis of Yugoslavism and socialism.

The CC LCY appointed a special committee for the preparation of congress documents, chaired by the secretary of the Presidency of the CC LCY, Štefan Korošec. The committee was to prepare a general congressional declaration, which would be a synthesis of all standpoints, and at the same time, represent a transitional document until the adoption of the new LCY program. The document was discussed by the CC LCY in December 1989 and its draft was accepted. The final version was to be adopted by Congress. The Central Committee also discussed the report on the work of the CC LCY between the 13th and the 14th Congresses. In that debate, controversies about the causes of the Yugoslav crisis already appeared. In the discussion on the document entitled "The new project for democratic socialism in Yugoslavia", throughout the session, Serbian representatives verbally assaulted the Slovenian representatives regarding the views of the 11th Congress of the LCS. They were criticized because, in addition to an asymmetric state, they also wanted an asymmetric LC. Serbia declared that it would not agree to such demands, and would protect its interests.

The document offered, indeed, a theoretical possibility for compromise. It opted for political pluralism and for abandoning the party monopoly. Yugoslavia would persist on AVNOJ principles, that is, as a federation in which sovereignty belonged both to federal units, and, at the same time, to the citizens of Yugoslavia. The negotiated economy would be abandoned, and a market economy and ownership pluralism introduced. Self-government would remain the social foundation, while the LCY would be based on a "new" democratic centralism. Environmental issues were also emphasized. In international relations, Yugoslavia would remain non-aligned, but it would also "express a wish" to join European integration. The LC would be transformed into a modern and democratic organization, with a renewed socialist program. After the congress, in addition to renewing the organization, the priorities would be the adoption of a new constitution, an international human rights act, the abolition of verbal offense, multiparty elections, radical economic reforms and the realization of a Yugoslav program on Kosovo, initiation of the procedure for accession to

the Council of Europe, as well as taking part in European and global integrations.

The Congress was held from January 20 to 22, 1990, at the Sava Center in Belgrade. The arguments began from the very start of the Congress, both in the three commissions (for the reform of the political system, for the reform of the economy, for the transformation of the LCY), and in the plenary part. At the center were diametrically opposed views of the Slovenian and Serbian delegations, with two completely different concepts, with the Slovenes joined by Croatian delegates on some issues. All Slovenian proposals were rejected in a very hostile atmosphere. If someone had suggested at that moment that the Slovenes get a cup of coffee, the majority in the hall would probably have picked up their red cards. Despite that, or precisely because of that, it took a lot of experience and knowledge of relations in Yugoslavia to assess and decide when and how to leave. On that issue, there was no unity in the Slovenian delegation. The "Young Communists" perceived the Congress from an exclusively tactical point of view, and, concerned for their own careers, wanted to get rid of Yugoslavism as soon as possible. The old, experienced communist, Vinko Hafner, a member of the pre-war and war generation, was skeptical about leaving, but agreed to it. He probably had in mind the consequences leaving would have for the former revolutionary party, which renewed Yugoslavia in impossible war conditions, realizing its communist federal vision. Sonja Lokar cried when she left, and a photo of her, in tears, flooded the Yugoslav press. Kučan and Ribičič insisted that the right moment had to be chosen, so that it would be clear to both Yugoslavia and the world what the Slovenes stood for. This is what Kučan said: *"During the night, we held a meeting of the entire Slovenian delegation, and the prevailing view was that we must carefully choose the moment of departure, because our decision to leave must be understandable not only to us, but also to the Slovenian, as well as Yugoslav and international public. The 'Young Communists', Pahor, Balazic and others, continued to press impatiently: 'let's go, let's go, what will they tell us at home?' I insisted that we will do it, when the head of*

the delegation, Ciril Ribičič, decides so. You need to persevere to the end, if you want others to notice, at all, what you stand for, and what the differences in attitudes are, due to which we are unable to identify with the others. Čiro (Ciril Ribičič, auth. rem.) also understood this well, and realized it perfectly. I was often misunderstood when I insisted that such radical decisions required argumentation and consistency. Even later in debates on the referendum law (he was referring to insisting on the view that the referendum succeeded if a majority of all registered voters voted for independence, and not just the majority of those who participated in the referendum, auth. rem.). Nervousness, impatience, and lack of argumentation have no place in such big decisions. Neither has haste. You have to fight, if you want others to know your views at all. You need to be persistent and have tactics. If you already give in at the first confrontation and avoid conflicts, they will think you are a weakling, that your arguments are irrelevant, as well as that you are not ready to bear the responsibility to the end".¹²⁶

The Slovenian delegation also took into account the possibility that it would be prevented from leaving, by the police or the army, or that “protesters” would gather in front of the hotel and thus prevent their departure. That didn’t happen. Silvo Komar, who was in charge of the delegation’s security, agreed with Yugoslav Interior Minister Petar Gračanin that their departure would not be hindered, and that the police would protect them. Though Gračanin was Milošević’s man, as an old Partisan general, this time he kept his word. Milošević accused them of planning everything, even of canceling their rooms in advance. His ardent Montenegrin supporter, Momir Bulatović, who came to power with Milo Đukanović in the anti-bureaucratic revolution, and chaired one session, claimed that Kučan sent him a note to prompt him to shorten the debate as much as possible and put the proposals to a vote, which was a trap, a conspiracy, because whatever he did, nothing would change the planned decision of the Slovenes to leave. During the Congress, the Presidency of the CC LCY was in

¹²⁶ Božo Repe, *Milan Kučan, prvi predsednik* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2015), 159.

session all the time, where Kučan was strongly pressured to make the Slovenes withdraw the amendments to the initial document, that is, to practically agree to the Serbian-Milošević concept of a centralized LCY. Kučan, due to his long experience, easily resisted the pressures, and consequently the meetings were without effect. The rejection of every Slovenian amendment was followed by a storm of applause from the majority in the hall. Most applauded even as the delegation left. They realized what their departure meant only in the following days. The delegation left the Sava Center for the Intercontinental Hotel, where they held a press conference and explained their decisions to the press. Then, in the shadow of the congressional confusion that occurred, they peacefully left Belgrade.¹²⁷

The turning point was the Slovenian amendment, proposed by Janez Kocijančič on behalf of the Slovenian delegation, on the transformation of the LCY: instead of the wording “it should be transformed into a modern, unified, democratic political organization”, the Slovenian delegation proposed that the LCY be a party of “equal republican LC organizations that associate freely in the LCY “. The proposal was rejected with 1156 votes against, and 169 votes in favor. After the vote, Ciril Ribičič was given the floor, emphasizing that the Congress not only refused to accept Slovenian amendments, but also the minimum necessary to enable autonomy, independence, and equality of the republic organization. He also stated that the Slovenes did not want to be co-responsible for the agony of LCY. The Slovenian delegates left the hall in the Sava Center, accompanied by a general applause.

However, that is only part of the story. What was important, in the events which followed, was that in the end, the Slovenes did not stand alone. The Croatian delegation also left the interrupted Congress. Due to the mixed Croatian-Serbian national composition, it was in a much more difficult position. In the context of Slovene-Croatian

127 30 years from the departure of the Slovenian delegation from the 14th Congress of the LCY, round table, January 22, 2020. Participants: Sonja Lokar, Janez Kocijančič, Lev Kreft, Milan Kučan, Božo Repe and Ciril Ribičič. Moderated by Dušan Balažič, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IqF5JdqHdvY>.

relations and the talks on an alliance in the federation (later, on the joint move for independence), this was one of the few really significant Croatian moves. If the Croats had stayed, Milošević's proposal would have been realized, namely, the Congress, after the departure of the Slovenes, would have established a new quorum and continued working as if nothing had happened. The Slovenian League of Communists would simply have "seceded", or, in the words of a Serbian delegate: let the Slovenes go, let them leave the Congress "and let us primitives organize the Party as we deem fit".

In that regard, the chairperson, Momir Bulatović, wanted the work to continue, as if nothing had happened, but Ivica Račan, on behalf of the majority of Croatian delegates, proposed that the Congress be adjourned, the situation and its causes analyzed, and possible solutions suggested, and that only after that, the work of the Congress be resumed. Milošević opposed Račan's proposition, and suggested that a new quorum be established, and work continued. During the break, Račan was pressured to withdraw his proposal, but he did not relent. In the continuation, the session was chaired by Milan Pančevski, who proposed the following: adopting the documents submitted up to that point and continuing the Congress upon decision of the CC LCY, with LCY bodies continuing to work in the meantime. The Croatian delegation did not vote in favor of this proposal, but Pančevski nevertheless declared it accepted, which was an attempt to create the impression that the Congress was not over, and that it would continue.

Slovenian representatives "froze" relations with the LCY until the conference of the CC LC of Slovenia in early February. The very next day, the CC LC of Slovenia fully supported the move made by the delegates, as did the Conference of the CC SC of Slovenia, on February 2. The following conclusion was adopted: the 14th Congress was over for Slovenian Communists, and the abbreviation LCS was supplemented with the name: Party of Democratic Renewal. For Račan and the Croatian LC, the situation was much more difficult. Under certain conditions, after the return of the delegation, (Račan) approved the continuation of the congress. While part of the membership criticized

him because the Croatian delegation was not as radical as the Slovenian one, Serbian communists in Croatia claimed that he fell prey to Slovenian separatism. The CC LCC, finally, approved the delegation's actions. In Serbia, the overall interpretation was that the separatist Slovenes encountered resistance from the majority of Yugoslav communists, as well as that the unified LCY was a key factor in the unified SFRY. The Macedonian and Bosnian communists were, under certain conditions and without exclusion, for the continuation of the congress. That did not happen, and the LCY actually ceased to exist at the 14th Congress, although the remainder of the Presidency of the CC LCY and the CC LCY, and especially the LCY Organization in the YPA, kept trying, until May, to continue the Congress. As an alternative, the attempt to replace the failed LCY by LCY – Movement for Yugoslavia, was also unsuccessful, despite the fact that it was joined, in late 1990, by the LCY Organization in the YPA. It became clear that the Movement could not succeed, when, at the beginning of June, the LC of Serbia and the SAWP of Serbia united to form the Socialist Party of Serbia. Consequently, of the three pillars supporting the SFRY, the only one to remain standing was the YPA.

And what about the fate of the Presidency of the CC LCY after the Congress? At the beginning, president Pančevski continued to work as if nothing had happened, as if the Congress had only been postponed, and immediately, the next day, he convened a session. There were no Slovenes attending, and only one Croat. Despite that, there was a request that the CC LCY and the Presidency be dissolved immediately, which Pančevski opposed. Čolak tellingly described the situation: "*Pančevski, of course, fiercely defended the Central Committee and the Presidency, and insisted on their work and activities, as if nothing had happened. He even insisted that Korošec was still the secretary of the Presidency, and that 'he had only presently taken a vacation'?*"¹²⁸ The sessions of the abridged Presidency were still being convened in January, February, and March. Two or three of them were called

128 Čolak, *Agonija Jugoslavije*, 507.

“consultative meetings”, and, following those, public statements were issued. The Serbian bloc, though, insisted that these were “normal” sessions. In the background, after the Congress, there were efforts by Milošević’s supporters and the YPA to somehow organize “communists from Slovenia” (Serbs who lived there, retired officers, and the like) and bring their representatives to the highest bodies of the LCY, as well as to the Presidency. At the same time, pressure was put on representatives of the Croatian communists – who would still occasionally send one of their representatives to “consultative” meetings – to return to the party bodies and support the continuation of the Congress. The situation with Croatia was “softer”, because there were many Serbs from Croatia in the representative bodies. Continuation of the Congress, and before that, a session of the CC LCY, were also main topics of the meetings. While the Croatian representatives did participate in the drafting of the document pertaining to the possible continuation of the Congress, which was prepared by the Presidency of the CC LCY, they were against its publishing (the Presidency, nevertheless, published it). Ivica Račan put an end to everything by a statement for *Borba*, on March 9, that the Congress was over, and that he had no time to argue with the Presidency, because LCC-SDP was preparing for elections. The divisions in the abridged Presidency continued, this time without Slovenes and Croats. The stronger bloc was represented by Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo and the YPA, and the weaker by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. A session of the abridged CC LCY was held on March 30, but it was only a show for the public. At the beginning of April, the Macedonians and Bosnians, at the sessions of their central committees, demanded the resignation of the Presidency of the CC LCY, but they still attended the sessions of the Presidency. These sessions were still being held in April and May, although they were no longer attended by some of the representatives from the Serbian bloc, who took over other duties.

The Presidency somehow managed to stay alive, primarily because of the assumption that the 14th Congress could continue. At the beginning of May, 98 members of the CC LCY met at a

“working-consultative meeting” and decided that the Congress would continue on May 26.¹²⁹ In an abridged composition, the “congress” in the Sava Center in Belgrade actually did continue at the end of May, and it was even announced that the 15th Congress would begin on September 25.¹³⁰ It was in those days that the Socialist Alliance of Youth of Yugoslavia disintegrated. Ante Marković announced the founding of his party, and new governments were formed in Slovenia and Croatia following the elections, but without reformed communists. There were no Slovenes at the Congress; from Croatia and Kosovo only Serbs attended, and from Macedonia there were several delegates from Kumanovo and Prilep. Only nine speakers took the floor. The LCC-SDP presidency sent a letter that it was not ready to participate in “creating the illusion of unity, when it does not exist, and even less to agree to the return of the old under the cloak of the new”. The LCC-SDP presidency informed the Congress that, for them, it was over four months ago.¹³¹ The Congress, indeed, dissolved all the bodies of the CC LCY, including the Presidency.

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Božo Repe

THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SFRY: WITHOUT AUTHORITY AND CHARISMA

THE QUESTION OF who would take over the country after Josip Broz Tito began to be raised in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1960s. According to the first postwar constitution, which was adopted in 1946 and copied the Soviet Constitution of 1936, the function of the collective president of the state was performed by the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the successor of the AVNOJ Presidency. It was elected by the People's Assembly and was responsible to it. The Presidium was composed of the president, six vice-presidents, a secretary and (maximum) 30 members, and (apart from passing laws) had significant powers including the power to dissolve the assembly, ratify laws, assess the compliance of republican laws with the federal constitution, appoint the prime minister, appoint ambassadors (at the government's proposal), ratify international treaties, declare martial law and mobilization, call a referendum and the like.¹³² Both the Prime Minister and the Government were formally subordinated to the Presidium. In reality, the most powerful political figure was the Prime Minister, Josip Broz Tito, who was also the Minister of Defence. He became President of Yugoslavia in 1953.¹³³ His power was still further strengthened, because at the same time he remained the Prime Minister (now the Federal Executive Council – FEC) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

132 Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Articles 73–76. Access 30. 4. 2021. http://www.arhivyu.rs/active/sr-latin/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/ustav_fnrj.html.

133 Constitutional Law, 1953. Access 30. 4. 2021. http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/sr-latin/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/ustav_sfj_1963.html.

Forces. He was elected from among the members of the Federal People's Assembly; each of his terms was tied to the term of the Assembly. Thus, until the election of the new Assembly, it could recall him before the expiry of his term. The constitutional law did not envisage how many times a candidate could be elected.¹³⁴ Under the 1963 Constitution, the functions of president of the state and prime minister were separated. The president's term was limited to two four-year terms, but this limitation did not apply to Josip Broz Tito.¹³⁵

Until 1966, it was believed that Tito would be succeeded by Aleksandar Ranković. After the so-called Brioni Plenum, when Ranković was stripped of all his official functions, the opinion prevailed that Tito could not be replaced by only one man. Truly, from among the politicians belonging to Tito's inner circle, the most serious candidate to succeed him was Edvard Kardelj, who was Tito's closest confidant and conceived most changes in Yugoslavia's internal development and foreign policy (nonalignment). At the same time, however, he challenged Tito's stances on a number of occasions. Although he occasionally resorted to tactics in order to survive politically, he was one of the few politicians who did not directly serve Tito, but the revolution.¹³⁶ Or, more exactly, how he saw it in a given period. In Moscow, he was considered a social democrat and very negatively assessed, which was important, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Tito again drew closer to Moscow and Kardelj, on the other hand, sought models in the Scandinavian social democracies. His occasional tensions with Tito culminated during the 1950s and 1960s, when Tito was deciding between centralism and federalism and, personally, between him and Ranković. The relationship between Tito's wife Jovanka Broz and Pepca Kardelj also contributed to some extent to conflict between the old revolutionary comrades. Namely, during the 1950s and the first

134 Ustavno uređenje Jugoslavije, *Gospodarski vestnik*, Ljubljana 1959, pp. 88–90.

135 Ustava SFRJ in SRS iz leta 1963" – Uradni list SRS, Ljubljana 1963. (Constitution of the SFRY, 1963).

136 Jože Pirjevec, *Tito in tovariši* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2020), 380.

half of the 1960s, the Kardelj family lived in Tito's neighbourhood in Užička Street in Dedinje. Pepca could not reconcile herself with the ambitious young "housekeeper" who suddenly became the "first comradess" and had a growing influence on the ageing Tito.¹³⁷ As for politics, Tito accepted Kardelj's idea about the republics as states within the federation, with the unified League of Communists as a protective mechanism, the Yugoslav People's Army as the defender of Yugoslavia – not only from external threats to Yugoslavia, but also of the socialist system – and Tito as the (life-long) president of the state and the Party, and as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

This principle was established by "Kardelj's Constitution of 1974". In that way, Yugoslavia managed to buy some peaceful time and, in terms of the standard of living, its most successful years, at the cost of a high foreign debt. At the same time, the relations between Tito and Kardelj calmed down. Kardelj died before Tito (1979), but it had become clear a decade earlier that he could not succeed Tito. This would be difficult in any case because, despite being well-read and analytical, he lacked charisma and was committed to normativism. He did not enjoy having power in the same way as Tito. In addition, he was not popular in Serbia due to the Constitution, which was especially evident in numerous newspaper articles during Milošević's media war in the 1980s.

Thus, with the adoption of Amendments 20–42 to the 1963 Constitution in 1971, the Presidency of the SFRY was established as the collective head of the state.¹³⁸ There was a lot of discussion how to constitute it and what its role would be – during Tito's life in general – both in the Assembly and in other bodies. Further, there were questions as to what function it would have in relation to other (government and assembly) bodies, whether its members should "only be representatives of the republics or be confirmed by the Federal Assembly, as well as how many

137 Božo Repe, *Rdeča Slovenija: tokovi in obrazi iz obdobja socializma* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2003), 249.

138 Ustava SFRJ in SRS iz leta 1963" – *Uradni list SRS*, Ljubljana 1963. (Constitution of the SFRY, 1963).

members it should have (both provinces demanded a higher number – 3+2). Finally, all this was decided by Tito.¹³⁹ The Presidency was composed of the Presidents of the Assemblies of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces, two members from each Republic and one member from each Autonomous Province. The members were elected in the Republican and Provincial Assemblies at the joint session of all Chambers, while the candidacy procedure, as in the case of all other elections, was carried out through the mediation of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People. Formally, candidates could also be directly proposed by a group of delegates. Proceeding from the historical role of Josip Broz Tito, the constitutional amendments also foresaw that, at the proposal of the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces, the Federal Assembly would elect him both as President of the Presidency and President of the SFRY. As the President of the Republic, he was also the supreme commander of the armed forces and represented the SFRY abroad. Thus, until the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, the Presidency, which began work in mid-1971, had 23 members. However, due to its vague role, there was not much interest in it among the most prominent politicians. In Slovenia, for example, Edvard Kardelj did not want to run for membership in the federal Presidency. He stated that he wanted to dedicate himself to the work in the LCY Presidency and that it would be better for someone younger to run.¹⁴⁰ Truly, the candidacy process in Slovenia brought about a sharpened political crisis and, consequently, political purges (the so-called case of 25 delegates). Namely, after Edvard Kardelj's rejection, a group of 25 deputies applied for candidacy. They had the right to do that but, due to their arbitrary action, they encroached on the cadre monopoly held a narrow informal group of the most prominent Slovenian politicians (the so-called republican coordination), which decid-

139 Kosta Nikolić; Vladimir Petrović, *Dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ 1991. Tom 1, (januar – mart 1991): od mira do rata* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju: Fond za humanitarno Law, 2011), 10–11.

140 Božo Repe, "Liberalizem" v Sloveniji (Ljubljana: RO ZZB NOV Slovenije, 1992), 208–212.

ed on all important issues. The Presidency began work in mid-1971. The 1974 Constitution reduced the number of its members to nine: one from each Republic and each Autonomous Province, and the President of the CC LCY by virtue of his office, but without the right to vote (the Presidency of the CC LCY lost its position as a member of the Federal Presidency according to the 1988 constitutional amendments and under pressure from growing democratization). The election procedure remained the same. The members were elected by the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces, while the Assembly of the SFRY announced the election results and the composition of the Presidency of the SFRY. In accordance with the Constitution (of one of the world's longest), Tito was given a special status under Article 333, which specified as follows:

“In view of the historic role of Josip Broz Tito in the National Liberation War and the Socialist Revolution and in the creation and development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the development of Yugoslav socialist self-management, the achievement of the brotherhood and unity of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the consolidation of the independence of the country and of its position in international relations and in the struggle for peace in the world, and in line with the expressed will of the working people and citizens, peoples, and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the Assembly of the SFRY may, on the proposal of the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces, elect Josip Broz Tito President of the Republic for an unlimited term of office.”¹⁴¹

The first Rules of Procedure concerning the work of the Presidency of the SFRY were adopted in 1975 and changed after Tito's death.¹⁴² At first, the Rules of Procedure seemed unimportant, but as the situation in the Presidency was becoming increasingly conflicted, there was increasing

141 Ustav SFRJ, Predsednik republike, III poglavje, 1974. Access: 30. 4. 2021, [https://sl.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustava_Socialisti%C4%8Dne_federativne_republike_Jugoslavije_\(1974\)/Organizacija_federacije#III_poglavje_-_Predsednik_republike](https://sl.wikisource.org/wiki/Ustava_Socialisti%C4%8Dne_federativne_republike_Jugoslavije_(1974)/Organizacija_federacije#III_poglavje_-_Predsednik_republike).

142 Poslovnik o radu Predsedništva SFRJ (7. 2. 1981), Službeni list SFRJ 6/81.

reference to them, although everyone interpreted them in his own way. In principle, the Presidency was supposed to work on the basis of adjustment of views of its members, but voting was also envisaged – with a simple majority of those present, or a two-thirds majority in the event of voting about important issues (such as, for example, the imposition of a state of emergency, security and defence issues, constitutional amendments, rejection or postponement of the implementation of the laws adopted by the SFRY Assembly). The Presidents of the Presidency formally had only a procedural role, that is, to convene and preside over sessions, but some of them began to assume increasingly greater competencies with the intensification of the crisis. In this connection, Borisav Jović especially distinguished himself. He used both the vice-presidential and presidential functions to pursue Serbian interests, or to discreetly realize deals agreed with the top army leaders; this can be learned from his memoirs.¹⁴³

According to the 1974 Constitution, the Presidency initially had nine members (their term lasted until 1989): Josip Broz Tito (President of the Presidency and President of the LCY), Vidoje Žarković (Montenegro), Stevan Doronjski (Vojvodina), Fadil Hoxha (Kosovo), Lazar Koliševski (Macedonia), Cvijetin Mijatović (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Petar Stambolić (Serbia), Vladimir Bakarić (Croatia) and Edvard Kardelj (Slovenia) – after his death he was succeeded by Sergej Kraigher.

The second composition (1979–1984) did not change significantly. The only reason for this change was the death of two of its members. Stevan Doronjski was replaced by Radovan Vlajković and Vladimir Bakarić by Mika Špiljak (1983). Žarković, Koliševski, Hoxha, Mijatović, Stambolić and Kraigher renewed their terms. The annual changes in both terms referred to the current President of the Presidency of the CC LCY, who was an *ex officio* member and had no right to vote.

The third composition (1985–1989): Veselin Đuranović (Montenegro); Radovan Vlajković (Vojvodina), Sinan Hasani (Kosovo), Lazar Mojsov (Macedonia), Branko Mikulić (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and after him,

143 Borisav Jović, *Zadnji dnevni SFRJ. Odlomci iz dnevnika* (Ljubljana: Slovenska knjiga, 1996)

a year later, *Hamdija Pozderac*, then *Raif Dizdarević*, *Stane Dolanc* (Slovenia), *Josip Vrhovec* (Croatia) and *Nikola Ljubičić* (Serbia).

The fourth and last composition: *Borisav Jović* (Serbia), *Janez Drnovšek* (Slovenia), *Stipe Šušvar*, succeeded by *Stjepan Mesić* (Croatia), *Bogić Bogičević* (Bosnia and Herzegovina), *Vasil Tupurkovski* (Macedonia), *Nenad Bućin*, succeeded by *Branko Kostić* (Montenegro), *Dragutin Zelenović*, succeeded by *Jugoslav Kostić* (Vojvodina), and *Riza Sapunxhiu*, succeeded by *Sejdo Bajramović* (Kosovo).¹⁴⁴

After Tito's death, the President of the Presidency served a one-year term, while the members rotated on 15 May. The first President, for a short period of time, after Tito's death (4 May 1980) until the regular shift on 15 May, was Macedonian *Lazar Koliševski*. He was followed by *Cvijetin Mijatović* from Bosnia and Herzegovina (1980/1981), *Sergej Kraigher* from Slovenia (1981/1982), *Petar Stambolić* from Serbia (1982/1983), *Mika Špiljak* from Croatia (1983/1984), *Veselin Đuranović* from Montenegro (1984/1985), *Radovan Vlačković* from Vojvodina (1985/1986), *Sinan Hasani* from Kosovo (1986/1987), *Lazar Mojsov* from Macedonia (1987/1988), *Raif Dizdarević* from Bosnia and Herzegovina (1988/1989), *Janez Drnovšek* from Slovenia (1989/1990), *Borisav Jović* from Serbia (1990/1991) and *Stjepan Mesić* from Croatia, who did not serve the full term due to the disintegration of the state (June 1991/October 1991).¹⁴⁵ All presidents before *Drnovšek* and *Mesić* were old partisan cadres, either from the prewar revolutionary times or from the People's Liberation War.

A change in the election of members of the SFRY Presidency referred to its last composition as some members were already elected in direct elections. The first was *Janez Drnovšek*, who was a very unconventional and self-effacing president. In a sense, he was a part of the political elite, but not at its top: he was a delegate to the Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly, worked as an economic adviser at the Yugoslav Embassy in Cairo for a year, and defended his PhD

144 *Nikolić, Dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ, 14–16.*

145 Predsedništvo Jugoslavije, dostupno: 30. 4. 2021, https://sl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predsedstvo_Jugoslavije

thesis entitled “Yugoslavia and the International Monetary Fund”. Before his election, he was the branch manager of a bank in Trbovlje. As the candidate of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (SSOS) from Zagorje, he won a victory in Slovenia over the candidate favoured by the political establishment – President of Slovenia’s Chamber of Commerce Marko Bulc, a well-reputed and influential politician. After assuming the position of the President, he surprised Serbian politicians and the JNA with some moves. For example, he took charge of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, which was usually headed by the Vice-President (Borisav Jović at that time). The Council was composed of Yugoslavia’s most important government officials – three members of the Presidency: Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Minister for Internal Affairs; heads of all three secret services: State Security Service (SDB), Military Counterintelligence Service (KOS) and Research and Documentation Service (SID) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.¹⁴⁶ Drnovšek spoke four languages, including Spanish among others, regularly played tennis with American Ambassador Warren Zimmerman and gave unconventional interviews for foreign newspapers, due to which he was criticised in the Presidency on several occasions, primarily by Jović for his interview with the German magazine *Der Spiegel*. He told the magazine that he was oriented toward a market economy and democracy. His optimistic announcement that he would abolish the state of emergency in Kosovo was not realized. However, some measures were lifted at the session held on 24 May 1989; the infamous “isolation”, that is, the confinement of politically suspicious persons in camps, was limited, but not completely abolished. On 20 February, the army was even sent to Kosovo; although Drnovšek did not vote for it, he was still sharply criticized in Slovenia. The situation seemingly calmed down for a while due to the presence of the army. Drnovšek also announced that he would plead for dialogue and patience. He

146 Janez Drnovšek, *Moja resnica: Jugoslavija 1989 – Slovenija 1991* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1996), 30–31.

strongly supported economic reforms and getting closer to European integration. Although he supported Slovenian politics, he sought to find a reasonable solution for the Yugoslav crisis and reach an agreement. He was in constant conflict with Jović, who first advocated the centralization of Yugoslavia and then covertly worked on the realization of the Greater Serbia plan. His (Drnovšek's) motto was that Yugoslavia was possible in Europe, or else it would not survive, which is what he told the media at the end of his tenure in May 1990. After initial suspicion, he was well-received by the media, especially the foreign media. With the exception of the Serbian media, he was supported by the majority of Yugoslavia media. On 15 May, at the end of his tenure, *Borba* wrote that the future would concede his point more than the current Yugoslav reality, while Zagreb's *Danas* wrote that he certainly met all requirements for Europe, but the question was whether they were met by the state that he had headed for a year.

On the other hand, Stipe Mesić was elected in the multiparty elections in Croatia and was a distinct representative of the Republic's separatist politics. After a two-month delay, Croatia recalled Stipe Šušvar and Mesić assumed the position of the President of the Presidency. He came from the position of Prime Minister and was nominated by the Croatian Assembly. In principle, as he himself wrote, he pleaded for the formation of an alliance of sovereign states which would jointly accede to the EU¹⁴⁷. Bogić Bogićević from Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the most difficult position. He was of Serbian descent, but "not by profession". He did not want to blindly follow the Serbian bloc, thus making it impossible to prevail.

After Tito's death, the SFRY Presidency was supposed to work according to the principle of collective decision making and responsibility, by harmonization of their views. Sessions were convened by the President and, in his absence, by the Vice-President. In September 1989, Vice-President Borisav Jović tried to use this provision in the procedure

147 For more details see: Stipe Mesić, *Kako je srušena Jugoslavija*. Zagreb: Mislavpress, 1994.

for the adoption of the Slovenian constitutional amendments when the President, Slovenian Janez Drnovšek (1989–1990), was absent. The Presidency could transfer a part of its security-related competencies to the Minister of Defence. In emergency cases, the Presidency could also work in an incomplete composition. The Presidency decided on the issues falling under its competencies by public ballot and a simple majority of its members. And by a two-thirds majority (this article was often not respected) when decisions had to be made concerning temporary measures, sources of funds for defence in emergency situations, a proposal for starting the procedure for changing the SFRY Constitution, postponement of the promulgation of laws or the implementation of the regulations of the Federal Executive Council, as well as the adoption of the Presidency's Rules of Procedure. The Presidents were replaced according to a rotating system. Since it was a question of automatic succession there was no need for an internal election.

After Tito's death there were no politicians with Yugoslav charisma in the Presidency (and other federal bodies). There were more and more representatives of the republics who advocated exclusively national stances. And the system was conceived in such a way that there were no "pure" federal functions, so that they could be assumed regardless of the will of the republics, that is, based on the so-called republican key. The last influential politicians at the federal level, who held various functions and were still Yugoslav-oriented, were Stipe Šušvar, Branko Mikulić, Raif Dizdarević (all were heavily burdened by ideology), Ante Marković and, in part, Federal Defence Secretary Veljko Kadijević, who began to collude with Milošević. In the second half of the 1980s, the Serbs and top JNA leadership tried to make Milošević Tito's successor, although he had no real potential for such a role. There even appeared poems dedicated to him such, for example: *People now wonder who will replace Tito. / It is now known who the other Tito is, Slobodan is a proud name.* According to Viktor Meier, a Swiss journalist and an astute analyst of the situation in Yugoslavia, when Milošević assumed power in the autumn of 1987, "he faced opposition from half of the Serbian Central Committee, the Belgrade

middle class, the liberal intellectual milieu in Belgrade, those Serbs whose families had been living for a long time in Vojvodina and at least half of the Montenegrins – quite apart from practically all non-Serbs in Yugoslavia”¹⁴⁸ However, it was a question of the so-called unprincipled alliances that were radically changed within two years as the result of Milošević’s double game (Greater Serbia / centralized Yugoslavia) as well as a successful crowd rally policy and the change of the Serbian Constitution. In May 1989, before the annual rotation of the President of the SFRY Presidency, “Milošević could now count on the votes of Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo in all federal bodies”¹⁴⁹. It should also be noted that already at that time Milošević’s silent coalition with the (pro-)Serbian or centralist-prone JNA top leadership was being created. However, the idea that Milošević could become a new Tito in those processes was quickly abandoned, while the balance of power was best seen in the SFRY Presidency which, due to the ratio of 4 to 4, finally let to its blockade.

The increasing disintegration of the federation was also reflected in the attitude towards Belgrade as the capital. The politicians from most republics (except Montenegro and partly Macedonia) considered their work in Belgrade as “temporary”; their families mostly did not move to Belgrade, so that they went home on weekends and holidays, and even extended the stay in their republics for one day due to “consultations”, meetings and participation in domestic political life. As early as the 1970s, Belgrade stopped being the real federal centre where the representatives of all Yugoslav peoples would live, socialize with each other and “do” politics at informal meetings, the place where a politician would simply have to be if he wanted to remain at the top. With the rise of nationalism in Serbia, Belgrade also lost its traditional hospitality and became the venue of nationalist meetings at which anti-Albanian and anti-Slovenian slogans were shouted

148 Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1996), 71.

149 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

as well as of physical clashes (see the chapter “The Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia”).

The Federal Assembly was organized in such a way that it was impossible to make any important political decision without consensus, which was a protective mechanism for the republics, but at the same time meant its blockade in the event of strained interethnic relations. It remained thus until the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was similar with respect to the Federal Constitutional Court and some other institutions, whose decisions could be blocked due to the vagueness of the Constitution and ambiguous legislation. For a long time, the Federal Government dealt only with economic issues and did not want to interfere in political relations among the republics more than necessary. At the same time, it left the Army in a privileged position as envisaged by Tito, despite its megalomaniac projects that undermined the budget. Only Ante Marković had wider Yugoslav political ambitions.

During the first half of the 1980s, the Presidency was faced with the Kosovo crisis and failure to resolve the Yugoslav economic crisis. Transcripts, minutes and newspaper reports show that these were the most frequent topics. During the second term, they also included Slovenia and crowd rally policy, while Yugoslavia was already completely destabilized. The Presidency, which had not carried much weight even before and had begun erode due to conflicts and insults, now had to play the role of “firefighter”¹⁵⁰ However, it could not defy the rallies or Milošević’s victorious campaign, or establish control over the Yugoslav People’s Army, which considered itself the supreme and untouchable guardian of Tito’s Yugoslavia.

This team counted on the adoption of a new constitution to overcome the Yugoslav crisis. Namely, the demands for the revision of the 1974 Constitution were increasingly stronger, so that the federal leadership gave in. It supported its decision with the argument that the economic system could not be changed without changing the constitution.

150 Raif Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: svjedočenja* (Sarajevo: OKO, 1999), 198.

On 12 November 1986, the SFRY Presidency adopted the draft proposal for changes, invoking the Long-Term Economic Stabilization Programme, the decisions of the 13th Congress of the LCY (including the demand to regulate the “unity and coexistence” issue in Serbia), and the “Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System”, as well as the conclusions of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People held on 23 May 1986 in which the demand for changing the Constitution was also expressed. (Namely, the Conference Presidency compiled all proposals concerning the Yugoslav system and presented them as a book, the “Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System”). The 27-point proposal lists the following areas where changes are required: the economy and social ownership; the political system (including the adjustment, harmonization and simplification of the electoral system); relations in the federation (a single Yugoslav market, single tax system and single technological development); uniform and efficient implementation of the federal laws and measures of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and the Federal Assembly; long-term and stable financing of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the implementation of the principle of adequate representation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces in the senior staff). According to the Presidency’s proposal, the Federation was supposed to regulate the following: the fundamentals of the state administration system, fundamentals of the national reserve system, fundamentals of the public information system, fundamentals of the Social Accountancy Service, fundamentals of organizing the technological systems (postal service, railways, electric power industry); JNA funds, environmental protection and engineering, nuclear power generation and use, and fundamentals of the educational system. As for the normative part of the Constitution, it would also be necessary to determine where the constitutional status of Serbia and of the Autonomous Provinces was not in compliance with the basic principles of the SFRY Constitution¹⁵¹. Two years later,

151 “Predlog da se pristupi promena ustava SFRJ”, Bg., 16. I. 1987, Arhiv predsednika RS.

after a great deal of dispute, only a few changes were adopted, primarily those in the economic sphere. Thus, the constitutional debate did not resolve the Yugoslav conflict, but only made it more complicated.

If we follow the agony of Yugoslavia during the last term of the Presidency, we will find out that the most common topics of its frequent night sessions and big mutual disputes, as well as its joint sessions with the Presidents of the Presidency of the Republics, were discussed in the following order: Kosovo, Slovenia, reopening of the constitutional question, multiparty elections that the Army wanted to prevent, conflicts in Croatia, (for more details see the chapter “The Yugoslav People’s Army”), referendum in Slovenia, disarmament of paramilitary units, attempts of the JNA and Serbian leadership to declare a state of emergency, failure to proclaim Mesić as President, war in Slovenia and negotiations with the European troika.¹⁵² The similar topics, that is, excerpts from the transcripts and behind-the-scene talks and events can be found in the memoirs of the former actors such as, for example, Jović, Mesić, Drnovšek and Dizdarević.

Among the debates on the above-mentioned topics and some others, the one dedicated to a new constitution, which would define the future of Yugoslavia, would be the most important in the long run, at least theoretically. After the adoption of the amendments to the Slovenian Constitution, in September 1989 – and the JNA and Serbian leaderships did not opt for the agreed intervention in Slovenia – the SFRY Presidency formed a special expert commission consisting of the representatives of all republics, which prepared the initiative for a new Yugoslav constitution in early October. The draft was finished in mid-December 1989 and the Presidency wanted to make alternative proposals relating to the controversial issues. Since Slovenia had made the greatest progress with respect to the constitutional concept and at the same time was in the centre of constitutional disputes, even earlier, in late October, the Vice-President of the Presidency, Borisav Jović,

152 Janez Zajc, “Seje predsedstva SFRJ: od maja 1989. do marca 1992” (Diplomska naloga, Univerza v Ljubljani, 2001); Nikolić, *Dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ*, 2011.

came to Ljubljana to talk about the constitutional changes (and other conflicts between Slovenia and the Federation, and between Slovenia and Serbia) with the entire Slovenian leadership. He termed the concept of an asymmetric federation, which Slovenia was offering for some time (in essence, the idea of confederation was already prevalent), as “novelty in our thinking”, but rejected it, because it was allegedly no longer possible to “patch up” the federation. He also rejected the Slovenian proposal to have the republics change their constitutions first and then agree on the federal constitution. According to him, this would mean “agreeing to the annulment of the SFRY Constitution and the liquidation of Yugoslavia.”¹⁵³

The preliminary draft of constitutional changes, prepared by the Presidency, was written in a complicated, ambiguous and vague manner. Truly, it envisaged that the new constitution would be adopted with the consent of the republics (as an alternative, it allowed the preservation of the current constitution); the socio-political system would still be based on socialist self-management democracy, which would allow “political pluralism on the socialist grounds”. A market economy would be introduced, while the relations in the federation would be in compliance with the “demands of a modern, efficient and democratic federation”. The federation should ensure territorial integrity, security, constitutional order, single market and potentials for the development of the underdeveloped.¹⁵⁴

After the proposal was analyzed by the Constitutional Commission of the Slovenian Presidency, the Slovenian authorities rejected the starting points proposed by the federal Presidency, since a great discrepancy between the starting points and the escalation of the crisis did not allow a sober discussion. They proposed that the SFRY Presidency set a deadline until which the Republics would formulate their starting points for discussion. As for the proposals for changing the

153 Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan: Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2002).

154 Prednacrt – Predlog da se pristupi promeni ustava SFRJ, donošenjem novog ustava, Predsedništva SFRJ, 17. II. 1989, preuzeto prema: Repe, *Jutri je nov dan*, 2002.

political and economic system, which could be unanimously adopted immediately, they should be in the form of amendments to the 1974 Constitution. Consequently, the economic reform prepared by the new Prime Minister Marković would not be linked to the constitutional changes, as was the case with the 1988 amendments.

The attempts to regulate relations in Yugoslavia by a new federal constitution and then hold federal elections, with no hope of success, lasted several more months, and the SFRY Presidency was forced to respect the stance that each republic should prepare its own proposal, which would then be discussed. In the second half of 1990 (after the multiparty elections and change of the government). Slovenia and Croatia began to prepare their proposal for a confederal agreement (Draft Agreement on the Yugoslav Confederation – Alliance of the Yugoslav Republics). In essence, it envisaged a customs and monetary union, common market, infrastructure harmonization, free movement of people and goods, and a joint military contingent in the event of danger. If Yugoslavia could not join the European Community as a whole, each republic would have the opportunity to join it separately. Naturally, what would happen to such a Yugoslav community if an individual approach to the EC would be possible, was just guesswork for the so-called “*if history*.” Given the situation at that time (the EC was still a political community in the making), such a scenario was not particularly likely. In formulating their proposals, the other republics proceeded from the reformed concept of a federation (the so-called modern federation that was formally advocated by both the JNA and Serbia), but with different approaches and nuances.

After the Slovenian referendum in December 1990, the question of the federal constitution became irrelevant, although Belgrade did not stop thinking about it. The question of the future organization of Yugoslavia had to be resolved in January and February 1991, during the negotiations of the SFRY Presidency with the Presidents (of the Presidency) of the Republics, which would also be attended by Prime Minister Ante Marković, the Defence Minister and some other government representatives. The meetings did not bring any solution, due to which only the

meetings of the Presidents (of the Presidency) of the Republics began in late March, which was the aim of Slovenia and Croatia. They proceeded from the concept of "AVNOJ" Yugoslavia according to which the fate of Yugoslavia had to be determined by its people, and not to be negotiated with the federal bodies. The meeting of the Presidents of the Republics began in Split on 27 March and was attended by Franjo Tuđman – Croatia, Slobodan Milošević – Serbia, Alija Izetbegović – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milan Kučan – Slovenia, Momir Bulatović – Montenegro and Kiro Gligorov – Macedonia. It was followed by the meetings in Belgrade on 4 April, Brdo near Kranj on 11 April, Ohrid on 18 April and Cetinje on 29 April. The last meeting was held in Stojčevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 6 June. It discussed "A Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community", prepared by Kiro Gligorov and Alija Izetbegović, representing a compromise between federation and confederation. All meetings, including the last one, were unsuccessful. The Izetbegović–Gligorov plan, also supported by the European Community, was the last attempt to resolve the unresolvable. . On 30 May, Belgrade was visited by Jacques Santer, President of the European Council, and Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, who met with the republican leaders with the aim to initiate the solution. The plan was presented to them earlier. In essence, the Izetbegović–Gligorov plan was a variation of an asymmetric federation, which Slovenia had unsuccessfully proposed in the autumn of 1989 (both Ante Marković and then Ejup Ganić, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also attributed the authorship of this plan to themselves). Yugoslavia would function according to the 2+2+2 principle. Serbia and Montenegro would be the centre of the federation or confederation, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina would be somehow half independent, while Slovenia and Croatia would be sovereign to the extent they deemed appropriate. Why was the plan was proposed just by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia? According to Vera Katz, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia proposed this plan because Bosnia and Herzegovina was the subject of a tacit division between Croatia and Serbia, while Macedonia would be directly threatened by

Greece in the event of the country's disintegration. In addition, both republics had a complex ethnic structure. Thus, they tried to avoid war by proposing this plan.¹⁵⁵ Even before the plan was discussed, it was sharply attacked by the Serbian press, because it was allegedly intentionally or accidentally aimed against Serbia, because it was first presented to foreigners and because it was a question of "political despair" due to the announced secession of Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁵⁶ The other Presidents (of the Presidency) of the Republics were also against it, but it was supported by a number of Western diplomatic actors. The model of an asymmetric federation ("Yugoslavia à la Carte") also appeared in Lord Carrington's plan for resolving the Yugoslav crisis on 18 October 1991.¹⁵⁷ The SFRY Presidency was supposed to be the central body for resolving the Yugoslav crisis. As the sad end of Yugoslavia revealed, it was far from being equal to the task regardless of its composition. This especially applies to the last two compositions of the SFRY Presidency (including other federal bodies). Their powerlessness became evident at sessions and in (non-)decision making during every major crisis. It was visually most evident at the anti-Slovenian rally held in front of the Federal Assembly in Belgrade, on 28 February 1989, where the raving Serbian masses, before the eyes of the Yugoslav and world public, booed the President of the Presidency, Raif Dizdarević, during his speech and drowned him out with their slogans and demand to have Milošević address them. In his speech, Milošević also indicated the direction of Serbia's politics and thus Yugoslavia's politics. He publicly promised the arrest of Kosovo leaders, whose names the masses shouted, which happened later on. He took the next step four months later at a celebration organized at Gazimestan, where he announced the possibility of war in his speech. The powerlessness of the Presidency only

155 Vera Katz, "Platforma o budućoj Jugoslavskoj zajednici (Plan Izetbegović–Gligorov), Pogled iz bosanskohercegovačke perspektive" (*Prilozi*, Sarajevo, 2013), 208–209.

156 *Politika*, 2. junij 1991.

157 Katz, *Platforma*, p. 223.

increased. In March 1991, when the imposition of a state of emergency was discussed at the request of the JNA leadership (between the first and second part of the session, Veljko Kadijević secretly visited Moscow), the second part of the session took place on 14 and 15 March in a JNA underground bunker in Dedinje where the Presidency was practically arrested (see more in the chapter “The Yugoslav People’s Army”). The Yugoslav system finally collapsed in the SFRY Presidency when its Croatian member Stipe Mesić was not elected President in May 1991. It was supposed to be a protocolary event to which the Presidents (of the Presidency) of the Republics were already invited. However, there was a blockade. Due to Serbia’s abolition of both of its autonomous provinces and uncertainty as to who should represent Kosovo, the SFRY Assembly did not confirm the candidates for the SFRY Presidency (the retired ensign and lottery seller Sejdo Bajramović from Kosovo, Branko Kostić from Montenegro and Jugoslav Kostić from Vojvodina) at its 10 May session. After the reactions of the public and Western politicians, at the next session (16 May), which was postponed several times, and in an atmosphere filled with manipulation and various pressures, the candidates were finally confirmed “in one package”, although this was contrary to the SFRY Constitution. Namely, by the constitutional changes Serbia abolished Kosovo’s autonomy, its Assembly (in fact, it continued to work illegally, while some of its members and other Albanian officials were granted asylum in Slovenia) and its Presidency. Thus, on behalf of Kosovo, the Serbian Assembly proposed Bajramović as member of the Federal Assembly (instead of Riza Sapundžiju). His candidacy was confirmed along with the other ones. The Constitutional Court had to determine subsequently whether his candidacy was disputable. In the meantime, he acted as a full member of the Presidency. The case of the Vojvodina representative was less controversial, at least formally, because the Vojvodina Assembly and Presidency still existed, but they were completely subordinated to the Serbian Assembly. Although the Croatian, Slovenian and Albanian delegations did not attend the confirmation of the candidates in the Federal Assembly, the results were declared valid. As the confirmation of the candidates took place only

one day after the session of the Presidency at which Stipe Mesić was to be elected (it was held on 15 May), the Serbian Assembly delegated its Vice-President Vukašin Jokanović as the representative of Kosovo, while Montenegro was represented at the session by the President of the Montenegrin Presidency, Momir Bulatović.

In the media, the day before the replacement of the President of the Presidency, Mesić advocated for changes in Yugoslavia and said that he would be the “last President of Yugoslavia”, which provoked sharp reactions from the Serbian media and was also criticized in the Western diplomatic circles. On 13 May, Milošević, Kadijević, Bulatović, Jugoslav Kostić, Jović and Vukašin Jokanović agreed not to elect Mesić. Thus, the Presidency was blocked – four Serbian votes against four others. In fact, Bulatović abstained from voting and his explanation was that the SFRY Assembly did not confirm the Montenegrin candidate, Branko Kostić, together with other candidates for the new members of the Presidency. However, it was only political cosmetics because, in essence, his abstention was a vote against. In that way, the SFRY Presidency de facto ceased to function. It only remained as a matter of form.

After the blockade of the Presidency, only the Serbian bloc continued to meet, while the other four members remained in their republics, trying to coordinate their activities. On 20 May, Mesić declared himself President of the Presidency, informing the Western countries of this, and working from Zagreb. Thus, in essence, the Presidency lost any symbolic and operative role, including the formal army command. This left the way open for the JNA leadership in Slovenia to intervene one month later, after Slovenia’s proclamation of independence, pursuant to decision of the Federal Government and not that of the Presidency.

On 28 and 29 June, during the JNA intervention in Slovenia, the so-called troika of the European Council visited Belgrade and Zagreb and arranged that, on 1 July, Stipe Mesić was elected President of the SFRY Presidency, which began to work only during the resumption of negotiations on the Brioni Islands on 7 July 1991. The first session of the Presidency, after the adoption of the so-called Brioni Declaration, was held on 12 July. The session, scheduled for 16 July, was not

held, because the Serbian bloc did not want to go to the Brioni Islands where it was convened by Mesić. Thus, it was held in Belgrade on 18 July (the decision on the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia was brought at this session). Together with the Presidents of the Republics, the SFRY Presidency met in Ohrid on 22 July (the reports on clashes in Croatia kept arriving between the sessions). It was only agreed to reach an agreement on the functioning of the federation during the transitional period as soon as possible, on the basis of the proposal prepared by the Federal Executive Council (the participants of the meeting were supposed to study the proposal until the next session). It was also agreed to start preparations for seeking the solution for the future relations. Mesić and Tuđman demanded that the army in Croatia withdraw to the barracks, which was accepted. In Belgrade, on 26 July, the Federal Presidency met alone again. On 30 July, it met in an extended format, including the Presidents of the Republics (except Tuđman, who did not want to come due to the conflict in Croatia). At the session it was supposed to accept or reject the proposal of the Federal Executive Council concerning the transitional functioning of the federation. Instead, the war in Croatia came into focus. Sessions of the SFRY Presidency were also held on 31 July and 2, 6 and 13 August; in the meantime, on 20 and 22 August, the “troika” of the European Council – Hans van den Broek, Jacques Poos and João de Deus Pinheiro, was on a failed mission (meanwhile, there was a failed coup in the Soviet Union which, in essence, heralded its collapse). The Presidency met again with the Presidents of the Republics, but the participants could not agree on the functioning of the state. At the next session, held on 28 August, the Presidency had to decide whether to accept the proposal for the Conference on Yugoslavia, which was put forward by the EC Ministerial Council the day before. The Serbian bloc opposed its acceptance because, allegedly, consultations in the republics were necessary. On 1 September, under pressure from EC, at the 140th session of the Presidency, the decision on the Conference was adopted (at that time, the EC Special Envoy for Yugoslavia, Dutch Ambassador to France Henry Wynaendts, and a three-member

EC diplomatic mission were in Belgrade). The SFRY Presidency, Federal Executive Council, all Presidents of the Republics and EC representatives signed the decision in Belgrade, on 2 September, at 1.20 a.m. Sessions were also held on 3 and 6 September 1991. At the latter session, Mesić's speech prepared for the Hague Conference was accepted. In his speech, he announced a political agreement on the future of Yugoslavia based on the following principles: respect for the right of all peoples to self-determination; respect for the democratically expressed will of the peoples and the Republics to determine their status in accordance with their own particular and real interests; the principle of equality of all options without imposing someone else's will and the use of force; the principle of legality on the basis of which the politically expressed will of the peoples would be legally shaped, and it would be also necessary to ensure a legal procedure for its realization.

The next session of the Presidency after the Hague Conference, on 7 September, was planned for 10 September, but Mesić was unable to convene it. It was supposed to be held on the Brioni Islands, which was again opposed by the Serbian bloc that was waiting in Belgrade. For revenge, the session of the "rump" Presidency (without Mesić and Drnovšek) was convened by Branko Kostić on 3 October. At this session it was decided that the Presidency should act in the situation of war danger, that is, in any format. This decision was later revoked by the Bosnian member, Bogić Bogićević, and the Macedonian member, Vasil Tupurkovski. In the West, this was considered a coup d'état although, in reality, Yugoslavia no longer existed. Several more sessions followed which, in addition to the Serbian bloc, were also attended by Bogićević and Tupurkovski. In the end, only the Serbian bloc met. During the continuation of the peace conference in The Hague, the EC forced the Presidency to convene the last joint session with all members (18 October 1991). Namely, Van den Broek still considered the Presidency the supreme commander of the JNA. As he signed the second peace agreement with Tuđman, Milošević and Kadijević on the eve of the session of the Presidency (the first

was signed by Lord Carrington in Igalo), he asked the Presidency to sign a decree by which the JNA should stop fighting immediately and unconditionally. Lord Carrington did not recognize the previous sessions of the incomplete Presidency. The Presidency signed the proposal by Lord Carrington and Van den Broek, including unconditional ceasefire, unblocking the barracks throughout Croatia and the evacuation of the barracks. The Montenegrin member of the Presidency, Branko Kostić, left the session and thereafter the Slovenian member, Janez Drnovšek, definitively left the Presidency. Some members of the Presidency came to the Hague Conference on 25 October (without Drnovšek and Bogićević), but were only observers. They also participated (without Drnovšek) in the Hague Conference on 5 November, which was also attended by the Presidents of the Republics and representatives of the Federal Government. The Conference was not successful. The Serbian bloc of the Presidency continued to meet in Belgrade, while Mesić, as the President, worked in Zagreb. He sent his last letters to the Chairman of the UN General Assembly and the world's statesmen on 22 October 1991, and then resigned from the Presidency at a session of the Croatian Assembly on 5 December. Pursuant to the decision of the Assembly, his function was terminated.

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Božo Repe

YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENTS: (IN)SURMOUNTABLE DIFFERENT INTERESTS

IN POST-WAR YUGOSLAVIA (Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) there were a total of 14 governments. At first, the government was led by Josip Broz Tito for four terms (March 7, 1945 – March 30, 1963). Tito became the president of the state with the constitutional law from 1953, but he also remained prime minister of a government which was, from that time, officially called the Federal Executive Council (FEC). These changes weakened its function – it was no longer a body truly representing a branch of government independent from the assembly and the president of the state, even less from the highest bodies of the League of Communists. The prime ministers, naturally, were all members of the League of Communists and, during the entire post-war period, there was only one woman among them.

Tito was succeeded by Petar Stambolić from Serbia (June 30, 1963 – May 19, 1967); followed by Mika Špiljak from Croatia (May 19, 1967 – May 18, 1969); Mitja Ribičič from Slovenia (May 18, 1969 – July 30, 1971); Džemal Bijedić from B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 30, 1971 – January 18, 1977, who served two terms, but did not finish the second due to a plane crash in which he died); Veselin Đuranović from Montenegro (March 15, 1977 – May 16, 1982, also for two terms); Milka Planinc from Croatia (May 16, 1982 – May 16, 1986); Branko Mikulić from B&H (16 May 1986 – 16 March 1989, as the first post-war president who did not complete his term) and Ante Marković from Croatia, who was the last prime minister before the break-up of Yugoslavia (16 March 1989 – 14 July 1992).¹⁵⁸ Marković actually resigned on December 20, 1991, and after that he no longer led the government.¹⁵⁹

158 Archive of Yugoslavia, Prime ministers, 2008.

159 Predrag Tasić, *Kako sam branio Antu Markovića* (Skopje: Mugri 21, 1993), 154.

After Yugoslavia abandoned the Soviet type of socialism and introduced self-government, a constant conflict between the two economic concepts began. The former was advocated by Serbia, which wanted a return to the strong role of the center (centralized planning system and distribution), and the latter by Slovenia and Croatia, which wanted more decentralization, along with a more modern economic system. The underdeveloped republics also favored a more centralized system, as it enabled administrative redistribution of funds from the developed to the underdeveloped. The economic reform of 1965, in the context of the political changes which took place during the sixties, gave priority to the “Slovenian orientation” that was to be carried out by a special working group led by Boris Kraigher (who died in a car accident two years later). The reform was also called “Kiro’s reform” (after Kiro Gligorov, the then Secretary of Finance in the federal government).¹⁶⁰ The reform looked very promising in the beginning but, later on failed, without fulfilling its main goal – a modern self-government economy. The reasons for this were many, primarily ideological and political, although the reform also had a very schematic basis, and was plagued by numerous inconsistencies.¹⁶¹ Although self-government socialism, with workers’ councils in enterprises, was to be based on the decisive role of workers, the real division of power in enterprises was much less democratic. “Political power played a decisive role; managers also had a significant influence due to business information, and workers, while formal bearers of self-management, were in reality powerless and in a subordinate position”.¹⁶² At the beginning of the seventies, a new method of social planning also came into force, the origin of which was the Law on Associated Labor,

160 Milka Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja* (Zagreb: Profil multimedija, 2011), 271.

161 Jože Prinčič and Neven Borak, *Iz reforme v reformo. Slovensko gospodarstvo 1970–1991* (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2006), 127–143.

162 Aleksander Lorenčič, *Od sanj o 'drugi Švici' v kapitalizem brez človeškega obraza. Pot gospodarske osamosvojitve in tranzicija slovenskega gospodarstva*, manuscript, 2021, 22.

passed by the Federal Assembly on November 25, 1976. The economy was transformed into the basic organizations of associated labor, organizations of associated labor and complex organizations of associated labor (BOAL, OAL, COAL), which were supposed to harmonize mutual interests and determine mutual rights and obligations. The intention of the system of “agreement-based economy”, as it was called, was for companies to make agreements between themselves, instead of competing, which was contrary to the goals of economic reform, that is, the introduction of a market economy with social ownership. On the foreign market, but also in general, companies became increasingly uncompetitive, and prices rose, as prices of final products were pre-calculated, rather than formed by competition and the market. The new economic system introduced a different perspective for companies, spending, at the same time, a lot of energy on various reorganizations, while the essence remained the same. BOALs remained small businesses, organized as before. Even in 1986, they were still the foundation of the agreement-based economy. Due to the new organization, company employees spent approximately half of their working hours in meetings. From the very introduction of the new system, in the mid-seventies, effective working hours were halved to five hours per day. The agreement-based economy lasted until the collapse of the state. The economic system, established by the 1974 constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, thus made the Yugoslav economy worse, instead of better.

Governments began to gain greater independence in the Yugoslav economic system only after Tito’s authority ceased to exist, and disputes between the republics began. They were partly a consequence of objective frictions between the federal authorities and demands made by republics, which is characteristic of all supranational creations, including the current European Union (EU). However, this is a key issue, which ensures the survival of such associations, that is, the balance of universal civil rights (in this case, Yugoslav), national rights (i.e., the rights of republics and provinces) and obligations, especially of governments, to ensure effective governance for the benefit of all.

Although Tito's death was a political turning point for the Federal Executive Council as well, interethnic disputes began to surface much earlier, and in them – especially in the economic sphere – the federal government became the center of confrontations between the republics. This was a consequence of the rapidly changing relations between the republics and the federation, which began in the late sixties and early seventies, with constitutional amendments, only to end with the 1974 constitution. The strengthened power of the republics, along with the rise of “party liberalism” in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, started to generate permanent conflict between the federal government and the republics. Government decisions directly affected both people's lives and the economic position of the republics, which is why the government became a target of criticism, both by the republican politics (politicians) and the media. This was, amongst other things, demonstrated by the fact that the formerly abstract faces in caricatures began to take on the outlines of actual officials.

The first to feel this change, in the seventies, when Tito still had the authority to halt political processes, as well as the power to remove politicians and entire leaderships, was Mitja Ribičič, the only Slovene to head the federal government. As the first post-war prime minister of the federal government, he was a target of massive criticism by domestic (Slovenian) media and politics, and was forced to make decisions caught in the crosshairs of both national interests and his function at the federal level, which he was obliged to perform to the benefit of the entire federation. This was something all his successors subsequently faced, especially during the eighties, after Tito's death, and which culminated with Ante Marković.

Ribičič, who was also scrutinized in the parliament of independent Slovenia (under allegations of being linked to post-war shootings and torture of political prisoners, although the charges were eventually dropped), was considered an unconventional and liberal-minded politician during the seventies and early eighties. Later, he became a popular author of epigrams. One of his most famous epigrams, after the independence of Slovenia was: “*Dva obraza, ena rit, je slovenski*

konvertit” (“Two cheeks, one ass – a Slovenian convert”). He was also known for his attitude that opposing ideas should be fought with arguments, expressed by the motto “fight a book with a book”, which he phrased in opposition to the prosecution of Alija Izetbegović (who was given a long prison sentence in 1983 for his book *Islam between East and West*, on the grounds of the so-called “verbal offense”). At party meetings, Ribičič also defended the then most popular Yugoslav comedian, Miodrag Petrović Čkalja, when the party wanted to prosecute him for imitating Ribičič, by making fun of him. Čkalja, for example, phoned Ribičič in his office and asked him if he knew how much the price of potatoes and tomatoes has risen, and then, imitating Ribičič’s voice, made a show out of it. Speaking about himself, Ribičič said that he was “a man of short statements and long retractions”, because he constantly had to explain what he meant by his statements. He once said of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) that it was “an elephant that devours a lot and poops a little”. Because of this statement, the YPA leadership accused him of being against investments and modernization of the army, which forced him to write a 15-page article in the leading military magazine *Narodna armija*, in which he explained that he was specifically in favor of modernization, and that it seemed abnormal to him that officers could not travel abroad and lead a normal life.

Ribičič allegedly took over the government because the liberal-minded Slovenian prime minister Stane Kavčič did not want to go to Belgrade (his condition was that the most powerful people from the republics join the government, auth. rem.). Ribičič made a number of changes in the work of the government. Despite resistance from within, the FEC partially opened up to the media. The journalists did not directly attend the sessions, but followed their course in an adjacent room, and the agreement, which the journalists honored, was not to publish things related to the army and foreign policy, that is, write about issues considered to be state secrets. Ribičič was convinced that without the support of the media he would not be able to make much progress while performing his function.¹⁶³

163 Interview with Mitja Ribičič by Ciril Ribičič, January 5, 2006, kept by the author.

Immediately after taking over the function, he was struck by the so-called “road affair”, which raised the question whether he would survive in the government, even before he took over properly. Namely, the government decided not to grant Slovenia a second loan for two sections of highway (Hoče-Levec and Postojna-Razdrto), because it had just received the first, and the second should have followed in the next package, after the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was awarding the loans, reviewed the situation on the ground. However, the government granted loans for roads that were not included in the previous financial packages, primarily due to poorly prepared projects (Belgrade-Novı Sad, Sarajevo-Zenica, Peć-Priština), or because the republics did not have funds for their own participation. Namely, the loans required 60% self-financing by the republics themselves. Most of the decisions concerning highways were made under the previous government, but the last one was made under Ribičič, who had been leading the government for only two months. The government discussed this issue just before the summer holidays, and the Slovenian representative apologized in advance for not attending. The decision led to mass protests in Slovenia, both political and those organized by municipalities and ordinary people. The television showed endless lines of people rolling, in the summer heat, from border crossings to the interior of the country, and published angry comments from drivers, as well as statements “that the Sava River flows downwards towards Belgrade” (meaning that Slovenia was being exploited). The journalists were given the task “of visiting the winding serpentines, that is, the most demanding part of the road towards Primorska, and recording the biggest traffic jams they could find”, which was not difficult in the middle of summer. News reporters received similar suggestions, and magazines were full of similar reviews. Meetings of socio-political organizations and bodies took place throughout Slovenia, from which telegrams were sent to the Slovenian and Federal Executive Council, the Assembly, and other republic bodies, with questions, protests, and expressions of indignation and dissatisfaction with the FEC decision. In those

days, despite the holidays, 25 Slovenian municipal assemblies (later even more) met, and, alone or together with municipal socio-political organizations, discussed the decision of the FEC and forwarded their opinion to the above-mentioned bodies. At the beginning, the Croatian government, at least indirectly, supported the Slovenian government and demanded that the federal government reconsider its decision. Tito perceived these events as unacceptable nationalism. At the Sixteenth session of the Executive Bureau of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY), convened urgently on August 7, 1969, at Brioni, the “road affair” was strongly condemned. The Slovenian leadership split, and the Slovenian prime minister Stane Kavčič was left to stand alone, as the main culprit, although he kept the position of prime minister.¹⁶⁴

In Ribičič's opinion, the road affair was unnecessary, because the federal investment policy had not changed in any important aspect. The issue appeared, at first glance, to be a fight against centralism but, according to his statement it was, in essence, the first Yugoslav attempt to alter the decision of an official body by means of the policy of rallies; that is, it is exactly what Milošević later used. The only difference is that he actually succeeded. Not a single republic supported Stane Kavčič, albeit for different reasons. At the Politburo session, the policy of the federal government won. At the session of the Executive Bureau, Ribičič offered his resignation, and proposed to change the decision regarding the loan, if the others deemed it necessary, but neither was accepted (Kavčič also offered his resignation, but it was not accepted either). If the federal authorities had given in at that moment, it would have represented an uncontrolled intrusion of the republics' ambitious policies into the federal policy, because each republic wanted something: Croatia, extra-budgetary financing of tourism; B&H, investments related to the army; Montenegro,

164 Božo Repe, *Jutri je nov dan: Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2002); Božo Repe and Jože Prinčič, *Pred časom: portret Staneta Kavčiča* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2009); “The Power and Powerlessness of Slovenian Liberalism” (documentary), January 9, 2016, <https://www.rtvsl.si/4d/arhiv/174381495?s=tv>.

funds related to the Belgrade-Bar railway; and in Serbia, problems with Kosovo began to worsen, and so on. "I had to take responsibility for things in Yugoslavia that I had no influence on." However, Džemal Bijedić, while taking over the office from Ribičić, who spoke to him at length about the problems, concerns and plans of the government that were in store for him, explained to Ribičić succinctly how the system worked: "Tie up the donkey where his owner tells you to".¹⁶⁵

In the early seventies, with the defeat of "liberalism" and the tacit abandonment of the economic reform, an autarchic development model was affirmed at the federal level, which required forced (political) concentration of funds and foreign loans in order to survive. This period was characterized by developmental immobility and the tendency to favor heavy industry. This happened at the same time a new wave of widening disparity between the developed and the underdeveloped was taking place in the world, due to the so-called oil shocks, and Yugoslavia, like many other developing countries, acquired a large foreign debt. Debt distribution was intended to reduce disparities between republics and provinces, which advocated different development models and thus relaxed political aspirations.

The 1974 constitution led to the constitutional (re)distribution of economic functions of the federation (fiscal decentralization, formulation of a common policy through the Council of Republics and Provinces in the Federal Assembly, direct negotiations between federal units). The process of "federating the Federation", as they called it, began with the 1963 constitution, when social activities, culture, science, education, health, republic budgets ("spending") fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of federal units, continued with the 1965 reform, and was completed by the 1974 constitution.

Different economic interests were reconciled within a complicated institutional system, characterized by lengthy procedures, which led to numerous conflicts. The state sought to control economic life through a network of self-government agreements, social

165 Interview with Ribičić. January 5, 2006, (kept by the author).5. januar 2006.

arrangements, and classic state interventionism. Since the manner in which negotiations were led was faulty, or did not function at all, governments became entangled in an increasing amount of administrative work. Both the market and market criteria were always treated as secondary, as a complementary lever of economic activity. The economy during the eighties was characterized by hopeless administration, which is why planes flying from the capitals of the republics to Belgrade were always full of businessmen who traveled there to acquire various permits.

The only true, that is, the strongest element linking the republics was trade, much less the companies, because the largest number of them operated on the territory of the republics and provinces where they were founded. The number of companies established by entities from one republic in other republics was insignificant. The same goes for the banking system. Only two banks, Jugobanka and Ljubljanska banka, had branches throughout Yugoslavia. The fiscal system was decentralized, and the federation was partially financed by contributions from republics and provinces. The only federal fund was intended for loans for the less developed. However, in practice, within the federal budget and the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped, an extensive system of special accounts emerged, used for extra-budgetary financing at the level of the federation. The total amount of funds within this system exceeded even the federal budget. It enabled a redistribution policy, for which there was no place in the federal budget based on the Constitution and the laws. Among the most fiscally burdened republics were Slovenia and the so-called Central Serbia proper, and the net recipients of funds were Montenegro and Kosovo.

In addition to the federation's budget and the special accounts of the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped, another important source of redistribution existed – the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY). It performed a number of fiscal tasks beyond its competencies, that is, exceeding its competencies. It financed priority branches of economy and implemented selective lending, provided

for in the federal plan and federal economic policy. The Yugoslav economic community needed large arbitrary transfers of funds for its functioning, which were realized through the NBY, the federal budget, extra-budgetary funds and the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped. Labor mobility (internal flow) was one-directional, from the less developed to the more developed, and was greater than capital mobility.¹⁶⁶

Apart from a failed economic system, the key reasons for Yugoslavia's economic difficulties were large, insurmountable differences in the level of development, for which every republic saw a solution in its own way. Slovenia and the more developed part of Yugoslavia could not take on the role of the "locomotive", which would have pulled the Yugoslav economy out of the crisis (following the example of the Italian north), because economic policy in Belgrade was guided by the majority, the less developed or underdeveloped "south". Underdeveloped parts believed that the key problem lay in the "conflict of interest between those who possess raw materials and those who produce finished products". When, during the mid-eighties Diana Plestina patiently interviewed more than 80 influential economists, sociologists, political scientists and politicians from all republics, including those most responsible for regional development, everyone's response was roughly the same: "Each republic is responsible for its own development and, understandably, it sees things differently (...) Economic interest overlaps with the political interest of each republic (...) What may be good for Slovenia is not good for Montenegro (...)"¹⁶⁷ This became evident already during the government of Veselin Đuranović, who was considered a tolerant but hesitant politician. Đuranović constantly tried to find compromises, and his biggest problem was that there were no clear instructions from the Presiden-

166 Neven Borak, *Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 2002).

167 Dijana Maria Plestina, *Politics and inequality: a study of regional disparities in Yugoslavia*, doctoral dissertation (Berkeley: University of California, 1987).

cy of the CC LCY and the Presidency of the SFRY. He, too, offered his resignation, but Tito intervened and prevented it. As Tito's authority ceased to exist, and Yugoslavia found itself in an economic crisis, this became increasingly recognizable in the actions of the government. Đuranović's specific problem was that, as a politician from a small republic that belonged to the underdeveloped, he lacked the knowledge necessary for coping with constant conflicts in the government between the representatives of the developed and the underdeveloped. Consequently, foreign loans were, politically, the least problematic option.

It was difficult to bridge different interests: for the less developed republics, the solution was to be found in solidarity, state redistribution of funds through the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped and other funds, emergency non-refundable assistance in crisis situations, writing off debts and taxes, supporting the so-called social upgrading (education, social services, administrations) with funds of the federal budget and individual republics, as well as in administrative pricing. For Slovenia and Croatia, the solution was respecting market laws, including free pricing and the right to invest in accordance with economic rather than political criteria. This is, of course, a schematic representation, because within the two most developed republics, economic entities existed that could not withstand market competition, while within the economically less developed part of the country, propulsive companies and industries existed. These requirements were respected to a degree during the eighties – the republics used a percentage of the funds they were obliged to contribute to the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped, in the form of direct investments. But the realization was minimal, because the environment for investments in underdeveloped parts was not favorable. At the same time, on the basis of political agreements made in Belgrade, requests arrived from underdeveloped areas for the construction of specific infrastructure facilities (schools, health and cultural centers) that would be financed by the developed republics.

All governments which were in power during the eighties, including the last one led by Prime Minister Ante Marković, attempted to mitigate the differences, but, at the same time, gave in to political pressures exerted by the underdeveloped, as well as social pressures coming from all over the country.

In the second half of the eighties, the so-called Central Serbia (Serbia without the autonomous provinces) emerged as a factor between the developed and the underdeveloped. Throughout the post-war period, it had been developing at the level of the Yugoslav average. At the end of the seventies, that level began to decrease, which was for the first time clearly pointed out by the then president of the Executive Council of Serbia, in a report at the joint session of the Federal Social Councils in July, in Brdo castle near Kranj.¹⁶⁸ During the mid-eighties, academician Kosta Mihailović developed the nationalist thesis that Croatia and Slovenia were exploiting Serbia. The same thesis also appeared in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Serbs were also convinced that they were victims of the policy towards the underdeveloped, because, allegedly, they had to bear a large part of the burden of supporting Kosovo and, at the same time, help other underdeveloped republics. Officially, such an assessment was accepted in the Yugoslav social plan for the period 1986–1990, which enabled the federal government to adopt measures that would improve the position of Serbia. Thus, for example, the number of short-term loans to Serbian banks and companies from the NBY primary issue, converted into long-term loans, was increased significantly; customs duties and other import duties were reduced as underdeveloped Serbian municipalities were made equal with Kosovo and other less developed regions; rights were expanded for covering negative exchange rate differences and foreign commodity loans for the production of some products in Serbia (fertilizers, copper, ferrous metallurgy); municipalities affected by the earthquake on Kopaonik received special long-term benefits; some pro-

168 Ivan Stambolić, *Rasprave o Srbiji 1979–1987* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988).

jects (for example, the ill-fated *Jugo-Amerika* project) were exempt from numerous obligations; the federal budget co-financed Serbian reserves and special-purpose production (military industry); the contribution by the National Bank of Serbia to the National Bank of Yugoslavia was reduced, etc. Of all these projects, the most famous (and in its own way, also entertaining) was the unfortunate *Jugo-Amerika* project *Jugo-Amerika*. It was a project of the factory “Crvena Zastava” (Red Flag) from Kragujevac, to place “Yugo” cars on the American market. It was supposed to be the cheapest car that could be bought in the USA, and therefore a hit, because it would be bought to serve as the second or third car in the household. The project failed completely, and it became the subject of numerous witty stories and humorous comments, with the car also becoming famous in movies. It “performed” in at least ten movies and TV series. The most famous are *Die Hard 3* with Bruce Willis in the lead role, *Dragnet* with Tom Hanks (described, in the movie, as a “gift from a socialist state to America”) and *Drowning Mona*, in which the car is even responsible for the death of the hated main character, because its brakes failed, landing it in the Hudson River.

In economic studies, opinions on whether Serbia really began lagging behind the Yugoslav average differed. One of the leading Serbian economic theorists at the time, Ljubomir Madžar, believed that Serbia did not deviate from the average, nor did it have a reason to believe that underdeveloped republics were taking advantage of it. At the same time, Madžar cited mechanisms (“funds”) that had benefited the developed republics, such as the Export Credit Fund, the Price Control Fund, and the Customs High Protection Fund.¹⁶⁹ The fact is, however, that the Serbian leadership, with such an interpretation, managed to obtain a special status (for Serbia) as well as a lot of additional funds, while at the same time, reducing its obligations towards the underdeveloped, which it allegedly could not bear. The

169 Ljubomir Madžar, “Ko koga eksploatiše”, in *Srpska strana rata. Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju*, ed. Nebojša Popov (Beograd, 1996).

bonuses it received between the years 1986–1989 amounted, in total, to between 2 and 2.5 billion dollars, that is, on average slightly less than 1.3 percent of the Yugoslav gross national product, or 5.6 percent of the Serbian GNP. However, the share dropped to 0.13 percent in 1989, while in this period, it fluctuated between 1.5 and 2 percent of the Yugoslav GNP. This tilted even more the already overburdened economic boat to the side of the supported parts of Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁰

The “agreement-based economy” entered into a crisis as early as the late seventies, when annual inflation exceeded 20 percent, but the Yugoslav government covered it up by taking foreign loans all the way until Tito’s death. At that time, the Yugoslav government was led by the Montenegrin Veselin Đuranović, and during his mandate, Yugoslavia borrowed the most: according to an approximate estimate, eight billion of the then dollar value. In 1981–1982, for the first time, the country was not able to repay the debt due in the amount of 5.5 billion dollars, and at the end of the eighties, it owed close to 20 billion dollars. While borrowing started even before Đuranović, namely, in the period 1972–1981 Yugoslavia’s debt increased by more than 17 billion dollars, it is true that the biggest rise in borrowing occurred in the period 1977–1982 (in 1975, 6.5 billion, at the end of 1979, already 15 billion, with the state paying a billion dollars a year only for interest). The reasons for such a pace of borrowing could be found in the significant deterioration in the current part of the balance of payments. The trade deficit increased from \$1.7 billion in 1973 to as much as \$7.9 billion in 1979. In addition, borrowing was influenced by the high investment goals of the five-year social plan for the period 1976–1980 which, in 1979, were already covered entirely with loans by more than half. Final consumption was 7% higher than the annual GDP. At that time, there were many expensive “political” investments, for example, the aluminum factory in Obrovac, the DINA petrochemical plant, or the ironworks in Smederevo. The problem, thus, lay not so much in borrowing itself, but, instead, in

170 Neven Borak, *Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 2002), 171–200.

insufficient economic growth, with an even more unfavorable outlook, as well as in uncontrolled finances (according to the World Bank, at this time, among the 20 most indebted countries in the world, 16 are from Europe, 10 of them even the most indebted, but they are mostly highly propulsive economies, and in recent years the “Yugoslav direction” has been mainly followed by Greece).

The covert economic crisis exploded abruptly immediately following Tito's death. For two years in a row, inflation in Yugoslavia rose to 40 percent, while the trade deficit with the West reached \$1.4 billion. The loans, which Yugoslavia received without major problems due to Tito's international political role, contributed to the country's political stability during the final period of his rule. However, the Yugoslav crisis was not only a consequence of borrowing and the system itself, but also – as Carl Gustaf Ströhm, a journalist extremely critical towards Yugoslavia and Tito, wrote in 1982 – an incompetent team that ruled in Belgrade.¹⁷¹ He held Tito responsible for the fact that the path, which led into great borrowing, started under his leadership. When asked if Yugoslavia could survive without Tito, Ströhm tried to answer, back in 1976, in his book *Ohne Tito: Kann Jugoslawien überleben*.¹⁷² The foreign press was considerate of Yugoslavia in the first period after Tito's death, and saw the problem primarily in the autarchic economy and the fragile authority of the federal government. Indeed, Yugoslavia was completely unprepared for the crisis, and tried to cope with the situation by using bureaucratic measures, which were very difficult to comprehend. “The FEC made a decision to change the decision on temporary extension of the validity of the decision on achieving the goals and tasks of the common issuance and monetary policy and common bases of credit policy for 1980”. This was a vivid example

171 Carl Gustaf Ströhm, “Razpad titoizma se spreminja v krizo političnega Sistema”, *Die Welt*, November 18, cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XIII, no. 204, November 23, 1982.

172 Carl Gustaf Ströhm, *Ohne Tito: Kann Jugoslawien überleben* (Graz, Wien, Köln: Verlag Styria, 1976).

of governance, presented by the Ljubljana *Dnevnik*.¹⁷³ In reality, the government was trapped in a system in which the annual budget was “determined to the last decimal” by the Council of Republics and provinces, and the FEC had to coordinate its plans with “nine partners”, as Zvone Dragan stated for *Politika* on March 22, 1982, on the occasion of adoption of the harmonized mid-term plan.¹⁷⁴ An additional problem for the government was the fact that, based on the decisions of the presidencies of the CC LCY and of the SFRY, it had to be operatively engaged in the introduction of the state of emergency in Kosovo. Sending the army and police to the province was much easier than resolving the social and economic situation, which was, incidentally, one of the main reasons for the demonstrations, although that aspect remained largely overshadowed by accusations of nationalism, desire for secession and “counter-revolution”.

Due to the inability to repay its debts, Yugoslavia began negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors in the fall of 1982, since the alternative was declaring bankruptcy. There was, indeed, a glimmer of hope within the Yugoslav political leadership that the friendly countries would write off the debts, in whole or in part, but Tito, who could achieve such a feat, was no more. The once generous United States, which had the greatest influence on the IMF, initially became the most ruthless creditor, but then decided it would be better to throw Yugoslavia a lifeline, but under strictly defined conditions. The IMF approved a loan of two billion dollars in 1981, and loans were also given by Austria, Kuwait, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. All of this, however, was not enough even to repay the interest. In addition to negotiations with the IMF, negotiations were underway with 563 commercial banks Yugoslavia was indebted to. Then the United States, together with 15 Western

173 ZIS se ni ravno izkazal, *Dnevnik*, March 10, 1981, cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XII, no. 48, March 11, 1981.

174 “Dragan: za kaj je odgovoren ZIS”. *Politika*, March 22, 1982, cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XIII, no 54, March 23, 1982.

countries, organized a bail-out program, which included close to 500 commercial banks. The banks agreed to join the bail-out mostly under pressure from the IMF and other political factors. The first agreement on deferring loans and taking new ones was concluded in the summer of 1983. In 1983, Yugoslavia received more than \$ 3.5 billion in loans, approved by 15 Western countries.¹⁷⁵

Visible indicators of the crisis in the early eighties were the 30 percent devaluation of the dinar (in June 1980), followed in the coming years by a rising inflation, shortages of oil, and even some basic living necessities. Đuranović's government had already been forced to adopt a series of measures that were met with resistance from the population in the republics, in Slovenia and Croatia mainly the measure to centralize foreign currency (exporters had to transfer 76 percent of their earnings to the NBY). When the Croatian Milka Planinc took over the government (May 16, 1982 – May 15, 1986), Yugoslavia could no longer repay its debts (the trend was visible as early as 1980, when the Yugoslav state debt rate exceeded 40 percent of its foreign exchange inflow and continued to grow with frightening speed). The arrival of Milka Planinc, who was the first woman to head a socialist government, had a favorable reception by the domestic public, as well as by the domestic and foreign press. Foreign observers saw several strong figures in the government (experienced Lazar Mojsos as foreign minister, Admiral Branko Mamula as defense minister, and Stane Dolanc as interior minister – Dolanc was, in particular, expected to resolve the Kosovo crisis). Milka Planinc was supposed to strengthen the power of the federal government in the “Balkan cocktail” (*Messaggero Veneto*). She was expected to play a more important role than the League of Communists (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*), even though the beginning of her term was overshadowed by the 12th Congress of the LCY. The Spanish *El Pais*, which dedicated a full-page commentary to Milka Planinc, even wrote that she was more determined than the

175 “Dve vprašanji Milki Planinc in Zvonetu Draganu”, *Duga*, June 18, 1983, cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XIV, no. 118, June 22, 1983.

British “iron lady”, and that she promised Yugoslavs “sweat and tears”, like Churchill.¹⁷⁶ The Yugoslav press was less considerate, seeing its government as sacrificed in advance, the newest usual suspect and a “team of written-offs”.

After being in charge for only a year and a half, Milka Planinc told the Italian *La Stampa* that her goal was not only to solve the Yugoslav crisis, but also to preserve Tito’s system.¹⁷⁷

When it came to the relations between the leading political bodies in the federation, strategic solutions for overcoming the crisis were to be sought in the state and party presidencies, followed by confirmation in the Assembly, while only “operational” measures would be left to the government. In addition, there were “duty mandates”, which prevented efficient work: “During the four years of the mandate of the Federal Executive Council and me as its president, four presidents of the SFRY Presidency came and went: Petar Stambolić, Mika Špiljak, Veselin Đuranović, Radovan Vlajković; four presidents of the Assembly: Raif Dizdarević, Vojo Srzentić, Dušan Alimpić, Ilijaz Kurteshi; four presidents of parliamentary committees (with whom FEC had the necessary and sometimes very significant cooperation in drafting important laws or documents)... Four presidents of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY also came and went: Mitja Ribičič, Lazar Mojsov, Draža Marković and Ali Shukriu. At the end of my term (May 1986), Vidoje Žarković was the president of the Presidency of the CC LCY, which made him also a member of the Presidency of the SFRY. He was the most engaged and persistent member of the Presidency in evaluating the work of the FEC, and especially when it came to issues that were crucial for further development, although we had a completely different approach to some of these issues”.¹⁷⁸

176 “Milka Planinc bolj odločna kot ‘železna lady’”, *El País*, June 10, 1982, cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XIII, no. III, June 10, 1982.

177 “Govori jugoslovska Thatcherjeva”, *La Stampa*, October 6, 1983; cited from *Republiški informativni bilten*, XIV, no. 191, November 8, 1983.

178 Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja*, 280.

Politicians talked about the “stabilization” of the economy, “accumulated economic problems”, and the like. The word crisis was not used in political speech until the mid-eighties, and only a number of Slovenian, Croatian and even Serbian economists began to describe the situation as a crisis, while advocating the introduction of a market economy. In the words of Branko Horvat, in the mid-eighties, it became clear that the political system became a major obstacle to both economic and social development.¹⁷⁹ Needless to say, he was not the only one who realized this, and the main consequence of increased criticism was the opinion that the federal constitution had to be changed, while, once again, each republic had its own ideas and plans, in which the economy did not play the most important role. This realization came as a result of the failure of the so-called Kraigher Commission (a group of about 300 politicians and economists, led by Slovenian politician Sergej Kraigher, a member of the Presidency of the SFRY and President of the Presidency in 1981/1982). The commission was supposed to find a way out of the crisis. Its analysis was based on the existing legal assumptions: the Constitution of the SFRY from 1974, the Law on Associated Labor from 1976, and Resolutions of the 10th and 11th Congress of the LCY – from 1978 and 1982. The conclusions and proposals of the commission were summarized in the so-called Long-term Economic Stabilization Program.¹⁸⁰

Administrative measures for tightening the belt thus became the characteristic of the government of Milka Planinc, and it is what the generations of that time mostly remember her by. At the level of everyday life, the government rationed some foodstuffs and introduced vouchers (oil, sugar, flour, washing powder). As the import of oil was enough for oil and gas consumption only some 290 days a year, the

179 Branko Horvat, *Yugoslavsko društvo u krizi: kritički ogledi i prijedlozi reformi* (Zagreb: Globus, 1985).

180 Milan Andrić and Tomislav Jovanović, eds., *Interventni zakoni, društveni dogovori, rezolucije i mere za sprovođenje ekonomske stabilizacije: (savezni, republički i pokrajinski – sa napomenama, sudskom praksom, zvaničnim objašnjenjima i stručnim uputstvima za praktičnu primenu)* (Beograd: Svetozar Marković, 1983).

government of Đuranović, in the last year of its mandate, limited car driving according to the numbers on the license plates, based on the “even-odd” system. This was wrongly attributed to the government of Milka Planinc, which introduced vouchers (40 liters per month, for every car owner). Restrictions were also imposed on imports, especially “luxury” goods, which included magazines, journals and tropical fruit. A deposit was introduced for each exit from the country, which increased with the number of trips, because those who could afford it went shopping in Austria and Italy. Numerous small shops for Yugoslav customers began to open in the border villages and towns on the other side of the state border.

Supply and transportation were only part of the daily concerns of the citizens. The dimensions of the crisis can be seen from the data presented by Deputy Prime Minister Zvone Dragan at a closed meeting of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations and the Committee on Credit and Monetary Relations in the Yugoslav parliament. Dragan led the negotiations with the IMF (they were previously discussed at both presidencies). He was the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Government from July 1979 to May 1984, replacing Andrej Marinac in that position, and he was the only member of Đuranović’s government who remained in the same position during the time of Milka Planinc. He survived half a term. The IMF demands for continuing to grant loans to Yugoslavia in 1983 were as follows: a 30 percent increase in interest rates, a restriction on bank placements, a 12.5 percent devaluation of the dinar, with an additional 1.5 percent each month, as well as an increase in prices; an increase in energy prices by 40 percent, transport by 50 percent, rent by 95 percent, as well as blocking a certain percentage of public spending. At a turbulent session on July 2 and 3, 1983, Milka Planinc revealed the catastrophic situation to the Council of the Republic and the Provinces, and threatened to resign if the IMF plan was not accepted. At that time, each of the 20 million Yugoslavs “owed” 850 dollars in foreign debt. In opposition to the hard reality, stood emotions: the dictate of foreign capital, the sale of Tito’s legacy and independence, and the like. The loudest voices came from the republics that were saved

by the socialization of debts. Namely, the state took over the guarantee for the debts, regardless of who made them, and thus shifted the burden to the developed republics. The Assembly, which was not capable of adopting any essential law, and which left the most delicate decisions to the government, eventually relented, but the conflict left deep consequences. The President of the Assembly, Raif Dizdarević, accused Dragan of taking the position that the only way out was to accept what the IMF was requesting, which was to be backed by a part of the Slovenian economy, and he asserted that the IMF received the most confidential information through secret channels, i.e., that it was aware of the Yugoslav position in advance.¹⁸¹ Dragan took this as an accusation that he was betraying Yugoslavia.¹⁸² In his book, Dragan also states that neither Dizdarević, nor any of the others who followed his line of reasoning, really delved into the causes of the crisis of Yugoslav liquidity.¹⁸³

Milka Planinc was under much worse internal attack from both the media and politics. In fact, she was under the impact of “party state”. Although she did not feel the direct pressure of party bodies in her daily work, their negative attitude was obvious: “From time to time, they hold a session that shows that they observe and criticize the FEC on what is negative. Nothing could be been done without being negative”.¹⁸⁴ When calling her to account, the Presidency of the CC LCY referred to her as a member of the CC LCY. Due to the issue of competencies and the negative attitude of both presidencies towards the government, Milka Planinc offered her resignation to the Presidency of the SFRY on two occasions: on April 11, 1985, and a few months later, on November 20 and 21, 1985. Her resignation offer was a reaction to the decision of the Presidency of the CC LCY to convene

181 Raif Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: svjedočenja*. (Sarajevo: OKO, 1999), 103–108.

182 Conversation between Božo Repe and Zvone Dragan, May 15, 2021, kept by the author.

183 Zvone Dragan, *Od politike do diplomacije* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2018), 72.

184 Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja*, 62.

a session with the issue of inflation on the agenda, because it was “the last straw in the failure to understand the difference between the role of government and the role of the Presidency of the CC”. At the first session of the Presidency of the SFRY, they convinced her to walk back her resignation and promised that the session of the Presidency of the CC LCY would be a “mobilizing” one. However, the session ended with threats that the workers would take to the streets and with the assessment that “FEC does nothing apart from indexing the inflation”. At the second session of the Presidency of the SFRY, the members declared their opinion on the resignation individually, and finally asked Planinc to give up that decision and endure until the end of her term, because resignation could cause a crisis in society.¹⁸⁵ They promised that the Presidency would take appropriate measures to harmonize relations in the federation, and solve the problems regarding the necessary coordination of all bodies of the federation for the implementation of the Stabilization Program.

The radical measures that earned Milka Planinc the nickname “Yugoslav Iron Lady” ultimately prevented Yugoslav bankruptcy, stabilized foreign exchange reserves, and restored the confidence of foreign creditors, resulting in loans beginning to flow in again. In 1983, after the adoption of the measures in the Assembly, Yugoslavia received 6.5 billion dollars for the purchase of necessary raw materials and materials for reproduction, as well as for the repayment of interests, however, the very next year, the country had to apply for a new loan, needless to say, with new strict protection measures. However, interest also existed, especially in the USA, in preserving Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, of course, under the condition that it accept protective measures, as the ambassador to the USA, Budimir Lončar, was the first to state. Lončar, with his connections in the USA, played an important role in lobbying for loans. “The impossibility of reprogramming the

185 Meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY, on November 20 and 21, 1985, in the Palace of the Federation in Belgrade, transcript. In: Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja*, 298–335.

debts and the weak financial support of Western banks, started pushing Yugoslavia towards the East, which was recognized as a problem in the American administration..."¹⁸⁶ Dragan heard a similar thing in a conversation with Vice President George Bush. But as far as measures were concerned, the Americans were uncompromising, and the IMF often dictated them very specifically, for example in the case of the rationing of oil and gasoline with vouchers. The measures were scrutinized by the IMF representatives in Belgrade on a monthly basis.¹⁸⁷

Dragan had, indeed, been a target of criticism in closed political circles at the highest bodies (that he negotiated on his knees, sold out the state, concluded rotten agreements, was pro-Western, accepted primarily what was "in the interest of capital", etc.). The public was, for the most part, unaware of his role in the negotiations. Under the weight of criticism, and squeezed between the demands of the IMF and the pressure of the Assembly, both presidencies, as well as individual republics, Milka Planinc also bore the burden of lobbying and receiving foreign delegations and visits (including all leaders of European countries and the USA).¹⁸⁸ The financial rescue of Yugoslavia lasted a long time and took place among conflicting international interests. "Federal Secretary Lazar Mojsov once objected to US Ambassador David Anderson that everything was going slowly, that the 'Friends of Yugoslavia' group was turning into an insufficiently friendly group, which exerted pressure, demanded high interest rates and set more difficult conditions compared to certain other states. After short negotiations, China gave Yugoslavia a favorable loan of \$150 million, while Western commercial banks gave only \$185 million after difficult, months-long negotiations. Yugoslavia would not give in to threats and blackmail. A country influential and respectable among

186 Tvrтко Jakovina, Budimir Lončar: *od Preka do vrha svijeta* (Zaprešić: Faktura, 2020), 362.

187 Dragan, *Od politike do diplomacije*, 65–75.

188 Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja*, 280.

so many, something Yugoslavia demonstrated during the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi, did not have to prove it".¹⁸⁹

Opinions about the work of Milka Planinc as prime minister are different and contradictory. On the one hand, some said she was efficient, precise, focused on essential issues, and politically wise, and on the other hand, that she was without experience for such a position, not up to leading the government, without sufficient knowledge, that her biggest mistake was being tricked to take over the debts of the republics, and the like.¹⁹⁰

After Milka Planinc, the government was taken over by Branko Mikulić, a Bosnian politician of Croat origin, who was previously Bosnian prime minister, and gained recognition and reputation chiefly by organizing the Olympic Games in Sarajevo. He led the government from May 16, 1986, to March 16, 1989, and was the first post-war Yugoslav prime minister to resign. Mikulić wanted to continue with the reform policy, and he formed a government of predominantly young people who came from companies. In his time, under the pressure of circumstances, self-governing parlance was transformed into more concrete language and, as already mentioned, terms such as "crisis" and "strikes" (instead of "work stoppage") started to be used, while criticism of the views that the political system had become the main obstacle to economic and social development began to weaken. Mikulić encountered severe social resistance, as well as criticism from both the underdeveloped and the developed and he was, in particular, systematically undermined from Milošević's Serbia through orchestrated media attacks. During his term of office, public spending began, once again, to overtake income growth, the burden on the economy increased, while economic growth approached zero.

Mikulić attempted to implement two stabilization programs based on programmed inflation (the first was introduced in June 1986 and

189 Jakovina, Budimir *Lončar*, 366–367.

190 Tvrтко Jakovina, "Milka Planinc as a Paradigm of Croatian History", in Planinc, *Čisti računi željezne lady: sjećanja*, 12–13.

the second in November 1987), but the government abandoned them (the first in March 1987 and the second in May 1988). The external liquidity program from 1985, requested by the IMF and based on abandoning price control and limiting salaries and loans, as well as reducing costs in the public sector, that is, with the “policy of three nominal anchors”, failed as well. In 1986, the banking systems in Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo went bankrupt, followed by increasing pressures for solidarity in redistribution of funds, and for covering losses and needs in the economies of underdeveloped republics. Although Mikulić promised to bring down inflation by 90 percent, the trend was going in the opposite direction. In October 1988, the government gave in under pressure, which resulted in a wave of hyperinflation. At the end of 1989, before Ante Marković began the economic reform, inflation reached 2,678 percent. The number of bankrupt companies began to grow, as did unemployment and the number of strikes (from 174 in 1982, to 1685 in 1987, or from 10,997 strikers, to 288,686).¹⁹¹

The main political reason for Mikulić’s resignation was the insurmountable gridlock he was in. On the one hand, he was pressured by the International Monetary Fund, which dictated economic policy and gave directives to the federal government, as during the time of Milka Planinc, forcing it to abandon price control, pursue a limiting wage and credit policy, and cut costs in the public sector. On the other hand, he was faced with social resistance of the workers, as well as a political elite in the decision-making bodies (both presidencies, but also the Assembly), which was estranged from reality and imbued with the mentality of Tito’s strong Yugoslavia, and which perceived the pressure of Western creditors on socialist Yugoslavia as an attack on the country and as interfering in its internal affairs.

The politically divided party and state leadership, despite the insights offered by experts, hesitated with decisions on radical

191 Jože Prinčič, “Gospodarski vidik osamosvajanja Slovenije (1986–1991)”, in: *Slovenska osamosvojitvev 1991: pričevanja in analize: simpozij Brežice*, June 21 and 22, 2001, 33–56.

changes almost until the end of the eighties. It was only at the end of 1988 that it embraced a new model of socialism, governed by market laws. That is why, after the collective resignation of the federal government of Branko Mikulić, on December 30, 1988, the government was taken over by Ante Marković, also a Croat from Bosnia, who became the last Yugoslav prime minister. Marković graduated in electrical engineering at the Zagreb Technical Faculty and held managerial positions in the Croatian economy and politics. Between 1986 and 1988 he was the president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. He was primarily a manager, one who did not lack self-confidence.

Due to the chaotic situation and political blockades in the state and party presidencies, and the mood in the Federal Assembly, it seemed that his government would have a more powerful position than the previous two. Marković quickly gained the support of the EC and the US, which wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, lead it through reforms and democratization and (even in the situation of bloc division) open the door for it to the EC. After presenting his program to the IMF director Michael Camdessus, he gained strong support and sympathy from the IMF as well, while US President George H. W. Bush had more dilemmas. Western banks promised financial support to Marković, should the program be realized.

In the initial phase, the government did truly gain operational power. However, decisions on systemic changes were still made in the old way and, to a large extent, in accordance with the old ideological patterns. Both the Presidency of the SFRY and the Presidency of the CC LCY often held sessions on the economic situation, devoting many discussions to economic issues, even when they were not on the agenda. At the time of the negotiations on Marković taking over the government, and then during his mandate, the CC LCY dedicated its Thirteenth session to economic problems, on February 20, 1988, as well as its Fourteenth session, on May 11, 1988, and its Fifteenth session, on June 27, 1988 – at which Ante Marković, as the future prime minister, fervently advocated market orientation, as well as the Seventeenth

and Eighteenth sessions, on October 18 and 19, 1988. It was only at the Nineteenth Session, on December 12, 1988, that most members, at least verbally, agreed with the reform, introduction of market laws and gradual privatization. At this session, the introductory speech was given by the Secretary of the Presidency of the CC LCY, Slovene Štefan Korošec who, supporting Marković, demanded that Yugoslavia adjust to EC standards.¹⁹² However, Marković soon became aware that real power no longer resided in the party bodies or in the Presidency; he lost interest in fruitless debates and no longer attended them.

The conflicts of interests between individual republics was another issue adding to the complexity of the Yugoslav economic and overall situation in Yugoslavia's final period. With the agreement-based system, according to the Constitution of 1974, the republics could bypass the federation to harmonize their interests and resolve conflicts, especially those between the developed and the underdeveloped. In the early eighties, for example, a very strained relationship developed between Slovenia and B&H. The Slovenian request was that B&H (and all other underdeveloped republics) receive 50 percent of the funds directly from the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped, while the other 50 percent Slovenia, that is, the developed, would invest directly into interested companies, primarily in energy, raw materials and semi-finished products. Also, the Slovenes believed that Macedonia and B&H should gain a transitional status in the following five-year period and leave the circle of the underdeveloped. Bosnians, on the other hand, concluded that this would mean becoming a raw material base for Slovenia, and that Slovenia did not want them to restructure their economy towards manufacturing (although the Bosnian leadership also predominantly advocated further development of energy and heavy industry, which already accounted for more than 70 percent). Slovenia's concern for changing the status was not so much in relieving the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped, as in the desire to change the relationship between

192 ARS, Fund of the CC LCY session, dislocated unit I.

the developed and the underdeveloped, which would enable the creation of a Yugoslav economic policy more tailored to the developed and the market. With the transition of B&H to the developed, that would have taken place. Due to economic difficulties, the Slovenian political leadership (at least initially) also opposed the organization of major sports events, including the Olympic Games in Sarajevo, and the Bosnians perceived this as Slovenia's fear that it would get a competitor in winter tourism. That is, there was great enthusiasm and excitement among Slovenes concerning the Olympic Games. Jože Trbovc, a Slovene from Kranj, won the competition for the mascot, creating the famous Vučko (little wolf) logo. Slovenian companies also participated en masse in the construction of facilities and preparations for the games. However, Raif Dizdarević perceived the Slovenian attitude towards B&H as "the attitude of the rich towards the poor and immature relative".¹⁹³ Altogether, however, this illustrates the great disparities in Yugoslavia, which were described by Diana Plestina at that time. It is not unimportant to mention subjective feelings, because everyone in Yugoslavia had the feeling of being used, both developed and underdeveloped, including Slovenia which, at that time, accounted for two thirds of the convertible currency inflow of the entire country. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we will never find out whether, at least from the economic point of view, these differences were truly insurmountable. And last but not least, the republics would have been considerably compatible with their different potentials, if they had just cared to look for common points of interest and agree on what to develop (that was, indeed, the plan of "liberal" teams from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia). The political and nationalist aspect was dominant in the disintegration, which was ultimately demonstrated by the conflict between Serbia and Slovenia in the late eighties, which shifted to the sphere of economy and additionally contributed to the already fragile Yugoslav market becoming even more fragile.

193 Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: svjedočenja*, 79–82.

The main reason for the Serbian economic war against Slovenia was in essence political. The overall conflict, both political and in the media, entered the economic sphere after the meeting in Cankarjev dom in February 1989, and intensified after the adoption of amendments to the Slovenian constitution in September 1989. The Republican Committee of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia called for an economic and general boycott of Slovenia, which was supported by the President of the Serbian Presidency, Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian Assembly and the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. According to a survey conducted by the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce (SCC), 229 Serbian companies had severed ties with Slovenian companies, with exports of textiles, furniture, household and electrical appliances, cosmetics and food products particularly affected. During 1988, Slovenia bought goods worth \$2.1 billion (8.8 percent of all purchases) in Serbia, and sold Serbia goods worth 2.6 billion (8.1 percent of total sales). The relationships were, naturally, significantly intertwined in other ways as well (joint appearance on foreign markets, exports through partners from the other republic, etc.). The financial claims of Slovenian companies towards Serbia amounted to 205.2 million dollars. According to the SCC, if sales in Serbia had fallen by 100 percent, production in Slovenia would have fallen by 15 percent and net wages by 13.8 percent, which were exceedingly high numbers in the existing crisis.¹⁹⁴ Slovenia responded to the blockade on all levels, but without much success. Its demands for a response from the federal government and other federal bodies were ineffective, even though the issue at stake was securing a single Yugoslav market. For example, the Slovenian government proposed to the federal government to deny privileged Serbian companies in the foreign trade the opportunity to cancel arrangements with Slovenian

194 "Poročilo o glavnih smereh delovanja IS v mandatnem obdobju 1986–1990, 5. 5. 1990", in: *Od kapitalizma do kapitalizma: izbrane zamisli o razvoju slovenskega gospodarstva v XX stoletju*, Neven Borak (ed.), 549–563, 1997; "Analysis of the effect of the blockade of the flow of goods in Yugoslavia", *Report of the Assembly of the SRS and the Assembly of the SFRY for delegations and delegates*, no. 2, 1990.

companies (Serbia accounted for more than 40 percent of all Yugoslav “clearing export”, that is, export to the USSR and Eastern European socialist countries, which was realized on the basis of the exchange of raw materials and goods, while the state reimbursed the companies at the agreed exchange rate). According to the Slovenian proposal, the government would keep the funds from the Federation Fund, intended for interventions in Serbia (subsidies for artificial fertilizers, interests in agriculture, payments of export incentives, exchange rate differences, etc.), suspend interest payments to Serbian banks on foreign currency deposits and funds for bank bailouts, and also, until the normalization of economic relations with Slovenia, suspend the payment of funds for special-purpose production for the YPA to all companies in Serbia that joined the blockade.

In the end, the effects of the boycott turned out to be smaller than expected, because Serbia acted selectively, carrying out the blockade where damage for Serbia was the least, reckoning that Slovenian countermeasures would not be so fast and efficient, and that the boycott would achieve its goal. The boycott was controlled by Serbian political institutions, and accompanied by demands for the dismissal of management staff in companies that were still cooperating with Slovenia.

The federal government did not intervene against Serbia, because it did not have sufficient political power to do so, and Marković probably reckoned that things would sort themselves out when the reform measures came to life. Indeed, in 1989, he succeeded in passing the fundamental laws in the Federal Assembly, based on which a new economic system began to emerge. Some of the normative changes in the adoption of market laws were, however, introduced even before Marković took over the government, that is, with amendments to the Yugoslav constitution in 1988. In the context of relationships, increased centralization, which was not to the liking of the developed republics, also worked in favor of the reform efforts made by the Marković government. On that basis, he achieved changes in the laws on companies, banks and other financial organizations, accounting,

financial operations, labor relations, foreign trade operations, commodity reserves, the NBY, and securities. He also advocated for constitutional amendments.¹⁹⁵ With the help of Western countries, and with the support of foreign financial institutions, by the end of 1989, when he presented a comprehensive reform program in mid-December of that year, he had already had some success. Yugoslavia's external liquidity improved, foreign exchange reserves reached \$5.8 billion and total debt was reduced to \$16.2 billion. However, inflation remained the main problem of economic policy.

The program had to ensure the fullest functioning of the goods, capital, and labor markets, which is why it was necessary to carry out political reforms and establish the rule of law (among other things, the division of power into legislative, executive and judicial). The reform was also supposed to ensure the equality of all forms of ownership, legally define the property title holder and allow the transformation of one form of ownership into another.

The basic guidelines for implementing economic policy in 1990, as Marković stated in December 1989, were: realization of systemic changes, establishment of institutions, mechanisms and infrastructure of the new economic system, creation of conditions for conducting macroeconomic policy, transformation of social property into social capital, replacement of the previous distribution system with a system in which the basic business result would be profit, while the price of labor would be determined on the basis of collective agreements, state reform and creation of conditions for its functioning. These measures would lead to a system of "modern socialism".

Daily economic policy would focus primarily on curbing inflation, separating monetary and fiscal functions, identifying deficits, and finding solutions for those deficits from real income sources. The realization of the 1990 economic policy was to start immediately (that is, on December 18, 1989), with the introduction of the

195 "Program ekonomske reforme i mere za njegovu realizaciju u 1990 godini", in: *Ekonomaska reforma i njeni zakoni*, Beograd 1990, 5–44.

convertible dinar. One new convertible dinar was worth 10,000 old ones. The dinar exchange rate would be tied to the German mark in the next six months in a ratio of 1:7. That move had the greatest media and psychological effect on the citizens, because it quickly restored the self-confidence of the Yugoslavs, which they used to have when traveling abroad. At that time, the prices in the electric power industry, oil industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, railway transport, prices of coal, PTT services, medicines and communal infrastructure were also frozen. Monetary policy was to be separated from the fiscal and credit function (realistically, this meant, among other things, the abolition of selective NBY loans and federation loans from the primary issue on any basis). Salaries would not increase (Marković expected a 1 percent increase per month, or 13 percent from December to December). The budget would be filled with customs revenues and new taxes on products that had been untaxed until then, the tax for financing the YPA and the personal consumption tax, which would increase by 2.5 percent. The budget, without new obligations, would amount to 7.5 percent of GDP, and together with transferred obligations, to 10.4 percent. The largest part of the budget was intended for the YPA (4.6 percent of the national income), while 0.4 percent of GDP would go to Kosovo and the underdeveloped. The budget would no longer borrow from the NBY.

For Marković, the already mentioned separation of competencies between monetary and fiscal policy was instrumental for the implementation of the macroeconomic policy, as was putting in order the sphere of economic relations with foreign countries. Therefore, it was necessary to quickly achieve the independence of the NBY and its governor in implementing monetary policy, a unified tax system and the foundations of tax policy at the federal level, as well as the separation of powers of the Assembly and the Federal Executive Council.

Although a great optimist, Marković was aware of the great difficulties, which were both economic and political in nature. The level of Yugoslavia's GDP was lower than \$3,000 per capita, and much of the GDP was used for repaying interests on loans and principals;

accumulation was insufficient (this could only be remedied by foreign investment). The reform was also hampered by the economic structure, which had a large surplus of employees, low productivity, and was mainly based on large inflexible companies, which were not able to effectively follow changes in the world market. Trade was insufficiently adjusted to the market-based business. It was clear that numerous companies should have been liquidated urgently, which would have led to an increase in unemployment, and thus great social upheavals.¹⁹⁶

Political obstacles to reform were more dangerous than economic ones. Yugoslavia was ruled by an ideologically obstinate nomenclature, both ideologically and existentially linked to one-party socialism. This leadership decisively influenced the economy, and did not want reforms. In addition, national conflicts were already so acute that the state, as a whole, functioned only in relation to the outside world. Despite that – although with numerous objections – most of the bodies did accept Marković's program, at least verbally. A similar thing happened in the republics. Slovenia, which saw, in Marković, a policy shift in its direction, was worried about the concentration of powers in the federal government and in the NBY. The republic also objected to the possibility, offered within the program, for organized, intentional, and planned redistribution of all internal and an even larger (additional) part of external debts, which could not be settled by the bearers of losses and debts. That is why the redistribution, from insolvent to solvent, took place through the federal budget, which took over the debts and losses. As the basic principle of financing the federation according to the criterion of share in the GDP, that is, national income, was also applied to covering debts and losses, an even greater burden of the reform fell on the most developed republics. They

196 Ante Marković, *Jugoslovenske promene: Govori i izlaganja Ante Markovića, predsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća* (Beograd: Borba, 1990); Drago Buvač, "Plače v delnice!: nasvet Anteju Markoviću", *Delo*, no. 40, February 18, 1989, 24; France Černe, "Ante Marković ante portas", *Večer*, no. 52, March 4, 1989, 26; Bogomil Ferfila, "Temelji prenove gospodarskega sistema: gradivo Zveznega izvršnega sveta". *Delavska enotnost*, no. 1, January 13, 1989, 8–9.

argued that Marković would not be able to secure an independent role for the NBY, nor sustain the state monopoly on foreign exchange, and that the program did not define all its effects. This is why the basic goal, a complete ending of the inflation, was very difficult to achieve. They also claimed that, due to many open and weak points, the success of the program was rather questionable. Some economists had already conveyed their reservations regarding the level of the exchange rate, because they believed it to be too low in relation to the German mark. Despite the reservations, the Slovenian parliament accepted Marković's program on December 19, 1989, albeit with the remark that its success depended on consistent respect for constitutionality and legality, and that it required an atmosphere of reason and trust in its executors.

Slovenia's support was particularly important in the initial period, because it was the most developed republic, and a large part of Slovenian nationalism derived from the situation in the economy. Marković also gained support in Croatia and other republics. He won over the underdeveloped with the thesis that the Yugoslav economic fleet sailed as fast as its slowest ship. Serbia, which also initially supported him, had a more ambivalent relationship. However, Serbia's attitude came as a result of Milošević's reckoning that Marković would help (him) in the centralization of Yugoslavia, which was in favor of Serbia, and that later on, he (Milošević) would succeed in replacing Marković. However, he soon changed his mind, and began to systematically undermine Marković. The reform program was not to Serbia's liking, because the republic believed it would lose too much (among other things, due to the decrease of the clearing market).

The YPA also initially supported Marković. Although he cut its funds, the Army saw in him a chance to save Yugoslavia. Additionally, in 1988, the YPA fought for, and won, a special tax. However, the Army also demonstrated its special status by the fact that the Minister of Defense, Veljko Kadijević, did not consider Marković to be his boss. He came to the sessions at his whim, being absent in certain periods several times in a row. The Army, with the help of those who

supported it, also outmaneuvered Marković during the procurement of weapons in the Soviet Union (the weapons were then used extensively in Bosnia). Deputy prime minister Aleksandar Mitrović told Marković that he would procure some spare parts for the YPA, but instead signed an agreement on a five-year order for airplanes, helicopters, and missile systems.¹⁹⁷

Even if the Serbian economic war against Slovenia may not have targeted Marković at the beginning, although it undermined his authority, as well as the market, the decisive blow was dealt to him by something else. Namely, the Serbian intrusion into the monetary system, which became public in January 1991. The National Bank of Serbia suddenly withdrew all the money intended for year-round stabilization of finances, from the primary issue, intended for settlement due to inflation and other financial needs. The reason for that, in the first place, was that Milošević, who won the elections in December 1990, soon after faced mass protests of students and the opposition, and thus urgently needed money for salaries and pensions, as well as their increase, in order to please the public and keep the majority on his side. He did this at the right time (namely, the demonstrations reached their culmination in March). Consequently, the Serbian government distributed 18.2 billion dinars (about 2.5 billion German marks at the time). Marković then called for sanctions against Serbia, but without success. Other republics also reacted, especially Slovenia and Croatia, which refused to pay their share in the Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped. These were significantly smaller amounts (175 million dollars for Slovenia, and 220 million dollars for Croatia), and that ended the short-term financial discipline, as well as the already fragile authority of Marković. This also signified the end to the reforms. The convertibility of the dinar was not maintained, and while Marković continued with some reform measures and privatization did begin, in June Slovenia declared independence, and the government approved the intervention of the YPA. The intervention

197 Tasić, *Kako sam branio Antu Markovića*, 151.

to secure the borders was supposed to be carried out by units of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and YPA border units, but the Army used the government's approval for long-awaited discipline measures against Slovenia. It dispatched tanks from barracks in Slovenia and Croatia and attempted to occupy strategic points throughout the country and in Ljubljana (among others, Brnik International Airport). This provoked Slovenian resistance, a conflict and the end of Yugoslavia. Due to these events, Marković accused the YPA of abusing its position and tried to replace Kadijević, but only at the session on September 18, just a few weeks before the moratorium on Slovenian independence expired on October 7. However, he failed. All of this had no bearing on the situation at the time, since Kadijević had been refusing to cooperate with the government since the summer, while due to the failed intervention in Slovenia, Marković's alliance with Milošević ended as well. Among other things, Marković explained the request for resignation as follows: "(...) After what happened in Slovenia and the decision of the YPA units to leave Slovenia and the borders, the entire escalating conflict was transferred to Croatia, and we are all witnesses to the fact that the genesis of the conflict hasn't stopped, as it is moving further to Bosnia and Herzegovina (...) It is a fact that during the war in Croatia, the Yugoslav army abandoned its neutral position. With its engagement, it not only exceeded its authority, but also got involved in the civil war (...) It is a civil war in which one army fights against one republic (...) It is a tragedy of this country, even more since I personally invested a lot of efforts in the Army maintaining its all-Yugoslav character (...)" Kadijević only tersely replied that Marković was shifting his blame to others.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, the federal government existed only on paper, because it had no power (out of 19 members, only 12 remained), and Marković was even physically threatened in Belgrade. The government was accused of treason, Serbian politicians called for Marković's lynching, and Šešelj's Chetniks also demanded it. In such circumstances, Marković remained in

198 Tasić, *Kako sam branio Antu Markovića*, 150.

Belgrade until December, then convened the remainder of the government and resigned. The operational leadership (of what remained) of the government was taken over by deputy prime minister Aleksandar Mitrović, and most other ministers endured until July 17, 1992, when Milan Panić, an American businessman of Serbian descent, became prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which comprised of Serbia and Montenegro. Marković's departure in December 1991 was interpreted as "a leave of absence". He flew to Zagreb, where he also did not feel comfortable in Tuđman's nationalist environment, and initially hid in his apartment, but was eventually left alone. He then founded a company in Graz, spending most of his time there, doing business, without public appearances. He advised the Macedonian government for some time, and, in 2003, he testified before the Hague Tribunal against Milošević, where he stated that both Milošević and Tuđman had confirmed to him that they had agreed, in Karadžević, on the division of Bosnia. He died in 2011 in Zagreb.

At a time when reforms were at their peak, Ante Marković was convinced that changes in the economy could change politics as well, but that calculation was wrong. In a situation where power in the republics was taken over solely by nationalist parties, and without clear prospects that federal elections would be called, he attempted to establish himself as a Yugoslav politician – savior. That is why he did not accept Tuđman's offer to join the Croatian side. He founded his own party, and the YPA helped him establish the YU-TEL television, which was broadcast from Sarajevo. He enjoyed the support of a part of Yugoslav intellectuals (UJDI) and Yugoslav-oriented citizens, but, on the wave of republican nationalisms, it was too little to fundamentally change anything. In a diverse Yugoslavia, he thus failed to form an executive federal government out of the Executive Council, let alone save the state.

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32. Perović, Latinka (et. al.). 1994. *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
33. Pirjevec, Jože. 1995. *Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Nastanak, razvoj ter razpad Karadorđevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije (Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Nastanak, razvoj i raspad Karadorđevićeve i Titove Jugoslavije)*. Koper: Lipa.

Aleksandar R. Miletić

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BREAKUP OF THE SFRY, 1988–1991.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT of Yugoslavia (USJ) was introduced into the system of federal institutions by the 1963 Constitution. It was only with the establishment of this (nominally) independent court that the equal status of republican and federal authorities was formally ensured. The introduction of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, meant that higher federal bodies were no longer able to use administrative decisions to derogate decisions made at the republican level. The equal status of government at the federal state level and the level of its constituent states is a prerequisite for a system of mutual control. This concept can be already found in the writings of the founders of American federalism in the 18th century. In legal science the general opinion is that in the absence of mutual control one cannot speak about true federalism.¹⁹⁹ A federal system of government cannot exist when one government is subordinated to another, regardless of their domain of competence. In his classical study of federalism, Kenneth Wheare reasoned that when a regional government was subordinate to the federal government, it created a model of power devolution; when the federal government was subordinate to regional governments, the result was a confederate system of government.²⁰⁰ In recent times, the criterion of equal status has been reaffirmed by John Law, who holds that this principle should not be attenuated by

199 “Federalist Paper No. 51”, in: *The federalist: a collection of essays, written in favour of the new Constitution, as agreed upon by the Federal Convention*. Vol. II, New York: J. and A. M’Lean, 1788, pp. 116–122.

200 Quoted in: John Law, “How Can We Define Federalism?”, *Perspectives on Federalism*, Vol. 5, Issue 3, 2013, p. 103.

conceptions of shared sovereignty.²⁰¹ Today, one of the most controversial issues of American federalism concerns the (un)equal status of the federal government and the governments of the constituent states. Many authors believe that the balance of power has been upset in favor of the federal government and that equal status has not existed for a long time.²⁰²

In the case of the Yugoslav socialist state, the lopsided balance of power and unequal legal status of the federal and republican governments were the norms between 1946 and 1963. This is evident from the provisions of the 1946 Constitution and the 1953 Constitutional Law, which stipulated that the federal bodies (the Presidium of the National Assembly, later the Federal National Assembly, the Federal Executive Council and its Secretariats) could repeal or suspend the validity of the laws, regulations and orders made by republican authorities.²⁰³ In the United States, in similar situations of dispute in the vertical axis, the decision is made by the Supreme Court which is, at least in principle, independent in decision making, despite being a federal government body. In the Yugoslav case, a similar independent institution did not exist until it was introduced by the 1963 Constitution, which stipulated that in the event of any disagreement or dispute between the republican and federal governments, the decision would be made by the Constitutional Court.²⁰⁴ With the introduction of the Constitutional Court into the legal system of socialist Yugoslavia, the republican and federal bodies acquired equal status, the federal bodies were no longer superior to the republican ones and, as already mentioned, could no longer arbitrarily annul the decisions and laws made at the republican level.

201 Ibid., p. 101.

202 Malcolm Feeley, Edward L. Rubin, "Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis", *UCLA Law Review* 41 (1994), pp. 903–952.

203 See Articles 74, 130 and 131 of the 1946 Constitution and Articles 16, 34, 89 and 95 of the 1953 Constitutional Law.

204 See Articles 241, 244–51 of the 1963 Constitution.

After the federal-confederate reorganization of the Yugoslav constitutional system by the 1968–1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 Constitution, the Constitutional Court was one of several institutions in which the principle of consensual decision making was not formally established. The republican delegations to the Federal Assembly elected two Constitutional Court judges each, while the provincial delegations could choose one Constitutional Court judge each, so that there was a total of 14 judges. However, the Constitutional Court did not make decisions by consensus, but rather by a majority vote of the judges creating a quorum at the session. This specificity of the Constitutional Court would have direct consequences when the Yugoslav crisis intensified and appeal to this court became the last line of defense of the constitutional foundations of the Yugoslav state union. It also became a space for manipulation by outvoting. Before the final phase of the Yugoslav crisis, the Constitutional Court was primarily focused on the everyday problems faced by the citizens of the SFRY. Out of 179 Constitutional Court decisions and opinions published in the 1988 Yearbook, 46 dealt with labor law issues (employment, income, the right to pension, etc.), 37 dealt with housing issues, and 23 interpretations referred to court process issues, involving the functioning of regular courts.²⁰⁵ Only two cases dealt with the escalating national, that is ethnic, problems associated with defining the official use of language in the Constitutions of SR Croatia and SAP Kosovo.

In its Opinion of 22 December (No. 59/86) the Constitutional Court concluded that the definition of the official use of the languages of the peoples and nationalities in the Kosovo Constitution violated the provisions of the SFRY Constitution, which stipulated that the language of the people should precede the languages of the nationalities. The SAP Kosovo Constitution listed the Albanian language in first place, followed by the Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages. Thus, the Constitutional Court decreed that the Federal Assembly should

205 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1988*, Belgrade: USJ, 1989.

take appropriate steps to remove these unconstitutional provisions from the SAP Kosovo Constitution.²⁰⁶ The opinion of the Constitutional Court regarding the provision relating to the official use of language in SR Croatia was adopted on 7 December 1988 (No. 15/85) by a majority vote. The opinion stated that the wording of the official language in Article 138 of the Constitution of the SR Croatia was ambiguous and thus contrary to the provisions of the federal Constitution. The Croatian Constitution defined the “Croatian literary language” as the republic’s official language. In the same sentence, however, the language was defined as the “standard form of the language of Croats and Serbs in Croatia, and called Croatian or Serbian”. The Constitutional Court rejected this wording, because it was not clear whether one or two languages were in official use in Croatia.²⁰⁷ Thus, in the formative period of Milošević’s antibureaucratic revolution and the beginning of the intensification of a crisis in inter-republic and international relations (1987–1988), very few state-legal controversies in the area of identity or ethnic relations had their epilogue in the Constitutional Court.

A similar conclusion can be derived from the 1989 Yearbook of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, which contains only 86 reasoned opinions and decisions. The subjects of the cases again involved regular circumstances and everyday problems in the areas of labor relations, tenancy laws, economic and trade issues and the like.²⁰⁸ The only decision involving identity issues centered on provisions of the SAP Kosovo Constitution that guaranteed the right to use and display the flags of the peoples and nationalities in the province. Since the use of flags throughout the entire territory of SR Serbia was regulated by its Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that the provision of the Constitution of SAP Kosovo was in conflict with that Constitution as well as with some provisions of the SFRY Constitution. Thus,

206 Ibid., pp. 379–381.

207 Ibid., pp. 377–378.

208 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1989*, Belgrade: USJ, 1990.

Opinion No. 210/85 of 25 January 1989 requested that these provisions be altered.²⁰⁹ In September 1989, the Constitutional Court began considering the Slovenian amendments, but the relevant material was published only in the 1990 Yearbook.

Ivan Kristan, a Constitutional Court judge delegated by Slovenia, wrote in his memoir that in this period it became clear that there was a “pro-Serbian lobby” on the Court or, in other words, a majority of judges were making decisions that were being dictated by Belgrade. In 1989, apart from two judges delegated by Serbia, the Milošević regime also had influence with the judges delegated by Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo, one judge delegated by Croatia (ethnic Serb Dušan Štrbac) and one by Bosnia and Herzegovina (ethnic Serb Milovan Buzadžić). The Court needed only eight out of 14 judges to make qualified decisions by a majority vote. Kristan also wrote that, apart from ethnic partiality, the “problem” with the composition of the Constitutional Court also stemmed from the fact that the judges mostly lived with their families in Belgrade and thus, often agreed with majority decisions that, at that time, tended to favor the Milošević regime.²¹⁰

However, is it true that the Constitutional Court was fully instrumentalized for political ends and lacking in professional integrity as Kristan suggests? Some court decisions show that this was not always the case and Kristan himself writes about them in his memoir. For example, when the Serbian member of the SFRY Presidency, Borisav Jović, tried to obtain the Constitutional Court’s opinion about the Slovenian draft amendments on 26 September 1989 – the day before voting about them in the Assembly of SR Slovenia – he succeeded only to some extent. Namely, using his influence on the already mentioned judges Buzadžić and Štrbac, he managed to have the Constitutional Court convene a session dedicated to this topic. However, the Constitutional Court, by a majority vote, refused to take a stand

209 Ibid., pp. 177–178.

210 Ivan Kristan, *Osamosvajanje Slovenije: Pogled iz Ljubljane in Beograda*, Ljubljana: GV Založba, 2013, p. 70.

on the constitutionality of the draft amendments. The decision was explained by the fact that the Constitutional Court could decide only on current regulations and not on those in draft form.²¹¹ For the Serbian leadership, which conducted an active political campaign in the party and state bodies against these amendments, the decision on their being contrary to the SFRY Constitution would have been of utmost importance. Nevertheless, the Court refused to take a stand on this issue by a majority vote. However, this integrity was squandered only two days later.

The procedural offence referred to the fact that the Constitutional Court's procedure was initiated by the Federal Council of the SFRY Assembly on 28 September 1989, the day after the amendments were adopted and at the time when they were still not published in the *Official Gazette of SR Slovenia*. The Amendments (60–90) were quoted from daily newspapers, which is an unacceptable practice in any domain of authoritative decision making relating to constitutional matters. Nevertheless, at the session held on 4 October 1989, the Constitutional Court accepted the proposal to assess the constitutionality of the amendments and started its opinion-giving procedure. An integral part of this procedure was a public hearing, which was held on 5 December 1989 and to which 11 Yugoslav constitutional law experts were invited. Only three judges responded to the invitation. Two of them, Gavro Perazić from the University of Titograd and Pavle Nikolić from the University of Belgrade, were persistent in challenging the 10th Amendment, which proclaimed that SR Slovenia was in the SFRY “on the basis of a permanent, complete and inalienable right of self-determination, including the right of secession”. Kristan writes that Perazić and Nikolić challenged the Slovenian right of self-determination invoking the principle of the consummation of a right, that is, the fact that this right was already consummated once (1943), or even twice (in 1918 and 1943). In other words, it was consummated by Slovenia's commitment to the first and second Yugoslavia.²¹²

211 Ibid., p. 68.

212 I. Kristan, *Osamosvajanje Slovenije*, pp. 70–76.

Out of 81 amendments requested for constitutional review by the Federal Council only six were ultimately considered by the Constitutional Court. As for the 10th Amendment, Kristan triumphantly writes in his memoir that, thanks to his exchange of arguments with the aforementioned legal experts, the majority opinion in the Constitutional Court prevailed in his favor. Decision making relating to the constitutionality of the mentioned amendments took place on 16–18 January 1990 and out of 13 judges only three voted for the unconstitutionality of that amendment.²¹³ In view of the fact that this issue especially disturbed the Serbian public and Slobodan Milošević's regime, one could reason that Kristan's "pro-Serbian lobby" still did not act solely for the sake of political expediency. In order to obtain a complete picture of the motives of the majority of the Constitutional Court judges, one should take into account the decisions relating to the remaining five amendments out of 89, which were adopted by the Slovenian Assembly. Namely, although Kristan argues that the declarative 10th Amendment was "defended" and thus the right of the Republic of Slovenia to self-determination was confirmed, it was concluded at the same session that the parts of the 68th and 72th Amendments, which stipulate the manner of exercising this right, were contrary to the federal Constitution. According to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the issue of altering the SFRY borders cannot be decided by an act proclaiming sovereignty and independence without the consent of all the republics and provinces and the decision of the Federal Assembly. In addition, all issues relating to the exercise of the right to self-determination and secession are the subject of the SFRY Constitution and not the republican constitutions.²¹⁴

Owing to this interpretation, procedural acts and decision-making process relating to self-determination were retained by federal institutions. This significantly complicated Slovenia's path to independence. In making this decision, the Constitutional Court judges

213 Ibid., p. 77.

214 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1990*, Belgrade: USJ, 1991, pp. 216–222.

invoked Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 3, which prescribed the territorial integrity of the SFRY and disallowed alteration of SFRY borders without the consent of all the republics and autonomous provinces. In addition, Article 283 (Item 4) and Article 285 (Item 6) of the SFRY Constitution prescribed that a decision on altering the SFRY borders could be brought by the Federal Council of the SFRY Assembly. Thus, regulating the issue of Slovenia's self-determination was not part of the competences of Slovenian institutions but of federal ones. As long as the SFRY could still be considered a functional state, the constitutional principle of consensual decision making relating to the alteration of state borders was legally sustainable. When the Badinter Commission, in interpreting the development of the Yugoslav crisis, took the stand that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution (Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991),²¹⁵ the possibilities for a different interpretation of the content of Article 5 of the SFRY Constitution opened up.

Despite the evident political instrumentalization, the decision-making procedure of the Constitutional Court relating to the Slovenian amendments was still largely based on strong constitutional grounds. After all, in their separate opinions about the Constitutional Court Decision of 18 January 1990, the Slovenian judges, Ivan Kristan and Radko Močivnik, set forth only reasons of a formal nature involving procedural deficiencies. They did not touch on the substantive legal interpretation of the aforementioned articles of the SFRY Constitution.²¹⁶ Božo Repe holds that the Slovenian amendments were partly the Slovenian leadership's response to the Serbian amendments of March 1989, which had already affected the constitutional system of the SFRY.²¹⁷ If we accept this reasoning, Serbia's unilateral decisions to change the constitutional configuration of its provinces in March

215 Alain Pellet, "The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples", *European Journal of International Law* 3, 1 (1992), pp. 182–184.

216 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1990*, pp. 223–224.

217 Božo Repe, *Milan Kučan: Prvi predsednik Slovenije*. Sarajevo: Udruženje za modernu historiju, 2019, p. 112.

1989 would act as a legal precedent under Anglo-Saxon law. Namely, when a legal principle is violated once or introduced into practice for the first time, and when the court instances do not annul that novelty, it becomes a source of law or, in our case, a source of the violation of a right.

The Constitutional Court proceedings on the amendments to the Serbian Constitution took place simultaneously with decision making relating to the Slovenian amendments (from 4 October 1989 to 18 January 1990). Unfortunately for jurisprudence, but favorable for Kristan's stance on the existence of a pro-Serbian majority in the Constitutional Court, the decision-making process relating to the Serbian amendments did not imply the same measure of principledness as in the case of the Slovenian amendments. Namely, the Constitutional Court refused to rule on the most significant violations of formal law (with respect to the enactment procedure) and substantive law (with respect to the content of positive legal regulations), involving the constitutional status of the autonomous provinces. In other words, it refused to review these aspects of the Serbian amendments. Judge Ivan Kristan presented in a reasoned manner the proposals to the Constitutional Court to discuss these issues. According to him, the nature of the formal objections was such that they should be considered as a substantive burden in terms of assessing their constitutionality. Due to the fact that the Kosovo Assembly adopted the proposed amendments during a state of emergency, when tanks, military and police forces were on Priština's streets, the legality and constitutionality of these changes are highly questionable.²¹⁸ Namely, can the supreme legal act of one country be radically changed during a state of emergency?

The material objections made by Kristan asserted that the amendments changed the relationship between the competences of constitutional courts at the levels of the provinces, SR Serbia and the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, as well as abolished the right of the autonomous provinces to give their consent for changes to the

218 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1990*, pp. 232–233.

republican constitution. Kristan holds that the latter was illogical because, according to the regulations in place, the autonomous provinces still had to give their consent for any change to the SFRY Constitution. According to him, the competences of the Constitutional Court of Serbia and the Serbian Assembly to repeal the constitutions of the autonomous provinces, thus completely changing the nature of the constitutional relations stipulated by the federal Constitution, were problematic. Instead of going into the merits of these issues, the Constitutional Court decided without explanation not to consider any of them. Ivan Kristan was thus forced to express his dissent by submitting a separate opinion about the Constitutional Court's decision.²¹⁹

Of all the Serbian amendments (9–49), the Constitutional Court established that only three amendments (20, 27 and 39) contained matters contrary to the SFRY Constitution. Those were the provisions related to the possibility of restricting the purchase and sale of real property; the provisions stipulating the primacy of Cyrillic over Latin in official use; and the provision related to the determination of the delegate base for choosing delegates for the Federal Council of the SFRY Assembly.²²⁰ One gets the impression that this was done for the sake of form in order to provide the illusion of impartiality in decision making relating to the Serbian amendments. In January 1990, in addition to the Serbian and Slovenian amendments, the Constitutional Court also rendered opinions and decisions about the constitutionality of Croatian, Macedonian, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Montenegrin amendments. With the exception of the amendments to the Constitution of SR Montenegro, which were in full compliance with the SFRY Constitution, some of the amendments from the other republics and provinces were considered unconstitutional. The majority did not deal with inflammatory issues such as interethnic relations or the reorganization of relations with the federal state.²²¹ As for the amendments to

219 Ibid., pp. 233–255.

220 Ibid., pp. 229–231.

221 Ibid., 225–228, 236–245.

the Constitutions of the SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo, the unconstitutional ones were those dealing with the primacy accorded to the Cyrillic alphabet in official use in Vojvodina and the right of the provincial authorities to determine the use of the flags of the peoples and nationalities in Kosovo.

The work of the Constitutional Court during 1991 and the structure of the cases being reviewed point to the dramatic situation during the last months of the common Yugoslav state. According to the 1991 Yearbook of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, out of 165 judgments passed by this court, only 47 dealt with everyday problems of the SFRY's society and institutions, while 118 judgements dealt with extraordinary circumstances created by the declarations and concrete acts of "disunion" and independence by Slovenia and Croatia. The members of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia from these two Yugoslav republics participated in its work even after their states' proclamations of independence, that is, after 25 June. The European Community-sponsored peace negotiations, which ended the Ten-Day War in Slovenia, resulted in the so-called Brioni Declaration of 7 July 1991. The Declaration introduced a three-month moratorium on the implementation of the decision on the independence of these two republics. Until 8 October, Croatia and Slovenia still formally recognized the sovereignty of the SFRY and their representatives participated in the work of the federal bodies. As can be seen from Kristan's memoir, the so-called European troika and Slovenian authorities insisted on the active participation and cooperativeness of the Slovenian judges in the work of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia.

Kristan writes in his memoir that he was not in Belgrade during the war in Slovenia and returned only in July 1991. He reveals that in taking the stand in this court during the moratorium period, he constantly consulted Milan Kučan, taking into account the current and strategic interests of the Slovenian state in the making.²²² Thus, for example, he tried his best to prevent putting the constitutionality of the SFRY Presidency's decision about the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's

222 I. Kristan, *Osamosvajanje Slovenije*, pp. 85, 90.

Army from Slovenia on the agenda of the Constitutional Court. It was in Slovenia's state interest not to challenge this decision. Moreover, a declaration of the SFRY Presidency's decision as unconstitutional would serve as an excuse for the military circles to take over the competences of the country's executive authority.²²³ The Constitutional Court did not comment on this issue until October 1991, when it took a formalist stand that, despite the evident violations of the constitutional norms, it could not discuss this decision of the SFRY Presidency because it was not published in the Official Gazette.²²⁴

By mid-1991, the instrumentalization of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia had reached such proportions that two prominent government officials and politicians (Ratko Marković and Vladimir Šeks, leaders of the Serbian Socialist Party /SPS/ and the Croatian Democratic Union /HDZ/ respectively, which were in power in the two republics), took up the duties of the judges from Serbia and Croatia. In his memoir, Šeks mentions that the decision to delegate him to the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia was made by Franjo Tuđman himself, while Marković was included in all constitutional projects of Milošević's regime from 1989 to Rambouillet.²²⁵ Both of them, as constitutional law experts and members of the executive or legislative authorities in their republics, already participated in the preparation of enactments whose constitutionality was assessed by the Constitutional Court. This led not only to a specific conflict of interest, but also to entirely paradoxical situations. Šeks, for example, points

223 Ibid" pp. 88–90.

224 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1991*, p. 279.

225 Vladimir Šeks, *1991: Moja sjećanja na stvaranje Hrvatske i domovinski rat*, Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 2015, pp. 45–46. About Marković's work on the amendments to the Serbian Constitution see the transcript of his testimony at the trial of Slobodan Milošević at the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague on 20 January 2005: <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/Milosevic/Transkripti/Transkripti%20sa%20sudjenja%20Slobodanu%20Milosevicu%20-%202815%29/Transkript%20sa%20sudjenja%20Slobodanu%20Milosevicu%20-%202020.%20januar%202005..pdf>.

out in his memoir that, as a coauthor and collaborator in the preparation of most of Croatia's constitutional declarations and laws denying the existence of Yugoslavia, he had a serious problem with swearing an oath to the Constitution of that country on 5 July 1991²²⁶. Like Kristan, Šeks also points out that his participation in the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia was the result of the European troika's mediation and should be viewed in the context of the agreed three-month transition period, that is, the moratorium during which the preconditions for the disunion of Slovenia and Croatia had to be created.²²⁷

However, Šeks stayed in Belgrade only until 16 July 1991, when he left his position as a Constitutional Court judge, allegedly of his own accord. He claims resignedly that he remained completely alone during court proceedings dealing with Slovenian and Croatian constitutional acts and declarations. Namely, the two Slovenian judges, Kristan and Močivnik, had not yet returned to Belgrade, after having left during the Ten-Day War in Slovenia. As for the Croatian judge, Hrvoje Bačić, he was allegedly loyal to the majority in the Constitutional Court and excluded from Zagreb's political combinations. Šeks says about him that, despite being delegated by Croatia, he lived in Belgrade for ten years, which had influence on his decision making.²²⁸ According to the 1991 Yearbook of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, Vladimir Šeks participated in only one session, which was held on 10 July of that year. Out of the five decisions adopted at that session, two dealt with Croatia. The most important decision, in constitutional terms, involved the implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 21 February 1991, which was declared unconstitutional²²⁹. As Šeks testifies

226 Vladimir Šeks, 1991.: *Moja sjećanja...*, p. 160.

227 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

228 V. Šeks, 1991.: *Moja sjećanja...*, pp. 45, 175.

229 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1991*, pp. 271–272.

in his memoir, he openly pointed out in court that he was the “main author” of that law.²³⁰

As already mentioned, the 1991 Yearbook primarily included decisions related to the extraordinary circumstances created by controversial laws and declarations of independence and sovereignty. Out of 118 decisions, 47 referred to the enactments adopted in Croatia, 29 referred to those adopted in Serbia and 26 referred to those adopted in Slovenia. There were only 15 decisions about the enactments adopted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina. All enactments relating to Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence and suspensions of federal laws were repealed or declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. This also referred to the enactments of the Serbian government relating to the disturbance of the unified Yugoslav market and unauthorized recourse to the primary issue and intrusion into the SFRY payment operations.²³¹ These issues were among the political priorities of Milošević's regime. An embargo on Slovenian goods and a possible imposition of taxes on goods from the other republics also occupied an important place in the populist phraseology of the regime. One gets the impression that, despite the instrumentalization of its role, the Constitutional Court respected professional principles in deciding about the essence of legal enactments. Abuse and manipulation cases were recorded as such in the procedure prior to giving a legal opinion, namely in deciding on whether to initiate the procedure or not, not in the provision of legal expertise itself.

The three-month moratorium period (July–October 1991) was the last period in which the Slovenian judges Kristan and Močivnik

230 “I fiercely defended the Croatian Constitutional Law using all possible legal arguments and persistently arguing that it was not in conflict with the SFRY Constitution. At one moment, Serbian judge Ratko Marković remarked that I defended this law so fervently ‘as if I were its father’. I answered that he was right, because I was the ‘main’ author of this Constitutional Law.” *Ibid.*, p. 176.

231 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1991*, pp. 75–76, 111–112, 124–126, 167–168, 181–182, 215–216, 230–233.

participated in the work of the Constitutional Court. Mutual anxiety and heated interethnic tensions were reflected in the attitude towards them. The Serbian authorities, Serbian public and Ratko Marković himself were especially outraged by the attitude of Ivan Kristan, who most persistently represented the Slovenian interests in the Constitutional Court.²³² Unknown persons twice broke into Kristan's official apartment in Novi Beograd and changed the lock on the front door. When he returned to Belgrade on 23 July, he could not enter his apartment, so that he spent the night in a hotel. The next day he apologized to his colleagues for coming unshaven to the Constitutional Court session. After an intervention, the apartment was returned to him, but only until 2 August, when a police officer from the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs moved into it. Kristan obtained a hotel room where he remained until the end of his stay in Belgrade.²³³ An anecdote in Vladimir Šeks's memoir is also interesting. He wrote that he came to Belgrade carrying a Scorpion automatic pistol in his luggage.²³⁴ He allegedly came to the Constitutional Court session with this pistol and two hand grenades for the sake of personal safety and showed them to Ratko Marković²³⁵.

The Constitutional Court held sessions until 27 April 1992. In the Yearbook of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, which covers this

232 Ratko Marković, Svedočenje u Haškom tribunalu na suđenju Slobodanu Miloševiću od 13. januara 2005, pp. 615–616. Accessible at: <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/Milosevic/Transkripti/Transkripti%20sa%20sudjenja%20Slobodanu%20Milosevicu%20%2814%29/Transkript%20sa%20sudjenja%20Slobodanu%20Milosevicu%20-%2013.%20januar%202005.pdf>.

233 I. Kristan, *Osamosvajanje Slovenije*, pp. 86–87, 91–92.

234 V. Šeks, *1991.: Moja sjećanja...* p. 158.

235 “After the vote, I opened a leather bag to put my papers into it. Judge Marković, who sat opposite me, remarked: ‘Wow, colleague, I see that you have convincing evidence.’ When I opened the bag, he saw the Scorpion pistol and two hand grenades at the bottom. I added: ‘I prepared this evidence for some other ‘talks’ and I have them just ‘in case of need’. They may be necessary given the place we are in. The others listened [to] our ‘dialogue’ silently,” V. Šeks, *1991.: Moja sjećanja...*, p. 176.

four-month period, there are only 96 decisions. No more than nine can be characterized, conditionally speaking, as regular issues normally considered by such an institution. In deciding on legal enactments relating to the irregular or extraordinary circumstances created by the process of secession and dissolution of the Yugoslav state, the Constitutional Court was mostly focused on legislative enactments by the Republic of Croatia. Out of 87 “extraordinary” decisions, 65 referred to the enactments and regulations adopted by Croatia.²³⁶ There were only four decisions relating to the Slovenian legislation which, from the aspect of the SFRY Constitution, was no less controversial, unconstitutional or “secessionist” than the legislation of the Republic of Croatia. Obviously, Slovenia was no longer considered a real domain of the Constitutional Court’s competences either territorially or constitutionally. This corresponded with the political strategy of Milošević’s regime, which was preoccupied with resolving the status of the Serbian population in Croatia.

The Constitutional Court’s Opinion No. 4/1–91, which was submitted to the SFRY Assembly on 14 February 1991, provides a good summary of the influence of its activities on the harmonization of legal matters at the provincial, republican and federal levels. The Opinion states that republican and provincial authorities (with the exception of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities) ignored the decisions and opinions of the Constitutional Court by failing to harmonize the texts of their constitutional amendments with the federal Constitution within the given time limit. The Constitutional Court points out that the federal authorities also failed to harmonize their laws with the amendments to the SFRY Constitution adopted in 1988. The new Constitutions of Croatia and Serbia only intensified the relationship maladjustment of constitutional matters at all levels. As for the Constitutional Court, the general complexity of the prevailing circumstances required changes in constitutional matters, including to the SFRY

236 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ 1992*, Belgrade: USJ, 1992.

Constitution, and their harmonization at all levels.²³⁷ Consequently, the murky situation was brought about not only by the problematic inclusion of individuals who were continuously politically instructed and frequently in conflicts of interest; nor by the frequent instrumentalization of the Constitutional Court by Milošević's regime; but also by the non-observance of the adopted decisions, with the exception of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian leadership. The Constitutional Court worked as a team of 11 judges until the end of its existence. Namely, After the expiry of the moratorium in October 1991, the two Slovenian judges stopped coming to sessions, while Vladimir Šeks had already left Belgrade in July of that year. The aforementioned Hrvoje Bečić, delegated by Croatia but loyal to the environment where he had spent a great part of his life, participated in its work until its end. In his memoir, Šeks mentioned that, immediately after his departure for Croatia, the Kosovo judge also left – he later practiced law in Istria.²³⁸ However, Kosovo judge Pjeter Kola was registered in the Yearbook of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia under “Decisions and Opinions” until April 1992.

What conclusion can be drawn about the role of the Constitutional Court in the last episodes of the SFRY's existence? With regards to the professional integrity of this institution, it is difficult to give an unambiguous or simple answer. As for decision making relating to the essence of legal matters, it is rare to find open partiality or an omission involving unfounded decisions or opinions of the Constitutional Court with respect to the wording of the SFRY Constitution. The instrumentalization of this institution occurred in procedures preceding meritorious decision making. For example, the Constitutional Court simply refused to rule on the formal and material violations to the norms of the federal Constitution contained in the 1989 Serbian amendments without explanation. It also refused to comment on the decision of the SFRY Presidency to withdraw the Yugoslav federal

237 *Odluke i mišljenja USJ*, 1991, pp. 267–269.

238 V. Šeks, 1991.: *Moja sjećanja...*, pp. 176, 80.

army from Slovenia, because such a decision was nowhere published. On the other hand, this court agreed to give its opinion about the 1989 Slovenian amendments, although at the time this procedure was initiated the amendments had not been published in any official publication, but were merely quoted from daily newspapers. When the Constitutional Court had an opportunity to declare itself meritoriously, it always decided in compliance with the SFRY Constitution. Almost all enactments of the Republic of Serbia which came to this court were assessed as unconstitutional. Among these decisions there were some the Serbian regime especially cared about. They involved the primacy of the Cyrillic alphabet in public use, real estate transactions in Kosovo, the law allowing the use of primary issue of banknotes from the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the imposition of trade restrictions and special taxes on goods from other republics. During the last two years of the common state, all of these decisions, together with a huge corpus of legislation from all the Yugoslav republics and provinces, were declared unconstitutional. The intensity of the violations against the SFRY's constitutional order certainly indicates that this state actually ceased to exist far earlier than the occurrence of the formal events that took place in mid to late 1991.

Vlaho Bogišić

YUGOSLAV LEXICOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE: EXITING THROUGH THE MAIN, ENCYCLOPEDIA DOOR

AT THE VERY start of the seventh, epilogue-like decade of the Yugoslavian state constitution, at the moment when president Tito, the key reformer of its institutions, was leaving to Ljubljana for healing purposes from which he would not return, on January 23rd 1980, the Social Contract on the construction and the financing of the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia²³⁹ was signed. That it was an extremely important act, besides being signed by one institution, the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute of Zagreb, it was also signed by the Assembly of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the assemblies of all eight of its constitutive units, six republics and two provinces, as is shown in the heading in which it calls upon the Constitution itself as its foundation. It is said conclusively that the matter of the amendment to the agreement was brought up and resolved in the same way that it was adopted. However, when towards the end of the decade, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia began to challenge the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute, its founder, and the social and political platforms on which it was initiated and acted for half of the Yugoslav constitutional period, it was now a matter of deconstruction, rather than of procedure. Thus even without distance it was possible to understand how this encyclopedic phenomenon was brought up in order to bring into question the general field of discussion – not only what directly enabled its existence, but also the sense of the historical process that led to the kind of concept advocated by that Institution, and contained in its first title: the Lexicographic Institute of the FPRY.

239 “Društveni dogovor o izradi i financiranju drugog izdanja Enciklopedije Jugoslavije.”, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

The institute was founded in 1950 by legal act of the Government of the FPRY, which Tito himself signed, and also appointed its Director, Miroslav Krleža, the Croatian novelist and scholar. The Federalist idea, directly taken into the imagined “federal budgetary institution” was not formal. The Institute would remain without Krleža in what, in the Yugoslav construct, was called the “fatal decade”. With reason, he was usually, seen as its founder. So the Institute’s Federalist conception, as well as its social position, was important in the understanding of the initiative, regarding not only its scope, but also its limitations. Krleža, as early as the first decade of the Yugoslav Communist movement, was seen as kind of a cultural icon of the Left. From the beginning, however, he was involved in episodes of conflict, not only with opposing poles, but also with many of the protagonists of the communist doctrine. That would result in dramatic disputes concerning Stalinist practices even before the Axis attack on Yugoslavia, so Krleža did not join Tito’s partisans. At the start of the creation of the second – Tito’s – Yugoslavia, Krleža’s position in the society was thus insecure and unclear. It was not only because of the personal and political dispute with the Stalinist character of the movement, but also because of his initial cultural and-political stance. Krleža persevered with the Leninist principle of the “Danube Federation of Soviet Republics”, which was implicitly open to components outside the “Yugoslav” circle, but undoubtedly had, as its own cultural foundation, the whole of the South Slavic idiom (including the Bulgarian component) a “civilization” with another, thousand-year confirmation of the specific “South-Slavic” participation within the compact east-Mediterranean space.

At the beginning of 1946, Tito’s government kept Krleža in Belgrade for a relatively long period, for six months. It was a sort of asylum, until the growing tensions with Zagreb in the republic’s political leadership against him were resolved, and also until Krleža decided what he saw and planned as the scope of his own and activities. At that time, Krleža made a study about possible and needed cultural

undertakings.²⁴⁰ The encyclopedia was not directly discussed in the available part of the manuscript that was saved, but, for example, the way in which the all-encompassing resistance of “this people” can be understood, is evidently the ideological subtext of the encyclopedic synthesis. He said that “this people”, as early as the 6th century, entered the war between Byzantium and Rome, which, to cite Brukner, did not concern them. The fact that the conflict between Byzantium and Rome did not concern them was obvious to the people for centuries and that is why they endeavored to emancipate themselves from this war. The church of St. Sava was founded by a Catholic, the bogomils drew inspiration from Bulgarian well-springs, and the old Slavic times of battle and the *glagolitic script* were certainly phenomena in opposition to both Byzantium and Rome equally. The people lived in areas crisscrossed by state lines and fronts, broken into thirty or so dialects, formed under the tyranny of thirty or so sovereignties of different dynasties and races. But if that problem appears as an intellectual formula, it never works in the interest of foreign conceptions. Once it was quickly confirmed that “foreign concepts” don’t work, not even in the network of the communist internationalism—bearing in mind that Tito successfully resisted the Russian overreach, Krleža’s approach was shown trust. Thus, he was entrusted with a grand exhibition of the Yugoslav medieval art in Paris. The success of this project lent argumentative force to realization of the project of the encyclopedia, even from the circles of insiders such as Milovan Đilas.²⁴¹ There is no doubt that the exhibition was important, even in that “unseen” dimension, since Krleža himself documented the problems he had with it in his will. However, it was still important, not only as an indication of possibilities, but as an indication of misunderstandings as well, which were transferred into the execution

240 “Društveni dogovor o izradi i financiranju drugog izdanja Enciklopedije Jugoslavije.”, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

241 “Društveni dogovor o izradi i financiranju drugog izdanja Enciklopedije Jugoslavije.”, *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

of the encyclopedia, that is, the many encyclopedic editions that the Lexicographic Institute would publish.

Soon afterwards, it turned out that the social and the governing timetables of the Yugoslav establishment of cultural and scientific work would find a place within the republics', that is, the national framework. Krleža knew that perfectly well, because the federal "council", as an informal Ministry of Culture, was led by Marko Ristić, and as the vice-president of the Yugoslav Academy from Zagreb, he himself was a member of the "interacademic council". He tried to soften the hard, traditionalist framework of the national paradigms within which the redesigned "socialist" framework to which the academies still held sway, as well as University chairs and *Maticas*. It is interesting to note that, in their time, the Academies in Zagreb and Belgrade advanced considerably in the execution of the ideas about a joint, "Yugoslav" encyclopedia.²⁴² This undertaking was, at least formally, stopped by the war. However, instead of bringing closer those paradigms for the establishment of the first Yugoslavia, they were becoming more and more a scene of controversy with an accent on political projections, especially those which used polygenesis in order to connect their own legitimacy to imagined differences from the past. That was how, during preparations for the aforementioned exhibition in Paris, Krleža came into conflict with some of its consultants who resisted the attributional viewpoint in order to, for example, give the frescos from the same medieval age on the spatial edges of what is presented to the Yugoslav circle, or "the world", from Kastav to Ohrid, a strong, integral ideological and stylistic basis. Insisting on delineating the borders of one's national area carries with itself an ambition for reaching out, i.e., the extension of its attributes to the general, mutual, at least to the level of the "other" attributes, even when they are established, resulting from it and becoming collateral. The attempts of *Maticas* at arranging the so-called Novi Sad Linguistic Agreement

242 "Društveni dogovor o izradi i financiranju drugog izdanja Enciklopedije Jugoslavije.", *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

proved to be seriously limited. In such an atmosphere, the relatively long statutory position of the Institute as an anomaly was subjected to contextual “loading”, while its “founding rights” were relegated, in the early 1970s, from the de facto Federal Executive Council’s care to the care of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Even when in its name, the state and federal description was changed into a cultural, “Yugoslav” framework (1963), the misunderstandings which were repeated from time to time, were typically present until the end, no matter how the society whose prosperity the institution represented and interpreted went through serious and constitutionally verified changes.

The institutional asymmetry was not mirrored only in a conceptual way, for example, in terms of whether work on the encyclopedia belongs to the scientific or the cultural sector, but on a functional level as well. The center of the Institute was in Zagreb, which created difficulties in the implementation of the proposed program, not only related to the symbolic distancing from the expected Belgrade address of the political institutions, but also from the majority of the mutual institutions. When the Institute in Belgrade opened a representation hall in 1981, across from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the institution in Zagreb was still without its premises; moreover, that was not to happen during the Yugoslav period; the YLI spent all four of its decades as a subtenant at various locations in Zagreb. Not even when its formal center in the palace of the Croatian Matica burned down in 1977, the approach to the solution of that situation did not change much. Krleža was right in thinking that the relationship toward himself personally, as an individual whose potential came from provisional rather than systemic integration, above all from access to Tito’s circle as the center of power, was transferred to the institution entrusted to him.

It turned out that, with an even more important balance of cadre, it was difficult to bring experts from other cultural centers, especially from Belgrade. While this kind of staffing of cadre in Belgrade, not only in academic, but in artistic, sport and other, was executed almost spontaneously, and not only in “federal” institutions, here, in spite of

Krleža's authority and personal magnetism, as well as the resources at his disposal, there was no interest in any of it.

However, the Institute operated from the editorial offices of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia in the different republics. But even when they received a certain status based on the aforementioned social agreement, they were not able to establish a functional difference that the Encyclopedia could articulate, in its own way, with regard to the community they were dealing with, nor with regard to their own sense of constitutional identity.

In working on the Encyclopedia, Krleža found his role models, first and foremost in the French encyclopedists who – as Ivo Cecić would say in 1984, once he took over the responsibility for that work – “used their encyclopedia both to affirm a new scientific paradigm and to initiate a social upheaval, the French Revolution. It was this very recognition about the blending of the two components: science and the class-conscious social engagement, that is the basis of Krleža's understanding of work on the Encyclopedia”. The dynamic dimension of this process was clear to Cecić: that “time brings new scientific knowledge and innovation of the Encyclopedia's meaning”,²⁴³ but, he emphasizes, “the basic notions”, as Krleža articulated them, are not being given up on. The matter of the modernizing, educational ambitions of that undertaking on the level of the development of Yugoslavia and its culture is also connected with the acceptance, not only of its critical elements, but also its social ones. This defines who are really the “Encyclopedists.” Even though the technical manuals from the first period of the YLI – concerning forestry, agriculture, technical arts, medicine, maritime science, geography, physical culture – replaced the university's textbooks in the ever-expanding world of institutions of higher education, the academic community kept a tacit distance from encyclopedia as a “social network”, holding to the cultural idea that regarded it as a canonical tool around which it would itself arbitrate.

243 Cecić, Ivo. “Interview s dr. Ivom Cecićem.” Razgovarao Vlaho Bogišić. *Studentski list*, br. 856, 7. ožujka, 1984, 5–7.

As early as 1956, Krleža alluded to the “level of our intellectuals” at formal consultations with the higher-ups of the Party in Croatia. Whenever he publicly expressed even a small objection to their texts, they would all leave.²⁴⁴ The Institute was initially formed “with the mission of gathering and cultivating lexicographic and other material for publishing the encyclopedias”. It was understood that they would be published, but the emphasis was on a documentary basis which had not existed before. The assumption that the Institute would be independently able to secure such a basis for its edition for a longer period of time was simply not realistic. Indeed, the remarkable undertaking of the retrospective bibliography of all the periods of the Yugoslav countries since the beginning of the printing age, collected and edited in parallel with the editing of the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia (in eight volumes, 1955–1972) would not even come close to happening again.

During the finishing work on the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia, Tito came to Zagreb, honored the Institute and Krleža, but also publicly put the emphasis on the fact that he also knew about the “difficulties they were facing – the financial, political, and sometimes of a national character”.²⁴⁵

The first volume of the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia, whose manuscripts were defined while Tito was still in treatment, was published only a few months after Tito’s death. At this time another scene of controversy broke out in public, a typical “political” and “national” one.

The Belgrade newspapers reported that the articles about the Albanians and about Albanian-Yugoslav relations were conceived and presented in a mistaken way, firstly because they treated these concepts in the context of the entire Albanian people and their cultural body, rather

244 Vojnović, Branislava, ur. *Zapisnici Izvršnoga komiteta Centralnoga komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske 1955 – 1959* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv, 2010), 201–204.

245 “Yugoslavski leksikografski zavod (1950 – 1975).”, *Bilten Jugoslavskog leksikografskog zavoda*, 25. obljetnica, br. 9–10 (1975).

than focusing on the Albanian community in Yugoslavia. Discussing this with his editor, Enes Čengić, Krleža commented, “Everything that is created in the Encyclopedia is in line with the self-managing agreements, and arises from the base. Given that, the central editing in those matters is basically powerless”.²⁴⁶ Krleža was in fact referring to changes which were rapidly happening in the transfer of self-governing practices into all areas of social life. Somewhat earlier (in 1977), in an edition of the YLI—the third edition of the General Encyclopedia—for the first time the social and cultural life of the Montenegrins was treated under the name of their people.²⁴⁷ It was at this time that public controversies like those came to garner more attention.

In principle, the constitutional reforms “relaxed” the process that Krleža mentioned. But on the other hand, they brought to the composition of the encyclopedic platform such a level of complexity that, in the interest of self-preservation, the drafters of the Encyclopedia had to make sure to adhere to these reforms first of all, rather to develop the content that they were actually supposed to be dealing with.

That second edition of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia was intended as a world precedent, meant to be published in six different editions: in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian, and in a shorter format in English.

Had that really happened – and judging by the fact that from the proposed number of editions, at least one volume was published, it was not just a matter of elaborate projection – Yugoslavia would have had one more document of great social energy it had at its disposal, though without succeeding in explaining the real reasons for its monumentality.

A crisis arose in the course of the production of a great number of printed volumes in the scope of the “contractual” projection of as many as 30,000 distributed sets of the first edition. Since demand for the first books of the basic edition was modest, and for the later

246 Čengić, Enes. *S Krležom iz dana u dan 4* (Zagreb: Globus, 1985), 286.

247 Šentija, Josip. *S Krležom poslije '71* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2011), 234–236.

versions basically non-existent, the warehouse was growing fast to its institutional ending, with the tens of thousands of new copies.

That metaphorical mastodon, the remnant of an unwelcome memory, would gain notoriety as a kind of “culturicide” when the unwanted product, which nobody wanted to take responsibility over, would be recycled into old paper. A much more serious aspect of post-Yugoslav cultural regression connected to the Encyclopedia are not only the fragments of those editions, nor the fragmented “separate parts” of an undisputed level that was never achieved and later unattainable, but comparable parallel editions as well, such as another which was never finished: a demanding and reliable Yugoslav Encyclopedia of Art. None of the national environments whose emancipation these editions significantly helped were taken into account. In the first period, moreover, the Institute, until its “jubilee” (1950–1975), working more within a general, “educational” program, would use its final “ascent” as an institution from its titular “Yugoslav” basis to dedicate itself directly to establishing and permeating the cultural particularities of that circle. In his application to take over Krleža’s leading role, which was entrusted him just in 1983--when the institution had already integrated Krleža’s name into its title--Ivo Cević asserts that reconstruction had been initiated, in Krleža’s opinion, of the “Institute which was disorganized and decimated, program-wise, in its cadre and a material-financial sense” as well. The legal and business stabilization of the institution should have enabled the basis of an “expert, scientific, program that would last until the end of the century”. The nature of the program that was planned is illustrated by the many titles/volumes that were started or conceived, as well as single editions (The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1983, was actually a monography in its own right, developed from the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia!); the Lexicon of the Music of Yugoslavia and the Croatian biographical lexicon, the Sports Lexicon, and Film encyclopedia, were published, but that specific project, with its structure based on the “self-governing spirit”, had a special way of reflecting itself in the sphere of language. Besides the Eight-language Encyclopedic Dictionary, a

Ten-Language Dictionary of the Peoples and Nationalities of Yugoslavia was also considered!

Thus, it would use this “integrated alphabet” of all of its editions and the vocabulary of modern vocabularies from which the YLI, as a system, would also develop in order to connect to Krleža’s long-ago introspection about “thirty dialects” which would be used to begin the process of written history.

Among other disputes in the encyclopedic system he led, Krleža was especially surprised by the very crisis of “language”, which was only indirectly connected to the Institute, through him.

While the suspicious biographies by certain experts who had been engaged, or the way their biographies were processed--especially those of negative historical figures – was a subject of dispute, this was mostly cleared up by Krleža’s compelling arguments. But in the mid-1960s a great controversy about the “name and position of language” broke out, stoked by the inclusion of Croatian cultural institutions in the discussion concerning constitutional amendments. At this time, Krleža’s way of overcoming contested phenomena from the catalogue of national identity was brought into question.

At that point he was particularly confounded, since virtually the same “amendment” that had already been under discussion during the signing of the new Constitution (1963), now, only three years later--after the process of “democratization” had started--was being contested so strongly.

However, the “change” would take place because of those very social surroundings, and it would have an effect on the functioning of the YLI as well.

While “politics” had until then operated from a closed, committee-like setting, boosted by the security “apparatus”-to which Krleža and many other authors/carriers of the project had access--the “opening” enabled the cultural elite to ask critical questions, with questionable reach in the realization of their goals, but it also gave them significant potential in the creation of their environment.

Krleža's insight into social crises was confirmed in this case as well. The Institute symbolically exited from this period--and from the world--twenty years later, with a linguistic document on the "Serbo-Croatian/Croatian-Serbian Language, Croatian or Serbian" (1988). It was critically based so as to be challenging--if not hard to beat in a debate--but ultimately it was tacitly accepted in the circle of reference: it should be forgotten. Was it a new type of "social" contract, a "hushed-up deal" that was discussed, even while the representative in the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (1989) Miloš Laban was calling for a complete end to cooperation with the YLI? Because Serbia, he asserted, "has de facto spent three decades financing propaganda against itself", that is, it has promoted forgeries "against the Serbian people"²⁴⁸. Maybe one day there will be an examination of why "the Yugoslav community", regardless of the constitutional framework, failed to recognize the familiar speech it used to communicate as its own language – because this is what is in question, where the Encyclopedia is concerned. Milos Laban was only the spokesman of that defeat, as Boris Dežulović recognized immediately: "Trying to prove that the relief of a stone lion of Venice represents a wooden Trojan horse, he is--although a mathematician--in his free time, therefore, a historian, encyclopedist and economist, so he is actually is destroying that relief himself. Disguised as a fighter for freedom and money (albeit, chronologically, actually in reverse), he is undermining one of our last great mutual projects. Unfortunately, that was not simply the continuation of an 'us versus them' reckoning.

In the "Us and Them" integral roles in Yugoslav Studies, someone wanted to present themselves as the missing link in a chain whose only purpose is to hold the national 'keychain' turned to the sinister side".²⁴⁹ As it happened, Yugoslavia exited its own historical space through a large, encyclopedic door.

248 "Sporna enciklopedija". *Vjesnik*, 27. IX, 1989, 7.

249 Dežulović, Boris. "Labanova nacionalna matematika." *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 27. kolovoza, 1989, 20.

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11. "The social contract concerning the construction and the financing of the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia", *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

250 "Društveni dogovor o izradi i financiranju drugog izdanja Enciklopedije Jugoslavije.", *Službeni list SFRJ*, br. 8 (1980): 255 – 258.

II

**THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS AND
AUTONOMOUS
PROVINCES**

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THE SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES FOR/AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

THIS CHAPTER WILL focus on changes in the Yugoslav socialist republics and autonomous provinces brought about by the death of Josip Broz Tito. The timeline covered will be from Tito's death in Ljubljana on May 4, 1980 until November 29, 1991, when the Badinter Commission – on Yugoslav Republic Day – announced that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”.²⁵¹ The editorial board of this book has given me the assignment to edit its third part. A separate article has been ordered for each former republic and province, which should be written by an author from the country he / she is writing about. The editor should write the author's problem-based text based on the submitted works, which will be published in full on the project portal. The editor was obliged to propose to the Editorial Board theses regarding the concept and content that the authors of the articles should have used as a guide in designing their own articles.²⁵²

Research on the period from 1980 to the present, in a historiographical sense, is heavily influenced by the history of the present (*l'histoire du temps présent*). Moreover, even when research encompasses longer durations that extend beyond the history of national origins, the research generally cannot escape becoming ethnocentric. “Others”

251 Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”, *European Journal of International Law*, No 3, 1992., 178–185, quote on p. 183.

252 See “Prijedlog tema za obradu u svim republičkim/pokrajinskim priložima”.

are more often the subject of the history of relations, especially when it comes to ethnic neighbors within the same political boundaries or across those boundaries, and less often an occasion for asymmetric comparison.²⁵³ National historiographical research of the history of the present and even the recent past is everywhere, *nolens volens*, intertwined with current challenges of a political and social nature. Therefore, dialogic communication between interlocutors regularly assumes the least sociopolitical contexts. Since this book should contribute to the expansion of dialogue spaces in the post-Yugoslav “macrocosm” (so saturated with “surpluses” of the unconquered past (*die unbewältigte Vergangenheit!*)), the chosen approach to the whole of the third part seemed to us the most appropriate. It was not easy to agree with the collaborators, but it was made possible with the efforts of several members of the Editorial Board, i.e. associates in the project, to whom we owe gratitude, and even more to the authors of the articles.

The editorial is limited to some key topics pertaining to the crisis in Yugoslav society. They include, firstly, the legal, political and economic aspects of socialist self-government from the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 to 1990/1991 Law on Associated Labor. Secondly, the controversy regarding the status of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, i.e. the republican and provincial League of Communists during the same period. Thirdly, the controversy surrounding the state-level status of republics and provinces, their institutional development and their political priorities. Fourthly, the role of republics and

253 V. Vladimir Stipetić, *Dva stoljeća razvoja Hrvatskoga gospodarstva (1820 – 2005)*, Zagreb 2005. One of his concluding remarks is the following: “... going through the Scylla and Charybdis of aggression, faced with numerous challenges, Croatia has lost its former position among the more developed countries of the world. It exceeded the level reached in 1989 in 2005, but the public expects a faster return to the circle of the developed! This is not an easy task: we are in debt and most of the production and financial capital is in foreign hands. Under these conditions, only a new economic strategy can deliver the results the public expects”. (365) Also, see: Drago Roksanđić (ed.), *Uvod u komparativnu historiju*, Zagreb 2004.

provinces, i.e. , nations and nationalities as actors in the Yugoslav crisis and its war, and, fifthly, disputes and changes in attitudes towards Tito's legacy in light of the crisis and disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Its content is mostly derived by a subjective, editorial reading of the content of articles by colleagues and colleagues of historians, that is, experts in various social sciences., The editor is solely responsible for the content of this article.

When it comes to political relations, it should always be borne in mind that SFR Yugoslavia in 1974 was constitutionally defined by Article 1, which distinguishes between "government" and "self-government": "The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state as a state union of voluntarily united peoples and their socialist republics, as well as the socialist autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo which are part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, and the socialist self-governing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities". The socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces are defined analogously (Art. 3 / "The socialist republic is a state based on the sovereignty of the people and on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, and the socialist self-governing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities". / And Article 4. /" A socialist autonomous province is an autonomous socialist self-governing democratic socio-political community based on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, in which working people and citizens, peoples and nationalities exercise their sovereign rights. it is in the common interest of working people and citizens, peoples and nationalities of the Republic as a whole established by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia – and in the Republic". / What this distinction means, when it comes to political relations, requires both problematization and interpretation. I will stick to but one aspect.

Making the distinction between government and self-government in the context of political relations requires both problematization and interpretation.²⁵⁴ The Law on Associated Labor (1976) and other laws, bylaws and related acts have enabled the participation of literally millions of people in “self-government”, “governance” and government, all the way to republican and provincial assemblies, using the logic of “pluralism of self-government interests”.²⁵⁵ The vast majority of participants were not members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, nor, in most cases, of any other socio-political organization. In other words, a minimum of social mimicry at that time enabled the legalization of attitudes, interests, practices and aspirations within the system’s institutions— from the bottom up, but also from the top down – which were not required to have any connection to the normative value order of 1974 or 1976. (This does not make the question of political dissidents, that is, of political opposition on the fringes or beyond the fringes of the political system, meaningless, but it requires special elaboration).²⁵⁶ In other words, the Law on Associated Labor was a de facto act of legalization of a “pluralism of

254 Sociological and political science literature in this regard largely dates from the 1980s. After 1990, it was significantly thinned, and in historical science it is the exception rather than the rule. Particularly indicative was Vladimir Arzenšek’s research, *Structure and Movement* (Belgrade 1984), which investigated the distribution of power in labor organizations in Slovenia from 1969 to 1981 and proved the existence of a permanent hierarchical structure of power. The greatest is the power of management, and the least is the power of workers, with a tendency to increase the gap, as opposed to normative intentions. By the way, the theoretical subject of his study is the critique of the Leninist party in the system of socialist democracy.

255 Edvard Kardelj, *Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja*, Belgrade 1977.

256 Given the period that the author opted to cover, it would be worth delving into a topic that is beyond our scope at this time, i.e. to compare the key provisions of the Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia from 1974 with the verdicts of the Badinter Commission. The Commission’s task was not to write a new constitution for the disintegrating country, but the question remains how its verdicts corresponded

interests”, but not necessarily a “pluralism of self-governing interests”. The monopoly on power by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia over the republics and provinces, was not only political, but was also expressed as economic, state security and military power. Such power minimized the achievements of pluralistic practices and aspirations of very different provenances. From the perspective of the eighties the goal was to program and institutionalize power into a multi-party system by 1989/1990 at the latest. From 1976 to 1990, the aforementioned mono-party concentration of power was reconfigured to be polycentric during Tito’s life, and then manifested itself in another way after his death. This begs the question of what happened to self-government during the lives of Tito and Kardelj, especially with regards to the legislatively proclaimed goal of “workers mastering expanded reproduction”.

The history of Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s is dominated by the search for constitutional formulas that would guarantee the survival and progress of the state union after Tito’s death. Nevertheless, profound societal and economic changes inside the Yugoslav cultural space increasingly developed uniquely and independent of one another within the borders of the socialist republics and socialist autonomous provinces. Thus, in the imaginary, or more precisely, phantom borders of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, several of these changes became nationalist obsessions in the wartime disintegration of the state union.²⁵⁷ In some cases, the borders coincided, and in other cases less so: In 1981, 97.2% of Slovenes lived in Slovenia, and 95.2% of Macedonians in Macedonia. 81.5% of Muslims lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 78% Croats in Croatia and 76.2% Serbs in Serbia. Compared to others, the least Montenegrins lived in Monte-

to the key provisions of the SFR Yugoslavia Constitution, regardless of the constitutional changes already voted on and approved in the (former) republics.

257 Hannes Grandits et al., “Fantomске granice: novo promišljanje prostora i aktera u vremenu”, in: *Vojna krajina u suvremenoj historiografiji. Zbornik radova s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem* (ed. Drago Roksandić and Vedran Muić), Zagreb 2021., 263–286.

negro – 69%. Similar to the Montenegrin case, 70.8% of Albanians lived in Kosovo and, conversely, 90.3% of Hungarians in Vojvodina.²⁵⁸

This was most noticeable in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although 81.5% of Muslims in SFR Yugoslavia lived in it, they made up 39.5% of the population of the Republic, with Serbs at 32%, Croats at 18.3%, and nationally undecided Yugoslavs at 7.9%. The spatial dispersion of each of these communities made relations even more complex.

Croatian-Serbian ethno-demographic relations in Croatia were also complex. The share of Serbs in the population of Croatia gradually decreased after 1941–1945, but ethno-demographic relations became increasingly complex. Both ethnicities left the areas of their traditional agrarian concentrations on a similar scale and migrated, above all, to urban centers, which then became more ethno-demographically complex communities due to the modernization changes in socialist Croatia. Thus, regardless of the gradually decreasing share of Serbs in the population of Croatia, the ethno-demographic picture of the Republic became even more complex. Similar situations can be found in Montenegro, Macedonia, etc.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Summarizing his assessment of the successes and failures in the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1980s, Dragan Markovina characterizes the ideology of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina (LC BH) (it is the only place in his article that refers to “self-government”): “All this with the ruling party, which stubbornly and more than any other republican party insists on political trials and self-governing Yugoslavia, and the idea of compromise in the name of the survival of the common state”. “Stubbornness” was pointless in a republic in which numerous workers’ mass “work

258 Paul Garde, *Život i smrt Jugoslavije*, Zagreb 1996., 109–120 (“Nacionalnosti”).

stoppages”, i.e. “strikes”, were transformed from social to ethno-confessional movements in an ever-shorter period of time.²⁵⁹

The disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) at its XIV Extraordinary Congress, held in January 1990, significantly accelerated the disintegration of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was otherwise significantly weakened by the “Agrokomerc affair” that erupted on January 25, 1987. The affair was a mastodon example of a business utilizing bills of exchange without having financial coverage, but instead relying on political coverage at the highest levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even Yugoslavia. The “Neum affair” of 1988 contributed even more to this, revealing the secret of 557 preferential loans to Bosnian politically powerful men of all nationalities for the construction of holiday homes in the only Bosnian town on the Adriatic coast, Neum. The scandals coincided with a worsening economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia, which in turn had an additional devastating effect on Bosnian society and its economy.

The inevitable dismissal of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the X Congress held in Sarajevo in December 1990, did not bring about necessary changes to the political ideology or program orientation. Above all, it failed to provide a sustainable vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the chaotic disintegration of the Yugoslav federal community. This inability to move forward left all the left-wing renewal movements, regardless of their backgrounds, fragmented. Like the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had shared the ideal of a transnational state of equal constituent peoples, but found they had to distance themselves from the “corrupt” “red bourgeoisie” in power.

After the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Communists, like their Croatian counterparts, wanted

259 Jake Lowinger, *Economic Reform and the ‘Double Movement’ in Yugoslavia: An Analysis of Labor Unrest and Ethno-Nationalism in 1980s. A Dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*, Baltimore, Maryland, October 2009.

to maintain their elevated status in society and ensure the continuance of the advantages they had created for themselves through decades as the party in power. They attempted this by announcing the progress they had achieved from 1945 to 1990 in advancing Bosnia and Herzegovina as it had never been before in modern history, and so on. They failed at that. As the socio-economic crisis steadily worsened, the Communists' attempts to de-ethnicize / deconfessionalize a political culture in transition failed due to the 12 June 1990 decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision legalized the right to form political parties with national and religious attributes, and set a new date for multi-party democratic elections to be held on December 18, 1990. These elections were overwhelmingly won by ethno-confessionally formed parties (SDA, SDS and HDZ), which each "won" "their" electorate, by avoiding mutual conflicts and, in all three cases, by labeling the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a party that it was necessary to delegitimize politically and historically.

Table 1. Election results of the parties successors of Republican Communist Alliances in 1990.²⁶⁰

	Party	% of votes	No. of seats in parliament won	% of seats	Election date
Bosnia and Herzegovina	SK BiH-SDP	12,4	19/240	7,8	18.11.1990.
Slovenia	ZKS-SDP	17,5	14/80	17,5	8.4.1990.
Croatia	SKH-SDP	25,2	73/356	20,5	23.4.1990.
Macedonia	SKM-PDP	21,8	31 /120	25,8	11.11.1990.
Montenegro	SKCG	56,1	83/125	66,4	9.12.1990.
Serbia	SPS	46,0	194/250	77,6	9.12.1990.

260 Alfredo Sasso, "Legacy of the past, dilemmas of the present and the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina between multi-party reform and elections", *Social Democracy in BiH – Historical Review and Considerations for the Future*, ed. Nermin Kujović and Alfredo Sasso (Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020.), 130.

The League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly weakened the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia. Both of them were oriented towards the same electoral body and competed with each other. The Alliance was constituted at a large rally in Kozara on July 29, 1990, and brought new energy to the reform-oriented part of the electorate. However, the Alliance was too weak to have a more decisive effect on stopping the process of ethno-confessionalization of BiH politics and society *in toto*.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the type of transition policy that played out was first modeled in Poland, albeit, under different circumstances. Alfredo Sasso writes about this: "In the transition to a multi-party system, especially if it takes place in a multiethnic country, a careful institutional plan and time schedule and the order of the founding elections are equally necessary and crucial. Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia as a whole did not have any 'roundtable negotiations' between the ruling party and the opposition forces on basic conditions for a multi-party system: a law on political association, mechanisms of separation of powers, electoral system, etc. Pluralism in Yugoslavia emerged from a chaotic sub-state competition between the republican branches of the LCY, which intensified in the late 1980s over a conflict in which the leaders of Serbia and Slovenia were the main participants. From 1989 to 1990, each branch of the LCY established its own conditions and schedule for elections to be held at the sub-state level. The branches used the transition to a multi-party system to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the republican sphere and increase popular support for their rule. In contrast, the Yugoslav State elections, envisaged by the federal government, were constantly postponed, and in the end were never held. However, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the LC BH approached the multi-party process with significant reservations and slowness. In the initial phase, until February 1990, this can be attributed to ideological rigidity, and in the later phase, until June 1990, to strategic indecision.

During the Congress in December 1989, the LC BH guidelines on pluralism remained essentially conservative”.²⁶¹

MONTENEGRO

In the Montenegrin case, according to Radenko Šćekić, self-governing socialism developed in a society whose culture of memory reached back to the Montenegrin tribal tradition at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. “Although under the communist regime, in which self-governing socialism developed, the memory of the tribal system from the beginning of the century, which intertwined with the post-war socio-political engineering of the Communist Party, was essentially preserved”. Montenegro, in the final phase of the Yugoslav crisis, became the scene of an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in August and September 1988. Self-governing slogans became instruments used to negate the fundamental values of the same socialist self-government and above all to retraditionalize the Montenegrin society: “From the very beginning of the gatherings, their characteristic was demagogic populism. The propaganda claimed that these were spontaneous movements and gatherings of the people, however, it was still an organized movement. For the sake of better and more efficient propaganda, this movement skillfully used the dissatisfaction of the people due to the events in Kosmet, as well as the difficult economic situation and presented itself as a movement aimed at overcoming the crisis, i.e. as a movement with primarily social demands. There were many slogans at the rallies about self-government, the fight against bureaucracy, and against ‘reborn’ officials”.

According to the same author, “the economic inefficiency of the political system in SR Montenegro in the 1980s initially seemed like a transient economic crisis, as another in a series of previous ones. The general illiquidity of the economy, huge costs, inefficient, expensive

261 Alfredo Sasso, “Hipoteke prošlosti, dileme sadašnjosti i Savez komunista Bosne i Hercegovine između višestranačke reforme i izbora”, in: *Socijalna demokratija u BiH – Historijski pregled i razmatranja za budućnost* (ed. Nermin Kujović and Alfredo Sasso; Sarajevo, 2020., p. 70–90).

and cumbersome administration, negligible investment and the introduction of new technologies made Montenegrin export products often uncompetitive on the world market. The return of a large number of guest workers to the country after the global economic crisis of the 1970s also resulted in a drastically reduced inflow of foreign currency. Inflation and unemployment rose with rising economic losses, while output and living standards declined. The growing economic crisis was inevitably increasingly accompanied by a growing crisis in all other areas of life – especially in interethnic relations. Along with the growing crisis and the increasingly obvious manifestation of the inability of leading political elites to find a way out of it, the dissatisfaction of the people with the situation in the country grew, the reputation and influence of the LCY and political leadership weakened and distrust grew in a system unable to find a way out from the crisis”. Since in the eyes of the Montenegrin public the most responsible for the long-lasting crisis of Montenegrin society were those who in the period after 1966 were at the same time key agents of the Montenegrin national self-awareness process, the wave of “anti-bureaucratic revolution” was actually directed towards the Montenegrin national elite. A “trigger” was a group of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, led by Miroslav Šolević, “secretary of the Committee for Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins to go to protest rallies outside the province”. The group played a role in conducting a series of “truth rallies” throughout Serbia and its provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. These rallies enabled Slobodan Milošević to secure power in Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina through a series of populist coups. They also helped him to wield control over personnel working in federal agencies and organizations, originating from Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The same group was given the task from Milošević’s associates to “ensure rallies of truth” and to launch the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in Montenegro in order to secure a “fourth” vote of a total of eight in (con)federalized Yugoslav bodies and organizations. The group and its Montenegrin supporters would not have done too much if there were not many people in Montenegro who needed her appearance so that they could announce themselves.

Although the 16th session of the LCY Central Committee in July 1988 declared itself against the “export” of the “truth rally” from Serbia, a mass rally was organized in Titograd on Milošević’s birthday, August 20, using the same pattern. “Anti-bureaucratic” rhetoric was intertwined with militant Serbian nationalist rhetoric. The rally succeeded in inciting the most mundane impulses in the Montenegrin public. Similar rallies followed in other parts of Montenegro. Although the Montenegrin leadership managed to prevent attempted personnel changes in 1988, Yugoslav and Montenegrin initiatives to prevent the next wave of “anti-bureaucratic” campaigns failed. The situation culminated in a conflict near Žuta Greda in which the police were called to intervene and three months later at a rally in Titograd on January 10, 1989, which forced the collective resignation of the Montenegrin leadership the next day: “The two-day protest rally of over one hundred thousand workers, students, youth and citizens ended at around 2 pm on January 11, 1989, after all their demands were accepted. The then Vice President of the Parliament of SR Montenegro, B. Tadić, announced that in accordance with the demands of the rally participants, the following personnel would resign: the Presidency of SR Montenegro, the Presidency of the Central Committee of LC Montenegro and its executive secretaries, the Presidency of the Republic Commission of the Socialist League of the Working People, and members of the Presidency of the SFRY and the Central Committee of the SKJ from Montenegro: V. Đuranović, V. Žarković and M. Orlandić, and the Executive Secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, M. Filipović. ‘All demands have been met, the people have won’, Momir Bulatović said, among other things, congratulating on the victory to the raging crowd. He further emphasized: ‘The Montenegrin leadership lost a lawsuit with the people. One wrong policy crashed, in which attitudes were fabricated, adorned with rhetorical flowers, and the results of the actions were disproportionately little behind it. What happened was due to the justified dissatisfaction of working people, citizens, young people and students, The political earthquake from October 7 to 10 last year, was not enough to

break with such a policy. Because of all this, the people had to gather again'.²⁶² Exclamations, songs, chanting and inscriptions on the banners reflected the diversity of demands and attitudes of those present at the rally. They moved from social demands for the improvement of economic conditions, to nationalist slogans, and finally to attacks on the then Montenegrin leaders...".

Although numerous actors of different political orientations and aspirations took part in the "happening of the people" in Montenegro, and although some key persons among them – depending on the changes in the "power relations" in Montenegro and outside Montenegro – changed their national political and other priorities even the goals until the state independence of Montenegro in 2006, in 1989 the winner was Slobodan Milošević. The consequences of his "crossing" the borders of Serbia with the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in SFR Yugoslavia, largely in a state of disintegration, were catastrophic. Serbia could no longer be re-elected in federal bodies and organizations, and the Yugoslav People's Army was potentially, as it would soon become, its ally.

Since the epicenter of change in Montenegro was in the University Committee of LCM, and the public bearers of change were mostly younger people, the joint session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCM and the Presidency of the University Committee of LCM, held on December 10, 1988, could create the impression of a "generational turn" in the Montenegrin Party as it faced the challenge of a multi-party system: "After the changes in Montenegro in January 1989, relying on the mechanisms and infrastructure, norms and rules of the previous regime, a certain division of functions was made to reconcile and satisfy the aspirations and wishes of the participants in the coup and part of the government administration, which needed for the system and institutions to function normally. It can be said that there was a certain mood among the main political leaders resulting from the January coup. The League of Communists

262 Pobjeda, 12. januar 1989., str. 5.

of Montenegro was already discussing, at least declaratively, political pluralism at its Tenth Extraordinary Congress in April 1989. (...) Although at their last congress (X Extraordinary, held in April 1989) the Communists of Montenegro discussed political pluralism, i.e. the need and possibilities of introducing a multi-party system, the assessment prevailed that 'more parties do not mean more democracy', so it could be interpreted that democracy can be achieved without a multi-party system and thus enter the transition". Nevertheless, the political pluralism of the mass movement that legitimized changes in the Montenegrin establishment obliged the new leadership of the Montenegrin Communists to agree to the constitution of the Democratic Forum, which consisted of representatives of all political movements emerging out of January and post-January changes, and should have made the conditions for an open discussion of all key questions about the future of Montenegro and Yugoslavia certain, which made the situation in Montenegro different from that in Serbia.

However, in the first multi-party elections in Montenegro, in December 1990, the League of Communists of Montenegro won convincingly without a reformist addition to its name. Their program insisted – paradoxically – on continuity with the “old order” rather than on discontinuity, but in the second part of the XI Congress (June 22, 1991 – again, a symbolic date) they opted for a new name, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). In the second multi-party elections in 1992, the party, under its new name, won an absolute majority in the Montenegrin parliament: “... the supremacy of the DPS was still enough to win an absolute majority in Parliament (46 out of a total of 85 seats). It is interesting that the parliamentary list of this party attracted more voters in the December republican elections of 1992, as well as in the first multi-party elections in 1990, than the lists of all other parties represented in the Montenegrin parliament. Comparatively speaking, the DPS is the only party in the post-communist countries of Central and Southeast Europe that, having won an absolute majority in Parliament in the first multi-party elections managed to preserve that majority in the second

multi-party elections”.²⁶³ Regardless of everything that could be said about that absolute majority, it was obviously reconstituted amidst the horrors of the wars that caused the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which included the active participation of Montenegro in the alliance with Serbia to conquer Croatia.

CROATIA

Tomislav Badovinac, the tireless president of the Association of Societies “Josip Broz Tito” of Croatia, edited two books dedicated to Zagreb and Croatia in the “Tito era”, These books included some 80 testimonies and scientific contributions about Croatia as it was from 1945 to 1990 in the eyes of people who believe that Croatia’s historical heritage must be thought about critically.²⁶⁴ While writing my article about Croatia for this edition, I used many other works, but these two books especially intrigued me because they contained writings by people who were in different ways identified with “Tito’s Croatia” or “Tito’s Yugoslavia”. Their observations often expressed critical, and even very critical point of view (Milan Kangrga, Predrag Matvejević, etc.).²⁶⁵

Since Tito’s name is symbolically linked to the concept of socialist self-government, I checked what could be read about it in relation to him. Socialist self-government is mentioned relatively often in relation to Tito, but generally quite briefly and with the sense that it is not worth in-depth examination nor should it be glorified any longer.²⁶⁶

263 Vladimir Goati, *Izbori u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori od 1990. do 2013. i u SRJ od 1992. do 2003. godine*, Beograd 2013., 38.

264 Tomislav Badovinac, *Zagreb i Hrvatska u Titovo doba*, Zagreb 2004., 476 p.; Ibid, *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije*, Zagreb 2008., 570 p.

265 By far the most prolific Croatian historian on the history of Croats in Yugoslavia is Ivo Goldstein. For the purposes of this paper, I singled out Zdenko Radelić’s study *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb 2006. i 2008. godine, 701 p.), which, by its plentifulness of themes and exact nature of insights, becomes ineluctable material.

266 Another such “silent” topic, with two explicit exceptions (Ivan Perić and Dejan Jović) are Serbs in Croatia.

The closest to glorification can be found in Adolf Dragičević's writings, and he, regardless of his reputation, was not a favorite of the "system": "The choice of the new and the better fell to the workers' self-government, but only in three of its important functions: decision-making by majority democratic overvoting, control of the execution of the decisions, and disposal of the realized income. The fourth and most important function – the function of preparing decisions – was retained by the party and state bureaucracy, using educated experts".²⁶⁷ Dragičević also considered the fundamental intentions of the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY and the 1976 Law on Associated Labor to be justified: "The novelty was the possibility and need of networking of economic entities, even of the basic organizations of joint work of different companies. It corresponded with a world turn in which traditionally fragmented community is replaced by – as its eminent theorist, Manuel Castels, calls it – a postmodern networked society. Along the way, however, the Croatian managerial elite imposed itself: by successfully penetrating world markets, establishing and developing internal scientific institutes, monitoring and adopting technological innovations, and changing the structure of production by training and hiring specialized experts".²⁶⁸ In contrast, Tomislav Badovinac himself, in the "Preface" to the same book, despite his belief that the path towards the development of self-governing socialism was historically justified, still rates it as lacking. I single out a few key criticisms: "The development of self-government and its success have increasingly lost their efficiency, and the much-needed solutions to contradictory difficulties and adequate further direction have been lacking. (...) The most important cause and the most responsible player is the League of Communists".²⁶⁹ According to Badovinac, it was not possible to transform the League of Communists from a "state

267 Adolf Dragičević, "Pogovor", in: *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije* (ed. Tomislav Badovinac), Zagreb 2008., 549–570, quote on p. 556.

268 Ibid.

269 Tomislav Badovinac, "Predgovor", in: Ibid, *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije*, Zagreb 2008., 7–18, quote on p. 16–17.

governing organization into a leading ideological and political force”, so the inevitable consequence was “the strengthening of bureaucratic tendencies and identifying with the role of self-management, imposing their own solutions, which were not always fully in agreement with self-management and further development of self-management. ... Legal frameworks were created but these were not the best solution, because there was no material basis for the for the achieved attainments of consciousness of self-managers. The Law on Associated Labor (ZUR, 1976) caused disunity instead of connecting the basic organizations of associated labor (OOUR). The technological units of companies are fragmented. (...) As a result, production stagnated and public consumption flourished, so companies had less and less income and accumulation at their disposal from year to year”.²⁷⁰ Badovinac also emphasized the effects of the republican-provincial *liberum veto* in federal bodies and organizations: “The desire for all decisions in the federation to be made by consensus has diminished its efficiency and reduced the possibility of resolving significant difficulties. (...) The 1974 Constitution enabled the republics to become independent as self-governing socialist republics, and they, unfortunately, became independent as nationalist-chauvinist republics, opposed to each other”.²⁷¹

Systematic research by many scientists about the Croatian experience of socialist self-government from 1980 to 1990, warned that the system suffered from unresolved issues that contributed to a variety of problems in Croatian and Yugoslav society. These scientists included: the sociologists Rudi Supek, Josip Županov, and Srđan Vrcan; the economists Vladimir Stipetić, Dragomir Vojnić and Marijan Korošić; the lawyers Eugen Pusić and Nikola Visković, and the political scientist Jovan Mirić. Warnings were also issued by people like Stipe Šušvar and Dušan Bilandžić, who enjoyed a special status among the political elite and the scientific community.

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid.

Table 2. Croats and Population of Yugoslavia and Croatia²⁷²

Year	Population of Yugoslavia	Croats in Yugoslavia		Population of Croatia	Croats in Croatia	
		number of	%		number of	%
1948.	15.772.098	3.784.353	24,0	3.779.858	2.975.399	78,7
1953.	16.396.573	3.975.550	23,5	3.936.022	3.128.661	79,5
1961.	18.549.291	4.239.809	23,1	4.159.696	3.339.890	80,3
1971.	20.522.972	4.526.782	22,1	4.426.221	3.513.647	79,4
1981.	22.424.711	4.428.043	19,8	4.601.496	3.454.661	75,1
1991.	23.472.000	4.664.292	19,8	4.784.265	3.736.356	78,1

I will dwell on Županov's critique: "... in constructing a self-governing project, the political elite started from a sociologically erroneous theory of social change:

- 1) Social change represents a sharp break with the existing reality – change means only discontinuity;
- 2) Change does not spring from the existing reality – it is revealed, imposed from above by the revolutionary avant-garde;
- 3) Change is imposed through new institutions, which means that the process of change is highly institutionalized;
- 4) Since new institutions are defined in legal norms, they are the main mechanism of social change. In other words, the process of change takes a characteristic form: project – realization".²⁷³

When it comes to the organizational level of self-government, Županov has long warned of the importance of his missing starting point: "In choosing the organizational level, the Yugoslav 'project' completely neglects the level of the working group. Self-management is centered at the level of the work organization with a tendency for self-management to be centered at the global level (delegate system). This is quite contrary to the sociological criteria that self-management is centered at the level where information and motivation are strongest".²⁷⁴ Since self-

272 Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006. i 2008.), 538.

273 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 15.

274 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 17.

management was organized opposite to how it should have been, the failures in its development were, according to Županov, exponentially greater: “Transferring self-management, i.e. its focus, to the global level (“mastering extended reproduction” and similar slogans) has even less chance of success than self-management at the enterprise level. This is reflected in the complete failure of the delegate system, i.e. in the failure of delegations to direct the work of elected delegates. The delegate system has acquired a regressive character, as it replaces democracy in society, blocks the development of a democratic political system and protects the political elite from democratic political control”.²⁷⁵ Županov’s critique, at least in some of its aspects, coincides with Badovinac’s, which is undoubtedly directed differently: “some essential elements of ‘dogmatic Marxism’ remained unchanged. These are: an absolutely negative attitude towards private property, which is incompatible with socialism and even self-governing socialism, and therefore a negative attitude towards the private economy and entrepreneurship, an ambivalent attitude towards the market economy; a hostile attitude towards the peasantry; theory of class struggle and the working class; acceptance of the one-party system and the Party’s monopoly (avant-garde theory); acceptance of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat; firm representation of democratic centralism in the Party, etc”.²⁷⁶

The “Avant-Garde”, the League of Communists of Croatia, as well as everyone else in the republics and provinces and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – in which the middle classes prevailed everywhere, people who for the most part no longer cared too much about “experiments” – clearly did not see their future in the labyrinths of self-management communication and social bargaining, the delegate system, etc. The reconstruction of the nation-state and civil society was already at their fingertips after all the crisis shocks of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, so that every League of Communists, republican and

275 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 18.

276 Josip Županov, *Poslije potopa*, Zagreb 1995., 24.

provincial, was fragmented into smaller ones, political parties that emerged from the decision to hold democratic, multi-party elections.

In Croatia, this decision, in the best party manner, was made in December 1989 by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCC, and then by the XI Congress of the LCC, on 13 December. Next up was the Republic Secretariat for Administration and Justice, which on February 5, 1990 issued registration decisions to representatives of eight political parties, and finally the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which on February 15 adopted the necessary constitutional amendments and the Election and Revocation Act for councilors and representatives.

The first round of voting was scheduled for April 22 and 23, and the second for May 6 and 7, 1990: “1705 candidates, 33 political parties and 16 various associations took part in the race for 351 seats. With 42 percent of the vote, the HDZ won 205 (58 percent) seats. The second-best result was obtained by LCH-SDP with 26% of votes and 107 seats (30 percent). It was followed by the KNS People’s Agreement coalition with 15 percent of the vote and 21 seats (5.9 percent). The last party to pass the election threshold was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which won 5 seats (1.4 percent of the seats) with 1.6 percent of the vote. The rest of the mandate went to independent candidates and national minorities. Based on the election results, on May 30 of the same year, the first multi-party Parliament was constituted – a day that was celebrated until 2001 as Statehood Day. This Parliament passed many historically important decisions, including the Croatian Constitution on December 22, 1990, the Constitutional Decision on Independence and Autonomy on June 25, 1991, and the Decision on the Termination of State Legal Relations with the Former SFRY on October 8, 1991, by which Croatia *de facto* became an autonomous and independent state”.²⁷⁷

277 See https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrvatski_parlamentarni_izbori_1990. /accessed: 1.11.2021./ In the second parliamentary elections, held on April 9, 1992, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia fell from second to fifth place, with 5.52% of the vote and 11 seats (7.97%). See https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrvatski_parlamentarni_izbori_1992. /accessed: 1.11.2021./

MACEDONIA

Jasmina Trajkoska Navomoska – in addressing problems inherent in the economic system and, especially, in the business environment in Macedonia in the eighties – puts the blame first on the “distorted” operation of the market; second, on the inefficiency and even futility of planning; and third on the general market closure within the Republic administrative distribution of loans and foreign exchange. Federal guarantees for repayment of loans, annuities and business losses, inevitable and unrealistic prices, interest rates and exchange rates, which were administratively regulated, and, in addition to all the above, “non-compliance with self-governing agreements” regarding anomalies in income acquisition and distribution, a general overload of the economy and, finally, low work discipline and an irresponsible attitude towards mistakes in work and business.

Economic policy measures in Macedonia taken to address specific problems, according to the author, were ineffective because they failed to take into account that, without a global approach, partial attempts at problem solving, would reduce some problems but increase others. In addition, their propensity for in-depth analysis and searching for causes from the 1960s and 1970s, etc., led to the examination of causes that were older than the issues on the agenda, which further complicated decision-making and ultimately had a paralytic effect. This increasingly raised the question of the notion of self-government in relation to “objective economic laws”, the state as an agent of economic policy, the meaning and implications of replacing domestic accumulation with inflation and foreign loans, miscalculations of factors of production and, ultimately, the undeveloped economic system. In other words, ideological and political limits prevented the development of self-governing relations in a market-oriented economy, so that in the late 1980s it was officially concluded that the self-governing “socialist-based economic system did not provide a way out of the crisis”.

The focus of the search for a way out of the crisis shifted towards technological innovations. In 1989, a “Draft program for the implementation

of the strategy of technological development of SFR Yugoslavia in FR Macedonia” was prepared, with a focus on informatics, biotechnology, flexible production systems, industrial equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery and appliances, vehicles, agricultural machinery, tools, tourism and food products. However, the key decision-makers in the normative socialist self-governing political and economic system in Macedonia remained the Party and the State. They held a monopoly on power and thus decisions on development policy.

The monopoly of power was only somewhat modified by the Trade Unions in the late 1980s, which sought to express and represent the interests of the working classes in decision-making processes. From 1986 to 1989, “bottom-up” pressures on real wages, but also on working and business conditions, intensified. They were increasingly related to decision-making methods in works councils and other self-governing and governing bodies, which expressed a loss of confidence in those responsible and, ultimately, in the political and economic system. Increasingly frequent strikes were gradually gaining more pronounced political characteristics: “The demands refer to: changing factory managements, quick implementation of reforms in the political and economic system, stopping social stratification and enrichment that is not the result of work, taking policies to stop inflation, etc”.

At the same time, the development of self-governing socio-economic relations in Macedonia was inevitably neglected, and the processes of combining work and resources on a Yugoslav scale were slowing down. The mentioned “Draft” therefore only normatively proclaimed development goals by which joint work was to fully master social reproduction by the year 2000, developing socialist self-governing socio-economic relations with a focus on building an “integral and creative personality”, with the aim of accelerating reduction and the difference in the level of development of FR Macedonia in relation to the Yugoslav averages, etc.

When it comes to the self-governing experiences and political culture of Macedonian citizens, research has confirmed that the experience of directly shaping the attitudes of individuals produced a

relatively high level of articulated public commitment. The actions of individuals, of course, correlated with various sociopsychological factors. According to public opinion polls from 1981, 75.9% of the citizens of FR Macedonia were of the opinion that nationalism was the greatest danger to the future of the Yugoslav socialist self-governing federation. When, in 1990, an amendment to the Constitution of FR Macedonia legalized political pluralism, lifted restrictions on the acquisition of private property, liberalized markets, etc., the value orientations of Macedonian citizens were after a decade of increasingly dramatic crises of Yugoslav society and the Yugoslav state union substantially changed.

Trajskoska Novomoska's very comprehensive account of the changes in Macedonia from 1980 to 1990 deals with the politically active League of Communists of Macedonia. Data from Macedonian public opinion surveys conducted in 1979 and 1981 are cited, which, among other things, check the perception of the communist figure among respondents. For many, communists were still supposed to be "people of a special kind" at the time, but those whom the respondents knew in one way or another were clearly not: "This is a period in which the League of Communists needs to reconsider its position among citizens and working people ... It is an interesting fact from the data that indicate that, although some schools of opinion said that "the time of communists has passed, and at this stage they should not be different from other citizens". Citizens and working people in FR Macedonia did not think so. Their common attitude was that a communist is a person who, out of personal conviction and without personal benefit, exemplifies the values of honesty and modesty, responsibility in performing work tasks, selflessness, willingness to fight for justice, having a Marxist view of the world, etc. In a previous survey in 1979, when asked: "In your opinion, should the criteria for admission to the League of Communists be stricter than the current ones?";

61.8% of the total number of respondents and 68.6% of the surveyed members of the League of Communists gave an affirmative answer.²⁷⁸

Such orientations of public opinion to some extent correspond to workers' behavior in strikes, which were an important phenomenon in Macedonian society in the period 1980–1990. Although the strikes were a new phenomenon of political participation in which workers publicly expressed themselves in new ways and even expressed resistance to the political system, they were “still under the great influence of the LCY”.

However, in the first multi-party elections in Macedonia in 1990, the League of Communists of Macedonia – the Party for Democratic Transformation won 25.83% of the vote and 31 seats, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), 63% of the vote and 38 seats. Despite Macedonia leaving Yugoslavia without war, the reformed communists no longer had a future in the eyes of the Macedonian electorate.²⁷⁹

SLOVENIA

According to Božo Repe, the Slovenian decision to “dissociate” from Yugoslavia was decisively influenced by a variety of differences. The first concerned Yugoslavia as an alliance of independent states or a unitary state with Yugoslav national integration in perspective. The second, difference was over the development of a democratic,

278 It is necessary to warn Zagorka Golubović's remark from 1985 regarding the public opinion poll in the countries of “real socialism”: “... In the countries of ‘existing socialism’, which includes Yugoslavia, there is a great influence of ideology on the formation of attitudes, and the question cannot be avoided: what are the obtained attitudes – whether the real opinion of the respondents, or what they think is expected of them (especially if they are members of the LC)”. (Zagorka Golubović, *How to inform the Yugoslav public about writing about Yugoslav self-government*).

279 Etem Aziri, “Izborni sistemi i izbori u Republici Makedoniji. Prošlost, sadašnjost i izazovi za budućnost”, *Političke perspektive*, 7–21. Quote from p. 12.

multi-party parliamentary systems as opposed to the maintenance of mono-partisanship and the constitutionally guaranteed privileges of the ruling party that came with it. The third difference centered on the introduction of market laws and pluralism of ownership or a formally self-governing but truly state-run economy with dubious social ownership integration during a time when the fear of German and Italian historical “enemies” disappeared, which justified the Slavic commitment to Yugoslavia while the fear of Serbs and their political goals grew.

In such a problem grid, it is difficult to single out specifically self-governing issues, whether they are experiences that should have been given up or those that would happen in the future. However, regardless of how anyone outside Slovenia in the 1980s or even looking back today, would accept such exclusively formulated alternatives, it is an unquestionable fact that the system of socialist self-government in Slovenia before the 1980s resulted in a much more pluralized political culture than anywhere else in Yugoslavia and, perhaps more importantly, legitimized institutional actors who in various ways crossed the mono-party permitted limits of “pluralism of self-governing interests”. The author cites the political “jumps” of the Alliance of Socialist Youth of Slovenia, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Slovenia, the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the Alliance of Communists of Slovenia and professional societies of writers, political scientists, sociologists, etc. In various ways in the first half of the 1980s, they influenced profound internal changes within the League of Communists of Slovenia and created the necessary preconditions for its reform transformation on the basis of a radical departure from “Titoist” ideology.

In addition to internal changes, no less important were the successive failures of key Yugoslav actors, centered in the Presidency of the LCY Central Committee and the SFRY Presidency, who were already functionally paralyzed by a system of annual rotations at the helm, to agree on anything that was constitutionally within the competence of

the federal state in situations of permanent crises that affected Yugoslavia as a whole and each of its citizens as individuals.

Until the beginning of 1989, the official leadership of the Slovene Communists tried not to radicalize their attitudes towards others in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia who were reform-oriented: "In January 1989, the LCS Central Committee Presidency still advocated that the LCS's vision was to develop non-partisan pluralism, in which the Socialist League of the Working People would permit the political parliament to be 'a space for democratic expression, confrontation and competition of initiatives and programs and control of their implementers'; socialism and self-government remained the foundation of the social order. The Socialist League of the Working People would be reshaped, together with the emerging alliances, while the competition for projects and programs would be taken over from the classical parliamentary system and the political responsibility of their holders and implementers would be affirmed".

Internally, the "innermost circle" already had a significantly different political orientation, which radically exceeded the limits of socialist self-governing constitutionalism: "At the same time, the closest leadership of the LCS concluded that it was necessary to organize the LC as a modern party, as well as to prepare for the party game, and the quiet abandonment of the idea of non-party pluralism before membership was justified by the fact that the situation changed, that Slovenian society had become pluralistic, that the transition to a democratic order required a legitimate government based on a 'time-limited, divided and democratically controlled structure of government institutions', which should 'allow political actors to decide for themselves what type of political organization (movement, alliance, party etc.) they prefer'. Given that in 1986, public opinion polls showed that 60% of Slovenian citizens – in contrast to numerous oppositional distances from institutional political actors – "had confidence in the system of socialist self-government", the question arises as to what delegitimized socialist self-government in Slovenia itself, regardless of Yugoslav disputes over it. In other words, why, could not at least some

important aspects of socialist self-government have survived the end of communist monopolism? Does the answer lie partly in the anti-communist mobilization of public opinion in the summer of 1991, which was not only Serbophobic and Yugoslav-phobic, but required a shift to new German and Italian “strategic partners, essentially discarding everything that bound Slovenes to Yugoslav socialist heritage? The historical paradox, however, is that nowhere in Yugoslavia was socialist self-government as productive as in Slovenia.

In his article on Slovenia in the period from 1980 to 1990, Božo Repe paid /much attention to the changes in the League of Communists of Slovenia. Starting from the claim that the position of President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS in Slovenia was the most important position in the political system, his interpretation of the changes is largely personalized, with the focus remaining on that systemically most influential person. From 1982 to 1986, the top leader of the Party in Slovenia was Andrej Marinc, who secured a place at the apex of the Slovenian political hierarchy by participating in a showdown with the “liberal” Stan Kavčič, succeeding him as president of the Slovenian Executive Council (1972–1978). Marinc continued his political career in Belgrade as Vice President of the Federal Executive Council (1978–1979) and then as a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SKY (1979–1982). After gaining the necessary federal experience, he returned to Ljubljana and replaced France Popit as President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party, where he remained for the next four years (1982–1986). From the perspective of the changes that took place in the second half of the 1980s, Marinc embodied a policy of continuity (e.g., support for heavy industry in crisis years); controlled discontinuity, e.g., limiting the use of repression in disputed cases; changing of attitudes towards the “dark” sides of the communist past (research of the so-called Dachau processes); opening opportunities for dialogue within the media, while also negotiating control of opposition media (“Mladina”); launching the “New Review”, etc. The members of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS were in the “field”

practically every day, “sector” issues were openly discussed, etc. The inner being of the League of Communists of Slovenia was gradually changing, but the leadership lacked a clear longer-term orientation.

Marinc had a decisive influence in reconciling the “old” and the “young”, which paved the way for Milan Kučan to take the lead in the League of Communists of Slovenia at its 10th Congress in April 1986. Although congressional rhetoric was still traditionally revolutionary, reforms were legalized that would open the door to non-partisan pluralism only two years later in 1988. Soon after, came the announcement of a possible “change of government”, culminating in the Decision of the XI (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Slovenia in December 1989, to go in a social democratic direction. In that sense, Kučan’s status in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was radically different from that of previous leaders. The Slovenian delegates elected for the XIV extraordinary Congress of the LCY received clear instructions on how to defend the new party identity, even at the cost of withdrawing from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and this time all under the leadership of Kučan’s successor at the helm, Ciril Ribičič.

Kučan’s understanding of social, economic, and political reforms encompassed neither the “letter” nor the “spirit” of the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Labor Law other than recognizing the state’s right to self-determination, including the right to secede; hence, federalism as defined by said Constitution. The focus of the reforms was on pluralism, dialogical democratization, a creative attitude towards open issues in society, technological development corresponding to world trends and, in particular, an orientation towards European integration (“Europe now!”). He sought ways to use Yugoslav formulas to achieve the fundamental goals of reforming Slovenian politics. Nothing more than that.

Table 3. Relationship between League of Communists of Yugoslavia membership and population of Yugoslavia in 1978 (in%)²⁸⁰

REPUBLIC / PROVINCE	Population in Yugoslavia	Membership in LCY	Members of LCY in population	Difference: Members of LCY - population in SFRY	
B&H	TOTAL	18,7	16,3	6,5	-2,4
	Croats	/	/	4,1	-8,7
	Muslims	/	/	6,0	- 5,7
	Serbs	/	/	9,0	+9,8
MONTENEGRO	2,6	3,6	10,3	+1,0	
CROATIA	20,9	17,0	6,2	-3,9	
MACEDONIA	8,3	6,7	6,1	-1,6	
SLOVENIA	8,3	6,2	5,6	-2,1	
SERBIA	Inner Serbia	25,1	33,4	9,9	+8,3
	Kosovo	6,8	4,5	4,9	-2,3
	Vojvodina	9,2	11,2	9,1	-2,0
YUGOSLAVIA	100 %	100 %	7,5 %	/	

By the way, "LCY at the time of Tito's death, as the only and leading political party, had 2,117,083 members, which is 9.5 percent of the population. In the first three years after Tito's death, the number of members increased, but in the second half of the eighties it began to decline, especially drastically in Slovenia, where the membership had traditionally been smaller, about 6 percent of the population. The LCS also entered the post-Tito period as a monolithic party (it had the most members, 126,737 in 1983), with its own newspaper (The Communist), the Marxist Center, the Political School, the municipal and inter-municipal network and basic organizations in every company and institution. For a long time, however, it was not a workers' party, but a party of the middle class: comprised of officials, teachers and others who associated membership with career advancement".

In articulating his reform program, Kučan was receptive to alternative culture, civil society, various organizations and the media. After

280 Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006. i 2008.), 520.

1988, he was even prepared to dialogue with the nuclei of emerging political parties. This secured him a respectable international status, but also provoked a deeply divided, largely reluctant reaction within the party establishments of the republican League of Communists and, in particular, the Yugoslav People's Army, which was increasingly the subject of fierce criticism in Slovenian public opinion at the time.

With the rise of Slobodan Milošević as the head of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987 and the launch of the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" in Serbia which aimed to expand throughout the whole of Yugoslavia, battles began on both sides to support others in Yugoslavia. Deep stratifications had begun even earlier, after Tito's death, when the document "Baseline of the long-term program of economic stabilization" was agreed with a lot of hesitation and with partial agreement in the Federal Assembly, along with the later document on the reform of the political system of socialist self-government as well. All of this was insufficient, so the Slovenian delegation at the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia prepared proposals for a series of democratic reforms for the whole of Yugoslavia: "They referred to guaranteeing human rights, a multi-party system, abolishing verbal offenses and suspending political trials, settling the situation in Kosovo in compliance with the Yugoslav constitution, direct elections and reform of the federation and the LCY as an alliance of independent entities. All of the Central Committee proposals were rejected in a very hostile atmosphere, which is why the delegates decided to leave, which they did very thoughtfully, because they wanted to show Yugoslavia and the world that they were truly fighting for reforms and not just using tactics".

Although Ante Marković, president of the Federal Executive Council, was convinced that his reform policy would maintain and stabilize the Yugoslav state union, this was no longer feasible in the fundamentally changed realities of Yugoslavia in 1990.

On the other hand, "in (internal) processes in Slovenia, the influence of the League of Communists became weaker in the mid-1980s,

and the number of members began to decrease. There were several reasons for this. With the democratization of society, the importance of membership diminished, and leading positions in society (except in politics and some other spheres) could be reached without a party card. Leaving the party was also without any consequences, which especially affected a large part of the passive and politically disinterested membership. The inability to seek an answer to the economic and social crisis has eroded the reputation of the hitherto leading political organization. (...) The loss of membership was also influenced by reforms in the party, as well as the possibility of political engagement outside the SK, in various civil society organizations and emerging alliances”.

The finale: “In the elections, LCY-SDP found itself in an unusual situation. Although it was the winning party individually, it practically went bankrupt financially (inflation already had eaten a lot of money planned for the new building in the middle of the eighties), and its management did not listen to the advice of its economists to establish companies and thus ensure stable financial elections. The political school was closed earlier, the magazine *The Communist*, which was little read at the end of the eighties, despite it being quite a solid magazine which even opposition authors wrote about, also failed (it was succeeded by the magazine *Evropa*, which did not have a long life). All employees, including officials, had to go to the Employment Bureau (at the beginning of the 1990s, this was the second layoff in Slovenia, previously it had happened only to Iskra workers)”.

SERBIA

According to Dušan Janjić, the author of an extremely comprehensive and extensive study of Serbia in this period, one of the fundamental characteristics of political change in Serbia in the 1980s was “giving up building a society on the ideals of socialism, self-government, decentralization, national equality, ‘brotherhood and unity’ and peaceful conflict resolution”. It is understood that all these “givings up” did not take place in Serbia at the same time, nor in a linear

manner, and were by no means limited to Serbia. The greater the crisis of Serbian and Yugoslav society, the more “external” and “internal enemies” there were. The criteria for identifying “enemies” were still determined, as in Tito’s time, by an arbitrary attitude towards “the development of a self-governing socialist system” etc. The identification of “enemies” was the monopoly of key actors at the top of the League of Communists of Serbia in cooperation with key actors in the civilian and military security and intelligence communities. Situational variability of the criteria was regularly related to assessments of the “balance of power” between Serbia and the provinces, Yugoslavia and the world. The purpose of assessing the “balance of power” was to maintain a monopoly of power and authority. Hence, policy changes – however verbally and / or normatively legitimized by the “general line” of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – were far from consistent in this crisis-saturated society: “This resulted in the collapse of the ‘socialist self-governing system’ and Yugoslavia, when the League of Communists itself ended its existence, and thus its rule”.

The political priority for the 1980s was the constitution of Serbia as a republic equal to others in Yugoslavia or, more precisely, the constitution of Serbia as a state. The intentions of the 1974 SFRY Constitution were obscure not only in state law but no less in self-government. They were seen as “endangering the existing division of power and a great risk for the then powerful”. The declarative call for socialist self-government, which was common to all political actors, regardless of mutual relations, nevertheless ranged from dogmatically expressed orthodoxy to critical affirmation with a focus on the need to “sacrifice significant forms of self-government in the interest of effective governance and political discipline”.

I have to add something independent of Dušan Janjić. Josip Broz Tito chose to be buried in Belgrade, in the “House of Flowers”, where his grave is still part of the Museum of Yugoslavia. It was his own decision. Although, it seems he was not optimistic about the future of socialist Yugoslavia, that is, any Yugoslavia, it could not be said that he wanted his grave to be in the capital of the independent Republic of

Serbia. How many times in Belgrade, as in many other places in Yugoslavia, did he say: “We have shed a sea of blood for the brotherhood and unity of our peoples. Well, we will not allow anyone to touch us or to ruin us from within, to destroy that brotherhood and unity”. He obviously wanted Belgrade to be and remain a symbol of such Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity”.

However, the way in which he treated his most reliable collaborator, Aleksandar Ranković, in Brioni in 1966, was a blow to conservative Serbia, which knew very well what “court coups” were. Likewise, the way in which Tito dealt with the party in 1972 – with the “liberal” Serbia of Marko Nikezić, Mirko Tepavac and Latinka Perović, along with a whole constellation of other equally young, educated, open to the world liberals, hit that other Serbia, the one facing the future, incomparably harder. The Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia from 1974, which was written for a Yugoslavia after Tito, contained many utopian projections that did not need (and did not have) direct practical implications. The result was that in the (con)federalized state union it petrified the status of Serbia and its provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, in a way that could / should have had the effect of a *Zeitbomb*. He entrusted the implementation of the constitutive provisions to his old war cadres, Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić, who did not receive flattering epithets neither in Serbia, nor outside of Serbia, when it came to their understandings of the equality of peoples and nationalities.

When Tito died, not only Belgrade, together with Serbia and Yugoslavia, paid him respects” but also a large part of the world did so as well in a way that became and remained paradigmatic. However, it did not take long for various Belgrades and various Serbias to start, often without consideration, to settle their accounts with the “locksmith”. There were those who wanted it on various sides of Yugoslavia, yet the priority lied with Belgrade, and everywhere in Yugoslavia it was understood as the beginning of the battle for a different Yugoslavia. In addition, the eruption of Albanian nationalism in the spring of 1981 – regardless of why and how it occurred – set back Serbian-Albanian / Albanian-Serbian relations for decades and disrupted the already

complicated relations between and within republics and provinces with a domino effect.

From then on, everything that happened in Belgrade was subjected to suspicion from various sides. The paradox was that in a prolonged crisis which manifested itself in more and more ways, solutions were nowhere sought by the logic of constitutional principles. Although everyone referred to the Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, every attempt on the part of Serbia to harmonize attitudes between the republics and provinces that would not call into question the fundamental constitutional provisions, and that would regulate relations between Serbia as a republic and Kosovo and Vojvodina as provinces in a legally meaningful and sustainable manner, was essentially rejected. Federal harmonization of positions was often reduced to “someone’s” *liberum veto*, because the constitutional problems of relations between Serbia and the provinces were constantly given different contexts.

In his text, Dušan Janjić pointed out that in ten years, from 1980 to 1990, Serbia found itself in probably the most difficult situation in its modern history, primarily due to the irresponsibility of its own party-state nomenclature, which was definitively formed at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia.

The populist stampede orchestrated by Serbia’s new strong man, Slobodan Milošević, in its various permeations (“anti-bureaucratic revolution”, “truth rallies”, “people’s events”) and *Wild West* operations (embargo on Slovenian products, incursion into the Yugoslav monetary system, etc.), repulsed every Yugoslav state union, inflamed Serbophobic nationalisms on all sides, and, in turn, initiated horrific wars that were to expand Serbia’s borders and gather all Serbs into one state.²⁸¹

281 “Milošević, who spoke about the importance of the unified Yugoslav market at all party gatherings, will in the end be remembered for the imposition of the economic embargo to Slovenia in December 1989. A principled recentralist would not dare introduce such an embargo after a simple political disagreement with the Slovenian leadership”. Or: “The probably most pronounced example of Milošević’s destruction of the institutions of the common state is the barging into the monetary system of the SFRY and the primary

The unfinished, but largely failed socialist modernization of Serbia from 1945 to 1980, could have been, as in the case of some other republics and Kosovo, the starting point for different development strategies and socio-political systems more appropriate to its reality and potentials within a Yugoslav, European and global environment. Why it did not become so, might have been best guessed at by Josip Broz Tito in a “Bolshevik” fashion at the VIII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1964): “Just as in the conditions of bourgeois society nationalism is, in fact, only one form of manifestation of bourgeois class interests. So in the conditions of our society nationalism is predominantly a form of manifestation of bureaucracy and various hegemonic aspirations. However, once it emerges, even with this new feature, it spontaneously seeks to ‘connect’ with ‘classical’ bourgeois nationalism and to use its ideological arsenal. The bureaucratic character of this nationalism is best seen in the fact that it, in fact, most often seeks to mask the mentioned resistance to the development of social self-government, strengthening the role of direct producers and poses the greatest threat to nationalism and hegemony of any kind”.²⁸²

However, in the excellent article by Milan Gavrović “The Cold War after the Cold War” in Badovinac’s *Tito’s time*, it says: “Sometime near the end of Tito’s life, someone (probably some intelligence agency) submitted to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia the text of a lecture given by National Security Adviser to US President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Stockholm or Amsterdam... Mr Brzezinski said that the communist regime in

emission of the National Bank of Yugoslavia in December 1990 – January 1991. On this occasion, the Republic of Serbia illegally ‘borrowed’ the dinar amount in the equivalent of 1.4 billion dollars at the time for the needs of budget payments”. (Aleksandar Miletić, “Generacije srpskih (re)centralista, 1968–1990: Opravdani zahtevi ili put u raspad Jugoslavije?”, p. 29 i 30).

282 “Izveštaj J. B. Tita na VIII kongresu SKJ”, in: Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Yugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Drugi tom 1943 – 1986*, Beograd 1987., p. 372.

Yugoslavia can be overthrown so that loans encourage its leadership's propensity to invest and spend. (...) In Mr. Brzezinski's words, the communist elites in all the Yugoslav republics could easily be recognized. (After the 1965 reform, the federation did not invest anything more) (...) Only a few years later, after Tito's death, Western financiers, exactly according to Mr. Brzezinski's prescription, suspended loans to Yugoslavia, leaving the country with large unfinished investments and without enough foreign exchange to import raw materials, intermediate goods and oil (...).²⁸³

KOSOVO

In his contribution, Memli Krasniqi pointed out the difficulties in the practical constitution of the delegate system, both from an organizational and functional point of view. The biggest problem was the passivity of the elected delegates, "who were not ready to open a discussion on various social and economic problems". It was different with the self-governing consensual connection of Kosovo's basic organizations of associated labor into one complex organization of associated labor. Thus, for example, "Kosovo Trade" was created with 10,000 employees and an annual turnover of 12 billion dinars, or over six hundred million US dollars at the current exchange rate. These were agreements that were supported and even encouraged by the provincial authorities.

By the way, using various provisions of the Law on Associated Labor, "many" organizations of associated labor, "even though they

283 Milan Gavrović, "Hladni rat poslije hladnoga rata", in: *Titovo doba. Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije* (ed. Tomislav Badovinac), Zagreb 2008., 187–188. Since this is an unverifiable diary entry, I will register that Kiro Gligorov, in a note to Dušan Bilandžić on 28 September 1980 spoke of how the foreign debt grew from one and a half billion dollars in 1972 to "16 to 18" billion in 1980: "It started when the Minister of Finance of Serbia, Petar Kostić, without the consent of the federation, took out a loan of one billion dollars for the Smederevo ironworks." (Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005.*, Zagreb 2006., p. 206).

worked at a loss”, increased the salaries of employees, paid unearned benefits, etc.

The demonstrations in Kosovo in the spring of 1981, on March 11 and 26, and on April 1, 2, and 3, were characterized at the federal, republican, and provincial levels as “counterrevolutionary”. The reasoning was that they attacked the socialist self-government system and endangered the territorial integrity and independence of SFR Yugoslavia, ie because they were “directed against the constitutional order, socialist self-governing system, policy of brotherhood and unity, as well as against freedom, independence and the territorial integrity of SFR Yugoslavia”. The Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, trying with all its might and arguments to calm the agitated masses, simultaneously had to oppose “any attempt by Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists to take advantage of the situation created after the student demonstrations”. However, recognition that the economic crisis was a major contributing factor to the mass expression of dissatisfaction came from the federal level (Stane Dolanc, member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY).

Student protests in Pristina, a city of 40,000 students (7,000 in Tirana at the same time), erupted on March 11 and 26, 1981 due to poor nutrition and housing conditions. , They immediately caused alarm at all levels of government in Kosovo, in Serbia and everywhere in Yugoslavia. The protests turned into mass demonstrations in Kosovo on April 1st, 2nd and 3rd with many different slogans, the most prominent of which was “Kosovo-Republic”. Bearing in mind that the population of Kosovo was on average the youngest in Yugoslavia and that, according to Krasniqi, of the 88,000 members of the League of Communists of Kosovo, 42% were under 27 and Albanians made up 65% of its membership, a mass protest mobilization of youth had far-reaching consequences in itself. In addition, these were the first mass protests “from below” in a country that was still experiencing the profound socio-psychological effects of Tito’s death, but also in which was potentially “boiling” on all sides. It was important for the provincial leaders to protect the constitutional position of the province, so

they themselves drastically sharpened their assessments of events and took adequate measures of repression. According to Krasniqi, “classification of the student demonstrations in 1981 as counter-revolutionary, despite the fact that there was no call for the overthrow of socialism as a socio-political order, and as nationalists and irredentists, directed against the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the SFRY, were the basis of the official policy of the LC of Yugoslavia, the LC of Serbia and the LC of Kosovo, which only deepened the gap between Albanians and Serbs. As the beginning of the creation of an anti-Albanian mood in FR Serbia and SFR Yugoslavia, it marked not only the brutal use of force by police units that came to Kosovo, but also the use of these events as triggers to attack and change the political elite in SAP Kosovo”.

Mass demands for the proclamation of Kosovo as a republic stemmed in part from the belief that fulfilling that demand would more easily address Kosovo’s fundamental development problems in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Dušan Dragosavac (Secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidency) unequivocally ruled out such a possibility on April 15, 1981, citing constitutional impediments. Many Albanians in Kosovo saw this as an expression of intensified confrontation between themselves and the state leadership.

In the following years, until 1985, the key actor in the development of institutions and the application of socialist self-government norms was the League of Communists of Kosovo. During this period, the LC of Kosovo was experiencing bilateral pressure – on the one hand from the League of Communists of Serbia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and on the other hand from the passive resistance of the majority of Kosovo Albanians. Their objections included corruption, abuse of office, delays in self-governing procedures, etc. – Despite the pressure, the LC of Kosovo acted in a way that brought results that were limited in scope.

The results were even smaller in 1986 when initiatives for socio-economic reform and constitutional change were intertwined at the federal level. A significant factor was that the Presidency of the SFRY

“demanded that during the constitutional changes not only some principles be respected but also changed, such as: the policy of brotherhood and unity and equality of all peoples and nationalities; the socialist self-government system; federal regulations and the constitutional position of republics and provinces, etc”.

Despite the shortcomings of both the organization and the functioning of the system of socialist self-government in Kosovo, the Kosovo economy recorded a 16.4% increase in industrial production in 1985, and for the first time achieved a positive foreign trade balance of \$11.9 million US dollars. Although 110 self-governing agreements on pooling financial resources and labor were signed at the time between various joint labor organizations from Kosovo and the Yugoslav republics, few were implemented. Numerous delays included funds from the Federal Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped along with incentive measures.

The development of Kosovo's autonomy in the period from 1966 to 1974 and in the years following the death of Josip Broz Tito, in the minds of many Kosovo Albanians along with undoubtedly many others in Serbia and Yugoslavia in the Yugoslav party nomenclature, was primarily related to Tito himself. Memli Krasniqi also testifies to this: “The process of national affirmation of Albanians and the new status of Kosovo was evidenced not only by two visits of J. B. Tito to Kosovo (1975 and 1979), but also by the fact that the Youth Relay, organized as part of the birthday (May 25) of the President of SFR Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito was last handed over on May 25, 1979, by the representative of the Socialist Youth Alliance of Kosovo, Sanija Hyseni. ... Kosovo and its representatives were supported by the President of SFR Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, especially from the 1970s until the end of his life. This was also seen in the case when the new composition of the Presidency of the SFRY was announced at the joint session of both chambers of the Yugoslav Assembly on May 15, 1979, with J. B. Tito expressing special gratitude to Fadil Hoxha for his contribution to the successful work of the Presidency of the SFRY”.

Many people, including non-Serbs, considered Tito to have an obsession with “weak Serbia in a strong Yugoslavia”, although one could agree, on the contrary, with Stipe Šušar: “He wanted peace and prosperity, and equality of people and nations in not just the country he headed, but in the whole wide world. And most of all, it remains in the historical memory of the people, and belongs to the future”.²⁸⁴ Contrary to indicators pointing to Kosovo’s growing lag behind the more developed Yugoslav republics and the province of Vojvodina, other undeniable signs coupled with and even more experience of epochal changes in Kosovo’s reality in socialist Yugoslavia, especially in Tito’s time.

However, when it comes to the constitutional status of Kosovo, as well as many other key issues affecting the survival of socialist self-governing Yugoslavia, the diagnosis made 40 years ago by Jure Bilić to Dušan Bilandžić on January 22, 1981 is still valid today: “... the whole system has been built for years around the danger of disintegration after Tito. Fear of the future”.²⁸⁵ The 1974 Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, with its hypernormativism, in which a socialist self-governing utopia was densely intertwined with reflections of a realpolitik “balance of power” within a multinational state union, could not have needed the reliable constitutional support of Yugoslav society in facing inevitable, far-reaching reforms. The Constitution’s questionability was all the greater because its self-governing component, which, along with the Law on Associated Labor (1976), was supposed to guarantee the sustainability of the (con)federal construction, turned into an interpretive chaos that created more new problems than it solved.

The Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the LC Kosovo and the Presidency of SAP Kosovo – therefore, in party-state symbiosis,

284 Stipe Šušar, *Hrvatski karusel. Prilozi političkoj sociologiji Hrvatskog društva*, Zagreb 20042, 216 (“Riječ u Kumrovcu, 4. April 1999”).

285 Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945–2005.*, Zagreb 2006., 218. Frano Barbieri, also towards Dušan Bilandžić, was even more cynical: “... the actual problem that Yugoslavia faces is the shift from Tito’s monarchy to a republic” (Ibid, p. 206).

initiated in 1980 and 1981 a collection of socio-economic changes in collaboration with leaders from within the Province, from Serbia, from the other republics, and from the Federation. These changes aimed to provide longer-term solutions to the fundamental development problems of this lesser-developed Province. The effects of these changes were extremely limited and the situation in the Province became increasingly tense. Tensions were exacerbated by the situation in Serbia, where the economic crisis was taking an especially hard toll on its industrial giants (metallurgy, automotive industry, etc.), thus causing constitutional issues in post-Tito conditions to come into the limelight.

From 1981 onwards, , Serb-Albanian / Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo intensified in a series of nationalist or chauvinistic paroxysms. Without delving into the interpretations offered here by Memli Krasniqi, Slobodan Bjelica and Dušan Janjić, it is important to point out that the unilateral de facto and legislative abolition of the 1974 Constitution by the Serbian Constitution in 1988 and 1989 multilaterally guaranteed that provincial autonomies, would experience violence of unprecedented proportions in socialist Yugoslavia. It also ensured both local and worldwide support for the Kosovo Albanian resistance, thus creating all the necessary preconditions for the establishment of an internationally recognized independent state of Kosovo.. In fact, on 23 December 1989, the Democratic League of Kosovo was formed, headed by Ibrahim Rugovawith a core of largely former members of the League of Communists of Kosovo, and it succeeded in developing a parallel government in Kosovo.

VOJVODINA

Discussing the problems of socialist self-government in Vojvodina in the early 1980s, Slobodan Bjelica emphasizes the legitimation principle towards the socialist autonomous provinces found in the policy of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Thus, in January 1982, the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party interpreted “problems in achieving unity” in the Republic

primarily as “an expression of stagnation in the development of self-governing socialist relations and inconsistencies in achieving constitutionally established relations and responsibilities”. “Unity and togetherness” in the Republic were again the subject of a dispute at the session of the Central Committee of the LCS in November 1984. The argument took place during a discussion about the tasks of the Party in the “further development of the political system of socialist self-government”. On that occasion, the introductory speaker Bogdan Trifunović pointed out that “certain results” had been attained in achieving “unity and togetherness”, primarily in “self-governing association of work and resources on the entire territory of SR Serbia”, but that “essential” differences in understanding relations between the Republic and the provinces remained. The session ended with the adoption of positions to which “development of the political system of socialist self-government” remained as the common framework, while the dissonant tones about what was most controversial remained.

Regardless of the great and even huge differences between Vojvodina and Kosovo, the events in Vojvodina and the relations between Vojvodina and Serbia from 1980 to 1990 were largely conditioned by the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The main reason for this is that both provinces had the same status in the SFRY Constitution and related constitutional acts. In the discussions on the constitutional status of the provinces, Kosovo issues were much more often on the agenda than Vojvodina, and the way of resolving some of them inevitably influenced the way of resolving others. This was due to the fact that the state-level legal aspects of the issue and their spillover to other areas would overshadow other problems. While the everyday life of Vojvodina and Serbia made additional demands, various open issues were more difficult to resolve due to the burden of the aforementioned aspects.

As early as the spring of 1981, “hostile and counter-revolutionary action” in Kosovo was used in Serbia as an argument to reconsider the constitutional status of the provinces. Such an approach was very

quickly rejected by Vojvodina at the highest level of the party and provincial presidency, but the issue remained open in the media. However, it was impossible to avoid a threefold questioning of normative and practical-political aspects, among which the national defense and social planning stood out. On that occasion, after lengthy discussions, it was possible to agree on at least some positions (for example, regarding the Law on Citizenship in SR Serbia). In 1982, the focus shifted to relations within the League of Communists of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which was an integral part of the issue of change within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. This again became a topic of discussion in 1985. The procedure for the adoption of the Law on Internal Affairs and the Law on National Defense lasted until the beginning of 1984. The issue of further development of the system of socialist self-government came on the agenda at the end of the same year. Legislative activity continued in 1985 when the regulations regarding spatial and social planning were harmonized. The working group of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, led by Milan Kučan, joined the discussions taking place among the leaders of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, ultimately supporting the positions of the republican leadership. In May 1986, the party's statutory solutions were harmonized, which, in Ivan Stambolić's opinion, paved the way for constitutional changes. The political atmosphere in Serbia then changed with the retirement of Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković, and the new "duet" consisted of Ivan Stambolić and Slobodan Milošević. However, in the 1986 and 1987 talks, positions regarding constitutional changes were not agreed upon, which did not prevent the Assembly of SR Serbia from initiating them in September 1987. In the same month, on September 24, at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, the "duet" Stambolić – Milošević broke up dramatically, and the issue of relations between Serbia and Kosovo came to the fore again. Stambolić was convinced that he had agreed with Kosovo's leaders on constitutional changes. Vojvodina members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, like Kosovo,

silently facilitated Milošević's confrontation with Stambolić, apparently in the belief that they would be able to more easily defend their understanding of Vojvodina's interests in negotiations with Milošević. However, Milošević's general purge of unsuitable cadres in Serbia and the strained attitude towards Kosovo did not herald better days in Belgrade-*Novi Sad* relations either. However, Milošević obviously could not support the rally in *Novi Sad*, because it added a new dimension to his policy towards Yugoslavia, which he was not yet ready for. However, on July 9, a well-known group from Kosovo arrived in *Novi Sad* and, refusing to talk in the provincial Socialist League of the Working People of Vojvodina, began a public gathering, which disrupted *Novi Sad*'s urban usages with its repertoire of slogans and manner of communication. At the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia on July 14, the Vojvodina leadership was already on the "dock". In a dramatic sequence of events from July to October in *Novi Sad* and throughout Vojvodina, a "street democracy" and a multitude of political coups and counterattacks, with ambivalent reactions from federal centers, gradually created a situation in which provincial leaders had to resign on October 6, 1988. In parallel with the pressures in Kosovo, preconditions were created for the amendments to the Constitution of SR Serbia to be adopted on March 28 in the Assembly of SR Serbia. At the same time, the "purge" in Vojvodina removed several thousand "autonomists", and the Vojvodina political landscape took on a completely new look.

CONCLUSION

“The Communist Party of Yugoslavia will continue to fight for a fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. It will fight equally against the Greater Serbia hegemonists, who seek to re-oppress the other peoples of Yugoslavia, as they will fight against those who would try to sow discord and disturb the fraternal unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia for the interests of any imperialist power”.²⁸⁶ Josip Broz Tito announced this fighting commitment as the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the commander of the Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and partisan detachments of Yugoslavia after visiting Bihać, on November 27. In 1942, the “Resolution on the Establishment of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia” was announced.²⁸⁷ He did so at a time when it was highly questionable whether it would be possible to create any Yugoslavia at all “after the war”. He spoke at a time when the restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was more likely on the side of the Anti-Fascist Coalition. Therefore, his unequivocal declaration for the “fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia” gave the “anti-fascist” attribution of the People’s Liberation Movement and the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia a much more substantial and obligatory program and even assumed historically far-reaching consequences.

More specifically, what the “fraternal, free and equal community of all the peoples of Yugoslavia” meant, can be seen in the “Declaration of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia”, “on the day of November 29, 1943 in Jajce”, under article 4: “to build Yugoslavia on a democratic federal principle

286 [Josip Broz] Tito, “Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti narodno-oslobodilačke borbe”, *Proleter*, year XVII, vol. 16, December 1942. (See Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Prvi tom. 1914 – 1943.*, Prosveta, Beograd 1987., 741–747. (quote on p. 747).

287 See Branko Petranović – Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost. Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Prvi tom. 1914 – 1943.*, Prosveta, Belgrade 1987, 725–738.

as a state union of equal peoples”.²⁸⁸ The decision of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia to build Yugoslavia on a federal principle, adopted on the same day, says in the preamble: “Based on the right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secede or unite with other peoples, of all the peoples of Yugoslavia ... The Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia makes the following DECISION: (...) 2. In order to achieve the principle of sovereignty of the peoples of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia to be the true homeland of all its peoples and never again will Yugoslavia be built on a federal principle, which will ensure full equality of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins, ie the people of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Article 4 was of crucial importance as well: “National minorities in Yugoslavia will be provided with all national rights”.²⁸⁹

With the death of Josip Broz Tito, the direct loser was the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, as it was basically defined by the Program and the Statute, which were adopted on VII Congress (April 22–26, 1958). The program preamble explains the meaning of the document that was to guide it in its “leading political role”: “It is not a code of dogmas and ultimate truths. Our future social practice and scientific thought as a whole will overcome, correct, and perhaps to deny certain concrete attitudes, views and formulations, and thus affirm the revolutionary spirit and creative conception of the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. That will be done by the social practice and scientific thought of the modern socialist forces in the

288 Ibid, p. 796.

289 This decision implies in principle the right to full equality of members of all peoples of Yugoslavia throughout the country as well as to full equality of peoples, obviously in terms of citizens of federal states, in their federal state. The guarantee of equality of people is expressed in both ways. The formulation of article 4, point 3, is also very important, because it concerns the national rights of national minorities and not the minority rights of members of national minorities.

whole world”.²⁹⁰ In just a few years, the primacy of “social practice” made most of this document pointless, and the changes that followed in the face of the inevitable contradictory “reforms” from the 1960s to the 1980s have called into question not only “immediate socialist democracy” but also socialism as a world process, as the Program understood it at the time. The only thing that would come on the agenda long before any other achievement of socialism in Yugoslavia was the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself.

Its “disappearance” was programmatically conceived in a significantly different way. In the part of the Program called “Leading role and constant conscious action of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia”, among other things, it says: “The leading political role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will gradually disappear in conjunction with the development and strengthening of more comprehensive forms of direct socialist democracy. This disappearance will go hand in hand with the objective process of the extinction of social antagonisms and all forms of coercion that have historically grown out of those antagonisms. But in order to achieve these goals, a constant conscious action of the communists is needed, through all forms of socialist democracy and the organization of the working people. The antagonistic forces have not yet been weakened to such an extent that they would cease to be a danger to the survival of socialism”.²⁹¹ It is a kind of historical sarcasm that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia disintegrated in a way that excluded not only the possibility for the development of any socialism, but also excluded the survival of any form of Yugoslavia.

Thus, everything that was created after 1945 as a more permanent and even lasting humanistic value became meaningless. The price of victory (“real losses”) in the national liberation war with goals proclaimed in such a way was 1,014,000 human lives, according to

290 Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na Sedmom kongresu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije 22. – 26. April 1958., Belgrade 1980., 7–8.

291 Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije usvojen na Sedmom kongresu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije 22. – 26. aprila 1958., Belgrade 1980., 233.

Bogoljub Kočović, and 947,000, according to Vladimir Žerjavić.²⁹² Such an appallingly high price obliged the Yugoslav communists – if nothing else – not to allow the horrors of World War II to be repeated in the event of the consumation of the right to self-determination and secession. That is the least they had to secure ten years after the death of Josip Broz Tito. However, less than ten years had passed when Slobodan Milošević in Gazimestan, on June 28, 1989, in front of allegedly two million people, in front of the entire Presidency of the SFRY, led by Janez Drnovšek, in front of the President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the SKJ Milan Pančevski, etc. stated, “We are again before battles and in battles. They are not armed, although arming ourselves is not excluded”. What could be expected from those who were already convinced at that time that the annulment of the fundamental values created in federal and socialist Yugoslavia *conditio sine qua non* was some kind of improvement for their people, free from any Yugoslav references.

We will not be able to verify the truth of Daniel Vernet and Jean-Marc Gonin’s allegations about the content of a private conversation between a French diplomat and Slovenian Prime Minister Lojze Peterle in early 1991, who tried to persuade him to postpone independence so as not to force Croatia to do the same.. Peterle, I repeat – *allegedly* replied: “ Cela fait des décennies qu’ils en rêvent: laissez-les donc se battre!”.²⁹³

Many other quotes from various parts of the disintegrating federal state from those years could be cited, and some of them have already become part of grand narratives in various performances and for various needs. The disintegration of the Yugoslav state union has not yet been put *ad acta*, although probably no one, regardless of nostalgia, cared about its restoration.

292 Bogoljub Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji*, London 1985., 124–125; Vladimir Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu*, Zagreb 1989., 116–117.

293 Daniel Vernet – Jean-Marc Gonin, *Le rêve sacrifié. Chronique des guerres yougoslaves*, Paris 1994., str. 131.

III

INTER-REPUBLIC RELATIONS



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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES

THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION confronted new challenges in 1980: the decentralization of the state and the liberalization within the ruling Communist alliance during the sixties and seventies Tito's death.

From the end of the sixties, with the process of decentralization, the republic and federal leaderships started meeting more often and talking not only about mutual relations, but about relations within the federation institutions as well.²⁹⁴This meant the cessation of the practice hitherto of the republic leaderships meeting only during sessions of federal institutions, which opened the space for the republics' ruling elite increasingly functioning on their own. Already during the beginning of the 1970s, the president of the Serbian Parliament, Dragoslav Draža Marković, lamented how the gatherings of certain republic leaderships more and more often received the character of "interstate meetings". It was also emphasized that "among the peoples, that is, republics of Yugoslavia, not only different interests, but objective contradictory interests exist",²⁹⁵ and that these contradictions cannot be overcome via pressure from the federation, which is why the reform of the federation commenced by the introduction of the so-called "princi-

294 Aleš Gabrič, "Odnos slovenske politike prema 'maspoku'", *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 1 (2010): 13; Husnija Kamberović, *Džemal Bijedić. Politička biografija*. Drugo, dopunjeno izdanje. (Sarajevo: Udruženje za modernu historiju, 2017), 119–120.

295 *Dogovaranje i odgovornost. O dogovaranju socijalističkih republika i socijalističkih autonomnih pokrajina u ostvarivanju zajedničkih interesa u federaciji i odgovornost organa, organizacija i pojedinaca u obavljanju Ustavom utvrđenih zadataka u organima federacije*. (Beograd: BIGZ, 1982), 18.

ple of agreement between the republics". It had shown, however, that this agreement had been encumbered by the mistrust of the republics toward federal institutions, which led to the gradual independence of the republic leaderships, and that process intensified after Tito's death in 1980. Tito had the role of the undisputed leader and ultimate arbiter of disputes in the country until then. After his death, all the problems within the functioning of the Yugoslav federation came into clear focus. Instead of "brotherhood and unity" ("bratstvo i jedinstvo"), there was talk about "coexistence" ("zajedništvo") that, nevertheless, ended up being more and more difficult to establish,²⁹⁶ and individual confrontations of republic leaderships, in time, became a systemic problem in the functioning of the federation.²⁹⁷ The republics were increasingly concerned with republic interests alone, and they were interested in the processes in other parts of the federation only if they had potential negative impact on their own functioning. This care about the interests of one's own republic solely made the functioning of the state government increasingly difficult, including all state institutions and the federal government. This was perhaps best put into words by Branko Mikulić during a session of the Presidency of the SFRY in 1984, when he criticized the republics and provinces whose representatives in federal institutions "demonstrated republic interests alone. Everybody is taking their own paper, reading their own prayer, reading the conclusions of that particular republics, avoiding solving the issue".²⁹⁸ There

296 Ivo Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1990.–2020. Godine velikih nada i gorkih razočaranja*. (Zagreb: Profil, 2021), 19.

297 Evidence of this can be found in numerous discussions at the top of the state and the party, especially in the late 1980s. See: Andrija Čolak, *Agonija Jugoslavije. Kako su posle Titove smrti republički lideri dokrajčili Jugoslaviju*. (Beograd: Laguna, 2017).

298 Dženita Sarač-Rujanac, *Branko Mikulić. Politička biografija 1965–1989*. (Sarajevo: Institut za historiju, 2020), 137–138.

was less and less interest to reach a consensus, and without it, saving Yugoslavia was impossible.²⁹⁹

The failure of the economic reform of the sixties and the increasingly serious problems in the economies of all of the republics continuously generated problems in the functioning of the federation. The systemic problems of the Yugoslav economy would become more visible after Tito's death and the increasingly intensified process of "closing-in" within republic borders. At the level of economy, there were attempts of establishing a new economic model that would pull the country out of the crisis in which it kept falling. One of these initiatives was the proposal of the Commission for issues of economic stabilization, overseen by Sergej Kraigher. In the conclusions of this commission, it was stated that "inter-republic differences guaranteed that nothing would be embarked upon in order to accept and implement the recommendations of Kraigher's report".³⁰⁰ This was the *modus operandi* of the then-republic elites, but this model has been used by intellectuals as well, who used the closing in of the republics to act in the cases they were persecuted in their environments. The *critical intelligentsia* in Serbia had become rather loud during the eighties, and the response from Croatia was seen in the so-called *White Book* in May 1984.³⁰¹ The fact that at one republic party council in Croa-

299 Latinka Perović once stated that "Yugoslavia was our first Europe, you are here with different peoples, you have to agree there, to reach a consensus, to seek some common interest, to reach an agreement, to respect the rules". *Snaga lične odgovornosti*. (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji (Svedočanstva, knj. br. 32, 2008), 123.

300 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Tri Jugoslavije. Izgradnja države i izazov legitimacije 1918.–2005*. (Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tahnička knjiga, 2009: 411.; O Jugoslavskoj krizi tokom osamdestih vidjeti i: Marijan Korošić, *Jugoslavaska kriza* (drugo izdanje). (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1989).

301 *Bijela knjiga Stipe Šuvara. Originalni dokument Centra CK SKH za informiranje i propagandu od 21. ožujka 1984*. Zagreb: Večernji posebni proizvodi, 2010; *Bela knjiga – 1984. Obračun sa "kulturnom kontrarevolucijom" u SFRJ* (prir. Kosta Nikolić, Srđan Cvetković, Đoko Tripković). (Beograd: Službeni glasnik i Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010).

tia, intellectuals from other republics (Serbia) were criticized, was an alarm to those who acted solely in their own republic and national interests, ignoring the Yugoslav context. "The Serbian political leadership saw the council as pressure from Croatia, as from everything that had been said and written (during the council), one could see that the Serbian Communists do not see said problems, or are unable to cope with them".³⁰² Nevertheless, having in mind that straining relations did not work for either of the sides, the effect of the *White Book* on Serbo-Croatian relations was not particularly strong. Since the criticism was aimed primarily towards the Serbian critical intelligence. According to them, further insistence would mean the weakening of the position of the Serbian leadership, that was under the pressure of the critical intelligentsia itself. Other than that, the Croatian leadership itself did not see such a critical attitude towards events in other republics as positive. "If Serbia is today criticized from Croatia, the same could happen in Croatia tomorrow, not from Serbia only, but from other regions as well". The *White Book* was supposed to "strengthen Yugoslav unity and thus establish a certain Yugoslav public. Now this was stopped".³⁰³ The *White book* was one of the last attempts of one republic meddling in the affairs of another. After that, everything went in a different direction. The republic political elites increasingly withdrew into their republics' borders, which opened the spaces for the strengthening of nationalism, which will ultimately lead Yugoslavia towards its historical end by the end of the nineties.

The reduction of the ruling elites' interests to solely their republic's affairs (and less often to general Yugoslav interests) led towards confrontation among the republics due to several significant issues. This took part in several stages: relations between developed and underdeveloped republics and the constitutional reform of the federation have dominated during the whole decade, while questions of identity

302 Hrvoje Klasić, *Mika Špiljak. Revolucionar i državnik*. (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2019), 209.

303 Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija. Država koja je odrumrla. Uspon kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (1974–1990)*. (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 350.

became especially pronounced from the mid-eighties, so that by the end (1989–1991), some ideological confrontations among the seemingly unified ruling coalition could be seen as well.³⁰⁴ It was clear that deeper interests underlay the inter-republic competition during the eighties. In time, these rose to the surface, while the representatives of the republics (working in federal institutions), started to feel uncertain by the end of the eighties.³⁰⁵

In the first stage, everybody started mouthing their dissatisfaction with the status of their respective republics in the Yugoslav federation, which gradually created a feeling of inter-republic, and soon international, enmity instead of cooperation. The Zagreb-based political scientist, Jovan Mirić, defined this as the process of consciousness-creating where “in Yugoslavia, we are threatening one another: Croats are threatened by Serbs, Slovenes by the South, Macedonians by the North, Serbs by Croats, Albanians by Great Serbs, Christians by Islamic fundamentalists...”³⁰⁶ This discourse about the “internal enemy” was seen already in June 1980, when in Bosnia and Herzegovina they claimed that this republic was neglected at the federal level, so that there were proposals that members of the Federal Executive Council (Federal Government) from this republic should offer resignations due to this marginalization.³⁰⁷ Representatives of the underdeveloped

304 Boris Mosković, “Partija kao arena za sukobljavanje. Hrvatska i konfrontacije između čelnih Jugoslavskih komunista krajem 1980-ih godina”. *Komunisti i komunističke partije: Politike, akcije, dabate*. (Zagreb–Pula: Srednja Europa – Sveučilište Jurja Dobrile, 2019), 61–82.

305 Božo Repe, *Milan Kučan. Prvi predsjednik Slovenije*. (Sarajevo: Udruženje za modernu historiju, 2019), 45.

306 Jovan Mirić, *Sve se mijenja, kriza ostaje. Izbor članaka i intervjuja*. (Zagreb: VSNM Zagreb – Plejada, 2018), 87.

307 The discussion by Raif Dizdarević at the session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5.6.1980 u: Raif Dizdarević, *Put u raspad – Stenogrami izlaganja Raifa Dizdarevića uraspravama iza zatvorenih vrata državnog i političkog vrha Jugoslavije*. (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2011), 43.

republics claimed that there was still no understanding for their issues and that their development was being stifled by insufficient investment. On the other hand, the representatives who came from the “developed” republics explained that by investing in the development of the underdeveloped, they hindered the further development of Yugoslavia. It was becoming more and more clear that the models of agreement between the republics and provinces “in the realization of common interests in the federation”³⁰⁸ – that existed within the SFRY Parliament – functioned with difficulty.

The question of the relation between the developed and undeveloped regions of Yugoslavia affected foreign relations. When Slovenia started showing doubt at the utility of the Olympics in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw this as the “relation of the rich cousin towards its poor and backward cousin”,³⁰⁹ connecting this to the already manifested differences between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in federal institutions on the question of economic equality in Yugoslavia. The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw Slovenian doubts regarding the Olympics as an attempt to thwart developmental attempts (which is how the Olympics was presented), as well as the Slovene fear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, with newly built Olympic facilities, could become the center of winter tourism in Yugoslavia. At the meeting of two leaderships, on 17 November 1980, the president of the Central Committee of the Communists League of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nikola Stojanović tried to show how important it was for the republics to cooperate, since they were responsible for the functioning of the federation.³¹⁰ He put forth the data which claimed that 40 percent of the financial help by the Federal Fund for the Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Provinces

308 *Dogovaranje i odgovornost*, 5.

309 Dizdarević, *Put u raspad*, 49.

310 Archive of Slovenia CC of the LC of Slovenia, IV/4244, Magnetogram razgovora med delegacijama SR Bosne i Hercegovine in SR Slovenije – dne 17. novembra 1980. na Brdu pri Kranju.

given to Bosnia and Herzegovina was infused by that republic into the Fund; the remaining 60 percent was drawn from the other republics. Raif Dizdarević, the then-president of the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, said that he already then started to feel that “there were some other separations that started to happen on the basis of developed-undeveloped”, which in and of itself implied that the quarrels between the developed and the undeveloped republics would not cease solely on questions of the economy. At the federal level, it was admitted in 1981 that it was impossible to achieve equality in the situation in which some republics, instead of coming to an agreement, asked only for the “fulfillment of their own requests”.³¹¹ The relations between the republics therefore kept worsening during the eighties, especially around issues of politics and economy, and some attempts to build deeper cooperation eventually lost their momentum.

What generated these conflicts among the political elites? It was undoubtedly the situation of Kosovo, around which sharp debates will develop, and that will show itself as the key generator of all dimensions of the Yugoslav crisis during the eighties.³¹² Serbians were frustrated that other republics did not support their effort to regain unity of Serbia. In his unpublished diaries, Draža Marković, writing about the discussions related to the situation in Kosovo during the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held in April 1981, wrote that all the collocutors in the discussion were “open and clear”, with the exceptions of the Bosnians (Branko Mikulić, Hamdija Pozderac, Nikola Stojanović), “who could not take a different stance, but they tried to ‘soften’ it up via pointing to the many shortcomings that became apparent in Kosovo, but existing in other places as well”, yet emphasized that “one should not forget that autono-

311 *Dogovaranje i odgovornost*, 13.

312 Holm Sundhaussen, *Jugoslawien und seine Nachfolgestaaten 1943–2011: Eine ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Gewöhnlichen*. (Wien/ Köln: Weimar Böhlau Verlag, 2012), 26–229; Marie-Janine Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia* (Translated by Dona Geyer), (Purdue University Press, 2019), 258–260.

mous provinces were a constitutive element of the federation”.³¹³ Two months later, Marković wrote that at the session of the Central Committee “the Bosnians (...) show ‘full understanding’ for the situation and the conditions ‘under which Albanian comrades are fighting in Kosovo’”.³¹⁴ This demonstrates that the leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia distrusted – and resented – the postures of the other republics about the situation in Kosovo. This would generate increasing friction in the relations between the republics. During the three-day plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Alliance of Serbia, in December 1981, held due to the aggravated situation in Kosovo, the thesis about “Serbia as the republic of all Serbs in Yugoslavia” was put forth, which included Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This thesis, which was in utter opposition to the idea that Serbian liberals held in the beginning of the seventies (“every claim to take care of all Serbs in the Socialist Republic of Serbia would be clear nationalism” – Marko Nikezić), aggravated interethnic relations. Leaderships in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina reacted, and since that moment, the conflict of republic elites commenced, to be seen even in the times in which the federal elite would succeed in imposing a policy of cooperation. At the beginning of 1981, a series of sessions of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was held, in which opinions presented at the plenum of the Serb Communists in December 1981 were debated.³¹⁵ No words were held back in the discussions, yet the mutual divergence still had not gone too far, as the Serbian leadership tried to soften the discussions heard at the plenum via its conclusions. It had shown that until then, the Serbian leadership had had no ally in any republic, but that also meant that a space for the reexamination of the statuses of the provinces had opened up.

313 Belgrade historical archive, Personal Archive of Draža Marković, *Dnevnik*, Box 9, 30. 4. 1981.

314 *Ibid*, 10. 7.1981.

315 AJ, CK SKJ; III /7332; AJ, CK SKJ, III/334; AJ, CK SKJ, III/339.

DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT

The dominant question in inter-republic relations during the eighties was constitutional reform, about which, in the beginning, republics and provinces divided into those who supported a stronger centralization, and those who aimed for more decentralization. Some are of the view that the centralization camp comprised liberal (Serbia) and conservative (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro) centralists, as much as one could divide the decentralists into liberals (Slovenia and Vojvodina) and conservatives (Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosovo).³¹⁶In time, within these two camps, change was shown: at the beginning of the eighties, Bosnia and Herzegovina was closer to the centralists, but gravitated toward the decentralists by the end of the decade. At this time, the categories of “federalists” and “confederalists” were still not used, as confederalization as a proposal came up only in the late eighties, among Slovenian intellectuals. By the beginning of the nineties, after the breakdown of the single party system, the leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia proposed it as one of the solutions for the Yugoslav crisis. In the meantime, Serbia was leading the camp that was proposing the centralization of the state and the diminishing of the provinces’ autonomy. Actually, the conservative part of the Serbian leadership centered around Draža Marković was consistently displeased with the status of the provinces, ever since the constitutional amendments by the end of the sixties and the 1974 Constitution. This dissatisfaction culminated in 1977

316 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkanski Babilon. Raspad Jugoslavije od Titove smrti do Miloševićeva pada.* (Zagreb: Alineja, 2005), 32; Zdenko Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945.–1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza.* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), 580; Dejan Jović observed this through the lens of a constitutional defender and a constitutional reformer (Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla*). Over time, the balance of power changed, so in mid-1988, the Prime Minister Branko Mikulić spoke of a 6:2 ratio (all republics and provinces on one side, and Slovenia and Croatia on the other). Dženita Sarač-Rujanac, *Branko Mikulić. Politička biografija 1965–1989.* (Sarajevo: Institut za historiju, 2020), 175.

with the publishing of the so-called *Blue Book*, in which legal contradictions and core deficiencies of the non-compliance of the functions of the republic and provincial governments were stressed. Demands for the returning of functions to the Republic of Serbia were initiated again in May 1981, when Ivan Stambolić commenced an aggressive campaign for the “solution” of the status of the provinces. These proposals first came up in November 1984, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, and then again in 1986, in the well-known SANU Memorandum, which caused negative reactions in other parts of Yugoslavia. In order to hold the process under control as much as possible, the Parliament of the SFRY, in October 1984, decided to embark upon the creation of an amendment to the Federal Constitution, and named the Constitutional Commission, led by Hamdija Pozderac. One of the questions about which the Constitutional Commission was supposed to deliberate was about the federal relations, especially the relations of the autonomous provinces towards Serbia. At the beginning of 1987, the Presidency of the SFRY officially proposed constitutional changes. This was preceded by an elongated balancing between different and often contradictory demands of federal units that lasted several months. In the meantime, Hamdija Pozderac, due to the Agrokomerc affair 1987³¹⁷, got removed from the political scene, and the discussions about constitutional changes further strained inter-republic relations. Although the constitutional reform was initiated with the wish to create a more efficient state apparatus, the discussions had shown that the strengthening of federal jurisdictions could change the relations between the republics. Because of this, the amendments of 1988 had little to do with reforming the basis of Yugoslav federalism. Instead, they were mostly aimed toward the removal of this already outdated system of

317 Agrokomerc was a food company headquartered in Velika Kladuša, Bosnia and Herzegovina with former operations extending across the entire area of former Yugoslavia. The company became internationally known in the late 1980s due to a corruption scandal known as the Agrokomerc Affair.

self-governance.³¹⁸ However, the pressure for constitutional changes was strong in Serbia, in order to reduce the autonomy of these provinces. By October 1988, even the federal presidency caved-in to Serbian pressure.³¹⁹ More significant constitutional changes would follow in 1989, by which time proposals to confederate Yugoslavia emerged.

THE CONSENSUS ON DECISION-MAKING AND DYED-IN-THE-WOOL RECENTRALISTS

With the debates on constitutional changes, discussions on the way in which decisions were made in state institutions were taking place, where the confrontation between Slovenia and Serbia was the first to erupt. The principle of decision by consensus at the state-level came into a deep crisis and increasingly started to block the functioning of the state. Political forces that strove for recentralization of the Yugoslav state, mostly from Serbia, tried to jettison the broad principle of consensus in decision-making, claiming that the consensus prevented efficient making of decisions at a federal-level, threatening the unity of the state. The other part, led by Slovenia, jealously defended their veto power. The discussion that developed at the 14th session of other Committee of Communists, in October 1984, can serve as a good illustration of these legal disagreements. The main protagonist on the Serbian side was the member of the Central Committee, Draža Marković, while Andrej Marinc and France Popit were on the Slovenian side. Marković advocated centralizing principles even during the seventies, so at this session, he recapitulated the attitudes for which he was already known in Yugoslav circles.³²⁰

318 Robert M. Hayden, *Skice za podeljenu kuću. Ustavna logika jugoslovenskih sukoba*. S engleskog prevela Gordana Vučićević. (Beograd: Samizdat 92, 2003), 49.

319 Živan S. Marelj, *Ukidanje autonomnosti Vojvodine. Početak razbijanja Jugoslavije*. (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2020), 99.

320 Marković was a loyalist chosen by Tito to facilitate Serbia's consent on 1974 constitution but in the same time he was bitterly opposed to it, and almost immediately after 1974 he started a campaign against this constitution. Aleksandar R. Miletić, "Generacije srpskih (re)centralista, 1968–1990: Opravdani zahtevi ili

The discussion came about due to reaction to an interview given by Borislav Srebrić, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council to the Sunday edition of *Borba*, published ten days before the session. In the interview, he criticized the principle of consensus in the federal decision-making process.³²¹ He went into the technicalities of how the “harmonization” required prior to every operative decision generated friction and impeded executive functionality. But he went further, asserting that the practice as applied ran contrary to democratic principles. “The question is whether the consensus is a democratic or undemocratic issue, having in mind that it majorizes the minority”.³²² This reasoning was in full consonance with Draža Marković’s developed concepts and argumentation over the previous fifteen years. The interview prompted negative commentary from Andrej Marinc, a member the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Marinc had also made a critique on the preliminary draft regarding the introduction of changes in the long-term program of economic stabilization, which was tabled by Serbia.

In his defense of Srebrić’s arguments, Marković pointed to a general issue of his recentralizing political doctrine. He, namely, often emphasized that the insistence on the consensus in reaching all decisions was, unconstitutional. The authors of the 1974 Constitution had, according to Marković, prescribed the consensus for a limited number of issues of general importance, and not for all decisions on all

put u raspad Jugoslavije?”, Portal YU Historija, dostupno na http://www.yuhistorija.com/serbian/jug_druga_txt01c3.html

- 321 14. sednica CK SKJ. *Ostvarivanje ekonomske politike u 1984. Godini i zadaci Saveza komunista u donošenju i ostvarivanju ekonomske politike za 1985. godinu.* (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1984), 23–6, 100–5, 107–8. Videti takođe Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Desintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević* (IV izdanje), (Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 2002), 15–6.
- 322 Blažo Šarović, “Kako do pravih promena?” Intervju Borislava Srebrića, *Borba*, 6–7. oktobar 1984, 280–1.

levels of jurisdiction of the federal authorities. Such a use of the consensus would create its own antithesis:

“[...] a good principle that should guarantee equality and provide certain interests has expanded and became its antithesis. Because we want to be more ‘constitutional’ than the Constitution requires, more ‘equal’ than we wrote in the Constitution, more ‘democratic’ than we agreed, we achieve the opposite effect [...] as we expand this question of equality outside the Constitution. [...] We criticize the Federal Executive Council for its lack of decisiveness and because it does not offer proposals. It silently works according to the principle of unanimity, contrary to the Constitution. This is the best example that more than the Constitution is against the Constitution as well, as much as less than the Constitution is.³²³”

As to the democratic nature of the principle of the consensus, Marković was of the same mind as Srebrić. Decision by majority vote – according to Marković, was the “most democratic” – yet in Yugoslav institutions it became so undesirable that a pejorative term was introduced for it: “outvoting”. In the conditions of the economic crisis that was deepening the gap between rich Slovenia and the less developed republics in the south, it seems that Marković and the other officials were convinced that they could get support from the less developed republics for a more efficient intervention of federal authorities.

This session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was an occasion for discussions in the republic’s party forums. In the area of the application of the principle of “harmonization”, Ivan Stambolić pointed to the detrimental consequences of the spread of this principle in almost all parts of the decision-making process in the federation during the council of the League of Communists of Serbia on 24 October 1984.³²⁴ The consensus thus spread from the decision making process and governance and general development goals, where its application, according to Stambolić, was justified and nec-

323 14. sednica CK SKJ, str. 101–2.

324 “Zadatke čitati iz života,” *Politika*, br. 25524, 24. oktobar 1984.

essary, to the domain of implementation, and even the control of the implementation process. Federal councils have, Stambolić, continues, become “inter-republic committees”, and the development of “republic-province science” progressed, serving to offer support for the political goals of their community.³²⁵

As previously mentioned, the council during which Stambolić promoted these views was held as well to discuss actual polemics from the Fourteenth Session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held a week before. Stambolić, in his exposé, especially stresses and unreservedly supported Marković. He went a step further, arbitrarily promoting a significant number of Marković’s points as the standpoint taken by the League of Communists. The principle of consensus in decision making of the federation was widely criticized.³²⁶ It seems that the Serbian view against the overuse of the consensus was met with support in other republics as well. In the letter that the Presidency of the SFRY sent to the Federal Parliament on 13 November 1984, on the occasion of the determination of the policy of social and economic development of the state for 1985, a recommendation that followed the line of reasoning by Marković and Stambolić was found: “The Presidency emphasizes the need for strict observance of constitutional provisions in resolving issues that require the consent of the republics and provinces, while at the same time opposing the requirements for the application of consensus where the Constitution does not provide for it”.³²⁷

This points to the fact that Serbian officials had support within a wider Yugoslav context, within which they expected support for their views, as well as for changing the nature of economic relations in the state. Namely, since the inflation commenced, the gap between the less – and more-developed republics –above all Slovenia,

325 Ibid.

326 Miletić, *Generacije srpskih (re)centralista*.

327 “Pismo Predsedništva SFRJ Skupštini Jugoslavije: Konsenzus samo po Ustavu”, *Borba*, 14. novembar 1984.

widened. Raif Dizdarević, in his memoirs, described the negotiations with the Slovenes about the structural developmental policies that the Slovenes were insistent on with a certain amount of bitterness. Dizdarević was critical towards the Slovenian policy of “keeping attained positions and their privileged position in industry”. As it was, inflation damaged the republics in which “energetics dominated, including heavy industry, raw material production, semi-finished products, and food”, as the prices of these products were determined by the federal government. Such was the structure of the industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in Serbia and other less developed republics as well.³²⁸

In contrast, the Slovenian economy which was producing mainly finished goods for the needs of the Yugoslav market, profited from the conditions of inflation. The prices of these goods in retail were not set by the state, and the representatives of other republics considered that to be a sort of monopoly and undeserved privilege. Dizdarević says that the Bosnian side used this argument against Slovenian criticisms of the economic policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. State intervention was the only road that could change such economic relations, and the typical response to the leadership of Bosnia from Slovenia was to tag them as statist. France Popit, with no little condescension, argued that the undeveloped often advocated statism. “He who lives in poverty is always ready to support statist measures that would better his life”.³²⁹

The proposal of opinions for the mentioned Fourteenth Session in 1984 contained a critical relation towards the preservation of monopolies as well: “one should energetically confront those who defend unjustifiably attained positions, monopolies, and privileged positions”. Andrej Marinc rejected these requests unless “the more developed republics and autonomous provinces or joint labor

328 Raif Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije*. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2000), 76, 80.

329 *Ibid*, 80–81.

organizations that export are understood under these wordings”.³³⁰ In the context of disempowering monopoly from determining prices, Ivan Stambolić, at his exposé at the Seventeenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, held on 28 September 1984, spoke about the need for the “quicker removal of border and territorial price disparities” at the level of the federation authorities.³³¹ Serbian officials probably expected that, should the principle of the consensus be removed from the collective decision-making at the Yugoslav level, they would get support from the less developed republics for their projects. Because the economic benefits of the so-called monopoly and privileges were enjoyed by only Slovenia, and perhaps Croatia to a certain extent, Serbia’s effort to change the status quo might receive support within the wider Yugoslav frame. Boško Krunić testified that there was a similar polarization between the interests of the republics who produced raw materials and energy sources on one side, and the exporters on the other during the period between 1987 and 1988.³³² However, until Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia, outvoting on this issue and attempts of unilateral decision making were not on the agenda among Serbian officials.

The Vojvodina episode of Milošević’s “antibureaucratic revolution” went almost without any opposition of the Presidency of the SFRY and the authorities of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Moreover, during the October 1988 “happenings of the people,” the “autonomy” leadership of Vojvodina was urged to resign from these forums. The first open opposition to Milošević’s policies came from the Slovenian leadership in November 1988, prompted by the

330 14. sednica CK SKJ, str. 25–6.

331 “However, certain measures in the federation are necessary as well, such as primarily changes in the foreign currency system, as well as the quicker removal of border and territorial price disparities, especially the prices of electric power and some products in the unfinished goods sector, and even the diminishing of obligations in the support of the quicker development of the underdeveloped.” U: AS, CK SKS, f. 399, 17. sednica CK SKS, 28. September 1984.

332 Boško Krunić, *Decenija zamora i raskola*. (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2009), 86.

intensification of the Kosovo crisis. The Croatian attempt to reach a compromise with Milošević – the so-called “Croatian silence” on the most important questions of Yugoslavia’s internal crisis – continued until January 1989. The Croatian leadership’s taking an independent tack on the Yugoslav stage was prompted more by a direct attack on Stipe Šušteršič in media that Milošević controlled than as a response to the violation of the Yugoslav constitutional framework. Slovenian opposition to Milošević was from the outset for the protection of the human rights of the Albanians in Kosovo, as well as the institutional mechanisms of the Yugoslav federal-confederal organization, as prescribed by the 1974 Constitution. This included the provinces as federal units. The principled attitude of the Slovenian officials received broad support of the intellectual circles and fledgling political organizations in these provinces, which manifested in the support gathering for the Albanian miners in Trepča in Cankarjev Dom in Ljubljana, on 27 February 1989. At this gathering, Milan Kučan stated that “Yugoslavia is being defended in Trepča”. In a legal sense, this was correct.

The “Croatian silence”, which followed the shock of the reaction to the Croatian spring in the seventies, moved the center of gravity of intra-Yugoslav political contestation from the Serbo-Croatian to the Serbo-Slovenian axis. The open conceptual disagreement between the Serbian and Slovenian leaderships continued through 1989, culminating with the ban of the planned protest gathering of Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins in Ljubljana. That assembly was supposed to carry the “antibureaucratic revolution” to the field of the most developed Yugoslav republic. Milošević responded by introducing an economic embargo on Slovenian goods. This contradicted Milošević’s articulated fealty to recentralization to abolish inter-republic economic barriers. Ironically, Milošević, who had insisted on a unified Yugoslav market for years at almost every party forum, is remembered for his introduction of an economic embargo in Slovenia in December 1989. As a matter of fact, should one follow the chronology of Milošević’s public appearances, the topic of the unified Yugoslav market will be seen for the last time in his speech at Conference of the League of

Communists of Serbia in November 1989.³³³The embargo against Slovenia was declared just a month later. Milošević's "principled" conceptions turned into their own antitheses at great speed.

His continuous opposition to the decisions and federal government measures (the Federal Executive Council), led by Ante Marković were also inconsistent with reputation of a principled recentralist. When Draža Marković requested greater competences for federal organs of the government on the aforementioned session of CC CLY in 1984, it was in the era of Federal Prime Minister Milka Planinc, delegated by Croatia. It reflected a principled commitment for a certain institutional profile, no matter what constellation was in power at a given time. Had Milošević been a principled recentralist, he would have had to support the authority of the federal institutions, no matter who staffed them. He was, however, not so principled. Probably the most pronounced example of Milošević's destruction of common state institutions was his assault on the monetary system of the SFRY through the primary emission of the National Bank of Yugoslavia in December 1990 – January 1991. This is when Republic of Serbia illegally "borrowed" a sum of the value of \$1.4 billion dollars (as valued in dinars) for the needs of budgetary payments. A recentralist in the mold of Pavlović or Stambolić would certainly not proclaim this federal unit "sovereign and independent", as it was introduced by the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia while the federal state still existed. Srđa Popović, in his famous polemical article, pointed towards article 2, paragraph 1 of said Constitution, which enabled the introduction of special taxes and fees for the traffic of goods produced in other Yugoslav republics. In this way, the embargo towards Slovenian goods was not only legalized, but also grounded in the highest legislative act. The model of the embargo and trade protectionism could further be applied to industrial subjects from other republics.³³⁴

333 Slobodan Milošević, *Godine raspleta*. (Beograd: BIGZ, 1989), 278.

334 Srđa Popović, "Kako smo branili Jugoslaviju", u: Sonja Biserko (priređivač), *Milošević vs. Jugoslavija* (knj. 1). (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava,

What, then, remained from Milošević's declarative recentralism after 1989? In a strained form, it was his failed combinations of outvoting at the Fourteenth Session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990, and in the Presidency of the SFRY, which could be seen as the final consequences of the long-term development of the recentralization concept in Serbia. This would be that particular "logic" that Latinka Perović spoke about, the logic of an internal conflict that could not be controlled and which led towards an armed conflict. Borisav Jović, a close collaborator of Milošević at that time, mentioned that Milošević's insistence on calling for the Fourteenth Party Congress had the goal to use the voting power of the delegates in Serbia and Serbian delegates from other Yugoslav republics.³³⁵ This was, thus, supposed to be the first realization of the years-long talk about an "efficient", "majoritarian", "most democratic" way of decision-making, while ignoring of the "undemocratic" practice of consensus and harmonization. Jović added that Milošević never consulted anyone in the procedure of the organizing of the congress. This, however, completely deviated from the decision-making method and forum arrangements during the time of former recentralists. The principled confrontation between the Serbian and Slovenian leadership defined the further development of the Yugoslav crisis even at this congress.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - DISSONANT TONES

The discussions about the functioning of the federation took part in an atmosphere created by the events in Kosovo, and the inability to efficiently solve the Kosovo issue, which caused a dissatisfaction among Serbian leaders already by the beginning of the eighties; their media began accusing others in Yugoslavia, especially the leaderships of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the media in these republics, that they have not been engaging enough considering the truthful reporting about the state of events in Kosovo, and

Beograd, 2004), 11–40.

335 Borisav Jović, *Knjiga o Miloševiću*. (Beograd: IKP "Nikola Pašić", 2001), 52–4.

that they have not been offering enough support to the efforts to stabilize the province.³³⁶ Republic of BiH authorities assessed that during 1981, in various media in Serbia, there were 430 articles characterized as attacks against BiH.³³⁷ This generated reactions from “accused” republics and their media. At the session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 20 July, the President, Nikola Stojanović, was of the opinion that there should be a meeting with Serbia’s leadership because of the attacks of the Serbian media, in order to divulge whether the Serbian leadership was behind these attacks. As he said to his Serbian colleague, Tihomir Vlaškalić, “these [attacks of the Serbian media] have become so intense that somebody had to be behind them”.³³⁸

This was debated during the meeting of the representatives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 28 September 1981.³³⁹ Stojanović, at this meeting, claimed that Serbia’s leadership stood behind these attacks. “By following the printed discourse and television programs (...) I got a very unpleasant impression that there is a sort of black and white relation in the means of information from Serbia towards Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In addition, as well as that Communists in Bosnia and Herzegovina were asking themselves whether “you [the Serbian leadership] stand behind such a general orientation of the press towards

336 The weekly *NIN* and *Duga*, as well as the daily newspapers *Politika* and *Politika ekspres* were in the lead in these accusations.

337 Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945 – 2005*. (Zagreb: Prometej, 2006), 232.

338 Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tape recording from the 93rd session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20. 7. 1981.

339 Authorized tape recording of conversations of comrades from the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 28, 1981 (I received this recording from Nikola Stojanović).

the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Stojanović emphasized that the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately took a clear stance on Kosovo (that the issue was "Albanian nationalism and irredentism", this "had been done before such a judgement was mouthed anywhere in Yugoslavia"), while the Serbian media was spreading rumours that Bosnia was "partying and enjoying" while there was a real drama for the Serbian people in Kosovo. "This is unacceptable", Stojanović stressed. He accused the Serbian press – which was mass distributed in Bosnia ("50 percent of the press in Bosnia is the press from Serbia and Croatia") – of not publishing the opinions of the leadership of Bosnia about Kosovo, yet "attacking the Republic of Bosnia because, as they say, there are no such attitudes".

At this meeting with the Serbian delegates on 28 September, Nikola Stojanović said: "Bosnia and Herzegovina is, due to its historical circumstances, against *any* nationalism. When it comes to its relations towards the Albanians, some of our attitudes are based not on what has been going on in Kosovo, but on what is going on and what started to happen to Albanians who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, those who number around 15–20 thousands in Sarajevo.³⁴⁰ When we were debating the deployment of the militia, Bosnia and Herzegovina deployed 500 members of the militia, and from other republics, excluding Serbia, altogether 800. That is when we said that Bosnia and Herzegovina would, if needed, send more, that is, as many as necessary, and such an instruction was given to our secretary. Because we understand what these events mean, that the point is to defend our country and the revolution". Stojanović stressed that Bosnia gave the most police officers to the intervention in Kosovo "even though we did not even want to mention it or set it as an issue, since by that, Bosnia and Herzegovina would be defending itself, as well as socialist Yugoslavia". Stojanović then emphasizes: "Only based on the most monstrous of intentions could the opinions of Bosnia and Herzegovina

340 It is unclear why Stojanović enlarged the number of Albanians in Sarajevo. According to the 1981 census, 4396 Albanians lived there.

be equated with the opinions of Tirana in regard to Kosovo, as well as the lack of readiness of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a tangible action. By this I mean the opinions of the political leadership [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] and the readiness of the people [of Bosnia] to fight against anything that questions the issue of the socialist self-governing development of Yugoslavia". Stojanović even came out with the thesis that the first signs of detoization could be seen in the Serbian media and their writing about the state of events in Kosovo, adding an example of a text in which the Federation was being blamed for the conditions in Kosovo: "The support that the Kosovar leadership got from the Federation (referring to the sixties, when Kosovo got the status of a province) may not have been crucial for what would happen later, but was certainly the key factor that disabled the Socialist Republic of Serbia from realizing its constitutional authority on the whole of its territory and the League of Communists of Serbia to enable a unified policy within the Republic, as well as carry the responsibility for the wholeness of its realization". Stojanović, in that text, saw a call to reexamine the whole Yugoslav policy towards Kosovo, that is, for a detoization of the policy towards Kosovo, and he considered that to be very dangerous for the relations within Yugoslavia.

It turned out that the Kosovo issue was the key challenge in all further negotiations about the preservation of the Yugoslav Federation, whereby Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vojvodina insisted upon maintaining provincial autonomy, which they considered to be important as part of the fight to respect the Constitution. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this fight for the preservation of Kosovo's autonomy was considered an important link in the strife to preserve the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic. "Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be equal in right if it were not to fight, in all cases, for the equality of all republics and provinces. Without a relation of equality, it would not be in Yugoslavia as a republic".

Whilst the Bosnians were emphasizing that the condemnation of Albanian nationalism was principled and demonstrating the necessity of the preservation of the existing order of equality in the relations

within the Yugoslav Federation, Serbs stressed that “the writing about Kosovo of the Bosnian press comes down to being taken for granted. It did not tackle the question of the [Albanian] intellectual circles that [...] saw its role as conducting nationalism”. Špiro Galović, a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, expressed his conviction that Serbia perceived, “as if others, not all, left us with somewhat not enough support (...) It is true that the press in Bosnia and Herzegovina was satisfied with general condemnation of the nationalism in Kosovo and then went to write about work actions of the soldiers and the youth. One should write about work actions of the soldiers and the youth in order to see that something is changing in the attitudes, but you cannot omit the analysis of a row of unpleasant things”. Nikola Stojanović’s reply was rather sharp: he firstly stressed that the Serbian public cannot know what the press was saying, as Bosnian press was not sold in Serbia. “The citizens of Serbia could get an impression about the opinions of Bosnia and Herzegovina only through the [Serbian] press, which does not publish the opinions of the leadership of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina. How would they [the citizens of Serbia] know that these are only general attitudes? Your press claims that Bosnia and Herzegovina was partying, that it has the same attitudes as Tirana, so how could the citizens respect that they read or see? A part of the public in Bosnia and Herzegovina is reading your press and watching television shows in which such a vision of our [alleged] opinions (is presented)”. Špiro Galović did not budge: he continued to talk about how in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the media do not present the real image of the events in Kosovo. “In that respect, there is a conviction [in Serbia], based on analyses that there [in the writing of the Bosnian press] was a positive component being emphasized – one should now go towards something positive, something positive should be stimulated, do not put what is negative into the agenda,

one should first of all have faith in the Albanians etc., as if we [in Serbia] had no faith in the Albanians in Kosovo.”³⁴¹

Although it seemed that during this September meeting things were getting in order in relation to the writing of the press and the situation in Kosovo (as well as about other issues connected to the relations between the two states), it was not like that in reality. At the session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 11 December 1981, Stojanović says that the attacks of the Serbian media onto Bosnia, due to the attitudes on Kosovo, are not coincidental, and that they are worrying: “I met a friend from the League of Communists in Serbia who says: ‘We are arranging a session of the Central Committee, I am very worried, I do not know how it will end.’”³⁴² This session (plenary) of the League of Communists of Serbia was held on 24–26 December 1981, and a series of complaints was presented to the provinces.³⁴³ The provinces reacted (especially Vojvodina); others in Yugoslavia started supporting Vojvodina’s attitude (some of them uncritically). Bosnian authorities followed suit, despite the opinions of the League of Communists of Serbia being taken very seriously in this republic. This plenary was dubbed the first public outing of Serbian nationalism and the Serbian political elites after Tito’s death, as well as the first attack on Yugoslavia.³⁴⁴ According to witnesses’ reports, but not according

341 Authorized tape recording of conversations of comrades from the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 28, 1981.

342 Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tape recording from the 103rd session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11. 12. 1981.

343 Draža Marković wrote about this plenary; “At this session Serbia stopped being silent and the right of others to meddle and pressure Serbia was revoked; tutelage over Serbia stopped.”, Historical Archive of Belgrade, Personal Archive of Draža Marković, *Dnevnik*, Kutija 9, 27. 12. 1981.

344 Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije*, 89–90.

to the redacted stereogram, a thesis was put forth, among others, that “Serbia is the republic of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia”, and consequently that of the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia, and Draža Marković – then the President of the Parliament of SFRY – spoke harshly about Bosnia and Herzegovina; he refused to talk about Muslims as a nation.

Even though the harshest reactions came from Vojvodina, the discussion during this Serbian plenary session led to the reactions from all parts of Yugoslavia, Bosnia included, since the opinion was put forth that via this plenary of the League of Communists of Serbia, “the unity of Yugoslavia became seriously endangered”, as Stane Dolanc openly proclaimed at the session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, on 7 January 1982. Even though some discussants of this session of the federal Presidency of the Yugoslav Communists were reticent, being of the opinion that one should not open the discussion about the opinions of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, some Bosnians still warned the Serbian leadership. Mikulić spoke about the inadmissibility of “certain theses that relate to international relations within Yugoslavia (...), then the stressing of the principle of the national [as] the absolute principle (...) in the decision making regarding the formation of the republics”, while Nikola Stojanović started openly talking about the Serbian media’s attack on the leadership in Bosnia. “We have a witch hunt from the parts of the means of public information towards Bosnia, recently now towards certain personalities etc. (...) Shall we now decide and allow (...) our means of information to act similarly”. Stojanović mentioned that Bosnia observed that Muslims are not mentioned as a people at the plenary of the League of Communists of Serbia. Nikola Stojanović and Hamdija Pozderac criticized the attitudes of Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić, claiming that their discussions on the plenary of the League of Communists of Serbia endangered the sovereignty of the republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina), put one nation (the Muslims) into an unequal position, and so on. Therefore, the discussion about Kosovo immediately opened many other questions of the relations within the Yugoslav

federation. This was most clearly seen in the question about the Muslims. “There are comrades who cannot force themselves to say the word ‘Muslim’ (...) In Bosnia, these questions [about why the identity of Muslims is being negated] are being made. Why would the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be treated as an artificial creation 40 years after the revolution”, said Hamdija Pozderac. Nikola Stojanović emphasized that this was no longer the question of just Muslims, but that of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, “that is Serbian and Croatian nationalist, and not only them, but decent citizens who say that this should be made clear, what it [Draža Marković not mentioning Muslims during the Serbian plenary session] means”. Lazar Mojsov attempted to soften the relations, claiming how it had been a minor mistake, and that Marković never intended to negate the equality of the Muslims and to question the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴⁵

The beginning of this decade, when it comes to the question of the inter-republic relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, was marked by these sharp discussions. Relations would go through various ructions during the decade. They were encumbered; on one side, by the picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dark place (promoted by the Serbian media), and on the other by the questions of the negating of Muslim national identity, which occasionally popped up during the mid-eighties not only within Serbia’s nationalist intellectual circles.³⁴⁶ One other issue were the attempts of the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to present itself as the most consistent defender of Yugoslav values, yet without the political paternalism from Serbia. The end of the decade was marked by yet another affair that had shown how Serbia had an “arrogant relation towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, its leaders and institutions”: we are talking

345 Archives of Yugoslavia, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Unauthorized tape notes from the 111th session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 7. 1. 1982.

346 On this, see: Jasna Dragović-Soso, *“Spasioci nacije”: intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma* (Beograd: Edicija Reč 2004).

about the illegal actions of the Serbian intelligence in Eastern Bosnia in 1989, where they spread disinformation in order to shatter interethnic relations in this part of Bosnia. "Some members of the republic government (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) were openly worried due to this policy that was being led in Serbia, but they themselves never took any anti-Serb attitudes".³⁴⁷ This will definitely put a strain on the relations between these two republics, hastening the end of the Yugoslav state.

THE AUTONOMY OF THE PROVINCES - THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION

The question of the status of the autonomous provinces in Serbia dominated the inter-republic relations during the eighties. Although this question had a deeper history, it was fully opened after Tito's death. Ivan Stambolić unambiguously testifies to this in his replies to the question of the publicist, Slobodan Inić. In this memoir-style text, published in 1995, Stambolić explained this gradual strengthening of Serbia's position within Yugoslav internal politics as related directly to Tito's death and the events in Kosovo in 1981.³⁴⁸ Raif Dizdarević also identified the Kosovo uprising as the trigger that led the Serbian officials towards a more aggressive course of action.³⁴⁹ Stambolić's speech at the 6 May 1981 session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, at the time when the Kosovo Albanian uprising was nearly suppressed, was in its entirety toned in the spirit of proving the righteousness of the policy towards provinces that he, Draža Marković, Dušan Čkrebić, and Petar Stambolić, as well

347 Neven Anđelić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Između Tita i rata* (Beograd: Samizdat b92/Edicija Samizdat, 2005), 154.

348 "And the more time passed after Tito's death, the more Serbia's attitudes gained weight..", Ivan Stambolić, *Put u bespuće* (Beograd: Radio B92, 1995), 25. "For us in Serbia, resolving the relations between Serbia and the provinces, after the uprising in Kosovo, was of vital importance [...]", *Ibid*, 113.

349 Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije*, 88.

as the authors of the *Blue Book* in 1977,³⁵⁰ had advocated. Stambolić kept returning to 1977, perhaps for the reason not to insist on 1974, as that would entail the questioning of the Constitution itself. In his speech, with principled remarks, there was a bitterness due to the complaisance of the then Serbian leadership, which allegedly did not persevere to deal with the problems with the provinces. The then compromise, that nothing should be done regarding the provinces, Stambolić called accepting the “illusion” that they have agreed on something. In his speech, he went back four times to the months-long debates of 1977:

“When we, these days, at the collective session of the presidencies of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Serbia, discussed the causes and consequences of the happenings in Kosovo, comrade Minić wanted ‘these problems to be put into the agenda as they are, to see the core of things and to solve them’. The debates that we led in 1977, however, went in full reverse – certain comrades wanted things to be solved while not clearing up the essence of the things. [...] We never said it clearly and decisively that the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo actually had their republic, their state community the Socialist Republic of Serbia.³⁵¹

In this speech, Stambolić was critical towards the period of the development of the relations towards the provinces from 1977 on, when Serbia in its narrower sense started to drift away from its provinces. He claims that this had the consequence the fact that in 1981, the Republic of Serbia had more successful collaborations with other Yugoslav republics than with its own provinces. The influence of the analyses contained in the *Blue Book* is seen in Stambolić’s pointing towards the faultiness of the delegatory system, in which delegates and officials from the provinces took part in solving all political and economic problems of Serbia in the narrow sense, while on the other

350 Ivan Stambolić, *Rasprave o SR Srbiji* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 20–27.

351 *Ibid.*, 24.

hand, republican officials seldom had the chance to even visit one of the provinces. The implicatory tone of Stambolić's speech could be said to have been implying that things should go back to 1977, and that the arguments and principled nature of the Serbian side should rise to a much higher level.

A similar tone could be seen in Stambolić's speech at the December 1981 session of the League of Communists of Serbia.³⁵² In this speech, he went back to 1977 as well, as the crucial moment for the development of the policies towards the provinces. He spoke in a much more decisive fashion, saying that the then wrong estimates about the legal and constitutional position of the provinces were the "great responsibility" of the Serbian leadership ("our great responsibility"). He adds that the "counterrevolutionary" attempts on Kosovo in 1981 would never have presented themselves as such a surprise for the Serbian leadership had the estimates in 1977 not been so wrong. In this speech, Stambolić calls for unity within the Republic, within which he equally harshly condemns manifestations of separatism in the leaderships of Vojvodina and Kosovo. In an indirect manner, he underlined that new solutions for the provinces should be found in the time after Tito and Kardelj.³⁵³ By the way, in the mentioned book, *The Road to Nothingness*, Stambolić, not unlike Draža Marković, had shown how frustrated and encumbered he was by the formal questions of protocol and procedures in Kosovo. He wrote that the visitations by republican officials were preceded by long lasting negotiations with the representatives of the provinces, as if it were a ques-

352 Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 55–62.

353 "We have repeated to each other the stipulations of the Constitution countless times, we have called upon the Law of Joint Labor, upon the words of comrades Tito and Kardelj. It is all alright. However, we now need to study what we have really created, we have to carefully analyze where it leads us, when we have steered away from general commitments, thinking all the time that we have been reading these documents correctly. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, whose word we believed, whose thought still guide us, sadly, are no longer with us, so that they would do it instead of us. We have to do it alone now." Ibid, p. 61.

tion of international relations. Stambolić was additionally resentful of the fact that, at provincial gatherings, where he came as the highest among republican officials, as the president of the Republican Executive Council, was formally greeted only at the end of the protocol list, “after the last provincial official on the list”.³⁵⁴

The question of the autonomous provinces was unavoidable at the Eighteenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, held in November 1984. In his speech, Stambolić insisted upon the “more complete construction of the Socialist Republic of Serbia as a republic” anew. His logic was simple: what contributes to the strengthening of a certain republic, contributes to the strengthening of the SFRY. This session recorded his well-known metaphor about “co-tenants and sub-tenants”. This metaphor clearly emphasizes that provinces cannot be subdued, but cannot be equal to the republic as well:

“The socialist autonomous provinces and ethnicities are not sub-tenants in Serbia, but we are not co-tenants as well. Both the former and the latter relation would be detrimental for the unity of the Republic. Maybe it only seems to me that sometimes, when certain people call for a unified SR Serbia, with a constitutionally defined autonomy of its provinces, it causes more fear than the slogan ‘Kosovo – Republic.’”³⁵⁵

Beginning from 1986, it seems that Stambolić’s rhetoric towards Kosovo somewhat softened. Instead of unconditional demands and the frustration by the state of things, his speeches started showing some positive examples of collaboration between the state and its provinces. This “improvement” in the relations Stambolić at that time ascribed to the positive climate that was induced by the shift of political generations on

354 Stambolić, *Put u bespuće*, 78–9.

355 “Završna reč Ivana Stambolića. Uvek smo bili partija promena”, *Politika* br. 25556, 25. novembar 1984.

Kosovo.³⁵⁶ The Kosovar party leadership, which had been consolidating around Azem Vlasi and Kaćuša Jašari since May 1986, was obviously according to Stambolić's will. From his side, he again stressed that these changes were the consequence of a correct policy that was taken by the republican government towards Kosovo in the preceding five years. In his later memoirs, Stambolić lists numerous areas in which, during that time, a thawing of relations happened, as well as mutual collaboration: from a joint legislature, to collaboration on an economic and political level. He particularly emphasizes that during this period, there was a statutory merging of the League of Communists on the whole territory of the Republic.³⁵⁷ No matter the political generational change in Kosovo and the positive changes in mutual communication, Stambolić continued, with undiminished zeal to prepare constitutional changes in the field of reducing provincial competencies in negotiations with other republics. In the basic issues of the constitutional consolidation of the Republic, his efforts can be traced back to the last moments of his active involvement in politics. Less than ten days before the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, he gave a speech in front of all three chambers of the Assembly of SR Serbia, in which he explained the proposal to amend the constitution

356 At the joint session of the presidencies of the SFRY and the CC LCY on 5 March 1986, Stambolić emphasizes: "I think that we can come to an agreement together that during this five-year period, in the League of Communists of Kosovo, in their leadership, a new Yugoslav political orientation claimed victory, that a new political direction was born by a new leadership corps". Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 155. Stambolić had the same reason on this topic later as well: "Unifying forces and a willingness for an efficient collaboration grow on this basis. This is how the leadership changed their officials. Younger, more educated, and politically unencumbered people are arriving, with a Yugoslav orientation. They are pushing back the protagonists of old policies and rehabilitating some of the critics of the old policies". Stambolić, *Put u bespuće*, 89.

357 Stambolić, *Put u bespuće*, 89–90.

of SR Serbia. For these changes, he managed to obtain the consent of the leaderships of other republics and both provinces.³⁵⁸

Dragiša Buca Pavlović, one of Ivan Stambolić's closest associates (besides Slobodan Milošević); was also preoccupied with the issue of provinces. Pavlović held the position of the President of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade for a relatively short time, from May 1986 until the events related to the Eighth Session (1987). It is not widely known among the general public that Pavlović's removal from that position was a key item on the agenda of the mentioned session. The speech that Buca Pavlović gave on that occasion is probably the last decisive defense of the most important achievements and values of Yugoslav socialism on the Serbian political stage. However, during his active involvement in politics, he also persistently insisted on the reduction of autonomous provincial competencies, so he can also be seen in the continuity of the practice of recent Serbian recentralists. In this area, he ideologically elaborates the existing conceptions of Draža Marković and Ivan Stambolić. In Pavlović's case, we also find elements of constitutional argumentation related to the establishment of a single economic and state space within the SR of Serbia, and insistence on the equality of the SR of Serbia in relation to other republics within the federation. He takes the Social Plan of SR Serbia as an example and insists that this document should refer to the entire territory of Serbia. The applicable legal regulations at the time stated that social plans are adopted by "socio-political communities", and the area of Narrow Serbia (i.e. Serbia without SAP territories) itself has never and nowhere been defined as such a community. Pavlović noted that for formal legal reasons and due to the opposition of the autonomous provinces, the social plan of SR Serbia had not been adopted for a whole decade, which indicates a significant disenfranchisement of this republic in relation to other Yugoslav republics.³⁵⁹

358 Stambolić, *Rasprave*, 241–53.

359 "A self-governing, delegate-organized state such as the SR of Serbia must play its role in economic development – both in principle as much as the other

A significant part of Pavlović's argument regarding the solution of the Kosovo problem refers to cooperation with Kosovar institutions.³⁶⁰ In the domain of political, cultural and economic cooperation with Kosovo, Pavlović's views in this way largely correspond to the views of Ivan Stambolić, in the 1986–1987 period. Pavlović also spoke extensively about cooperation with Kosovo at the Eighth Session, when such rhetoric had already been "overcome" in the nationalist group formed around Slobodan Milošević.³⁶¹

Slobodan Milošević was in the inner circle of the Serbian leadership from the end of 1983, and until his visit to Kosovo Polje in April 1987 he did not show much interest in the so-called Kosovo issue. In the collection of his public appearances, we come across the first mention of the Kosovo problem only in June 1986, at the conference of the presidents of the district committees of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Milošević spoke about the crisis in Kosovo, among other topics, during the meeting with Kragujevac's political activists in December 1986. Although Ivan Stambolić's rhetoric towards Kosovo had already softened considerably at the time, Milošević was still speaking the old language that defined phenomena in Kosovo immediately after the 1981 uprising. While Stambolić pointed to possible ways of cooperating with the new provincial leadership, for Milošević, the phenomena in Kosovo are simply branded

republics; management implies planning and realization of the planned, as well as harmonization of the functioning of individual parts with the whole and vice versa. Therefore, it is necessary that there is one Social Plan of SR Serbia, yet not as a mechanical sum of three separate plans that touch only within the materials for the forum sessions. Otherwise, the strategy and policy of material development of SR Serbia will be, as before, an unpredictable result of the development and other ambitions of its three separate and unrelated works; it would mean weaker economic results for the provinces and for the so-called narrower Serbia and for Yugoslavia itself as a whole composed of equal (by no means unequal) parts", *Ibid*, 27–9.

360 *Ibid*, 25–7, 36.

361 Dragiša Pavlović, *Olako obećana brzina* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 173–4.

as a “counter-revolution”, and problem solving as “removing the consequences of the counter-revolution”.³⁶² With the exception of these two incidental mentions of the situation in Kosovo, in which we may recognize the beginnings of Milošević’s future harsh rhetoric, the issue of the southern autonomous province of SR Serbia does not seem to have occupied Milošević too much at the beginning of his political career.

Ivan Stambolić also testified about Milošević’s lack of interest in Kosovo. Allegedly, he was also persuading him (Stambolić) to give up the autonomous provinces and turn to solving Yugoslav problems.³⁶³ It may sound paradoxical, but his later opponents, Draža Marković, Ivan Stambolić and Buca Pavlović – politicians whom Milošević removed from politics due to alleged opposition to solving the Kosovo problem – were much more occupied by this issue.

In the realm of practical politics, and especially after the events in Kosovo Polje in 1987, the priorities of Milošević’s recent recentralism completely changed. Firstly, it should be noted that in the period 1987–1989, the scope of his activities was completely redirected to the issues of the provinces and other internal issues of the SR of Serbia, from the issue of the federation. It seems that the “happening of the people”, the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and the reckoning with the “counter-revolution” in Kosovo have completely suppressed the issues of relations in the federal state. Even in the domain of “resolving” the Kosovo issue, Milošević’s methods certainly do not correspond to the policy advocated by Ivan Stambolić and Dragiša Buca Pavlović in 1986 and 1987.

While Stambolić and Pavlović were persistent in their cooperation with the moderate leadership of Kosovo since March 1986, Milošević subjected the leadership to political pressure in the events after the Eighth Session, and later to forms of repression as well. In November 1988, the most prominent provincial party leaders, Kaćuša Jašari

362 Slobodan Milošević, *Godine raspleta* (Beograd: BIGZ, 1989), 97–98, 121–124.

363 Stambolić, *Put u bespuće*, 165.

and Azem Vlasi, were removed from the Kosovo party organization by an intervention from Belgrade. A state of emergency was imposed in Kosovo in February 1989, and Azem Vlasi was arrested in March. The amendments to the Serbian constitution from March 1989 significantly limited the autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The procedure to amend Serbia's 1974 constitution implied consent from the provincial assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In Kosovo, this consent was coerced under a state of emergency, with army and police in the streets, and the threat of further repression. Vojvodina's consent was previously secured, when the leadership led by Boško Krunic was replaced in the violent demonstrations of October 1988.

Milošević's reckoning with the provinces disrupted the previous balance of power in the Presidency of the SFRY and other state and party bodies. From that time on, out of eight votes that belonged to the subjects of the federation, Serbia had three votes, to which the Montenegrin vote was added in January 1989. After that, the Kosovo and Vojvodina leadership lost their subjectivity as part of the Yugoslav crisis. Alluding to the Munich Agreement from 1938, Boško Krunic metaphorically defined the events surrounding Milošević's takeover of Vojvodina as "Little Munich" in his memoirs. What Krunic was referring to was the capitulatory behavior of the federal party and state bodies, namely, the presidency of the SFRY and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia during the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolutions, as well as the later military outcome of the Yugoslav crisis.³⁶⁴ The Yugoslav "Munich", like the appeasement of Hitler with the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia for the sake of European peace, implied territorial concessions to Milošević within Serbia with the hope of achieving peace in the rest of Yugoslavia. In both cases, hopes that peace would be ensured proved unfounded.

However, Kosovo was not the only province whose status was called into question, since with the opening of the issue of the status of Kosovo in Serbia, the status of Vojvodina was also called into

364 Boško Krunic, *Decenija zamora i raskola* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2009), 185–189.

question. The latent conflict between the leaders in Novi Sad and Belgrade, opened in 1981, would go through various phases, ending in 1988 with the liquidation of the autonomy of Vojvodina as a political subject and an element of Yugoslav federalism. The escalation occurred in 1984 at the Eighteenth session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, at which the processes of disintegration that “destroy the Yugoslav federation and threaten to break-up Serbia” were criticized. The republican leadership, in which the conservative centralists Dušan Čkrebić and General Nikola Ljubičić played a crucial role, asserted there was danger in the provinces and their status. Provincial leaders retaliated by accusing the Serbian political leadership of statism and nationalism. The situation was aggravated by the Belgrade media, which were already beginning to prepare public opinion in the direction of nationalist homogenization. Following its constitutional obligations – the guarantee of provincial autonomy – the federal leadership worked to calm the passions and form the Inquiry Commission in the spring of 1985. Four years later, the Yugoslav leadership would remain powerless, silently watching Serbia’s violent and unconstitutional attack on provincial autonomies. However, during the crisis of 1984–1985, the Serbian leadership had already achieved one important victory: constitutional changes were put on the agenda, provincial autonomies have been called into question, and they would not be removed from the agenda until the *de facto* abolition of their autonomy in 1989.³⁶⁵ Thus, the so-called the Serbian question was opened just four years after Tito’s death. Nationalist homogenization, then relevant only to the question of provinces, was achieved. The synchronized action of political, intellectual and media elites prepared the ground for Slobodan Milošević to come to power. It was a great victory of the republican leadership, led by Nikola Ljubičić and Dušan Čkrebić, over the pro-

365 Petar Atanacković, “Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela. Položaj pokrajina i ustavne reforme u Srbiji 1980-ih godina: pozicija Vojvodine”, in: *Slobodni i suvereni. Umetnost, teorija i politika – knjiga eseja i intervju o Kosovu i Srbiji*, ur. V. Knežević, K. Lukić, I. Marjanović, G. Nikolić (Novi Sad: Cenzura, 2013), 144.

vincial political structures. At that time, few people in Novi Sad and Priština anticipated the danger that loomed over them, but also over the entire Yugoslavia.

With the formation of the Inquiry Commission, which would examine the possibilities of constitutional changes, the problem between Serbia and the province had not been solved. The Belgrade media continued the nationalist campaign, which in 1985 focused on the controversial “Martinović case”, the abuse of Serbs in Kosovo³⁶⁶. The Serbian and Yugoslav public was brought to a state of emotional turmoil, and the anti-Albanian – and indirectly anti-provincial – mood was significantly inflamed. The image of the Albanian perpetrator and the Serbian victim was daily in the Belgrade media. At the end of the same year, the Kosovo Serbs “self-organized” and, until the abolition of provincial competencies, official Belgrade would use them as a political force of Serbian nationalism, primarily against Vojvodina and Montenegro. The arrival of a Kosovo Serb delegation in Belgrade, as well as violent incursions into institutions and the apparent support of Serbian security services and the media, heated up the political situation. After the well-known nationalist petition from January 1986, which was published against the situation in Kosovo in the opposition and increasingly openly right-wing *Književne novine*, in September of the same year, the draft of the notorious Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) leaked and was published by Belgrade press. Theses about the Serbian endangerment in Yugoslavia and the unequal position of Serbia in the federation fell on the fertile ground of an already homogenized public opinion. Provincial autonomy had been identified as a key issue, and their abolition as a major political goal. Serbia was preparing to reorganize relations in the Federation on the basis of a “balance of power”. The

366 Đorđe Martinović was found in May 1985 with his anus impaled on the broken glass bottle. The crime took place in Gnjilane municipality in Kosovo, and it has never been confirmed whether it was an ethnically motivated, however it did cause a huge disturbance in Yugoslav public due to an aggressive exploitation by the press. Atanacković, 1944

moderate part of the party leadership, led by Ivan Stambolić, who had already started negotiations with the provincial leaders on the agreed constitutional reform, was delegitimized and became unpopular. The Memorandum dealt a great blow to Stambolić and his concept of implementing constitutional changes in a peaceful, institutional way – with the consent of all subjects of Yugoslav federalism. On the other hand, the Vojvodina leadership welcomed the appearance of an aggressively nationalist document such as the SANU Memorandum as an occasion to accuse the republican leadership of supporting its dangerous intentions.³⁶⁷

The fact is that the republican leadership of Serbia used the real problems in Kosovo to change the constitutional status of Vojvodina, which by all parameters, both economic and political, was among the most successful elements of the federation.³⁶⁸ Already in the second half of the eighties, the main focus was on the predominantly Serbian, although multiethnic Vojvodina, as economically significantly more developed than other parts of Serbia. The leadership of Vojvodina was aware that it would fall as the first victim of the conflict between Belgrade and Priština, which is why it opposed more radical constitutional changes, which further irritated the republican leadership, which accused them of supporting Albanian separatism.³⁶⁹ That is how the stage was set for the violent overthrow of Vojvodina's autonomy.

The issue of provincial autonomy, perceived in the state leadership of Serbia as a key problem in the functioning of the republic, was especially radicalized, as it was said, by demonstrations in Kosovo (1981), the “Martinović case” (1985) and finally, culminated in the murder of several JNA soldiers in barracks in Paraćin (1987), carried out by an Albanian soldier from Kosovo. The atmosphere of nationalist homogenization and the demand for the “unification” of Serbia,

367 P. Atanacković, “Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela”, 144–145.

368 Živan Marelj, *Ukidanje autonomnosti Vojvodine, početak razbijanja Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2020).

369 Krunić, *Decenija zamora*, 22.

which had been “broken” by the provinces, was considered a first-class political goal. However, part of the Serbian leadership accused the leaders of the campaign, the newspaper *Politika*, of inciting hatred. This indirectly targeted Slobodan Milošević, who effectively controlled the paper through his staff. A conflict broke out which ended with the defeat of the moderate president of the Serbian presidency, Ivan Stambolić, at the eighth session of the Serbian party leadership (1987) and the subsequent election of Slobodan Milošević as the undisputed party and national leader. The provincial leadership of Vojvodina did not want to choose a side, remaining neutral in the conflict within narrow Serbia, knowing that Stambolić and Milošević did not differ substantially in their intentions towards provincial autonomies.³⁷⁰ The ultimate goal of rescinding of autonomy was not taken into consideration at that time, since the violent and radical methods that the newly enthroned regime in Belgrade would apply would be completely new and beyond the previously agreed patterns of compromise of political activity in the second Yugoslavia.

At the very beginning of 1988, the new republican and provincial leaderships continued the negotiation of constitutional changes begun during the time of Stambolić in order to increase the functionality of Serbia as a specific federal unit. An agreement was reached between the republican and the two provincial leaderships, but the conflict was renewed due to the demands of the Serbian leadership to speed up and deepen the changes – thus completely circumscribing and hollowing provincial autonomy. The leadership of the provinces, especially Vojvodina, unequivocally opposed this. In the summer of 1988, an unprecedented propaganda campaign against the provincial leadership, above all that of Vojvodina, began in all Belgrade media, encouraged from the top of the republic. The everyday severe accusations and open threats did not break the provincial leadership; they even homogenized it. When the pressure through the

370 Đorđe Stojić, *Osmo sednica. Kako je Slobodan Milošević pobedio, a Srbija istorijski izgubila* (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2014).

media and party forums failed to bear fruit, they started organizing mass street demonstrations with the goal of violently overthrowing the Vojvodina leadership. Thus, at the beginning of July 1988, a group of several hundred Serbs from Kosovo “self-organized” and came to Novi Sad, demonstrating in front of the Provincial Assembly building. The relatively small number of people gathered, the ignorance of the local population and the still insufficiently clearly articulated demands, would not have caused more attention if it had not been for the manipulation of the Belgrade media. Namely, a short-lived incident – the shut-off the electricity to the protesters, in order to prevent hate speech uncharacteristic of the previous public discourse in Yugoslavia, was portrayed in an extremely dramatic tone in the extensive Belgrade media reports. Day after day, with various montages and manipulations, the political temperature in Serbia had been raised as planned. The pressure on the disobedient provincial leadership grew. The launch of a counter-campaign of the political assets of the League of Communists of Vojvodina (SKV) and media loyal to the provincial leadership did not yield results, because it remained within the limits of old patterns and delegitimized formulas. The regime in Belgrade used a new homogenizing force in society – nationalism, combined with a more efficient and more brutal means of propaganda.³⁷¹

The signal for the beginning of a more radical showdown with the disobedient provincial leadership was given personally by the newly enthroned leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, in an interview with the most influential weekly in the country, *NIN*, in July 1988. He said that parts of the provincial leadership want the “provinces to be states in the long or near future”, which is why “they are negotiating to win some rights, which, if won, are the basis for splitting Serbia into three independent and mutually separate parts – three countries”. Thus, the provincial leaders of Vojvodina and Kosovo were directly

371 Krunić, *Decenija zamora*, 114; Milivoj Bešlin, “Vojvodina u Jugoslaviji: Borba za autonomiju”, *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi*, prir. W. Hoepken, F. Bieber, L. Perović, D. Roksandić, M. Velikonja (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2017), 279–324.

accused of separatism, which in the northern province, inhabited mainly by Serbs, was an accusation that seriously shook the already reduced legitimacy of the League of Communist of Vojvodina Provincial Committee. The daily propaganda of the media in Belgrade, now under Milošević's complete control, amplified the pressure. To complete bending Vojvodina to his will, further gatherings of citizens in Vojvodina were announced, called "happenings of the people".³⁷²

In parallel with this extra-institutional pressure, the institutional squeeze on the provincial leadership tightened. Milošević attacked from two directions, both attempting to create divisions in the Party of Communists of Vojvodina and to take over the "base" of the provincial party. This latter front entailed instrumentalizing the party's municipal and city committees to start demanding the removal of their own provincial party leadership in Novi Sad. Another form of institutional pressure came from the very top of the republic, which stated at the Twelfth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia that it was a crisis caused by the conflict between "democratic aspirations of the people" and "bureaucratic defense ... of the provincial nationocracy ("naciokratija"), called "arm-chair people". The legal leadership of Socialist Autonomous Province (SAP) of Vojvodina had also been accused of "insolent demonstration of statehood ... on the imaginary border on the Belgrade-*Novi Sad* highway", with the goal of creating a "Vojvodina people", as well as of supporting the "Albanian irredenta". These and similar accusations of anti-Serbism, made for the first time in the public discourse of the second Yugoslavia in an atmosphere of years of unstoppable anti-Albanian hysteria and heated nationalism, were a call for the lynching of provincial leaders who did not agree to Milošević's proposal to voluntarily abolish Vojvodina's autonomy and authority. The propaganda of the regime in Belgrade, presaging that intensively applied during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s,

372 Dimitrije Boarov, *Politička istorija Vojvodine* (Novi Sad: Agencija CUP, 2001), 213–214.

was postulated and first applied to Vojvodina. As that propaganda spread and grew, it took on more and more extreme forms, uttering accusations such as the one about the establishment of the “anti-Serbian axis Zagreb – Novi Sad – Ljubljana”.³⁷³

When it was estimated in Belgrade that the provincial leadership was shaken and thoroughly compromised, and the citizens were sufficiently homogenized and incited against it, during the second half of August, the next phase of rallies in Vojvodina commenced. The number of rallies, as well as the presence of citizens, grew exponentially day by day, the anger of the gathered people also grew, and the risks of victims who would fall in the conflict between the demonstrators and the police forces, which were still under the provincial command, rose. For the first time in the second Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church also became actively involved in political events. The basic organizations of the League of Communists of Vojvodina increasingly refused to obey the direct party leadership in Vojvodina, thus separating themselves from the political system and placing themselves under the control of the republican party structures against the provincial ones. Places inhabited by post-1945 (ethnic Serb) settlers, so-called colonists: Bačka Palanka, Titov Vrbas, and Nova Pazova, were centers of resistance to the provincial leadership.³⁷⁴

The federal political leadership, which in 1945 guaranteed the inviolability of Vojvodina's autonomy, seemed confused and disinterested during the blitzkrieg that Serbia carried out on Vojvodina under Slobodan Milošević. Although the federation's constitutional order was called into question, especially after Serbia began exporting street methods to other republics in August (first to Montenegro), the federal political center seemed uninterested, hoping Milošević would end his campaign by subduing the provinces. In mid-September, the federal leadership tried to mediate in the dispute between Serbia and Vojvodina, but the mediation ended unsuccessfully, stating that the

373 P. Atanacković, “Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela”, 148–151.

374 Krunić, *Decenija zamora*, 135–141; D. Boarov, *Politička istorija Vojvodine*, 215.

differences were insurmountable. However, all appeals to stop the increasingly violent rallies, as well as the increasingly heated campaign in the media, remained without consequences, because the federal state limited its activity to requests and appeals. The real *modus operandi* of the federal authorities was seen during the final act of destruction of Vojvodina's autonomy, which began on September 25, 1988. The reunion of Kosovo Serbs in Novi Sad then took place; unlike the previous one, this reunion received far greater support from the local population, being welcomed by the citizens of Vojvodina and party organizations in Vojvodina's interior. It was also supported by several particularly important large factories, such as Novi Sad's "Jugohalat". The federal police detachment sent to the capital of Vojvodina, although it was clear that the constitutional order of the state was being violated on the street, was given the task of intervening only in the event of more serious bloodshed.³⁷⁵

The last act in destroying the autonomy of Vojvodina took place on 5 October 1988. The previous day, the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina tried to call to account the key organizers of the rally; the local leadership in Bačka Palanka: Mihalj Kertes and Radovan Pankov. Their response to that was a gathering of 10,000 people who headed to Novi Sad with the task of finally demolishing the leadership of SAP Vojvodina and bringing a new one, which would be loyal to Belgrade. With the strong support of the Belgrade media and the secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Zoran Sokolović, tens of thousands of people gathered in Novi Sad, brought by chartered buses from all parts of Vojvodina, but also from Serbia, even from Montenegro. Protestants threw stones and yoghurt at the building of the Executive Council of Vojvodina, a symbol of provincial autonomy, which is why the whole event was later named the Yoghurt Revolution. The isolated provincial leadership sought the help of both the Republic and the federal authorities. Despite promises, help did not

375 P. Atanacković, "Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela", 152.

arrive. On the contrary, the federal institutions, as guarantors of the provincial autonomies, increased the pressure and accelerated the leading people of Vojvodina to resign.³⁷⁶ The next day, October 6, all members of the Vojvodina leadership and representatives of Vojvodina in federal institutions resigned. It was a complete triumph of the policy of the Serbian leadership. The disobedient leaders of Vojvodina were soon replaced by Milošević's loyalists. The media campaign against the dismissed leadership continued in the months that followed, aimed at preparing the public for the final abolition of the autonomous rights of Vojvodina. "Radical personnel changes", as they were called, as well as the break with "autonomous politics", brought the most conservative advocates of centralist politics to key positions in Vojvodina.³⁷⁷ The new provincial cadres, as well as the hitherto cosmopolitan Vojvodina media, became the most ardent promoters of nationalist politics and everyday hate speech overnight. The reality produced on the street needed to be planted in the broadest strata of the population. Thus, Vojvodina became an important logistical base in Slobodan Milošević's continuing campaign in Yugoslavia. The first in line were FR Montenegro and SAP Kosovo.³⁷⁸

After the violent change of the provincial leadership in October, the constitutional changes and the *de facto* abolition of the autonomy of Vojvodina were just a formality. The final act took place in March 1989, when amendments to the constitution of SR Serbia were adopted, which reduced the autonomy of the two provinces to a minimum, after which it essentially ceased to exist. Thus, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina voluntarily ceased to be a political subject in the architecture of Yugoslav federalism, soon to cease to exist as any subject. Economic journalist and publicist Dimitrije Boarov claims that Vojvodina, as a "historical region with a Serbian autonomist tradition

376 Živan Marelj, *Ukidanje autonomnosti Vojvodine*, 99–103.

377 D. Boarov, *Politička istorija Vojvodine*, 216–217; P. Atanacković, "Srbija iz tri dela mora biti cela", 152–154.

378 M. Bešlin, "Vojvodina u Jugoslaviji", 279–324.

and more than 40 percent of the population who are neither Serbs nor Montenegrins, voluntarily renounced acquired rights, asks the Serbian national headquarters not to have the right to decide independently on a single important political issue, demands that the taxes collected on its territory be distributed and spent by someone outside Vojvodina, that its companies (...) lose their business independence and their own financial accounts (...) The political suicide of Vojvodina was carried out by collective action of terrible political and media pressure from Belgrade, and the restraint of other political centers in Yugoslavia – for fear that it would be their turn”.³⁷⁹

Shortly after the change of the provincial leadership and the constitutional changes, one of the most thorough purges in the history of Vojvodina followed. There are no exact data, but it is estimated that during and after the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, about 40,000 political officials, senior government officials, police chiefs, judges, directors of health, cultural, educational, scientific and information centers were fired or cancelled. In the economy, about 80 percent of the management staff has been replaced; in just the former capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, the leaders of all five banks were replaced, as well as the directors of the post office, railway, Naftagas, etc. No media editor remained, entire newsrooms were changed in all official languages in the province. Vojvodina’s investment and pension funds were abolished, and the funds were transferred to the republic center.³⁸⁰

MONTENEGRO AND SERBIA

Identity issues were important in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relations with Serbia and Croatia, but also in Serbia and Montenegro’s relationship in the mid-1980s. These issues were raised as early as the mid-1960s, after a change at the top of the Montenegrin party leadership. The old, “partisan” leadership in Montenegro was then inherited

379 D. Boarov, *Politička istorija Vojvodine*, 217.

380 M. Bešlin, “Vojvodina u Jugoslaviji”, 279–324.

by representatives of the younger generation, who defined the affirmation of the Montenegrin national and cultural identity as one of the priorities of their policy. Their activity would be additionally initiated by the gathering of certain cultural and intellectual elites from Belgrade, who, on the platform of support for the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro, were increasingly challenging Montenegrin identity. Already at the IV Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro (March 1965), the new party leadership emphasized the necessity of defining a new cultural and national policy of socialist Montenegro, which is why a special commission was formed to “review the ideological orientations of cultural creation within its own nation”.³⁸¹ Following these conclusions, the party commission prepared a study in which it analyzed the current cultural policy of socialist Montenegro with a plan for further development. The study stated that the denial of the Montenegrin nation and the existence of the Montenegrin national culture could not be permitted.³⁸² These views were repeated at the Fifth Congress of the Alliance of Socialist Working People of Montenegro (March 1966), at which it was stated that due to insufficient commitment to these issues, the Montenegrins paradoxically had a nation, but no national culture. In that context, the affirmation and development of Montenegrin national culture were the basic tasks of the development of cultural policy. This was considered was a precondition for the equal treatment of the Montenegrin nation in Yugoslavia.³⁸³ The first announcements of the affirmation of the Montenegrin cultural and national identity immediately opened discussions and dilemmas in Serbian intellectual and cultural circles. The Belgrade-based *Književne novine* described

381 Jadranka Selhanović, *Crnogorska vlast i crnogorsko nacionalno pitanje. Dokumenta 1970–1985* (Podgorica: Državni arhiv Crne Gore, 2015), 9.

382 Commission of the Central Committee of the SCCG – Current Issues of Our Cultural Policy and Conceptual Problems in the Field of Culture, February, 1966, State Archives of Montenegro (hereinafter DACG), Archival Department for the History of the Workers’ Movement (hereinafter AOIRP), CK/1967.

383 Selhanović, *Crnogorska vlast i crnogorsko nacionalno pitanje*, 11

the activity as a “suspicious and dangerous request”, allegedly trying to separate the unique cultural space into, as they claimed, “ultra-Montenegrin and ultra-Serbian”. On the other hand, in the *Zagreb Vijesnik*, the initiative of the Montenegrin authorities was assessed as a “liberation of Montenegrin culture from appropriative ambitions and aspirations of the Serbian cultural policy”.³⁸⁴

The dissonant tones coming from the two most important Yugoslav political centers clearly indicated that the process of establishing a Montenegrin identity and national culture would be a predominantly political issue. This was also pointed out by the leading people of the Montenegrin party leadership, who, after the first reactions from Belgrade, concluded that these were “ideas of Greater Serbian nationalism which considers Montenegrin culture a part of Serbian cultural heritage”.³⁸⁵ These views were confirmed in the document titled “Current issues of development of the Montenegrin culture”, which was adopted at the end of 1970 at the session of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro. In this document, the Montenegrin party leadership said that the continued affirmation of the Montenegrin nation and culture will be a key task for the party leadership, with the message that it will fight against all those who deny or dispute Montenegrin national individuality. Processes initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s would permanently determine the character of relations between the Montenegrin and Serbian party leaderships. While, on the one hand, the Montenegrin leadership would insist on the thesis that the Montenegrin national culture is autochthonous and unique, and that it should be affirmed and improved as such, certain circles from Belgrade will constantly try to prove that the Montenegrin national culture and identity are part of the Serbian

384 Current political information – information sector of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, 18. februar 1967, DACG, AOIRP, CK/1967.

385 Current political information – information sector of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, 18. februar 1967, DACG, AOIRP, CK/1967.

cultural space, and therefore there was no reason to open and further problematize cultural and identity issues of Montenegro.

The narrative that challenged the Montenegrin national and cultural identity will, for the first time, receive an organized and articulated public statement during the construction of Njegoš's mausoleum on the Lovćen mountain. The realization of this project was renewed after 1968 and the arrival of the new leadership of the League of Communists of Montenegro, led by Veselin Đuranović. The idea of building the Mausoleum was strongly opposed by the top of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro, which received the open support of the SOC Synod and some intellectuals from Belgrade, most of whom were of Montenegrin origin. However, unlike the top of the Serbian Orthodox Church and some intellectuals from Belgrade, the top of the League of Communists in Serbia³⁸⁶ supported party colleagues from Montenegro. The Commission for Interethnic Relations of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia stated that "the top of the Serbian Orthodox Church used religion as a basis for the national hegemony of Serbs towards those parts of Yugoslavia where Orthodoxy is the dominant religion".³⁸⁷ The party leadership of Serbia confirmed its support for the Montenegrin leadership during the meeting in June 1970 in Titograd. At the joint session of the representatives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro and of Serbia, support was provided for the further process of building the mausoleum in Lovćen. A member of the Central Committee of the Serbian Sports Confederation, Predrag Ajtić, said at the time that the story that was started from Belgrade about the construction of the mausoleum on Lovćen was not an "artistic-aesthetic issue, but a platform for the forces of unification and of Greater Serbia". Ajtić said that the obligation of the Serbian party leadership was to condemn

386 It is rather important to stress that in the 1968–72 period, the League of Communists of Serbia was led by the so-called liberal current, personified by Marko Nikezić, Latinka Perović, Bora Pavlović, Mirko Tepavac, and Koča Popović.

387 Dragutin Papović, "Odnosi Crne Gore i Srpske Lawslavne crkve tokom izgradnje Njegoševog mauzoleja", *Matica*, br. 69, 2017, 233.

and reject as unacceptable “any manifestation of paternalistic, pastoral and patronizing attitude and attitude towards the decisions of self-governing bodies in SR Montenegro”, explaining that such actions harm Serbia and the Serbian nation.³⁸⁸

Circumstances changed significantly after 1972 and the dismissal of the so-called liberals at the head of the LC of Serbia. The new party leadership of Serbia, although ostensibly identifying all attempts at radicalization, in practice did nothing to prevent the increasingly open campaign from Belgrade, which relativized and denied Montenegrin national identity. This was also recognized by the top Montenegrin authorities. Marko Špadijer, a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro, at a session in September 1985, claimed that “the manifestation of Greater Serbian nationalism in relation to Montenegro has a long tradition, but that it has been especially militant lately”. In his opinion, Serbian nationalists base their ideology on the denial of the Montenegrin nation and that “by stirring up nationalist passions, they create a paternalistic climate that harms interethnic relations”.³⁸⁹

In an attempt to quell the increasingly open attacks from Belgrade, the Montenegrin party leadership initiated a series of meetings with the republican leadership of Serbia. According to the Central Committee of Montenegro, a series of consultative meetings with colleagues from Serbia was held in 1981, including one in Titograd and the other in Belgrade, where “information and opinions were exchanged on the most current ideological and political issues”.³⁹⁰ The intensive campaign, which was conducted in the Serbian public space against the Montenegrin leadership and the most important political decisions related to the process of strengthening the Mon-

388 Jadranka Selhanović, “Mauzolej – Partija – Crkva”, *Arhivski zapisi*, br.1, 2013, 203.

389 J. Selhanović, *Crnogorska vlast i crnogorsko nacionalno pitanje*, 260.

390 Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – Theses for conversation with friends from the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia, January 1985, p. 2, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

tenegrin national and cultural identity, necessitated the organization of a new meeting. At the beginning of 1985, the Montenegrin party leadership prepared a platform with four key theses, which were to be the basis for negotiations with the Serbian party leadership. The main topics were: *Implementation of a long-term economic stabilization program; Critical analysis of the functioning of the political system; Realization of ideological and action unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; Analysis of a number of issues in the field of culture, science, education and information.*³⁹¹

In the preparatory theses for the meeting with colleagues from Serbia, the leaders of the LC of Montenegro explained that in the previous period, the activities of Serbian party structures were intensified, aimed at “settling accounts with nationalism in their own ranks”. They noticed that one could talk about some “positive trends”, because, as they noted, there were “fewer and fewer sensationalist and unacceptable articles about the situation in Montenegro” in the media in Serbia. However, the party leadership believed that it was not possible to talk about the end of the campaign against Montenegro, but only about the lull caused by the actualization of some other topics and “weaker activity of self-proclaimed Montenegrins, specialized in finding hot topics and provocative interlocutors in Montenegro and abroad”. In that campaign, they named the media that occasionally or continuously sensationally reported on Montenegro: *Novosti* & *Večernje novosti*, *Politika ekspres*, *Duga*, and occasionally *NIN*.³⁹² The Montenegrin party leadership saw a special problem in the way the Montenegrin past was treated, which was interpreted within the thesis that “the Montenegrin people are part of the Serbian people, so the Montenegrin nation is fictional”. The *History of the Serbian Peo-*

391 Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – Theses for conversation with friends from the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia, January 1985, p. 3, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

392 Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – Theses for conversation with friends from the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia, January 1985, p. 3, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

ple project was especially problematic for them, in which, in their opinion, the existence of the Montenegrin nation was denied. The details of the project were also problematic, especially the appropriation of Montenegrin dynasties Vojislavljević, Balšić and Crnojević, which are said to be Serbian dynasties, while some Montenegrin cities were claimed to be “Serbian”; the case was similar with the remains of material cultural heritage. They recognized no fewer problems in literature, where Jovan Deretić’s book *Istorija srpske književnosti* stood out, in which contemporary Montenegrin writers (Zogović, Banjević, Đonović, Pekić) were treated as Serbian writers. The problem with the appropriation of contemporary Montenegrin writers is especially interesting due to the fact that the author of the book was Jovan Deretić, a member of the League of Communists of Serbia inner circle. The role of a number of intellectuals, originally from Montenegro, who, as they say, “use every opportunity to deny Montenegrin identity and dispute its identity”, was highlighted as a special problem that burdened the relations between the two socialist republics.³⁹³

The proposed platform for talks with the political leadership of SR Serbia was also discussed at a special session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro in May 1985. Marko Špadijer, a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of Montenegro, explained that the Montenegrin delegation, in talks with colleagues from Serbia, had to point out and clearly define “the increasingly pronounced denials of Montenegro’s cultural past, from the position of Greater Serbian nationalism”. Špadijer also pointed out the need to explain some historiographical topics that were being processed in Serbian scientific institutions, in which the autocephaly of the Montenegrin church was disputed, and the existence of the Montenegrin nation was denied. He concluded that the constant politicization and abuse of these topics was “unacceptable from a

393 Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – Theses for conversation with friends from the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia, January 1985, p. 6, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

Communist point of view, and had a chauvinistic overtone that pointed to the hatred of two peoples”.³⁹⁴ Svetozar Durutović, a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, agreed with Špadijer’s views, assessing that Montenegrin culture and identity had a “subtenant” position in Serbian historiography and culture. He suggested that the danger of politicizing these issues should be pointed out to his colleagues from Serbia. These issues, in his opinion, should be the subject of interest exclusively to the professional and scientific public. The presentation of the academician and historian Vaso Čubrilović at the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts was especially problematic for him. Durutović cynically commented on Čubrilović’s performance, stating that he “kept the bomb that did not explode in 1914 and threw it at Montenegrins in 1985 in the middle of the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts”.³⁹⁵

A meeting of the Montenegrin and Serbian party leadership was held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986, in the office of the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić. During this meeting, the leaders of Serbia tried in every way to avoid the discussion of identity issues posed by the Montenegrin delegation. Serbian officials tried to focus on issues of economic reforms, relations in Kosovo and the like. In the part in which they responded to the open campaign of denying the Montenegrin identity from Belgrade, they assured their colleagues from Montenegro that they cannot influence certain intellectual, media and cultural circles that spread a negative campaign about Montenegro. That argument was not acceptable to Miljan Radović, the president of the Presidency of the Central Committee of LC of Montenegro, who said that it was difficult to explain to the party members “that we cannot channel those

394 Stenographic notes of the 149th session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – presentation by Marko Špadijer, 31 May 1985, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

395 Stenographic notes of the 149th session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro – presentation by Svetozar Durutović, 31 May 1985, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1985.

flows and that we are not united around some major political and historical phenomena".³⁹⁶ However, Radović remained moderate, as he did not want an open conflict with his colleagues from LC of Serbia. Probably for that reason, he was trying to partially relativize what Montenegrin party structures dubbed "Great Serbian nationalism". In addition to the problem of Serbian nationalism, Radović emphasized the danger of alleged Montenegrin, Muslim and Croatian nationalisms. This approach was not immanent only to Radović, as similar views could be found in several party reports from the second half of the 1980s, in which Montenegrin Communists, in addition to the Serbian, recognized the danger from Montenegrin, Muslim, Albanian, and Croatian nationalisms.³⁹⁷ However, when explaining the examples of each of the mentioned nationalisms, they were limited exclusively to individual cases, incidents, which did not have the characteristics, intensity and institutional support as in the case of Serbian nationalism. That did not prevent Radović from putting the danger of any nationalism in one basket at the meeting, claiming that "a handful of nationalists can poison relations between peoples". The head of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro nevertheless stated that the biggest problem was the way in which certain cultural institutions and media in Serbia presented the situation in Montenegro, as well as the way in which Montenegrin cultural and national identity was treated in Serbia.³⁹⁸

396 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Miljan Radović, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

397 Summary from the discussion of the extended session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro regarding the treatment of the Montenegrin national question, Titograd, 22 February 1987, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1987/1015.

398 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Miljan Radović, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

On behalf of the Serbian leadership, Slobodan Milošević, President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, answered to his colleagues from Montenegro. Only in the introductory part of his presentation did Milošević agree in principle with the views of his Montenegrin colleagues, but he tried to interpret their specific interests as part of the wider social environment and the economic crisis that hit Yugoslavia. The head of the party organization of Serbia believed that limited successes in economic growth and poor results in reforms were the main reason for all other political problems. In addition to economic problems, Milošević recognized the key reasons for what he called “a bad ideological, political and security situation” in Kosovo. To the specific objections from Montenegro about the process of institutional denial of the Montenegrin national and cultural identity, Milošević responded with the thesis about “articulating the anti-socialist and anti-communist right, which is becoming louder”. According to his interpretation, there was a gathering and unification of the “civil right wing, dogmatic forces and anarcho-liberals from the seventies”, which, according to his interpretation, had the goal of breaking-up Yugoslavia. He explained that all these views were best expressed in the SANU Memorandum, where three goals of these forces were clearly defined: “Attack on the character and work of Comrade Tito; introduction of multipartyism; leading to such a situation of the Serbian people”. Milošević, despite the fact that he clearly recognized all the attacks from Serbian cultural institutions on Montenegro, tried to relativize the whole situation, explaining that these are much more complex and complicated processes that have nothing to do with Montenegro. Milošević explained with precision that “there was a connection between a number of members of the Academy and the Association of Writers of Serbia leading into a single political center”. He explained that four members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Mihiz (Borislav Mihajlović), Dobrica (Ćosić), Bečković (Matija) and Isaković (Antonije), in the Association of Writers of Serbia, together with Mihailo Marković and Ljuba Tadić, created the core of

the organization that “stood out from the position of the civil right”. However, Milošević never condemned the views of these intellectuals about Montenegro, nor the views of SANU and the Writers’ Association. He claimed that the activity of this group was much more complex and that the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia had already launched a broad action to marginalize them; i.e. “tackling this anti-communist opposition”. By claiming that the activities of intellectual circles from SANU and the Association of Writers of Serbia are aimed at destabilizing the LC of Serbia and “the long-term problem of economic stabilization and the issues in Kosovo”, Milošević was trying to relativize the continuous campaign of these circles towards Montenegrin cultural and national identity. He did not mention Montenegro once, nor other unacceptable behavior from Belgrade, as seen by the Montenegrin state and party leadership. Milošević relativized all these claims and reduced the story to the problem of the actions of the “civic right”, which, in his opinion, worked against the League of Communists. This was why he suggested that “one should not fire large artillery unnecessarily”.³⁹⁹ Similar views were expressed at the same meeting by Bogdan Trifunović, President of the Republic Committee of the League of Socialist Working People of Serbia, who supported Milošević’s views, declining to respond to the specific interests of the Montenegrin side.⁴⁰⁰

The members of the Montenegrin delegation tried to prevent the sidelining of this issue and to return the discussion to key topics. The first to do so was the President of the Montenegrin Parliament, Velisav Vuksanović, who, at the beginning of his presentation, asked that “issues on which there are different opinions and differences should not be postponed”. Vuksanović said that the attacks that appeared

399 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Slobodan Milošević, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

400 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Bogdan Trifunović, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

in the “media and cultural institutions” should not be underestimated, recalling the examples in which the Belgrade media “scolded the party leadership in Montenegrin municipalities and rehabilitated the Chetniks”.⁴⁰¹ Ramiz Bambur, President of the Republican Committee of the Socialist League of Working People of Montenegro, also warned of the danger of ignoring these problems, announcing that a whole year had passed without tangible results. Like his predecessors, he pointed to the negative campaign of the Serbian media, underscoring that no one from Montenegro could influence the editorial policy of *Politika*, *Novosti* and other media which were “obsessed with Montenegro and allegedly excessive opportunities” (as well as other falsehoods) that appeared in the Serbian media.⁴⁰² The President of the Presidency of Montenegro, Radivoje Brajović, returned to the basic topic of the meeting as well, saying that he “cannot avoid the issue of public information, because there is obviously a problem there”. He asked his colleagues from Serbia for understanding, because this issue was of key importance for Montenegro. The entirety of Yugoslavia was receiving information from the media in Belgrade, misleading the public about Montenegro. According to Brajović, the negative campaign against Montenegro in the Serbian media “does great political and social damage”. He explained that in Belgrade and its media, every initiative that meant a step forward in the affirmation of Montenegrin culture was “welcomed with a knife”. He continued by claiming that this was most often conducted by people who were originally from Montenegro, and that the Belgrade media “place such things on the front pages for various reasons and often with intent”. Even the denials of the official bodies of Montenegro on frequent fabrications failed to give results, because, as Brajović pointed out, “what

401 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Velisav Vuksanović, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

402 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Ramiz Bambur, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

gets clarified can never come to the pages of the paper that invented the affair, which used forgeries and untruths”.⁴⁰³

The first man of Serbia – Ivan Stambolić, who was the President of the Presidency of Serbia, tried to explain the interest of the Montenegrin delegation in the problems of disputing the national and cultural identity of Montenegro, as well as the attempts of political instrumentalization of certain topics. According to him, the Serbian state leadership could not do anything about that issue. He explained to his Montenegrin colleagues that he would try to change something, with the caveat that he was quite skeptical whether it would bring any result. He announced that he would try to “work operatively, daily” on that problem, to create a slightly better atmosphere, to “put a little pressure”, and then those problems would diminish. Stambolić tried to relativize the anti-Montenegrin campaign, stating that “all manners of things are published, the public has gotten used to it and is not getting too excited, because it is difficult to control these things in Belgrade”. Stambolić explained his views by drawing parallels with media articles about Slovenia and Croatia, noting that the press wanted to “make enemies with those republics as well”. He called such media articles the yellow press, which, according to him, is “akin to charlatans and cowboys”.⁴⁰⁴

In short, the meeting of the republican leaders did not resolve or illuminate any essential issue in the relations between the two republics. Unlike the series of preparatory meetings of the Montenegrin delegation, in which they confronted differences the issue of Serbia’s relations with Montenegro, its identity and culture, no topic from that corpus was opened in direct talks. General statements on economic problems, social processes and similar topics indicate that there was

403 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Radivoje Brajović, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

404 Transcript of the meeting of the delegations of SR Montenegro and SR Serbia held in Belgrade on 9 October 1986 – presentation by Ivan Stambolić, DACG, AOIRP, CK SKCG/1986/922.

no sincere interest in initiating a conversation on essential topics. This is confirmed by the brief statement of the state agency *Tanjug*, which conveyed general statements from the meeting about “consistent changes in the political and economic system (...) exchange of views on key issues of development and economic policy (...) the importance of self-management economic bases, etc.”⁴⁰⁵

In less than a year, it will be shown that the messages that Montenegrin leaders heard in Belgrade were just an announcement of a much broader plan coordinated by Slobodan Milošević. In September 1987, there was a conflict at the top of the League of Communists of Serbia, in which Belgrade’s relationship with Kosovo and the Yugoslav federation itself would be one of the key points of the conflict. Shortly after taking over all the levers of power, Milošević managed to bring the party leadership of Priština and Novi Sad under his control. In the final resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, Milošević tried in every way to secure control in the most important body of the Yugoslav federation – the Presidency of the SFRY. For that plan, he needed 4 or 5 votes; with the three he had already secured (Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo), he also needed Montenegro’s vote.

Milošević’s plan for Montenegro meant causing instability by organizing mass protests that were supposed to show that the Montenegrin party leadership had no legitimacy to preserve power. The realization of that plan began during August and September 1988, when the so-called “solidarity rallies” were organized in Montenegro. These gatherings, organized and coordinated by individuals close to Milošević, allegedly showed support and solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo. Rallies were organized in Titograd, Nikšić, Kolašin and Cetinje. Official documents of the Montenegrin State Security Service, as well as the testimonies of its first man in that period – Vlado Keković, unequivocally confirm that individuals from Serbia, primarily from the Serbian secret service, played a key role in organizing these protests. The direct perpetrators and organizers of

405 “Odlučno za dugoročni program”, *Pobjeda*, 10. okt. 1986. str. 1.

mass gatherings demanding the resignation of the Montenegrin leadership were individuals from municipal and republican authorities, but the most important role was played by the leading people of the most important economic organizations who coordinated the workers' street protests.⁴⁰⁶

The Montenegrin party and state leadership had information on how the protests had been organized, but they remained deeply convinced that workers' dissatisfaction was generated solely by their poor economic condition. Because of that, they formally supported the demands of the protesters, but the top of the party leadership of Montenegro was clear that problems could not be solved on the street. After successful but ineffective demonstrations in August and September 1988, Slobodan Milošević organized mass demonstrations against the Montenegrin government in October 1988, with the support of certain security structures and a number of individuals from Montenegro. With a sophisticated media campaign, this attempted coup was presented as a struggle of workers for their rights, better working conditions, higher salaries and similar populist messages that covered the basic function of mass protests against the Montenegrin party leadership. Encouraged by the support they had from the federation, the Montenegrin state and party leadership reacted decisively this time. The same evening, a decision was made for the police forces to break up the demonstrations, which was successful. As a consequence, in the following days, most of the activities of the demonstrators were confined to the factories. The Montenegrin party leadership was encouraged to act by the support of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which gave full support to the Montenegrin leadership at the extraordinary session of the Presidency. It was pointed out that the party leadership understood and respects all justified demands of citizens that refer to many examples of bad practice ("bureaucratism, social deformations,

406 More about that in: Vlado Keković, *Vrijeme meteža 1988–89* (Podgorica: Grafo Crna Gora, 2007).

manipulations, etc.”), but that the phenomena that occur in Montenegro have some other characteristics as well. Thus, the views of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists showed assessments of the danger of “the emergence of nationalism in Montenegro” which undermine the idea of brotherhood and unity as “the foundation of common life and prosperity of all our citizens”. It was assessed that these “nationalist forces tried to use the protest rally in Titograd to change the leadership of SR Montenegro by a coup d’etat and endanger its constitutional position as an equal member of the Yugoslav federation. By abusing the hospitality of the Montenegrin people and acting on the platform of Serbian nationalism, such militant groups and individuals in alliance with like-minded people in Montenegro are increasingly aggressively questioning the existence of the Montenegrin nation, its history and culture”.⁴⁰⁷

It would turn out that the mass gatherings that have been organized in Montenegro since the summer and autumn of 1988 would only be a preparation for Milošević’s main attack on the party and state leadership of Montenegro. At the beginning of January 1989, workers of the “Radoje Dakić” factory first took to the streets and were quickly joined by members of student organizations from the University of Montenegro, who were later joined by workers from other companies, as well as a large number of citizens. As *Pobjeda* reported, the reason for their gathering in front of the republic parliament were unfulfilled promises from October 1988. The organizing committee said that the basic demand of the protesters was the complete resignation of the leadership of the republic. Nevertheless, they further shaped their demands into six demands submitted by the organizing committee to the Montenegrin party and state leadership: 1. That the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro resign collectively; 2. That the members of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from the League of Communists of Montenegro resign; 3. That the

407 “Podrška rukovodstvu Crne Gore”, *Pobjeda*, 9. okt. 1988. 1.

Presidency of Montenegro submit a collective resignation; 4. That a member of the Presidency of the SFRY from Montenegro resigns; 5. That the President of the Parliament of Montenegro resigns; 6. That changes in the electoral system within the Party should be implemented. Reporters from the scene estimated that about 40,000 citizens gathered in front of the Montenegrin Parliament, and that their dissatisfaction began to grow after 7.30 pm, when a member of the organizing committee, an assistant from the Faculty of Economics in Podgorica – Momir Bulatović said that the republican leadership would not accept their demands. Bulatović told the participants in the rally that “this rally was organized and carried out by the people, and that the top leaders either do not feel the need or do not have the courage to stand with you face to face.”⁴⁰⁸

The strong pressure exerted on the Montenegrin leadership shook the representatives of the authorities, who on 11 January 1989 gave in to the demands of the protesters. The Vice President of the Montenegrin Parliament appeared in front of the gathered and told them that all members of the Presidency of Montenegro had resigned, that the President of the Assembly and the Presidency of the Montenegrin Party had done the same, and that a member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia from Montenegro resigned. The Montenegrin representatives in the party leadership of Yugoslavia did the same. That night, at the extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, a decision was made to convene the 10th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro, which was scheduled for May 1989.⁴⁰⁹ Under the influence of the structures that organized and coordinated the rallies in Montenegrin cities, members of the new leadership of Montenegro were elected: Veselin Vukotić – coordinator of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro; Branko Kostić – President of the Presidency; Radoje Kontić – President of the Executive Council.

408 “Narod traži ostavke”, *Pobjeda*, 11. jan. 1989, 1.

409 “Usvojene ostavke, kongres u maju”, *Pobjeda*, 12. jan. 1989, 1.

The transition of power ended at the 10th Congress of the LC of Montenegro, when the political current that had the absolute support of Slobodan Milošević took over key positions in the party and state bodies. At the 10th Congress, Momir Bulatović was elected President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, and Milo Đukanović was elected Secretary of the Presidency. Already at the congress itself, messages were heard according to which it was absolutely clear that the new Montenegrin leadership would follow Milošević's concept of reorganizing the Yugoslav federation. With theses about the "anational regime" that forgot the interests of the working class, the new party leadership repeated the views on which Milošević also built his party authority. Veselin Vukotić, coordinator of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LC of Montenegro, explained to the participants of the Congress that "recent events have exposed the absurdity and sterility of the governing policy, whose foundations were predominantly ideological, instead of rational-economic". Vukotić explained that the former party leadership distanced itself from membership, from everyday life, which is why "the people self-organized by suspending the institutions of the system and overthrew the alienated leadership that did not have the courage to appear before the people in January". He said that such a turn of events could not be interpreted as "Serbization and national sale of Montenegro, but a decision to restore dignity to the Montenegrin nation".⁴¹⁰ The new path of the Montenegrin leadership received the support of the party leadership of Serbia. One of Milošević's closest associates from that period, Zoran Sokolović – Secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, addressing the participants in the congress, said that the events in Montenegro represented a great contribution to the fight against bureaucratic forces and to the opening of democratic processes. He emphasized that the League of Communists could be the

410 "Začetak racionalne i realne politike", *Pobjeda*, 26. april 1989, 1.

leading social force only if “it has the trust of the working class and the people, if it is together with the people and in the people”.⁴¹¹

The 10th Congress of the LC of Montenegro completed the takeover of pro-Belgrade elements in the party leadership, allowing Milošević to pursue his goal of reorganizing the Yugoslav Federation. On the wave of social dissatisfaction, but also with the clear support of security structures from Serbia, a political group that was unreservedly loyal to Milošević came to power. Instrumentalizing labor disputes, this group managed to take power with a narrative of the necessity of economic reforms, allegedly alienated and bureaucratized political elites and the democratization of society. Yet their reform capacities proved limited. The whole story of democratization and economic reforms was just a populist deception of the citizens that enabled this group to take power.

Everything that has happened between Montenegro and Serbia since the end of the 1960s indicates that there was an obvious misunderstanding in the relations between the two socialist republics on the questions of resolving the fundamental issues that burdened the relations between Titograd and Belgrade. Despite constant messages of respect, understanding, friendly and fraternal relations between Montenegro and Serbia, differences in the experience and interpretation of Montenegro's national and cultural identity were clearly the most serious problem burdening relations between the two socialist republics. Unlike the period from the end of the sixties, when Serbia was led by representatives of the so-called liberal current, everything that happened in the second half of the seventies and during the eighties confirms the thesis of misunderstanding and disagreement of Serbian cultural and intellectual elites with the process of affirming Montenegrin cultural and national identity. This is confirmed by the events related to the consultative meeting of the Montenegrin and Serbian leadership in October 1986. The course and dynamics of that meeting clearly indicate that the two sides do not have the

411 Ibid.

understanding to solve the key problems that burden the relations between the two countries. On the one hand, the Montenegrin leadership, in several preparatory meetings, but also during the talks with colleagues from Serbia, accurately detects all attempts to challenge the Montenegrin national and cultural identity of certain circles from Belgrade. They are asking their colleagues from Belgrade for a clear determination on these issues, but also for decisive action to suppress these phenomena. On the other hand, the Serbian party leadership is trying to relativize these interpretations of Montenegrin colleagues and to interpret them in a broader context. Their explanation that they could not influence the activities of certain cultural and intellectual elites from Belgrade is highly suspect. However, even if we accept that interpretation as correct, the question remains why the Serbian leadership did not condemn such phenomena. Representatives of the state and party leadership of Serbia remained silent on all the concerns of their Montenegrin colleagues. The essence of such an approach of the Serbian political leadership will be confirmed in the coming years, when the new Serbian leadership led by Slobodan Milošević would coordinate activities that will lead to the collective resignation of the Montenegrin party and state leadership through the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution in January 1989.

CONCLUSIONS

Relations between the republican and provincial party and “state” leaderships during the 1980s increasingly indicated a lack of mutual trust in the Yugoslav federation. The historical scene began to be dominated by processes aimed at closing in on republican frameworks, on the one hand, however, on the other, ambitions to unite individual national communities across republican borders also developed. Attempts at co-operation in the cultural field within inter-republic cultural communities, which would keep national policies outside the main political scene, did not bear fruit. At the level of the state union, the Yugoslav federal-confederal system required endless patience in “harmonizing the positions” of the republics and provinces and

extremely rational reasoning about the advantages, thus not only the limitations, that such a state union provides. As the 1980s progressed, there was less and less patience and less willingness to think in such a rational manner. In proportion to the growing crisis of confidence between the republics, nationalism strengthened, which in the second half of the 1980s strongly affected the ruling League of Communists, and in the late 1980s spilled over into the streets and eventually led to the collapse of the state in bloody wars.

Several issues dominated relations between republics and provinces during the 1980s. Economic issues, expressed through the relationship between developed and underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia, were only one element that led to misunderstandings, but it turned out that purely economic issues often took on political dimensions. Disagreements between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina over the Olympics, as well as some classic economic scandals from the late 1980s, led to political confrontations. The control of the prices of raw materials and energy, which in the conditions of high inflation affected the interests of the less developed republics, was often also on the agenda of inter-republican disputes. However, in addition to numerous problems of economic policy and inconsistent positions on many issues, certainly the biggest challenge to the stability of the SFRY came from the continued resentment of the Serbian party and state leadership toward the 1974 constitutional arrangement. From the second half of the 1970s until the Eighth Session in 1987, Serbian recentralists constantly insisted on limiting autonomy at the provincial level and expanding the powers of the federal authorities. The issue of the status of autonomous provinces, raised by the events in Kosovo in 1981, sowed division in the Yugoslav federation. The status of Vojvodina was defended with the issue of Kosovo's status. This was successful until 1988, when the Yugoslav leadership succumbed to media, political and street violence pressure. This facilitated the seizure of power by "Belgrade loyalists" in Vojvodina, who would complete the destruction of provincial autonomy in 1989–1990.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republican elite realized that by changing the status of Kosovo, the next target could be this republic itself, which is why they persistently insisted on preserving the status of the provinces. This gradually strained its relations with Serbia, which sought to undermine Bosnian unity in the media. In addition, Serbia's confrontation with others in Yugoslavia intensified in the second half of the 1980s, especially with Slovenia and Croatia, due to strong Slovenian-Croatian support for preserving Kosovo's autonomy.

In its relations with Montenegro, similarly to its relations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia has used various media channels to challenge the legitimacy of the Montenegrin republican leadership and even Montenegro's cultural and national identity. In the second half of the 1980s, several meetings were held between the party leaderships of Montenegro and Serbia, in order to stop the campaign against Montenegro, but without results.

The system of consensual decision-making in the SFRY ended with unilateral acts undertaken by Slobodan Milošević, first in the domain of reorganizing the constitutional position of the provinces and the regime change in Montenegro, and then in relations at the federal state level (trade embargo on Slovenia, intrusion into the payment system). From May 1990, he was joined by Franjo Tuđman with the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which won the first multi-party elections in Croatia, in the project of destroying the SFRY's institutions and value systems.

During the 1980s, the republics became more and more closed within their borders. The case with the *White Paper* showed that the republican elites cared not about Yugoslav, but about particular republican interests. The desire for consensus was fading faster, and the rise of nationalism in the second half of the 1980s showed that it was impossible to control nationalist winds within individual republics, which eventually led to dramatic and bloody clashes in the early 1990s.

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IV

CRISIS AND DISINTEGRATION



Vladimir Gligorov

WRONG POLITICAL RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC CRISIS

YUGOSLAVIA DID NOT break up for economic reasons. However, its inability to respond adequately to the economic crisis in the 1980s, has certainly contributed to the lack of confidence in the country's political viability. We will deal with the economic crisis first, then with the wrong political response to it and finally to the rise of economic nationalism and the failing last attempt at reform. All this will be preceded by a short methodological note.⁴¹²

REAL-TIME HISTORY

Like other histories that rely on social sciences, economic history also approaches the data in a different way, because it relies on the relevant theoretical knowledge. It is probably simplest to say that historical events are explained as if (i) they belong to the same period of time and (ii) as if they are assessed in real time. Therefore, it is possible to talk about the expectations instead of looking for the causes in the past. Thus, in this case, the 1980s are viewed as one moment in time, as one period together with the two preceding decades. And the expected outcomes, including the one that happened, are viewed as the series of choices faced by people, countries and politics, just like any other decision-making centre.

In addition and most importantly, it is a question of recurring problems, which is the assumption of scientificity. Thus, the comparisons with the past events and those occurring in the observed time period are also useful. The economic crisis in Yugoslavia is an example of economic crises, so that it is comparable not only with the economic crises in this country in the past, but also with those in other

412 A detailed theoretical and methodological basis is given in my work "Why Do Unions Collapse? The Fiscal Story". It also contains the largest part of the relevant literature.

countries and those occurring in this region and other countries later on. In other words, the crisis in the early 1980s can also be understood on the basis of what is known about the crisis of the end of the first decade of the 21st century, because economic science has a theory or theories of economic crises. At the same time, this enables the assessment of the policy implemented by following different paths.

Thus, the narrative of economic or any other history that relies on social sciences is decidedly different from the one including a series of events in chronological order. Although historical science certainly has a methodology, it has no theory of history to rely on in order to explain why something has happened. The real danger is that it accepts fatalism either willingly or unwillingly, so that everything that has ever happened had to happen, which the approach of social sciences to historical data avoids. This difference should be observed in this paper.

NATIONALISM, THE POLITICAL LEFT AND LIBERALISM

Everything started with the economic crisis in 1981–1982, which coincided with the death of Josip Broz Tito. The latter event had an impact on political competition in the broadest sense of the word, which will be important later on, when the appropriate political solutions will be sought. However, the systemic constraints were of greater significance for the development of an economic crisis. The system itself was established in response to a series of political crises during the 1960s. And the economic policy conducted during the 1970s was adjusted to the circumstances. However, neither the system nor the policy reckoned with the outbreak of an international financial crisis with the consequences of which the country did not know how to deal for a whole decade.

The literature on the Yugoslav economic and political crisis is almost completely dissatisfactory, because the foreign trade balancing problem lasted for a decade that was characterized by the inability to find the solution. Yugoslavia was not an exception in this respect. Similar problems in the same period and for similar reasons were also faced by other socialist countries as well as developing countries such as, for example, those in Latin America. The reasons were different only in some respects.

It is not difficult to see the key problem. It is not unique and specific. It is characteristic of exchange rate and foreign debt crises wherever they emerge. Moreover, the country was faced with similar problems only a decade or so earlier, that is, in the mid-1960s, but there was an understanding as to what should be done. However, the then solution was discarded in order to move on to the system and policy ensuring the implementation of an adequate solution should the country face a similar crisis, as it did in the early 1980s.

Therefore, it is important to see how the crisis in the 1960s was resolved. It should be viewed as a transition crisis, which is now easier due to our experience of the post-1989 transformation of socialist countries. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia underwent a similar transition which, unfortunately, was unsuccessful. There is an extensive literature about the anticipated economic reform and its consequences, but most of it is almost useless.

The problem was how to shift from the reliance on donations from the United States and some European countries to import financing and normal foreign economic relations in general. It probably makes sense to point to some economic reform measures first, then to some of the consequences and finally to the reasons for its rejection.

The aim was to establish a financial system of relations with the world, so that the Yugoslav economy could develop and thrive as an open and market one, especially vis-à-vis the European economies that were recovering very fast from the consequences of the world war. This anticipated changes in the banking system as well as changes in the corporate sector. The aim was not to have enterprises and banks rely on state planning, which was largely abolished, especially at the federal level. It was intended to introduce commercial banking and profitable enterprises. It could also be stated that the aim was to introduce a hard budget constraint or, as they said, a market constraint (to allude to János Kornai).

As the borders were opened and a visa-free regime with most European countries was introduced, first with Western ones, then with socialist ones (with some exceptions) and finally with third world

ones, and there was a need for labour in many European countries, primarily in Germany, about one million people emigrated. Thereafter, the country became dependent on remittances from abroad, primarily in German marks, as well as on imports on which the inflow of foreign funds was spent.⁴¹³ Also, the cooperation of Yugoslav enterprises with the German and Italian economies (in the automotive industry and production of durable consumer goods, for example) was also largely developed. Otherwise, these two economies are the leading trade partners in the Balkans.

There emerged a problem with the corporate sector, that is its reliance on the market due to unclear property relations. The state withdrew from the ownership of property, but it was difficult to define the concept of social ownership precisely enough from the viewpoint of investment decision making as well as in terms of taxation and return on capital distribution. This prompted the longest theoretical debate among Yugoslav economists, which was futile and useless. But the problem was real. The natural step would be to introduce some kind of shares, so that enterprises would become joint-stock companies. However, this idea was met with great resistance not only within the Communist Party, but also in public. The final economic aim was to shift to a convertible regime in international trade and finance.

Before I tackle the resistance to reform, it will be necessary to clarify the basics of the so-called socialist dilemma. Namely, socialist economies relied on state ownership and thus can be considered as state-capitalist in the sense that the state gets the profit and invests it according to a certain plan. This caused the problems known from the experience of the socialist world to which Yugoslavia did not belong after 1948.

413 This is in the nature of things and is not an objection as to why the inflow of money from abroad was not spent on domestic goods and services. The inflow of money from abroad can either be covered by imports or reinvested abroad (by increasing foreign exchange reserves, for example). Naturally, imports can include capital goods, which leads to an increase in exports where the exchange rate policy is crucial.

However, if the state does not invest, who does and why? Let us assume that socially-owned enterprises invest, but why will they do that if they cannot count on investment income? It can be said that they will benefit indirectly, because the total income will increase and the country will be more developed and richer. However, this anticipates a certain political system that is not state-socialist in order to see microeconomic advantages at the macroeconomic level, that is, the advantages of nonprofit investments for each individual enterprise. Aiming to increase total income and not profit, such investments increase both social and personal well-being.

This provided the basis for a complex social ownership and political decision-making system, which lacked the coercion of state socialism and the incentive of a market economy. The economic reform was aimed at solving that problem which – should the change be consistent and motivate enterprises to invest – would lead to a transition similar to that carried out in the socialist world two decades later.

Naturally, the market character of enterprises somewhat solves the problem of motivation to invest in accordance with demand. If there is the need to expand production in order to meet increased demand, this can encourage additional investments and employment in order to meet the increased market requirements. This could also increase the salaries of employees, which was mostly reckoned with when explaining the associated labour system that obtained its final form in the Associated Labour Act in 1976.

It was a systemic replacement for the abandoned reform. There remained the problem of how to finance investments, which gained importance in a time of crisis. The reform introduced commercial banking, which was retained, but could not be the basis for income from investments, at least not directly due to which, in a time of crisis, it also had limited possibilities and was a source of disputes, especially between the republics and provinces.

However, the problem primarily lied in the legitimacy of reforms. In later transitions it was the first to be resolved. The countries undergoing the process of abandoning socialism sought support for the

measures to change the system through elections. This was not possible or, rather, not sought in Yugoslavia. However, the reform led to political differences in interests within the party and in the society, as well as between the republics and provinces.

Three disputes – about privatization, social inequality and national justice. – are probably the most important.

Although there were no plans about the privatization of state and social assets there was a public concern that it could be the next step in a reform process. An example that caught the public eye was the privatization of state-owned cars. Then some hints about the establishment of private companies with a larger number of employees in both the manufacturing industry and trade. Resistance to these plans was one of the central themes of the student protest in June 1968. Many influential intellectuals saw in the whole reform the intention of the “new class” to privatize common, that is, social property. On the other hand, there was a concern within the party that the reform would finally change the balance of power in the party and that young cadres would prevail over older ones. The change of generations was already taking place. The Marxists rallied around Praxis magazine were also against the potential yet unplanned privatization. One of their themes was resistance to the market and increased influence of the middle class or petty bourgeoisie.

However, the problem was real regardless of the motivation of the advocates of its resolution. Namely, it was necessary to properly define enterprise if for no other reason than to make tax and other public obligations clear. And, what was even more important – to regulate the establishment and dissolution of enterprises. For example, there were bankruptcy laws which were never enforced, because it was not clear what to do with the property and employees of bankrupt enterprises. Thus, later on, during a crisis, many enterprises whose accounts were almost constantly frozen still survived, although their real business prospects were not clear either to their management or their employees.

In this context, the discussion about the labour market and the distribution of earned income was important. As enterprises differed in how much the contribution to their earned income was derived from labour and how much from capital, there were significant differences in wages among enterprises that were more profitable than others or were capital intensive. This was also so because it was not clear what was the motivation of the employed to invest in the expansion of production and the growth of enterprises in general. This also led to the tendency to finance investments with borrowed money and not with one's own resources. This will prove significant in the event of a crisis.

The second dispute was about social inequality. This was probably the central message of student protests in 1968. In essence, there were great demographic changes in the country that was characterized by rapid urbanization and industrialization. The ideological dispute was about the relationship between ideals and reality, that is, about how much social development deviated from the socialist ideals. Milovan Đilas was probably the first to raise this issue in his article "Anatomija jednog morala" (Anatomy of a Moral) and the book "Nova klasa" (The New Class). Later on, around the time of the increased influence of young Marxists, he gave up this approach in the book "Nesavršeno društvo" (The Unperfect Society) and advocated some form of liberalism. But the objection that the authorities abandoned the revolutionary ideals and gave priority to personal and collective interests was preserved by both the intellectual and general public.

Unlike some other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Yugoslav dissidents tended to be to the left from the people in power. According to the first, the source of solution lied in the market, while Yugoslav dissidents saw it as the source of problems. Therefore, the attempt at reform, which could lead to the transition process seen in Eastern Europe twenty or so years later, ended in both social and public resistance and was abandoned. The objection was that this attempt was meant to legalize the enrichment of the people in power, that is, a new class, and not to solve real economic and political problems. That relationship between private and social and

between personal and public, was at the root of the lack of understanding the reform intentions and reason for the leftist criticism of the changes facing the country.

The third dispute was certainly the most serious. It was about an equitable distribution of costs and benefits among the republics and nations.⁴¹⁴ Here it makes sense to point to the different approaches taken by the Serbian and Croatian leaderships. From the end of the 1960s onwards, the Serbian leadership has strived for more liberal solutions, including specifically market reforms. Unlike Milošević's nationalists in the late 1980s, the Serbian leaders were ready to talk with their counterparts from other republics and provinces with an open agenda. The assumption was that the further market liberalization as well as the democratization and opening of the Yugoslav economy and politics in general would suit Serbia. According to Marko Nikezić, Serbia had no special interests. This should have been understood as an offer to talk openly and freely about the organization of the state and its economy, which was not met with understanding by Serbian nationalists at that time or later on.

This misunderstanding and disagreement are very important to understand what was happening in Serbia. Yugoslavia was constituted as a multinational state where taking care of the interests of one's own nation was implied. After all, belonging to a nation, that is, an ethnic group, provided the basis for political advancement. Thus, the Serbian leadership was taking care of Serbian interests like all others. In this connection, there were two approaches. One was a liberal approach to the economy and politics as bring the most favourable for the Serbian people living in almost the entire territory of Yugoslavia. The other approach was territorial in the sense that "all Serbs should live in one state", thus not being a minority anywhere. For the first Yugoslavia was the solution to the Serbian question, while for the latter it was the problem.

414 The term "nation" does not mean people or political community, but ethnic group.

The Croatian leadership was under pressure from nationalists who, similarly to those in Slovenia, pointed out that the economic system and politics were inconsistent with the Croatian and Slovenian interests. Later on, the Fund for the Underdeveloped, through which transfers to the less developed republics and the province of Kosovo were made, became especially controversial. At the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, the foreign exchange regime was in the focus of attention. In addition to the tax system. This will be important in the decade preceding the economic crisis, so that it makes sense to point to the subject of the dispute. However, at the end of the 1960s, more liberal currents prevailed in the Croatian as well as Macedonian leaderships. Like the Serbian leadership, they will be replaced in the early 1970s.

As the country became open to the world and, in particular, to the surrounding countries in the west and north, there began a mass emigration from the less developed regions in Croatia and elsewhere, on the one side, and an almost simultaneous growth of tourism trade, on the other side. The banking system was adjusted to this situation, so that it could offer deposits in foreign currency, mostly in German marks, and approve loans with a foreign currency participation. This raised the question of the exchange rate and exchange rate regime. Croatia's objection was that German marks, that is, Croatia's German marks were transferred to Belgrade in exchange for dinars at an unfavourable exchange rate, under conditions of accelerated inflation. This was coupled with the oldest Croatian objection that the tax system was unfair and that Croatian money was used to finance the development of Serbia, in particular. Slovenia's objection was similar and included the request that the central government stops interfering in its borrowing in order to invest in infrastructure. Regardless of the similarity in political objections, the behaviour of Slovenian enterprises and Ljubljanska banka, in particular, was different and actually adjusted to the possibilities offered by the system of transfers from abroad and within the country.

The results of these disputes were (i) the abandonment of reform and, in fact, transition, (ii) shift to the system of contributions to the

federal budget, in which there was not much left from the administration and the military, and (iii) a de facto fixed exchange rate under conditions of relatively accelerated inflation.

The majority of the republican leaders were replaced by the politicians enjoying Josip Broz Tito's confidence. As is usual in such purges, these persons were opportunists who had a minimal understanding of economic problems, were greatly distrustful of each other and increasingly relied on authoritarianism. And this happened when Tito was nearing the end of his life.

FROM STABILITY TO CRISIS

The system established by the change of the constitution in 1974, the adoption of the Associated Labour Act in 1976 and the banking reform in 1977, was a combination of the measures envisaged by economic reform and the measures that had to meet the objections of the developed republics.

The simplest way is to summarize it as an (informal) fixed exchange rate system coupled with a real negative exchange rate on loans.

This implies that inflation at home was faster than in the country whose money was used, that is, in Germany. This had two consequences. One was an implicit credit subsidy because interest rates were lower than the inflation rate. The second was credit financing by external borrowing, since the exchange rate was fixed, so that creditors could gain, regardless of the inflation trends in the country and abroad. However, the objection about the transfer of German marks to Belgrade did remain. This will later have an influence on the differences in the approach and disputes over the exchange rate policy in dealing with an economic crisis.

This system favoured the export of tourist services, because they were competitive. Namely, tourists did not bear the costs of accelerated inflation and investments paid off, because the dinar-denominated debt burden was decreasing with the rising of prices. Naturally, this favoured imports, so that the foreign trade deficit increased a lot. The stable dinar also became de facto convertible, since it was accepted by

currency exchange offices abroad. The abandoned reform, of course, anticipated the convertibility of the dinar on the basis of the real positive interest rate. It was realized on the basis of a negative real interest rate and the growth of foreign debt.

Naturally, this was unsustainable. Yugoslavia was not the only country to conduct a similar economic policy. As the world's real interest rates remained low for almost a decade due to accelerated inflation, partly caused by the rising of oil prices, socialist and some developing countries relied on a similar system of borrowing to maintain their economic and social stability. And, as is often the case in these circumstances, short-term borrowing abroad increased at the expense of long-term borrowing, which is an additional problem if there is a change in the monetary conditions and this is what happened.

Foreign debt was not large relative to total production. It is estimated on the basis of the data for the late 1980s that it amounted up to 30 percent of gross domestic product (the debt level and GDP did not change too much during the whole decade). However, this was not enough to make its financing sustainable. Due to the changed circumstances in foreign trade and international finances, it was necessary to ensure an adequate inflow of foreign funds for debt financing without a continuous debt increase, that is, the increase that is faster than the increase in production and exports. This implied a change in the exchange rate, that is, devaluation in order to influence an increase in exports and decrease in imports. Exchange rate crises are usually resolved by exchange rate correction. As is usually the case, this should lead to a change in the sources of financing the corporate sector. Enterprises should rely more on investments in shares than on borrowing, because devaluation not only encourages exports, but also increases the interest in investing in existing and new enterprises.

Simply said, the country can obtain the necessary funds to repay its external debt by increasing exports and selling its assets. The latter is not necessary if the change of the exchange rate and other measures that facilitate doing business abroad open up foreign investment

opportunities. This was seen in the late 1980s when the reforms of the Ante Marković Government were implemented. In a relatively short time, the inflow of foreign funds was sufficient to significantly reduce the external debt burden. In fact, the states created after the collapse of Yugoslavia inherited relatively small external debts, which therefore did not pose a problem in their foreign relations.

The problem in Yugoslavia was that enterprises could not rely on the capital market, because it did not exist. And it did not exist not only because foreigners could not invest, but also because there was no ownership and thus no property for trading. Therefore, enterprises had the choice to either invest their own funds or borrow them. In fact, both needed to be further encouraged because, it was not in the direct interest of enterprises to invest in other enterprises or establish new ones. This was a systemic problem of the self-management economy as it was regulated after the abandonment of reform and the adoption of a new constitution and other systemic laws.

Exchange rate crises usually do not pose a long-term problem. Naturally, they can cause a significant temporary loss of production and unemployment, but exports should increase and imports decrease, while the reduced value of assets should encourage foreign investment. If the economic policy and fiscal policy, in particular, do not undermine the new exchange rate and have the funds provided by the International Monetary Fund the sustainability of external debt and further economic recovery would be ensured.

This was not so in the case of Yugoslavia, because the suspension of access to the financial market, coupled with the impossibility to open the capital market, caused that the funds and conditions of the International Monetary Fund brought about a prolonged economic stagnation. Coupled with increasing unemployment and the increasing insolvency of enterprises depending on central bank loans (so-called selective loans). Therefore, the whole stabilization process took long and was primarily based on exchange rate depreciation in order to discourage imports and decrease trade deficit, coupled with a gradual acceleration of inflation. Until hyperinflation in 1989.

The social ownership system, which cannot be simply explained, stood in the way of resolving the crisis that was neither unique nor unknown. Many countries were faced with an exchange rate crisis. In fact, the International Monetary Fund was established as a world central bank to help the countries that had to change their exchange rates in order to adjust their foreign trade and fulfil their international financial obligations. It was necessary to establish a foreign trade balance with debt repayment support by increasing foreign investment.

Simply said, a country that accumulated its external debt which creditors are reluctant to continue financing under sustainable conditions should, with short-term credit support by the International Monetary Fund, (i) balance imports and exports, which implies devaluation, and (ii) replace external debt financing with investments, until foreign credit relations are normalized, which may anticipate the sale of assets.

Yugoslavia's economic policy had to adjust to the changed circumstances on the world financial market only by balancing its foreign trade. This happened relatively fast and partly due to quantitative restrictions. However, the problem of liquidity and solvency of the corporate sector still remained, because it still had to rely on borrowing as a means of financing. It was reckoned with a negative real interest rate, the system introduced after the abandonment of reform. As the conditions of external borrowing changed and external loans were expensive, investment activity had to be significantly reduced, just like economic growth and employment. There was simply no solution for that in the system established by giving up economic reform.

Therefore, during the 1980s, the economy stagnated and unemployment was on the rise. A temporary increase in unemployment is common in exchange rate crises, because it is necessary to increase the export exchange rate at the expense of the sector producing goods and services for the domestic market. That is accompanied by layoffs and new hires. In addition, the real wage is decreased as the result of an increased labour supply. Over time, employment should be restored and wages increased. In the Yugoslav economy it was difficult

to ensure a real decrease in wages, which was reflected in the constant acceleration of inflation, coupled with the constant exchange rate depreciation. Thus, there was no significant increase in exports. Instead, there was a decrease in imports, coupled with resistance to a real decrease in wages, so that unemployment was increasing year by year. Not only in the regions where it was always present, but also in Slovenia, which was characterized by full employment and the inflow of workers from other parts of Yugoslavia, actually until the outbreak of a crisis and during its first years.

Both the exchange rate crisis and the labour market crisis put pressure on the more developed republics to suspend transfers to the less developed republics and provinces. As the cost was not too high, there were proposals to change the system of contributions to the federal budget, which was in proportion to the share of each republic and province in total production and income, and make them equal for all members of the federation. Or at least to harmonize the payments in the federal budget with the funds from that budget which are spent at home, so that the Slovenian funds are spent in Slovenia and so on. These discussions were similar to those held in the European Union between the countries being net contributors and net beneficiaries to the joint budget. The fact that, for example, Croatia paid more into the federal budget than it received from it was one of the main arguments about Croatia's unfavourable position and the lack of "clara pacta", as they used to say. As the federal budget was mostly spent on defence and the federal administration, the objections were more rhetorical than actual.

Foreign obligations also posed a problem. They were mostly decentralized and foreign creditors demanded that they should be joint. And that all should be equally liable for all foreign debts. It was not possible to reach agreement until 1998, which was already late and proved unnecessary after the introduction of reforms in late 1989 and the opening of the door to foreign investment. So, after decade-long discussions, the foreign debt problem was solved, which could have been done at the very beginning of the lost decade.

THE STATE BEFORE DEMOCRACY

As the economic crisis was a systemic problem, that is, the anti-crisis policy was limited by systemic solutions, the so-called structural reform was certainly necessary not only to straighten out financial relations with other countries, but also to establish a sustainable investment and business system. This required changes in the constitutional system, because it precisely regulated both social ownership and all economic relations in self-management enterprises and the society as a whole. However, there was no agreement on the necessary changes to the constitution, largely because it was feared that the balance of power between the republics and provinces would be disturbed.

This was not so because of an economic crisis, but because of the way in which the nationalist disputes in the late 1960s were resolved, so that the opening of the constitutional issues led to the consideration of the relations between the Republic of Serbia and its provinces and the relations among the republics, because Slovenia and Croatia were dissatisfied with their position. The solution that imposed itself was a kind of democratization, but it was not supported by anyone for different reasons.

This theme is independent of the economic crisis, although made central by it. It only makes sense here to point to the misconceptions about democracy, which motivated some to propose and others to reject it. We now have not only the experience of other democratized European countries, but also the experience of the states created after the collapse of Yugoslavia, so that we can judge how the rejection of democracy made any sense.

The major problem was based on the idea that the introduction of democracy would lead to the tyranny of the majority. Those who hoped to be in the majority saw the advantage of democratic decision making in it, while those who feared being in the minority felt that democracy actually guaranteed them that they would have no political influence. The worst version of misunderstanding a democratic system was recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to avoid

having a majority or minority, the country was constituted in such a way – which was also internationally agreed – that democracy at the state level should be mostly limited and actually disabled. It was assumed that at the state level the ethnic groups would be uniquely represented, that is, each group would be represented by its own party. Thus, as the largest ethnic group, Bosniaks, would have a permanent majority and the greatest influence. Even in this case, the coalition possibilities are such that the prospects of all ethnic groups to influence political decisions are almost equal, when observed over a longer period of time. However, if one takes into account that there was also political competition within the ethnic groups, so that if there was no unwillingness to cooperate politically, a democratic system should practically ensure equal prospects for the interests of both social and ethnic groups.

As we can learn from the experience of many multinational countries, including the former socialist ones, minority parties are very often coalition partners in their governments. Even in the countries where there are conditions for the dominance of bipartisanship, the minority influence is visible in the parties themselves, because in political competition every vote is influential. All political parties are coalitions and all governments are also coalition ones, if not in every mandate then certainly in a certain political or democratic cycle.

The same misconception was an obstacle to the democratization of Yugoslavia itself, despite additional protection in the form of decentralized federalism. However, in public appearances and advocacies for democratization there were calculations about the possible influence of certain nations in the “one man one vote” system where all would vote for their ethnic party. It was held that this would be favourable for the majority people, that is, the people having a relative majority in Yugoslavia – Serbs. That was one of the arguments in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. However, this was a source of fear for minority peoples not only in Yugoslavia but also in some republics. Serbs would be a minority in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and so on. Consequently,

democratization is desirable if it enables one's own nation to be in the majority. Otherwise, if one people becomes independent, it is more desirable to change the borders.

This is wrong, because it was reckoned with one-party systems on a national basis, which was not in line with a democratic political competition. As we now have the experiences of postsocialist democratized countries, this is not just a theoretically defensible claim. An additional mistake was to consider democratic decisions as one-off. Thus, the results of the first elections, which could easily be identified with national homogenization, were considered as final, as if voting in democracies takes place once and for all. However, democracy is a system in which opinions, interests and coalitions change. So, the victory of a nationalist party in one election cycle does not have to imply its permanent domination if, naturally, democracy is preserved. In several election cycles, interests should be distinguished and opportunities created for the influence of all interests. At the core of every democratic policy there are individual, clearly minority interests that pull together, enter into coalitions, in order to ensure a majority.

What to do if the democratization of Yugoslavia was not possible, because the expected outcome was unsatisfactory for some members of the federation? The answer was to hold democratic elections in the republics. In the end, it was the choice made by Slovenia and Croatia, while other republics and provinces were late. Serbia's delay especially had great consequences. The prevailing opinion in Serbia was that it would be necessary to build a state first and then to democratize it. At first, constitutional changes were sought in the one-party assembly in order to limit the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and then it was relied on the decisive influence in the League of Communists to change the balance of power in the federation. In the end, it was resorted to elections, which initially were not democratic in the true sense of the word. The alternative proposal, which was rejected, was to demand democratic elections, so that after gaining the necessary legitimacy, the internal relations in Serbia and the Yugoslav federation would be resolved.

It must be noted that the Yugoslav authorities had no idea about how to resolve the political crisis. The Government of Ante Marković started from the assumption that economic stabilization would also bring about political changes that would be motivated by economic successes, in addition to the positive contribution of the United States and the European Union. So, there was no idea how to win political support for economic transition. The alternative solution that imposed itself was to organize some kind of round table, which already had been practiced in the socialist countries undergoing transition. That opportunity was missed. Again, because there was no clear idea about the benefits of democracy.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

The economic crisis was not such that the solutions were unknown. The problem lied in the fact that not only the economic and political systems lacked the means to overcome the crisis, but the public was also prone to misidentify the problem and therefore propose wrong economic measures. Systemic obstacles were the result of abandoned reform, while ideological obstacles were a combination of nationalism and Marxism, or simply the rejection of the market economy. The latter was supported by a large number of advocates of increased protectionism as the solution for the economic crisis. This is not uncommon in exchange rate and external debt sustainability crises, and emerges whenever such crises occur. Economic nationalism is not unusual in other circumstances either. Thus, it is not a specific Yugoslav phenomenon.

Here, it makes sense to compare the transition of state socialist countries with that which should have been implemented in Yugoslavia. In European socialist countries, the corporate sector collapsed due to its inefficiency, while in some of these countries it was the result of the external debt crisis. The democratization movement was accompanied by a set of economic reforms that were basically the same as those abandoned by Yugoslavia in the 1960s: opening the economy, coupled with a normal exchange rate regime and

commercial banking system, as well as privatization with a view to resolving the crisis in the corporate sector. And the request for accession to the European Union. Regardless of the views on certain economic policy measures and programmes and the implementation of privatization, it cannot be disputed that the problems were correctly identified and that, in principle, the solutions were adequate. Where countries and the public hesitated, the whole process was longer and more expensive.

The economic crisis in Yugoslavia was wrongly identified. This is of great importance in politics in general, while those having an influence on the public played a significant role in it. The greatest change took place in Serbia. Regardless of the fact that the more liberal leadership left together with economic reform and the hints of political pluralism, the interests of the Serbian economy were largely harmonized with the openness of the Yugoslav economy. In fact, it was to be expected that the response to the economic crisis would trigger the demands for still greater openness and additional structural changes. In a sense, this was the case, but the pressure of the supporters of protectionism in the public and the party was increasing. The situation was similar in other republics and provinces. This is not unexpected, since it was a question of those wishing to reate the borders within Yugoslavia, but it was quite incomprehensible that this would be in Serbia's interest.

In any case, that is what it was all about. One problem in Belgrade was the banking system. In other republics and provinces there was generally one dominant bank (two in Croatia), while the presence of banks from other federal units was limited. There was a number of Serbian and Yugoslav banks in Belgrade, including those from other republics and provinces. This is not unexpected bearing in mind that Belgrade was the capital of Yugoslavia where the central bank was located. But there were opinions that Serbian banks should be pooled and that, later on, the activities of Yugoslav and other banks should be limited. This is how Beogradska banka and Invest banka were pooled and the goal was to take over others too. The latter did

not succeed and only increased frustration in the Serbian political circles. In the end, Ljubljanska banka became especially bothersome for them, so that it grew into Slavija banka, thus becoming Serbian and not Slovenian. It all ended with an unsuccessful boycott of Slovenian goods, but at that time the country was probably irreversibly on the path of disintegration.⁴¹⁵

The details here are not important. The sources of misidentification of the problem and the conviction to know the solutions are important. This is of course the problem in social sciences and not something exceptional or unknown. In the assessment of the usefulness of democracy and the proposals for solving the economic crisis the interests that influence biased assessments and proposed solutions are clear. But, it is also certain that social sciences have been quite unsuccessful in understanding the nature of the crisis and proposing solutions. It is especially depressing when you consider the fact that the crisis lasted for a decade. And that it did not pose an unknown problem and that the solutions were not unknown.

Thus, the inability to correctly identify the problem and propose the solutions was the consequence of reliance on a wrong approach or model or theory or ideology. For nationalists, the problem lied in Yugoslavia and for social scientists in the negative impact of liberalism or the ideology of a market economy. This led to wrong solution proposals. Leaving the Yugoslav economy because others are privileged in it. Or enhanced state intervention by re-establishing the state investment fund, for example. Or the imposition of internal custom duties in order to equalize economic conditions. Or protectionism vis-à-vis the developed economies from which it is imported the most and to which it is owed the most. In the end, it was tended towards

415 There was a widespread misconception that the Slovenian economy would be in a very difficult position if it lost the Serbian market. So, it was calculated that the boycott of imports from Slovenia could change the policy of its government. It was also expected that the Slovenian economy would face major problems and a deep recession should Slovenia secede from Yugoslavia. Naturally, these expectations were wrong.

the nationalization of customs revenues, which were almost the only direct source of federal budget revenues.

This is not the place to discuss in more detail the influence of any ideology, especially not the nationalist one, but there is no doubt that it stood in the way of understanding the economic crisis and necessary measures to overcome it.

ANOTHER FAILURE OF REFORM

The last attempt to resolve the economic crisis and stabilize Yugoslavia politically was the reform in the late 1980s. In the preceding period, the Yugoslav government mainly sought to balance foreign trade and establish a balance on the current account of the balance of payments by depreciations of the dinar exchange rate, expressed mostly in German marks, and their inflationary consequences. In the meantime, external debt mostly stagnated. Only in 1988, the International Monetary Fund demanded that the members of the federation assume the joint and several liability for the total external debt, or at least for the part that cannot be considered as the investment of one type or another. This was not popular in the more developed republics. However, the developments over the next years showed that their objections were mostly unjustified.

The new Government of Ante Marković, which was mostly composed of Slovenian and Croatian representatives, as well as the new management of the central bank, where Slovenia's influence was also increased, stopped inflation which, at the end of 1989, turned into hyperinflation, by freezing the exchange rate overnight. The adopted exchange rate was mostly the one prevailing on the black market for foreign currency, which was mostly the best solution. During hyperinflation there is a fast and massive flight of the domestic currency. Thus, in fact, black market currency exchange rates realistically show the relative prices in the economy as well as the propensity of people to save and invest. So, the fixed exchange rate stops inflation almost immediately, which is what really happened. A similar operation was later carried out by Dragoslav Avramović, as well as the Central Bank

of Croatia and many other banks before him. Poland did the same almost simultaneously with Yugoslavia. Of course, this was part of the economic reform of the 1960s. These examples are needed to show that this was not a historically specific solution, but rather a measure that was usually taken to stop hyperinflation.

Also, the inflow of foreign capital was large enough that the government was repurchasing its debt with the prospect of eliminating it altogether. This was important because of the significance of the external debt crisis and its influence on the decade-long economic trends and political disputes. Although this was neither necessary nor desirable at the time when the economy was using the German mark as real money. However, there emerged other problems that led to the collapse of the reform, which failed to ensure the support of the Serbian leadership and the country as a whole. What was important was the lack of democratic legitimacy which did not exist in other European countries in transition (or in most of them; Russia is a special case like some other countries).

The first problem was a wage increase, which is not unexpected when stabilization is based on a fixed exchange rate. As inflation stops, labour costs often continue to rise. This can make the exchange rate inadequate, although not relatively fast. In the situation when there is a large foreign investment inflow, this may not pose a problem over a short term. Even over the next few years. However, the Yugoslav reform government did not last long enough to face this problem, but it was aware of it.

Another problem was a large decline in industrial production in the first half of 1990. It was also necessary to decide what to do with agricultural subsidies, as stabilization affected their costs. The economy faced a transitional recession, which affected all similar reforms in the European socialist countries. It was also present in the economic reform of the 1960s. The federal government sought to find a way to stimulate production, which was probably an unnecessary attempt, but again it did not see the effects of the measures it had proposed and implemented in some cases.

However, the most important problem was the parafiscal role of the central bank, which needs further explanation. Namely, if borrowing abroad is set aside, the federal and republican budgets mostly tended to be balanced. Given the system in which the real interest rate is negative, the central bank had to help both enterprises and budgets by money issue. This was helped – although it originally did not intend to do that – by the Social Accountancy Service, which carried out payments operations. Thus, it was possible to decide to send money on one or another account, including budgets, by political intervention. Any problems in excess liabilities would be covered by the central bank, so that this bank was a parafiscal institution where financial relations were balanced by means of the inflation tax. Real money, reserve money, was the German mark.

With a fixed exchange rate and price stabilization, that is, with the elimination of inflation, a considerable number of enterprises, banks and budgets were faced with financial problems. The federal government had tacit expectations or, better said, hopes that it would force the republican authorities to embark on fiscal and other reforms. This would certainly be necessary for the beginning of economic recovery. Instead, we had an intrusion into the monetary system and the printing of money through the Social Accountancy Service. As a result, the foreign exchange reserves were very quickly depleted and foreign payments were interrupted. Thus, the reform that started in December 1989 failed in December 1990. The Serbian government was especially under pressure, so that it contributed the most to the financial collapse. Not only the central bank reserves virtually disappeared, but also citizens' foreign currency savings as well. This is the problem that will be solved for years and, in some cases, decades later.

OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSIONS

This is roughly the history of Yugoslavia's economic problems from the mid-1960s until the year of its disintegration. It is not about some special and historically unique problems, so that the disintegration of this country is comparable to many other political unions that did

not survive. The economic crisis itself was almost trivial, but proved to be insolvable. Democratization and accession to the European Union were also the solutions that imposed themselves. Political interests, which are somewhat left aside here, were not harmonized with those political solutions. This especially applies to Serbia, which is almost incomprehensible yet historically correct. The historical novelty is only an incomprehensible misunderstanding of one's own interests and political paths in Serbia. And its wandering continues.

APPENDIX 1: **EXCHANGE RATE AND EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS**

There are several generations of exchange rate crisis theories. The Yugoslav case is rather simple, so that the basic Krugman model is quite sufficient for understanding what it was about.

When the exchange rate is really overvalued because, for example, inflation rises faster than justified and when the exchange rate is fixed to a foreign currency, the German mark in this case, it pays to convert dinars to marks until the central bank decides to devalue the dinar exchange rate in order to protect the foreign exchange reserves, and then to buy cheaper dinars or assets, which are also cheaper in foreign currency, and make profit. Or buy goods, since devaluation reduces export prices. Economic activity and employment usually decline, but a recession should not last for a longer period of time. In Yugoslavia, production stagnated for almost a decade. Why? Because both the overvaluation of the exchange rate and obstacle to overcome the crisis were built into the economic system. I wrote about this issue in 1982, in an essay that was later published, but it is not available where I am now.

In essence, it was the system of subsidizing investments and consumption by external borrowing. Dinar investments, credited by external debt, were devalued by inflation, because the exchange rate was practically fixed, or inflation was faster than the exchange rate depreciation. Credit commitments were met by short-time borrowing, so that those debts were increasing as a share of total external debt. To this one should also add foreign currency savings on the basis

of which dinar loans were also financed. The economy and households practically switched to the German mark as real money.

This system came to an end when, after 1979, interest rates on dollar loans and then on all others dramatically increased. Calculated on the basis of these new interest rates, the Yugoslav external debt became unsustainable. Namely, if they were refinanced by short-term loans and this practice continued, a large portion of external debt would fall due almost immediately. Due to the inevitable devaluation, dinar loans also became unsustainable, especially because both investment and consumer behaviours were calculated on the basis of the interest rate that was, at least, lower than the growth rate of the incomes of enterprises, households and the state.

As they were based on these higher interest rates, all incomes were significantly reduced, which should not be confused with their unsustainability. There were many papers in which the causes of the problem were wrongly identified. It was argued that the investments were insufficient or unprofitable, because they were state or politically motivated investments. If this was really the case, it would have been known that the capital market was open, so that those enterprises could change their owners and, if necessary, undergo business reconstruction. This was not possible, since assets could not be traded. So, the social ownership system was the cause why a transient exchange rate crisis turned into the crisis of the system.

What was the amount of external debt? It was probably between one fourth and one fifth relative to the country's total production, that is 18–20 billion dollars in the whole period from the beginning of the crisis until the reform in 1989. Probably between one fifth and one fourth accounted for short-term loans. This was relatively a low level of indebtedness, while the share of short-term liabilities was particularly small. However, if they should be financed out of the increased exports of goods and services, this implies significant adjustments by an exchange rate realignment. This is easier if increased exports are accompanied by increased foreign investments, since after the devaluation assets are cheaper and exports are more favourable. After 1989,

other countries in transition were characterized by the inflow of foreign investments and significant increase in exports.

Foreign investments were not possible, so that it was necessary to rely on the funds of the International Monetary Fund, which were conditioned by the relevant economic policy measures. However, they were not producing the desired results, because it was not easy to follow them in the system that was not adjusted to them. Thus, the exchange rate and debt crisis, coupled with poor overall results, lasted for almost a decade. By opening the door to foreign investment, the crisis would probably have ended relatively fast, primarily because the foreign financial liabilities were not large.

In the late 1980s and the first year of the 1990s, when the exchange rate was stabilized and foreign investment was allowed, external debt ceased to be a problem. However, both the economic and political situation deteriorated, so that there was neither the will nor the time to go through the process of adjustment, that is, through transition like other socialist countries.

APPENDIX 2: **TRANSFERS**

Probably the greatest disagreement, especially during the last years before the collapse of the country, was about the transfers of the more developed republics to the less developed republics and provinces through the Fund for the Underdeveloped. Although it was not unknown that the consequences of these transfers for economic activities did not end with finances, because obvious economic consequences also existed.

It is necessary to consider the overall consequences of transfers which consist of the substitution effect, on the one side, and the income effect, on the other side. The former has a favourable effect on the recipient of the transfer, which is visible if it is a question of goods transfers. If it is a question of money transfers, as it is, they should have an adverse effect on the donor's demand because, for example, Slovenia's transfers to Kosovo reduced its income and thus its demand. The other effect, that is, income effect, can have a favourable

effect on the aid donor, which can be seen if it is a question of money that increases the recipient's demand for imports. So, for example, Kosovo will import more Slovenian goods, because it received a money transfer from Slovenia. As there are also other republics and provinces, this can be more complex, but if one only takes into account money donors and money recipients, the final impact on the incomes of both of them will depend on their mutual trade. If, for example, the recipients of transfers import more than they export, the net transfer effect should be positive for the republics that paid into the Fund for the Underdeveloped. This does not mean that anyone is at a loss; instead, they all benefit, including donors. This is especially so if customs duties protect the production of both the developed and the underdeveloped republics and provinces, so that the transfer-related consequences for incomes do not spill over the country's borders.

There are no valid estimates of the overall consequences of transfers to the underdeveloped republics and provinces. It can be indirectly assessed that the more developed were not at a loss because, in Yugoslavia, the differences in the levels of development, expressed in per capita income, were not decreasing. Kosovo was lagging behind in per capita income for demographic reasons. Otherwise, the growth rate was at least as fast as in the country as a whole.

Therefore, the criticism of the developed republics was unfounded. It can be argued whether the same outcomes could have also been achieved by loans and direct investments. And whether this would have been more efficient than budget transfers, which of course depended on the change of the system, because the capital market was banned. And crediting was not sufficiently profitable, because the real interest rates in dinars were negative due to accelerated inflation.

APPENDIX 3: **TARIFF PROTECTION**

A customs union has the impact on the comparative advantages of regions. The less developed members of the Yugoslav federation emphasized that the Yugoslav market was closed and that more developed republics benefited from the situation. It is theoretically possible

that the distribution of the comparative advantages of an open economy is different than in a customs union. As an example, the republics and provinces that do not have access to the sea should have comparative advantages in industry and agriculture, if they were not the members of the Yugoslav customs union. Within the customs union, however, industrialization could be considered as an advantage of more developed regions over less developed ones, although the latter do not have an advantage in services for, say, geographical reasons. In the 1980s, the share of industry in total production was just over 20 percent, while the share of agriculture was over 10 percent. If we take into account that agriculture had a higher share in total production in the less developed republics and Kosovo, it can be concluded that the more developed republics were probably more industrialized than they would have been outside the Yugoslav customs union. As for Serbia, the Yugoslav customs union was more suited to it than to the less developed regions that would have been less industrialized than they would have been outside the Yugoslav customs union. Both of them, say, within the European Economic Community.

Thus, it should be concluded that the more developed parts of the country probably had a higher share of the manufacturing industry than it would have been outside the Yugoslav customs union. If other regions were less industrialized over a longer period of time, this could be due to the fact that their comparative advantages in the Yugoslav customs union were not adjusted to those in an open economy.

If the level of industrialization is taken into account, it could be concluded that the Serbian economy benefited from the Yugoslav customs union and the same applies to the Slovenian economy. The latter was probably more industrialized than it could have been as a member of the European Union, while the Yugoslav customs union suited to Serbia just in accordance with its comparative advantages in industry and agriculture. This is probably more correct when it comes to Serbia proper than Vojvodina. Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were probably less industrialized considering their comparative advantages in an open economy.

APPENDIX 4: **TAXES**

The tax system was the object of criticism due to the absence of clean bills, as they used to say. This was certainly true, because there was no consistent tax policy. Naturally, this is of utmost significance for the legitimacy of a state and its government. In Yugoslavia, such objections were responded by cutting the federal government's expenditure, that is, reducing its obligations in various social care areas. Therefore, the federal budget was confined to financing the administration and the army, as well as transfers to the less developed. As a result, the direct revenues were mostly reduced to customs duties and sales taxes, collected by the republics and provinces. There were also the contributions from the republican budgets, which were mostly in proportion with the share in the country's total income, just like the federal shares in the sales tax.

A key consequence of such a system is the loss of interdependence of the citizens of the whole country, because they are not the members of the same insurance company so to speak. This also leads to a loss of interest in joint decision making, including specifically regulatory decisions that have no clear fiscal consequences. Thus, the fiscal and legislative legitimacy of the common state is reduced.

The overall burden of the federal state was not big, about 7 percent of the so-called gross social product, which is probably about 10 percent smaller than the gross domestic product. If we exclude military and defence expenditures, which are up to 5 percent of the domestic product, they probably account for less than 2 percent of the gross domestic product in the regime of the 1980s. If military expenditure were reduced in accordance with a significant reduction of national security risks, the federal state's burden would be relatively small.

Should the transfers to the less developed economies and their budgets (which were outside the budget) be abolished – which happened to some extent just before the collapse of the country by the abolition of the Fund for the Underdeveloped – the federal state would pose a small fiscal burden for its members. The question would be what it is for, because it is not a community of risks, so to speak.

The answer would depend on the persistence of comparative advantages within the Yugoslav economic space and the distribution of benefits from the EU funds in the process of accession and subsequent membership. Judging by regional development in other countries in transition, the more developed parts and regions, which are closer to the European Union have generally fared better. In addition to those having better conditions for the development of the service sector.

Thus, it follows that probably all, especially the more developed and Serbia, would fare better after the transformation and accession of Yugoslavia to the European Union.

APPENDIX 5: **PROTECTIONISM**

There was a widespread belief in the Serbian public that the Slovenian economy would face great difficulties should it lose the Serbian market. Because it benefited from limited competition due to tariff and non-tariff protective measures. Because who would buy Slovenian goods if they had to be sold on the European market, for example? And who would buy it in Serbia if they could import the same products from other markets without tariff protection?

This was also a justification for the protectionist measures that the Serbian authorities began to impose on Slovenian goods. They were intended to reduce Slovenia's financial presence on the Serbian market, stage an informal boycott of Slovenian goods and impose the sales tax on Slovenian goods. All this was aimed at achieving a political impact on Slovenian resistance to constitutional changes, especially those which would or were related to the constitutional position of the provinces, especially Kosovo.

It is a question of misunderstanding. Small economies, like all Yugoslav economies, do not face limited demand on the world or European market. Namely, their supply of goods is too small to affect export prices and thus prices on a large market. The problem always lies in supply, that is, whether a small country has something to sell on the world market.

After 1991, the Slovenian economy adapted rapidly to the European market and largely substituted the Serbian and Yugoslav markets within a few years. It is difficult to say whether the transition would have been even more painless, because a decline in production and employment would have been smaller. However, there is no doubt that the Serbian economy did not benefit from the protectionist measures before and after the country's disintegration.

APPENDIX 6: **WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN**

What has happened seems to be necessary, because there must be a cause and thus its consequence. Hence historical fatalism, that is, a belief that the collapse of Yugoslavia has been inevitable. Thus, there is no point in asking what the alternative outcome would have been. At least not in a historical sense.

From the viewpoint of social science, however, it is not absurd to ask oneself whether the Yugoslav countries would have fared better if the country had undergone the process of transition and had become a EU member.

If one assumes that (i) comparative advantages would change in line with the large European market and that (ii) geographical and historical ties within Yugoslavia would be preserved, the less developed countries would have fared better in socialist Yugoslavia for the reason under (i), while for the reason under (ii) the more developed countries should have also fared better, because for the reason under (i) their transition to more advanced forms of business activity would have been accelerated.

Within the EU, their monetary problems would have been reduced thanks to their membership in the monetary union, while the fiscal system would have been relieved of spending on the military and significant part of the administration. An additional advantage would have been transfers from the European budget that would have also been of benefit to the more developed countries via mechanism explained in Appendix 2.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

1. More significant essays on the Yugoslav crisis can be found in my book *Why Do Countries Break Up? The Case of Yugoslavia* (1994), which is available in English and Serbian in Peščanik.
2. I have written about the theory of the breakup of countries and political unions a number of times, while the overview of the theory and several most significant examples can be found in my paper *Why Do Unions Collapse? The Fiscal Story*, which was written in parallel with this essay.
3. I first wrote about the systemic obstacles to transition in Yugoslavia in 1969 in the essay "Socijalizam kao granica" (Socialism as a Limit), which was reprinted in the book *Socijalistički žanr* (Socialist Genre) in 1985.
4. I wrote about the failed attempts at reform and transition in the socialist countries in the book *Gledišta i sporovi o industrijalizaciji u socijalizmu* (Views and Disputes on Industrialization in Socialism) in 1984.
5. I wrote about the economic crisis in a longer essay titled "Privredna kriza u Jugoslaviji" ("The Economic Crisis in Yugoslavia", the title is from memory) in 1982, which was published (I think) in a collection of essays by the Institute of Economic Sciences in 1986 (I think).
6. Some of the later essays dealing with the development of individual republics and Kosovo were published in the book *Neoclassicism in the Balkans and Other Essays* in 2015.
7. I wrote about the disputes in economic science in Yugoslavia in "Yugoslav Economics Facing Reform and Dissolution" in: H.-J. Wagener (ed.), *Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist Europe* in 1998.
8. The data cited in this article are available in my works and, in particular, the reports by the International Monetary Fund and, in particular, in an unpublished OECD study. I have cited some in my essay "Jugoslavija i razvoj" (Yugoslavia and Development) published in the book *Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi* (Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective) by the Helsinki Committee in 2017.
9. As for availability, the best source is probably a series of reports on Yugoslavia published by the OECD almost once a year. Thus, the development of crisis can be monitored from one report to another. The OECD has made them available on its website.

V

**A BRIEF TIMELINE
OF THE KEY EVENTS
OF THE EIGHTIES IN
PICTURES**




The death of Josip Broz Tito, May 1980. The members of the Presidency of the SFRY by Tito's catafalque (from left to right): Vidoje Žarković, Petar Stambolić, Stevan Doronjski, Lazar Koliševski, (President), Fadil Hoxha, Vladimir Bakarić, Sergej Krajger and Cvijetin Mijatović.



Disbelief: Citizens' reaction to the news about the death of Josip Broz Tito.



*The world "summit" in Dedinje: Leonid Brezhnev (USSR), Margaret Thatcher and Prince Philip (UK), Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and many other foreign statesmen (below)
photos: Archives of Yugoslavia (Fond 112, Tanjug photo-archives)*



From the student canteen (spring 1981) to mass protests of citizens and students, and brutal state repression: Kosovo 1981-1990.



Photo: State Archives of Kosovo



photo: Archives of Yugoslavia



photo: wikipedia.org



photo: Archives of Yugoslavia





photo: Archives of Yugoslavia





photo: SNP


The penetration of nationalism into culture: Jovan Radulović's drama "Golubnjača" (1982) and high circulation literary production



Stipe Šušteršič: "White Book" as an attempt to deal with nationalism.

photo: Vreme archives





The herald of change in the East: Mikhail Gorbachev

photo: un-photo



The powerful voice of the non-dogmatic left: Miroslav Krleža

photo: Archives of Yugoslavia



The implementer and the strategist of the Greater Serbia project: Slobodan Milošević and Dobrica Ćosić

photo: Draško Gagović / Vreme archives



"Nobody should beat you!": Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo Polje, spring 1987.

photo: Imre Sabo / Vreme archives




photo: Draško Gagović / Vreme archives

The winner and the loser: Slobodan Milošević (top) and Ivan Stambolić (bottom left) at the 8th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, September 1987



photo: Slobodan Dimitrijević / NIN



photo: Archives of Yugoslavia




photo: Archives of Yugoslavia




photo: Draško Gagović / Vreme archives

Sessions without results – one of the many sessions of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Kolë Shiroka and Azem Vlassi (above), Vasil Tupurkovski (left) and Borislav Jović (top)



"The Trial of the Four": Janez Janša

photo: Archives of Yugoslavia





The (ab)use of the army: Federal Secretary for National Defense, General Vejko Kadijević

photo: Archives of Yugoslavia



*Ideological convertitism:
Ljubomir Tadić*

photo: Dragoslav Simić



*The Slovenian national question:
Dimitrij Rupel*

photo: Vreme archives



*The press in the SFRY:
from the flourishing
of journalism to
warmongering*





“Happening of the People” 1988-1090: the “Yoghurt Revolution” in Vojvodina and protests in Montenegro, which led to the change of the leaderships in Novi Sad and Titograd.

photos: Archives of Yugoslavia








*The largest rally of support to Milošević
at Ušće, autumn 1988.*

printscreen: youtube.com



*Consistent resistance to
Greater Serbian nationalism:
Milan Kučan.*

photo: Vreme archives



The long-term strike of miners at Stari Trg (Kosovo), winter 1981.

photo: Oral History Kosovo



Support to miners from Slovenia: rally at Cankarjev Dom.

printscreens: youtube.com



*The announcement of an armed
conflict: Slobodan Milošević at
Gazimestan, 28 June 1989.*

photos: Draško Gagović / Vreme archives



A new sound in Yugoslav music



“Laibach”

wikipedia.org



Koja, “Disciplina Kičme”

photo: Stanislav Milojković / facebook.com



“Pankrti”

photo: facebook.com



"Paket aranžman"

photo: Branko Gavrić



"EKV"

photo: wikipedia.org



"Bijelo Dugme"

photo: wikipedia.org



"Riblja Čorba"



"Prjavo Kazalište", album cover



"Haustor", poster



Džoni Štulić, "Azra"



"Zabranjeno pušenje"

photo: Dražen Kalenić

frontslobode.ba



Lepa Brena, video "Jugoslovenka"

printscren: youtube.com



*A step into
conceptual art:
Marina Abramović*

photo: moma.org



A belated reform effort: Ante Marković.

photos: Archives of Yugoslavia



The end of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: the 14th Extraordinary Congress in Belgrade, January 1990.

VI

**SUCCESSFUL
DIPLOMACY,
SMALL RESULTS**

Tvrtko Jakovina

THE SFRY AND THE WORLD FROM TITO'S DEATH UNTIL THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA

AT THE AUGUST 31, 1991 meeting of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) Cabinet of the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Budimir Lončar) and after several turbulent days when only the situation in the Soviet Union was discussed, its members focused on what was then the most serious European crisis after the Second World War. Namely, in Brussels on August 27, 1991, the member countries of the European Community (EC) adopted the Declaration on Yugoslavia, one of the most important about the crisis in Tito's Federation. It reiterated that they did not approve a forceful change of the borders, pointed to the negative role of one part of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) in the Yugoslav crisis and called on the country's civilian leadership to place the army under its control. It also proposed a peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague. As early as May 5, 1991, the European Community imposed an arms embargo on all warring sides. It was a more resolute step compared to all previous statements, such that this one aroused limited optimism in Kneza Miloša Street in the center of Belgrade.

At this morning meeting, the introductory speech was given by Dr. Damir Grubiša, Chief of Staff of the Federal Secretary, who was already serving a notice period. Grubiša, the Croatian member of Budimir Lončar's Cabinet, flew in the last plane traveling from Belgrade to Ljubljana four days after his speech about the reactions to the Declaration at the meeting.⁴¹⁶ As early as July 17, 1991, the Government of Democratic Unity was formed in Zagreb. By then, the Brussels Declaration had received a positive response from foreign media. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher, spoke

416 Conversation with Damir Grubiša, October 4, 2020.

laudably about its provisions. Should Serbia refuse to accept the EC proposal, Slovenian and Croatian demands for independence could be accepted. The EC position in favor of a conference was also supported by the United States. The problem for the Yugoslav side was the “categorical” demand of Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army that Germans and Italians should not be included in the EC mission coming to Yugoslavia. It was important for federal diplomats to explain to those circles that the mission would be composed of civilians and that “this has nothing to do with the past.”⁴¹⁷ The involvement of these states in the Yugoslav crisis would be useful; annoying them by associating them with the Second World War could only cause harm. Decades later, especially a few years after the breakup of the SFRY, the past, the Germans, the Second World War and the historical injustices became a constant accompaniment to politics, if not its only content, in the Southeast European space. Preparations for conflict by manipulating historical narratives in the country itself had already been going on for some time.

For the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Budimir Lončar, the adoption of the Declaration was a historical event and a courageous step taken by the European Community. The Federal Executive Council (FEC) unanimously and swiftly accepted the initiative to organize a conference.⁴¹⁸ The consent had also to be given by the federal republics; it was an opportunity for all and the sense of seriousness was imparted to everything. Four republics quickly agreed, but Serbia and Montenegro waited. Yugoslav diplomats had to do everything possible not to give the impression in these republics that they would go to The Hague where their responsibility was presupposed. According to the highest-ranking officials of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs

417 Ibid.

418 Budimir Lončar, SSIP (Office of the Federal Secretary), page/chp./no. 426962, Stenographic records of the meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Secretary on August 31, 1991.

(FSFA), all this was a “salutary effort” to “keep Yugoslavia together.”⁴¹⁹ A peace conference implied an effort to preserve the country. In the opinion of the highest-ranking FSFA officials, a conference that would focus on the collapse of the state would be a meeting dedicated to war, because the breakup of the state would not be possible without bloodshed.⁴²⁰ The discussion should be focused on a higher degree of autonomy and sovereignty for the constituent republics, including the perspective of joining the association of European countries. The EC should support the restructuring of Yugoslav society and not only the creation of peace. The EC decided to be the tailor of Yugoslavia’s suit. If that is the case, Lončar said, it should “get all necessary things to make this new suit look good ... [and] incorporate the social and economic components.”⁴²¹ As emphasized by the Federal Secretary, although the “universal values” of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were also welcome in the light of the Paris meeting, the EC could heal Yugoslavia “by building closer relations with it through association, its admission to the Council of Europe, and economic and organizational-financial assistance.”

Given the situation in the country, the expectations from the conference sounded almost unrealistic. Such expectations would be too high even if the EC had to talk with disciplined and cooperative politicians, even if the real knowledge, capacity and will to fulfill whatever was asked, suggested and promised actually existed. The situation on the ground was quite the opposite: there was no will to talk, people were being killed and the SFRY was faced with chaos, hatred and war.

Optimism and great expectations from the EC had also existed before this, after the meeting of the European Three (H. Van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, J. Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister and the Portuguese Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro), who came to Yugoslavia on July 7, 1991 in order to agree on the measures

419 Ibid.

420 Ibid.

421 Ibid.

complying with the decisions of the Twelve made in The Hague on July 5, 1991 and the conclusions of the Brioni Agreement signed on June 30, 1991. Under the Agreement, the YPA was obliged to withdraw to its barracks, while Croatia and Slovenia agreed to freeze their decisions of June 25, 1991 to declare independence for a three-month period. The statement made by the Three was favorably assessed by the FSFA. The EC recommendations included democratic dialogue, the renunciation of the use of force, respect for human rights, advocacy for a market economy, establishment of the rule of law and reforms.⁴²² The ceasefire in Slovenia, which declared independence on the same day as Croatia, June 25, 1991, needed to be consolidated. The Slovenes immediately turned their decision into the conclusion and began taking over the border crossings. Croatia announced that it had just “embarked on the process of dissociation.”⁴²³ The EC wanted to do something, but there was neither the will nor the ability on the ground to stop the killing and the destruction of the system. Since May 15, 1991, when the Croatian member of the Presidency, Stipe Mesić, assumed the position as President of the SFRY Presidency, which was blocked despite being a pure formality, it was clear that the federal institutions were almost non-existent. Ante Marković’s government had no influence on the YPA or Defense Minister General Veljko Kadijević. Any act of the FSFA could mean a lot under normal circumstances, but it no longer had a country to represent. Its actions were diplomatically thought out, but they had no real political relevance. Decisions were being made elsewhere.

After a number of events – Stjepan Mesić’s failed appointment, the two republics’ proclamation of independence, the European Three intervention and embargo, as well as Mesić’s election as head of the SFRY Presidency and consent that the Slovenian authorities would

422 Budimir Lončar, SSIP (Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove; Foreign Ministry of Socialist Yugoslavia), Report on the visit of the “EC Three” foreign ministers to Yugoslavia on July 7, 1991, Belgrade, July 11, 1991.

423 Božo Repe, *Milan Kučan. Prvi predsjednik Slovenije* (Sarajevo: Udruženje za modernu historiju / Udruga za modernu povijest UMHS, 2019), 251–254.

control the SFRY's international borders in adherence with federal regulations as previously – it became clear that the federal government did not function because it did not control the federal army and larger parts of the state. The Yugoslav People's Army was increasingly turning into the army of the largest republic. Non-Serb recruits were fleeing the Yugoslav People's Army and increasingly numbers of non-Serb officers were asking to be dismissed from service or were leaving. The army gradually "merged" with the policy of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, who had an influence on all Serbs in the country, advocating a change of the internal borders and speaking about the threat to the largest nation. The federal political party, namely the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was dissolved at the beginning of 1990. Serbia had already changed the internal structure of the country by abolishing the autonomy of its provinces in 1989, achieving something it had advocated for years. On the other hand, in other parts of the country, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, their leaders were fully convinced that the preservation of Yugoslavia was not only impossible, but also unnecessary and incompatible with the interests of their peoples. Yugoslavia wore itself out and the desire for independence in a country overwhelmed by nationalism was dominant. In May 1991, Sandžak Muslims decided that, in the event of the secession of any Yugoslav republic, they would also have the right to consider acting on their own behalf. Sulejman Ugljanin came to Zagreb, while Kosovo journalists had the opportunity to read their news in Albanian after the "Chronicle of the Day" on Radio Zagreb (Croatian Radio since 1990), which they could not do in Priština. Those events had no precedent. It was obvious that the borders and divisions could be "discussed" only with the use of weapons. The EC probably offered salvation, but the partners on the ground had no real wish to accept it.

The FSFA concluded that the European Community became the "prevalent factor in resolving the Yugoslav crisis thanks to the proposed constructive approach, consistent with our own options and

the declared views” of all actors.⁴²⁴ These events coincided with Yugoslavia’s repeatedly expressed wish to join the European integration process. The EC wanted to be a partner and offered “generous financial assistance to the reform programme of the Federal Executive Council (FEC), as well as the opening of negotiations on the extended status of Yugoslavia (association).” Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission and Jacques Santer, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, mentioned four to five billion dollars and the prospect of accession to the association, which could have “multiple kinds of feedback.”⁴²⁵ As it was written in the FSFA report of early July 1991, the use of force by the Yugoslav People’s Army against one republic caused outrage in one part of the EC, especially Austria and Germany, and eroded confidence in the strength of democratic groups and support to the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

In those days, any optimism was unrealistic. Yugoslavia’s ailments, such as systemic errors, lack of reforms and deep-rooted problems, were real. Much of what happened in the summer of 1991 was determined or at least accelerated by the events in the Soviet Union. August 1991 became the crucial month of the Cold War, that is, its real end. Just as the changes in Moscow triggered everything that led so quickly to the end of a historical epoch, the events after the failed coup in the Soviet Union determined the path to be taken by Eastern Europe and the rest of the world. On August 19, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was detained in his vacation villa “Rassvet” and placed under house arrest. It is still unclear why his bodyguards did not react and why the telephone connection with the outside world remained open, or whether all this was Gorbachev’s attempt to show the world and liberals that he was irreplaceable in the ongoing global events. On August 21, 1991, Gorbachev flew back to Moscow and said

424 Budimir Lončar, SSIP (), Office of the Federal Secretary, page/chp./no. 423816, Stenographic records of the meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Secretary on July 16, 1991

425 ;ibidem; Repe, *Milan Kučan*, 239.

that he had arrived in a “new country.”⁴²⁶ The Soviet Union was collapsing. The message of US President George H.W. Bush from Kiev in early August 1991, warning Ukrainians that America would not support those who might seek independence in order to replace far-off tyrannies with local despotism, became obsolete as a reflection of the pattern of thinking that was no longer needed.⁴²⁷ This was also the position of US State Secretary James Baker when talking with all relevant players in the Yugoslav crisis in Belgrade on June 22, 1991. The events dramatically accelerated their pace and Cold War considerations were no longer necessary.⁴²⁸

By August 27, 1991, the three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were (re-)recognized, similarly to what was later done in the case of Croatia and Slovenia: they first recognized each other (Ljubljana and Zagreb on June 25, 1991) and then were recognized by Iceland (like Croatia and Slovenia on December 19, 1991) and other EC member countries. The three Baltic states had an even shorter and easier path: Iceland recognized them on the same day they recognized each other. The Russian Federation, along with Denmark and Finland, recognized them on August 23 and on August 26 the same was done by all EC member countries. The Soviet Union peacefully changed its borders.⁴²⁹

These events briefly overshadowed the events in Yugoslavia. The drama in the second strongest country in the world was the most important for humanity. Borisav Jović, a member of the SFRY Presidency, read his cautious statement that sounded cold, bureaucratic and uninventive. Some Serbian politicians were much clearer. They

426 William Taubman, *Gorbachev. His Life and Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017.) 614, 617, 621; Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Penguin, 2017), 610–613.

427 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Tri Jugoslavije. Izgradnja države i izazov legitimacije 1918.-2005* (Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2009), 492.

428 Repe, *Milan Kučan*, 245–248.

429 Daina Bleiere, Valdis Bērziņš and Paul Goble (eds), *History of Latvia. 100 Years* (Riga: Domas Speks, 2014), 453–454.

described the events in Foros and Moscow as “bad for democracy, but good for Serbia⁴³⁰” because the overthrow of the politicians who were pushing the Soviet Union towards a confederation would weaken the possible pressure on Serbia to agree to something similar in Yugoslavia, or would at least provoke a series of unpleasant reactions.⁴³¹ Croatian President Franjo Tuđman spoke without advance preparation, so that he sounded unprepared and inarticulate, leaving an impression that he could not clearly say what the events in Moscow could mean. However, Croatia did not support the coup leaders in contrast to Serbia; it is possible that the new Russian leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin reminded them of how Serbian leaders praised the news from Foros.⁴³² The Soviet Union was not the equal partner of the United States, but was still the “equal bearer of the world’s self-destruction.” Whatever was happening in Moscow was important for Yugoslavia as the factor that was “directly affected by the outcome of the crisis over there due to a number of similar problems,” according to Federal Secretary Lončar.⁴³³

The failure of the coup marked the real end of the Cold War. The old Stalinist methods were worn out, wrote Zdravko Malić, Professor of Polish Literature at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, in his

430 Borislav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika* (Beograd: Politika 1995), 393.

431 Ramet, *Tri Jugoslavije*, 493; Josip Glaurdić, *Vrijeme Europe. Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije* (Zagreb: Mate, 2011), 189

432 Mario Nobilo *Hrvatski feniks. Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990–1997* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), 75. In his book, Mate Granić, the then Deputy Prime-Minister and, later, longtime Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, mentions Gorbachev only once, as a man who had established good relations with Helmut Kohl and H.D. Genscher (Mate Granić, *Vanjski poslovi. Iza kulisa politike*, (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), 25).

433 Budimir Lončar, SSIP (Office of the Federal Secretary, page/chp./no. 423816, Stenographic records of the meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Secretary on July 16, 1991.

diary. It could also be a warning to “our hot-headed generals.”⁴³⁴ After the failed coup in Moscow and an unexpectedly peaceful settlement of the Soviet crisis, a comparison between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union ceased to be relevant.⁴³⁵ Until then, many feared that the escalation of nationalism in the Soviet Union, the confederalization of the state and, in particular, the Russian Federation’s demand for independence could generate an adverse effect on Yugoslavia, especially Serbia’s demand for independence. The German political circles were not ready to support the overthrow of Gorbachev, because “hard-liners” would come to power, the new states would be unstable and large-scale forced migration of the population would likely occur.⁴³⁶ Such assessments made in the late spring of 1990 seemed valid. They remained valid, but only in the case of Yugoslavia. As the German circles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it, “if we insist on the narrow-minded principle of the nation state,” large-scale migration will be realistic, which is “unthinkable in today’s Europe”⁴³⁷ However, the unthinkable became reality. Russia wanted independence, but did not fight for the Russians who remained outside the Federation. The crisis that raged in Yugoslavia remained the only one. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as Secretary General of the Communist Party of the USSR; Boris Yeltsin humiliated him in the Supreme Soviet on August 23, 1990. In fact, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Admittedly, Mikhail Gorbachev invited the Croatian and Serbian leaders, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević (respectively), to Moscow in September, but the meeting – where Milošević communicated in English and Tuđman in Russian – also failed.

434 Zdravko Malić, *Noć bez sna. Dnevnik devedesetih* (Zagreb: Disput, 2019), 191

435 Glaurdić, *Vrijeme Europe*, 190.

436 Budimir Lončar, Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (SSIP), Research and Documentation Service, page/chp./no. 264, June 26, 1990, Information: Some Western reactions to the current circumstances in Yugoslavia and comparisons with the situation in the USSR.

437 *Ibidem*.

The dramatic crisis of the previous model of behavior in Moscow was clear to some a little earlier. As early as July 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in Poland that the Soviet Union had lost the race with the West. This remained unknown not only to opposition leaders and dissidents in Eastern Europe, but also to Yugoslav hardliners and probably one part of the Soviet leadership in the last years of the Cold War. This meant that the special Yugoslav position between the two opposing blocs had become less significant. What made the Soviets significant in its satellites was the presence of the Red Army, but they gave up their position as the hegemon. The Yugoslav analysis of 1988 suggested that the Soviet Union would strive for “functional-type integration,” which would “replace territorial integration more and more often.”⁴³⁸ The Soviets would only set an example, try not to get involved in any situation beyond observation and push for a single economic space on the continent. The Soviet party and political leaders were certain that the army would not be involved in the ongoing events in Eastern Europe. Thus, tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers stationed in Hungary, Poland and East Germany did nothing when the changes began to take place in these countries and the empire was falling apart. Gorbachev was speaking about ecology, a common European home, cooperation and a world in which both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would merge into a single Europe. Gorbachev’s ideas were more the ideas of a visionary than those of a practical politician.⁴³⁹ In the Soviet state’s situation, this might be understood. The Soviet leadership believed that in the event of a deep crisis, the state could survive only if its core, namely its “imperial center” – which survived the period after the Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet Russian civil war – was preserved. The Russian core was exactly defined under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This does

438 Budimir Lončar, SSIP, UMES, Reminder about the current developments in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance /COMECON/ and SFRY-COMECON relations, 1988.

439 Westad, *The Cold War*, 586.

not mean that Gorbachev wanted the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rather, he wanted a “new socialism” in a new Europe, which would valorize the Cold War experience and only recognize the possibility that he was reasoning as a Russian statesman and not only as a Russian leader. This could explain why the Red Army remained passive at a time when the borders were changing and the empire ceased to exist. Boris Yeltsin’s Russia wanted independence, but was not ready to fight for the Russians remaining outside Russia.

The Soviet Union was the first concern of the whole world, but the leaders of the Federation wanted to avoid war, the leaders of the largest republic wanted independence within the existing borders, while the military proved its professionalism. It remained subordinated to the civilian authorities and did not become an independent factor. In Yugoslavia, at least as far as the largest republic and the YPA are concerned, the situation was completely different. Partly due to Milošević’s ability to present himself as the protector of diverse and even disparate interests, the army gradually turned into a reserve Serbian army. Until the failure of the coup, the Yugoslav military leaders expected that the authentic revolution, staged by the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples, would eventually survive. This would guarantee the survival of the forces resisting the breakup of Yugoslavia and supporting a unitary state, which was closest to Milošević’s vision of a Great Serbia. Since Tito’s death in 1980, the YPA had become increasingly independent in its public appearances. It considered itself the only real federal institution that was called upon to develop Yugoslav consciousness and was often backed by a rather dubious understanding of society, democracy and even freedom. The Yugoslav army wanted to secure stable funding, but was not ready or able to move beyond the system into which it was well integrated.⁴⁴⁰ It was only when the system started to fall apart that General Veljko Kadijević started

440 CWIHP, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Research Report, Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Federation; IRR No. 145, January 22, 1988.

searching for a new financier and master and was helped by the fact that most YPA officers were Serbs. However, there were never so many Serbs as to dominate Yugoslavia in the way the Russians (and Ukrainians) dominated the Soviet Union. Despite a large number of Serbs in the Army, it was partly late for such an effort to be successful. The outcome of the crisis in the Soviet Union in August 1991 aggravated the position of the advocates of Yugoslav unity, based on Milošević's or centralist conceptions, and accelerated military operations in the territory of Yugoslavia, mostly in Croatia.

In the summer of 1991, Croatia became the main, very bloody battlefield. The war in Slovenia was over; the YPA was withdrawing from the northwestern republic, while the convoys of the republican presidents, who were expected to reach an agreement, failed and actually deepened the disintegration processes by sidelining the federal government and its bodies. In the summer of 1991, competition of Yugoslav sports clubs stopped. In Zagreb, on August 19, 1991, two bombings occurred, with one not far from the Jewish Community Centre in Palmotićevea Street and the second near Jewish graves at the Mirogoj Cemetery. There were TV comments how "Serbian people are butchers" and that "not all Croats are evil". The Serbs in Croatia were requested to join the newly formed Croatian National Guard.

And "Polityka" carried out an article about Yuga entitled: A Thousand Small Wars. (...). In the world today they write more about Yugoslavia than ever before. The stereotype of Balkan bloodthirsty primitivism is more interesting and probably more necessary to the world than what we are and what we mean as a cultural entity. Meštrović's stone and bronze sculptures and Krleža's texts are shit on a stick in comparison with Tudman's guards and Milošević's volunteers. The world wants us to be primitive and we readily offer ourselves to it.⁴⁴¹

Everything that had largely been suppressed in official circles and beyond over the past decades exploded by the summer of 1991.

441 Malić, *Noć bez sna*, 191–192.

Yugoslavia was in complete chaos and probably no action could have calmed the situation even if such a wish had existed.

Together with Ana Marija Bešker, head of the FSFA Analysis and Planning Directorate, Damir Grubiša was supposed to submit a letter to the United Nations to the office of Stipe Mesić, President of the SFRY Presidency, inviting this organization to send “blue helmets” to the SFRY, deploying them in Croatia. However, just as Budimir Lončar was later viewed as a problem in Croatia, Grubiša was “stigmatized as Yugonostalgic,” as he was told by Josip Manolić, the former Vice Premier and influential member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). “The Ustasha was plotting” against him and it would be good for him to step down.⁴⁴² His wife had already been fired from the District Public Prosecutor’s Office, as were many other judges. However, he became the head of the Analysis and Planning Department and then Chief of Staff of Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonko Šeparović (who held this position from April 15, 1991 to January 2, 2000). Such was the fate of many members of the former Yugoslav diplomatic staff who moved to Croatia and the policies which had consequences felt for decades, turning Croatian citizens into Croats and not-so-good Croats and, above all else, causing chaos and injustice.

Thus, in July 1991, all statements issued by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs sounded a bit out of place and unrelated to the reality on the ground. In early July 1991, Ivo Komšić, a Bosnian-Herzegovinian professor and politician, issued a statement against the war in Slovenia in his capacity as Vice President of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Social Democratic Union. The party leadership had a large number of members who approved the Army’s methods and use of force, and agreed with the assessments that the Slovenian leadership was “fascist.” This differed from the view that the army should be depoliticized and that the crisis should be resolved peacefully and by agreement.⁴⁴³

442 Conversation with Damir Grubiša, October 4, 2020.

443 Hrvoje Klasić, *Mika Špiljak, revolucionar i državnik* (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2006), 425–426.

In late July in Kiseljak, a predominantly Croatian town near Sarajevo, Komšić watched long unhappy citizens, who had not been allowed to say who they were for years, now wishing to replace their status with Croatianness and Catholicism. Disguised autocrats and “sickly ambitious sycophants of the system” addressed them as collaborators with the former authorities and frequently “loonies, humbugs, drunkards and brawlers.”⁴⁴⁴ Such was the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lagged behind events in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.

The Yugoslav societies were falling apart like other large communities composed of different nationalities, religions and levels of development, namely economically exhausted societies held together by external systems, like the one existing during the Cold War, which then relaxed. It was impossible to find a way to a synthesis, that is, common foreign policy within the non-existent framework. Sun Yatsen compared China with a sand castle: “Shake it and it will crumble.” Such was Yugoslavia at that time. What brought China together was nationalism. Yugoslavia was finally, above all else, divided by nationalism.⁴⁴⁵ In the opinion of Federal Secretary Lončar, a peaceful breakup of the country was not possible. However, all this turned The country therefore became an important “negative” factor in the global events of the 1990s.⁴⁴⁶ It was sad how Yugoslavia was discussed at the CSCE, how the problem had to be resolved by the EC Three and how the country turned “from a peacemaker ... the creator of a new situation” into the first client of the mechanisms that it itself had proposed to create. The Conference organized in The Hague and held from September 1991 under the chairmanship of British politician Lord Carrington did not achieve any results. In the meantime, military operations in Croatia persisted.

444 Ibid., 51.

445 Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, *Totalni rat* (Belgrade: IRO Rad, 1987), 470.

446 Budimir Lončar, SSIP (Office of the Federal Secretary, page/chp./no. 423816, Stenographic records of the meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Secretary, July 16, 1991.

THE END OF DÉTENTE, TITO'S DEATH AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN (1979-1980)

From the moment, in 1948, that Josip Broz Tito stopped being perceived in the West as Stalin's most faithful follower, the fate of Yugoslavia after his death was repeatedly questioned in every analysis and all considerations of foreign intelligence services, especially those with serious interests in Yugoslavia. Tito's disease and death in May 1980 coincided with one of the most serious crises in international relations, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which caused the end of the Cold War détente and beginning of the so-called Second Cold War, as well as the tightening of relations between East and West. For Yugoslav diplomacy, the period of détente in the 1970s was the period when the objectives of Yugoslav policies, appeals and advocacies, were suddenly realized. Relations with international actors with which Yugoslavia had had difficulties or unresolved issues were improved and settled. Tito visited the Vatican and Italy in 1971 and finally determined their shared border under the Treaty of Osimo in 1975. In 1974, Tito was in Germany on a visit that ended with his mentioning friendship between the two countries. In 1977, he was received in France in a spectacular way, which was symbolic if one bears in mind the long history of cold relations due to Algeria. During most of Mao's rule Yugoslavia had no good relations with China. Thereafter, in 1977, Tito was invited to China where he was the first foreign statesman to visit Mao's unfinished mausoleum on the Square of Heavenly Peace. Chinese leader Hua Guofeng visited Yugoslavia in 1978, after the Chinese withdrew their advisers from Albania to the horror of Enver Hoxha. Although the worst part of Yugoslavia's diplomatic efforts involved relations with its neighbors, especially Bulgaria and Albania, while the dispute over Macedonia with Greece was not settled, its relations with its Western neighbors rapidly improved. In this connection, a great contribution was made by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in 1975. Yugoslavia played a prominent role and was rewarded by the decision to hold the first follow-up CSCE meeting in Belgrade in 1977. In agreement with other

neutral and non-aligned (NN) countries, Yugoslavia launched the NN group, which often served as a catalyst for European policies divided between the two opposing blocs. Thus, the policy of non-alignment was Europeanized, but what was even more important was the possible settlement of the Slovenian and Croatian minority issue with some other countries, especially Austria.

One of Yugoslavia's most enduring foreign policy orientations was the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), namely the movement of those countries that carefully guarded their young, hard-won independence and sought to survive between the two opposing blocs. The strengthening of multilateralism was also an important component, such that the Non-Aligned Movement provided a significant impetus to the strengthening of the United Nations. Many Third World countries could agree on these points, but not all adopted the policy of active peaceful coexistence to an equal extent, remaining in the realm of philosophy rather than the realm of action. For Yugoslavia, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was largely conceived by it and in which it was most active, represented a programmatic and action platform. The end of the 1970s was marked by Josip Broz Tito's last important foreign policy action – travel to the Middle East in order to soothe relations between Egypt and other Arabs who rejected the Camp David Accords as part of the Cuban attempt to convert the NAM to the strategic reserve of the Soviet camp with the help of radical countries.

The event that changed everything took place in a country, which, like Yugoslavia, was socialist, non-aligned and, naturally, not a member of the Warsaw Pact. Two months after Afghan President Prince Daud visited Kupari near Dubrovnik and Kotor (February 22, 1978), talking with Tito about the meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement expected in May, he was assassinated. At first, this event was called a coup d'état in Soviet media, but then it developed into the April (Saur) Revolution, and relations between Washington and Moscow were abruptly almost blocked. The meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement was not held in Afghanistan, but the Ministerial Meeting – delicate due to Cuba's playing host to the Sixth Summit

Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1979 – was held in Belgrade and provoked great attention from both US Ambassador to Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, and President Jimmy Carter's Special Envoy to Tito, Averell Harriman. Finally, at the very end of 1979, Soviet Red Army units marched into Afghanistan. Although it looked highly unlikely that there was any intent to intervene elsewhere – in Balochistan, for example, to directly threaten the Persian Gulf – all these events contributed to the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine and panic around the world. The United States announced that they would react to any state's attempt to gain control over the Gulf region and threaten oil transport routes. The relations between China and the Soviet Union, and between India and China were also endangered. Pakistan became a non-aligned country in 1979, while Iran also applied for membership after the fall of its Shah. As Josip Vrhovec – Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1978 to 1982 – said, the non-aligned countries were the greatest victims of these strained relations. It was necessary to explain to India, which was on good terms with the Soviets, but had a strained relationship with Pakistan, that only strict adherence to the founding principles of non-alignment could be useful to all of them and protect them against the arbitrariness of the great powers. However, New Delhi was not ready to react like Yugoslavia, because the events in Afghanistan were of utmost strategic importance for the subcontinent. The world was entering the phase of dangerous aggravation, which also affected Yugoslavia at the delicate time when Tito was admitted to hospital.

Tito condemned the Red Army intervention in Kabul “... such an act is also an attack on non-aligned countries... It is well known how we look at such cases. We cannot reconcile with it, we cannot agree that one country interferes in the internal affairs of another country, regardless of whether someone from that country called someone to come to the rescue. We are against it because it can be anyone.”⁴⁴⁷ The President of the SFRY was voicing the mantra of the Yugoslav

447 Josip Vrhovec, SSIP (Draft note on the Comrade President's reflections on President Carter's message /handwritten date (Jakovina 2007), 302–303.

regime since the Second World War, which after 1948 became a fetish, the basic principle, the highest value protected by the army and foreign policy, and the ideology developed by the country. Truly, the first reaction to the event was a little more polished than the politicians' comments among themselves. At the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Yugoslav leadership called for the observance of the UN Charter, sovereign rights to independence, autonomy, the territorial integrity of any state and the inadmissibility of intervention and imposition of someone else's will.⁴⁴⁸ As is usual in such cases, Yugoslavia was speaking about itself. This time, there were a number of others who also saw Yugoslavia in the events in Afghanistan. At the extraordinary session of the NATO Council held on January 15, 1980, Warren Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State, spoke about the potential of the crisis to spill over "into Yugoslavia, in particular."⁴⁴⁹ Tito was in the hospital and the chances of his recovery were slim. American journalists in the region were "instructed by their editors" to create an "atmosphere of sympathy" for Yugoslavia in their reports.⁴⁵⁰ When Tito died, the *New York Times* wrote that he "chose the worst possible time to die." The *Christian Monitor Observer* caricatured Yugoslavia as a helpless widow who received the visit of a sinister Russian whispering: "I'm your long-lost uncle. I'm here to take care of you."⁴⁵¹

At first, panic was everywhere, including Yugoslavia. Tito's illness and Afghanistan meant that the army was put on high alert. But on the surface there was no big panic. Fears were heightened

448 Josip Vrhovec, SSIP Cabinet PSS I. Goloba, January 6, 1980.

449 Ibid.

450 Josip Vrhovec, SSIP (Research and Documentation Service, page/chp./no. 98, 30 January 30, 1980. An overview of the intelligence elements for the assessment of the security risk status of the SFRY after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

451 Benedetto Zaccaria "The European Community and Yugoslavia in the Late Cold War Years, 1976–1989," in *Disintegration and Integration in East-Central Europe: 1919 – post-1989*, ed. Wilfried Loth and Nicolae Păun, 264–283 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014). 275.

by American newspapers, which, in the same articles, covered non-aligned Afghanistan and non-aligned Yugoslavia, both with communist regimes. What if Yugoslavia becomes so unstable that some forces are found to call in the Soviets? Such realistic or exaggerated fears prompted some good moves Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis used the potential instability on the country's northern borders after Tito's death to do something difficult and unimaginable: to improve relations with Ankara which had deteriorated after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus. Yugoslavia, which would become a Soviet, that is, a Bulgarian ally, could destabilize relations throughout the Balkans.⁴⁵² NATO clearly stated that a US military response would be necessary in the event of a threat to Yugoslavia. The US analysis of January 1980 concluded that, although the Soviets had crossed the border and invaded a "non-Warsaw Pact Marxist-led state," replicating the Asian situation in South-Eastern Europe was still not simple.⁴⁵³

Tito's health deteriorated dramatically at the beginning of the year. Therefore, on January 11, 1980, two days before the dramatic surgery and amputation of Tito's leg, the members of the SFRY Presidency and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia held a meeting entirely dedicated to Afghanistan. The NAM had to react, everything should be "dynamized," aggression against non-aligned Afghanistan should be stopped. Yugoslavia advocated that the Non-Aligned Movement condemn the Soviet intervention. Western politicians, such as British Minister Lord Carrington, said that only non-aligned countries could force the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, reiterated this and warned that the *détente* was collapsing while the Non-Aligned Movement was keeping silent.⁴⁵⁴

452 FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States 1973–1976, Vol.XXX, document 51, Memorandum of Conversation, Helsinki, July 30, 1975 (Ford-Caramanlis). Foreign relations of the United States (FRUS), 1973–1976, Vol.XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, US Government Printing Office, Washington 2007.

453 NIE 15–79, Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, January 28, 1980.

454 JV, SSIP, Kabinet SS, Str.pov.br. 669/1, 21 June 1980. (Razgovor SS druga Vrhovca sa ministrom inostranih poslova Tanzanije Mkapom, 2. juna 1980. u Dar es

For Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia seemed only to be feigning concern over the NAM and, as they used to say in East Berlin, it worked to the benefit of China and the West. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov commented that everything was just a continuation of the well-known “not-at-all communist, but nationalist and opportunistic” policy, unchanged since the “counter-revolution in Hungary.”⁴⁵⁵

Tito’s health condition was stabilized during the following months, but he stopped acting as president because there was no hope of recovery. The situation in the world also stabilized, because there was no spillover from the conflict in Afghanistan, although hundreds of thousands of refugees left the country. Yugoslav diplomacy fought to preserve its independence by condemning the invasion of Afghanistan. Tito’s funeral, when the moment came, was an opportunity to affirm the country’s policy. Insistence on a ministerial meeting of non-aligned countries before the set date became a new Yugoslav concern, an attempt to break down resistance in India and even more so in Havana, states more conservative than the Soviets which proved detrimental to the NAM’s interests.⁴⁵⁶ It became the largest venture of Yugoslav diplomacy in the early 1980s and coincided with Western interests.

The funeral of the lifelong head of Yugoslavia on May 8, 1980 was one of the largest state funerals in the history of humankind. All the

Salamu) (The conversation of the Federal Secretary, Comrade Josip Vrhovec, with Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa in Dar es Salaam, 2 June 1980).

455 JV, SSIP, Služba za istraživanje i dokumentaciju, Str.pov.br.98, 30. January 1980 (Pregled obaveštajnih elemenata za procenu bezbednosnog položaja SFRJ posle sovjetske vojne akcije u Avganistanu) (An overview of the intelligence elements for the assessment of the security risk status of the SFRY after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan).

456 JV, SSIP, Kabinet SS, 21 May 1980. (Zapisnik o razgovoru saveznog sekretara J. Vrhovca i MIP-a Velike Britanije Lorda Karingtona u Beču 16. maja 1980. godine u rezidenciji britanskog ambasadora) (Minutes of the conversation of Federal Secretary J. Vrhovec with British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington in Vienna on 16 May 1980, in the residence of the British Ambassador); Pirjevec 1995:420.

world's leaders came. The fact that US President Jimmy Carter was unwilling to come to Yugoslavia for Tito's funeral, as speculated for months before the Marshal's death, was regarded as a "wrong signal to the Soviets" that the United States actually "did not strongly support" Yugoslavia. However, for the American President to attend alongside the also expected Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, would be impossible. Avoiding the meeting would be wrong, but agreeing to it would also be. At the same time, suggestions were made that representatives of major American investment companies were suggested to attend the funeral (David Rockefeller went), that Secretary of State visits be encouraged and that the FBI tighten control over the representatives of "immigrant terrorist groups."⁴⁵⁷ It was necessary to publicly express confidence in the ability of the SFRY government to keep the situation under control and try not to irritate Yugoslavia with too much speculation that it could soon become the new target of Soviet pressure or intervention. Thus, media reporting proceeded along these lines. In his letter to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, President Carter wrote that the United States and their allies considered the independence, unity and territorial integrity of "non-aligned" Yugoslavia to be crucial. Whoever led the Yugoslav government after Tito's death should remain free to choose which path to take. Therefore, it was expected that neither side would exert influence on the cohesion and "traditionally" independent foreign policy of Belgrade.⁴⁵⁸ Such messages were repeated and included in the analyses of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union even after the Washington administration changed and Ronald Reagan became president. Yugoslav economic problems made the country more vulnerable to Russian pressure, which the Yugoslavs knew, but it was also in American

457 CWIHP; Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, 16 January 1980. Tito's Health; Checklist (17 January 1980).

458 CWIHP, Draft Letter Carter-Brezhnev, 26 January 1980.

interests to “prevent the worsening of Yugoslavia’s economic situation” that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure.⁴⁵⁹

THE CRISIS YEARS: THE SECOND COLD WAR, REAGAN’S SECOND TERM AND PERESTROIKA (1981-1989)

The transition through Tito’s illness and death was organized by the SFRY leadership, who carried out perfectly in the sense of propaganda. Tito was accompanied to his final resting place like no other Cold War leader, while Yugoslavia got the necessary good publicity. Then the mourning ended and it turned out that Tito was only absent physically. He remained one of the pillars of the regime’s legitimacy so literally that the transformation of the Federation was aggravated. On the one hand, the slogan “After Tito – Tito” protected those who feared Tito’s last change to the system: the Constitution of 1974. On the other hand, all those who thought that the system should be reformed and modernized as soon as possible were prevented by this ideology of Titoism in the post-Tito period. The Yugoslav structure prevented the escalation of Serbian nationalism in its entirety, regardless of the fact that the Serbs, as the largest ethnic group in the country, were the strongest. The regime desperately needed reforms, but it was questionable whether there was enough strength for real change, especially after the changes of the 1970s. At the same time, the quasi-confederal system created powerful republic centers, while the system was “republicanized.” Thus, in the early 1980s there were no possibilities for centralization without bringing Serbia into conflict with the larger part of the country.⁴⁶⁰

Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, visited Belgrade on February 28–29, 1980, on behalf of the EC, in order to conclude a special agreement between Yugoslavia and Brussels, which

459 CWIHP, National Security Decision, Directive No. 75, 17 January 1983; U.S. Relations with the USSR.

460 CWIHP; Political Leadership in Yugoslavia: Evolution of the League of Communists (U), A. Ross Johnson, November 1983; RAND Corporation.

was soon thereafter signed. It was a clear signal that the EC was ready to support Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The SFRY's request to temporarily limit European Parliamentary debates on Yugoslavia was also granted by Emilio Colombo, President of the European Parliament.⁴⁶¹ Yugoslavia had a number of strong advocates among the European nine, including specifically Italy, France and Germany. The Brussels progress reports on the changes in Belgrade were never particularly critical, although there were reasons for that. Energy prices were increasing on the international market while the productivity of Yugoslav companies deteriorated and decreased in competitiveness. Loans were due in the early 1980s and inflation began to erode the stability of the Yugoslav system, while stores were emptied of citrus fruits, chocolate and the like. The proposals from Brussels to create a stronger central government and unified system of economic regulation were adopted at the federal level. However, they were insufficient, inadequate and encroached upon the constitutional prerogatives of the federal republics. Even before this, almost immediately after the revolutionary and siege phase of its society, Yugoslavia was unable to carry out reforms that affecting numerous interest groups.⁴⁶² In the 1980s, this was even more difficult. Admittedly, many societies created decades after the breakup of Yugoslavia were unable to carry out significant reforms even then.

Yugoslavia was always aware of its vulnerability, but its exposure to an unstable economy, that is, the crisis eroding the country from within, was much more painful. Shortly after Tito's death, Yugoslav society plunged into a difficult economic situation. The efforts of Milka Planinc (1982–1986) and Branko Mikulić (1986–1989) were unsuccessful and, during the 1980s, the standard of living fell continuously. The first woman prime minister of a socialist country, Milka Planinc, established a "clear political platform, tightly monitored the timeliness and steps of the government's legislative programme, and

461 Zaccaria 2014:273–277.

462 *Ibid.*

effectively ensured the adoption of the most difficult decisions in parliament.” In that sense, she was much more skillful than Mikulić. In 1987, there were massive work stoppages and strikes, which had occasionally been organized in the past, occurred in the hundreds throughout the country. At the beginning of 1988, American circles analyzed the incompetence of the government of Branko Mikulić, President of the Federal Executive Council after Milka Planinc. While the country’s economy was in dire straits, the regime did not lose support. “Paradoxically, weaknesses inherent in the system constituted strengths during periods of social restraint, deflecting and diffusing political pressure before it [became] system-threatening,” because pressure could hardly be directed towards the center.⁴⁶³ The population had no tradition of criticizing its government. Despite inflation and the feeling that the system could not offer solutions, the regime became more permissive, stabilizing things and allowing some areas of culture, art and youth life to simply erupt.

Thus, on one hand, the United States and other Western countries actually advocated similar policies pursued by the European Commission and supported Yugoslavia. They supported its non-aligned policy and territorial integrity, encouraged reforms and secured agreements between Yugoslavia and those countries which joined the European Community during the 1980s, like Greece, Spain and Portugal.⁴⁶⁴ The Soviet Union and the countries belonging to its camp were Yugoslavia’s important economic partners and thus there were no special attacks from this sphere, except marginally from Bulgaria (and Albania, as a special case). The feeling that the Cold War continued, despite numerous clear signals that the leadership of the aged Brezhnev and short leadership of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko could hardly lead an empire in crisis, internal fear, its huge military

463 CWIHP, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Research Report, Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Federation; IRR No. 145, 22 January 1988. Prepared by Adrian Harmata.

464 Zaccaria 2014:278.

force and insufficiently noticeable dissatisfaction of the population. The Cold War held Yugoslavia from the outside, tightening its grip. The framework of the 1980s was strong enough to hold off change, even if this would have saved the regime and the country.

Although the belief in the survival of Yugoslavia's regime persevered and it became clear that the Soviet Union did not intend to intervene in other parts of the world after Afghanistan, many diplomatic and military analyses presented a neuralgic situation in Yugoslavia and South East Europe. NATO's military exercise codenamed Able Archer, which was carried out from November 7 to 11, 1983, was indicative. It simulated a situation in which the crisis on the Iraq–Iran battlefield spilled over into the Balkans, where Kosovo was destabilized and exploded under the pressure of pro-Soviet forces. The very fact that the simulation of Middle East war escalating to Yugoslavia and then to Finland, ending in a nuclear conflict did not in itself have much significance. But in 1983, the Able Archer military exercise led to a crisis closest to nuclear holocaust besides the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and marked a real turnabout in that period, which is usually referred to as the Second Cold War.⁴⁶⁵ The panic in the Kremlin, where Soviets started to fear that the West was really planning to use a military exercise as cover for a nuclear first strike against Moscow, was an illustration of how certain instabilities are never overcome and how Cold War spy games were imperfect and dangerous.

Yugoslav relations with the United States after Tito's death remained good and intensive, although presidential visits became increasingly one-directional. While in the 1970s Nixon, Ford and Carter visited Yugoslavia, the highest-ranking Yugoslav officials now met with US presidents only in Washington D.C.. Mika Špiljak and Josip Vrhovec, members of the SFRY Presidency, visited the White House in 1984 and 1988 respectively. There were also numerous meetings with other high-ranking US officials. These visits meant much more to the SFRY, but the United States used them, like always, to reaffirm

465 Westad 2017:586–587.

Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and respect for non-alignment,"s well as for giving financial assistance. Yugoslavia still separated the Warsaw Pact countries from the Adriatic; its large army did not belong to the Soviets; it acted independently and maintained long-standing cooperation with the United States. In that sense, the United States had to respond favorably to its requests for help in building jet engines for supersonic fighter planes.⁴⁶⁶ In September 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig came to Belgrade to discuss, among other things, the situation in Angola, especially the presence of the Cuban forces.⁴⁶⁷ In 1983, the Cuban government asked Yugoslavia to sell it a large quantity of automatic rifles. Yugoslavia did not refuse it, but postponed the decision on the sale until the settlement of the situation in Latin America, so that such a transaction would not increase tension. It was a clear signal to those who viewed Cuba as one of the main security threats. Shortly afterwards, in September 1983, Vice-President George H.W. Bush came to Belgrade. On this occasion, he invited the President of the SFRY Presidency to visit Washington D.C.⁴⁶⁸

Mika Špiljak's visit to Washington on January 30, 1984 was the first visit of a formal head of state after Tito's death Špiljak came to the United States at the time when the conflicts in the Middle East were intensifying and the Balkans and the Mediterranean became increasingly interesting to the superpowers, due to the emergence of an increasing number of crisis hotspots.

Given the current constellation of power where the position of our country remains an important factor, coupled with its readiness and resolve to resist any aggression, none of the superpowers, despite their known long-held ambitions towards us, can unilaterally and without risk upset the current balance in Europe and the Balkans.⁴⁶⁹

466 CWIHP, Visit of Yugoslav President Mika Spiljak, January 30, 1984; Klasić 2019:193–197.

467 Jakovina 2011:557–558.

468 Klasić 2019:191–193.

469 Ibidem.

Yugoslavia viewed itself as a “factor of strategic balance and stability.”⁴⁷⁰ Relations between the two regions were good and constantly improving, which also had a positive impact on others. The United States sought to strengthen the cohesion of the West and bilateral relations with Yugoslavia, in addition to multilateral ones, which was also evident in their approach to some non-aligned countries. In 1985, President of the Federal Executive Council Milka Planinc traveled to Washington D.C. In 1988 Josip Vrhovec, member of the SFRY Presidency, spoke with Ronald Reagan first “about the case of Colonel Hawari” in which Yugoslavia helped the United States locate an Arab terrorist group leader – a Palestinian guerrilla fighter – who planted a bomb on a TWA plane flying from Rome to Athens.⁴⁷¹

Until the very end of the decade and until Eastern Europe began to carry out its own Perestroika, Yugoslavia could count on its global position and rely on the reputation it had acquired. As long as Eastern Europe was under tight Soviet control, whatever Yugoslavia mishandled was tolerated – human rights, Kosovo and the like. The situation only changed when the Cold War encirclement began to loosen. In the middle of 1990, the Yugoslav side received information from its intelligence sources that Austria still supported Yugoslavia’s market economy, pluralism and democracy, but had stopped mentioning its support for a “single” state. Many “new forces” in the country were looking for something else, so that Austrian politicians decided

470 Budimir Lončar, SSIP, IV administration, page/chp./no. 449995, Platform for the official visit of Mika Špiljak, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to the United States, January 31 – February 4, 1984, Belgrade, December 27, 1983.

471 JV, SSIP, Pov. br. 431832, 27 May 1988. Izveštaj o poseti člana Predsedništva SFR Jugoslavije Josipa Vrhovca SAD 5–6. maja 1988. Zabeleška o razgovoru člana Predsedništva SFRJ Josipa Vrhovca sa predsednikom SAD Ronaldom Reganom 6. maja 1988. (Report on the visit of Josip Vrhovec, a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, to the United States, 5–6 May 1988. A note on the conversation of Josip Vrhovec, a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, with US President Ronald Reagan, 6 May 1988).

to stop repeating something that should “probably be revised.”⁴⁷² According to the Swiss (analysts), American contacts expressed concern over the real danger of the collapse of Yugoslavia or even its “Lebanonization.” In their opinion, a war between Serbia and Croatia would prompt their seeking help outside the country, which would destabilize the wider European space. Therefore, they suggested that the federal government should still be supported.

For some time, Yugoslavia had to intensify efforts to push through its initiatives in the Non-Aligned Movement. Holding a Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement due to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan without a plan was a Pyrrhic victory, but the effort was more important, especially after it became clear that there would be no spillover of aggression. After all, India had more reasons for leaving the Soviet Union alone. While India’s reasons were not the same as those of Cuba, both of these important non-aligned countries had a different perspective than Yugoslavia. When the hype after Tito’s funeral subsided, more and more questions were directed to the Yugoslav leadership. Who is actually governing? Who are the members of the Presidency and who is the negotiator on behalf of Yugoslavia? It seemed that Yugoslavia was losing its foothold in the Non-Aligned Movement, which it had founded and which represented the clearest symbol of its independent position on the international scene.⁴⁷³ In the early 1980s, Yugoslavia first abandoned its old principle of condemning any aggressor. In 1980, Iraq was the aggressor in the Iran–Iraq war, but it had a secular regime, while in Iran the Shah was overthrown and replaced by a revolutionary clerical group. In this connection, Yugoslavia reacted like most of the world and almost all Arabs. However, its support to the initial proposal for holding the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Baghdad in

472 Budimir Lončar, SSIP, Research and Documentation Service, page/chp./no. 264, June 26, 1990. Information: Some Western reactions to the current circumstances in Yugoslavia and their comparison with the situation in the Soviet Union.

473 Zaccaria 2014: 267.

1983, although missiles were falling on the Iraqi capital, undermined confidence in Belgrade, at least among some non-aligned countries. The fact that Iraq was a market for Yugoslav companies even in times of its declining production, that about 20,000 Yugoslavs worked there and that the value of its contracts amounted to about ten billion dollars meant a lot for the Yugoslav economy and the special interests of the Yugoslav People's Army.⁴⁷⁴ In the end, Iraq did not host the Seventh Summit Conference, thus avoiding a boycott by a large number of heads of state. Instead, as host and chair of the NAM Summit Conference held in New Delhi, India failed to be particularly inventive.

The non-aligned countries did not began forgetting Yugoslavia, but Federal Secretary Raif Dizdarević's efforts at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAM in Angola, to propose Yugoslavia as host of the Eighth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement met with failure.⁴⁷⁵ Hosting the 1986 Summit Conference was a reward and the first major international assignment for Zimbabwe, which had won independence only six years earlier. Zimbabwe was favored by Cuba, one of the main opponents of Yugoslavia's place in the Non-Aligned Movement for many years. Thus, everything seemed to point to Yugoslavia's loss of influence in the NAM, which was heightened by the fact that it was represented in Harare by an otherwise unknown politician: Sinan Hasani, the one-year President of the SFRY Presidency and the first Albanian to hold this position. Even more serious was the fact that Zimbabwe became radicalized and thus clashed more and more often with Yugoslavia's stance on non-alignment. In a world newly embarking on a major transformation of the Cold War, Zimbabwe chaired the Non-Aligned Movement in a traditional and disorganized manner due above all to its lack of international experience and reluctance to embrace the changes initiated by the Kremlin when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power (in March 1985). During its chairmanship, the Yugoslav Embassy in Harare strengthened its capac-

474 Ostojić 1989: 57.

475 Jakovina 2011:601–614.

ity, in hopes of regaining its position. “Yugoslavia’s position in the Movement is an important and decisive element of our overall international position,” said Josip Vrhovec, one of the three former foreign ministers, at the session of the SFRY Presidency in 1986. “If we didn’t have this position in the Movement, we would certainly encounter different relations and higher pressures in the world, while the scope of our international activity would be narrowed.”⁴⁷⁶ As the situation in the country deteriorated and Yugoslavia received increasingly negative publicity, its foreign policy became more and more important.

During the last years, relations between Serbs and Croats were calm and American analysts praised the “moderate Croatian leadership.” For the time, the more pronounced initiatives in Slovenia, including the literary magazine *Nova revija*, reassessed the regime and the system, but did not endanger them. The only serious threat was posed by Kosovo.⁴⁷⁷ The discontent and real or imagined fear of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, the presence of the federal police inducing Albanian fear, as well as the separation of Albanians from Yugoslavia and their feeling of not belonging to the Federation affected the very foundations of the SFRY. In fact, for foreign observers, the problem of repression, human rights violations and, in particular, the massive internal publicity about these things turned into a less and less tolerable problem for the Americans, including those inclined towards Belgrade. The rise of Serbian nationalism, which was first caused by the situation in Kosovo and then escalated, “finally” triggered the Croats. According to American analysts, federal interven-

476 JV, Predsedništvo SFRJ, br. 216, 30 June 1986. Informacija sa sednice Saveta Federacije održane 16. juna 1986. godine (Information relating to the session of the Council of the Federation held on 16 June 1986).

477 JV, SSIP, Pov.br.431832, 27 May 1988. Izveštaj o poseti člana Predsedništva SFR Jugoslavije Josipa Vrhovca SAD, 5. i 6. maja 1988. Zabeleška o razgovoru člana Predsedništva SFRJ Josipa Vrhovca sa predsednikom SAD Ronaldom Reaganom 6. maja 1988. godine (Report on the visit of Josip Vrhovec, a member of the Presidency of SFR Yugoslavia, to the United States, 5–6 May 1988. A note on the conversation of Josip Vrhovec with US President Ronald Reagan on 6 May 1988).

tion in one of the “Slavic republics” was politically much more delicate than the involvement in a province with a majority non-Slavic population. Indeed, unlike the changes initiated by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Yugoslav conservatives proved to be even more dynamic and innovative than historically more conservative, orthodox Soviets.

In early 1989, Mikulić’s resignation triggered the process of economic reforms, as predicted by State Department analysts, and even the consolidation of federal bodies. Ante Marković – the long-time Director General of Rade Končar, a large Croatian company, and two-time President of the Republic Executive Council of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Croatia – was appointed to Mikulić’s position with the support of reform and liberalization advocates. Ante Marković had solid knowledge of economics. However, when it came to political issues, including the situation in the republics and certain centers of power, he was not quite up to the task. Marković did not deal much with foreign policy issues, such that the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs was more independent than some others. In the late 1980s, the Yugoslav diplomatic role was also consolidated to the extent that those responsible for such policies were involved. Even at the time of Raif Dizdarević – Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1984 to 1987 and also the first Muslim and the first politician from Bosnia and Herzegovina – preparations began for a meeting of Balkan foreign ministers. The fact that these countries came together in 1988 (at the beginning of Budimir Lončar’s term) was considered a miracle and hope for this part of Europe which rarely and insufficiently cooperated. It was one of the signals that the threads were starting to come together, that the country might pull itself together and that diplomacy would make a contribution.

On the European continent, excluding Brussels, Yugoslavia was one of the engines of the group of NN countries. At the time of deteriorating relations between the superpowers during President Reagan’s first term, non-aligned and neutral European countries realized that there was no interest for a new *détente*. Therefore, they sought to stop the maintenance of peace based on “controlled inter-bloc

competition.” In this group of countries Yugoslavia played an active role, alongside some of the most prominent European countries. During the 1980s, ministerial meetings were institutionalized and frequently organized.⁴⁷⁸

THE NEW “PEOPLE’S SPRING” AND LATE RECOVERY (1988-1991)

The decision of the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Budimir Lončar, to agree at the 1988 Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement that Yugoslavia would host the Ninth NAM Summit Conference was not without risk. The Non-Aligned Movement had been attacked for years in Yugoslavia: it was considered megalomaniac and a failure. It was also held that the undemocratic nature of other non-aligned countries spilled over into Yugoslavia. Criticism originated in large measure from the majority of the population’s inability to perceive the world due to its provincialism. On the other side, the Non-Aligned Movement felt a need to emphasize and strengthen the European position of Yugoslavia, to make a country that had little to offer look attractive. The NAM chairmanship tried to emphasize that Yugoslavia was still important as a driving force and factor, that Belgrade could modernize the Non-Aligned Movement and adjust it to the world’s trends and new times. The conference to be held in Europe would also show its distance from the radical policies of some distinguished members and represent a symbolic return of the NAM to the continent where both it and the Cold War started. An increasingly less divided Europe and increasingly more profiled European Community as an important economic factor also gave greater importance and impetus to Belgrade’s new role. The motives of the Yugoslav side were also multifaceted. Yugoslavia’s diplomats had to send a message that Belgrade was still relevant thanks to its global relations. The Ninth

478 Budimir Lončar, SSIP, IV administration, page/chp./no. 449995, Platform for the official visit of Mika Špiljak, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to the United States, January 31 –February 4, 1984, Belgrade, December 27, 1983.

NAM Summit Conference began in Belgrade on September 4, 1989. It was attended by 102 member countries, ten observer countries and 20 guest countries. During the next three years, until 1992, the SFRY chaired the NAM once again, which was approved by all in the West, in what was the East and in most non-aligned countries.

At the session of the Joint Council for EC–Yugoslavia Cooperation on November 27, 1989, Budimir Lončar informed the European partners that Yugoslavia was interested more than ever in gaining Europe's understanding and support and was open for new forms of cooperation. The impossible in 1980 became the possible. Yugoslav diplomacy was ready to show that it was not afraid of catching the rhythm of change in both the East and the West. The Yugoslav themes and components that could contribute to a new Europe and the contemporary world included a better global understanding, experience in international politics, multilateral politics and the United Nations as well as an emphasis on the importance of Mediterranean security. All this seemed logical and such were also the suggestions of Yugoslavia's Western friends.

Despite criticism from some parts of the SFRY, especially Serbia, federal diplomacy supported the Alps-Adria Working Community in which Slovenia and Croatia had participated since 1978. The Working Community viewed Italy's proactive policy in the late 1980s, which sought to create a threesome with Austria and Yugoslavia – which soon evolved into a foursome, five-some and six-some with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania – as an important outcome of the policies laid down in Helsinki in 1975. In the summer of 1990, European countries were prepared to support the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the rule of law, parliamentary and pluralist democracy and free market competition for all.⁴⁷⁹

When the Cold War blocs still existed, the neutral and non-aligned group was one of Yugoslavia's mechanisms of action in Europe. In the

479 Budimir Lončar" Draft /The first meeting of the Pentagonal (1990)

late 1980s, increasing integration within the European Community and the end of the Cold War division in Europe diminished the interest of some countries (such as Austria and Sweden) in the NN group, but it was still possible to establish relations with some important European countries. For Yugoslavia and Austria, the NN group was a classic example of a catalyst or, more exactly, an indicator of how good multilateral cooperation could help resolve bilateral issues.⁴⁸⁰

As far as diplomacy was concerned, the way things worked was relatively orderly: the Balkans, the Non-Aligned Movement, Europe, the European Community, bilateral relations. The relations with the United States were good, despite observable signs in the late 1980s that the United States decreasingly noticed Yugoslavia. After Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1988, suspicions concerning the Soviet acknowledgment of the Belgrade and Soviet Declarations of 1955 and 1956 (respectively) evaporated. Economic relations were good: 34% of Yugoslav exports were going to the Soviet Union, while 19% of its imports, mostly energy products, paid in clearing dollars, came from that market.⁴⁸¹ The way diplomats communicated with Yugoslavia was also in compliance with global change and the international community, taking into account attempts to fit Yugoslavia into these ongoing changes. Successes were achieved, but the results were small.

Eastern Europe languished for a long time. In most countries, governments had decreasingly credibility, but the population was more resigned than militantly seeking change. Frost began to melt with changes in the Kremlin, followed by slow and not particularly brave movements in East European countries, with the exception of Poland. As it happens, these events were later often interpreted romantically. The changes in Poland came after a compromise agreement reached by the then ruling PZPR and the Solidarity trade union. Communists from the liberal wing of the ruling party carried out the "negotiated revolution" in Hungary. There were no protests or mass demands

480 Jakovina 2019, 254.

481 NIE, 15–83, Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis, 26 January 1983.

for change in Hungary. The real situation in the Soviet Union was unknown to any former Warsaw Pact country. Everyone thought that Soviet intervention was still possible, that Brezhnev's doctrine, formulated after 1968, was still in force. In fact, there were some indications that the individual path to socialism, as was acknowledged in Yugoslavia during Gorbachev's visit, was really the announcement of a profound change in Soviet politics. In East Germany, the protests of hundreds of thousands of people, primarily in Leipzig, may have given the impression that East German citizens were asked about unification and a change in Berlin. However, most citizens stayed at home and waited for the outcome. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1991, the impression that everything started with changes in Germany began. The Poles accurately pointed out: "Everything started at a round table." Finally, when elections were held in Poland, China's Red Army intervened at Tiananmen Square. Consequently, everything could have taken another course if the player in Moscow had been different.

CONCLUSION

Tito's Yugoslavia achieved its greatest diplomatic accomplishments much before the last decade of the state's existence. Socialist Yugoslav diplomacy did nothing that could dismiss or label it as unequal to the events occurring at the same time as the Federation's collapse and the Cold War's end. However, this chapter points not only to the great importance of external realities for the Yugoslav community, but also the fact that the forces of destruction or the ideology of nation and xenophobia were stronger than any already rotten structures.

The post-1948 defense of the country, a time when hundreds of soldiers were died in a series of provocations by Soviet satellite countries, the ability to reorient the country, find a way to preserve its ideology, adjust it to the new circumstances and get closer to the West – all these things ripened the Yugoslav diplomatic service, which was made up of many new staff members with a partisan background. There followed steps that required not only courage but also confidence in

the Yugoslav position. The conclusion of the Balkan Pact with two NATO members in 1954-55 also showed deep confidence in Yugoslavia's position, ideology and support from a population that had not freely elected the the government that had been in Belgrade for less than ten years. Almost simultaneously, Yugoslavia stepped into the big world, the world outside Europe and America, and the Non-Aligned Movement was established. However, for such a venture it was necessary to overcome the almost endemic provincialism of the population, the inward-looking attitude and feeling of peculiarity. The way in which this was done was also unique, because mass events and rallies were included in Tito's travels aboard "Galeb," thus including the Yugoslavs part of the quest to open the country to the world.

During the Cold War *détente* of the 1970s, the SFRY succeeded in settling a number of long-unresolved issues. While maintaining good relations with both superpowers and keeping satisfactory relations with Germany, the border delineation with Italy was finally settled, Yugoslavia normalized relations with the Vatican and, at the end of this period, Tito paid a visit to Beijing, thus ending a long-standing ideological conflict. Upon asking his waiter, who accompanied him on this trip, to pour him a glass of Vanga rosé wine, Tito said "Could you imagine that I would drink my rosé wine on the Great Wall of China?" The Marshal of Yugoslavia then made a toast. During this decade, three American presidents visited Yugoslavia and Tito was twice in the United States, while meetings with Soviet leaders were held on a regular basis. The crisis only came one or two years after Tito's death. In international relations this was primarily reflected in a dramatic deterioration of relations within the country, economic slump and general instability.

At a session of the SFRY Presidency in mid-May 1990, Budimir Lončar, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, expressed his concern over the ongoing destruction of the entire country's system and a belittling of its achievements. Everything that Yugoslavia was able to do in the past – to build itself up after 1948 as an alternative to real socialism, emerge as an alternative to the bloc division with the

Non-Aligned Movement and become the initiator of balanced developments in post-Cold War Europe – was lost. The inspiring country became miserable, pitied, inefficient.⁴⁸² The internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis, that is, the attempt that the country be “integrated into a new European architecture or be isolated from the democratic trends in Europe to which the future belongs,” could be a matter of debate in a different climate and under different circumstances.⁴⁸³ The attempt to use all its comparative advantages – its former reputation, its leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, an active role in the OSCE, a high reputation in the United Nations and good relations with all important international representatives, including the European Community – had no influence on this crisis because diplomacy cannot stop a process of disintegration from within. For Miroslav Šolević or Mihalj Kertes and for those who shouted “We want Russians!” during the solidarity rally in Titograd (now Podgorica) on August 20, 1989 – which propagandists later tried to interpret as “We want gusle!” – the EC or the “human dimension” of the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the burial of the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean were not important.

The great systemic crisis affected relations within the country much more. Value was given to old ideas that affected if not all of foreign policy, then many of those in the diplomatic service. The divergence between an orderly foreign policy and the internal situation became more and more pronounced. Foreign ministers are usually more pleasant, more popular and nicer than the heads of many other departments. Foreign service officers usually speak foreign languages better, dress better, know the world and can more easily put events into perspective. They also know well the situation at home and abroad. This did not, however, mean that foreign affairs could

482 Budimir Lončar” SSIP (Federal Secretary B. Lončar’s speech at the session of the SFRY Presidency, May 16, 1990.

483 Budimir Lončar, The international position of Yugoslavia, speech in the Parliament, June 13, 1991.

be separated from the overall situation in the country or that those working in the foreign service did not have their own views on what was going on around them. However, the Federal Secretary's instruction to the next cadre of diplomats going abroad (given on September 21, 1990) to suppress their own views and aspire to being representatives of Bavaria and FR Germany, remained only a wish, a vain hope that the country would not collapse and that the split would be orderly. The Yugoslav republics were not like Bavaria nor was the SFRY like FR Germany.

The breakup of Yugoslavia led to wars fought on European soil for the first time since the Second World War. Neither an embargo on arms sales imposed by the EC or the UN, nor international monitor missions nor the engagement of the great powers could completely influence the events on the ground. These conflicts also determined the situation in the states created after the breakup of the SFRY, which remind us too often and too much of what happened to Yugoslavia, but not of the best in it. Thirty years after the breakup of the SFRY, many fears arising in the late 1990s became almost notorious: nationalism remains strong, corruption is commonplace, the rule of law is barely visible, while a marginal position in the world applies to all successor states. Career progression is still possible only with a party membership card, economic inefficiency is widespread, companies that carried out construction work worldwide in the past went bust and societies have great difficulty in carrying out any reform. What certainly does not exist is a significant and visible foreign policy. At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, Eastern Europe and the post-Yugoslav space look for the cause of various developments relative to the situation in the West during the Cold War. Is all this the consequence of the Cold War and Soviet imperial presence, as in the Yugoslav case, or the question of a substantially different part of Europe and different Europeans?

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APPENDICES

1. THE ALPS-ADRIA WORKING COMMUNITY IN 1988.⁴⁸⁴

COUNTRY/REGION	POPULATION	AREA	CAPITAL
Bavaria	10.959.203	70.546	Munich
Friuli Venezia Giulia	1.233.984	7.845	Trieste
Burgenland	269.771	3.965	Eisenstadt
Upper Austria	1.269.540	11.980	Linz
Győr-Sopron	421.742	4.012	Győr
Croatia	4.601.469	56.538	Zagreb
Carinthia	536.727	9.533	Klagenfurt
Lombardy	8.891.652	23.856	Milan
Slovenia	1.891.896	20.255	Ljubljana
Styria	1.186.525	16.387	Graz
Trentino-Alto Adige	873.413	13.613	Trento
Vas	280.465	3.337	Szombathely
Veneto	4.345.047	18.368	Venice
Salzburg	442.301	7.154	Salzburg
Somogy	359.600	6.082	Kaposvar
Zala	260.400	3.287	Zalaegerszeg

484 Source: Vjesnik, December 15, 1988. The Community was later joined by the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a great deal of controversy over the accession of Socialist Republic of Montenegro.

2. COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE AS OF AUGUST 1987⁴⁸⁵

	total	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Montenegro	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia	Vojvodina	Kosovo
Senior staff	152 %100	19 12.5	17 11.2	27 17.7	14 9.2	21 13.8	32 21.1	14 9.2	85 5.3
Diplomatic staff	815 %100	92 11.28	90 11.04	129 15.83	80 9.82	59 7.24	267 32.76	55 6.75	43 5.28
Other staff	2350 %100	264 11.23	174 7.40	323 13.74	125 5.32	89 3.79	1149 48.89	139 5.93	87 3.70

According to the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs staff classification, there were 2,522 staff members; 1,276 were in-country (525 diplomatic staff members) and 1,246 were in diplomatic and consular missions (480 diplomatic staff members); 2,350 posts were filled (172 posts vacant). There were 1,885 full-time and 465 part-time employees.

The FSFA staff age structure was considered unfavorable because 220 were younger than 30 (9.36%), 880 were under 40 (37.44%), 586 were aged 40–50 (24.93%) and 581 were aged 50–60 (24.47%). There were also 83 staff members aged over 60 (3.35%).

As for the senior staff, the federal secretary was from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the deputy federal secretary came from Croatia and the undersecretary from Macedonia, while out of four assistant federal secretaries, two were from Serbia and one each from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were 11 ambassadors (four from Slovenia, three from Croatia and one from each of the other republics and provinces).

The FSFA had 683 female employees, making up almost 29% of the total staff. However, only two women were ambassadors, one in Guinea and the other in Denmark, and one woman headed the Cultural and Information Centre in Vienna.

485 Source: Savezni društveni savjet za međunarodne odnose, 9 November 1987, Informacija o kadrovskom stanju u SSIP-u [Information on the Staffing Situation in the FSFA]. At that time, the Federal Social Council for International Relations was headed by Jakša Petrić (Budimir Lončar's Private Collection).

3. DIPLOMATIC STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE IN 1987⁴⁸⁶

REPUBLIC/PROVINCE	FSFA	DCP	TOTAL	Uni. degree (diplomats) 1987.	Uni. degree (diplomats) 1976.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	118	146	264	122	148
Montenegro	86	87	173	104	112
Croatia	154	169	323	149	209
Macedonia	48	77	125	91	83
Slovenia	29	60	89	66	63
Serbia	594	556	1150	385	304
Vojvodina	71	68	139	68	53
Kosovo	34	53	87	48	86
TOTAL	1134	1216	2350	1033	1058

4. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SFRY DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN 1987⁴⁸⁷

	Neighboring countries	Eastern Europe and PR Mongolia	We- stern Europe	USA and Canada	Asia	Africa	Latin America	Australia and New Zealand	TOTAL
Embassies	10	5	12	2	20	24	13	2	82
Generalni konzulati	8		8	7			1	2	26
Consulates	1		8	1		1	1	1	12
DCMs	1		2	1					4
Permanent missions		1	2						4
Permanent delegations			2						2
TOTAL	20	6	34	11	20	25	15	5	136
Honorary Consulates	1		1	2		1	11	1	17

486 The Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs is mentioned in all documents. DCP is an abbreviation for diplomatic and consular staff (Budimir Lončar's Private Collection).

487 Source: Cultural and Information Centre (CIC). There were four CICs: in Vienna, Cologne, New York and Paris (Budimir Lončar's Private Collection).

5. COMPOSITION OF NEW FSFA STAFF WITH A UNIVERSITY DEGREE BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE, JANUARY 1, 1986 -FEBRUARY 15, 1987⁴⁸⁸

REPUBLIC/PROVINCE	NUMBER OF STAFF
Bosnia and Herzegovina	13
Montenegro	6
Croatia	16
Macedonia	7
Slovenia	8
Serbia	45
Vojvodina	9
Kosovo	0
TOTAL	104

From January 1, 1986 to February 15, 1987, a total of 96 new persons were employed in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. Out of all new employees with a university degree 16 were from Croatia, 45 from Serbia and only eight came from Slovenia. There were a total of 1,034 employees with a university degree, thus accounting for 44% of the total number (50 employees had the so-called recognized university degree). Most of these were lawyers, then economists, political scientists, philologists, etc.

To some extent, the table can illustrate the trend of receiving (delegating) republic officials.

6. THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WORKING UNITS IN 1987⁴⁸⁹

DIVISIONS	9
SERVICES	13
DIRECTORATES AND COMPARABLE UNITS	29
DEPARTMENTS	1
DIRECTORATES WITHIN SERVICES /SERVICE FOR RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION, ETC./	5

488 Source: Ibid.

489 Source: Budimir Lončar's Private Collection.

7. JOB CLASSIFICATION AND OCCUPANCY IN SFRY
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN 1987⁴⁹⁰

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS	JOB CLASSIFICATION	JOB FILLED
Ambassadors	86	83
Chargés d'affaires - minister counsellors	6	5
Minister counsellors	25	24
First counsellors	15	15
Counsellors	80	77
First secretaries	62	54
Second secretaries	41	38
Third secretaries	27	21
Attachés	20	18
Consuls general	26	22
Heads of consulate - first counsellors	9	9
Heads of consulate - counsellors	3	4
Consuls - counsellors	11	9
Consuls	44	40
Vice consuls	17	15
Heads of delegation - minister counsellors	2	2
Directors of cultural and information centres	4	4
TOTAL NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS	478	440

490 Source: Ibid.

8. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMBASSADORS BY
 REPUBLIC/PROVINCE AND BY REGION AS OF AUGUST 1, 1987

Republic/ Autonomous Province	Total	Eastern Europe	Western Europe	North America, New Zealand	Middle East And Medi- terranean	Africa	Asia	Latin America
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11	GDR	Greece, Denmark, Sweden		Syria, Kuwait	Nigeria		Panama
Montenegro	11	COMECON - Moscow, Bulgaria		Canada	Algeria, Jordan	Tanzania, Zaire, Somalia		Mexico, Cuba
Croatia	14	CSSR, Albania, Poland	Italy, Cyprus, France		Libya	Kenya, Angola, Uganda		Guyana
Macedonia	10	Romania	UK, Finland, Belgium		Tunisia, Iraq	Guinea, Mozamb.	Sri Lanka	Brazil
Slovenia	10		Vatican, EEC, UN, Gen.	Australia	Egypt	Zambia, Sudan, Ethiopia	China	Colombia
Serbia	13		FR Germany, Austria, Turkey, Norway	USA - UN New York	Lebanon	Zimbabwe	Philippi- nes, Iran	Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela
Kosovo	5		Spain, Netherland, Switzerland			Gabon	Thailand	
Vojvodina	11	USSR, Hungary	Portugal			Ghana Mali	Bangla- desh, Indonesia Vietnam	Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru
TOTAL	85							

9. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
AMBASSADORS BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE, BY REGION
AND BY MISSION CATEGORY, JUNE 21, 1990⁴⁹¹

Republic/ province	Status after June 20, 1990	Eastern Europe	Developed Western Countries and Japan	Middle East and Medi- terranean	Africa	Asia	Latin America
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12		USA I Italy I Sweden II Spain II Canada II	Tunisia III	Zimbabwe III Ghana III	South Korea II Bangladesh III Sri Lanka III	Panama III
Montenegro	11	Bulgaria II	Japan I	Jordan III Cyprus III Morocco III	Nigeria II Ethiopia III Zambia III Mozambique III	Burma III Pakistan III	
Croatia ⁵⁰⁸	13		New York I France I Austria II Denmark III Holy See III	Egypt II Kuwait II	Uganda III	Indonesia II Philippines III Malaysia III	Chile II Argentina II
Macedonia	10		Belgium II Finland III	Iraq I Turkey II Iran II Lebanon III	Sudan III	Thailand III	Uruguay III Venezuela III
Slovenia	13		FR Germany I Australia II Netherlands II Portugal III	Libya II UAE II	Kenya III Tanzania III Zaire III	India I	Mexico II Peru III Nicaragua III
Serbia	13	Poland II CSFR II	UK I EEC II Greece II Norway III	Algeria II Syria III		Mongolia III	Brazil II Ecuador III
Kosovo	3		Switzerland II			PR China I DPR Korea III	
Vojvodina	4	GDR II Hungary II			Mali III	Vietnam III	
FSFA quota	2				Guinea III		Colombia III
TOTAL	81						

Diplomatic missions were ranked in three categories. The higher a category, the higher salary coefficient. The first category, for example, had the coefficient of 4.0, while staff members had 5. These coefficients were lower for categories II and III, consulates general, etc.

491 In comparison with the same table, but with the overview made on October 25, 1990, Croatia had one ambassadorial post less – in Eastern Europe, i.e. the ambassadorial post in Albania. It also lost Kuwait and Denmark. B. Puharić returned from Poland even earlier.

In the summer of 1990, the procedure for the appointment of ambassadors to the USSR, Albania, Romania, Cuba, the Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, and the Permanent Mission to COMECON in Moscow was underway.

The embassies in Guyana and Somalia were to be closed or downgraded.

In the 1990s, an embassy was opened in Seoul, South Korea.

10. OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONSULS
GENERAL BY REGION, INCLUDING REPRESENTATION
BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE, AS OF AUGUST 1, 1987⁴⁹²

Republic/ Province	TOTAL	EASTERN EUROPE	WESTERN EUROPE	AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3		Zurich, Switzerland, <i>Military Mission, West Berlin</i>	Chicago, USA
Montenegro	2		Gothenburg, Sweden	San Francisco, USA
Croatia	5		Milan, Italy Salzburg, Austria Hamburg, FR Germany	Pittsburgh, USA Vancouver, Canada
Macedonia	2			Melbourne, Australia Toronto, Canada
Slovenia	5		Klagenfurt, Austria Trieste, Italy Stuttgart, FR Germany Frankfurt, FR Germany	Cleveland, USA
Serbia	5	Timisoara, Romania	Munich, FR Germany <i>Strasbourg, France</i>	New York, USA <i>Sidney, Australia</i>
Kosovo	1		Istanbul, Turkey	
Vojvodina	2		<i>Graz, Austria Thessaloniki, Greece</i>	
TOTAL	25	1	15	9

492 The missions and consulates general closed in the late 1980s are marked in *italic*.

11. OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONSULS
GENERAL BY REGION, INCLUDING REPRESENTATION
BY REPUBLIC/PROVINCE AS OF JUNE 21, 1990

Republic/ Province	TOTAL	EASTERN EUROPE	WESTERN EUROPE	AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA
Bosnia & Herzegovina	3		Milan, Italy Istanbul, Turkey Munich, FR Germany	
Montenegro	2		Gothenburg, Sweden	New York, USA
Croatia	5		Zurich, Switzerland Hamburg, FR Germany	Vancouver, Canada Pittsburgh, USA San Francisco, USA
Macedonia	4		Frankfurt, FR Germany Salzburg, Austria	Toronto, Canada Melbourne, Australia
Slovenia	3		Trieste, Italy Klagenfurt, Austria	Cleveland, USA
Serbia	3	Timisoara, Romania	Stuttgart, FR Germany	Chicago, USA
Kosovo	0			
Vojvodina	1	Pécs, Hungary		
TOTAL	21	2	11	8

During 1990, a reopening of the SFRY Consulate General in Sidney, Australia was planned. It had been closed due to a consular worker's attack on Croatian protesters in front of the mission in 1988.

Apart from these consulates general, the SFRY also had a number of ordinary consulates: in Perth (Australia), Lyon (France), Bari (Italy), Malmö (Sweden), Benghazi (Libya) and Dusseldorf, Nuremberg, Mannheim, Dortmund and Freiburg (FR Germany).

Although there was a Consulate General in Sao Paolo (Brazil), and Sežana (Slovenia) they are not listed in the tables.

Honorary consulates existed in Montreal (Canada), Kansas City, New Orleans and Jacksonville (USA), Balzan (Malta), Antofagasta (Chile), Chaca and Rosario (Argentina), Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (Bolivia), Guatemala City, Reykyavik (Iceland), Tegucigalpa (Honduras), Kingston (Jamaica), San Jose (Costa Rica) and Auckland (New Zealand).

15. OVERVIEW OF AMBASSADORIAL POSTS, SFRY, AS OF 1989⁴⁹³

Country	Ambassador name	Year of birth	Nationality	University study	Years of service	Previous employment
EUROPE						
Albania	Novak Pribičević	1938	Serbian (from Croatia)	Law	27	FSFA
Austria	Miloš Krstić	1931	Serbian	College degree	36	FSFA
Belgium	Kuzman Dimčevski	1929	Macedonian	Law	34	FSFA
Bulgaria	Milenko Stefanović	1932	Montenegrin	Law	30	Government of SR Montenegro
Denmark	Ana Jovanović	1937	Croatian	Economics	27	Socialist Alliance of SR B&H
France	Božidar Gagro	1938	Croatian	Philosophy	27	SRC Government
Finland	Ivan Toševski	1929	Macedonian	Journalis/ Diplomay	34	FSFA
Greece	Vladimir Sultanović	1939	Yugoslav	Economics	25	CC LCB&H
Netherlands	Zvonimir Kostić	1930	Serbian	National Defense	38	Fed. Sec. for National Defence
Italy	Dušan Štrbac	1929	Serbian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	34	FSFA
Cyprus	Petar Bošković	1931	Montenegrin	Political Science	27	President of CC LCY
Hungary	Rudolf Sova	1934	Croatian (from Vojvodina)	Law	29	President of CC LCY
GDR	Milan Predojević	1936	Serbian	Economics	28	FSFA
FR Germany	Milan Dragović	1941	Serbian	Mechanical Engineering	25	Assembly of SR Serbia
Poland	Branko Puharić	1941	Croatian	Economics	24	RTV Zagreb
Portugal	Dušan Vučić	1933	Montenegrin	Law	31	SFry Presidency
Romania	Boro Denkov	1937	Macedonian	Law	23	FEC member
USSR	Milan Vereš	1928	Serbian	Law	35	FSFA

493 Source: *Nedjeljna borba*, March 11–12, 1989.

Country	Ambassador name	Year of birth	Nationality	University study	Years of service	Previous employment
CSSR	Dušan Rodić	1932	Serbian (from Croatia)	Law	31	FSFA
Norway	N. Radovanović	1927	Serbian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	36	FSFA
Switzerland	Jovan Pečanović	1933	Serbian	Political Science	31	FSFA
Sweden	Zlatan Kikić	1937	Yugoslav	Economics	26	FSFA
Turkey	Vladislav Jovanović	1933	Serbian	Law	28	FSFA
Vatican	Štefan Cigoj	1935	Slovenian	Political Science	28	President of SAWP SRS
UK	Mitko Čalovski	1930	Macedonian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	39	FEC member
ASIA AND OCEANIA						
Australia	Boris Cizelj	1942	Slovenian	Economics	21	Centre for Developing Countries
New Zealand	Vojislav Savin	1929	Serbian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	32	FSFA
Afghanistan	Momčilo Drašković	1933	Montenegrin	Law	24	FSFA
Bangladesh	Kalman Feher	1940	Hungarian	Law	23	NIŠRO "Forum"
Philippines	Zoran Andrić	1938	Serbian (from Croatia)	Political Science	28	ECO SRC, Rep. Councillor
Burma	Branko Vuletić	1934	Serbian	Philosophy	30	FSFA
Indonesia	Đorđe Jakovljević	1930	Serbian	Medicine	29	Fed. Health Commission
India	Živojin Jazić	1927	Serbian (from Croatia)	Law	38	FSFA
Iraq	Stojan Andov	1935	Macedonian	Economics	28	SFRY Assembly
Iran	Mirko Žarić	1929	Serbian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	40	FSFA
Japan	Tarik Ajanović	1928	Muslim	Economics	37	FSFA
Jordan	Zoran Popović	1949	Montenegrin	Philology	17	Editor, Pobjeda
China	Zvone Dragan	1939	Slovenian	Economics	28	SFRY Assembly

Country	Ambassador name	Year of birth	Nationality	University study	Years of service	Previous employment
PDR Korea	Miodrag Bogićević	1932	Serbian	Philosophy	28	Language Institute, B&H
Kuwait	Hasan Dervišbegović	1943	Muslim	Technology	20	IC of B&H Assembly
Lebanon	Stanislav Lazarević	1928	Serbian	Law	41	SAWP of Serbia
Malaysia	Zoran Jašić	1939	Croatian	PhD in Economics	27	Professor, Faculty of Economics
Mongolia	Dimitrije Krivokapić	1931	Montenegrin	Philosophy	34	SAWP of Montenegro
Pakistan	Josip Franić	1930	Croatian	Law	34	Yugoslavia Trade Union Council
Syria	Darvin Kostanjšek	1931	Croatian (from B&H)	UDB's Higher School	36	President, SR B&H
Sri Lanka	Vančo Andonov	1928	Macedonian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	38	SRM Executive Council
Thailand	Đon Široka	1928	Albanian	Philology	39	Fed. Sec. for Inform.
Vietnam	Mihajlo Hornjak	1929	Ruthenian	Philosophy	31	FSFA
NORTH AND LATIN AMERICA						
USA	Živorad Kovačević	1930	Serbian	Journalism/ Diplomacy and Political Science	35	FEC Member
Canada	Vladimir Pavičević	1938	Montenegrin	Law	28	FSFA
Bolivia	Svetislav Rajević	1934	Serbian	Law	32	FSFA
Brazil	Branko Trpenovski	1934	Macedonian	Mathematics	29	Professor, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
Chile						FSFA
Ecuador	Pavle Živković	1930	Serbian	Law	32	FSFA
Guayana	Marin Geršković	1936	Croatian	Political Science	19	Fed. Sec. for Science
Colombia	Radomir Zečević	1936	Montenegrin	Philosophy	23	FSFA
Cuba	Mihajlo Popović	1934	Montenegro	Mechanical Engineering	36	Titograd Aluminium Works

Country	Ambassador name	Year of birth	Nationality	University study	Years of service	Previous employment
Mexico	Slavko Šuković	1938	Montenegrin	Law	25	FSFA
Nicaragua	Dušan Trifunović	1932	Serbian	Law	31	FSFA
Panama	Emir Humo	1935	Muslim	Electrical Engineering	27	Faculty of Electrical Engineering
Peru	Ladislav Varga	1936	Hungarian	Philosophy	24	SAWP of Vojvodina
Venezuela	Milan Vukos	1932	Serbian	Philosophy	34	RTV Belgrade
AFRICA						
Algeria	Borislav Milošević		Montenegrin	Law	31	President of CC LCY
Angola	Živadin Jovanović	1938	Serbian	Law	26	SFRY Presidency
Egypt	Milan Zupan	1927	Slovenian	Diplomacy	41	FSFA
Ethiopia	Ivan Seničar	1935	Slovenian	Philosophy	26	EC of SR Slovenia
Gabon	Čedomir Štrbac	1940	Serbian	Law	26	Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad
Ghana	Lazar Čović	1933	Serbian	Law	28	Assembly of SAP Vojvodina
Guinea	Ljiljana Todorova	1934	Macedonian	Philosophy	30	Faculty of Philology, Skopje
Libya	Milutin Galović	1932	Yugoslav	Economics	28	FSFA
Kenya	Bohumil Bernašek	1934	Czech	Economics	31	Zagreb Trade Fair
Mali	Branko Zeković	1933	Montenegrin	Philosophy	26	FSFA
Morocco	Bratislav Krstić	1937	Serbian	Law	29	FSFA
Mozamb.	Andon Mojsov	1947	Macedonian	Law	17	EC of SR Macedonia
Nigeria	Vlatko Ćosić	1935	Croatian	Forestry	28	RTV Sarajevo
Somalia	Dragoljub Kantić	1929	Montenegrin	Journalism/ Diplomacy	35	SFFA
Soudan	Dušan Zavašnik	1928	Slovenian	Journalism/ Diplomacy	35	FSFA

Country	Ambassador name	Year of birth	Nationality	University study	Years of service	Previous employment
Tanzania	Branko Lukovac	1944	Montenegrin	Economics	22	Assembly of SR Montenegro
Tunisia	Luan Starova	1941	Albanian	Philosophy	26	Faculty of Philology, Skopje
Uganda	Hrvoje Skoko	1935	Croatian	Economics	25	Jugoinspekt, Zagreb
Zaire	Žarko Milutinović	1930	Montenegrin	Law	37	FSFA
Zambia	Jelko Žagar	1928	Slovenian	Journalism/Diplomacy	39	Assembly of SR Slovenia
Zimbabwe	Dušan Litvinović	1932	Serbian	Law	25	FSFA

Momčilo Drašković was the Chargé d'affaires in Kabul, Svetislav Rajević in Bogota and Bratislav Krstić in Rabat.

There were ten Croats, including those from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina.

13. AN OVERVIEW OF OF FSFA SENIOR STAFF BY REPUBLIC/ PROVINCE, AS OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1990

	BiH	MN	CRO.	MAC.	SLO.	SRB.	KOS.	VOJ.	TOTAL
Officials			1			1			2
Undersecretaries	1								1
Asst. Federal secretaries		1	1	1	1	1	1		6
Ambassadors	1		3	1	3	3		1	12
Advisors to federal secretary	4	3	2	2	1	4		1	17
TOTAL	6	4	7	4	5	9	1	2	38
%	15.79	10.53	18.42	10.53	13.16	23.68	2.68	5.26	
Heads of political administration	2	1	6	2	2	4		2	19
%	10.53	5.26	31.57	10.53	10.53	21.05	0	10.53	
Heads of non-political administration		1			1	4		1	7
%		14.29			14.29	57.13		14.29	

14. OVERVIEW OF STAFF MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR MISSIONS BY REPUBLIC/
PROVINCE, AS OF OCTOBER 25, 1990

	BiH	MN.	CRO.	MAC.	SLO.	SRB.	KOS.	VOJ.	FSFA	TOTAL
Ambassador	11	8	12	8	11	14	4	4	2	74
Cons. General	3	2	2	3	2	3		2		17
Chargés D'affaires				1		2	1	1	1	5
Consuls	2		2			3		2		9
Direct. Of CIC			1		1	1				3
Heads of DCP	15	10	18	12	14	23	5	9	2	108
%	13.89	9.26	16.67	11.11	12.96	21.29	4.63	8.33	1.85	
Minister councillors	5	3	5	1		8				22
Councillors, embassy associates	5	1	5	1		13	1			26
TOTAL	25	14	28	14	14	44	6	9	2	
%	16.02	8.97	17.95	8.97	8.97	28.21	3.85	5.78	1.28	

VII

SOCIETY

Vesna Pusić

SOCIAL CHANGES: ENVIABLE DYNAMISM AND CREATIVITY

FOR MY GENERATION, born in the 1950s, the 1980s were “the best years of our lives.” In those years, we finished school and even earned masters and doctoral degrees, had children, acquired homes and worked in our still new workplaces, not doubting that they unequivocally belonged to us. Not all were necessarily happy at work, but no one was afraid of not finding a job. The economic crisis was felt everywhere and became intertwined with our everyday life. We had to wait in line in front of stores in order to buy coffee, detergent, and toilet paper. Due to the shortage of petrol, we had to drive our new or used 4L cars (as the Renault 4 model was called) every other day according to the odd-even driving scheme. Inflation quickly devoured the savings of those who had them. But our generation mostly had loans, which were miraculously reduced by inflation, especially if a portion of the salary was converted into German marks.

There is no doubt that our lives had changed in comparison with the period before the 1980s and we knew consciously or subconsciously that we were heading for something new and unknown, which would require much more effort, commitment, or at least a serious adjustment to the forthcoming circumstances. Many of us saw this as a challenge and a transition to a more modern, enlightened, and orderly state. The more the decade went on, the more we talked about democracy. It seemed to be the answer to our evidently headless government and state, a way to dissolve and refresh the hermetic self-preoccupation of the state and the party, and the best model for overcoming the economic crisis at which we both laughed and felt a little embarrassed, while waiting in long lines outside stores. We knew about democracy from books, the media, and our travels to Western neighboring countries and around the world, but we never experienced it on our own skin and in our own backyard. Those who

were more cautious and more experienced feared that a multi-party system in Yugoslavia could lead to ethnic-based political divisions and conflicts. However, most of us thought that a multi-party system was the best solution for getting rid of rigid conservatives and autocrats among party members and for including society into state politics. In the 1980s, unlike the state, society showed enviable dynamism and creativity.

The 1980s in Yugoslavia began with a powerful explosion, but not like the ones we experienced later, in the 1990s – the explosions of grenades and other projectiles in Croatian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Kosovo towns and villages. Although this first explosion was of a political nature, it was actually a prelude to all the tragedies of the 1990s and the first tentative step towards liberal democracy twenty years later. This political explosion was Tito's death in May 1980.

Until that moment, Yugoslavia was a one-party state, but not a dictatorship in the true sense of the word. When measuring its dictatorial character in terms of the level and quality of human rights protection, it turns out that it was a kind of "benevolent totalitarianism". After the first post-war years of experimenting with Stalinism and Stalinist methods and after the split with the Soviet Union in 1948, benevolent totalitarianism since the 1950s implied the state's ability to intervene in the private sphere at any time but, in general, this was not done. Increasingly greater decentralization created conditions in which individual republics took turns in being more liberal or more hard-line at different times in country's political development. Thus, one could always identify the republic that was going through a more relaxed, liberal phase and where one could publish and act publicly more freely than elsewhere in the country

. These arbitrary, informal spaces of freedom enabled the development of arts, social sciences and humanities – foundations of an increasingly stronger and creative society. It is probably more accurate to say "societies" because, despite a vivid interaction of artistic, academic and intellectual elites from different republics, the societies in individual republics were developing on parallel tracks rather

than as a cohesive group through strong interaction and assimilation. In the 1960s, changes also began taking place within the political elite. Tito and Kardelj played an indisputable role in the stabilization and development of the Yugoslav political system. However, in those years, a younger generation of politicians with a slightly different profile and significantly different public discourse emerged simultaneously in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Their main common characteristic was that they were too young to draw their political legitimacy from their participation or roles in the national liberation struggle. Therefore, they had to seek that legitimacy through their plans for the future, in their visions for the next phase of Yugoslavia's political development. Although they could not participate in multi-party elections, this new generation of politicians held intra-party elections. In order to realize their ideas about freer markets, more modern governance, more liberal politics and "clean bills" within the Yugoslav federation, they had to rise to leading positions within their own parties. Conflicts and resistance were often greater than in multi-party democracies. However, there were two decisive differences: the final decisions were made by the party leadership, not citizens, and a loss of support implied one's leaving politics rather than preparing oneself for the next elections. But unlike classical dictatorship, benevolent totalitarianism was to some extent still sensitive to public opinion. This new generation of politicians recognized this possibility and began addressing the public. For the first time, the topics tackled by these politicians and the way they spoke about them were more similar to what people cared about in their daily lives, what they talked about with their families and friends. The previous meta-speech of politics made the political realm isolated and mostly incomprehensible to a majority of citizens. There were "specialists" for reading between the lines, but most citizens considered politics as something completely different and distant from real life. People encountered the consequences without understanding where exactly they had come from. New politicians talked about injustices, freedoms of opinion and expression, budget and

financial transparency, professional rather than political criteria in the choice of company managers, the right of the republics to make their own infrastructure plans. They spoke less about the class struggle and historical role of the working class, and more about factory wages. Although they did not need citizens' votes, the source of their legitimacy was public support, which paved the way for their leadership roles in their own republics. They were all about the same age, more politically liberal and economically modern than their predecessors, and mostly focused on progress and rational governance within their own republics, which would ultimately lead to progress for Yugoslavia as a whole. Although they had strong teams and charismatic leaders in their republics and belonged to the same political party, it is surprising how little they communicated with each other across the republican borders. There was very little horizontal communication within their party, and communication channels were almost exclusively vertical: from the republican leaders towards Tito and vice versa.⁴⁹⁴

In a sense, the new politicians proved too successful for their own good and the good of their projects for the next stage of the country's development. It was good to have public support, but not too much. In the early 1970s, they were removed from office and completely excluded from politics. Tito hesitated to make such a decision for a rather long time.⁴⁹⁵ However, when it was finally made, the party did not experiment too much. It used the proven stereotypes about the republics as an explanation and justification for the removal of this younger generation of politicians from office: Slovenes were techno-managers, Croats nationalists, Serbs liberals and Macedonians too close to the Serbian liberal leadership. Although these people had a very similar vision for the further development of Yugoslavia,

494 Vesna Pusić, "Korijeni Hrvatskog političkog identiteta", *Erasmus* no. 15 (February 1996): 3–8

495 Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1990)

the disqualifications used to justify their removal were considered “pre-modern” even for Yugoslav standards.

These events determined the nature of the 1980s and most likely the fate of Yugoslavia. But as they unfolded, they only seemed a part of the many steel hand-tightenings that were being imposed in a somewhat less benevolent period of totalitarianism. The Yugoslav republics, and thus Yugoslavia as a whole, lost an entire generation of politicians in their prime. The old guard retook the helm and younger party members were sent the message that only the obedient and less creative ones would survive.

In 1974, in order to offset, to some extent, dissatisfaction in society, which was caused by the removal of these politicians from office and other political purges, the old guard of Yugoslav politicians agreed to the adoption of a new Constitution. Tito and Kardelj especially insisted on it. Ironically, this constitution sanctioned many stances and demands of the purged young politicians, including a higher degree of state decentralization, guarantees for the right of the republics to self-determination, greater powers for the republics and provinces and their more pronounced “statehood”. Miko Tripalo, who was removed from office as a member of the Croatian Spring, was one of the co-authors of the draft Constitution of 1974. However, this inconsistency was completely in line with Tito’s previous policy: the alteration of periods of more liberal openness with periods of a strong-hand tightening policy. However, times had changed and the “warm-cold” technique was not quite as effective. Police repression prevented resistance in the short term, but the atmosphere in society changed. The ousted younger generation of politicians enjoyed public support not only for the contents of their demands, but also for their differences from the old guard – their more direct public speech, political style, leadership type, raising of new life topics and common-sense approach. The 1974 Constitution could not make up for that. Moreover, there was a cuckoo in the nest, which further undermined Tito’s authority among citizens. The Constitution designated Tito as the life-long president of Yugoslavia. Despite all politics, merits and oaths of

allegiance, this constitutional provision de facto sounded pathetic. Naturally, no one said so in public, but society read this message that way. It befitted caricatural third world dictators rather than a leader who enjoyed popular support and trust.

In his interesting book *Yugoslavia: The State That Withered Away*⁴⁹⁶, Dejan Jović considers a series of causes leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia. In his opinion, the concept of the withering away of the state, which was seriously taken and consistently implemented by the chief Yugoslav ideological theoretician, Edvard Kardelj, was the most important. The way in which he implemented this concept involved continuous decentralization. The answer to any crisis or deeper conflict was further decentralization: the transfer of additional powers to the republics and provinces, their financial strengthening and increasing decision-making autonomy. According to Jović, the Yugoslav political elite decentralized and impaired state functions to such an extent that the state could no longer resist internal and external challenges. A fatal blow to this process was the 1974 Constitution.⁴⁹⁷ Thereafter, instead of institutions, the main integrative force holding Yugoslavia together was President Josip Broz Tito himself.

There is no doubt that these processes played a significant role. However, decentralization did not have to mean the disintegration of the federation. The 1974 Constitution could also be the basis for a more modern, consensual state that would gradually open up to democracy. In order to push development in that direction, Yugoslavia needed new, more modern leaders, who would dare to think beyond the established framework. It lacked a whole generation of politicians who were expelled from politics in the purges of the early 1970s. It was led by the old guard that had acquired skill in maneuvering between East and West. However, it was unable to think about a future in the European Community and similar political strides away from what it knew and could cope with. Simply put, it was led by politicians who

496 Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla*, (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003)

497 *Ibid.*

did not know how to step down and retire. By eliminating the best among their potential successors, they created a situation in which they had no one to whom they could leave the country. If the period from 1950 to 1973 was the *time of the state*, the decade of the 1970s was the *time of illusion*. Time went on, society went forward, the political authorities and political elite existed, but there were no political leaders who could lead forward. A great role in the fall of Yugoslavia in such a terrible and cruel way was played by the fact that its political elite was stuck in the past and there was nobody who could lead the country in the new time that had already begun.

These were the circumstances in which, in a span of several months, death removed Josip Broz and his loyal associate Edvard Kardelj from the Yugoslav political scene. Thus, the constitutionally and de facto integrator of the state vanished. The successors were second – and third-rate regional politicians and apparatchiks. The slogan “After Tito – Tito” or the fact that the country began to be governed by a collective presidency, chaired by a president who would be chosen annually on a rotating basis from among the individual republics and provinces, speaks enough about the successors not knowing what to do and none of them having the capacity to take the lead and responsibility for the country. The previously concealed quarrels over the 1974 Constitution, that is, the conflict between federalists and centralists, flared up. Jović called these two groups “constitutional defenders” and “constitutional reformers”.⁴⁹⁸ However, the debate was only seemingly devoted to the constitutional issues. Amidst the general confusion, a group from the old guard of Serbian politicians, which was soon to be joined by some politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina and some young “technocrats” like Slobodan Milošević, saw an opportunity to seize power in Yugoslavia. They will end the *time of illusion* and create a state that differs significantly from the one created by the Constitution. As they had no real competition in other republics, this job should not have been too difficult. Positioning and

498 *Ibid.*

preparations for this maneuver lasted throughout the first half of the 1980s. During this period, the state and the party were preoccupied with themselves.

Yugoslav citizens were shocked by Tito's death. The football players and spectators were shown crying at Hajduk's stadium in Split; many people stood along the railway track on which the train carrying Tito's dead body travelled from Ljubljana to Belgrade. At the Zagreb railway station people sang the Zagorje song *Fala* (Thank You) ... However, their fears about the future were greater than their grief over the president's death. The society felt the ensuing explosion of uncertainty much more than the state and its representatives. As the members of the political elite fought for power and supremacy among themselves, the people felt that the entire situation could backfire on them.

After Tito's death, it became even more evident that the society lived its own autonomous life. People coped with shortages, but companies worked, trams and buses operated, children attended school, hospitals treated patients, garbage was being collected Institutions functioned by some inertia, without real control or the involvement of the state authorities. Hardly anyone noticed when Prime Minister Milka Planinc first submitted her resignation and then revoked it, or when she was replaced by Branko Mikulić, a man with a substantially different political background and agenda.⁴⁹⁹ The society learned to live outside the state. The fact that the authorities were preoccupied with themselves, created an atmosphere of greater freedom. It was not the freedom guaranteed by more liberal institutions and laws. It was a freedom created by the absence of the state and institutions functioning by inertia. Everything felt somehow provisional. But while it lasted, the media became freer, the theater and musical scenes more revolutionary, the academic community more open and courageous. Television broadcasters in the republics were accountable to the republican, not federal authorities. The news was

499 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkanski Babilon: Raspad Jugoslavije od Titove smrti do Miloševićeva pada*, (Zagreb: Alinea 2005)

no longer uniform. So, for example, TV Belgrade and TV Zagreb reported quite differently on the unrest in Kosovo as early as the 1980s, and especially at the end of the decade. The more the government was preoccupied with itself and stuck in internal conflicts, the freer the society became. In that short 1980s period, there came the *time of society* like the calm before the storm.

DESTRUCTION OF THE PILLARS OF THE STATE AND ITS IDENTITY

The quarrel over power formally took the form of a quarrel about the Constitution. However, it was far from being the only fundamental institution of the system that was brought into question and critically assessed. Liberalization, which came thanks to the “absence of repression”, provided room for critics of the socio-political system at many levels. The term “socio-political system” meant a mixture of state and social institutions, relying partly on laws and partly on ideology, which were crucial for defining the state and its society. Some of them, such as self-management and social ownership, were specifically Yugoslav. They were also the important elements of “Yugoslav exceptionalism” which, as a form national pride, was built after the split with Stalin in 1948.

SELF-MANAGEMENT

Self-management was an especially interesting institution. It was partly taken from 19th century anarchist authors and the Paris Commune, and partly from the model of workers’ participation in decision-making, which still exists in almost all West European countries and beyond. Self-management played an important role in the liberalization of the state. It introduced workers’ participation in decision-making in all work organizations – factories, companies and institutions. It also introduced local territorial self-government through a network of local communities and municipalities. However, industrial democracy and territorial participation were not the only self-management goals. From a global viewpoint, they were not even the

main goals. Self-management had a much more important role to play: it was to be a substitute for political democracy and a way to offset, as efficiently and painlessly as possible, the potential demands for democracy, which with time might emerge. Due to its dual role, self-management was gradually falling between the cracks. In factories, workers were faced with making decisions for which they had neither enough knowledge nor sufficient information. Power was separated from responsibility: workers and workers' councils formally made final decisions and thus were responsible for them. However, management possessed the relevant knowledge and information and they prepared the contents of the decisions. The real power was in the hands of those who knew something about the topic. This was certainly better as far as competent management was concerned. However, management had no formal responsibility for the results of these decisions.⁵⁰⁰ Despite self-management, workers felt helpless: they had too little decision-making autonomy in their daily work and were frustrated when voting on technological innovations, long-term investments and financial plans which they mostly did not understand. In sociological research on workers' participation, they rated their influence as "small".⁵⁰¹ At the same time, industrial democracy could not replace political democracy. The attempt to shift more and more decisions to workers' councils diminished the efficiency of workers' participation and only more clearly exposed the fact that the whole model lacked the crucial context and framework – political democracy. Social scientists Josip Županov, Veljko Rus, Branko Horvat, Eugen Pusić and many others were increasingly pointing to the serious flaws and even failure of such a model, which was too broad and comprehensive to meet the workers' participation criteria and too narrow and limited to substitute for democracy. Županov wrote

500 Vesna Pusić, *Industrijska demokracija i civilno društvo*, (Zagreb: Sociološko društvo Hrvatske, 1986)

501 IDE – International Research Group, *Industrial Democracy in Europe*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)

about the divergence between decision-making and power structures in organizations, and about the crisis into which the Yugoslav model was gradually plunging.⁵⁰² As it turned out, some critics attacked the system for other, more intricate reasons. They would later join Slobodan Milošević in his power struggle using all possible means. However, Rus, Županov, Horvat, Arzenšek, Rudi Supek, Eugen Pusić and others did not have any hidden intentions or motives. They simply analyzed the reality and tried to find a way out of the impasse that could be seen quite clearly. They began their critical analyses earlier, but by the 1980s they were no longer being fired from their jobs at the university or publicly attacked.

SOCIAL OWNERSHIP

Another specificity of the Yugoslav system that became an object of criticism was social ownership.⁵⁰³ It is somewhat ironic that in the *time of society* when the state was becoming increasingly weaker and distant, it was social ownership that came under attack. It was most often defined negatively: ownership that was neither state nor private. It was another institution by which Yugoslavia differed from the Eastern bloc countries and real socialism, which did not bother with finesses and simply nationalized property. If the idea was the eventual withering away of the state, as Dejan Jović would say when explaining Kardelj, it was logical to make its property collective and transfer it to society. However, the representative of that society was the state, waiting to wither away. According to Andrija Gams, it was another fraud or self-deception of the system. Social property had no title holder, that is, someone who could stand up and say: it is mine and I am responsible for it. It was another example of the separation of power and responsibility. Property was de facto state-owned, but the responsibility for it laid with society – in this case an amorphous category without a title holder. And when society came to the fore

502 Josip Županov, *Sociologija i samoupravljanje*, (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977)

503 Andrija Gams, *O svojini*, (Beograd: published by author, 1982)

in the 1980s, it established that it actually had nothing and that the long-cherished concept of social ownership should be clarified one way or another. Nothing happened right away. However, open criticism of social ownership in the 1980s was a sign of what would happen ten years later. In the 1990s, as part of political transition and emergence of new states, social property was being transformed into state-owned and (much more frequently) private property and the sinister predictions of some analysts made in the late 1980s came true. Instead of transparent private ownership and free market, there began a plundering of property by criminals teamed up with the new political authorities. But this happened later, during the 1990s, in the first authoritarian decade of “our young democracies”.

BROTHERHOOD AND UNITY

The slogan “Brotherhood and unity” was also one of the pillars of Yugoslavia’s identity, political culture and exceptionalism. The slogan implied the togetherness of diverse peoples, that is, the ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia. One of the standard ways to impress foreign politicians and researchers who came to Yugoslavia was to list the ethnicities, religions, scripts and languages coexisting in harmony in one state. *E pluribus unum!* In the 1980s, it became a rather trite phrase that lost its meaning. However, at the time it was created and a few decades later, the notion of brotherhood and unity had a great emotional charge. During the Second World War, the quislings – Nazi and fascist collaborators from the ranks of all Yugoslav peoples – exterminated the members of some other Yugoslav peoples, most often in the most gruesome ways. The slogan “Brotherhood and unity” implied a joint emotional resistance to the trauma and chaos that had been experienced. It was the program for the future and some kind of collective redemption from the bloody past. It provided space for forgetting what had happened and creating enthusiasm for a new, different society and thus new, different people. Like nationalism, populism and other forms of political motivation that appealed to emotions were strong but relatively short-lived. New generations had no

personal experience of the Second World War and pitted ideological and emotional constructs against rational interests.⁵⁰⁴ For a few more decades, brotherhood and unity served as an ideological integrator in the country which, apart from the army and the president, de facto had increasingly less integrators. As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, this slogan was indirectly contested with a new logic – the policy of clean accounts. The phrase was made famous by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, the leader of the *Croatian Spring* and one of the victims of political purges in the early 1970s. It was a demand for the state's financial transparency, accountability in budgetary spending and clear picture of “inputs and outputs”, that is, the financial contribution of each federal unit to the joint state and the amount returned by the state to each republic and province. If political history can also be viewed as alternation of periods of identity politics and emotions and periods of rationality and interest, then the policy of clean accounts was a metaphor for rationality. As for the resilience and stability of the state, this rational approach was overly optimistic. Solidarity, as a way of reducing differences and achieving a more balanced development of Yugoslavia, but also as an emotional, integrating category, was still very much needed. The term was worn out, but the need for the consolidation of society remained. In the 1980s, under the pretense of economic rationality, the political elites waged their struggle for political dominance. At the same time, society viewed the slogan “brotherhood and unity” as something between ridiculous and insignificant. The state had no substitute to fill the vacant slots labelled solidarity and empathy. However, society or societies did find their communication venues. The new wave, rock and punk musical trends travelled across republican borders smoothly and without delay, while intellectuals regularly met to debate and carry out joint research. In Zagreb, for example, the study group “Man and System” gathered intellectuals from Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade, as

504 Hirschman, A.O. *The Passions and The Interests: Political Arguments For Capitalism Before Its Triumph*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

well as a few other regions in Yugoslavia. Comic strips and illustration experienced a global explosion. A new generation of illustrators produced internationally renowned stars who cooperated with each other, formed creative groups and influenced each other. Brotherhood and unity no longer had the power to defend these societies from their past. Although the slogan was intended for society, it was part of the state/party ideology. Thus, one more pillar of state identity withered away. Society easily found other integration channels, but the state no longer had enough strength, interest or flexibility to turn them into its own integrators.

NON-ALIGNMENT VS THE AWAKENING OF EASTERN EUROPE

There is no doubt that the policy of non-alignment was one of the best political ideas of post-war Yugoslavia. Although it was a foreign policy concept focused on international relations, it had a huge influence on the country's domestic policy and identity in the eyes of its society. Conceived in the early 1950s, the idea of non-alignment was a lifeline for a big number of "Third World" countries that gained independence from colonial rule or were in the process of achieving it. On the world political stage, they were offered a choice between America (USA) and Russia (USSR), as well as China for those in its immediate neighborhood. In many respects, this choice was uncomfortably reminiscent of neocolonialism. At that time, half of the world's population lived in such countries. These included the entire African continent, much of Asia and some Latin American countries, some of which were not technically colonies, but had recently overthrown various dictatorships. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offered them the possibility not to bow down to any great power, and by the same token not to a priori confront them. It freed them from having to unequivocally engage in the Cold War. At the same time, togetherness gave them the strength to stand alongside the great powers in international multilateral organizations and become a decisive factor in the election of the UN Secretary General and voting on many

important decisions of this organization.⁵⁰⁵ The basic principles of non-alignment were presented by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in a speech given at the Colombo Conference in 1954. Yugoslavia succeeded in turning its own position of balancing between world powers, into a global movement. The split with the Soviet Union in 1948 left Yugoslavia without its “great protector” and a clear bloc affiliation. The fact that it took a little less than ten years to break with its version of Stalinism shows how traumatic and unexpected this break was for the country.⁵⁰⁶ However, it opened the door to other possibilities and alliances, including much closer cooperation with the West. Yugoslavia benefited from development assistance, and scientific, educational and economic cooperation with the world’s richest democracies. In fact, the tectonic political shifts that had threatened its destruction, in fact enabled Yugoslavia to assume a unique political position in the world. When Khrushchev came to power in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia became interesting. It was an occasional partner to both world powers but did not belong to any bloc. The fact that it survived and thrived with such a political balancing act, made the Yugoslav model and international position attractive to newly formed states. This helped to gather together many historical figures and founding fathers and mothers of countries to form the Non-Aligned Movement. The world’s political circumstances and historical moment were perfect for the formation of such a movement.

On the internal political plane, non-alignment was reflected in the transformation of Yugoslavia into a world political power or, at least, an important world factor. From a rather parochial state on the European periphery it turned into one of the leaders of a world movement. Cooperation and development assistance programs, carried out with other NAM members, brought foreign students of different racial and cultural backgrounds to the country. Statesmen from all parts of the world were coming to international conferences or for bilateral visits.

505 Tvrтко Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar: Od Preka do vrha svijeta*, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2020)

506 Martin Previšić, *Povijest Golog otoka*, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2019)

Economic cooperation with new partners was developing. For example, during that time Yugoslavia exported one-third of its industrial machinery output to Indonesia.⁵⁰⁷ The whole world knew about Yugoslavia. People from other non-aligned countries considered it to be a role model and an example they wished to follow. The citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries, some of whom obtained permits to visit Yugoslavia as tourists every three or four years, looked at it as a space of freedom, continuous development and opening. As former Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi said in a free-flowing conversation with EU foreign ministers in Cyprus, where I was also present, in response to some of my younger colleagues trying to push Yugoslavia into the category of Eastern bloc countries: “For us, in my youth, Yugoslavia was America!” Western democracies looked at Yugoslavia as “socialism with a human face”, namely a one-party socialist state with an independent policy with which cooperation could be possible and worthwhile. All this created a sense of pride, importance and self-confidence. We were an international political factor.

However, the 1980s brought other themes onto the international political scene. That was not the time of the Third World, but the time of Europe. Although the processes that started in Eastern Europe in the 1970s did not culminate until 1989 with the symbolic demolition of the Berlin Wall, the entire 1980s were permeated with a feeling that something big was brewing in Europe. Pressed by much more cruel and serious dictatorships than the Yugoslav one and confined to being Soviet satellites, the societies in the Warsaw Pact countries gradually mobilized a critical mass of rebellion. After the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring crushed by Soviet tanks and occasional riots in Poland, something continued to smolder under the surface in those countries. The tension was clearly articulated in political projects inspired by Charter 77, a civic initiative launched by Václav Havel and a group rallied around him, and by the Polish trade union/political movement Solidarity (1980) led by Lech Wałęsa, Adam Michnik,

507 Tvrčko Jakovina, *Ibid.*

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jacek Kuroń, Bronisław Geremek and many other members of the Polish opposition elite – the best and the brightest that Poland and all of Eastern Europe had. Many factors contributed to the fact that, at the time of the fall of communism, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland already had an alternative political elite.⁵⁰⁸ Unlike some contemporary analysts,⁵⁰⁹ I believe that resistance, victory, transition and a vision for the future were authentic East European products. Eastern Europe did not try to imitate the West; rather, it relied on its historical experience and its best political imagination to design its own future. Michnik's *Letters from Prison*⁵¹⁰ and *The Church and the Left*,⁵¹¹ Havel's *The Power of the Powerless*⁵¹² or Hankiss' *East European Alternatives*⁵¹³ were the programmatic texts on which the “new Europe” was built. In addition to the novels, stories and essays by Czesław Miłosz and Milan Kundera, they put the focus back on Europe, which was no longer frozen, boring and predictable, but had new energy and authenticity. Although Yugoslavia did not have its alternative political elite,⁵¹⁴ its society absorbed the ideas coming from Prague and Warsaw. There was talk about the European Community and the unification of Europe, democracy and human rights, as well as civil society.

During this period, in many NAM member countries some dubious dictators came to power, while the Yugoslav leadership role dissolved

508 Vesna Pusić, *Vladaoci i upravljači*, (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 1992); and Timothy Garton Ash, *Mi građani*, (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 1993)

509 Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, *The Light That Failed*, (New York: Pegasus Books, 2020)

510 Adam Michnik, *Letters From Prison and Other Essays*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 1966)

511 Adam Michnik, *The Church and The Left*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)

512 Václav Havel, “The Power of The Powerless”, in Havel, V. *Living in Truth*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1986)

513 Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1990)

514 Vesna Pusić, 1992., *Ibid.*

amidst conflicts and turmoil in the Third World. The movement was no longer a basis for global relevance and feelings of collective importance and pride. The world's attention was focused on the end of the Cold War and the birth of a new democratic Europe, and not on a movement that was slowly dying. And Yugoslav society/societies now looked toward this new Europe. Yet another pillar of the country's identity was crushed by time. The state had nothing new to act as a substitute and help it to develop a link to this new Europe that was being born.

FEDERATION

And finally, there was the federal structure of the state. Thanks to his pragmatic balancing, Tito succeeded for years in maintaining an equilibrium between the republics and the nations which differed in size, level of development, GDP per capita, standard of living, views and expectations from the common state. Although the federal institutions were dominated by Serbs, especially the security-intelligence, defense and diplomatic apparatus, the creation of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo somewhat balanced relations among the federal units. The conflict over the 1974 Constitution was de facto a quarrel over the federation. Those who attacked the Constitution did not advocate a step forward in reform. Instead, they wanted to concentrate power and supremacy over the entire Yugoslavia in their hands. They mistakenly assumed that Tito was the only thing standing in the way of achieving their goal. Serbian politicians who opposed such an attack on the federation were quickly eliminated and the ensuing power struggle eventually drew the final curtain on the Yugoslav state. In 1986, the Memorandum of the *Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* was published. It created an ideological, psychological and emotional basis for the destruction of the federation. The main motive that permeated the Memorandum was, in the opinion of the academicians, the historical injustice suffered by the Serbian people, thus precipitating the need for resolving the "Serbian question" within Yugoslavia in a different way. The irony of fate and

history was that the late 1980s was the last period in which “all Serbs will live in a single state”.

The authors of the Memorandum used many diverse arguments in their attack on the existing state, which was not difficult as the state was becoming increasingly weak. Many of these arguments were convincing and attractive. They even seemed to be linked to parallel developments in Eastern Europe. For example, they criticized the lack of democracy and civil liberties, as well as violations of human rights. An anecdote I was personally involved in at that time illustrates what it was all about and how that “democratic populism” worked. After a panel discussion attended by intellectuals from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, one of the authors of the future Memorandum gathered several of us younger listeners and suggested that we should form a human rights group. Something like that had not existed before and we were thrilled. It was agreed that we should continue preparations. I told my father about it with great enthusiasm. He did not criticize me, or oppose such an initiative; moreover, he praised it. He suggested that at the next meeting I should propose the case of Adem Demaçi, a Kosovo Albanian and the longest-serving political prisoner in Yugoslavia, as the first such case. This is what I did readily at the next meeting. Silence ensued, then the topic was changed and the human rights group was never mentioned again. It turned out that the older generation might have understood something and seen something that we did not. It also turned out that we would have to learn and mature politically much faster than we had planned.

In 1986, the same year when the SASA Memorandum was published, Slobodan Milošević was elected head of the League of Communists of Serbia and the political platform got its leader. Although Milošević seemed more like a technocrat than a politician, he was primarily interested in power and authority. He had before him a medium size European state where de facto no one was in power. He was absolutely ruthless towards anyone who stood in his way, to the point that in 2000 he, in all probability, had arranged the killing of his

longtime friend and mentor Ivan Stambolić.⁵¹⁵ Milošević did not start his conquest of power as a nationalist. However, as early as 1987, in his speech in Kosovo, he transformed himself into a nationalist and populist almost in front of the television cameras.⁵¹⁶ He did not stop on this road until 2001, when the new Serbian government led by Zoran Đinđić, put him on a plane to The Hague where he faced war crimes charges and went to prison never to return.

Under the onslaught of aggressive nationalist populism, the federation fell apart. It was no longer possible to talk about balance and balancing. Slobodan Milošević terrified one part of the public in Serbia and societies in other Yugoslav federal units. No one wanted to live under his rule. Although in the 1980s it was still not clear how things would develop, the various societies barricaded themselves in self-defense. The federation now existed only on paper. This was especially evident in Croatia and Slovenia.

The party-state was so preoccupied with itself that it did not notice when it was taken over by Slobodan Milošević. He embarked on a systematic overthrow of provincial and republican leaderships throughout Yugoslavia with his “Yogurt Revolution” (attack on the Vojvodina leadership) and the “happening of the people”. At first, the people “happened” in a highly organized way and were transported in buses and trains. Over time, mass hysteria gathered enough momentum, so that some of these events were spontaneous.

Thus, in the whirlwind of anarchy and populist mobilization in the 1980s, the main pillars of the Yugoslav state, identity and exceptionalism – self-management, social ownership, non-alignment and the federal balance of power – were definitely destroyed.

515 Paula Bobanović, “Zločini Slobine obitelji: Zbog pisma završio u živom vapnu”, *Express* 24sata.hr, March 28, 2019.

516 Silber, L., Little, A. *The Death Of Yugoslavia*, London: Pinguin/BBC Books, 1996.

SOCIETY

What remained was the society/societies. They kept pace with the times through the media, culture, science and even the economy. Some years earlier, the old term used in the theory of the modern state – civil society – was revived in world literature and political theory debates. At first, it was very difficult to translate this term into Croatian and other Yugoslav languages. We understood the term “civil” as the opposite of “military”, but not as a special entity or space of civic self-awareness. The term “civic” also no longer fit quite well. Until then, it had meant belonging to a particular social class, not society as a whole based on the political category of citizen. In general, the language was an excellent indicator of the situation faced by the Yugoslav societies. There were no common, standardized terms to describe the new phenomena in society and to name the ongoing changes. We needed to invent new words in order to express what was happening to us and where we were going. A small example of this “toil with language” was the translation of John Stuart Mill’s treatise *Considerations on Representative Government*.⁵¹⁷ When we look back now, it seems almost unbelievable that we spent so much time on terms such as government, civil society, civic rights, government accountability to the citizens, change of government and the like, which simply did not exist in our political vocabulary. Naturally, most of these words already existed, but their meaning was different and did not capture the meaning of Mill’s description of a liberal democratic state.

If there were no words, there was even less legal and institutional infrastructure into which the new phenomena could be fitted.

517 John Stuart Mill, Razmatranja o predstavničkoj vladavini, in Mill, J.S. *Izabrani politički spisi*, vol II, (Zagreb: Informator/Fakultet političkih nauka, 1989)

CIVIL SOCIETY

The notion of civil society in our intellectual space and in large measure globally, was revived by John Keane in his articles and books.⁵¹⁸ The Australian-born, London-based professor began using this term again, but with a slightly different meaning from the one used in classical political theory. Civil society was no longer a term for society versus state or civic society. Keane used it to describe proactive society, a society that changes institutions, values and relations, and not necessarily through the classical, usual political channels. This society is made up of groups and activists who are often concerned with one specific topic – women, climate, human rights, refugee rights, the power of large banks – and seek to change society and circumstances in that specific respect. In Yugoslavia in the mid-1980s, there was a great deal of debate about new and alternative social movements and civil society.⁵¹⁹ Some felt that the notion of “civil society” was too civic (bourgeois) a concept, derived from a liberal democratic theory of the state. New or alternative social movements were considered more revolutionary and in line with the Marxist approach to the state. Numerous young Slovenian theorists made an especially significant contribution to this debate. Some went so far as to deny the continuity between the theories of new social movements and civil societies. However, Tomaž Mastnak,⁵²⁰ the most significant representative of the young generation, pointed to the existence and even necessity of continuity, regardless of the obsolescence of the conceptual apparatus of social movements. The topic of civil society created the basis for the intellectual flourishing of a new generation and real practical civic engagement. It still had no institutional form, but had a strong voice and practice.

518 See for instance John Keane, (ed) *Civil Society and the State*, (London – New York: Verso Books, 1988)

519 For example debates and articles published in *Gledišta* 5/6, Beograd 1998.; *Pogledi* 1, vol. 18, Split (September 1988.); *Mladina* 29, Ljubljana, (September 4., 1987.)

520 Tomaž Mastnak, “Civilno društvo u čistom obliku”, *Pogledi* vol.18, no.1, (1988.), 247–264

Civil society was exactly the term needed to designate something that was happening in Yugoslav societies. People rallied around the new music, *Novi kvadrat* (a group of comic strip artists associated with the Zagreb magazine *Polet*), new topics and different media. In addition to culture – music, comics and illustrations, and the media, where the 1980s left its deepest imprint and for which it will be remembered, civil society also introduced other new topics and social movements.

FEMINISM

At the end of the 1970s (1978), Belgrade hosted a big international feminist conference. It was the first such conference in Eastern Europe, and was attended by a majority of the most famous feminists from around the world. It was organized by sociologist Žarana Papić and the Director of the Student Cultural Centre, Dunja Blažević. The conference was attended by young women from all the republics and provinces. At first, most of them spoke shyly about their experience and research. At that time Yugoslav legislation was very liberal with respect to reproductive rights, while equality in pay and other rights also looked good on paper. Therefore, it was not so simple to articulate real discrimination against women in a patriarchal society with relatively progressive laws. On the first day of the conference, all Yugoslav participants, myself included, started their presentations with the sentence: “I am not a feminist, but ...” This “but” was followed by the data on the difference in salaries between women and men with the same qualifications, which was 25% in favor of men;⁵²¹ on the division of housework and family maintenance where women accounted for 80%; and on child care, which was actually done exclusively by women. At that time, nobody in our country collected data on sexual harassment and abuse at work, in the street and in the family. However, there were data on rape, the appallingly humiliating procedure

521 Vesna Pusić, “Žene i zaposlenost”, in *Žena i društvo: Kultiviranje dijaloga*, (Zagreb: Sociološko društvo Hrvatske, 1987), 71–76

of proving such a crime in court and the insultingly mild penalties for offenders convicted of rape. The participants also spoke about support for patriarchal stereotypes in the media, school textbooks and public discourse. Young historians and anthropologists came up with new interpretations of historical facts and new facts not taught in history classes.⁵²² In our discussions with more experienced colleagues from the West, we gradually began to better understand both the topics and the circumstances we were facing. After five days spent at the conference, many participants, including myself, began talking about themselves as feminists. At that time, it was just the brave first step in the demystification of the term. Feminism was ridiculed in the usual way women's rights were being ridiculed: feminists were viewed as sexually frustrated, mannish and ugly women, who should be pitied and not taken seriously. However, this, almost collegial misogyny was only the first line of attack. The second took the form of political re-examination of this dangerous Western influence on the self-managing socialist society. This could have had even worse consequences than ridicule.⁵²³ However, after their return from the Belgrade conference to Zagreb, seven women decided to organize the first feminist group in Yugoslavia. This group was formed in 1979 and started to work at full capacity in 1980. It received a much greater response than anyone could have anticipated. Since the founding members were sociologists, philosophers, writers, journalists and literary theorists, it was no wonder that numerous articles written by this first feminist group appeared in various media and publications. In some way, they were all associated with the Faculty of Philosophy of Zagreb University, either as former students or young teachers. Therefore, the Faculty of Philosophy was the venue for the first large Zagreb feminist gathering. The response was impressive. All of this provoked

522 Lydia Sklevicky, "Konji, žene, ratovi, itd.: Problem utemeljenja historiografije žena u Jugoslaviji", in *Žena i društvo: Kultiviranje dijaloga*, *ibid.*, 52–60

523 Slavenka Drakulić, *Smrtni grijesi feminizma: Ogledi o mudologiji*, (Zagreb: Moderna vremena, 1984), a new edition *Smrtni grijesi feminizma*, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2020)

sharp reactions and many attacks. It is interesting to note that they primarily came from opinion makers and renowned social critics (I. Mandić, V. Tenžera) rather than the authorities.⁵²⁴ We clashed with the authorities a little later, when it was necessary to define the mode of existence for this first feminist group. Such phenomena were not recognized in the legal and institutional structures of the state. Non-governmental organizations, social movements and civic initiatives were unknown phenomena – they were not forbidden, but simply did not exist as possibilities. This was yet another example of the state lagging behind society. Pressure on the group was growing and it was criticized as engaging in illegal activity and agitation. Finally, a life-saving solution was offered by Rudi Supek, a former professor of the majority of the founding members, founder of Croatian and Yugoslav sociology and President of the Croatian Sociological Association. He suggested that we register our group as part of the Sociological Association. This is how the *Woman and Society* Section was formed. It was a de facto NGO before the emergence of NGOs and civil society. The movement spread rapidly on the grassroots level. Before long, thousands of women were involved in activities related to women's rights and women's fates. The group evolved from mostly intellectuals to activists, who emphasized violence against women as the burning issue in society. Over time, similar groups sprung up in Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina... The traces and historical echoes of those first women's civil initiatives still exist, forty years later, in the new states created after the breakup of Yugoslavia. They exist in societies which, unlike the states, cannot deny their historical continuity.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

The fight against pollution and the destruction of nature has a rather long tradition in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, dating back to the 19th century. However, during the longest part of its history it was linked either to the state or the scientific community. It was not

524 Slavenka Drakulić, *Ibid.*

until the 1970s that, under the influence of global movements, there emerged groups of citizens and social movements that demanded a different attitude towards the environment. They appealed to the government calling for the suspension of construction of hydroelectric power plants, regulation of waste management and wastewater discharge into the sea and rivers, as well as the suspension of the plans to build a nuclear power plant. They requested that the government change some of its already announced projects. In the mid-1980s, after a period of stagnation, environmental movements re-emerged, but now in the somewhat changed circumstances of the crisis of the state or, as environmental movement analyst Oštrić put it, the crisis of legitimacy.⁵²⁵ These movements no longer demanded change from the state, but sought to mobilize society for it. Not as strong and visible as the women's movement, nevertheless these initiatives took the topic of ecology, which up until then had been under full state jurisdiction, and put it on society's agenda .

There are three types of environmental groups: 1. antinuclear movement; 2. citizens' self-organization and spontaneous local protest groups, and 3. spontaneous youth groups.⁵²⁶ As the state increasingly removed itself from the public scene in the 1980s, some of those initiatives had a significant impact despite their relative political weakness. After the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in particular, anti-nuclear groups fought successfully against the construction of the Prevlaka nuclear power plant in Croatia. During the 1980s, they appealed increasingly less to the government, and focused on mobilizing society, including citizens living in vulnerable areas, and those who probably did not notice industrial pollution for years or had reconciled themselves to illegal construction and improvised and unprotected landfills. At that time, the more broadly perceived problem of global

525 Zoran Oštrić, "Ekološki pokreti u Jugoslaviji", *Socijalna ekologija* (January – March 1992), Zagreb, 83–100

526 Zoran Oštrić, *Ibid.*; and Wollfy Krašić, "Ekološke teme na stranicama časopisa Arena", *Ekonomska i ekohistorija* vol 13, no.1, (2017), Zagreb, 128–146

climatic change was still not one of the central themes, even in countries where environmental movements were much stronger than in Yugoslavia. For example, in the 1980s, during his term of office, American President Reagan claimed that trees were also responsible for air pollution (!).⁵²⁷ Thus, the fact that Yugoslav environmental movements dealt with environmental protection and not climate change did not make them lag behind something that was happening on the global political scene. In the 1980s, the environmental movement had the greatest impact in Slovenia. But wherever it existed in that period, it shifted from the strategy of sending petitions to the government to mobilization for political action. In the later multi-party period, this transformation made it easier for environmental movements to transform themselves into political actors in a narrower sense, that is, into green political parties.

MANAGERS

In modern political theory managers and the economy are not the first thing that crosses one's mind when it comes to civil society. In the classical theory of the modern state, however, the economic sphere represented the core of society, most of which was not part of the state. In Yugoslavia, in the 1980s, all companies, with the exception of artisan's workshops and small companies with up to ten workers, were state-owned. However, in a weak state, in which it is not clear whether the "state" exercising pressure on a company is in fact the Federation, the Republic or maybe the city in which the company is located, the notion of state-owned company took on a new meaning. It is a well-established fact in organizational theory that if an organization is left alone to do its job, without external pressures and political interference, it will most often start doing just that – its job. The 1980s, especially the second half, once more confirmed this theory. In Croatia and Slovenia, party-state pressure was weakening and even courts

527 Peter Baker, Susan Glasser, *The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James A. Baker III*, (New York: Doubleday, 2020)

were often judging in accordance with the law rather than bowing to political decisions and party pressure (e.g. the verdict in the *Mladina* case).⁵²⁸ Such an atmosphere was felt in both factories and companies. Company management included fewer and fewer political appointees with little education and long party careers. A new generation of managers arrived on the scene. They were ambitious, educated and more independent than ever before. The empirical research I conducted in 1989–90 in 18 of the most successful factories in Zagreb, including 90 successful managers, showed that those people considered themselves to be “enlightened technocrats”.⁵²⁹ Probably under the influence of self-management, most of them still preferred industrial democracy – the right of workers to participate in decision making and even make key decisions, but only periodically, when deciding on a company’s strategic objectives, and not on a day-to-day basis. In addition, 80% were highly educated; 97% held that management was a special profession that required special, additional education, and 85% exhibited a desire to do their job increasingly better and more efficiently.⁵³⁰ More than 95% pointed out that a successful manager should be a businessman, a leader and an entrepreneur. In their opinion, characteristics inherent in being a politician, an administrator, a mediator or a coordinator were much less important. From a sociological point of view, all this pointed to the formation of a new social elite having its own identity, values and rules. In the 1980s, the managers of successful factories were not products of the state-run economy and its inherent political criteria for managerial positions in industrial organizations. It was the absence of the state that enabled them to come to the fore. The freedom created by the absence of rules and pressure – the old rules no longer applied and there were

528 Mark Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992); and Vladimir Primorac, “Može li se upropastiti Hrvatsko pravosuđe?” *Erasmus* no.7 (1994.), Zagreb, 23–32.

529 Vesna Pusić, *Vladaoci i upravljači*, *ibid.*

530 Vesna Pusić, *Vladaoci i upravljači*, *ibid.*, 82

no new ones – allowed organizations to do what they were founded to do – their job. In order to survive in the freedom created by a power vacuum, without an outside guarantee nor a structure, they could be saved only by having good managerial staff. The emphasis on quality managers rather than political appointees enabled these companies to be successful in the chaos caused by the vanishing state. The industrial managerial elite had a lot of potential, especially in the period of political transition that took place in the 1990s. In a society without a democratic tradition and alternative political elite, successful managers who came to the fore in the 1980s could have been a useful support in the process of economic and political transition. However, probably with the exception of Slovenia, the process of political transition in the former Yugoslav republics did not progress from the dictatorship of “benevolent totalitarianism” to democracy. Under conditions of war and violence this was not possible. In any case, the first step in the transition process was made towards a new authoritarian government. At first, it was not clear how long it would last, but its character was clearly visible.⁵³¹ A successful manager interviewed during this period described the problem precisely: “With political change and the coming of the new government (1990), political loyalty became very important ... It would be disastrous if political loyalty should continue to play such an important role. ... This is the greatest danger. At least as great as it was during the former one-party system, that is for sure. ... One thing is loyalty to the system – loyalty to democracy is not a problem. The problem is the demand for party loyalty – loyalty to the ruling party. When we speak about the demand for political loyalty as a problem, that is what I mean.”⁵³²

The potential of the new managerial elite which, thanks to the unfavorable political conditions was the result of positive selection, was not realized. Of the 18 general managers from the most profitable

531 Vesna Pusić, *Demokracije i diktature*, (Zagreb: Durieux, 1998), 59–82

532 Vesna Pusić, *Vladaoci i upravljači*, *ibid.*, 143–144

factories in January 1990, only five remained by the end of 1991.⁵³³ They were cleansed, some politically (as “commies”) and some ethnically (as Serbs), but those were just convenient excuses. Yesterday’s party members joined the new ruling party – HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in large numbers and no one was concerned about it. What decided against the small yet useful managerial elite was the danger that it would stand in the way of large-scale plundering through privatization, which was soon to follow, and that its authority was derived from its knowledge and success at work and not from belonging and being loyal to the ruling party. The most dramatic attempt to employ the skills of successful industrial managers in the process of political transition was the arrival of Ante Marković as head of the Yugoslav government in the early spring of 1989. The electrical engineer and legendary general manager of Zagreb Rade Končar Factory, Marković was the most prominent representative of the managerial elite. In the 23 years he ran Končar, the factory grew from 2,000 to 25,000 employees, including 4,500 engineers. Successful as the CEO of a large company, he also proved successful, creative and convincing when, as Prime Minister, he tackled the galloping inflation that had reached 2,679% annually during his first year in office (1989).⁵³⁴ He introduced the convertible dinar, stabilized the banking system, almost halved the military budget, significantly increased the share of federal funds relative to republican ones in financing the federal budget... However, all this was too little too late. He first came into conflict with Slobodan Milošević over the composition of his government and then over Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan. At the end of 1991, he de facto barely escaped from Belgrade to Zagreb. However, the new authorities did not find a place for him in Zagreb either. The man who had shown that he could rationally run the national economy, was also the last one who tried to save Yugoslavia. In late 1991, this was not a recommendation. Ante Marković came too late not

533 Vesna Pusić, *Vladaoci i upravljači*, ibid., 131

534 Ivo Goldstein, *Hrvatska 1918 – 2008.*, (Zagreb: Znanje, 2008), 645

only to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia, but also to prevent the brutal manner in which it happened. As he battled inflation and negotiated assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the state on whose behalf he acted had already de facto vanished. New political parties and new leaders came to power in the federal republics that formally still existed, but their programs no longer had anything to do with Yugoslavia and Marković. Maybe with the slight exception of Slovenia, nowhere in the former Yugoslavia did the new ruling parties intend to share power.

NATIONALIST POPULISM

In parallel with the strengthening of civil society and the emergence of an increasing number of diverse social groups which empowered its base, nationalist populism was also spreading. Its first public political leader was Slobodan Milošević, President of the League of Communists of Serbia. Formally speaking, Milošević came from the very core of the party-state, so that it might be concluded that nationalist populism came from the state and not from society. However, Milošević differed from other politicians of the time. He started his political career relatively late and his behavior showed that he was in a hurry. He was probably the first to realize that no one had truly been in power in Yugoslavia for several years. Thus, he set out to win it. Endless mutual outwitting in the federal institutions and breaking through the ossified party structures would take much more time than he was willing to spend. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that this was no longer the proper path to power. Thus, Milošević turned to mass mobilization. Unlike the proponents of civil society who were speaking about citizens and civic initiatives, he needed zealous masses whose emotional energy would help him rise swiftly to the top. He needed the “happening of the people”. The happening of the people required mass mobilization that always rested on strong collective emotions. There was no place for autonomy of the citizen, rule of law, nor compliance with procedures and democratic institutions. Freedom, that obscure “object of desire” in

the distance, was very concretely translated into “either them or us”. Milošević began his political rise as a cunning intra-party operative, not a nationalist. He outwitted his competitors and unscrupulously rejected his former allies and fellow travelers. However, at some point he went beyond that. Like so many other times in the Balkans (but not only in the Balkans!), aggressive nationalism proved to be a logical choice and the next step. It was absolutely inclusive of “us” and absolutely exclusive of all others – “them”. The fear, uncertainty, poverty and frustration felt by the people could be turned into collective anger and hatred towards Albanians (Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks). At the same time, such nationalism offered the warmth of the herd that had found its guardian. In the subsequent decades, this mobilization technique would be used by political elites in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and even Kosovo. The common enemy of one nation will be members of the other nation, but “traitors in our ranks” will be even more passionately persecuted. Traitors will be all those who did not submit to the leader’s authority, who advocate the ideas of a civic state, and those who criticize the misdeeds of their side and even dare to speak about it in public. In the second half of the 1980s, Milošević and the Serbian political elite were the first to introduce such an approach to politics in the former Yugoslavia. From his speech at Gazimestan in June 1989 on the 600th anniversary of the Serbian army’s defeat in the Battle of Kosovo, through an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that toppled the leaderships of Vojvodina and Montenegro, to threatening Slovenia with trains bringing hundreds of thousands of protesters from Serbia onto the streets of Ljubljana in order to overturn the Slovenian government, Milošević showed everyone, even himself, what emotional, inflammatory nationalist rhetoric could do. Some practical steps to dissolve the federation had already been taken. This was especially evident in Kosovo, as Azem Vllasi describes in detail in his book.⁵³⁵ However, mass gatherings began only after Gazimestan. Crowds of

535 Azem Vllasi, *Kosovo: Početak raspada*, (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2016)

people followed Milošević, shouted at rallies, waved flags and banners, and hated politicians, most of whom they did not know anything about. This was another newly discovered and, at first, not entirely clear advantage of nationalist populism. It made the people co-conspirators and therefore co-responsible. And when time sweeps away the leaders who exploited people's discontent, hard life and fear in order to push them towards collective hatred, and when the passions subside and the "happening of the people" stops, there will remain those carried away by collective emotions; those who had threatened and hated, and maybe even taken part in atrocities in both war and peacetime. They will have to find a way to rationalize their former behavior. The easiest way to do this is to never to admit to themselves or others that they were wrong. They will find hundreds of reasons why they were actually provoked, why the victims were to blame for their fate, why they defended the honor and freedom of their people, why many facts from the past were actually lies and fabrications of those who a priori hated them and their country... More than anything else they will defend their leader who seduced them and made them co-responsible for his politics and hunger for power. Namely, by defending the leader they will defend themselves and their own past.

This is an additional safeguard which populists, not only in the former Yugoslavia, but all of them everywhere, incorporate into their political methods. Through mass mobilization of emotions, which they inevitably call patriotism, they make it very difficult for them to be convicted or rejected in their own countries even when they are overrun by the wheels of history. Moreover, over time many of them will be transformed in the collective consciousness of their compatriots from controversial politicians when they were in power into unquestionable historical leaders. As a self-defense against its bad or controversial past, the society will also defend those who made it co-responsible for their politics through mass mobilization and patriotic blackmail.

The 1980s clearly showed the dilemma which, by the end of the decade, not only divided Yugoslavia and its society, but also made

Yugoslavia practically unsustainable – the contrast between civil society in a democratic context and populist nationalism. All the republics contained elements of both political forces and social initiatives. But symbolically, Milošević and the Serbian leadership represented populism, and Kučan, Drnovšek and the Slovenian leadership, democracy.

TOTALITARIANISM FROM BELOW

The 1980s were undoubtedly the years of society. Whatever happened either positive or creative or cooperative, happened in society. Societies within Yugoslavia communicated not only among each other, but also with the wider world. In many respects they did not lag behind the world and, thanks to some artistic, creative and academic achievements, belonged to the global avant-garde. The revived and redesigned notion of civil society fitted perfectly into this situation. Among analysts and in society in general it was taken for granted that civil society meant something positive, future-oriented and inclusive. It was almost synonymous with human and civic rights, environmental awareness, women's emancipation, rights of LGBTQ persons (or homosexuals, as they were called at the time) and other social minorities, as well as a general expansion of freedom for an increasing number of disadvantaged or discriminated groups.

In such an atmosphere in 1987, one of the originators and main promoters of the idea of civil society in Yugoslavia, Tomaž Mastnak, published an article titled "Totalitarianism from Below".⁵³⁶ Using repression against the alternative cultural scene in Ljubljana, especially punkers, as an example, he argued that civil society could also be repressive, restrictive and anti-democratic. Even before the publication of this article, some authors wrote about the dark side of civil society,⁵³⁷ but Mastnak's text was the turning point. It described how

536 Tomaž Mastnak, "Totalitarizam odozdo", *Gledišta* 5/6, Beograd 1988, 80–90.

537 Slavoj Žižek, "Pravci razvoja: Zašto nije vredno pisati o Agrokomercu", *Mladina* 29, Ljubljana, September 4, 1987, 7.

the police (i.e. state) repression of punkers and other members of the alternative cultural scene prevalent in the 1970s, turned gradually into societal repression in the 1980s. Arrests, searches and interrogations were replaced by complaints from neighbors, interventions by the owners of the bars where they gathered and reactions by the local community or tenants' communities. Enraged citizens wrote letters of protest and took spontaneous collective action to get rid of those strange-looking and ill-suited individuals. Those neighbors, workers and caterers were also part of civil society, which acted spontaneously and independently from the state. The revelation of the anti-democratic potential of civil society, a potential which does not expand but limits the human and civil rights of various groups, caused real shock. According to Mastnak, civil society was attacking its own democratic potential.⁵³⁸ The concept and the institutions of civil society, which were believed to be life-saving at a time when the hermetic party-state was vanishing, carried the embryo of a threat to freedom and democracy. In the 1980s, civil society represented the path to democracy, not its negation. From today's perspective, given the current flood of reactionary, extremist and even violent social groups, each of which wants to suspend, deny or diminish a right of somebody, this belief in civil society seems naive. However, in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, civil society was the only institution that could be relied upon.

We will learn over time how significant the cognition articulated by Mastnak was and how significant it will prove to be in the war and post-war 1990s, as well as in post-Yugoslav societies to this day. In fact, it is astonishing how long it took for this cognition to become generally accepted, since the demonstration of anti-democratic civil society was already taking place before the public eye in the second half of the 1980s. At the beginning, populist rallies attended by a large number of people had to be carefully organized. Over time, however, people began gathering spontaneously, screaming in "righteous rage" against the enemy, whoever he was, and hailing their leaders. Those

538 Tomaž Mastnak, "Totalitarizam odozdo", *ibid.*, 88.

angry faces, threatening and calling for war and the destruction of the enemy, also formed part of civil society. This fact was so frightening that it simply remained unprocessed. The civil initiatives wishing to deprive ethnic minorities and members of the LGBTQ community of their rights, ban legal abortion, make it difficult for women to get paid jobs, and glorify racism, religious intolerance and hatred of immigrants, appeared on the public scene only later, in post-Yugoslav societies. In the 2020s, they are perhaps the bigger and louder part of civil society. In order to distinguish a democratic civil society from these totalitarian groups, it was necessary to adopt a stance on human and civil rights as a criterion. The main difference lies in the fact that a democratic civil society advocates for the expansion of rights, while an anti-democratic one advocates for the deprivation and reduction of rights. However, this distinction is still not consistently applied. In the 1980s it wasn't even articulated. The totalitarian tendencies deriving from society were only a hint that the decade of society could bring political dangers not previously encountered and pose a serious obstacle to democracy in the years to come. Until the end of the 1980s it was not clear that Yugoslavia would fall apart, but it was evident that everything would have to change dramatically. The cognition of "totalitarianism from below" shook the previous confidence in civil society as a civic and democratic response to a repressive, undemocratic and dysfunctional state.

THE LEGACY OF THE 1980S

The end of the 1980s and, in particular, the subsequent years, showed how dangerous was this time of a weak and vanishing state coupled with a diffuse and improvised freedom of society. Such a combination could not have lasted. When the time for transition came, there was no one who could negotiate. This was not the only reason, but it was one of the most important reasons why the collapse of Yugoslavia was so brutal and bloody.

The wars of the 1990s brutalized the societies in all the former Yugoslav republics. The newly created states set out to build their

multi-party systems and beginner's democracies. Societies in poorer condition became less democratic and less diverse than in the 1980s. Thirty years after the end of the 1980s we can say with certainty that they revealed both the creative and threatening potentials of societies. Some creative potentials could be seen in politics, but they were most prominent by far in the culture and counterculture – media, music, comic strips and illustration. This has been our heritage from the 1980s. They have also shown both the positive and the destructive role that can be played by intellectuals in our societies, this exotic social group which, under this name, exists and has always existed only in Eastern Europe and France. They have also shown that the old state had no answers and did not know how to adapt to new times. With the exception of Slovenia, the new states created after 1990 were not democracies. Their governments were elected in multi-party elections but their models of governance, procedures, judiciary, government accountability, civic equality and discrimination policies were not democratic.⁵³⁹ Neither economically nor politically did these states initially function any better than the one on whose ruins they had been built. They most closely resembled a model of governance that did not have a name at that time. “Dictatorships with democratic legitimacy” and similar names were tried out but none stuck. Only decades later, Viktor Orbán would name this type of governance “illiberal democracy”. In the first post-transition period, the Central European countries – Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary – established functioning democracies. That is why it was thought that our “dictatorships with democratic legitimacy” were partly the result of a civil war and partly the last gasp of an authoritarian political culture inherited from the old state. In any case, this had to be the end of an era, before the onset of true liberal democracy. Time will show that old habits die much harder than expected. Thirty years later, our “democratures” seem more like a hint of what was to come

539 Vesna Pusić, “Diktature s demokratskim legitimitetom”, in Pusić, V. *Demokracije i diktature*, *ibid.*, 58–82.

than a farewell to the past. Populist leaders and populist governance are dominant in some of the previously most successful transition countries of Eastern Europe – Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. The right-wing populist parties have grown stronger both in Europe and globally and use aggressive nationalism for political mobilization and social divisions.⁵⁴⁰ As for civil society and media, they have changed beyond recognition under the impact of new technologies and social networks, but we have not yet reached the creativity and diversity of the 1980s. This period is a testimony to the potential carried by every society. In some aspects the states did make progress when compared to the 1990s. In that aspect the 1980s have not left a usable legacy. But all subsequent experience with the new states have not yet met the expectations and hopes of which the 1980s had dreamed.

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540 Anton Shekhovtsov, *Russia and The Western Far Right: Tango Noir*, (London – New York: Routledge, 2018)

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Alemka Lisinski

JOURNALISM AND MEDIA: THE CHALLENGES OF FREEDOMS WON

THE CONTEMPORARY TELEVISION series “Black and White World” (*Crno-bijeli svijet*) – a family show focusing on the 1980s Zagreb scene, including its (pop)artistic and media connection with Belgrade – saw its fourth season in 2020/2021 with great ratings and success on the Croatian market.⁵⁴¹ The media are the main “characters” of this story in which the protagonists are journalists and photographers from *Polet*, *Studentski list*, *Danas*, *Start* and *Svijet*, pioneers of opposition radio (Omladinski radio and later Radio 101), musicians, as well as young actors and actresses, commuting between Zagreb and Belgrade. Apart from being excellently written and directed, the TV show is filled with fine irony, but also with warmth and humor, like a TV kaleidoscope time machine, with an approach to characters and themes similar to Dubravka Ugrešić’s treatment of her main heroine in *Štefica Cvek u raljama života*.⁵⁴² Just like Ugrešić, the TV series authors Kulenović and Mirković love their characters, understand their greater and smaller weaknesses, and adopt a Schweikian approach to this crucial decade of recent Yugoslav history, not shying away from any topic, ranging from the media to the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), from the Communist Party to small entrepreneurs, from national discontent to the artistic avant-garde. Contrary to expectations, nostalgia is not the main spice of this excellent TV endeavor, named after the eponymous hit of the Zagreb new wave group *Prljavo kazalište*, as the epoch was revived in a way to communicate with the present – for this reason the series gained such a wide audience. In the fourth season, a middle-aged couple goes through a crisis: the husband is a military person married to

541 *Crno bijeli svijet* (TV series), authors Goran Kulenović and Igor Mirković, 3rd and 4th episodes, season 4, 2021, <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt3674454/>.

542 Dubravka Ugrešić, *Štefica Cvek u raljama života* (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1981).

a housewife. In this miniature, the authors brilliantly portrayed the role of the women's magazine *Svijet*, which was popular at the time, edited by Đurđa Milanović of the Zagreb feminist circle. The husband sees the main reason for his unexpected marital problems in his wife's dedicated reading of *Svijet*, which she regularly "serves" as an example, saying how she no longer wants to live as a silent companion of his officer career, that was to take them, this time, from Zagreb to Banja Luka. Through several episodes, the magazine, which successfully sold an average of 220,000 copies throughout Yugoslavia, "travels" from hand to hand among the characters of "Black and White World," eliciting a variety of comments, from praise for the new feminist spirit to ironic remarks by elderly ladies from Zagreb, who complain that it no longer features a tailoring pattern (the famous tailoring pattern was indeed the subject of heated discussions within the editorial office, between the representatives of the "old" and "new" approach to so-called women's issues, including fashion). The *Svijet* feminists provide employment for the main heroine of the show, the editor Marina, although she is pregnant, and in the end, this biweekly magazine "reconciles" the squabbling married couple, who continue to live in Zagreb. With this miniature – typical of the series' real-life episodes – "Black and White World" speaks more clearly of a pivotal decade than many serious political interpretations. Namely, in the 1980s – despite the one-party system and the lack of genuine political democracy – Yugoslav everyday life underwent (r)evolution; it began looking optimistic, diverse, full of hope, different ideas and lifestyles. Society began to seriously pull itself out of the party's grip, and the same thing began to happen, in a fast-tracked way, to the media.

In many ways, the 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states were some sort of a happy decade, an *interregnum* "between" the weakening and fall of the communist system and the renewal – in some cases the initial establishment – of civic democracy, multiparty systems and market economies. The hopes of individuals and entire societies were at their peak, and the overall belief was that the future could only be better. At the beginning of the 1980s,

on May 4, 1980, the lifetime Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito died. Although all former Yugoslavia republics underwent a liberalization of social and political life – thus also the media – it was not because of the ruling party’s genuine political introspection that changes were needed. Instead, among other things, it was due to the disappearance of the country’s strong leadership “glue” (i.e. Tito). Interest groups, especially the Communist Party and the YPA, became seriously worried about their positions, and thus were far more occupied with themselves than with “disobedient” citizens.

Most European communist regimes were toppled by a (relatively) peaceful surrender of power, in various forms of “velvet” revolutions, while at the same time, for the better part of that decade, many Yugoslav media exercised a provocative attitude towards the government and party-established truths, whether these be socialist self-government, or the cult of comrade Tito. However, the 1980s were not an unadulterated idyll of democratization. At the time, all print media in Croatia, like the rest of Yugoslavia, were under the jurisdiction of the Socialist League of Working People, and the penal code contained the infamous Article 133 of the Criminal Law, which sanctioned “verbal offense” and “hostile propaganda.”

In Jerko Bakotin’s feuilleton “The Croatian Press of the 1980s and Today”, Viktor Ivančić, the longtime charismatic editor-in-chief and journalist of the Split satirical weekly *Feral Tribune* explains the other side of the 1980s – and compares them to the 1990s and present times – “That system encouraged obedience, no doubt. It was not a democratic system. The 1980s should not be mythologized because a certain liberalization of the whole system took place, including the media scene, not to mention the music scene, and so on. Nevertheless, the system was not totalitarian, because it did not retain complete control – but it was undoubtedly undemocratic. Quite simply, if you wanted to gain a modicum of freedom, you had to violate the written laws as well. We were knowingly getting involved in such activities, we knew we were going to be charged for verbal offense when we published some things, but one consciously took these risks. However,

that position was not as cynical as it is today, because at the time, the rules of the game were known. The real folly began in the 1990s, when we had constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, a multiparty system, and all democratic standards, but in reality, we had a tyrannical system, persecuting freedom of speech according to a nationalist matrix – and this persecution was merciless. This is true social hypocrisy. It was not like that in the 1980s. Something else, which was created in the 1990s, was also nonexistent, and that is public intimidation. In the 1980s, the public lynching phenomenon did not exist. You would be quietly removed, editors would be fired, or you would be convicted, but there was no such harangue, incidents of being beaten in the street, something that became the most natural thing in the 1990s. To be made so notorious that then the righteous would beat or kill you in the street. These, namely, are the differences. Today, however, something new is at play – they will leave you without a job.”⁵⁴³

On August 26, 1988, the District Prosecutor’s Office in Split banned *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* for the first time in the 45 years of the Split newspaper’s existence, because of *Feral*. Only two days later, the Municipal Court in Split, in a panel chaired by judge Branko Šerić, lifted the ban, but copies of *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* were not returned to the newsstands. This was the true nature of the 1980s: full democracy did not yet exist, but the regime no longer seriously hindered anyone.

Bakotin’s feuilleton was in fact an extended version of a conversation this journalist, publicist and travel writer recorded in 2012 with four veterans of Croatian print journalism, active in the profession since the 1980s – Marinko Čulić (*Danas* and *Feral Tribune*), Vlado Rajić (*Vjesnik*), Viktor Ivančić (*Feral Tribune*) and Jasna Babić (*Danas*, *Globus*, *Nacional*), for the show *Skrivena strana dana* (Hidden Side of the Day) broadcasted on the Third Program of Croatian Radio, edited by Ljubica Letinić. Jasna Babić, a respected investigative journalist in the 1980s and 1990s in Yugoslav and Croatian journalism (d. 2017),

543 Jerko Bakotin, “Hrvatska štampa 80-ih i danas”, feuilleton in five sequels, *Lupiga* 2017, www.lupiga.com.

revealingly explained the position of the two most important political weekly magazines of the 1980s, Zagreb's *Danas* and Belgrade's *NIN*.

Danas is important for the history of Croatian journalism at least because it was the first relevant political newspaper to compete with the equally important and very good Belgrade-based *NIN*. To that extent, a Yugoslav market where this kind of competition could appear really existed. Although Croatia was considered a republic without the ability to produce a strong political magazine, *Danas* demonstrated just the opposite. After all, my last article in *Danas* – before I moved to *Globus* – was entitled “The War Can Start” and it was a text that made Tudman furious. He claimed that *Danas* was spreading war panic and that there would be no war. This article I wrote, therefore, announced the war. It was one of the days after August 17, 1990.⁵⁴⁴

Bakotin's interlocutors, numerous newspaper professionals, as well as the media audience, believed that in a formally one-party system without freedom of speech the media were much more relevant than they are today. Is that so? And if so, why? How was it possible that, in many cases – those same media, flourishing signs of the coming democracy – turned into war machines in record time? This text will try to answer these – as well as many other – questions about the media in the 1980s taking into account both the origins of media progress in Croatian and Yugoslav society before the 1980s, but also the disappointing developments in the early 1990s. One should bear in mind that, among the advocates of independent, professional and responsible media, which serve the public interest, from the mid-1960s – regardless of the then one-party system – to the present day, an ideological divide exists between those who believe that the media can fulfill their informative and social function within the commercial media framework, while others believe that only the so-called non-profit media can genuinely nurture autonomous and independent journalism, and thus serve the public.

544 Jerko Bakotin, “Hrvatska štampa 80-ih i danas”, feuilleton in five sequels, *Lupiga* 2017, www.lupiga.com

There is a social consensus that the 1980s were the best years of Croatian and Yugoslav journalism, and the circulations sold support this thesis – even without taking into account the size of the Yugoslav market and the fact that, in the meantime, print journalism experienced a major global crisis. Newspapers on offer were exceptionally diverse, the print media market crossed the borders of the republics, and in terms of today's standards in Croatia, but also everywhere else in the former Yugoslavia, the number of copies sold was incredible. In the late 1980s, for example, the number of copies of the political weekly *Danas* sold reached 180,000, of which one fifth was sold outside Croatia. Belgrade's *NIN* sold over 200,000 copies, while Ljubljana's *Mladina* – an alternative magazine – sold over 100,000 copies in Slovenia and other republics. *Start* was sold in 200,000 copies, *Večernji list* up to 370,000 copies, *Vjesnik*, a hundred thousand, and, in their best days, regional newspapers such as *Slobodna Dalmacija* reached the massive circulation of 150,000 copies.

THE 1980S (NONETHELESS) DID NOT FALL FROM THE SKY

In the former Yugoslavia, for decades following the Second World War, all newspapers, as well as electronic media, were considered primarily to ideologically transmit politics. Their primary task was to offer guidance to the readers in terms of information and ideology. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslav newspapers, still publicly owned, began to take small steps towards liberalization, as well as to behave more professionally. In addition to their progress in the technological and professional sense, the media began to develop a different self-understanding of their role in society, in terms of an independent, and even corrective social factor. Political changes, however, mostly affected the professionalization and partial independence of the media.

Given the fact that Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a one-party, socialist state, change was impossible without either tacit or open party support. In the mid-1960s, in Yugoslavia, two factions within the Communist Party fought for supremacy. The first, dogmatic and centralist

faction, was led by Aleksandar Ranković, the then vice-president of Yugoslavia. The opposing faction of the communist leadership was reform-oriented and called for decentralization of the state, i.e., greater rights of republics within the federation, as well as some elements of the free market. In 1962, President Josip Broz Tito publicly advocated decentralization and practically supported the reformists, and in the spirit of reform, a new Yugoslav constitution was adopted (in 1963) and the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was held in 1964. Belgrade author, founder and president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Sonja Biserko, in her paper “The Role of the Media in Preparing for War,”⁵⁴⁵ revealingly describes how the struggle for Tito’s legacy began in the 1970s, when it became clear that Yugoslavia could not be preserved as a centralized federation:

However, the Serbs perceived Yugoslavia only as it was, and every attempt to reform it, as an attack on the Serbian people. The key dates for the ‘dismantling’ of the centralist state should also be mentioned: the Brioni Plenum (1966), the student demonstrations (1968), the first Albanian demonstrations (1968), and the adoption of the ‘confederate’ Constitution (1974).⁵⁴⁶

In this sense, the most significant phenomenon in Croatia was the Croatian Spring, a social movement for political and administrative decentralization with national overtones (the movement was heterogeneous and partly nationalistic), but also for the liberalization of political and economic life. During this period, various cultural institutions expanded their freedom of action, and so did the media. With the collapse of the Croatian Spring in late 1971 and early 1972, the process of strengthening the media was interrupted, but the seeds were sown. At the same time, the 1969–1972 movement for the liberalization of the Communist Party and the society, led by Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović in Serbia, was stifled. Both Nikezić and Perović

545 Sonja Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata,” July 2002, www.helsinki.org.rs.

546 Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata”.

were dismissed, together with their associates, on charges of anarcho-liberalism. During this period, large student demonstrations in June 1968 in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana also played a very important role, criticizing the red bourgeoisie and communist privileges, and demanding social justice and a reform of socialism. The strongest protests took place in Belgrade and lasted a full week. The police physically assaulted the students and banned all public events, but they gathered at the Faculty of Philosophy, where they held debates and speeches, and distributed copies of the banned *Student* magazine. The youth were supported by well-known artists and intellectuals, such as film director Dušan Makavejev, actor Stevo Žigon and poet Desanka Maksimović, who later had problems due to their engagement. Tito managed to end these protests by giving his famous televised speech on June 9, claiming that “the students are right”, and promising social reforms. However, in the following years, student leaders suffered police persecution, among them the most famous was the film author Lazar Stojanović.

The evolution of the newspaper profession in that period was accompanied by the establishment of numerous new papers, as well as the improvement of existing publications throughout Yugoslavia. There was also a flourish of magazine editions: at that time, for example, the Zagreb biweekly *Start* and the Serbian magazine *Duga* were initiated, to become, in the 1980s, among the most important and influential newspapers in Yugoslavia. In the mid-1960s, the Zagreb *VUS (Vjesnik u srijedu)* stood out prominently, as a political weekly that began to advocate for elements of a market economy – the so-called fair trade between the republics, which was considered a Croatian nationalist approach – as well as for some principles of civil society, which was, at the time, branded as an almost counter-revolutionary act. Within the same period, youth newspapers such as *Omladinski tjednik*, *Polet* and *Pop Express* were also initiated under the auspices of the Youth Association. Newspapers dealing with culture, such as *Telegram*, emerged on the market, and in 1971, *Hrvatski tjednik* began publishing, though it had a rather short lifespan, from April of that

year, until being banned in December. Of interest, beyond doubt, was also *Studentski list*, a newspaper of the Student Union, in which many young journalists worked – many of them with a worldview formed by the 1968 student protests – who were still active in the 1980s, during the flourishing of Yugoslav media. On the one hand, there were journalists who experienced nation, market, and civic awakening – some of them with a nationalist orientation – and on the other, there were authors with faith in the political ideas of the left and a better socialism, with a philosophical foothold in the Frankfurt School and Yugoslav *Praxis*, attracted to new social movements such as feminism, and anti-war and hippie movements. In various forms, this social, ideological and media divide has persisted to this day. One of the reasons the media had its golden moment in the 1980s until the appearance of Milošević, was an unspoken minimal social consensus among editors and journalists, notwithstanding national or political affiliation and worldview, regarding priorities: freedom of speech, building and preserving professional standards, and opening up a democratic space. Had this consensus been stronger, it would have had a chance to persevere through the 1990s, and to “emerge” towards the present in the form of a professional media, belonging to different genres and worldviews. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

The federal media dispatched by the party center, such as the newspapers *Komunist* and *Borba*, or the news agency *Tanjug*, received much more funding than the republican media primarily due to their significance ideologically and politically for spreading a unified message. However, in 1968, the centrist model slowly began to collapse, and thus, in that crucial year, Ivo Bojanić, director of RTV Zagreb, decided to terminate the joint TV daily news with RTV Belgrade and broadcast independent Zagreb daily news.⁵⁴⁷ In the second half of the 1960s, radio and television broadcasts began to develop more dynamically on the entire territory of Yugoslavia, and a lot was invested in

547 Josip Mihaljević, “Liberalizacija i razvoj medija u komunističkoj Hrvatskoj 1960-ih i na početku 1970-ih,” *Društvena istraživanja* 24, no. 2 (2015): 245.

transmitters, so that, for example, by the end of 1971, the whole of Croatia was covered by a TV signal, which resulted in an increased number of TV sets in households. In 1961, the payment of a mandatory TV subscription was introduced. Freedom grew, and on October 26, 1967, the Federation of Journalists of Yugoslavia asked the President of the Federal Executive Council (SIV), Mika Špiljak, to implement the constitutional provision on public access to information from all state and public institutions, proposing that the sessions of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) be open for journalists, which Špiljak accepted. This practice was soon abandoned, upon the intervention of Tito and Kardelj, who considered it an “exaggeration” in the application of constitutional principles.⁵⁴⁸ This situation is very reminiscent of today’s Law on Access to Information obliging public and state bodies to be transparent about their work to the media – who exercise it not without problems.

The 1960s were a time of global media prosperity and the development of media self-awareness – although, of course, the latter had also existed previously. In a classic Hollywood masterpiece, the movie *The Man Who Killed Liberty Valance* (1962) by John Ford, a small publisher and journalist in a remote wild west town, whose editorial office is practically a one-man band, defends his newspaper’s right to free expression, resisting not only pressure from interest groups, but also the vicious physical assaults of a local sadistic gunfighter. Journalism has never been a benign vocation, but in the 1960s, media freedom began to be treated as one of the fundamental human rights in the developed world. What exactly did this mean for the media? That their mission be primarily focused on the interests of the so-called general public? That independence from the executive should be legally guaranteed? That any violation of media independence should be addressed by the judiciary, not the executive? That the media outlets must provide comprehensive information on state and public affairs as well as differing views on issues that trouble the state and society, or international relations,

548 Mihaljević, “Liberalizacija i razvoj medija,” 248.

as well as the world globally? Of course, no legal norms can fully guarantee professionalism to journalists, or an autonomous position and independence in their work. This profession must battle daily for these goals, because the methods of applying external pressure in the modern environment are multiple, intertwined between advertisers, politicians and publishers, and the effects are no less brutal than those suffered by the newspaper editor in the wild west.

ALL IN TEN YEARS: FROM BLOOMING JOURNALISM TO WARMONGERING MEDIA

The information space of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1980s reflected the party's further need for media control, but it also bore the imprint of positive developments in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s. The information space was divided by republican borders – all republics and autonomous provinces had their own TV outlets (RTV Zagreb, RTV Sarajevo, RTV Ljubljana, RTV Belgrade, while Yugoslav Radio-Television, with its Belgrade TV Center, operated in Belgrade). Also, following the ideal model of control of large systems, the republics had one or more media companies each – *Vjesnik* in Zagreb, *Politika* and *BIGZ* in Belgrade, *Oslobođenje* in Sarajevo, *Delo* in Ljubljana. Most often, one electronic media source (republic television) and one daily newspaper – in the Croatian case *Vjesnik*, in the Serbian *Politika*, in the Slovenian *Delo*, etc. – were the semi-official bullhorns of republic governments, always under the watchful eye of republic authorities. Republic party committees kept editorial policies under a magnifying glass, following changes in their work, no matter how small. Given that the reach and importance of television were well understood, the head of television was also most often a member of the republic's Central Committee.⁵⁴⁹

549 Jasmina Kuzmanović, "Media: The Extension of Politics by Other Means," in *Beyond Yugoslavia. Politics, Economics and Culture in a Shattered Community*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša. S. Adamovich (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1995), 83–98.

In the second half of the 1980s, the gradual liberalization and change of social climate encouraged a larger number of newspapers and magazines throughout the former Yugoslavia to gradually opt for a more liberal view of society – more or less openly – with the implicit ideal of multipartyism. The prominent Croatian and Yugoslav intellectual Slavko Goldstein called for the necessity of multiparty elections in the late 1980s, precisely in the Zagreb-based *Danas*. When it comes to liberalized speech or the selection of authors, topics and approach, the political weekly *NIN* in Belgrade, the biweekly *Start* in Zagreb and the alternative youth weekly *Mladina* in Ljubljana were in the lead. The media cultivated different strategies: the weeklies *Danas* and *NIN* openly analyzed party policies, offered economic analyses and critical columns, and names that were not at all to the party's liking began to appear among the authors – themselves as external collaborators. Economic issues were also scrutinized, yielding extensive stories that demonstrated the failures of party policy, and thus of the overall state policy. Among the most relevant topics was the failed aluminum industry in Obrovac. This is something *Danas* wrote about, exposing political and party violations of economic preconditions for successful business – namely, inaccurate estimates were made concerning the amount of bauxite, which is processed into aluminum. The financing model was also unfavorable, so the assessment regarding the Obrovac factory, before it was finally closed, concluded that it generated less costs when it did not operate, than when it worked.

In 1969, Radio Belgrade 202 started operating in Belgrade, TV Sarajevo began broadcasting its own program, and the *Start* magazine (1969–1991) was launched in Zagreb. *Start* was also interesting genre-wise – it was not a political weekly, and, in a way, this magazine behaved as if there was no party at all, experiencing its full bloom in the 1980s. So-called “worldly” lifestyle topics were treated, prominent intellectuals were interviewed, as well as stars, both domestic and global. Journalists traveled everywhere and wrote about everything, from the report on female sexuality by Shere Hite (the so-called Hite Report) to interviews with Olga Hebrang, all spiced up with the

so-called *Playboy*-style double-page spreads. From today's feminist point of view, and the dominant discourse of political correctness, many would be surprised that two feminists, Slavenka Drakulić and Vesna Kesić, published articles in a *Playboy*-like magazine. But the high quality of journalism, great circulation and the tackling of new contents was an opportunity not to be missed. *Start* aimed at a wide audience in the 1980s, and it is interesting to note that the editorial board published its circulation statistics for each issue from 1983 to mid-1985, so that we know circulation reached 210,000 copies.

Each issue of *Start* – as described by Dragan Golubović in his article on *Analiziraj.ba* – included topics ranging from politics (foreign and domestic), to culture, technology, curiosities, and entertainment.⁵⁵⁰ During 1985, the editorial board commissioned a study of the demographics of its readers. The data were published in the August issue, and the analysis showed that *Start* readers were mostly men (74.4 percent), while 24.6 percent were women, and that 62.2 percent of readers had a high school or university degree. This readers' profile required not only entertaining content, but also topics that could satisfy the high percentage of the audience with a university degree. *Start* journalists also interviewed almost all of the key people from the former Yugoslavia, as well as globally important persons such as: Noam Chomsky, Susan Sontag, Saul Bellow, Arthur Miller, Günter Grass, Ruud Gullit, Michel Platini, Krzysztof Kieslowski and Linus Carl Pauling, who was already a two-time Nobel laureate at the time, and was later placed on the list of the 20 most influential scientists of all time by *New Scientist* magazine. The importance of *Start* for public opinion at the time was its readiness to open new topics that remained unpopular reading in contemporary society. An interview with the American feminist Gloria Steinem, conducted by Slavenka Drakulić in December 1983, and published in May 1985, tackled the

550 Dragan Golubović, "Zagrebački Start: Najvažniji magazin bivše Jugoslavije," *Analiziraj.ba*, 2016, <https://analiziraj.ba/zagrebacki-start-najvazniji-magazin-bvse-jugoslavije-1/>.

role of women in society and the strengthening of the feminist movement. In the same issue, journalist Dubravka Tomeković published her article “The First Yugoslav Gay Radio” in which she recounted the countercultural show *Frigidna utičnica* (Frigid Outlet) of the Zagreb Youth Radio, edited and hosted by Sead Alić. One of the guests on the show was Toni Marošević, a cult urban figure from the 1980s, and a man who had a brave coming-out, despite numerous negative reactions. Later, Radio 101 developed serious political shows such as *Week Report*, run by the great journalists and authors Zinka Bardić, Nataša Magdalenić Bantić and Lidija Šeparović, but also special humorous formats such as *Zločesta djeca* (Naughty Children), a cult show run from the mid-1980s to the 1990s by a group of journalists, nurturing a mixture of local and Monty Python-like humor, making (only) the Zagreb audience laugh to tears (“only” because the broadcast frequency did not reach beyond Zagreb).

Start was also one of the first newspapers in the former Yugoslavia to deal with the media itself, its own professional world. A series of articles on domestic and foreign newspapers was a thematic novelty, and interviews were published with the founders and editors of the largest newspaper outlets, such as Hubert Beuve-Mery, founder of *Le Monde*, Eugenio Scalfari, longtime editor of *L'Espresso*, and Stephen Samuel Rosenfeld, editor of *The Washington Post*. The disintegration of Yugoslavia can be clearly traced through the topic of Kosovo issues, the analysis of the economic situation in the country, as well as through articles dealing with the rise of nationalism and armament. Furthermore, the editorial office opened its doors to intellectuals who did not represent the political establishment. Interviews with Slavoj Žižek, Zagorka Golubović, Ivan Supek, Srđa Popović, Vlado Gotovac and others were published. At the very end of the decade, in 1989, religious leaders also talked to *Start*, first in a published interview with the then Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church German, and immediately after, with Cardinal Franjo Kuharić and Reis ul-ulema Husein Mujić.

Slovenian *Mladina*, on the other hand, systematically demolished party cults – starting with the most important, and that was the cult of Tito, followed by the cult of the Yugoslav People’s Army. They especially targeted the baton, in its symbolically powerful phallic shape, ridiculing the custom that cultivated Tito’s personality cult. Young people jogged all over Yugoslavia, carrying and passing to each other Tito’s birthday baton (the so-called youth baton), which was solemnly presented to the Yugoslav president every year on May 25 (Youth Day), at a mega stadium rally in Belgrade, one even Chinese communists would not be ashamed of. *Mladina* also connected with *Neue Slowenische Kunst* (NSK), an avant-garde art collective founded by the music group *Laibach*, whose membership included the art group *IRWIN*, as well as the Teatar Sestara Scipion Nasice (Scipion Nasice Sisters Theater). In 1987, NSK won a competition for the Youth Day poster, by daring to present a “socialist-realism” design that was actually Nazi-kunst. The background was a painting by Nazi artist Richard Klein, where the German flag was replaced by the Yugoslav, and the eagle by a dove. The authorities interpreted this move as an attempt to equate Tito with Hitler. The federal authorities considered *Mladina* – which showed open contempt for the Communist Party, the state and socialism, and was a completely alternative magazine in its worldview and cultural choices – a serious state enemy, and therefore events in the late 1980s related to *Mladina* were directly linked to Slovenia’s determination to fight for independence. At that time, the later Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša published several critical texts about the Yugoslav People’s Army in *Mladina*.

In the late 1980s, certain professional media and democratic standards had already been established, but, unfortunately, Milošević was by then on his political and media war offensive. Pressured by the atmosphere in the country, and a series of velvet revolutions, the Croatian communist authorities agreed to a multiparty system in November 1989, with the first democratic elections held in April 1990. The then Television Zagreb seemed to be waiting for its chance; the program was produced quite professionally, although the political and

surveillance system was, in the formal sense, still quite rigid. Television Zagreb did a very good job of covering the first multiparty elections, and an effort was made to produce the pre-election TV program according to the rules of the profession. Shortly after the elections, after the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) formed the government, Television Zagreb, which became Croatian Television, underwent a serious purge of journalists and editors, based on nationality, but also on political affiliation. Croatian film director Antun Vrdoljak, who was the director general of Croatian Radio and Television from 1991 to 1995, played a particularly important role in removing Serbian and other undesirable “cadres.” The program “slipped” into waving the flag and the “šahovnica” (chessboard, the coat of arms of the Republic of Croatia), in the literal and thematic sense, and soon after, as the armed conflict began, into a real war program.

Until the last minute, the communist authorities in Croatia were unprepared to stand firmly against Milošević’s nationalism and his attempt to dominate the whole of Yugoslavia, and the Zagreb media called it “Croatian silence.” In the feuilleton of Jerko Bakotin, Viktor Ivančić spoke about the media scene of the 1980s, as well as his personal taste:

In Croatia, *Danas* was the first to oppose this policy of Milošević, and then, through *Danas*, that famous Croatian silence was broken. This was important for Croatia at that time. But in terms of style, that newspaper didn’t appeal to me. That kind of journalism was overly analytical for my taste, and I found Split journalism in the 1980s far more interesting. I think it was much livelier. First of all, we were lucky to have several editors who worked in *Slobodna Dalmacija* at that time. I am referring to Joško Kulušić in the first place, a man who sensed the pulse and allowed talented youth and new voices to work. News reporting was nurtured, as well some genres that had already been discarded in the upper country. For me personally, *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* was far more interesting than *Danas*, even though *Danas* had a larger circulation. It was journalism that was closer to the street, rather than, for example, some analysis of the work of the

Central Committee, which could be critical one way or another, but you constantly had to guess whether they were in favor of this or that current in the party. Split newspapers – both *Nedjeljna* and *Slobodna Dalmacija* – were livelier than *Vjesnik* and *Danas*. Not to mention the Belgrade weekly *Intervju*, whose first editor-in-chief was Aleksandar Tijanić. It was a very interesting newspaper. *NIN* was also good. Later, it all more or less went to hell, but it used to be relatively lively.⁵⁵¹

In the second half of the 1980s, when Milošević came to power and successfully stifled most of the Serbian media, Zagreb's *Danas* began to seriously reassess that policy, albeit calmly and without nationalism. Marinko Čulić, one of the prominent authors of *Danas* and later of *Feral Tribune*, recalls:

We reacted fiercely. Jelena Lovrić trampled him so much that, in the end, he allegedly trampled *Danas* – in fact not allegedly, but really, and this was published several times – he would literally throw it on the floor and trample it with his feet. At the time of that famous Croatian silence – however imprecise this notion may be – we were absolutely at the forefront of this confrontation. If people had listened to that voice for a year or two, maybe the resistance to Milošević would have been stronger and more controlled, because when resistance to Milošević later happened, that resistance was Milošević-like – uncontrolled, crazy, unwise. We were measured, we knew exactly why we were criticizing him, not because he was a Serb. In the end, it turned out that that was the main problem.⁵⁵²

Social movements and the development of free media

Along with the media of the 1980s, a development of social movements and civil society in the former Yugoslavia began. The so-called youth media, in particular, followed that path. *Polet*, the newspaper of the Alliance of Socialist Youth, began to change significantly in the

551 Jerko Bakotin, “Hrvatska štampa 80-ih i danas”, feuilleton in five sequels, Lupiga 2017, www.lupiga.com

552 Jerko Bakotin, “Hrvatska štampa 80-ih i danas”, feuilleton in five sequels, Lupiga 2017, www.lupiga.com

late 1970s. There were more and more articles about music – which represented a specific socially subversive phenomenon – and the media discourse was changing, the language of the street and youth started to appear in the articles, and an alternative view of the world was expressed through newspaper graphics and approaches to photography. *Val* started publishing in Rijeka, *Laus* in Dubrovnik, *NON – Nove omladinske novine* (The New Youth Newspaper) in Serbia.

A very engaged medium was the Zagreb Youth Radio, founded in 1984, as the official radio of the Socialist Youth Association of the Trešnjevka municipality. At that time, Zagreb Youth Radio was already networked with Ljubljana and Belgrade through Ljubljana radio *Študent* (Student) and Belgrade Youth Radio, later known as B92. Youth Radio, today Radio 101, has helped promote liberal-democratic values.

The dynamics of the development of Yugoslav feminism did not overlap with world trends but rather followed its own path. In her article published on the *Kulturpunkt.hr* portal in 2017, Vesna Kesić states that Jill Benderly, in her article “Feminist Movements in Yugoslavia, 1978–1992,”⁵⁵³ offered the following chronological breakdown, based on specific goals and actions.⁵⁵⁴ The first period, 1978–1985, initiated by the conference Drug-ca žena (Comrade women), is considered the period of the creation of feminist discourse. In this period, feminist research on the realities of women’s lives was launched in sociology and social theory, such as the research of Anđelka Milić, Žarana Papić, Vesna Pusić, etc., as well as on women’s history and the history of the feminist movement in the former Yugoslavia, which was researched by Lydia Sklevicky. Texts on feminist philosophy were published by Rada Iveković and Blaženka Despot, and significant attempts were

553 Jill Benderly, “Feminist Movements in Yugoslavia, 1978–1992,” in *State – Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945–1992*, ed. Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine and Carol S. Lilly (London: MacMillan, 1997).

554 Vesna Kesić, “Kako se kalio feminizam: od DRUG-ce žena do Građanke,” *Kulturpunkt.hr*, 2017, <https://www.kulturpunkt.hr/content/kako-se-kalio-feminizam-od-drug-ce-zene-do-gradanke>.

made to reinterpret the artistic and literary canon in the works of numerous female scholars and curators, from Ingrid Šafranek and Jelena Zuppa, to numerous other authors. The second period of development of the feminist movement in the former Yugoslavia, from 1986 to 1991, was characterized by feminist activism, within which projects of direct assistance to women victims of domestic violence emerged. The third period, from 1991 onwards, was a period of feminist opposition to war and nationalisms.

The progress in feminism influenced the evolution of journalism on the Yugoslav media scene, and new topics simply flared up. Female sexuality, labor rights, treatment of the female body in the media, women's participation in politics, the global feminist movement, the disintegration of patriarchal upbringings, women's history, and finally women's literature – from Marguerite Duras to Slavenka Drakulić and Dubravka Ugrešić, women's specificities and new phenomena suddenly gained the right to become public. In the 1980s, women's journalism definitely gained momentum, concurrently with the development process of the first period of the feminist movement. Some of the strongest journalistic names of this decade were Slavenka Drakulić, Vesna Kesić, Maja Milles, Jelena Lovrić, Jasmina Kuzmanović, Ines Sabalić, Jasna Babić and Đurđa Milanović; they were, for the most part, pillars of the media in which they worked or collaborated. The disintegration which took place in the 1980s was, perhaps, best manifested in nationalist and anti-women attacks and campaigns in the 1990s, the fiercest of which was the so-called case of the “witches” from Rio, which speaks equally of women's subordinate position in public and society as well as of the violence of the media, which tried to improve circulation and achieve nationalist homogenization primarily on the backs of women. In May 1993, Meredith Tax, an American writer and organizer of feminist actions,

published an article about this case, in the prestigious American magazine *The Nation*.⁵⁵⁵

“Croatian feminists rape Croatia” read the headline in the weekly *Globus* in December 1992, which published the story about five “witches” who – as the article claimed – in order to impose themselves as political dissidents and derive personal benefits from it, launched a series of shameful actions: they covered up the rape of Bosnian women and “gossiped” about their country by talking about media censorship in Croatia to PEN international, a reputable network of writers that monitors freedom of expression globally and opposes its suppression.⁵⁵⁶ Five women authors were placed on *Globus*’ defendant’s bench: Vesna Kesić, Slavenka Drakulić, Jelena Lovrić, Rada Iveković and Dubravka Ugrešić. An article in *Globus* was accompanied by a table with their personal data: place of origin (proving that they are not of pure Croatian blood), political affiliation, occupation, address, etc., although some information was incorrect. The five women were accused of concealing information about Serbian rape camps, although Drakulić and Kesić did indeed write about war rape. They were accused of describing crimes as crimes committed by men against women, and not as crimes committed by Serbs against Croat and Muslim women in Bosnia. Also, their “sin” was that they published a lot in foreign media, read foreign literature, complained too much, and had problematic views. Tax quotes the paradigmatic part:

Almost without exception, they were girls of communism! Girls from the families of intelligence officers, police officers, prison guards, diplomats, and high state and party officials. The few among them who, despite their theoretical position and physical appearance, managed to find a life or marital partner, chose something according to JUS (Yugoslav Standard): Rada Iveković, a Serb from Belgrade,

555 Slavenka Drakulić, *Smrtni grijesi feminizma/Ogledi o mudologiji* (extended edition), introduction by Zsófia Lorand – “Ulozi feminizma” – and afterword by Meredith Tax – “Pet žena koje neće ušutkati” (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2020)

556 See PEN International’s Charter at <https://pen-international.org/who-we-are/the-pen-charter>.

Slavenka Drakulić, a Serb (twice) from Croatia, and Jelena Lovrić a Serb from Croatia. This would be immoral to mention if not for the fact that, if observed together, it appears to be a systematic political choice, rather than a random choice based on love.⁵⁵⁷

In accordance with the new market media conditions, the signature under the article against “witches” read the “*Globus* investigative team.” The same was true for the slanderous feuilleton about the actress Mira Furlan, who was previously fired from the Croatian National Theater and, at the time, already lived outside Croatia with her husband. In this feuilleton, she was declared a mentally unstable person, who, to say the least, does not love Croatia. Such journalistic presentation was supposed to guarantee the seriousness of an “investigative” approach and cover the media harangue with the cloak of “anonymous” serious investigative journalism, one would assume like in *The Economist* or the German *Der Spiegel*. In fact, it was solely about protecting the identity of producers of gossip, slander and public humiliation.

Only a few years passed between this article – an arrest warrant, which violated all professional and ethical norms – and the golden 1980s; and although all the women on the “witch” list are now intellectually and career-wise accomplished, some of them writing about Croatia and in Croatia even today, the collective female force that existed in the public space of the 1980s has disappeared. In the first American edition of Slavenka Drakulić’s book *Cafe Europa*, a sentence on the book’s cover reads as follows: “Today in Eastern Europe the architectural work of revolution is complete; the old order has been replaced by various forms of free-market economy and de jure democracy.”⁵⁵⁸ This is a short and clear sentence about the process of social change after the fall of communism, which included the decline

557 Hrvatske feministice siluju Hrvatsku, *Globus*ov investigativni tim, *Globus*, Zagreb, 11 December 1992, page 42.

558 Slavenka Drakulić, *Cafe Europa. Life After Communism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996)

of journalistic freedoms and intellectual autonomy during the war, followed by embarking on a road towards new conservatism, national isolation, and populist political “solutions.”

In the 1990s, the development of social movements was particularly important, as that voice often made up for the lack of media and other critical voices. In her text, Vesna Kesić stated that, in the second half of the 1980s, a younger, “second wave” generation of activists worked on developing a system for direct assistance to women. It was a practice-oriented generation; street actions were organized as well as counseling centers for women, and, in 1990, they squatted in a space that grew into a safe house for women (today’s Autonomous Women’s House Zagreb). In the summer of 1991, the Anti-War Campaign was founded in Zagreb, whose founders were mostly activists of Svarun and the Women’s Group Trešnjevka. Within the programs that included peacekeeping, non-violence, ecology and conscientious objection against military service, a section Women for Peace also operated. At the same time, the Center for Anti-War Action was established in Belgrade. The two projects collaborated systematically during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, functioning as an incubator for many peace initiatives, including anti-war feminist groups such as the Zagreb and Belgrade Women’s Lobby, the Center for Women Victims of War (Zagreb), Women in Black, the Autonomous Women’s Center (Belgrade), Women’s Infotheque, B.a.B.e, Medica Zenica and many others. It is no coincidence that, during the 1990s, when the media beat the drums of war, these women’s organizations, with their activism and courageous public reporting, embodied the resistance to the prevailing political and media discourse: in this sense, the role of Women in Black in Serbia is especially important.

THE RISE OF MILOŠEVIĆ: MEDIA FRENZY AND THE REAL WAR

In the early 1980s, the Serbian media, like other media in Yugoslavia, became more independent and open. However, after a nationalist homogenization in Serbia took place, most devoted themselves to this political goal, playing a very important role in the whole process

of inciting and, later, waging war. In her text “The Role of the Media in the Preparation of War,” Sonja Biserko writes:

Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981 were used to open the Serbian national question and to initiate the Serbian nationalist euphoria. The YPA openly entered the political scene and, in effect, occupied Kosovo. The Serbian elite returned to its national program, which was being prepared on an informal level since the early 1970s, and articulated into a program in 1986, when the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (SASA) was published.⁵⁵⁹

Today, the SASA Memorandum sounds like a title of a document to be understood and discussed by intellectuals, politicians and experts, however, the exact opposite took place. It comprises the essence of the conflict and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and its content was repeated and retold so many times in the media that it could be repeated and well understood by every adult citizen of the former state, regardless of educational status. It could be said that this was propaganda material that first flooded Serbia, and then raised the alarm in other republican and national publics of the former state. The Memorandum formulated the Serbian national question as a state question, which could only be resolved by creating a new state, on the foundations of the old Yugoslavia. Biserko explains: “The basic thesis for this approach was that Serbs could not live as a minority in Croatia or Bosnia after the break-up of Yugoslavia, while the Croat and Muslim questions were perceived as anti-Serb from the start.”⁵⁶⁰ According to the Memorandum, Serbia and the Serbian people also faced three additional problems: “Serbia’s economic underdevelopment, the unresolved legal status with respect to Yugoslavia and

559 <https://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf>
https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorandum_SANU, the original document of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art was published by the daily newspapers *Večernje novosti*, Belgrade, 24 and 25 September 1986

560 Sonja Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata,” July 2002, www.helsinki.org.rs.

the provinces, and the genocide in Kosovo.”⁵⁶¹ While Serbs in Kosovo were “victims of physical, political and legal genocide,” in Croatia they were “exposed to assimilation.”⁵⁶² The basic thesis of the Memorandum was that Yugoslav decentralization was the root of the crisis of the entire state, and of the problems the Serbian people were facing. Thus, the memorandum defined, with a high level of precision, the main topics that gained first-class importance in the media and were repeated to exhaustion. The Serbian communist leadership was divided with respect to the Memorandum standpoints and views, and the final victory, at the Eighth Session of the LCS Central Committee (September 1987), was achieved by the nationalist current led by Slobodan Milošević and his intellectual alter ego, the main ideologue, writer Dobrica Ćosić.

As an extremely capable populist politician, Milošević managed to gain mass support in Serbia, and turn his policy into a mass movement. Milošević began his campaign against the media paradigmatically, with the prestigious and largely circulated daily *Politika*, which was also a relevant social forum. Biserko describes Milošević’s first coup, which was “the publication of a humorous piece entitled “Vojko and Savle” which attacked and confronted people who did not support Milošević in the most shameful way. Two academicians, Gojko Nikoliš, a medical doctor and a general, and Pavle Savić, a world-famous physicist, were semi-hidden under the distorted names. The insulting text was aimed at intimidating the increasingly loud critics of the system. This affair was strongly condemned by a part of the public, which demanded that the name of the author (which is still not known with certainty) be disclosed. 67 *Politika* journalists signed a petition, which, however, was not published by either *Politika* or *Ekspres politika*. *Politika*’s column *Odjeci i reagovanja* (Echoes and Reactions), which was created in 1988 and was shut down in 1991,

561 Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata”

562 Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata” <https://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf>

after fulfilling the purpose of political radicalization in the country, belonged to a similar category of false popular rostrum.

Milošević used *Politika* for settling accounts with political opponents as early as in the fall of 1988. Concurrently with the cleansing of the League of Communists, personnel changes took place in the electronic and print media. As Sonja Biserko writes, *Politika* had a dual role in these changes: “as Milošević’s representative for ‘cleansing’ and disciplining its own house, as well as to appoint new staff in other editorial boards in Belgrade that opposed Slobodan Milošević’s policy.”⁵⁶³ Milošević build his propaganda machinery with great care; very soon after his victory in the party, *Ekspres* and *Večernje novosti* became the regime’s bullhorns, but Milošević quickly realized that *Politika* and state television, with their reach and reputation for seriousness, had de facto the greatest influence on public opinion. Biserko concludes that Milošević “showed a lot of skill in subduing this newspaper, and it can be said that this was one of his greatest victories in conquering and consolidating, and later preserving power.”⁵⁶⁴ Within the purge in journalism, Milošević fired about 70 editors, destroyed the newspapers *NON* (*Nezavisne omladinske novine*), *Mladost* and *Študent*, and the then president of the Association of Journalists of Serbia, Jug Griželj – one of the well-known and respected Yugoslav journalists – left his leadership position.

At that time, the daily *Borba* took the baton of responsible journalism, publishing numerous topics that *Politika* kept silent about. At the time, *Borba* was closer to the federal government headed by Ante Marković. Milošević did not have a formal lever required to replace personnel⁵⁶⁵ in this paper, because the founder of *Borba* was the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance. According to Sonja Biserko, at that time, *Borba* “rather successfully analyzed the technology of

563 Sonja Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata,” July 2002, www.helsinki.org.rs.

564 Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata”

565 The editor-in-chief of *Borba* at that time was Staša Marinković.

Slobodan Milošević for gaining power.”⁵⁶⁶ There was an attempt to destabilize *Borba* by a strike of graphic designers, incited by *Politika* and *Ekspres politika*. On that occasion, *Politika* wrote that “*Borba*’s graphic designers, under the pretext that the editorial office was not paying what it owed them, were, in fact, rejecting the editorial policy of this paper, which was hostile to Serbia.” *NIN* also joined the persecution of *Borba*, by publishing a text in which it accused some of the female editors of *Borba* of “achieving their careers in bed, using their charms, and thus solving their housing problems as well.” Over time, the pressures on *Borba* continued, followed subsequently by pressures of a financial nature, until the paper stopped publishing, in October 1998, just before the NATO intervention.

Immediately after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Serbia (in September 1987), the so-called differentiation, that is, political retribution, in the media started. The editors-in-chief of *NIN* and *Duga* were removed, though of course not without resistance. Editors and journalists resisted, while *NIN* received numerous qualifications as “an anarcho-liberal newspaper, mouthpiece of the opposition, and instigator of national hatred.” Given that *NIN* did not accept Milošević’s personnel solutions, most of the editorial board was eventually barred from work. To the thus “cleansed” *NIN*, Milošević gave his first major interview, on June 30, 1988, which represented the political platform of the new national program. Milošević abandoned his communist rhetoric and became an interpreter of the ideology of “straightening the humiliated Serbian people.”⁵⁶⁷ Immediately after this interview, *Politika* welcomed a delegation of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts on its premises, and fully supported their program, as set out in the Memorandum. After that, the criticism of academicians ceased, as well as criticism of the Memorandum. After his reckoning with political dissidents, Milošević turned to nationalists. Two respectable pillars of seri-

566 Sonja Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata,” July 2002, www.helsinki.org.rs.

567 Biserko, “Uloga medija u pripremi rata”

ous media, which had a reputation throughout the former Yugoslavia, were torn down. Thus began the media war, and soon, the real one as well.

The weekly *Duga* occupied a special place in the gamut of Serbian print media, and before it completely succumbed to Milošević's occupation, it was considered an almost oppositional, libertarian and anti-communist newspaper. However, with the coming to power of Milošević, the magazine was quickly and nationalistically consolidated. *Duga* then dealt intensively with "Croatian issues," that is, the position of Serbs in Croatia, from the political perspective of the Memorandum. It rounded off its activity with a special edition *Srbi u Hrvatskoj* (Serbs in Croatia) in July 1990. *Duga's* columnist Brana Crnčević most often wrote about Serbs in Croatia, talking about the "genocidal nature of the Croatian people,"⁵⁶⁸ while academician and writer Matija Bećković called the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia "the remnants of a slaughtered people."⁵⁶⁹ In any case, the distribution of *Duga* was significantly increased in the Dalmatian hinterland, Lika and Slavonia in order for the "truth" to reach every Croatian citizen of Serbian nationality. At the same time, in the media war, Serbian media and politicians used the metaphor "bare-handed people" for Serbs in Croatia – which soon proved to be factually incorrect, as the Yugoslav People's Army began arming Serbs in Croatia as early as 1990.

In the 1990s, the beacons of free media in Serbia were Radio B92, the daily *Borba* and the weekly *Vreme*. The latter was founded by a group of Serbian liberal intellectuals, including prominent lawyer Srđa Popović. The first issue was published on October 29, 1990, a month before the first multi-party elections in Serbia. Former journalists and editors of *Politika* and *NIN* gathered in *Vreme*, and the slogan of this brilliant weekly was: a magazine without lies, hatred and prejudice. For thirty years, the editor-in-chief of *Vreme* was Dragoljub

568 Biserko, "Uloga medija u pripremi rata"

569 Biserko, "Uloga medija u pripremi rata"

Žarković (d. 2020). The eulogy for Žarković, authored by Bojan Munjin in *Novosti*, the weekly of the Serbian National Council in Croatia, read:

The fate of the first non-regime and liberal weekly in Belgrade in the early 1990s, but also the fate of free journalism among the ruins of Yugoslavia and, later, in Serbia, in its turbulent years, until today, was forged by journalists of *Vreme*, especially its editor-in-chief. From the beginning, the weekly *Vreme*, headed by Žarković for almost three decades, fought against every idea of war and chauvinism, all kinds of atrocities, criminal transition and the ‘what our struggle has given us’ attitude.⁵⁷⁰

And although the 1990s are not the subject of this text, we should not forget that the media boom in the 1980s gave strength to many media, from radio through print media and later digital (portals) to endure the state of war, to swim against the current – to survive against the desires of the ruling elite, and in some cases, against the prevailing mood in their own environments. The best Serbian intellectuals wrote in *Vreme*, from journalists Miloš Vasić and Milan Milošević, to prominent intellectuals such as Vesna Pešić and Srđa Popović, to publicist Stojan Cerović and director Lazar Stojanović. In Croatia, such was *Feral Tribune*, in Sarajevo *Dani*, a political weekly edited brilliantly by Senad Pećanin, and in which authors such as Miljenko Jergović, Aleksandar Hemon, Mile Stojić, Semezdin Mehmedinović and many others wrote. Regardless of the differences between these three newspapers, they certainly did their best to be a refuge for free, critical, and relevant written journalism in the difficult period of the 1990s and beyond, in an open worldview struggle for a civilized society, devoid of obsessive nationalism and numerous other prejudices.

570 Bojan Munjin, “In memoriam/Dragoljub Žarković: Odlazak glavnog urednika svih novinara,” *Novosti* (February 2020), <https://www.portalnovosti.com/in-memoriam-dragoljub-zarkovic-odlazak-glavnog-urednika-svih-novinara>.

AND WHAT NOW?

The kind of culture, and consequently media, desired by a large portion of the audience in the Balkans today is brilliantly described by Katarina Luketić in her book *Balkan: od geografije do fantazije*, using the example of the musical phenomenon of turbo-folk. Luketić says:

This schizophrenic audience is ready to raise a hand in a sign of Ustasha greeting, wear black and sing along with Thompson one day, and the next, jump into a new tight, shiny outfit and indulge in turbo-parties with the hits of Arkan's widow... Such an audience grew up in the 1990s – their habitual image of society is the one that includes nationalism, crime, earning fortunes in times of transition, the rise of a new class, etc. In Serbia, it is an audience that was not able to travel abroad, lived in isolation and poverty, and, in Croatia, an audience that grew up on Tuđman-like narratives. Such an audience was formed mostly by the media, which, in recent years, by turning every content into show business, supported the so called “newly-composed,” narcotizing and retarding cultural matrices, such as the one of turbo-folk.⁵⁷¹

“The principle of democracy,” says Montesquieu in his book *The Spirit of the Laws*, becomes corrupt not only when the spirit of equality is lost, but also when the spirit of extreme equality is adopted, and everyone wants to be equal to those he chooses to command him. At that point the people, unable to bear the very power they confer, want to do everything themselves: deliberate for the senate, execute for the magistrates, and divest all the judges.⁵⁷²

In his book *Erasmova poslovice i Cargo kultovi novog doba*, Darko Polšek further discusses the words of this French lawyer, political philosopher and educator, and states that Montesquieu believed that, in the conditions of extreme equality, no one would respect institutions

571 Katarina Luketić, *Balkan: od geografije do fantazije* (Zagreb, Mostar: Algoritam, 2013), 427.

572 Montesquieu, Baron de., *The Spirit of Laws*, Vol. 1 Cosimo Classics, March 2011. *ibid.*

anymore, and consequently, any virtue would disappear.⁵⁷³ How does this happen? Montesquieu explained that one of the ways for virtue to disappear is to flatter the people. “The people fall into this unhappy state when those whom they trust, trying to hide their own corruption, seek to corrupt them.”⁵⁷⁴ For example, to cover up their sins, politicians speak to the people about their greatness. In order to cover up their own avarice, they corrupt the people completely. This picture of the disintegration of democracy hits close to home in today’s era of populist politics, both left and right wing, which always makes use of the corruption of expectations. Both the left and the right use this method abundantly: whether citizens expect easy money from the state treasury, the abolition of historical (especially racist) injustices through the demolition/deletion of “inappropriate” monuments, films or literary works or a great patriotic catharsis (MAGA and Brexit) and reviving of failed jobs. All these political forces are present at the same time, in all countries of Western democracy, from the United States and Great Britain to Hungary and Poland. Political rifts and the need for new solutions, both for democratic processes and for social inequalities, seem to be tormenting the entire developed world at once, the same world we longed for in the 1980s, as the absolute and definite hope for the future. In such an environment, journalism is always, at the same time, both the desired object of corruption and tangled in its chain, and can use its relationship to the readers, advertisers and publishers, to corrupt in turn its own audience with a turbo-folk approach. It is an illusion to believe that newspapers become “fair” and “good” if they do not have to think about profit. Great and professional newspapers that are part of the media industry exist, serving their readers and the public interest, and, at the same time, being extremely market-successful, just as there are public media servic-

573 Darko Polšek, *Erazmove poslovice i Cargo kultovi novog doba* (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2016), 77–78.

574 Montesquieu, Baron de., *The Spirit of Laws*, Vol. 1 Cosimo Classics, March 2011. *ibid.*

es, such as the BBC, that fulfill their function. There are also alternative non-profit media – funded by the state or various foundations – which often see their media function through a “partisan” world-view lens, as a battle for the goals of justice and freedom for certain social groups, minorities or a certain view of society, political development, etc. There are still too few media outlets in the former Yugoslav republics that are worthy of the compliment of being a media institution, and thus playing the role of a barrier against the loss of trust in all other institutions – which, for the most part, collapsed before they even developed. Universal populism is more easily expressed and thrives on social networks, than in the media. Media that care about the factual truth and do not offer readers easy corruptive promises, but systematically care about expanding the space for different worldviews, freedom of speech, democracy, culture and creativity, human rights and market freedoms require dedicated professionals for everyday battles. We are still waiting for a positive media sequel to the ever so lively 1980s.

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Dejan Kršić

SQUARING THE EIGHTIES

IN THE STRICTLY chronological sense, the appearance of the Novi kvadrat (New Square) group certainly belongs to the 1970s. When the new *Polet* series was launched in 1976, Editor-in-Chief Pero Kvesić appointed young Mirko Ilić as its comics and illustration editor, who used this continuous publishing opportunity to engage a group of colleagues from the School of Applied Arts (Krešimir Zimonić, Igor Kordej and Emir Mešić). They were soon joined by the colleagues whom they mostly met while working part-time at Zagreb Film (Radovan Devlić, Ninoslav Kunc, Joško Marušić and Krešimir Skozret). The group began working under the name Novi kvadrat in 1977 and was then joined by two “dislocated members”, the graphic editor of Belgrade’s *Student* and journal *Vidici*, Nikola Konstadinović, and Ivica Puljak from Osijek. Their media visibility provided an impetus to new domestic comics; they staged exhibitions and engaged in debates. Kordej and Ilić soon got their first designer jobs. In 1979, the group also received the “Seven Secretaries of SKOJ” Award but, towards the end of the year, its members stopped working together. In the same year, a thematic issue of the *Pitanja* magazine titled *Strip–Novi kvadrat* was published with the introductory text by Pero Kvesić,⁵⁷⁵ which cemented the importance of the group as a symbolic tombstone, but remained the only publication that thematized their work for years.⁵⁷⁶

Then why to write again about Novi kvadrat, a phenomenon that has been written about so often that it seems as if we know everything? Moreover, why does the topic of comics (and illustration)

575 Pero Kvesić, “Prethodnici bez nasljednika – strip u zagrebačkoj omladinskoj štampi”, Zagreb: *Pitanja* No. 10, 1979, 6–10.

576 In 1990, Veljko Krulčić published *Put u obećanu zemlju – 12 godina stripa u Poletu* (RS SOH, Zagreb), a wider survey of domestic and foreign comics published in *Polet*.

appear in the anthology dealing with the political aspects of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s? The history of domestic comics is relatively well documented in a large number of publications by enthusiasts and comics professionals like critics and publishers, in particular, as contrasted to academic art history. Although it is almost pointless to write about comics or any other art form without a wider social and political context, in both historico-artistic and fan and professional publications, attention is especially devoted to the internal development of the media, authors' biographies and critical reviews of certain editions, without a political context which only appears as the most general framework of one period of time. Consequently, there is still much that we can say in this context about comics, a phenomenon that is still considered ephemeral and marginal in "serious" academic circles.

INTEREST IN THE EIGHTIES

Over the past years, we have observed a strong interest in various cultural fields – cultural studies, major exhibitions, popular music and fashion in the 1980s. Popular music is still largely rooted in the performers and production styles of the 1980s, while the Hollywood industry still gives the franchises for the TV series launched at that time. When we add to this the *revival* of vinyl records and genres like electro-pop and post-punk, reissues and projects in which artists return to their old albums, it seems as if we live in a very prolonged 1980s. However, this pop culture enthusiasm conceals the fact that the 1980s – the decade whose symbolic beginning was marked by the rise of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, the Iranian revolution and the coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini, also witnessed the "greed is good" logic of the *yuppie* generation and the emergence of designers and models as "superstars". This was the time when artists became a "brand" and artistic works openly emphasized their commodity character – and it was the last decade before the (neo)liberal "end of history". This does not mean, however, that important things did not happen later on, but the logic was different. Thus, the 1980s marked

the beginning of a historical sequence that seemed for some time to be nearing its end with a series of events: from the economic crisis of 2008, through the rise of right-wing populist movements, Brexit and Donald Trump's election, to the COVID-19 pandemic – but like a horror film monster, it never dies, but returns to haunt us. Margaret Thatcher's famous statement that "there is no such thing as society" can finally be understood not as the description of the current situation, but as the *decree* of neoliberalism: *from now on society no longer exists!* And the lesson that may be learned from the current pandemic is that this living dead man, whose name is neoliberalism, cannot find rest, and it will not die, until we reinvent that which we call society.

BETWEEN THE TOTALITARIAN PARADIGM AND YUGONOSTALGIA

After the decades of an organized social oblivion and the systemic erasure of the past – regardless of whether it was a question of books or the demolition of monuments, when academic institutions avoided such themes and political dissidents were accused of Yugonostalgia, the interest in the culture of socialism during the 1980s, in particular, became especially intensive in the media and cultural space of the states created after the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia during the last years. After the initial pop-cultural trend of vernacular Yugonostalgia in the form of *Balkan parties*, as a protest against nationalist and war politics, the appearance of *Lexicon of YU Mythology* made Yugonostalgia fashionable as a commercial exploitation of cultural memory in the form of various *History Textbooks*, *SFRY for Repeaters*, *Tito's Cookbooks*, *Happy Children* and *Seventh Republics*. The former actors on the scene, now the members of the post-socialist media elites, used every anniversary to tirelessly reinterpret their own actions.

Valuable initial impulses from more serious research came primarily from the curatorial projects of the independent cultural scene and work of the young generation of artists and theorists. Today, various aspects of the socialist past are dealt with in scientific papers, books, films and TV series. A series of large media-promoted exhibitions

thematizing Yugoslav cultural and artistic production were staged. Foreign universities and academic publishers encouraged the proliferation of “Yugoslav studies”, so that the socialist *chic* now serves as a “regional spice” in the globalized cultural offer.

The interest in the period of the 1980s is emphasized by the fact that in the collective imagination of (post-)Yugoslavs this decade, in particular, was marked by pop culture – which is often confined to mythical topoi such as *Zvečka*, *Polet*, *Azra* and *Film*, *Lapidarija* and Kulušić, the Student Cultural Centre, Sarajevo’s Olympic Games, *New Primitives* and the like – so that just the topics of the documentaries like *Sretno dijete* (A Happy Child), which focuses the story about new wave on the mythology of *Zvečka*, *Kad Miki kaže da se boji* (When Miki Says He Is Afraid), an interesting documentary about the characters from Štulić’s songs, *Dugo putovanje kroz istoriju, historiju i povijest* (A Long Journey Through Balkan History), *Orkestar* (The Orchestra), documentary TV series *Robna kuća* (The Department Store) and *SFRJ za početnike* (The SFRY for Beginners), as well as the comedy series *Crno-bijeli svijet* (The Black and White World). All such projects regularly find themselves “between the hammer and the anvil” of the two prevalent tendencies in the discourse about the socialist past and make the sober observation of that period more difficult – on the one hand, the so-called “totalitarian paradigm”, which confines the past to everyday life painted with grey tempera in gloomy times under the total control of the Party, and, on the other hand, different forms of commercial Yugonostalgia seeing the peaks of socialism in individual consumerist joys, thus adjusting the image of socialism to the values of current capitalism. It is a question of cultural and media products in which different parts of Yugoslav cultural and commodity production seek to make the very memory of them “market-recycled”, thus separating them from the social and political context in which they were created. The two absolutely dominant elements in the post-Yugoslav period, *anticommunism* and *anti-Yugoslavism*, fill the space of the hegemonic culture of post-socialist identity communities only by adding that third element, which seems more

benign and seemingly emerges from a conservative-nationalist image. Although it may seem at first glance that they have different actors – on the one hand, rigid nationalists who reject the achievements of the socialist period making themselves the victims of the totalitarian regime socialist period and, on the other hand, tolerant neoliberal “pop-cultural Yugo-nostalgists”, who enjoy the cultural products of the past in an ironic camp conscious manner. Naturally, these two approaches – the anticommunist erasure and revision of history and apolitical Yugonostalgia – depend on each other and mutually support each other. Being united on their ecstatic collective path towards traumatic inclusion into Euro-Atlantic integration, they jointly (from an identitarian viewpoint) construct the image of totalitarian socialist Yugoslavia and communism as the product of the “other”, the foreign culture not being originally “ours”, but imposed by those “others” (Serbs, Croats, communists, etc.) like “imported crows”.⁵⁷⁷ Although seemingly incompatible in the current social context, such different tendencies function quite well together, so that, for example, the film *Orkestar* tries to turn a thin story about the commercially successful career of a popular teenage band, *Plavi orkestar*, into material worthy of a film, and inflate its fate into the metaphor of the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia.

The trendy market ubiquity of the sale of cultural “Yugonostalgia”, as well as a new fitting into academic culture, represent the way not to talk about the political aspects of partisan struggle, self-management, and the anti-bloc policy of nonalignment, that is, the modernist project of universal emancipation. It is about the effective depolitization of the cultural practice of socialism which, by celebrating the popular mythology of socialist consumer society (from the *Fića* to shopping in Trieste, *Vegeta* and *Bajdera*, advertisements, Levi’s trousers and *YASSE...*), erases its greatest achievements (such

577 See the documentary film *Uvozne vrane – film o prirodi i društvu* (The Imported Crows – A Film About Nature and Society), directed by Goran Dević, Zagreb: ADU, 2003.

as the reconstruction of the country, workers' rights, emancipation of women, public health...). The socialist past is thus distilled into a *cultural memory* that nicely fits into the neoliberal trends of "exploiting the dead". From such a viewpoint, there is no substantive difference among "Yugo-nostalgic" apology of the *EKV*, uncritical aesthetic apotheosis of Bogdan Bogdanović and "Bosnian coat of arms" shown by the "Bosnian psycho" Damir Avdić to the former state. Both of them serve to make the period of universal emancipation under the aegis of the communist idea "illegible", prevent any political understanding, silence its most important elements and thus service the social oblivion of the revolutionary core of the Yugoslav socialist project in their own way.

WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT THE EIGHTIES?

It is obvious that one cannot avoid the fact that it was a question of the last decade of the SFRY, so that in various surveys the 1980s are reconstructed as an unambiguous sequence that begins with Tito's death and ends with the historical turnabout in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the SFRY. The proponents of the "totalitarian paradigm" repeat clichéd formulas about the "repressive community of dictator Josip Broz Tito", so that only the "thaw" after Tito's death "released the cultural resources" and enabled creatively vivid years (often characterized as "mythical") of the new wave scene. However, such an interpretation is both banal and wrong, because the concrete chronology shows something completely different: not only did the dynamics of the scene begin before Tito's death, but almost all creative and infrastructural foundations of punk and new wave in pop music as well as comics, fine arts and theatre were laid during the 1970s. All important protagonists of the visual arts scene in the 1960s and 1970s continued to develop their activities during the 1980s, so that the new media production (in the fields of design, comics, photography, film, video and television) was enabled by the phenomena occurring in the artistic and media practices of the 1970s.

The development of the new wave pop music scene was also prepared by the appearance of *Bijelo dugme* which, in local circumstances, acted as a strong modernization impulse and strikingly elevated the domestic rock scene to a new level, regardless of whether it was a question of audio production, stage performance and equipment, music record design or the appearance of performers. At the turn of the decade, the cultural scene was therefore more characterized by continuity than by discontinuity and upheaval which were characteristic of the late 1980s and the 1990s.

Although the historical classification of cultural and artistic events by decades is common in the conceptualization of monographic publications and big exhibition projects,⁵⁷⁸ this approach represents one of the most superficial and rarely fact-based methods. Although such an approach corresponds to our tendency to introduce order into chaotic historical events, it actually betrays them. History is not orderly, it does not obey chronologies and our firm calendar boundaries (regardless of whether you hold that a decade starts at 0 or 1), so that even Arnold Hauser believed that the 20th century started after the First World War. Despite the fact that such periodizations are always provisional and should not be considered as indisputable facts, they can still play the role of an initial analytical tool for interlinking the events in different fields – politics, economics, culture... – and thus confirm their intertwining. When it comes to the history of socialist Yugoslavia, such approaches are even more important, because we still do not have a “definite” book dealing with political history – let alone an economic or cultural one – so that various authors often differ in terms of the periodization of social, political and economic development. Meanwhile some, like Dušan Bilandžić, use different periodizations in different books, depending on the political situation. If we

578 For example: *Pedesete u Hrvatskoj umjetnosti*, Zagreb: HDLU, 2004; *Osamdesete! Slatka dekadencija postmoderne*, Zagreb: HDLU, 2015; *Šezdesete u Hrvatskoj – Mit i stvarnost*, (Zagreb: MUO and Školska knjiga, 2018). The 1970s were evidently viewed as an uninteresting decade.

cannot agree on the crucial symbolic moments, it is even less possible to agree on their interpretation.

Our political historiography focuses on the history of the Party, so that culture is only considered with respect to changes in official policy. In such historiography artists are exclusively mentioned as political actors; literature is considered relevant primarily because writers themselves have understood their work as that of the guardian of the national being. Popular culture and subculture are exclusively interpreted as the area of “resistance” or “rebellion”, while the value of every artist is upheld by his allegedly subversive activity. It is symptomatic that in Hrvoje Klasić’s book *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968* (Yugoslavia and the World in 1968)⁵⁷⁹ there is no reference to the world of fine arts, design and pop culture. At the very beginning of his book, the author refers to Vojdrag Berčić’s documentary *Devaluacija jednog osmjeha* (Devaluation of a Smile), but exclusively as a case of political persecution in culture. Can the picture of such an event as the year 1968 in Yugoslavia be complete without considering the role of popular, media culture and new art? Yes, this is unthinkable, but is obviously still possible. Thus, the high-level history of political forums does not attempt to connect with other aspects of life, so that culture, art, everyday life and history “from below” remain reserved for anthropologists and cultural studies, beyond the horizon of our historians. “Westernization” and the return to the East are debated, so that “government” and “dissidents” remain in logical opposition, although in Yugoslavia there was no classical Soviet or East European dissidence, the importance of intra-party struggles, personal relations, “court intrigues” and animosities have been emphasised, as well as interethnic relations and conflicts. What made the SFRY a *novum* within the scope of the CPY/LCY activities in the full sense—self-management, social ownership and nonalignment—have been neglected.

On the other hand, a serious and non-clichéd view of culture, primarily the material traces of pop-cultural practices in the period of socialist

579 Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968*, (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012)

modernization, could now be the “royal path” to revealing all complexities of the development of the project of Yugoslav self-managing socialism. The fact that this is still not the case testifies not only about the traumatic attitude towards that period, but also about a larger number of shortcomings in our academic system and the disappearance of cultural journals in which such interdisciplinary discussions are possible.⁵⁸⁰

ABOUT COMICS, FINALLY

Just as the story about the 1980s often begins with Tito’s death, Darko Macan holds that this decade was “the last golden age of Croatian comics”⁵⁸¹ (we can now add Yugoslav comics too), which started with the death of the old master Andrija Maurović (1901–1981) and ended with the dissolution of the SFRY and, along with it, the self-sustaining comics market. In the meantime, between these two deaths, there was the “golden age”, blissfully unaware of its end, in which comics were published in large numbers and in numerous publications in a large and still unified market: in specialized journals, children’s journals, the youth and student press, as well as daily newspapers, weekly journals and an increasing number of fanzines. According to Macan, it seemed at the moment as if a specific kind of continuity was established:

“The tradition of comics was still autochthonous – local authors read comics by their predecessors and the works of one generation were the reaction to the works of the previous one, either by following it or rebelling against it, while editorial offices were open to experimentation.”

Several authors belonging to the new generation began to publish their works abroad (Ilić, Kordej). At the same time, the first albums of domestic authors belonging to the older generation (Bednjanec,

580 Such as *Kulturni radnik*, *Kultura*, *Delo*, *Marksizam u svetu*, *Treći program*, *Republika*, *Pitanja*, *Gordogan*, *Off*, *Quorum*, *Moment ...*

581 Darko Macan, “Posljednje zlatno doba”, in: *Osamdesete! Slatka dekadencija post-moderne*, eds. B. Kostelnik and F. Vukić, (Zagreb: HDLU, 2015), 291–297.

Maurović, Radilović) were published. The first monographs (*Hrvatski poslijeratni strip* /Croatian Post-War Comics/, 1984, and *Maurović*, 1986, by Veljko Krulčić; *Istorija jugoslovenskog stripa* /History of Yugoslav Comics/ by Slavko Draginčić & Zdravko Zupan, 1986) were also published. In 1984, the YU Comics Salon was set up, while in the same year Zimonić also initiated the formation of the Comics Authors Association of Croatia which, in the early 1990s (obsessed with getting rid of the genitive!), was renamed the Croatian Comics Authors Association, only to sink into passivity later on.

Although they often speak about the exceptional and sudden appearance of the Novi kvadrat group, the evolution of new comics within the domestic context still could not have occurred without their predecessors and foundations.

The history of domestic comics is usually conceptualized by “generations”, with the “first” being the *spice-up* one. Its authors began work in the 1930s, including Andrija Maurović and the brothers Walter and Norbert Neugebauer, as the representatives of two styles: realistic, action comics and funny comics characterized by stylized drawings and witty, rhyming texts. The “second generation”, which emerged after the war, included the authors rallied around *Plavi vjesnik* (Beker, Radilović, Delač, Dovniković). As the generation originating mostly from *Kerempuh* and Zagreb Film, they accomplished the highest achievements in comics in *Plavi vjesnik* in the first half of the 1960s when, in cooperation with script writers (Zvonimir Furtinger, Rudi Aljinović, Marcel Čukli), they practically created the prototype of the continuously invoked model of domestic, realistically drawn, commercial comics. It was the appearance of Novi kvadrat with its short-form comics which defined the so-called third generation. The author of this phrase, Ljubomir Kljakić, has emphasized that each generation has some authors who work differently, so that the term “implies a specific way of comics expression and not the author’s age.”⁵⁸² The

582 Zoran Đukanović, “Intervju sa Ljubomirom Kljakićem: Medijska kultura stripa”, Belgrade: *YU strip magazin*, No. 71, 1984; see also: <https://www.academia>.

“fourth generation” emerged in the 1990s, which was *wittily* characterized by Krešimir Zimonić as the *lost generation*, because its members worked primarily for foreign publishers, thus being practically lost for the domestic comics scene if, under the conditions of globalized cultural production and consumption, it makes sense to speak about “domestic comics”.

THE TIME OF LICENSED EDITIONS

The *Plavi vjesnik* journal, the key place of the authors belonging to the so-called second generation, was published from 1954 to 1973. In its heyday, during the first half of the 1960s, it had a circulation of 170,000 copies. However, during the mid-1960s, its editorial policy shifted the journal towards teenagers, who were more interested in other topics such as pop music and fashion, so that the space for domestic comics was reduced. Thus, the renowned authors belonging to the “second generation” gradually stopped making comics and completely devoted themselves to animation and cartooning. Julio Radilović mostly created comics for foreign clients, so that beginning in 1977 and during the 1980s he created the series *Den Partizanen* (The Partisans) for a Dutch publisher. According to Macan, it was his most extensive and best series but, symptomatically, it was the only one that was not reprinted in independent Croatia for years (its integral three-volume edition came out only in 2015). Ivica Bednjanec remained in the sphere of children’s and young adult comics with his series about teenagers in *Modra lasta* (since 1967, *Lastan, Jasna i osmoškolci* /Jasna and Eight-Graders/, *Genije* /The Genius/). In 1986, he started drawing *Durica*, a popular children’s comic published in the *Smib* journal.

At the same time, licensed editions were strengthening their position in the Yugoslav market. This trend was also noticeable in the domestic industrial design in those years. The established journals,

edu/9831459/_Third_Generation_and_Beyond_Tre%C4%87a_generacija_i_posle_Novi_kvadrat_i_ostali_

such as *Politikin zabavnik* and *Kekec*, did not pay attention to domestic comics anyway. In 1968–1969, Jugoslavija Publishing House published the comic books *Stanlio i Olio* (Stanlio and Olio), *Slonče Ćira* (Little Elephant Ćira), *Tarzan, Korak – Tarzanov sin* (Korak – Son of Tarzan) and the like in its Ara – Knjiga za decu Series. *Panorama* (1965–1971) and *Stripoteka* (1969–1991) were published in Novi Sad. The subtitled *Jugoslovenska strip revija*, *Stripoteka* was traditionally oriented towards licensed editions. It started publishing comics by domestic authors only in the 1980s. The most commercially successful and longest-running editions, *Zlatna serija* and *Lunov magnus strip* (both published by *Dnevnik*, Novi Sad, 1968–1993), including popular comics of the Italian publishing house Bonelli (*Tex Willer*, *Zagor*, *Komandant Mark* /Commander Mark/...), which had been considered to be trashy in that genre by true comics fans, obtained an aura of *camp* and nostalgia later on. Apart from children's comics like *Tom and Jerry*, the Vjesnik publishing house has primarily published comic books in its *Super-strip biblioteka* Series. Since 1967, it has primarily published the comics by British and Italian authors, including *Pauk* (The Spider), *Čelična pandža* (The Steel Claw), *Diabolik* (Diabolic) and *Uranela* (Uranella), as well as Western and war comics. The greatest success was achieved by the *Alan Ford* Series adapted by Nenad Brix. The first episode, "Grupa TNT" (The TNT Group), was published in 1970. Since 1975, *Super-strip biblioteka* has practically published only *Alan Ford*, while other comics have only been published sporadically.

It is important to mention Ervin Rustemagić who, at the age of 19, launched the comics journal *Strip art* in Sarajevo in 1971, while in 1972 he set up the private agency Strip Art Features (SAF). In the beginning, he cooperated with a smaller number of foreign authors, whose comics he licensed on the international market. He soon became not only an important intermediary in foreign comics publishing in Yugoslavia, but also in selling domestic comics abroad and establishing links between domestic authors and foreign authors and publishers. The first *Strip Art* Series was published until 1973, while in 1979 a new series was launched (with Mirko Ilić's logo). At the International Comics

Festival in Lucca in 1984, the journal was awarded as the best foreign publication. Two years later, it had to shut down for financial reasons.

Almost all domestic newspaper publishers have dynamically launched and closed down comics magazines that are difficult to list (*Zov, Zov strip, Bis, Popaj, RS Magazin, Cak and Cak ekstra, Denis, Eks Almanah, Super, Biser strip, Gigant, Strip zabavnik, Novi Strip zabavnik, Spunk, Spunk novosti, Spunk novosti – jugoslovenski strip*, etc.) These commercial magazines, mostly having no profiled publishing policy, have not exerted much creative influence on the members of Novi kvadrat. Thus, this sphere has remained invisible in the stories about “author’s comics”, but still represents an unavoidable historical *background*. After all, it is precisely the opposition between commercial and authorial, popular and elitist, and *mainstream* and alternative, which is an important part of the controversy over new comics.

ANOTHER COMIC - TUPKO AND MAGNA PURGA

In that period of the dominance of imported comics and retreat of domestic ones, the appearance of *Tupko*, a series of short comic strips, distinguished itself. Its author was Nedeljko Dragić, who did not belong to the generation rallied around *Plavi vjesnik*, and was primarily known as the author of award-winning animated films (*Idu Dani /Days Go By/, Tup-Tup, Dnevnik /The Diary/...*). *Tupko* was first published in *Večernji list* in 1970. Being characterized in the spirit of the times as an *anti-comic* (at that time, on the occasion of the Genre Film Festival-GEFF, there was a lot of talk about anti-film and anti-art) it represented above all else the author’s witty play with the boundaries of the medium. In its everyday production Dragić experimented with the very form of a comic strip, its means of expression, graphic conventions and codes (dialogue bubbles, lines showing movement or emotion, onomatopoeia...). In other words, he turned semiotic actions into the very content of the comic. Midhat Ajanović will write that this is a “parody or satirical deconstruction of aesthetic conventions (...), which aims not to deconstruct the medium but to enrich

it..."⁵⁸³ He is concerned with the way comics are read, so that sometimes *Tupko* only communicates through pictures, while sometimes there is only a text. The framework is not just a mere line that separates individual frames. With its form, positions and spatial bending, it becomes an integral part of the reading, space and meaning of comics. The comic hero communicates directly with readers, addresses the author and complains about his position in comics; he is aware of his comic character and even the relationship of comics to the surrounding space on a newspaper page. The appearance of such a daily comic strip in a relatively conservative and market-oriented daily newspaper has provoked divided reactions from the public, readers' protests as well as the reaction of intellectuals, so that articles about the "phenomenon" of comics have also appeared in the media. However, thanks to the editorial team's support, *Tupko* was published in *Večernjak* for a year and a half, and thereafter in *VUS* and *Intervju* for a short period. It is also important to point to the role of scene continuity and influence, because without the influence of Ico Voljevica's *Grga*, which was regularly published on the last page of *Večernji list* for decades, there would have been no *Tupko*. And *Tupko* was a necessary reference in the work of the core members of Novi kvadrat in examining and extending the boundaries of the medium, that is, the influence, first of all – though perhaps not obvious at first glance – on Ilić's examinations of the medium of comics (*Debil Blues, Otvoreni strip / Open Comics/, Shakti, Vodoravno i okomito /Horizontally and Vertically/, Na istoj strani /On the Same Side/...*). And that influence was also present, due to the humorous forms of the metalanguage of comics, on Kunc's *Sjena* (The Shadow) and Devlić's *Huljice* (Rascals). These remain, perhaps unjustly, the peculiar trademarks of their works.

Kostja Gatnik, an illustrator, photographer and designer from Ljubljana, has published his illustrations and short comics since 1967. In 1970–1971, he shaped the politicized student magazine *Tribuna*. Like

583 Midhat Ajanović Ajan, *Nedjeljko Dragić – Čovjek i linija*, (Zagreb: HFS/DHFR, 2014), 48–50.

Mihajlo Arsovski's somewhat earlier design for the magazines *Polet* and *Pop express*, his work – influenced by pop art and psychedelia – is characterized by the violation of the modernist rules of international style, which have become *mainstream* in Yugoslav design. As a passionate comics reader and author, Gatnik has come under the influence of American underground, so that his comics, published under the pseudonym *Magna Purga*, "have been something completely new and different from anything seen in domestic production".⁵⁸⁴ He published short comics, mostly single-panel ones, in *Tribuna*. As a collection, titled *Danes in nikdar več* (Today and Never Again), it was the first alternative comics album in Yugoslavia, published by Ljubljana's ŠKUC in 1977 (the editor and author of the preface was Igor Vidmar).

For the *Magna Purga* series he himself says that it was created just for kicks. It was the comics answer to various phenomena that mostly got on his nerves, in short, something he did not find very important. This type of alternative, underground comics, funny, often filled with black humour, based on ironyzing petty-bourgeois mentality, national cultural myths, as well as the comics medium itself, its clichés and genres (for example, the superhero) will represent a creative breakthrough in the Yugoslav comics scene. It has an echo or, at least, a parallel, in the first album of Marko Breclj and the *Buldožer* band – *Pljuni istini u oči* (Spit at the Truth in the Eyes), issued by the *Alta* publishing house in 1975, with financial support by the Forum Student Organization and ŠKUC. Its cover, designed in the form of a newspaper, contained satirical commentaries through comics and false advertisements and, what was unusual for music record covers, had several pages, printed on yellowish single-colour uncoated paper. The name Slavko Furlan was written as the author, although it was undoubtedly a joint product by the band members and their circle of friends.

584 Krulčić, *Put u obećanu zemlju*, 1990, p. 11.

ON THE WAY TO KVADRAT

Since the 1960s, simultaneous with the decline of the “great” domestic comics production and under the influence of *underground* comics, as a critique of the commercial orientation of big publishers, youth and student magazines like *Omladinski tjednik* and *Studentski list* began paying attention to comics as a medium, and started publishing works by young authors (Ratko Petrić, Nikola Marangunić, Pero Kvesić, Krešimir Skozret...) Apart from translations of works by theorists like Umberto Eco, writings on new American comics (Crumb, Spiegelman, Gilbert Shelton...), classics by Foster and Raymond, superheroes and, on two occasions, French new comics – Reiser, Willem, Wolinski and Crepax, have also been published. After *Omladinski tjednik*, Skozret contributed to the teen magazine *Tina*, so that he joined *Kvadrat* as a relatively experienced author. Other authors of *Novi kvadrat* also published their comics before *Polet*. Ilić published his first illustration in *Omladinski tjednik* in 1973, while in 1976 he published his first comics *Slikovnica za diktatore* (Picture Book for Dictators) and *Slikovnica o velikom i malom* (Picture Book About Big and Small) in *SL*.

Theoretical interest in comics has also been increasing. In 1974 there appeared *Pegaz – revija za istoriju i teoriju stripa i ostalih vizuelnih medija koji se izražavaju grafičkim putem* (Pegaz – a Magazine for the History and Theory of Comics and Other Graphically Expressed Visual Media). It was first published by the Belgrade Cultural Centre and then by Novi Sad's *Forum*. Although its editor Žika Bogdanović was mainly interested in classic narrative comics by American authors and domestic authors such as Maurović and Đorđe Lobačev, *Pegaz* No. 6, 1975, also carried a translation of the famous essay by Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, “How to Read Donald Duck. Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comics”. It also published Lazar Stanojević's *Svemironi* (“one achievement of a very peculiar type...which finally introduces works by domestic artists into the modern currents of global comics”) and *Lun*, the first published comic book by Krešimir Zimonić. This artist has been described as “the first example of a

domestic author who is growing into one of the most interesting currents of modern European comics. thanks to his undeniable imagination and good taste”.

In the same year, the magazine *Kultura* dedicated its 28th issue to a “panorama of essays on comics by domestic and foreign authors”. Probably the first issue of a domestic magazine that was entirely dedicated to a theoretical consideration of comics was prepared by Ranko Munitić and, apart from translated texts, it also published contributions by Vera Horvat Pintarić, Branko Belan, Bogdan Tirnanić and Munitić himself. The author of the foreword, Miloš Nemanjić, wrote about “the pressures of academic and university culture” due to which comics, film and television “fight for their cultural legitimacy”, as well as about a division into the sphere of “legitimate culture (...), which bears the academy or university trademark” (music, painting, sculpture, literature, theatre...), and the “sphere of activity: film, photography, jazz and, let us add, comics, which are fighting for their legitimacy”.

Ljubomir Kljakić, who will be extremely important for the consideration and affirmation of the new comics, published the text *Novi strip* (New Comics) in Belgrade’s *Student* (No. 29, 1975). In 1976, in Ljubljana’s *Ekran*, Igor Vidmar published the first comprehensive bibliography of the texts, books and magazines dedicated to comics, while in 1977 he edited the thematic issue of *Tribuna* dedicated to comics, *Stripbuna*. In 1977, Galerija Nova in Zagreb hosted the exhibition of Maurović’s works and published a catalogue with the texts by Mladen Hanzlovski “Maurović i mi” (Maurović and Us) and Vera Horvat Pintarić “Zagrebačka škola stripa” (The Zagreb School of Comics), which significantly contributed to the public perception of comics as an art form. The following year, the Ninth Art Club Cultural Society from Ljubljana founded a comics award, which was named “Andrija” after Maurović.

THE NEW WAVE OF NOVI KVADRAT

While the core members of Novi kvadrat (Ilić, Kordej, Zimonić, Mešić) were linked to each other by attending the same School of Applied Arts, the other members had a less similar background and were mostly much older. They connected with Devlić, Kunc and Marušić through part-time work at Zagreb film, so that Novi kvadrat was more a form of *friendship organization* in which joint work and socializing were firmly interlinked, than a group defined by one style or generationally. It is significant, therefore, that there were great differences among the Kvadrat members themselves, not only in the manner of drawing, but also in the very approach to comics. In the works of Ilić, early Kordej and Mešić one can observe the transposed influences of the authors rallied around *Les Humanoïdes Associés* and the *Metal Hurlant* magazine. Zimonić was interested in lyrical comics with clear artistic pretensions, while Devlić and Kunc, in *Huljice* and *Šjena*, their major works from the Novi kvadrat period, distinguished themselves for the reduced forms of gag comics with social commentaries and frequent metacomic elements. Joško Marušić primarily dealt with marginal forms of comics, cartoons and illustrated jokes, which were regularly published in the *Danas* weekly, as commentaries on the current political and social events.

With the appearance of Novi kvadrat, *Polet* became the centre of a new comics production within a relatively short time. The members of Novi kvadrat soon began publishing their comics in other newspapers and magazines (*Pitanja, SL, Student, Mladost, Vidici, Laus, Mladina, Fokus...*), as well as the comics magazines of commercial publishers, which previously published only foreign comics (*Yu strip, Stripoteka, Spunk...*). Their success, the affirmation of comics through media presentations and exhibitions, stimulated the general interest in (new) comics. For personal reasons, older authors, such as Bekker and Dovniković, also turned to comics, while a number of young authors also emerged, so that almost all young adult publications opened space to new comics which, practically throughout Yugoslavia, resulted in the appearance of a number of followers and imitators.

Novi kvadrat became synonymous with the new comics. In his text dedicated to the 20th anniversary of Novi kvadrat Darko Macan dealt critically with that tendency:

“And soon everyone was creating comics *à la* Novi kvadrat without understanding anything. And thus we (...) got dozens or maybe hundreds of experimenters filling one panel after another with dashes, having nothing to say, but doing that in a terribly pretentious manner.”⁵⁸⁵

If Novi kvadrat undoubtedly represents a specific new wave before the *new wave* itself and the *new wave* music scene, the phenomena that amply confirm the thesis that media do not have some previous content, but create it through their actions. The Gutenbergian print media, particularly, create their public as well as a certain scene with their presentation, reception and reflection in the full sense of the word. And design and media, as the means of (re)production of the contemporary industrial society, not only create a product but, above all else, their users-consumers and their new needs and interests. Comics authors first create *themselves as authors*, then the *audience* for comics and thus *other authors*. *Polet* played a key role in providing space and enabling continuous publication, but the public reception and influence took place thanks to other publications in a “polycentric and decentralized, as well as unified and common Yugoslav artistic space”.⁵⁸⁶ Thus, in 1978, Belgrade’s *Student* published the supplement titled *Treća generacija?* (The Third Generation?) with Ljubomir Kljakić’s text of the same name, which introduced this notion into the perception of domestic comics.⁵⁸⁷ In the same year, the young adult magazine *Mladost* announced the first “Competition for Young Yugoslav Comics” in which Ilić won the first prize, while the Gallery of the

585 Darko Macan, *Vampiri u Croatiana – Fenomen Novog kvadrata*, 10 November 1999.

586 Ješa Denegri, “Unutar i izvan ‘socijalističkog modernizma’?”, in: Irena Lukšić (ur.), *Šezdesete* (zbornik), (Zagreb: Hrvatsko filološko društvo, 2007), 47–67.

587 Ljubomir Kljakić, “Treća generacija?”, Belgrade: *Student* No. 15, 20 May 1978.

Student Cultural Centre (SKC) hosted an exhibition titled *Jugoslovenski mladi strip* (Yugoslav Young Comics). In his article in *Vjesnik Veselko* Tenžera praised the appearance of *Novi kvadrat*, which creates “an entirely new optics in our culture, a worldview freed from those serf-like intellectual footnotes, a dialogue with the world and people”. The following year, the thematic issue of the magazine *Vidici*, dedicated to comics, *Strip Vidici*, was published. It was prepared by Nikola Kostandinović and included Kljakić’s new article “Quo vadis treća generacija?” (Quo Vadis Third Generation?)⁵⁸⁸ Srba Ignjatović also included the current examples of new comics in his essayistic reflections in the book *Poetizam stripa* (Poetism of Comics) (Izdavački centar Revija, Osijek 1979). Although Darko Glavan published his polemical texts about the relationship between *mainstream* and alternative in comics in *VUS* and then in *Polet*, the whole discussion took place within a much broader Yugoslav framework, including the texts published in *Vidici*, *Studentski list*, *Student*, *YU strip* and the like, so that there was still a *bonus* or *profit* from these critical attacks. Controversies enable the formulation of concepts and broader determination of the positions in cultural struggles, not only over comics, but also over the role of the media and the position of creative activities in the sphere of popular culture.

The interest of commercial publishers in domestic comics was undoubtedly encouraged by the success of the so-called new comics. Thus, *Yu strip* (Dečje novine, Gornji Milanovac, 1978–1987) was entirely dedicated to domestic comics as well as information and education about comics. It also had a comic art school section and space for publishing the works of young comic artists. From 1981 to 1983, *Vjesnik* published *Strip magazin*, combining classical, modern and new comics by both domestic and foreign authors, while *Naš strip* (1983–1984) was exclusively dedicated to domestic authors. *Stripoteka* and *Spunk* started publishing works by domestic authors, so that,

588 Ljubomir Kljakić, “Quo vadis treća generacija?”, Belgrade: *Vidici* No. 2, 1979.

from 1983 to 1986, Kordej was the first author to be officially employed in Novi Sad's Marketprint as a comics artist.

Although Zimonić initiated the work on comics among the students of the School of Applied Arts, Mirko Ilić undoubtedly became the key member of the group, that is, its organizational and media engine later on. Although Kunc, Marušić and Devlić published more works in *Polet*, it was he whose approach to comics, in particular, provoked heated debates in the media (Darko Glavan, Anton Gomišček, Zlatko Gall, Želimir Koščević, Igor Vidmar...). They were reproached for their orthodoxy, esotericism, hermeticism, non-communication (which was a rather strange accusation given the influence of their actions), elitism and the display of comics in galleries – with Ilić's crucial solo exhibition, which he opened in the SC Gallery as early as 1977. In *Vjesnik's* annual ranking of the most important cultural events, Ilić's solo exhibition was ranked second, while such exhibitions were also held in Koprivnica, Belgrade, Rijeka and Dubrovnik. There were also discussions about *mainstream* and alternative, and the orientation to single panel comics (apart from the new sensibility and desire to have as many authors as possible publish their works, this orientation also stemmed from the very nature of the youth press).

Indeed, Ilić created a very specific form of comics in a very specific manner. In essence, it was a question of continuous examination of the comics media and attempts to push their boundaries still further, including almost constant changes of technologies, styles and approaches, and following the idea that the experimental approach does not allow the existence of some predefined results. By contrast, his critics advocated the need to develop classical – *mainstream* – narrative comics for which there were almost no conditions in the youth press at that time. However, authors like Kordej and Devlić soon adopted such longer narrative forms and the historical and science fiction series. In addition to working independently and in cooperation with Ilić in the SLS studio, the tireless Kordej also soon started working for foreign clients. In Grožnjan, at the end of the 1980s, David Simić and Zoran Leko founded a studio, which was also joined by

Kordej. He led a group of twenty or so authors, cartoonists and script writers (including young Darko Macan, Edvin Biuković and Goran Sudžuka, as well as veterans like Devlić) who made comics and illustrations for the German market. In 1991, Kordej went to Denmark and thereafter, in 1997, to Canada where he continued to work for major American publishers such as Dark Horse and Marvel.

After making some extraordinary and world-scale unique formal breakthroughs in the comics format, Ilić sought new creative challenges in the newspaper, political, illustration and graphic design fields (posters, music album covers, front pages of the *Danas* weekly, book design...). Despite the fact that other members of Novi kvadrat, primarily Kordej and Kunc, also dealt professionally with design, Ilić was the only one who made a radical transition from comics creator and illustrator to designer – although it was often disputed that he was a designer. In his design work, Ilić uses the formative experience of comics, while at the same time continuously running away from it and studying other approaches and techniques. He made a series of posters using his drawing skills, but the use of his comics experience also goes beyond realistic drawing with stylized and strong contour lines, which can be observed in a series of his works. Despite using other techniques like photography and photomontage, and the maximum condensation of the idea, the narrative principles of comics are only noticeable in a small number of his works.

Therefore, his role as a newspaper or, better said, magazine illustrator was much more important in the chronological 1980s than his innovative comics opus, which encouraged the enthusiasm of the new generation about the possibilities of this medium, but which he did not deal with after publishing the comics *Survival*. At the time Ilić stopped working as a *Polet* editor in May 1978, he already regularly published his illustrations in Zagreb's *Start*, the magazine that embodied some specifics of cultural and media policies in the former Yugoslavia with its unusual history.

It was launched as an automobile magazine in 1969 but, following the trend of sexual liberalization in the late 1960s, it began

publishing the photographs of scantily clad girls in the centerfold, which remained its recognizable trademark almost until its closing-down. In 1973, Sead Saračević became Editor-in-Chief of *Start*, and introduced cultural topics and brought in new authors who wrote about popular culture more seriously. At the same time, special attention was devoted to very long interviews with local and foreign politicians and artists. In the *Vjesnik* newspaper publishing house, great attention was devoted to newspaper graphic design and the improvement of printing technology. Thus, *Start* was printed in the copper engraving technique and designed by renowned graphic artists like Zoran Pavlović and Fadil Vejzović from the very beginning. For the magazine redesign in 1978, Saračević invited Roman Cieslewicz, one of the most renowned and most avant-garde European designers of the time. The magazine was printed in black and white, while colour was mostly used for photographs. Black and white illustrations had an important place – one entire page was reserved for them along with the main story. The page, filled just by Ilić, often included several smaller illustrations. Other members of Novi kvadrat, primarily Igor Kordej, also joined *Start*, while Devlić and Skozret more often worked for *Vjesnik's* other publications.

Until then, our print media were dominated by cartoons, while the space for illustration was reserved for those “artistic ones” which accompanied essays, feuilletons and stories. At the beginning, illustration in *Start* was related to erotic stories and cartoons. Sometimes it was the work of renowned artists for whom it was an opportunity to earn some extra money and who – like Josip Vaništa – frequently did not want to sign it. These works tended to be beautiful, emphasize a lyrical atmosphere and be politically unproblematic, that is, not to be critical or require thinking. Although Fadil Vejzović had already made a series of brilliant illustrations, the real turning point occurred just with the appearance of young Ilić and Kordej who brought a different type of newspaper illustration by which *Start* became recognizable. Trained by comics to write concise and witty commentaries, their works were no longer something optional and placed in a space

that had to be filled; instead, they became a part of the editorial presentation of the material, on an even par with the newspaper text, and often better than it. Although Ilić's works were ideologically and visually provocative during his full-time engagement (1978–1985), the editorial board refused to publish only one illustration (accompanying the text about Goli otok which was published).

From 1976 to 1980, *Start* had a stable circulation of 180,000–200,000 copies. For its jubilee 300th issue, it engaged a new Editor-in-Chief, Mladen Pleše, who retained this position over the next seven years and brought a large number of the former *Polet* journalists (Denis Kuljiš, Ratko Bošković, Rene Bakalović, Vladimir Cvitan, Slavenka Drakulić, Marjan Jurleka, Ivan Cico Kusić...) into the editorial office. The new editorial policy was characterized by the spectacularization of popular culture and alternative phenomena, from new fashion, through the gay scene, to video spots and neofolk music. However, it was during that period, especially from 1984 to 1988, that the circulation of *Start* recorded a decline (although the circulation was still high by today's standards). There is no doubt that the social and media circumstances changed, but this decline also shows that the editorial policies including pandering to the public, triviality and commercialization were wrong.

OUTSIDE THE SQUARE

After Ratko Petrić, who used his position as a graphic editor to publish his "anti-comics" on the last page of *Omladinski tjednik* as early as 1969, other graphic editors of the youth press in Zagreb sometimes entertained themselves with short-form comics or comics-like illustrations. Thus, the graphic editor of *Studentski list*, Vjekoslav Fabić Holi, was the author of several contour drawing posters, but his best-known work is probably the cover for the Haustor rock band's LP album *Bolero* (1985), a peculiar kind of dedication or reference to *Corto Maltese*. In the late 1970s, another graphic editor of *Studentski list*, Boro Ivandić, published the comics *BWA*, a specific media extension of the artistic project with the same name, which was a unique

pop and conceptual art hybrid and satire about the dominance of world corporations and corporate art. Within the scope of the *5th April Meetings* at the Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade in 1976, he realized the project titled “Reklamni panoi kao strip protiv EPP” (Billboards as Comics Against TV Commercials), while his exhibition at the Student Centre Gallery consisted only of a pile of accumulated packaging with the logo of the fictitious BWA Corporation. His comics were mostly textless; high-contrast black-and-white drawings and unusual shots resembled film shots, while the main protagonist had no distinct physiognomy and very often carried a gun in his hand. It is interesting to note that at the time of Novi kvadrat, *Polet* also published seven of its comics without a title, and that Ivan Doroghy was persuading the members of Novi kvadrat to admit Ivandić in the group. Today we can only speculate about the reasons why this did not happen. If we bear in mind that the members of Novi kvadrat did not admit other authors after assessing the quality of their works and seriousness of their engagement, in Ivandić’s case, it was undoubtedly a question of his different approach to the medium itself, so that in *Pitanja* Kvesić described him as “an author who had nothing to look for in Novi kvadrat”.

Unfortunately, in the 1990s, Ivandić went to Paris and then to Berlin, where he now occupies himself with painting, so that his early artistic and design works, as well as comics almost do not exist in the official cultural memory of this environment. As his comics were in line with an accentuated raw-style graphic design, which was later promoted by *Shoebizz* and the ZZOT, and not with the preciseness of “dense dashes” of Novi kvadrat, it is all the more surprising that his work did not represent any reference for the later generations.

During the time when Ivan Cico Kustić (1981–82) was its Editor-in-Chief, *Polet* again changed its editorial policy to some degree and thus its graphic design. According to its graphic design editor Ivan Doroghy, Kustić wished to launch an art-rock magazine titled *Egoist*, but his idea was not financially feasible, so that it was confined to the

Shoebizz comics series, published under the pseudonyms “Dr Paul & D.C. Paulin”, a specific conceptual and designer approach to comics.

“The main protagonist of the comics was a stupid, unrealized and frustrated rock ‘star’ who was dreaming of an international career. (...) To Kustić the comics did not seem meaningless enough, so that he suggested that we launch the comics series titled *Headhunterz* in which people speak a nonexistent language and the plot and dialogues are even more meaningless.”

Doroghy and Kustić already created comics together for *SL*. Later they published several similar projects among which *Headhunterz* was the most radical one. However, *Shoebizz* will be considered by many not only as the best transfer of the current iconography of the (post-)new wave pop music scene to comics, but also as the “most unusual comics ever to be created in this area”.⁵⁸⁹ Created by emphatically combining flat drawing, strong contrasts between sharp lines and irregular black surfaces, with the recognizable designer awareness of the importance of counterform, and totally banal and deliberately stupid dialogues of urban heroes dreaming about the career and life of a music star, *Shoebizz* is thus intertwined with pop rock iconography, irony, the banality of everyday life and pessimism. Filled with private references, the content is often incomprehensible, but for that reason, it has become the graphic design equivalent to pop songs. Its effect on us is greater than the literary quality of the lyrics due to its raw energy and form, and only thereafter, due to its details, can we recognize or identify with those lyrics.

On several occasions, comics drawings appeared as illustrations, including on the front page of *Polet*, while the echo of that visual style, only in colour, can also be seen in the series of Doroghy’s front pages of the *Pitanja* magazine (1982–1983).

589 Krulčić, *Put u obećanu zemlju*, 1990, 27.

AFTER KVADRAT

The 1980s were also an era of collective artistic activities, ranging from Kugla glumište and its various later factions, as well as Novi kvadrat, through new wave bands, to various artistic groups and organizations (Group of Six, *Podroom*), tandems (Greiner & Kropilak Mailart Office, Bachrach & Krištofić, Studio imitacija života/Krici i šaputanja /Life Imitation/Shouts and Whispers Studio/ ...) to more or less formalized collectives (Nova Evropa/NEP) and temporary initiatives. Due to the nonexistence of documentation and often being on the margins of the interest of art galleries and museums, their work has mostly remained in the sphere of *private mythologies*. This is also the case with the ZZOT, an informal artistic organization, which now appears primarily as an incidental note in the biographies of its former members.⁵⁹⁰ It is also interesting to note that in the otherwise valuable book *Dizajn i nezavisna kultura* (Design and Independent Culture)⁵⁹¹ dedicated to the ZZOT, there is only one note about “intermediate activity”, which can only be explained by the author’s view that it actually does not belong to design, so that it is irrelevant for the topic of this book. Indeed, it is quite difficult to answer the basic question of whether it is really a comics group or a group of artists dealing with different media and comics are just one of the means available at the moment.

The ZZOT was formed in the mid-1980s by a wider circle of artists rallying around the cultural section of the Student Centre, SC Gallery, Kugla glumište and *Haustor*, when an informal group of a few – as is usually said, alternative – artists specialized in different fields began to cooperate. This group was formalized by the establishment of the ZZOT in 1984. The prehistory of this group dates back to the project involving the refurbishment of the SC Club which, in 1983,

590 The original members were Helena Klakočar, Željko Zorica, Kruno Mavar, Nina Haramija and Milan Manojlović Mance. They were later joined by Kruno Mavar, Dragan Ruljančić, Mirjana Vukadin and Miljenko Sekulić Sarma.

591 *Dizajn i nezavisna kultura*, eds. Maroje Mrduljaš and Dea Vidović, UPI2m Books, Zagreb 2010.

was decorated with wall drawings by the Grupa Novac, comprised of Helena Klakočar, Mirjana Vukadin and Željko Zorica. The wider media activities of the ZZOT and its members, who specialized in animated film, theatre, stage design, graphic design and the like, evolved from the group's fundamental interest in comics and related graphic design media. Already in this media nomadism there was much of the *zeitgeist* of the 1980s. In the period when *Polet*, headed by Mladen Babun as its Editor-in-Chief, did not show much interest in domestic comics, the editorial office provided space just for their works. Thus, in 1984, after individual comics, *Polet* published a supplement with the comics and manifesto of this group.

The early 1980s were marked by the emergence of stylistic post-modernism and the dominance of “new painting” on the domestic artistic scene. Although this domestic “new image” did not have very convincing authors in the field of painting, some of its more original forms emerged among some unexpected authors outside the centre of artistic production. Interesting designs were made just by designers and comics authors like Boris Bućan, Dalibor Martinisa, Doroghy and the ZZOT Group. Although the ZZOT members would probably reject a direct connection, their works represented a specific local transposition of the impulse of new expressionism and *bad painting*, and often naïve and “clumsy” drawing (in which Zlatko Burić sees a kinship with the German movement *Geniale Dilletanten*). It was about the denial, namely destruction (or probably deconstruction?) of the classical conventions of “good” comics. As Saša Rakezić (aka Aleksandar Zograf) says, “their works seemed ‘contemporary’ to us, something like new wave music shaped into graphic expression”. Although they are linked by strong graphism and expressive drawing, while *Shoebizz* is a direct ironic commentary on the new wave scene, ZZOT's comics – a thorn among the ambitions, pretensions and pretentiousness colliding with everyday chaos in life – are much darker. Their humour is dark and even morbid, but at the same time it is silly and enigmatic. It expresses both the spirit of absurdity and melancholy; *noir* crime stories and the grotesque; wonder and anarchy;

a children's view, but also a kind of social criticism. In line with the spirit of the times, their criticism focuses on the general misery of the human condition in modern human society, which offers the promise of happiness and at the same time, due to capitalist exploitation, creates general misery, victims of alienation and depression, all caused by the rush to achieve that happiness. There is no glamour in that strange world; rebellion ends in failure, while the protagonists remain trapped in their daily routines, in which *love is colder than death*.

It must be noted that, even after the decades of absolute dominance of male comics and animation authors, Helena Klakočar stands on the starting line of contemporary female authors of domestic comics. And although it is difficult to say how much the later generations of female and male authors, like those rallied around the *Komikaze* project, were directly inspired by the ZZOT's comics aesthetics, there is undoubtedly a similar sensibility and specific continuity of visual language.

In the second half of the 1980s, Milan Trenc was one of the most visible new authors in the media. He attracted the attention of the audience in 1985 with the comics version of the humourous-satirical radio series about the adventures of *Milan Blenton* published in SL. Unlike the short forms of *Novi kvadrat* and the crudeness of the ZZOT, Trenc was interested in sequelled narrative comics, precise drawing, accentuated retro stylization and even parodies of the heroes from the French-Belgian production, while his open narratives combined fiction and *film noir*. With a different drawing sensibility, Trenc took over Ilić's basic message about newspaper illustration as a topic commentary, so that during the turbulent political events, from the end of 1985 until its shutdown in 1991, he was actually an in-house *Start* author. At his retrospective exhibition, held at the Klovićevi dvori Gallery in 2005, the visitors could convince themselves how his commentaries on the then-current political and social everyday life still seemed to be surprisingly fresh and often applicable to the present situation. As Marko Golub points out: "His humour is by no means naïve or banal and each story leaves much more to be sensed than

that which has been literally illustrated. The key lies in a surreal shift relative to conventional reporting, which Trenc also used in his comics to shake up the adopted classical models of comics narrative for readers.”⁵⁹²

In 1989, he also made a visual contribution titled *Titoland to Start*. It was an ironic commentary on the current rejection of socialist heritage, suggesting ironically that Kumrovec should be turned into an amusement park, practically hinting at the later projects of spectacularizing socialist heritage.⁵⁹³ At the time of the dissolution of *Start*, he went to New York where he created illustrations for the most important American newspapers and magazines. At the time of the systematic disintegration of the SFRY, he created the comics *E.L.V.I.S. Files*, which were not published for many years. The story, set in Nazi Germany, is about the reactions of “ordinary” citizens to the rise of authoritarian policies.

The most relevant comics designers whom we characterize as the “last generation of autodidacts” are Boris Greiner and Stanislav Habjan, who realized their projects within the “office for design and postal questions”, that is, Greiner & Kropilak Mailart Office (since 1983), which has enabled a peculiar permeation of comics, graphic design and a specific form of artistic activity. This is best evidenced by the series published on the last pages of SL during 1988 and presented at the “Exhibition of the Last Pages” staged at the Događanja Gallery. Their comics and illustrations are characterized by the process of turning a photograph into a high-contrast photocopy, while the minimal plot consists of absurd-poetic conversations of the main characters – Greiner & Kropilak. However, precisely due to its indeterminate

592 Marko Golub, “Milan Trenc: Retrospektiva 1980–2005. Strip, ilustracija, film”, Zagreb: *Radio 101*, 10 October 2005.

593 This contribution got its additional twist 30 years later when, in the process of buying this state property, Chinese entrepreneur Jiang Yu, the owner of the Z-Run WellTon Industry from Beijing, literally said for the media that she would turn the complex of the former political school in Kumrovec into a Tito-themed amusement park, *Titoland*.

genre position – whether it represents comics, literature, design or conceptual art – their work, although extremely consistent, has not been included in the institutional contemporary art narratives, nor has it been valorized by comics critics. Thus, it has been included in the indeterminate and wide area of design which, in a narrower sense, they also dealt with.

Danijel Žeželj, an author of comics, animated films, graphic designer and illustrator, published his first comics in the second half of the 1980s. In 1991, he started cooperation with Greiner and Kropilak, so that they signed their joint works as *Slipa konfidenca*. While the visual expression of Greiner & Kropilak, based on photocopying, is a peculiar retro melancholic Central European form of magic realism, Žeželj's drawing is expressive and even aggressive in the depiction of metropolitan life tensions, so that such a bond may have been sponsored more by some personal bond of poetic sensibilities than stylistic closeness in the strict sense.

THE NINETIES AND TODAY

While in the post-socialist period emphasis is regularly laid on the so-called ban on the comics of the early post-war years, what slips under the radar is the fact that just the period of commercial orientation of the media, whether in the 1960s or 1990s, was much longer and more harmful. In the mid-1980s, inflation hit the publishers for the first time, so that specialized comics journals began to disappear one after another, while the situation became even worse in the transition period.

For the general conservative cultural shift, it is symptomatic that in the 1990s, after Rodolfo Mancenaro's *Communist Manifesto Comic Book* (1979) and *Marx, Freud, Lenin i Einstein za početnike – u stripu* (Marx, Freud, Lenin and Einstein for Beginners – in Comics) (1980), *Povijest u stripu* (History in Comics) and *Povijest rocka u stripu* (The History of Rock in Comics) came out in the 1980s, while during the 1990s comic books were used to spread national mythology like the two-volume *Povijest Croatiana u stripu* (Croatian History in Comics).

Changes can also be observed elsewhere. On the wave of “democratization” in the late 1980s, explicit erotic publications also appeared on newsstands. So, Novi Sad’s *Dnevnik* published a series of “adult comics”, *SekStrip*, from 1988 to 1992, while *Vjesnik* published *Erostrip* (1989). The selection of works in *SekStrip* was characteristically eclectic, ranging from the classics of this genre signed by the pseudonyms W.G. Colber and Mancini, through Georges Pichard (whose *Paulette* was also published by *Polet*) and the astonishing *arty* fetishism of Alex Varenne, to the works of two domestic authors, Ahmet Muminović (previously the author of the comic book *Valter brani Sarajevo* /Valter Defends Sarajevo/ and, later, *Zelene beretke* /Green Berets/, a comic book about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Miodrag Marković. Political and cultural changes also affected these seemingly completely non-political publications. After ten issues and the coming of Tuđman and the Croatian Democratic Union /HDZ/ to power, *Vjesnik* cancelled its edition, while the front page of the 1992 edition of *SekStrip Special* was printed in Cyrillic for the first time. It is characteristic of the transitional circumstances that in Zagreb, from 1992 to 2000, in a combination of typical scam and a peculiar plunder of cultural heritage, M-Press/Art print published the editions of *SekStrip*, *Biser strip* and *Stripoteka* under the subheading *Hrvatska strip revija* (Croatian Comics Magazine). Apart from the title, it also took over the logoi on the front page.

It may really sound a little unusual that sharp political illustrations, such as those made by Ilić and Trenc, have become practically impossible in “democracy”. The reasons are partly political, but are also related to the policy pursued by the media themselves. As early as the 1980s, with the new revival of comics and political newspaper illustration, cartooning experienced decline. In the opinion of Nedeljko Dragić, it was a question of saturation, and we can add that the era of increasingly sharpened ideological views and daily political (ab)use of the past more and more affected political communication, without leaving much scope for more subtle and witty commentaries. Thus, after cartoons, illustration and comics also began slowly to

disappear.⁵⁹⁴ During the war, in particular, editors attached priority to the (pseudo)documentarism of sensationalistically charged photographs over intellectually more demanding and frequently more problematic illustrations. One of the first things to be done by the conservative government of Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ after the so-called first democratic elections was to take over control of the media or shut them down. *Start* and the *Danas* news magazine were shut down under politically directed economic pressures, so that two important print media that devoted great attention to culture, art and the development of creative illustration ceased to exist. As for the disappearance of illustration, we cannot only blame the fact that the “print media were taken over by the generation of editors having no sensibility for political illustration”. Moreover, some of the crucial people on the Croatian media scene from the 1990s to the present day are the same people who worked at *Polet* and *Start*. Today’s identitarian communities do not structurally tolerate any form of internal criticism, but immediately proclaim it hostile. Thus, some remnants of satirical political illustration (and photomontage) were only possible in the newspapers like *Arkzin* and *Feral Tribune*, and in recent years in *Novosti*, primarily thanks to the transfer of *Feralovci*, comics authors and illustrator Alem Ćurin (1953–2020). Since 2010, after his return to Zagreb, Trenc has been publishing his illustrations in *Globus* and on the front page of *Obzor*, the Saturday supplement to *Večernji list*. However, despite his efforts and occasionally visually interesting solutions, they have not achieved the strength of his earlier works, primarily due to the editorial selection and treatment of topics to be illustrated. At times, magazines and newspapers under direct or indirect control of the HDZ also used illustration, political cartoons and comics, but mostly in a very primitive way as a means for the promotion of hate speech and demonization of the enemy.

594 It can also be said that since the 1990s original political jokes have disappeared and that memes, satirical visual comments, have appeared in social media only in recent times.

This causes feedback in which different aspects of dissipation uphold each other – newspapers do not publish comics and illustrations, authors create them increasingly less, editors and readers forget that illustration can be used in a creative way, while authors lose the opportunity to work and continuity. Thus, in the 1990s, there were also two main paths leading to comics, which sometimes intertwined: some authors turned to the production of comic fanzines (*Kvadrat, Endem, Stripoholic, Variete radikale...*), while some others, who did not consider comics a casual hobby, focused on foreign publishers, from production for a foreign market to a distance “guest worker” job for corporations like Marvel. During her stay in the Netherlands in 1999, Helena Klakočar published the comic book *Nemirno more* (Rough Sea) for a Belgian publisher in which she wrote about the collapse of Yugoslavia and the fate of stateless people through her lenses (her Mediterranean Odyssey on a catamaran, while receiving dramatic news from her war-torn homeland). Although her comic book has received several prestigious awards, due to its political context, the Croatian edition appeared only 15 years later. In publishing, magazines are replaced by more profitable hardcover albums, mostly reprints of old masters or licensed editions, so that domestic authors are also turning to artistically more ambitious comics for the adult public.

One interesting indicator of the path travelled from the alternative of the 1980s to the present is the fact that in 2016 the most frequent form of comics in the media was the one used in advertising: *Croatianko i Crna Luca* (Croatianko and Black Luca) – the superheroes of the Croatian Postal Bank as its PR text says: “lovable and somewhat self-ironic heroes who create better living conditions in Croatia”. It is especially interesting to note that they were drawn by Helena Janečić, an author from the margins of domestic comics production who, in her works filled with pop culture references, deals primarily with the queer topic and gender stereotypes through ironic commentaries about comics superheroes (*Horny Dyke...*).

THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS POPULAR CULTURE IN SOCIALISM

Although much has been written about popular and mass culture in the socialist era, the problem in left-wing social theory has been caused more by Adorno and the Frankfurt School than by Stalinism due to their rejection of “entertainment industry” and media and mass culture. In that sense, for example, the lack of interest in the role of popular culture by the *Praxis* philosophers’ hard core is striking, especially at that time it was becoming increasingly significant.

The usual post-socialist reading of popular culture in socialism follows the classical denial or celebration patterns, with value enhanced by anticommunist ideological additions. Popular culture is interpreted as the satisfaction of something, at the imaginary level, which was not accessible in real life. Thus, it is seen as a “subversive” activity that has brought us “Western values” of individualism and freedom (other values are not mentioned anyway). Even in the interpretation of the participants and witnesses of the time, there is plenty of fabrication about the “worse past” in which one’s own actions are depicted as heroic. This is how the argument has been drawn that the popular media have “smuggled the market and consumer mentality” into Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is interesting to learn the extent to which this rhetoric follows conservative critics from the socialist era. These critics had spread moral panic and, in pop culture, had seen an incompatibility with the “spirit of socialist youth”, while at the same time ignoring the views of economist Branko Horvat and politician Stipe Šušvar that, by definition, a socialist society is both a market and consumer one. Thus, on the one hand, popular culture has been attributed something done by populist movements and nationalist elites installed in institutions. On the other hand, the value orientation of the greater part of Yugoslav popular culture, which was neither anti-communist nor anti-Yugoslav, even in radical cases involving the provocation of the bureaucratic system, was falsified. In fact, it was a question of the universalist position of predominantly young and educated people who took the fundamental values of socialist self-management more seriously than the cynical ruling elite.

Today, however, the existence of a dynamic cultural scene – that “unofficial yet no less determining moment of the socialist system itself” – inevitably imposes the question how all this could have happened.

The dominant story of the late 1980s is about new social movements, so that the appearance of “civil society” is regularly dated back to the late 1980s, which are reinterpreted in the post-socialist vision as the continuous linear advance of liberalism, coupled with the celebration of civil initiatives and associations as the “heralds of democracy”. The dogma that there was no civil scene in the socialist period and that we now have it, overlooks the fact that various forms of a truly civil society also existed in the socialist period – from the Socialist Alliance of the Working People to the self-management structure of basic organizations of associated labour (BOALs) and composite organizations of associated labour (COALs), self-managing communities of interest (SCIs), as well as city and Republic youth and student organizations, whose print media – with their editorial policies and division into the so-called Republic and city orientations of the youth press – also show the diversity of their political views. Today, there exists the fiction of totalitarian political control, so that it is claimed that it was a question of government cynicism. There is one theory – which attempts to overcome the cognitive dissonance of the fact that all those allegedly subversive activities against the system were supported by the institutions of the system – that the communist government left a playground for young people so as not to interfere in other, allegedly “more serious” matters. According to the curator of Belgrade’s Student Cultural Centre, Bojana Pejić, that “relief valve” theory anticipates an unrealistic opposition between “Them” [i.e. Stalinists in power] and “Us”:

“There is a thesis that the Student Cultural Centre was an oasis, that it was a ghetto and relief valve in the whole system. I don’t believe much in this thesis because, in my opinion, it attaches more importance to the state than it had in the creation of the SCC programme (...). I think that this thesis is a bit naïve, just like that pyramidal

model, that kind of Stalinist model – the authorities are there and we are here, so that the authorities regulate everything we do. Thus, I still can't accept the thesis about a valve, but I hear it more and more...."⁵⁹⁵

In the post-socialist period they often speak about the “failure of self-management” with ridicule, but just the logic of self-management, coupled with the existence of infrastructure, made self-organization in culture possible. It is symptomatic that in the imprint of the Journal for Social, Cultural and Political Issues *Vidici*, it is stated that it “belongs to the students of Belgrade, the Socialist Youth Union and the Presidency of the University Conference of the Socialist Youth Union of Belgrade as the publisher.” The state and the League of Communists were not the only ones to finance youth and student organizations, at both the Republic and city levels. It is also important to note that in Zagreb, both youth and student organizations as well as wider cultural activities also had their own sources of income: a number of cultural programmes, including commercial ones, have also been financed by the Student and Youth Services for Student Employment Mediation out of their own income. Thus, the entire Student Centre (including Teatar & TD, SC Gallery, MM Centre...) and the CeKaDe's comprehensive publishing programme were largely co-financed from their own resources, so that the issue concerning the status and financing of cultural activities and entertainment for young people was much more complex than it is now interpreted.

Most cultural events we are talking about would not have taken place, or at least not in that way, “neither in the East nor in the West”, neither under rigid party control nor under “free” market conditions. Without the infrastructure of a socialist civil society, it would not have been possible to organize various initiatives and groups, cultural activities at student centres, youth press and the related artistic scenes (comics, new wave, photography, literature and the like), media such as Radio Študent in Ljubljana and Radio 101 in Zagreb, not

595 *Političke prakse (post)jugoslovenske umetnosti*, eds. Jelena Vesić, Zorana Dojić, Prelom kolektiv, Belgrade 2009, p. 130.

to mention something called the “Slavic alternative of the eighties”, which largely parasitized on this structure, practically until the collapse of the SFRY. However, all this does not correspond to the commonly held conceptions of the “totalitarian paradigm”. It is also true that, according to Tomaž Mastnak, certain aspects of a “socialist civil society” also enabled “totalitarianism from below”, repression in culture through the protests of “working people and citizens”, while personal interests and conservative views were often hidden by an alleged concern about the preservation of socialism (just as clerical organizations today practice “totalitarianism from below” by invoking their concern about the preservation of the nation). In short, if we really wish to understand the eighties, we must look at that period more broadly, considering social relations under self-management, not through today’s dominant national optics, but as a complex networks of relations, power struggles, solidarity and particular interests. At the same time, generational, cultural and private interests of some individuals and professional groups, but undoubtedly also class ones, were in play.

The 1990s brought us neoliberal myths about creative individuals in the cultural and creative industries, so that the famous examples of the success of *Novi kvadrat* and the new wave are sometimes also presented as role models, including the lamentations and the question of why we do not have *new waves* and *new squares* today. Although the talents and work of the members of these and other groups and authors are unquestionable, their successes were possible thanks to the existence of a social infrastructure. Exactly the one we destroyed in the process of “national liberation” during the 1990s, and it cannot be replaced or rebuilt by the liberal market model. It is therefore not justified, as is often the case, to set the “liberalization of social values” exclusively in the 1980s or the instances like *Polet* and *Start*. It is a continuous process which had its ups and downs but, much more than being dictated by politics, it was linked to the character of the Yugoslav project involving socialist modernization, continuous processes of social and political innovations, urbanization, rising education and

information, as well as the free cross-border flow of migrant workers, tourism, films and TV series, books, journals, comics and music.

The late 1980s and the post-socialist period are generally characterized by exactly the opposite policies: policies of closure, nationalism, xenophobia and cultural conservatism. Instead of a universalist position, emphasis is placed on particular identities and instead of internationalism, emphasis is placed on particularism, so that it is symptomatic how the “foreign and international policy” column is vanishing from the front pages.

WHY THE EIGHTIES TODAY?

The question that also imposes itself is why we deal with the “eighties”, why this period is so important to us. Perhaps to us, the “witnesses of time”, those years seem both attractive and traumatic because, despite the trauma caused by Tito’s death, and the economic crisis and “stabilization” programme, the early 1980s were marked by a burst of creative energy and optimism; we can interpret that period both as a show of youthful defiance and a form of escapism (to the point that they are sometimes also characterized as the “carefree years”!).

We have seen that the thesis that the alternative artistic and (sub) cultural production is just a “matter of the eighties” does not hold water. In other words, it brings us back to the question what the 1980s were and when they actually started. They maybe started as early as the mid-1970s, or it was the calendar mid-decade when the “real” 1980s started. Or this was already the beginning of the 1990s. A part of the answer probably lies in the ideological stance contained in the answer to the question whether we wish to look at those years primarily as the “decade of thawing” in which “life was imagined in the rhythm of dance music”, or as the decade of rising nationalism and inter-republic and inter-ethnic tensions. Can we keep these two opposing ideas in mind at the same time? How were they connected to each other in their time? The question also arises to what extent and in what way, apart from chronologically, the 1980s were the predecessor and foundation of the 1990s,

Naturally, in response to these questions we can also argue that the “eighties do not exist”. The use of such a term anticipates a relatively coherent whole, while in the history of the SFRY almost every decade was internally divided into two rather different periods, the scene of opposing tendencies. This is especially evident in the decades that are the main periods of cultural fascination; the 1960s and 1980s were characterized by significant social, political and economic upheavals and strong divisions that enable us to view them effortlessly as a single “organic” whole. In other words, it is precisely these divisions that we should view as constitutive for those decades and the development of society.

If the post-Yugoslav countries, from the 1990s onwards, won the nominally multi-party parliamentary system and then lost everything else – from ownership of the economy to a semblance of sovereignty – experiencing a decline in GDP, increasing inequality and declining population, we can wonder not so much about the historical meaning of that transaction and who benefited from it, but how we could allow it. Where did history run off the tracks? Is that the real reason for our interest in the ‘eighties’? Are we not persistently trying to find, in the phenomena and events of those years, a certain meaning or justification, or at least an acceptable explanation, some “historical necessity” for everything that has happened to us from then up to the present?

In the post-socialist period, apart from the language, the new construction of history is the crucial part of a state-building policy, while historiography is an important ideological apparatus of a new nation state. Institutional, academic, publishing and museum activities, culture and arts (including popular culture) and their historicization are both the ground and means in the struggles to rethink the past. Is that which we call “Eighties” so important to us *today* just because of the ongoing struggles to redefine the past and legitimize contemporary social events – ideological struggles in which all actors have their political and ideological interests – by determining their significance? While it is evident why the use of Tito as a stitch for mending the “totalitarian” image of the SFRY and the “eighties” suits the

revisionist, nationalist-conservative-right-wing or Western-liberal views of the SFRY and the “eighties”, it should also be clear why the *leftist approach* must not agree to such a historical supradetermination game and the crucial role of great personalities. It is necessary to reappropriate one’s own history, acknowledge the open-endedness and fundamental fluidity of historical events and the responsibility of all actors, and not to agree to the simplified narratives of the “Yugoslav studies” of the Western academic community.

* * *

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Zlatko Gall

YUGOSLAV MUSIC – BETWEEN THE NEW WAVE AND NEW “TURBO-FOLK”

IT ALL STARTED in the sixties; that turbulent decade the world remembers after the Cold War, the huge economic rise in war-torn Europe, the flourishing of pop and “baby boomer” subculture, rebellious students, technological innovations, struggle for civil rights, sexual revolution... For some, “the sixties” have been and remained the mythical decades of the birth of the “brave new world”, and for others, a decade of “classic Jungian nightmare”, when the old culture, powerless in the face of growing demands for personal freedoms, abandoned the restraints of the previous period and gave in to extreme deviations from social norms.

What did “the “sixties” look like in our country? A few years ago, a big exhibition “The Sixties in Croatia – Myth and Reality” at the Zagreb Museum of Arts and Crafts (MAC) tried to answer that question. It was an extensive exhibition project led by Zvonko Maković, covering the period from 1958 to 1971, and filling all available MAC spaces in 18 thematic sections, analyzing the sixties in Croatia in the field of art, culture, architecture, photography, design, literature, theater, music, film...

Why were these specific dates chosen to “flank” an extensive exhibition project, but also to deliberate on the “phenomenon of the sixties” on domestic soil? Because our “phenomenon” of the sixties is also determined by crucial political events. In the words of Zvonko Maković, “(only) after the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, when the party was liberalized”, were basic conditions were created for economic and cultural changes, which followed in the subsequent decade. The concluding year was – as was

also to be expected – 1971, in which both Croatian “nationalism” and “liberal citizenry” were brutally dealt with.⁵⁹⁶

As the years of the greatest prosperity, the sixties have so far been wrapped in a nostalgic (often uncritical) veil, and have long been part of the mythical “better past”, just like the equally mythical eighties. But, on the other hand, the flip side of the sixties was: one-party orthodoxy, Goli Otok, the notorious Article 133 of the Criminal Code, which sanctioned statements and even opinions as well as enforcing ubiquitous censorship (and self-censorship).. However, even in such political circumstances, the more liberal-minded party members, balancing on the edge, advocated huge shifts forward in art – *Nove tendencije* (New Tendencies) was a good example of this – as well as in culture, announcing positive processes, without which there would be neither a popular nor a “high” culture with great accomplishments.

After all, as the correct diagnosis says, “it is undeniable that life was better in this part of the world than in some other socialist countries”, but the negative and the positive, economic growth, cultural opening to the world, establishment of a new consumer society, and the accompanying popular and high cultures cannot be fully perceived outside the broader political and socio-cultural context. That is why, when deliberating of the “liberal sixties”, we should start with the 7th Congress of the LCY, which announced, in its conclusions, the creation of a “socialism with a human face”, that is, the creation of some sort of a hybrid Yugoslav model of Western consumer society, accompanied by the liberalization of life and gradual flourishing of the corresponding popular culture. It was the time of the first domestic festivals of music hits, as harbingers of popular culture and consumerism, fashion shows that promoted the creations of local designers and workshops, popular music, television shows, product design, department stores, thought-out urbanistic and architectural projects and, of course, in line with growing purchasing power, the creation

596 1 Zvonko Maković, in *Šezdesete u Hrvatskoj – mit i stvarnost*, (Školska knjiga: Zagreb, 2018).

of consumer culture with a "socialist trademark". The same leap forward happened in "high culture". For example, as early as 1961, Milko Kelemen initiated the Music Biennale in Zagreb, which hosted the biggest names in contemporary music, such as Karlheinz Stockhausen and John Cage, and – significantly – a few years earlier, *Nove tendencije*, one of the crucial movements in the field of visual arts, was founded. In 1959, the *Gorgona* art group was created, and extra-institutional projects took place, such as the "Red Peristyle" in 1968, while the SC Gallery in Zagreb promoted a whole new visual arts scene of conceptual artists...

Our sixties are also marked by "fičo" (Fiat 600) and "Vespa", "šuškavac" (nylon coat), purchased in Trieste, which was the clothing status symbol, and numerous items of domestic product design. Thus, when this decade is evoked, local designers, architecture, and urbanistic solutions hold a special place. "If we want to single out an idea or achievement to (...) denote the important features of the design of the sixties in Croatia, it should certainly be noted that, during that decade, perhaps the biggest and most important problem of urban areas was being solved – accommodating a huge number of newcomers", wrote Feđa Vukić.⁵⁹⁷ The sixties brought an explosion of "collective housing", the creation of New Zagreb, as well as the construction of new neighborhoods in most cities, while, at the same time, awareness not only of new architecture and urbanism but also of design, was developing. This is why, in 1964, the Center for Industrial Design was founded in Zagreb, to promote, as much as possible, the role of domestic design and domestic designers. Unfortunately, this was much more at the level of theory than in practice. However, during those years excellent examples of product design by Bernard Bernardi, Davor Grünwald, and others appeared. Graphic design also emerged, entering pop culture in a big way (great examples are the work of Mihajlo Arsovski on flower-power solutions in "Pop Express",

597 Feđa Vukić, *Stoljeće Hrvatskog dizajna*, (Meandar: Zagreb, 1996).

or the *Group 220* debut album – *Naši dani* (Our Days) from 1968, and a year later, the debut of Arsen Dedić – *Čovjek kao ja* (A Man Like Me).

The sixties cannot, therefore, be fully perceived without “interdisciplinarity”, that is, without the permeation of elite and popular culture, pioneering pieces of product design, architecture, photography, and graphic design, as well as the “mark of time”. Among them are also the “red scarf” (neckerchief worn by young pioneers) and jeans from Trieste, vinyl records, comic books, magazines, and domestic “VIS” (vocal-instrumental groups) – all genuine symbols of the growing consumer culture.

It is safe to say that the “phenomenon of the sixties” finished in the late eighties. Does this claim seem absurd? Perhaps, but for a different interpretation, one should consider the thought of the historian Dragan Markovina, who said that in Croatia, as elsewhere in Yugoslavia, “there was no concept of modernization before the socialist system”. He added: “...the education of the wider masses took place from the sixties to the mid-eighties. It is a period of 25 years, and it has taken root in too small a part of society. Had there been another 20 years, I believe we would have (today) a different conversation”.⁵⁹⁸

The process of “modernization” that started in the 1960s was, in fact, logical for the political system of Yugoslav “socialism with a human face”. Therefore, Jure Vulić was right claiming that, in the world, Yugoslavia “eagerly presented itself as the most open and most pro-Western socialist country, thus investing heavily in its international image”. (...) “De-Stalinization in all communist bloc countries, including Yugoslavia, was followed by a period historians call the ‘process of intensive Occidentalisation’, during which a controlled distribution of Western intellectual and musical cultural products was released in a selective and limited fashion. (...) The Titoist regime combined elements of repression with an exhaust valve. One of the

598 Dragan Markovina at the promotion of his book *Jugoslavija u Hrvatskoj, 1918–2018: od euforije do tabua*, held on March 10, 2019, in the Split “Golden door” cinematheque.

still unfinished stories in this context (the eighties – author's note) is the role of the Yugoslav counterculture and the so-called new wave".⁵⁹⁹

Aleksandar Raković goes even further, claiming that "in the development of rock and roll a very specific example occurred in socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia, which balanced between East and West". Specifically, he observes that "until the end of the sixties, Yugoslavia regarded rock and roll music as an integrating factor for young Yugoslavs and a progressive confirmation of its policy of peace, neutrality, equality and love among people regardless of their skin colour".⁶⁰⁰

The old motto that every new wave is also composed of old water is valid, as well, for the appearance of the Croatian (Yugoslav) new wave and punk, which marked the end of the seventies and eighties.

When it comes to Croatian (Yugoslav) "popular" and pop-rock music, the seventies are most often perceived as a not particularly inspired buffer zone between two damn exciting decades. Of course, with some participants on the scene, who were exceptional, influential, or very important for the record industry. Like, for example, Arsen Dedić, who made a star appearance with a series of albums (*Arsen 2*, *Homo Volans...*), which gave new meaning and impetus to the chanson/authored song, the group *Time*, which testified, with its debut, to the acceptance of the Anglo-American trends of the times (prog-rock), Josipa Lisac with the album *Dnevnik jedne ljubavi* (The Diary of a Love) – as the ultimate proof of a specific evolution of the music hits of the previous decade into a pop (and even rock) expression, and – last but not least – *Bijelo Dugme* (White Button). One could argue that that the domestic rock scene before *Bijelo Dugme* was a marginal discographic phenomenon, but became big business, along with concert production, following their appearance. The record industry (especially the Zagreb-based Jugoton and Suzy) grew tremendously

599 Jure Vujić, "Sjaj i bijeda novog vala", *Vijenac*, no. 549.

600 Aleksandar Raković, *Rokenrol u Jugoslaviji 1956 – 1968. – Izazov socijalističkom društvu*, (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2011)

in the seventies. This was, on the one hand, proof of the increasing standard and purchasing power of citizens, and on the other, adjustment to the preferences of the new teenage audience.

“Those who, for all intents and purposes, immediately discovered the magic formula of the generally accepted folk rock’n’roll called “pastoral” (D. Vrdoljak) were Goran Bregović, Željko Bebek and the people gathered under the *Bijelo Dugme* logo. Deeply rooted in the tradition of the environment from which they originated, and which offered, to those who were wise, all the benefits of a crossroads of cultures (just like Yugoslavia in a nutshell), they immediately conquered the market by selling their – it’s just rock’n’roll – recipe in bulk! The first editions with more than one hundred thousand copies of long-playing records in the history of domestic pop discography have inspired many epigones...”. These words of Siniša Škarica⁶⁰¹ place *Bijelo Dugme* in the very center of the rise of domestic (Yugoslav and Croatian) pop-rock discography during the seventies and most of the eighties. *Bijelo Dugme* is a kind of link connecting both of these decades, as the constant of the pop-rock mainstream, that is, the mainstream that has acquired or caused many secondary tributaries. In the case of punk and the new wave, even real torrents.

As an old pop-culture saying goes, like mainstream – like alternative. The numerous sales – and profits – *Bijelo Dugme* delivered spurred numerous bands also wishing to cash in. Epigones included *Divlje Jagode* (Wild Strawberries), the teenage pop-rock attraction *Srebrna Krila* (Silver Wing), as well as Sarajevo’s *Plavi Orkestar* – Blue Orchestra – in the eighties. Pop groups like *Novi Fosili* (New Fossils) or *Magazin* (which continued the evolution of the music festival hit

601 Siniša Škarica, *Tvornica glazbe – priče iz Dubrave; knjiga druga: 1970 – 1989* (Croatia records: Zagreb, 2019). Škarica was a long-time editor of the domestic program in Jugoton, and from the eighties onwards he was the author of numerous (winners of the *Porin* discographic award) compilations, extensive monographic box sets, notes, and essays, most of them collected in books *Kad je rock bio mlad – Priča s istočne strane 1956 – 1970* (VBZ: Zagreb, 2005), *Tvornica glazbe – Priča iz Dubrave (Knjiga prva: 1947 – 1969 and Knjiga druga: 1970 – 1989)*.

towards a contemporary pop expression, inspired by foreign groups like *Ricchi e poveri* or *ABBA*), encouraged discographers to release the heavier rock "alternative." With its success, *Dugme* became a reference point for deviation from the mainstream. This was the same dynamic seen in Britain when punks defined themselves against the prog-rock "dinosaurs" of the seventies, such as *Yes*, *Emerson, Lake & Palmer*, *Genesis*, and *Pink Floyd*.

But let's get back to *Bijelo dugme* for a moment.

Initially wrapped in myth and venerated until the 1990s, then becoming a topic of dispute, the *Bijelo Dugme* discography still cries out for a sober assessment. Which, *nota bene*, may only now be possible. Not only because of the historical distance, but also the notorious fact that, regardless of the lens used for interpretation, it must not be blurred by slimy nostalgic emotionality, traumatic Sarajevo war experience, or daily politics that dominated the nineties. Namely, these were precisely the starting points from which the scandalous journalistic "review" of Bregović's character and work, as well as the career and discography of *Dugme*, emerged in the middle of the war.

"For rock, the 1980s are the years of its final maturity. Throughout the 1970s, it still suffered from a youthful lack of criticism, often even teenage enthusiasm. Although it is true that the first album of *Time*, Josipa's "Diary of a Love", *Buldožeri*, occasional flashes of *Index*, obviously *Bijelo Dugme* and, above all, the unquestionable skill of performance, were already there. Still, it could be said that domestic rock from the reproductive 1960s (...) jumped from baby diapers into a well-tailored new wave suit."

One of the important reasons for the mentioned "transition" was nicely diagnosed in 1981 by Veselko Tenžera, in the preface to the book "Ništa mudro" (Nothing Wise), the authorized biography of *Bijelo Dugme* written by Darko Glavan and Dražen Vrdoljak.⁶⁰² "The appear-

602 Darko Glavan and Dražen Vrdoljak, *Ništa mudro – Bijelo dugme: autorizirana biografija* (Polet rock: Zagreb, 1981). Glavan and Vrdoljak – the founders of Croatian rock criticism and the most influential critics during the 1970s and 1980s – are the authors of the first biography of a rock performer published in Yugoslavia.

ance of the rock group *Bijelo Dugme* had the effect of a natural disaster in our culture. Our musical stage suddenly started thundering with a rhythm that set a generation of youth in torrents of ecstasy (...) And when the ‘merry Bosnians’ started to play on our music stage, already well polluted with the lifeless tones of a decayed sensibility, the audience welcomed *their own* sound, tailored to *their own* moment. Unlike many other rock bands, which tried to turn rock into a traditionalist preserve intended for the martyrs of the new, *Bijelo Dugme*, with its powerful sound, cut profoundly into the widest masses of listeners...

Anyone with a longer memory can readily testify to the extent of the euphoria that accompanied the tours of *Dugme*, following the release of their second album “Što bi dao da si na mom mjestu” (What Would You Give to Be in My Place), and point out the evidence Tenžera speaks about: Bregović’s discovery of the “collective sensitivity code”. Because of which, as Tenžera rightly points out, like never before, “an entire generation began communicating with his rock-codewords”.

As was written in the media, this second album of *Bijelo dugme* generated real “dugmemania”, demonstrated by not only the sale of 200,000 copies, but also by the turnout at the band’s concerts. In Sarajevo, 15,000 fans turned out; in Belgrade, three concerts in the Pionir Hall were sold out. When asked why Bregović and *Bijelo dugme* were so successful, critic Ante Perković gave an interesting answer: during the last fifteen or so years of Yugoslavia’s existence, Goran Bregović “was like Ivan Meštrović in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War – an acting state artist and great synthesizer who adapted national elements to fit the Western form and almost succeeded in creating a mythical and never-before-understood Yugoslav culture”⁶⁰³.

Those who dispute the merits of *Bijelo Dugme* for specific emancipation of rock from the hit-pop custody, most often forget precisely

603 Benjamin Perasović, *Supkultura i Hrvatski kontekst* (Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilak: Zagreb, 2002).

this dimension of Bregović's past work. More precisely, the undeniable fact that the huge success of the first singles ("Top" (Cannon), "Da sam pekar" (If I Was a Baker), "Selma") and the debut album, as well as the mass hysteria that accompanied the promotional tour *Što bi dao da si na mom mjestu*, showed urbi et orbi (which included editors of radio programs and cultural columns, discographers, and managers-merchants) that rock "splashed" by folklore elements was (also) a profitable commodity. In other words, without the huge commercial success of *Bijelo Dugme*, the then record industry giant Jugoton would have hardly taken under its wing both the Belgrade punk-new-wave trio from the "Paket aranžman" (Package Tour) album, and the key protagonists of the Zagreb new-wave punk scene.

To consider *Dugme* and Bregović at the end of the seventies and the very beginning of the eighties only as the relics from the Jurassic period of rock history, would mean only a literal rewriting of imported stereotypes about the "historic" British clash of the "rock dinosaurs" and the punk-alternative. Finally, both in "Doživeti stotu" (To Live to Be a Hundred) (Jugoton, 1980) and the already discographically documented recording of the concert at "Kulušić", *Bijelo Dugme* did not present itself as a corpse preserved in formaldehyde, but rather as a group aware of the new age and its trends. After all, "Ha, ha, ha" – a "jig" with an ironic text – was borrowed from *The Beat*, and the new connection (after Bregović's military service) with the mainstream world scene was confirmed by the accompanying visual covering, as well as by new arrangements, visible in the concert album from "Kulušić".⁶⁰⁴

604 The Kulušić Music and Stage Center (GSC Kulušić) was a concert club in Zagreb run by the Croatian Socialist Youth Association until 1987. During the 1980s, it was a favorite stage for rock and new wave band performances. Therefore, several concert albums were recorded in Kulušić, among which the most famous are those from 1981 – *Ravno do dna* (Straight to the bottom) by the band *Azra*, *Film u Kulušiću – live* by the band *Film*, and the *Bijelo dugme* album *5 april 1981*. Concert albums were recorded in Kulušić by many of the most famous protagonists of the rock scene of the eighties such as *Buldožer*, *Leb i sol*, *EKV*, and *Električni orgazam*.

The objections addressed to Bregović and *Dugme*, that their folk-rock hybrid from the first albums, that is, the “pastoral rock”, crucially contributed to pulling Yugoslav rock out of its urban homeland and transferring it to the context of rural, or at best suburban festivities, only partially hold water. Because, until the appearance of *Bijelo Dugme*, Yugoslav “urban rock” did not even exist as a relevant discographic fact. Rock – except for the Ljubljana *Buldožer*, as a glitch or “system error” – was mostly a synonym for “progressives” or “classically educated” instrumentalists, such as *Korni Grupa* and sympho-jazz rockers convinced that Chuck Berry (whose hymnic “Rock and Roll Music” Bregović replicated without batting an eyelid) was but a primitive entertainer, unsalvageable even by those few tones borrowed from the great Ludwig in the “blasphemous” “Roll Over Beethoven”.

Naturally, the discography of *Dugme* was not uniform but rather divided into three separate phases. The first consists of albums with a populist timbre from the seventies, created by combining hard rock clichés and folklore quotes, but on each of the albums following the first one, Bregović also included at least one authored “grand ballad”. For many, it was also the key proof of his authorial talent and skill of stylization. “Bitanga i princeza” (A Rascal and a Princess) (Jugoton, 1979), released at the turn of the decade, represents a creative and commercial triumph of the first phase, while “Doživeti stotu” (Jugoton) from 1980, is a decent album aware of a better past, but also of current events on the world stage, as well as of the change on the domestic “urban ground floor”. “Uspavanka za Radmilu M” (Lullaby for Radmila M) (Jugoton, 1983), despite its still decent level and positive duration, shows some cracks, but the real beginning of the author’s downfall began with the album “Bijelo dugme” (Diskoton, 1984), better known for the picture on the cover featuring “Kosovka devojka” (The Kosovo Maid).

The first album for Diskoton and without Željko Bebek, apart from the hit-like “Padaju zvezde” (Falling Stars) – articulated as a clone of Van Halen’s hit “Jump” – and “Lipe cvatu” (Blooming Linden), did not offer significant new contributions. The result of the next two studio

albums is similar – *Pljuni i zapjevaj moja Jugoslavijo* (Spit and Sing, My Yugoslavia) (Diskoton, 1986), with two hit songs – “Hajdemo u planine” (Let’s go to the mountains) and “Ružica si bila...” (You Were a Rose...), as well as *Ćiribiribela* (Diskoton, 1988), which also featured one of the songs crucial for Bregović’s later career – “Đurđevdan” (St. George’s Day). The reason for the gradual fade-out of *Dugme* was the end of functioning of the band as a whole, and the transformation of *Bijelo Dugme* into Bregović’s backing orchestra gathered for a new album and tour. True, during the concert sessions that followed the release of *Ćiribiribela*, Brega acted on the stage as The Edge, recalling sequences from the then-current U2 movie/album *Rattle and Hum*, but instead of relating with the inspiring (trendy) role models, *Dugme* was just dragging on the sidelines.

Finally, Bregović was obviously more interested in media manipulation and in provoking political commonplaces within the limits of what was allowed (especially in the songs “Hej, Slaveni” (Hey, Slavs), “Kosovska” (Of Kosovo), the guest appearance of national hero Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, as well as the symbolic merging of the choir “First Belgrade Singing Society” and the Dalmatian klapa “Trogir” ...), rather than in a real stylistic or genre perestroika of *Dugme*. If one is familiar with the ease with which he rejected the image of the guitar rock hero in the 1990s and with the transformation of *Bijelo Dugme*’s legacy into a pastiche of Balkan world music, the band’s last discographic stage can be interpreted as Bregović’s obvious realization that the “rocker” segment of his career had come to an end.

Subsequently, in the second half of the eighties, another reason for Bregović’s formula of “pastoral rock”, which flirted with “folk”, to become worn out, were the competitors on both sides of the folk-rock syntagm. On the one side, the more “urban” audience was attracted by *Azra* and the new wave, and on the other, there were many clones (Merlin, *Divlje Jagode*, *Plavi Orkestar*...), as well as the new hybrid hit pop-folk, alongside its biggest and most influential all-Yugoslav star, Lepa Brena.

“After-wit” had different conclusions in the case of Bregović and *Bijelo Dugme*, as well. Some of these conclusions included a political overtone as well. Because, for some commentators, the breakup of *Bijelo Dugme* as the “ultimate Yugoslav band”, happened right at the beginning of the disintegration of the state in which they were the main and most popular rock group. In that context, Bregović’s premonition of war was also mentioned – in 1988, on *Dugme*’s last album, in the introductory number he says: “If a war breaks out tomorrow/What will you and I do, my little one/Lock the doors/Lower the windows”.

A “premonition of war” during the 1990s was not detected only when it comes to Bregović and *Dugme*. For example, the historian Dragan Markovina wrote: “On the musical level, the album of *Ekaterina Velika* “Par godina za nas” (A Couple of Years for Us), from 1988, almost prophetically announced what was about to happen. Immediately after, Branimir Štulić published his first solo album without *Azra*, naming it “Balkanska rapsodija (The Balkan Rhapsody). Known as someone who announced social and political disaster, Štulić recorded a contemplative album, full of archaic sound, rooted in the Balkan *melos*. It was reminiscent of a move of a desperate man, finally confronting what he believed likely to happen, distancing himself from the context that surrounded him, both by the sound and the name of the album itself. At a time when the statements of the entire Croatian public were full of Europe and European values, Štulić turned to the loathed Balkans – a notion that was only slightly less unpopular than Yugoslavia, which he also continued to insist on. However, the album that marked the year with the significance of its last song, was a joint project by Zoran Predin and Arsen Dedić, entitled “Svjedoci priče” (Witnesses of the Story). Connecting, in the last song, called “Domovina” (Homeland), the two of them and Bora Đorđević, this album remained a monument to the last utopian attempt to preserve a sinking culture...”⁶⁰⁵

605 Dragan Markovina, “1989. u Jugoslavskom kaleidoskopu”, *Časopis za povijest Zapadne Hrvatske* (special edition “Slojevitosti 1989”) (Rijeka, 2014).

Bora Đorđević – to whom Arsen, at the end of the eighties, personally dedicated the witty verses, which turned out to be prophetic: “Life’s easy for Đorđević, a rocker from Čačak/It’s a old age pension for me and a fighter’s pension for him”⁶⁰⁶ – with his statements and actions of a “partisan” of Milošević’s bloated radical nationalism, “refuted” the thesis of “a monument to the last utopian attempt to preserve a sinking culture” at the very beginning of the 1990s. Štulić, on the other hand, with his independent projects, statements, and Dutch exile, seems to have systematically worked on dismantling his own mythical status as a hero, and even a prophet of the new wave.

Although the new wave is in the forefront when considering the Croatian music scene in the 1980s, the most prolific discographic decade in the history of domestic (understood in the widest sense) “popular music”, was evident in all genre and style offshoots.

Veterans like Husein Hasanefendić Hus and his former guitarist from the first line-up of *Parni Valjak* (Steamroller) managed to skillfully catch the train for the “new age”. Already with the album *Gradske priče* (Urban Stories) (CBS / Suzy, 1979), *Parni Valjak* announced a connection to the new wave, and a year later, with the album *Vruće igre* (Hot Games) (CBS / Suzy, 1980) and its cover (following the black-and-white clothing stylizations of the British representatives of the “2 Tone” movement), the band confirmed its leap into a new sound. Evidence of this was the inclusion of two of Štulić’s songs (“Kad Miki kaže da se boji” (When Miki Says He’s Afraid) and “Ne udaraj me nisko” (Don’t Hit Me Low), which were a result of a short-term collaboration between Hus and Štulić just before *Azra* was founded) in the album, and the full abandonment of former hard-rock stylizations inspired by groups like the *Status Quo*. Jurica Pađen and his band *Aerodrom*, on the other hand, after a short flirtation with modified prog/sympho-rock, in their debut single “Kad misli mi vrludaju” (When My

606 Arsen Dedić made the witty remark referring to the joint performance with Bora Đorđević at the concert that was held at the Belgrade Theater at Terazije on March 6, 1987. The concert was published as a “pirate edition” on the album “Arsen & Bora Čorba Unplugged` 87”.

Thoughts Wonder) (Jugoton, 1979), sailed straight into the new wave of pop, with the albums "Tango Bango" (Jugoton, 1981) and, a year later, "Obične ljubavne pjesme" (Ordinary Love Songs) (Jugoton, 1982). *Atomsko Sklonište* (Atomic Shelter), *Stijene* (Stones), *Metak* (Bullet) (from the beginning of the decade) had their ups and downs, and a great novelty on the scene was brought by *Plava Trava Zaborava* (Forgotten Blue Grass, behind which, as a group of top musicians who polished their craft in various groups in the seventies, stood the music critic Dražen Vrdoljak) with their covers of country and country-rock, which were gradually substituted by authored material.

Albums from the eighties by Arsen Dedić or Drago Mlinarac are a kind of given for the "authored song", pop music was still dominated by Mišo Kovač, Tereza, Oliver Dragojević, but also hit pop formations such as *Novi Fosili* and *Magazin*, jazz was ruled by the tireless Boško Petrović... but the main imprint on the decade, however, was given by the new performers who were directly inspired (or stylistically touched) by punk, new wave, new romanticism, second (or third) generation art-rock, mutating heavy metal... The Rijeka duo *Denis & Denis* become the first domestic electro-pop stars, and the *Tutti Frutti Band*, *Neki to vole vruće* (*Some Like It Hot*), *Xenia*, *Dorian Gray*, *Stidljiva Ljubičica* (*Shy Violet*), *Cacadou Look*, *Osmi Putnik* (*Eighth Traveler*)... occasionally achieved great commercial successes. Among the new production stars in the foreground were Mato Došen, Tihomir Tini Varga (in whose Swedish studio many leading protagonists of the scene of the eighties were recording), Željko Brodarić Jappa (former member of Split band *Metak*), and Ivan Piko Stančić (who in parallel played drums for bands *Psihomodo Pop* and *Film...*). New wave sound inspired by current British and American role models, but even more by the new interest in the retro soundtrack of power-pop, American singer-songwriters, rockabilly, pioneering rock and roll... was best embodied by *Animatori*, led by Krešo Blažević and Nena Belan's *Đavoli* (Devils), while *Boa* successfully sailed towards neo-romantic art-rock. *SexA* and *Trobecove Krušne Peći* (Trobec's Bread Ovens), on the other hand, were extremely interesting representatives of the alternative

with a cult audience, support of the critics, but without (quite expectedly) commercial success and a contract with discographers.

The same thing was also happening in Serbia. The metallers *Kerber*, *Galija* from Niš – which had its most loyal audience and still has a strong fan base (sic!) in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Novi Sad's *Laboratorija* (initially called *Laboratorija zvuka braće Vranešević* /Vranešević Brothers Sound Laboratory/) prone to trans-genre expression, blues band *Point Blank*, as well as the most prominent mainstream bands also testified to the genre variety of the music scene in the eighties.

Riblja Čorba, which started its upward journey in 1979 with the singles "Lutka sa naslovne strane (Front Page Doll) and "R'n'R za kućni savet" (Rock'n'Roll for Tenants Council), became a mega-successful band and the backbone of Yugoslav mainstream rock, along with *Bijelo Dugme* and *Parni Valjak*, after its debut album "Kost u grlu" (Bone in the Throat) released the same year and "Pokvarena mašta i prljave strasti" (Rotten Imagination and Dirty Passions) released two years later (both on the PGP RTB label). If in the 1980s Bregović was a genre chameleon of the mainstream (and some minor trend branches), while Hus and Parni Valjak were typical refined urbanites, Bora Đorđević and Riblja Čorba represented a purebred rock band that publicly expressed the "rotten imagination and dirty passions" of the lead composer and frontman, and the crackling riffs of a tight rock band. The "secret" of Riblja Čorba's success, which filled all halls from Mount Triglav to Gevgelija, lay in the charm and street wisdom of Đorđević's lyrics about alcohol, love, lowlifes, and the rebellion of a rock bohemian which – even if it had no direct connection with politics and censorship problems⁶⁰⁷ – was perceived as a sound slap in

607 During its career, *Riblja Čorba* often had problems with the lyrics in which there were political undertones. For example, in "Na Zapadu ništa novo" (All Quiet on the Western Front), in which there were the lyrics *za ideale ginu budale* (only fools die for their ideals) and *kreteni dižu bune i ginu* (jerks start uprisings and get killed) met with condemnation from Sarajevo's SUBNOR /Yugoslav Veterans' Federation/ and Socialist Youth Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina for insulting the achievements of the national liberation struggle. Other songs which raised

the face of socialist morality. The formula worked brilliantly on the first two albums and (probably even better) on the subsequent ones, “Mrtva priroda” (Still Life) (1981), “Buvlja pijaca” (Flea Market) (1982), live album “U ime Naroda” (In the Name of the People) (1982) and “Večeras vas zabavljaju muzičari koji piju” (Tonight You Will Be Entertained by Musicians Who Drink) (1984). However, after the departure of guitarist Momčilo Bajagić Bajaga, who began a successful solo career, *Riblja Čorba* seemed to be run by an automatic pilot. In the late 1980s, Đorđević was often accused of “verbally insulting the patriotic socialist sentiments of citizens”⁶⁰⁸ In the years of the collapse of Yugoslavia and Milošević’s radical nationalism, “Bora Čorba became a Serbian Thompson and began to show his national-chauvinist face, calling for a crusade and declaring himself an authentic Chetnik vojvoda (warlord). At that moment, the myth of a fun street singer and a man living off provocative rhymes ceased to exist.”⁶⁰⁹

When his solo album “Pozitivna geografija” (Positive Geography) (PGP RTB, 1984), premiered at Zagreb’s Kulušić Club, achieved unexpected success, Momčilo Bajagić Bajaga soon turned from the handsome rhythm guitarist of the popular rock band *Riblja Čorba* into a Yugoslav pop rock star in his own right. His next albums “Sa druge strane jastuka” (On the Other Side of the Pillow) (1985), “Jahači magle”

hackles included *Slušaj sine, obriši sline* (Listen Son, Wipe Your Nose), *Kako je lepo biti glup* (How Nice It Is to Be Stupid), *Pravila, pravila* (Rules, Rules), *Ja ratujem sam* (I’m Waging War Alone), or critique of socialist morality (*Mangupi vam kvare dete* (Bad Boys Are Spoiling Your Kid)... In the biographical entry on *Riblja Čorba* in the *Ex-Yu rock enciklopedija* (Belgrade, 2007), Petar Janjatović writes that “at the beginning of 1986, the lyrics of *Riblja Čorba* were even discussed at the session of the Commission for Information and Propaganda of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia”.

608 In the biographical entry in the *Ex-Yu rock enciklopedija*, Petar Janjatović mentions the indictment filed by the public prosecutor for “disturbing the public” after Đorđević recited his lyrics in 1987 at Belgrade’s Sava Centre, but the lawsuit was rejected because these lyrics had already been published.

609 Anđelko Jurkas “Bez rocka trajanja – glazbeno dešifriranje Balkana”, Znanje: Zagreb 2010.

(Fog Riders) (1986) and "Prodavnica tajni" (The Secrets Shop) (1988), released by a Belgrade recording company, were also the successful projects of escapist mainstream pop (completely different from Đorđević's "actionism") with elements of blues, jazz, and gentle ballads, coexisting with flamboyant rock and roll.

In the 1980s, similar poetics, but with a pronounced songwriting flair, was practiced by another great Yugoslav star – Đorđe Balašević. "Đorđe Balašević was and remains a masterful poet with an incredible gift for conjuring up all the imaginations of Vojvodina's clashes of cultures, mentalities, customs and nature in the way that will not offend or leave anyone indifferent. Sowing respect for tradition and everyone's past, he looks lazy, but very effectively creates an image of the world being one step away from reality, but represents an oasis of overwhelming charm and intimacy that (still) lives in everyone", wrote Petar Peca Popović in 1982, at the time of the release of Balašević's album "Pub" (Jack).⁶¹⁰ Admittedly, Balašević entered the war nineties with mocking songs and lyrics about "renegade" Slovenes – and while on a tour in the late 1980s, he tastelessly commented on the events in Kosovo. But his songs of the 1980s were and remain impressive. They might be also called anthological. Being halfway between the poet and causeur Arsen Dedić and the witty folk entertainer for a more demanding audience, Đorđe Balašević built his career during the 1980s (but also in the later decades) not only on his songwriting talent but also on the "Lala charm" of a guy next door, so ordinary and absolutely without the attitude of a great star. "...Balašević was also a turbo successful star with a loyal following among the peoples and nationalities in the former state (just like in the "dissociated" areas today). The "secret" of his success on the popular music scene was exactly the same formula used by Lepa Brena to create the most profitable pop music company: tickling the Balkan emotions. Finally, what Lepa Brena was in the late 1980s for truck drivers, military wives and a million-strong audience raised on Čkalja's humor and TV

610 Petar Popović "Rock 82", 5 May 1982.

Belgrade show “Nedeljno popodne” (Sunday Afternoon), Balašević was for the generation of 1968 protesters nonconformists, unmarried intellectuals, high school girls loving Yesenin’s poetry, and a teenage audience in transition from folk/pop singers to Bregović and Dedić. Dole was the most tenacious metaphor of the Yugoslav music scene: the confluence of all its common places – its very essence. The form of Balašević’s travelling shows, conceived as a mix of music, poetic chatters, the dramaturgy of the radio show “Veselo veče” (Merry Evening) and alternation of song and humor, was and still remains pop-style nonconformism, coupled with a consistent and Lala-like artful realization of the motto “always on the edge – never in a police van”. Thus, it is not strange that Balašević was so happily worn as a trendy badge by the audience that was “too old for rock and roll, but too young for a functionary’s pension...”, I wrote in 2003.⁶¹¹

In the early 1980s, Oliver Mandić introduced Bowie’s androgyny into the Yugoslav pop scene as well as funky-soul-pop stylizations that promoted him as the new icon of the (not only) Belgrade urban scene. Apart from his cleverly conceived pop melodies, funk with face lifting close to David Bowie’s “plastic funk” (which also later proved to be highly influential on the later opus of Dino Dvornik and, in particular, the *Songkillers*) and provocative image and compositions with ambiguous and erotic lyrics, Mandić also released a series of successful albums such as his debut album “Probaj me” (Try Me) (1981) as well as the albums “Zbog tebe bih tucao kamen” (I Would Break Rocks for You) (1982) and “Dođe mi da vrisnem tvoje ime” (I Feel like Screaming Your Name) (1985). As a kind of Yugoslav Toyah, Slađana Milošević also followed a similar trail, while at the same time relying on the British new wave. The same applies to Bebi Dol (Dragana Šarić), prone to alter pop with the elements of new wave art rock.

At the beginning of the decade, however, they readily accepted the new wave.

611 Zlatko Gall, *Kako Iggyju reći Pop a Dylanu Bob – ogledi iz rock i pop-kulture*, (Profil, Zagreb 2009.)

There is a lot of symbolism in the fact that at the same time *Bijelo Dugme* was starting to record its album "Doživjeti stotu" in the big studio of Radio Belgrade called "The Six", the mythical *Paket Aranžman* (Package Tour) was being created in the Belgrade-based studio of Enzo Lasić, a "Belgrader" from Split. Or, more precisely, recordings of three new Belgrade bands (unquestionable icons of the Yugoslav new wave) *Šarlo Akrobata*, *Idoli*, and *Električni Orgazam* (*Electric Orgasm*). Incidentally, in those days (months) the then key editor of Jugoton, Siniša Škarica, often stayed in Belgrade on business, and "repackaged" the recordings of the Belgrade trio into Jugoton's album called *Paket Aranžman*. This was because Škarica wrote years later, "it was clear that the mentioned trio, no matter how much they emphasized mutual diversity and initial intolerance (...) created practically at the same time, according to the same matrix of new sound and musical worldview, deserved the title of the flag bearer of the Belgrade alternative scene". Namely, says Škarica, "they were a kind of response to the high tide of the Zagreb new wave trio – *Azra*, *Film*, and *Haustor*".

The mentioned comparison is completely correct, although *Prljavo Kazalište* (Dirty Theater), which, at that time, published albums with Jugoton's competing urban label Suzy, should be added to the Zagreb trio. In Ljubljana – the unofficial capital of Yugoslav punk – the *Pankrti* had been active since September 1977, under the leadership of Petar Lovšin and Gregor Tomc. The first single containing the songs "Lepi in prazni" (Pretty and Empty) and "Lublana je bulana" (Ljubljana is Sick) (ŠKUC, 1978) was released a year later, while the real punk patriotic songs "Anarhist" (Anarchist), "Tovarši jest vam ne verjamem" (Comrades, I Don't Trust You) and the mentioned "Lublana je bulana", later found their place in the influential compilation *Novi punk val 78–80* (New Punk Wave 78–80).⁶¹² Their debut album

612 *Novi punk val 78–80* (ZKP RTV Ljubljana, 1981) is an album compiled by Ljubljana critic and promoter of punk Igor Vidmar, intending to offer a representative cross-section of Croatian and Slovenian punk and new wave bands. The album includes compositions by Croatian performers *Prljavo kazalište*, *Paraf*, *Termiti*, *Problem*, as well as Slovenian *Pankrti*, *Buldog*, *Berlinski zid*, and *Grupa 92*.

Dolgcajt (ZKP RTV Ljubljana) was released on February 8, 1980, and even today it is recognized as (along with *Buldožer's* debut) one of the most important albums in the history of Slovenian rock, as well as a crucial Yugoslav punk album. Although in the (at that time called “engaged”) lyrics one could sense arguments and criticism of certain phenomena in Yugoslav society, the album won the “Seven Secretaries of SKOJ” award, which was, at the time, awarded by the Croatian Socialist Youth Alliance. Judging by a later statement by Pero Lovšin, none of the members of the group came to Zagreb to collect the award. Why did a punk band win an award in Croatia? There are several reasons for this.

At the end of the seventies, and especially after Tito died in the eighties, a strong “rocker” (read as: punk new wave) connection was established between Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade, as a contemporary, revived motto (coined by the new wave music) of “brotherhood and unity”. *Pankrti's* short appearance at Mirko Ilić's comics exhibition at the Zagreb Student Center in late 1977 (which has become a mythical date a long time ago, just like the Ramones' first London appearance on the British punk scene) was the trigger that led to the founding of many Zagreb punk groups. The famous YURM or Yugoslav rock moment,⁶¹³ which took place in Zagreb during the eighties, as well as the guest appearances of Belgrade musicians in Zagreb's “Kulušić” under the name “Greetings from Belgrade”, followed by the return visit of Zagreb bands to Belgrade, firmly cemented the close ties of key protagonists of the new wave and rock scene from the capitals of the two republics. The result was only seemingly unexpected: *Električni*

613 The importance of YURM, as a promotional channel for young performers, is evidenced by Bora Kokan's text from *Studio* (May 1985), in which he writes: “We should grasp at the straw of trust that this year's YURM has offered us the best of the two hundred groups that have arrived, and that, from that dozen, we should expect the successors of groups such as those affirmed by past YURMs: *Xenia*, *U škripcu*, *Animatori*, *Laki pingvini*, Elvis J. Kurtovich and his *Meteori*, *Dorian Gray*, *Psihomodo pop*, *Kongres*, *Videosex*, *Trotakt projekt*, *Sex*, *Trobecove krušne peći*, *Automobili...*”

Orgazam, *Šarlo Akrobata*, that is, *EKV* and *Disciplina Kičme* (Discipline of the Spine), *Idoli*, *Bajaga...* were more popular in Zagreb than in Belgrade, which, in turn, adored *Film*, *Parni Paljak*, and *Psihomodo Pop* (although the latter had the status of a demo band that failed to find a discographer in Zagreb). Sarajevo's "new primitives" *Zabranjeno pušenje* and *Elvis J. Kurtovich*, *Crvena Jabuka* (Red Apple) and *Plavi Orkestar*, Maribor's *Lačni Franz* (Hungry Franz) and Ljubljana's *Videosex* and *Laibach*, Split *Đavoli*, Rijeka *Parafi*, *Xenia*, *Denis & Denis*, Belgrade's *Riblja Čorba* (Fish Stew), *Bajaga*, Oliver Mandić, *U Škripcu*, *Laki Pingvini* (Light Penguins), *EKV* (*Ekatarina Velika* – Catherine the Great), *Disciplina Kičme* and *Partibrejkers*, Vinkovci's *Majke* (Mothers) and *Satan Panonski* (Pannonian Satan), Pula KUD *Idijoti* and *Messerschmitt*, Novi Sad *Boye*, Koprivnica *Overflow*, Skopje jazz-rockers *Leb i sol* (Bread and Salt) and *Mizar...* confirmed the existence of an all-Yugoslav pop-rock scene, its high-quality production, genre diversity and huge sales of published sound carriers, as did those unreal 700 thousand copies of Daniel Popović's album with the Eurovision song "Džuli" (Julie).

After all, the eighties gave us a significant number of anthological albums of the Yugoslav rock scene.

Even today, just like at the time of the great popularity of Johnny Štulić and *Azra*, their live album "Ravno do dna" (Straight to the Bottom) (Jugoton, 1982), recorded at a concert in the hellish atmosphere of Zagreb's Kulušić Club, sounds like a genuine masterpiece! "Ravno do dna" is not only a brilliant live album and an impressive document about one band and – in particular – about one time. It is above all "the best of" Štulić and *Azra*, as well as the Zagreb branch of the new wave. There are several reasons for this... Their performance at the Kulušić Club was also a kind of make-up exam for the clumsily realized studio debut, which was a fascinating letter of intent and proof of Štulić's exceptional authorial talent. The album "Ravno do dna" contained 11 of the 12 songs from the debut album (only "Žena drugog Sistema" – /A Woman of Another System – was left out). It included the hits like "Jablan" (Poplar) "Uradi nešto" (Do

Something), "Vrijeme odluke" (Decision Time), "Krvava Meri" (Bloody Mary), "Gracija", "Tople usne žene" (The Warm Lips of a Woman), "Iggy Pop"... The double album "Sunčana strana ulice" (The Sunny Side of the Street) also contained the key songs from Johnny's "Zagreb phase" with striking urban vignettes like "Užas je moja furka" (Horror Is My Sort of Thing); compositions endowed with a devastating diagnosis: "the stinking city closes the cellars, the stinking city closes the streets, the stinking city is satisfied with itself...". "Sunčana strana ulice" provided the live album with Štulić's exceptional love songs ("Provedimo vikend zajedno" – Let's Spend the Weekend Together), new pervasive urban vignettes ("041) and mostly angry political and social themes ("Poljubio me...: He Kissed Me...", "Kurvini sinovi" – Sons of Bitches, "Poljska u mom srcu" – Poland in My Heart, "Užas je moja furka" – Horror is My Sort of Thing...). "Ravno do dna" was an album of eruptive power, but also a live music project that was precisely constructed and intended to emphasize Johnny's "quarrelsome" and moralizing discourse with a shift of the authorial focus from "little man" and the Zagreb environment to the "great truths" marking the album "Sunčana strana ulice".

One of the unavoidable music albums of the 1980s is, unfortunately, the only album by *Šarlo Akrobata*, "Bistriji ili tuplji lovek biva kad..." (A Man Gets Brighter or Dumber When...) (Jugoton, 1981), namely Milan Mladenović, Koja and VD. The album-opening cabaret miniature "Pazite na decu 1" (Look After the Kids 1) with its jazzy-avant flair, furious rhythm, Zappism and pseudo-operetta (or church) vocals, as well as the narrative and cacophonous ending, showed right away that *Šarlo Akrobata* was a unique and unrepeatably phenomenon on the former rock scene. "Fenomen" (Phenomenon), "Sad se jasno vidi" (Now It Is Clear) and "Rano izjutra" (Early in the Morning) are the punky rapids of the powerful trio, fiercer than most compositions of its then competitors, coupled with unexpected twists that owe more to the avant-garde (especially in "Sad se jasno vidi") than to the patterns of three-minute "rabble-rousing" punk. "Ljubavna priča" (Love Story) is even more strangely structured. It begins as a

free-jazz theme with bass and drum solos, develops as a bizarre light composition with unusual lyrics and then bursts explosively every now and then. The song "Čovek" (A Man) seems to have come from an avant-garde album à la Hugh Hopper before the "noise" develops into a punky number that also has an "extension" in the theme "Bes" (Fury). And then there comes again ska/reggae in "OOO", which merges with "Problem", so that, conditionally speaking, it is partially performed as a "conventional piece". "Ja želim jako" (I Strongly Wish) brings back melodious punk to the taste of a punk/new-wave audience. The album ends with the brilliant song "Pazite na decu 2" (Look After the Kids 2), performed – like the whole album – as a musical stream of consciousness at a casual studio session.

Šarlo Akrobata split into two new bands which – each in its genre – certainly marked the Yugoslav music of the 1980s. Using other means, Dušan Kojić Koja, who formed the band *Disciplina Kičme*, continued with his distinctive avant-garde fusions of funk, rock, punk, noise, rap, jazz... which could also be sensed on the *Šarlo Akrobata* album. During the 1980s (before leaving for London at the beginning of the new decade), he recorded seven albums and on each of them he offered boldly original, anarchic, aggressive and non-commercial material that was praised by both critics and Koja's growing following.

Ekatarina velika, or EKV, was preceded by *Katarina II* in 1982, which was formed by Milan Mladenović and guitarist Dragomir Mihajlović Gagi after the disbandment of *Šarlo Akrobata*. The band was "equipped" with keyboardist Margita Stefanović, bassist Bojan Pečar and *Šarlo Akrobata*'s drummer Ivan Vdović ("VD"). In 1984, the band released its eponymous debut album. With the departure of VD and Gagi and the arrival of drummer Ivan Fece Firči the band changed its name into *Ekatarina Velika* (Catherine the Great) and with its second album "Ekaterina Velika" (1985) laid the foundation for a recognizable new sound and stylistics which marked all its releases during the 1980s. Mladenović's characteristic vocals, guitar playing style and peculiar poetic lyrics that were often urban to the core, through abstract pictures, dynamic rhythm section and Magi's keyboards soon

brought EKV the hits and fans throughout Yugoslavia. The songs like “Tatoo”, “Oči boje meda” (Honey Coloured Eyes), “Budi sam na ulici” (Be Alone in the Street), “Modro i zeleno” (Blue and Green), “Hodaj” (Walk), “Ti si sav moj bol” (You Are All My Anguish), “Novac u rukama” (Money in the Hands), “Zemlja” (Earth), “Ljubav” (Love), that is, the albums “Ekatarina velika” (Catherine the Great) (1984), “S vetrom u lice” (With the Wind Against Our Faces) (1986), “Ljubav” (1987) and “Samo par godina za nas” (Only a Few Years Left for Us) (1988) form an indispensable part of the new wave soundtrack of the 1980s.

After the release of “Paket aranžman” (Package Tour) and “Malčiki” (Boys), the band *Idoli* became overnight a media star and the favourite of the new wave audience. However, the “real *Idoli*” shot to fame with the album “Odbrana i poslednji dani” (The Defence and the Last Days) (Jugoton, 1982) – the best and most mature album of Yugoslav rock in the 1980s. Namely, the album represents both a conceptual whole – inspired by Borislav Pekić’s book of the same name – and the compilation of individual “stand-alone” pop titles. In addition, the multi-layered compositions with deeper contents under the surface layer of enticing melodies were not exactly tailored to the taste of the widest audience. “Odbrana i poslednji dani” was deliberately presented as a non-commercial, artistic project which – by insisting on the integrity of the story and the absence of promotional video spots for individual songs – seems to be screaming that this album is not for everyone. The impression of “artism” was certainly further enhanced by the Cyrillic alphabet (very unusual for the then rock bands) and the cover on which, instead of a photograph of the band, there was an “unattractive” detail from an Orthodox icon, while the “smell of incense” was felt in the (brilliant!) song “Moja si” (You’re Mine). The album “Odbrana i poslednji dani” has a supreme music content: the fierce “Kenozoik” (Cenozoic), bitter-sweet “Poslednji dani” (The Last Days), mystical “Moja si” (You’re Mine), fascinating “Senke su drugačije” (The Shadows Are Different), which combines the stylizations of Dragačevo trumpeters and march rhythm, Divljan’s typical airy light melody “Nebeska tema” (The Celestial Theme), romantic,

folk-clad "Rusija" (Russia), garnished with imaginary "Kraftwerkian" electro-jokes, ironic rockabilly miniatures "Igrale se delije" (Lads Were Dancing) and "Jedina (Uzurlikzurli)" (The Only One /Uzurlikzurli/)... The album ended magnificently as it began: first with Šaper's theme "Odbrana" (The Defence) (with the mantra repetition "Jesus is our May"⁴ as the theme should have originally been called) and then with the new wave "up tempo" pearls "Gde si sad cica maco"⁵ (Kitty kitty, where are you now?) and "Glavna ptica" (skрати svoj dugački jezik) (The Main Bird /Hold Your Tongue/), as well as Divljan's dreamy piano miniature "Hajde sanjaj me sanjaj" (Come on, dream of me).

Before the release of its debut album ("Haustor", Jugoton 1981), the band *Haustor* recorded its single with Sacher's "Moja prva ljubav" (My First Love) in 1981, which remained its most famous and most recognizable song for years and somewhat stole the show to the compositions on the live album. This single and the single "Moja prva ljubav" were produced by Husein Hasanefendić Hus and the album was symbolically announced with Sacher's song "Radio" and Rundek's "Crni žbir" (A Black Spy). Namely, the album almost evenly featured the songs of *Haustor's* two authors Darko Rundek and Srđan Sacher. The original vinyl album was supposed to include the song "Radnička klasa odlazi u raj" (The Working Class Goes to Paradise), but it was removed for political reasons and replaced by the well-known song "Moja prva ljubav". Nevertheless, the debut album vividly suggested the developmental directions of *Haustor's* songs and the personal authorial poetics of Darko Rundek and Srđan Sacher. Although the later studio album "Treći svijet" (Third World) was more rounded off and better produced, the debut album still represents all basic features of *Haustor's* pioneering challenging of the form of "pop music", that is, the influences of its permeation with punk, Caribbean rhythms, new wave, vaudeville... Apart from the hit "Moja prva ljubav" and new wave "Radio", close to the poetics of the *Specials* or *Selecters* which, like the polyrhythmic "Noć u gradu" (Night in the City) with the elements of a vaudeville drama, showed Sacher's tendency to listen to the current musical vibrations and adopted them

into a unique authorial expression, the album also featured a number of unusual songs. It was close to its world competitors and completely different from the dominant new wave trend in the country. On the other hand, Rundek's "Crni žbir" was a layered composition with an accent drum, unexpected sound inserts and striking wind instruments, "Duhovi" (Ghosts) was thoroughly irradiated with ska/reggae, "Mijenjam se" (I'm Changing) represented a new-wave theme in the orbit of *Film*, and the new-wave song "Tko je to?" (Who Is It?), which is even close to the *Talking Heads*.

The third actor of the mythical "Package Tour", *Električni Orgazam* also released an exceptional album in the eighties. In the autumn of 1983, under the strong influence of the New York scene, Ivan Stančić Piko and Srđan Gojković Gile called themselves *Hijene* (Hyenas) and recorded the material for the album "WooDoo za početnike" (WooDoo for Beginners). The album was not released, but got a kind of upgrade and was finalized just with "Distorzija" (Distortion), (Jugoton, 1986). The album opens with "Vudu bluz" (Voodoo Blues) and "Lui Lui" (Louie Louie). The first is garage psychodelia as can be found on the box set of the psychodelic-garage compilation *Nuggets* with a roaring bass, crackling guitar riffs and Gile's striking vocals. Naturally, "Louie, Louie" is the cover of the *Kingsmen's* emblematic song and garage rock, played with adrenaline gushing virtually from each tone played. Crackling guitars – on the trail of the old *Stones'* phrasing – and the harmonica give the essential touch of rhythm and blues, while the accent bass in a repetitive riff – an irresistible "rocker" strength. "Svaka nova noć" (Every New Night) is another garage theme that has a simple scheme with polyphony and melody on the trail of the beat bands of the 1960s, while the light "Ša la la" (Sha la la) with a slide guitar enters the country-rock space. "Debela devojka" (Fat Girl) – the last song on vinyl side A and a great radio hit – is a specific burner of basic rock with the balanced influences of the 1960s and punk/new-wave constructions. The original vinyl side B opens with another hit – "Ja sam težak kao konj" (I Am Heavy as a Horse) – with the riff that is an imaginative combination of the beginning of "Baby Come Back"

by the *Equals* and "Osmijeh" (Smile) by *Grupa 220*, and is followed by the garage rockabilly "Vidim svoj lik" (I See My Image). The crackling "Ne postojim" (I Don't Exist) is another hit and holds an important place in *Orgazam's* discography; "Horor Bugi" (Horror Boogie) is the proof of how Gile and his company can cope with a boogie on piano, while "Hej ti" (Hey You) is a firm rock music inspired by garage and the *Stones* from the late 1960s. The end belonged to one more mega-hit – "Kapetan Esid" (Captain Acid), a light melody also inspired by the *Stones'* classic ballads. The album titled "Distorzija", as well as a great majority of the albums on the ranking list of the most significant releases in the 1980s. show a relatively fast progression from punk to post-punk, new-wave (conceptual) art rock and garage rock rinsed with punk, and a shift to the roots R'n'R and R'n'B "Americana"...

Partibrejkers (transliteration for Partybreakers) embraced these two last genre branches and, on three albums released in the 1980s (titled simply "Partibrejkers I", "II" and "III"), demonstrated a bursting "roots" rock and roll, combined with a garage and punk ferocity. The recognizable voice of singer Zoran Kostić Cane, who shouted the lyrics rather than singing them, then the guitar of Nebojša Antonijević Anton, and manic rhythm section offered a simple and effective basic rock and roll that was both archaic and modern.

But let's get back to punk. In the review "Spori in spopadi druge Slovenije" (Disputes and Encounters of the Other Slovenia), Gregor Tomc writes: "In a country where there is so little space for what is unpredicted and unpredictable by the system, I see the importance of punk in expanding autonomous public action for free action and creation."⁶¹⁴ It is, says Tomc, about action and creation occurring outside the state and its institutions, strengthening the civil society. "Punk (namely) expands the space of autonomous action for those who follow it. The emphasis is neither on building a more just society nor on greater actual freedom. It does not try to act through existing state institutions, it does not criticize existing visions with a view

614 Collection *Punk pod Slovenci* (Univerzitetna konferencija SSOS: Ljubljana, 1984).

on the ones dominating the future, it does not confront (proclaimed – author’s note) ideas with reality – as it had begun with the student movement. Unlike other, say, revisionist movements, punk is also not state-building (...).”

The words of Gregor Tomc, a prominent sociologist, activist, and founder of the legendary pioneers of Slovene punk, point out the space where punk “rebellion”, that is, alternative activity (within the limits of what was allowed) was possible. However, this was not the case everywhere in Yugoslavia – because what was tolerable in Slovenia (and Croatia) until the end of the 1980s, was not tolerable in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which the media also called the “dark vilayet”, due to its harsh political attitudes). In Slovenia (and Croatia), in the 1980s, a kind of “decentralization” became most prominent, and thus “the alternative operates in an environment where it most often interacts with political actors” (G. Tomc), especially with youth organizations, such as student centers. Of course, as long as such decentralization and autonomy of action did not challenge the political system itself and the existing ideological monolith.

The 1980s are therefore also a time of flourishing youth press and youth (rocker) clubs such as Zagreb “Kulušić” and “Lapidarium”, Rijeka “Palach”, Pula “Uljanik”, Split “TOK”... as well as (youth) subcultures. Primarily due to the “punk identity”, which in the late 1970s was only hinted, immersed in a wider “new wave” of music, only to return, in its second generation, irrespective of the domestic music scene, wrote Benjamin Perasović.⁶¹⁵ But, he wrote, “the mid-eighties were marked by fragmentation, and already at the end of the 1980s, by a “crossover” process, so that heavy metal (already fragmented into speed, death, thrash), dark/gothic, hard-core, rockabilly and other movements became gradually independent, forming separate identities and intermixing with each other. Football hooliganism also became part of the urban subcultural scene in the mid-eighties, followed later by hip-hop

615 Benjamin Perasović, *Supkultura i Hrvatski kontekst* (Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar: Zagreb, 2002).

(...) Fancy pants, "hashomans" (shabby looking youth, supposedly on drugs – translator's note), punks, "corashes" (related to "hardcore" music style – author's note), metalheads, rockabillies, darkers, rappers, ravers – are just some of the most famous common denominators that appeared in Croatia (...) Music and the complex world (from underground to establishment) that was created around music and lifestyle enabled most of these subcultural "common denominators" in our country as well...".

Unlike the occasional punk "excessive" question-posing,⁶¹⁶ the new wave, as well as the overall "scene" of the 1980s, with its "brotherhood and unity" in terms of urbanity, subcultural groups, and rock, brought a desirable "exhaust valve", in the decade marked by a huge economic crisis, during which the common state started dying, and the mentioned "valve" worked. Especially when, slowly but steadily, in the second half of the eighties, the new wave mostly moved away from "engagement" to hedonism and took crucial steps towards pop as a mass amnesia industry. A vivid proof of this is brought by a comparison of the first two albums of *Prljavo Kazalište*, but also by the genesis of *Parafi* from the pioneers of punk⁶¹⁷ to a new post-punk wave.

616 The most frequent topics of criticism in punk texts pertained to the political system, within the limits allowed, such as criticism of bureaucracy (in the song "Veze i poznanstva" (Connections and Acquaintances) by *Prljavo Kazalište*), of SUBNOR (the organization of war veterans) and their mythologizing of the National Liberation War (indirectly in the song "Bog nima telefona" (God has no phone) by Lačni Franz and "Računajte z nami" (Count on us) by *Pankrti*), of professional youth activists (*Pankrti* in the song "Sedamnaest" (Seventeen), "Jest sem na liniji" (I'm in line)), and of "commanded" self-governing-socialist idylls (*Prljavo Kazalište* in "Sretno dijete" (Happy child), "U mojoj općini nema problema" (No problems in my municipality), *Parafi* in "Živjela Jugoslavija" (Long live Yugoslavia)...))

617 *Parafi* in Rijeka "started" with punk at the same time as the main representatives of punk in Great Britain. Their first performance was held on the Belvedere in Rijeka on December 31, 1976, and their debut album was *A dan je tako lijepo počeo* (And the Day Started So Nicely). Punk activist and promoter Igor Vidmar, who was also one of its producers, spoke about the album and its significance,

Some other examples of the change were *Idoli*, moving from the magnificent ambiguous album *Odbrana i poslednji dani* (Defense and the Last Days) (Jugoton, 1982), to (a year later) *Čokolada*, as well as Johnny Štulić and *Azra*, who were among the most convincing representatives of the new wave (with ingenious early albums among which *Ravno do dna* (Straight to the Bottom) – the ultimate sound hit of the eighties), but at the end of the decade turned into their own parody...

The debut of *Prljavo Kazalište* (*Prljavo Kazalište*, Suzy, 1979) was a first-class product of Croatian (Yugoslav) punk in its formative years; an album that in 1979 (a year after the single “Televizori” (TV Sets)) captured the spirit of the times and turned the teenage straightforwardness and raw energy of primordial rock (and punk) into a series of numbers (“Ja sam mladić u najboljim godinama” (I’m a Young Man in My Prime) “Veze i poznanstva” (Relationships and Friendships), “U mojoj općini problema nema” (No Problems in My Municipality), “Subotom uvečer” (On Saturday Night), “Sretno dijete” (Happy Child), “Neki dječaci” (Some Boys)...), which, with an ironic distancing, reflect the generational frustration with the environment. Already a year later, Jasenko Houra and the band, on the albeit brilliant and influential album *Crno-bijeli svijet* (Black and White World) (Suzy, 1980), leaned towards the fashionable ska statement (without its British political and social connotations) and the apolitical topics, spreading the original punk sound towards power-pop, new wave ska and basic pop-rock.

saying that they “were an anticipation of the coming crisis, in the sense of a precursor of social disillusionment and the efforts of socially subordinate strata to express their individuality in some way”. While the music critic Bojan Mušćet wrote: “Parafi is a key phenomenon of punk and new wave explosions in the city (Rijeka – author’s note), and with the activity of this band, a rich scene was created, followed by photographers, designers, fashion designers, journalists, comics artists, a huge number of new musical groups and all the others who marked the propulsive force of the Rijeka new wave generation. Best of all, *Parafi* managed to do it twice, with two lineups – the first that spawned punk in the former Yugoslavia, and the second that defined new wave post-punk idioms on the same territory.”

The mentioned examples are a nice illustration of claims like the one made by Vujić that “controlled tolerance of new avant-garde western trends and even punk-rock music” was also a “simulation of social reality”, as well as a way of channeling and directing youth rebellion towards “hedonistic escapism”. Especially since the new wave – and especially the punk – “scene” did not have the fundamental “class” characteristics as the US and UK scenes. Or, as Benjamin Perasović wrote, “Because of the shaping of social strata in our country, because of the specific socio-political context of the 1970s and later, but also because of the way rock culture was transmitted and created, it is impossible to talk about a hippie movement or punk in Croatia with such a pronounced distinction between the working and middle classes, to whom these styles should exclusively belong. This does not mean that the socio-economic status of parents did not affect the type of sub-culturalization of actors at all, but such an attitude clearly avoided determinism and respected the reality in which Croatian subcultural actors usually did not represent any social class in particular...”

Prljavo kazalište with the first three albums, *Film*, early *Azra*, *Haustrator*, *Patrola*, *Animatori*, *Đavoli*, *Paraft*, *Boa*, *SeXa*, *Trobecove Krušne Peći*, *Xenia*... as well as many others, were the proof of the creative rise of the new wave sound, which has – at least when it comes to rock – marked the 1980s and became the key reason for the mystification (not only musical) of this period.

It was also similar elsewhere.

In Vojvodina there emerged an exciting new scene with a series of projects recorded in Radio Novi Sad or the Vranešević Brothers Studio (“Sound Laboratory”).⁶¹⁸ *Pekinška patka* (“Peking Duck”, formed in 1978) was among the first Yugoslav punk groups. In 1979, it released its inaugural single “Biti ružan, pametan i mlad” (Being Ugly, Clever and

618 Bogomir Mijatović, “NS Rokopedija – Novosadska rok scena 1963 – 2003” (Novi Sad: SWITCH, 2005) i “Ilustrovana enciklopedija rok muzike u Vojvodini 1963 – 2013”, Novi Sad: SWITCH, 2013)

Young) and faced problems with censorship. Two years later, Jugoton released its (only) album “Strah od monotonije” (Fear of Monotony), which sold 35,000 copies. In 1988, as the first real domestic “grrrl power” band, *Boye* released the alter pop album “Dosta! Dosta! Dosta!” (Enough! Enough! Enough!) (PGP RTB). *Luna* was undoubtedly one of the most important Novi Sad bands in the 1980s. With Slobodan Tišma and Ivan Fece Firči, two former members of *La Strada* and two members of the disbanded *Pekinška patka*, it attracted the attention of critics in the early 1980s. In 1982, Petar Luković wrote: “Today, *Luna* is – probably – the most mature Novi Sad band of this generation: its music is a strange symbiosis between the avant-garde influences of an alternative scene and the reflection of pop philosophy, coupled with a sure rhythm and moving vocals.”⁶¹⁹ Critic Aleksandar Žikić was even more precise: “*Luna* was a rounded concept, strong at all seams, which is very rare. In general, *Luna* was an amazing excess that really occurred! Such events move things forward; in the opposite, everything stands still.”⁶²⁰

Despite having only one album, that is, the eponymous recording released in 1987 (M produkcija Radio Novog Sada, 1987), the band *La Strada* – whose members were brought together by Tišma in 1979, who disbanded it in 1981, formed *Luna* and then led the first band again in 1985 – made a “classical pop/rock album relying on its recognizable sound and featuring several radio hits, the greatest being ‘Okean’ (Ocean)...”⁶²¹

The Slovenian scene also entered the eighties with singer-songwriters like Jani Kovačić and Andrej Šifrer, jazz-rock groups like *Predmestje*, punkers (*Pankrti*, *Otroci socijalizma...*) and new-wave

619 Petar Luković, “Duga”, No. 213, 24 April 1982.

620 Predrag Popović, Saša Rakezić i Goran Tarlać, “Ogledala Lune”, Društvo ljubitelja popularne kulture, Belgrade 2017.

621 Bogomir Mijatović, “NS Rokopedija – Novosadska rok scena 1963 – 2003” (Novi Sad: SWITCH, 2005) i “Ilustrovana enciklopedija rok muzike u Vojvodini 1963 – 2013”, (Novi Sad: SWITCH, 2013).

pop attractions like *Vidosex*, while at the end of the decade there appeared *Laibach*, *Borghesia*, *Miladojka Youneed...* Maribor's *Lačni Franz* did not rely directly on the punk-new-wave models but, with its "collective songwriting" and charismatic singer and author Zoran Predina, was a kind of "exception that proves the rule". Or, more precisely, an independent phenomenon which, due to tectonic "disturbance" on the then pop-rock scene, was able to deviate from the current and attract media attention. All this also applies to Ljubljana's *Buldožer* which, led by Marko Brecej and Boris Bele, introduced Frank Zappa's irony and sarcasm, twisted humor, ambitious performance with the elements of jam sessions and instrumental free forms, into domestic rock with its debut album "Pljuni istini u oči" (Spit the Truth into Eyes) (PGP RTB, 1975 and Helidon, 1977). As one of the methods used to make each album, subversion and provocation (more directed at a satirical and ironic commentary on the petty-bourgeois norms than being explicitly political) caused the postponement of the release of the band's second album "Zabranjeno plakirati" (Post No Bills). After PGP RTB rejected to release it due to the controversial lyrics, it appeared on the Helidon label in 1977. The music for the film "Živi bili pa vidjeli" (That's the Way the Cookie Crumbles) (1979), which gave the hymnic "Novo vrijeme" (New Time), completed the striking triplet of *Buldožer's* album from the time of Marko Brecej. "Izlog jeftinih slatkiša" (Shop Window of Cheap Sweets) (1980) with Boris Bele as the lead composer and frontman, was the latest in a series of albums that were highly acclaimed by all Yugoslav critics, especially those in Croatia.

This also applies to the appearance of *Laibach* in the alternative circles. Formed in the industrial town of Trbovlje in 1980 as the musical wing of the avant-garde *Neue Slowenische Kunst*, inspired at the beginning of its career by the sound of British bands like *23 Skidoo*, avant-garde noise, and absolute departure from rock iconography, coupled with the questioning of the links between totalitarian regimes (politics) and art, *Laibach* stood out as a unique phenomenon from the outset. Due to its early banned project "Rdeči revirji"

(Red District), intended to challenge and provoke the local political structures in Trbovlje, using Malevich's black crosses as a symbol, as well as pseudo-uniforms and singing in German (understood as a "Nazi provocation"), the band was labelled as perpetual provocateurs. Their first performance at the Novi Rock festival in Ljubljana in 1982 and the concert in Zagreb, where they showed Tito and a penis at the same time on the screens, also provoked an incident.

The problems with bans in the country did not prevent the band from going on tour with the British band *Last Few Days*, which attracted a great deal of attention in the European media, surprised by the provocativeness of the band coming from "behind the Iron Curtain". It increasingly used Third Reich symbols, either by decontextualizing them or combining them into the "new images". This activity, even the band's very name – the "Nazi" name Laibach (the German name of for the city of Ljubljana – otherwise prohibited) – were considered by the guardians of socialist morality and the tradition of the national liberation movement as the ultimate proof of openly Nazi ideology. Therefore, the band's first album titled "Laibach", released in 1985, had no names of its members on it. However, the interest of the European media was growing, so that after signing a contract with the UK's Mute Records *Laibach* released the album "Opus Dei", which also got a lot of publicity, due to a lawsuit from the eponymous Catholic organization. With this album, *Laibach* definitively entered the global scene as the most controversial and most original rock group in the world, as written by a British critic.

Great changes were also taking place in Macedonia without "Slavic provocations". During the 1980s, apart from *Leb i sol* as the pioneer of fusion folk or jazz rock (as well as pop rock), the local (Skopje) scene generated a number of interesting post-punk bands. After the usual rocker beginnings, *Mizar* changed its direction in the early half of the decade by creating a distinctive musical pastiche of dark/gothic rock, Byzantine mysticism, Orthodox (old Slavic) chants and Macedonian folklore tradition. The band *Padot na Vizantija* (Fall of Byzantium), led by the later *Mizar* member, Goran Trajkovski, was also

on the same trail. *Archangel*, formed in the late 1980s, was also leaning on *Mizar*, that is, on its early "rocker" phase, in addition to being inspired by hard-core and alternative-rock of Minneapolis band *Hüsker Du*, Manchester's *The Smiths*, as well as Belgrade's EKV.

However, although *Kazalište* sold "Crno bijeli svijet" (Black and White World) in the nowadays unimaginable circulation of 150,000 copies, and while Johnny and *Azra* were generally accepted "from Triglav (in Slovenia) to Gevgelija (in Macedonia)", and Bregović was still a big star of the rock mainstream, "under the surface", i.e., with much less media support, a new "subculture" was flourishing: the production of a new, popularized "folk", with its main star and promoter, old festival pop music also lived on. For example, in Croatia as well as in the whole of Yugoslavia, Mišo Kovač was still a great star. For example, his album "Ti si pjesma moje duše" (You're the Song of My Soul) (Jugoton, 1986) was a part of the specific hitoid trilogy (including "Ostala si uvijek ista" /You've Always Stayed the Same/ released a year earlier, and "Malo mi je jedan život s tobom" /One Life with You Isn't Enough for Me/, released one year later) earned Mišo Kovač the status of the most popular singer in the former state. Four years earlier, the winning discographic formula was cemented by combining the Dalmatian songs of Dušan Šarac and pop-songs of hitoid Đorđe Novković, which were mostly recorded with the pop-rock lineup of top musicians (Milo Vasić, Pif Bogunović, Vedran Božić, Davor Černigoj, Mato Došen)... Mišo launched hits like on a conveyor belt, so that his album "Ti si pjesma moje duše" also contained the songs as pop stylizations with hints of country music, Caribbean chords and folk phrases, which showed the effectiveness of Mišo's showbiz strategy: a star tailored to popular taste. Someone who is both an indisputable star and a guy next door; a mega-star who is there, at arm's length; someone with whom the audience can very easily identify even if you are not a Dalmatian. The phenomenon of Mišo Kovač certainly owes at least a little to the fact that he enjoyed the role of the high priest of his own cult. This was particularly pronounced on stage, where he remained a charismatic master of ceremonies, keeping the

audience on a short leash and sparking its frenzied excitement at the end of his concert.

While Mišo Kovač dominated the pop music and festival hit scene, a new “subculture” emerged in parallel with it: production of a new, popular “folk” whose main star and promoter was Lepa Brena. Despite long essays and reviews in *Start*, *Danas*, ardent advocacy of the new wave and punk in *Polet*, *Studentski list*, but also regional youth and specialized music media (*Val*, *Omladinska Iskra*, *Jukebox*, *Ritam...*), in the second half of the eighties, the new wave was still “only” the music of the urban minority. The other – the majority – audience was inclined towards the popular music of the festival production (Mišo Kovač, Oliver Dragojević, Tereza, *Magazin*, *Novi Fosili...*), pop-rock mainstream or – even more – the new “folk” of Lepa Brena.

While Bregović managed to sell his “pastoral rock” with slogans such as “I am a peasant child” to the audience who saw, in the jig “*Tako ti je mala moja kad ljubi Bosanac*” (So It is My Little One When a Bosnian Loves You), a symbolic train for the move from the village to the city, Brena’s fusion of popular music production standards and folk had a clear and loud message: “*Mile voli disko a ja kolo šumadijsko*” (Mile loves disco and I love the circle dance from Šumadija.) With an unspoken addition in line with Jagger’s “but I like it”!

Turbo-folk of Fahreta Jahić, alias Lepa Brena – who was once called the “minister of optimism” or “Peter Pan of the eighties” by the then most popular Serbo-Croatian columnist Aleksandar Tijanić⁶²² – was

622 In his essay “Peter Pan of the Eighties” published in the book *Što će biti s nama* (Globus: Zagreb, 1988), Aleksandar Tijanić writes: “Instead of scaring them with serious eroticism, which is a classic mistake of pop stars, Jahić offers promise through play, reveals innocence that seeks protection (...) Her monumentality at an early stage, the appearance and power of a caryatid, were an atavistic bait. (...) Despite being easy to listen to, easy to watch, and no need to think – she is a model of a perfect and democratic idol (...) Her communication with the audience is most reminiscent of the passionate relationship between Argentines and Eva Peron. Brena was also forgiven for her fame, wealth, luxury, and the fact that even today, the brand of her underwear can be seen at her concerts: she remains, literally, the embodiment of the Yugoslav dream.”

an ideal product for an audience tired of the crisis, inflation, and the stabilization and rationalization advocated by the federal government. Especially for the one with one foot on (city) asphalt, and the other (emotional) still on its muddy native soil. The songs, which worked equally well in sports halls and pubs, carried (to use Tenžera's remark about *Bijelo Dugme*) a new "code of collective sensitivity". Just like the "optimism" Tijanić mentioned, they were a desirable model of musical escapism, in a country increasingly devoured by the economic and political crisis. Brena's "messages", devoid of any ideology and "smartness" were an ideal musical commodity, which, in the already complex record market, were able to go hand in hand with the most commercial pop releases (by *Plavi orkestar* or Daniel Popović, *Magazin* and *Novi Fosili*) and "rocker" hit releases of *Dugme*, *Čorba*, *Bajaga*, *Valjak*....

In the second half of the eighties, the new wave found itself in the crosshairs between Brena's turbo-folk and the regular "rockers", so the claim that only the urban minority in larger cities remained faithful to the new wave, the "alternative" and punk, is not far from the truth. If, during the formative years of domestic punk and the new wave, Yugoslavia was a seemingly strange combination of socialism, state capitalism (with successful companies like "Gorenje", "Končar", "RIZ", "Iskra", "UNIS"...) and a real Western consumer society cult, in the second half of the eighties the economic crisis and the easing of party grip should have opened a space for a freer expression of even alternative political deliberations, or lead to a greater "engagement" and freer expression of criticism in the texts. After all, except for a few high-profile cases in the media⁶²³, punks and new wavers did not have major prob-

623 The media's most famous scandals related to punk and the new wave were the arrest of Ljubljana punk activist Igor Vidmar for a badge with a crossed-out swastika and the message "Nazi punks fuck off", and an episode with the Ljubljana punk group *Četvrti Rajh* (4th Reich). The 1980s were also remembered for the "case" of *Zabranjeno Pušenje* (Smoking Forbidden), whose career was almost ended by the pun on a broken amplifier and the words "our Marshall is dead", for occasional censorship interventions for lyrics of songs such as "Marshal" by

lems in expressing their washed-up “criticism”. Štulić’s *Azra* released (mildly) politicized songs such as “Kurvini sinovi” (Sons of Bitches) and “Poljska u mom srcu” (Poland in My Heart) on their albums, but during the Kosovo unrests of 1981, devastating inflation, economic crisis, falling standard, SANU memorandum (1986) and the arrival of Slobodan Milošević to power (1987), the notorious “happening of the people”, Vojvodina’s “yogurt revolution” and the ousting of local leadership in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro... Croatian punks and new-wavers mostly remained silent. It is as if, except for *Laibach*, an entire generation/scene was convinced that “hedonism” and “apoliticism” were the true expression of a political stance: disgust at what (once controlled by one party and then fueled by nationalist extremism) dirty politics, in its essence, really is. Subsequently, the disintegration of the Party and the monolithic nature of the one-party system, the anticipated end of the Cold War after Gorbachev’s about-face and “perestroika”, the flourishing of democratic ideas behind the “Iron Curtain” as well, seemed to additionally politically demotivate or deaden the expected more direct engagement of the “sharp-tongued” punks and new wavers. Which – if there was one – was whispery, just like the then official policy of the famous “Croatian silence”. It is as if the new wave – which for its “first five years”, from 1977 to 1982, laid a solid foundation for what was called “urban culture and art, as well as for alternative expression and the buds of liberalization in culture – had given way to some new splash of stale water of withering rocker “mainstream” and a torrent of recent “dance” and turbo-folk.

In his reference book “Rokenrol u Jugoslaviji 1956 – 1968” (Rock’n’Roll in Yugoslavia between 1956 and 1968), in the chapter “The Period of Electric Rock’n’Roll 1961–1968”, Aleksandar Raković writes: “As the 1960s progressed, generational disparities between old and young Yugoslavs became increasingly apparent. The youth who were socialist spoke out against the deformations in society, advocated that

Idoli and the activities of *Laibach* and *Neue Slowenische Kunst* at the end of the decade.

the ignorant attitude of the elderly stop and demanded more freedom for their creativity." It was a social context that facilitated the emergence, and then flourishing, of domestic rock and pop production.

Paraphrasing Raković, it could be said that "as the eighties progressed", it became increasingly clear that the sixties were finally over. And that the once-anticipated birth of the "brave new world", which, like Ariadne's thread, dragged on through the eighties, ended by surrendering to a decade of a new "Jungian nightmare".

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VIII

INTELLECTUALS

Nadežda Čaćinović

THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS: BETWEEN THE *POWER OF TRUTH* AND THE *TRUTH OF POWER*

WHO EXACTLY ARE those “intellectuals” and what is their “role” so that we single them out thematically and anticipate their special effect and mission?⁶²⁴

The question that actually imposes itself is the question about the nature of “the public,” in a society in which there is control over the press, radio and television, publishing companies and, supposedly, assembly.

The first period of SFR Yugoslavia, when the so-called “spaces of freedom”, started in the 1960s, which can be judged with some certainty. Possibilities for writing, speaking, painting and the like at least differently, if not *against* the official discourses, rules and institutions, kept reemerging – only to be subsequently abolished.

Naturally, various possibilities also existed in the past. University professors always had a certain degree of freedom in choosing the subject of their presentation. It was in the nature of the system that the level of freedom was greater if the subject matter in question had a more distant relationship to official stances. Social sciences were more under the influence of politics than the natural sciences – and within the social sciences, there was a spectrum. Any change in the interpretation of Marxism was certainly more dangerous than presentation about something quite different – for example, about Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, natural sciences were even less afflicted. Writers and other artists, who were accepted by the authorities as “ours”

624 A short note about the nature of this essay: it seeks to highlight some general characteristics, including illustrative details, and not to provide a comprehensive overview or or final analysis.

– that is, “theirs” in one way or another – could express their views in informal contacts, in privileged circles and, to some extent, in public, because they were beyond suspicion and censorship.

Each individual belonging to such a circle had different possibilities. Miroslav Krleža is an inexhaustible source of research. It is still discussed over and over again what he did, what he failed to do, whom he protected, what messages he has conveyed, and how effectively.

In continuing to recall the elementary structures of intellectual involvement, I point out that the Hegelian heritage in Marxism (as well as the basic assumption of the dialectics of class struggle and its inevitability) allows for changes within the system. This is a matter of recognition of the necessary conditions. It is therefore not a moral question. However, the Leninist gesture is pure activism, just like the entire rhetoric of struggle and sacrifice for a better future. Something is demanded from us, we must do something. Although there is no *explicit* reference to morality, moral pressure is constantly present – all the way to the monstrous justification of actions contrary to customary moral principles. Intellectuals may rely on the *power of truth*, but they are also the object of the *truth of power*.

The former high-ranking state official and most prominent dissident in socialist Yugoslavia, Milovan Đilas, could publish a series of utterly critical articles in the newspaper *Borba* without a problem – until his comrades stopped him. This latitude placed those who enthusiastically processed and distributed these articles in peril, thinking that this was a new party line. The legitimacy of the regime lay in the proclaimed intention to build a better society, that is, socialism pursued in a specific *Yugoslav* way. This was different from the condemned Stalinist, dogmatic, and other ways followed by other countries of real socialism. There were no free elections, but it was still necessary to build and maintain legitimacy. Theoretical debates were a form of struggling for supremacy within the governing structures. The cultural sphere sometimes served as a testing ground for innovation, demonstrating Yugoslavia’s uniqueness and openness (in the socialist world).

Two types of political pressure on artists were applied: (a) art must not leave its sphere and interfere in politics and (b) art must be a mediator of correct stances. Yet these variants were far from exclusive to the left or right – or Yugoslav system. After the war, under given circumstances, not quite democratic rulers quickly realized that it would be easiest to continue with the *civic neutralization of art*. This naturally included the censorship of possible political moments, instead of bothering with control over artistic engagement. This was all the more a focus, because there was no longer external Stalinist pressure (the compulsory adoption of social realism as a style also implied the neutralization of engagement), while internal Stalinism sought supports for legitimacy. Philosophy could have avoided Marxism and modernity as a philological-historical activity, which was done by the relevant departments. The contemporary reading of Marx's work was more dangerous – and it was done, for example, by the group rallied around the magazine *Praxis*.

Consequently, there were various ways in which it was possible to depart from the official and prescribed. Neither did the government prohibit everything, nor were the heroic dissidents the only ones to offer resistance. The obstacles to the truth are not only external.

Today, we are faced with the situation in which the impact of intellectuals are lost. The power of criticism remains an effective criticism of power, but it now seems to be more difficult to locate it. The basic gesture of an intellectual has remained the same: speaking in one's own name, using new words in a way that draws attention and leads to contemplation.

I am convinced that there was a special and probably unrepeatable constellation of factors, forces and power relations in the 1980s. It is possible to clearly identify a certain number of personalities whose speeches and conceptual strategies enabled changes or facilitated the transition to a different system, regardless of their intentions and perceptions.⁶²⁵

625 With such a choice, I set aside the completely different definition of an intellectual and intelligentsia than that given by G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi in a debate about

In this chapter, I consider intellectuals as those *unauthorized speakers*, who did not speak on behalf of the existing institutions but, using the public or semipublic place, actually *created*, presented, and pointed out something hitherto unheard of.

In defining such fundamental nonconformism the Greek term *parrhesia* is often referred to and often through Michel Foucault's work. In 1983–84, Foucault lectured on “The Courage of Truth”, a philosophical form of speaking the truth whose structural features are openness, courage, engagement, and risk-taking readiness. Speaking without regard to the possible reaction, but to practically interfere in community life. Naturally, the intellectuals I am writing about could not be absolutely and always faithful to such a “parrhesiastic pact”. But they had to perform this role, at least to an extent, to be the subject of my essay.

Unfortunately, the peculiarity of their role also lied in the fact that they were largely the *vanishing mediators*, namely catalysts. Or, more precisely, the unrecognized factors.⁶²⁶ In the 1990s, however, their paths became different and even diverged. A certain continuity has been preserved in the role of an *activist*. Here I have a feminine gender in mind, because activists have mostly been women; the role of an *expert* has also been developed⁶²⁷ where the continuity is also pre-

the road of the intellectuals to class power in the countries of real socialism (cf. G. Konrad and I. Szeleny, *Die Intelligenz auf dem Weg zur Klassenmacht*, Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1978), which certainly prompted necessary self-critical discussions.

626 I quote Zdravko Malić's remark in his diary entry of 9 December 1992: “Journalists criticize Puhovski for his statements on German television, because he allegedly (I did not check) spoke about the rule of the far right here. Those journalists hold that you can only speak about the situation in Croatia if you first spit at everything Serbian. This spitting comes as a ticket or pass for the Croatian public space (...) Someone writes that Puhovski must be ‘thrown out of the Croatian womb’, all this in the name of a new democracy. The lynching of a man who, like few others, was responsible for the liquidation of the previous regime...”, Z. Malić: *Noć bez sna. Dnevnik devedesetih*, Zagreb: Disput, 2019, p. 365.

627 Naturally, many authors of critical texts have been primarily considered as experts; only their later role has become semineutral.

sent (with modifications), but the gender has remained to be predominantly masculine. And parrhesiastic action also exists in those forms.

For the purpose of comprehensiveness, the typology should also be complemented by the personality of the late journalist author Veselko Tenžera, who died in the mid-1980s. He created a special space and certain degree of freedom for himself in public. In his case and that of other journalist authors (such as the impressive Igor Mandić) we can speak about their subversive effects, although their intention has not been necessarily parrhesiastic. Rather, it was a question of easiness, cynicism and Aesopian formulations. In the case of many of them there has been mention of the right to entertain, ridicule, refuse to comply with the rules...

In this text, I will concentrate on the element of unauthorizedness, consisting in an attempt to tell the truth to those who have power, not as a gesture or end in itself, but rather with the intention of generating a certain effect, a change.

That Yugoslavia experiences crisis during the 1980s is undisputed. Differences arose over the cause of the crisis and, naturally, the proposed solutions to overcome it.

The crisis was the central issue for everyone at all levels. For some it meant coping with shortages, while for others the key issue was the regulation of community affairs: democracy, human rights, different election procedures and – naturally – economic issues, ownership and the market.

This does not mean, however, that the subversive effect could not also be linked to the two thematic circles mediated through a cultural phenomenon. One has dealt with the attempt to *construct Central European identity* and the other with *postmodernity*.

In the debate on Central Europe, there was an evident attempt to find something else beyond the West-East divide. However, the building of the myth about the continuity of the European values of Central Europe excluded Nazism and Fascism, although they were eminently Central European products. The most valuable aspect of this heritage is that Kafka, Kraus, Musil, Freud and Broch make great

companions in times of crisis. However, the ideological construct of some Central European link that makes us different from others proved to be just an ideological construct. However, it still survives in the bastard form of liberal democracy – or at least in the belief that whatever happens we do we do not have to worry a lot, because we belong to Europe.

In postmodernity debates there have been evident attempts to participate in a cutting-edge debate in the “West”, overseeing a very questionable affiliation to the modern world.⁶²⁸ The “parrhesiastic” nuclei were contained in the criticism of so-called grand narratives, while the official picture of the world affiliated officially to socialism was based on one of the most successful grand narratives.

It is ironic that another grand narrative became prevalent after 1990: the one about the end of history and only one model of community and social organization, as dictated by the market.

In some respects, the third thematic circle, which has directly involved pondering over the ways out of a crisis, has also used to overlook or neglect the context, but certainly to a much lesser degree: it has been a question of *civil society debates*. They have sought the possibility of getting involved, the *possibility of change under the circumstances when there were (still) no democratic institutions*. First of all, it has been about the initial possibility of *deliberation*, reflection, as opposed to the political *action* based on the assumption of unquestioned affiliation, that is, a nationalist programme. Or should one write in accordance with the belief of the bearer of such a programme – based on one’s national affiliation.⁶²⁹ Here, it is also neces-

628 “Modernity”, the “rationalism of Western culture” in Weber’s sense, anticipates a developed autonomy of different areas; the economy functions economically, judiciary is based on the rule of law and so on. When “class struggle” and “post-modernity” are pitted against each other, it becomes evident that there are no indirect factors. Like the debate about Central Europe, this one has also been dealt with in a series of thematic issues and selection of texts, mostly at a high level.

629

sary to avoid the wrong optics of perceiving the mentioned debates in hindsight.

The civil society topic has also been an all-Yugoslav one and has been pursued in direct contact with the international community of researchers. As a striking illustration of the expansion of debating, I will mention the thematic issue of the Split magazine *Pogledi*,⁶³⁰ which had already written about *new* civil society debates. Naturally, it contains two John Keane's texts⁶³¹ and a large block of Slovenian texts dedicated to civil society. All this is testimony to debating at a high level, which has never been brought to an end, but has simply been interrupted. Seeking a civil society solution has implied an implicit assumption that the system was not totalitarian, because such a dimension no longer exists, on the one hand, and a clear statement that one cannot act freely, "in a regular way", on the other hand. In this connection, apart from Keane, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, associated with Agnes Heller and her theoretical circle, have also been good interlocutors for the occasion. Among many other authors, they have also discussed Rawls, Nozick, Sandel and Walzer. In any case, the debates have gone much further than those initiated by the *compro-messo storico* and so-called Eurocommunism.

Some debaters have turned to pre-political⁶³² and then direct political action – trying to enable (that is, "facilitate" in the jargon of NGOs) the introduction of democratic procedures and then participate in them.

The Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) was formally established on 2 February 1989, but those who assumed the

630 *Pogledi*, a magazine for the critical theory of society and culture, 18/1, Split 1988. So-called nongovernmental organizations and the whole NGO scene, are dealt with in a separate section, including their emergence and rise, different forms of dependence, as well as various episodes of courage and bravery.

631 In Keane's book *The Life and Death of Democracy* (London, 2009) the nationalist threat to democracy is exemplified by Serbia and Dobrica Ćosić.

632 For instance, the Initiative for Democratic Transformation UJDI meant among other goals as a careful preparation for the multi-party system.

leading functions already had a long history of intellectual involvement. Thus, economist Branko Horvat, as an advisor to numerous foreign governments and a recognized authority on the economy of socialism,⁶³³ has experienced (or could have experienced) a direct effect of his proposals. With such a move, he has left the position of an expert and entered into a direct joint action. The complex theoretical vocabulary of philosopher Žarko Puhovski has been translated into the programme principles for wide use. The UJDI did not gather the proponents of Yugoslavism, but rather people reassessing whether Yugoslavia could provide the framework for a different society.

In defining intellectual activity, the greatest difficulties arise with respect to determining the relationship between individuals and possible collective actions and initiatives they have encouraged or launched. There are also collective projects which, despite being collective, have always been an individual action, such as the interdisciplinary gatherings titled *Man and the System* where the discussions have still been decisively determined by the clever lawyer Eugen Pusić and the militant sociologist Rudi Supek. This group was established as early as 1971.

I am inclined to believe that the nationalist motivation decisively limits the special role of an intellectual, because it ties him to the unquestioned and untested facts. However, it is evident that under the conditions of the denial, repression and prohibition of national affiliation, intellectual statements relating to the identification of a “fictional community” and affiliation with it have a special and even subversive impact: it is evident that the fact of the historical origin and construction of national identity does not diminish the effectiveness of what has emerged, nor has it been simply removed from the agenda by a justified denial of the natural and eternal fact of national affiliation.

633 His book *The Political Economy of Socialism*, 1982, which was first published abroad (in Yugoslavia as late as 1984), made him a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Economics. The Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), and cautious preparations for a multi-party system.

The dialectics of national recognition and the intention to transcend that framework created different variants. The group rallied around the magazine *Mladina* has formulated its programme of Slovenia's independence differently from the group rallied around the Slovenian magazine *Nova revija*,⁶³⁴ in Serbia, the process of rapprochement between the party and state leadership and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) also underwent different phases. In Croatia, there were many tacit gatherings, habit changes, different language practices, rehabilitations of books and authors, and the like. Today, we know more about nonpublic activity and even about an active liaison with the forbidden foreign groups, but it seems that nationalist manifestos were published in 1971 or earlier.

There are also overlaps. In 1983, it was proposed to revise the school curricula and introduce the so-called "common cores" throughout Yugoslavia. The resistance in Slovenia, for example, was certainly motivated by the defense of its national peculiarities, but it mobilized the widest possible circle, creating the embryo of a series of initiatives that could have been considered civil society. For example, Rastko Močnik, an anti-nationalist Marxist, had a very prominent role in the debate.

Resistance to nationalist unification was successfully and succinctly expressed by Srđa Popović: "I am a lawyer, not a Serb." Others have performed their intellectual role of challenging common conceptions somewhat differently. Zdravko Grebo (who later became a legend of a besieged Sarajevo) fit in well into the TV satire *The Surrealist Top List*, but also participated with his critiques in party forums for a relatively long time. He even proposed that the Socialist Alliance be transformed into a pluralist-opposition factor. In the note to the Zagreb

634 "Europe now", on the one hand, and the depths of identity, on the other hand, not to mention the difference between a national programme that evoked the past and, for example, a Slovenian programme that begins *ab ovo*.

edition of his book *The Twilight of Byzantium*⁶³⁵ Byzantine specialist Ivan Đurić made a comment that this new edition was published:

“thanks to the commitment of the house whose seat is outside my ‘narrower’ homeland. This truth also encourages me and I hope that, no matter how modestly, it will also instill courage in everyone who believes in the common Yugoslav cultural space. I want to believe that this act actually represents a normal procedure and is explained by the need to resist Balkan provincialisms and deal solely with oneself and not with someone entering into someone else’s ‘vilayet’ or ‘betrayal’ by one people or another. After all, in *The Twilight of Byzantium* there is fortunately no mention of any of our national histories, but there is mention of the parts of the South Slavic lands in the context of wider, Mediterranean and European events”.

Ivan Đurić was prompted by some kind of *noblesse oblige* (that is, his hereditary affiliation to the intellectual elite) to enter into direct political competition in Serbia’s first multiparty elections in 1990. Winning 277,348 votes in the 1990 presidential election – third-place – cannot be considered a failure. But his constituency has remained at a dead-end since. His sharpened critical stance has finally led him to emigrate to France. He sent a text about the fate of the book to *Erasmus* for its 11th issue from abroad.

While pondering on the way out of the crisis, Jovan Mirić, a Croatian professor, did not proceed from his Serbian nationality. However, this identification was eventually imposed on him and became a component of his activity,⁶³⁶ while linguistics professor Milorad Pupovac was gradually forced to assume the position of a political Serb.

Some of the participants of the 1980s debates were a part of the revolutionary movement, that is, former fighters. Although, like Veljko Rus, they were at odds with the ruling establishment on several

635 Ivan Đurić, *Sumrak Vizantije*, (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1989)

636 Mirić’s understanding of his role is best described in the preface to his book where he says that he has always tried not to be noticeable so that he could write what he considered to be necessary.

occasions for a decade, and then refused to assume political roles, they were directly involved in the transition process. And like Veljko Rus, who participated in drafting the new Slovenian constitution, they withdrew thereafter, because there was no continuity in the debate. In fact, the debate about what to do was abruptly interrupted, because a “ready-made” model was adopted, shutting down other possibilities.

I will use the “Croatian” example of Josip Županov to illustrate the dilemmas of that generation. In the “concluding remark” in his 1983 text “Where Is Yugoslav Society Going?” (*Kuda ide Jugoslavsko društvo*), the author abandons the rhetoric of a sober analysis and writes: “Naturally, if the way out of the economic crisis is still sought in linear restrictive measures and if the society is left to authoritarian inertia, the system will plunge back into a scarcity society and eventually into a neotraditional society. Nothing needs to be done to have the process end with such a result. Just let things go as they go. However, by no means do I want to suggest that the process will really end in this way. The processes of system transformation, which I have outlined in this text, are not irreversible, they can be reversed. But this needs action. Moreover, a democratic alternative to the way out of the crisis is needed. It is necessary to pit the volcanic energy and creative ingenuity of millions of people against bureaucratic restrictions and a fruitless administration. Now is not the time to suspend self-management and wait for favorable times – on the contrary, now is the time for self-management to show its capabilities and pass its historical exam.”

This emphasized confidence in the “internal” capabilities of the system seems to have been subsequently added to a sober analysis of the poor situation.

The required democratic solution was not possible within the baroque self-management structure, which functioned in such a way that the final decision was made (even had to be made) by a non-self-management instance, that is, the party leadership, while countless reform proposals were also emerging.

A search for classical liberal rights – the rights customary in liberal democracies, human rights, and reliable procedures – was also evident, constituting a revolutionary pursuit in this context.⁶³⁷ The “one man, one vote” formula has certainly been challenged in various ways. At the time of a developed self-management system, we had a great number of decision-making and voting opportunities. However, during the 1980s, regardless of whether this is recognized or not, it was a question of the boundaries within which this fundamental democratic principle had to be implemented and how much Yugoslavia could be challenged as a single constituency.

Feminism was a significant part of the picture. Here, too, the starting point was clearly determined – the negation of the naturally given and unquestioned (almost the whole movement). The dialectics between speaking personally and collective action is somewhat different than in other political movements, just as the patriarchal heritage restricted women’s participation in the parrhesiastic pact. But while restricted, their participation was not entirely prevented. In any case, the variety of feminist stances and effects can simply be presented by listing several feminists who were already active at that time: Lydia Sklevicky, Rada Iveković, Svetlana Slapšak, and Žarana Papić – all of them feminists, none of them limited to the “single issue” movement, and ready to consider the possible change of the whole.

However, since the very beginning, the basic critical effect of feminism has been to expose the difference between the *proclaimed* and the *factual*. Equality and equal opportunities as articulated in the basic documents did not determine women’s daily experiences.

In general, one should always bear in mind the limited possibilities of mediation, disagreement, resistance, and having a different attitude

637 This search has not been necessarily based on the absolutization of those achievements; instead, it has been based on the belief that “excess power production” in the system of real socialism has been, inter alia, a drag on a bottom-up reform (cf. Žarko Puhovski: *Socijalistička konstrukcija zbilje*, Zagreb: Pitanja/Školska knjiga, 1990, including the 1980s texts) and that it has been necessary to find an indirect lever. The year 1980 showed that there was a collapse of excess power production, not a revolution.

in the 1980s.⁶³⁸ At that time, there was no Internet or social media; instead, there were recurring attempts to create “spaces of freedom”.

Attacks and disputes were also very helpful in conveying different views.

What helped create intellectual innovation spaces? One factor was the lack of a unified policy of suppressing criticism, because decisions were made in the republics. The official support to an intensive debate due to the attempt at Marxisation – redogmatization – in the early 1980s, also allowed space. The effort toward renewed ideological orthodoxy mainly has the opposite effect.⁶³⁹ Also, obvious dysfunctionality, such as the prevalence of shortages, made popular awareness of the crisis inescapable. Forums for intellectuals included scientific meetings, summer schools, magazines, alternative radio stations daily newspapers⁶⁴⁰ and also, gradually, the hitherto controlled central media.

It is difficult to explain the exceptionality of this intellectual debate at the time when writing about it after a few decades – and in a completely different context.

It might be said that by choosing to be the reminder of the parhesiastic role of intellectuals, this text completely missed something that was happening during the 1980s: the *complicity* of intellectuals

638 Instead of giving numerous examples, I will cite the collected papers titled *What Is to Be Done?* (Šta da se radi?), Vols. I and II, which was edited and published by Dušan Bogavac in 1986, three years after the collection of contributions and conversations. This happened in 1983, “with the permission” of the relevant institutions. Dušan Bogavac served as editor at *Komunist* and, at first, counted on a normal publishing procedure. The materials published in the second volume: peer reviews, correspondence with the authorities, protests, etc. show, on the one hand, the need to somehow respond to the existing situation and, on the other hand, the limits of freedom as well.

639 Although there were the attempts to introduce, for example, the Althusserian or some other type of strictness into Marxist theory with a critical intention and not due to the closeness to the authorities. Those were the late offshoots of Marxist philology.

640 The “readers’ letters” sections represented special curiosity; some of them were provokative, while some were long and thoughtful, and based on arguments.

– producers of words and ideas – for war, violence and uncontrolled transition that destroyed many achievements.

Terrible simplifiers have prevailed relying on an old syntagm that still affects the state of affairs. It turns out that the nationalist rhetoric was primarily conformist, because the powers were largely vested in the republics and strengthened according to the national principle. The remaining supranational institutions, such as the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), remained without a real control from above and were soon renationalized – captured. For nationalists, the democratic procedure was not of primary concern. The strengthening of the existing divisions was.

The crisis of the 1980s in Yugoslavia was not the crisis of other countries of real socialism. Various reforms and market principles had been tried for decades. Confusion was heightened by everything coming from the use of a privileged status: the transfer of knowledge from West to East, abundant loans used beyond economic logic and the like. Complex analyses, like those made by Veljko Rus, did not reach decision makers even before 1989. But who would have thought that of all the analyses of the possible productive foundations of socialism, including variants of opening up the economy to the world and possible radical changes,⁶⁴¹ only proclaimed market fundamentalism and – in practice, the protection of the particular interests – would remain as options?

Just as the democratic procedures failed to prevent the transfer of the acquired power and influence from one system to another.

In the interpretation of the recent past, it is not reasonable to expect a calm assessment. However, the presentation of what was happening as a division between the proponents and the destroyers of Yugoslavia, between the communists – “commies” – and the representatives of a free society is actually not a simplification. It is, rather, a forgery.

641 For discussions about this and other mentioned aspects of the 1980s, compare, for example, the thematic sections of the magazine *Naše teme*: 12/79; 4–4/1987, 6–7/1987, 12/1988, 1–2/1989, the extraordinary issue with the collection of texts 1957–1987 (1987) or, quite concisely, the selection of texts prepared by Marijan Korošić: *Quo vadis Jugoslavijo?*, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1989 (Jerovšek, Korošić, E. Pusić, Puhovski et al.).

Aleksandra Đurić-Bosnić

RESPONSES OF INTELLECTUALS TO THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN SERBIA

IN *THE TREASON of the Intellectuals*, published in 1927, Julien Benda⁶⁴² writes about intellectuals, his contemporaries, who abandoned the ideas of idealism and humanism, gave up the defense of universal values and chose to be ardent advocates of political (national and class) interests and passions. According to Filip David, Benda wrote his study in the nascent days of Italian fascism, “having a good insight into the activities of nationalist-oriented French, German and Italian intellectuals”. The treason committed by intellectuals, which came by way of acceptance of particularistic and national imperatives, motivated exclusively by pragmatic interests, estranged from freedom, democracy, truth, and humanism, serving the political passions of the rising regime and manifesting unconditional loyalty to political leaders, was the dominant model established in Serbia on the eve of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and during the wars of the 1990s that followed.

It is important to note that a group of Serbian intellectuals, at that crucial time, remained loyal to the idea of Yugoslavia. These intellectuals, together with their colleagues from other Yugoslav republics, were gathered in the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). UJDI was founded on February 2, 1989, in Zagreb, at the initiative of Branko Horvat and a group of professors from the Zagreb Faculty of Philosophy (Predrag Matvejević, Žarko Puhovski, Milorad Pupovac, Predrag Vranicki). Intellectuals and artists from Serbia and Vojvodina were also among the members of the UJDI Council, namely, Bogdan Bogdanović, Radivoje Lola Đukić, Jug Grizelj, Andrija Krešić,

642 Žilijen Benda, *Izdaja intelektualaca* (Beograd: Socijalna misao, 1996).

Miroslav Pečujlić, Vesna Pešić, Nebojša Popov, Koča Popović, Nada Popović-Perišić, Laslo Sekelj, Mirko Simić, Svetlana Slapšak, Ljubomir Tadić, Aleksandar Tijanić, Zoran Vidaković, Tibor Varadi, Laslo Vogel and Ljubiša Ristić. Believing that the reasons for the Yugoslav crisis were a lack of democracy and a growing political irresponsibility, members of UJDI perceived the transformation of society primarily as a result of intellectual and moral, rather than political activity. “The model advocated by UJDI assumed a ‘subnational’ concept (understood as non-national), which was centered on the individual, rather than the ‘unquestionable and given’ community or collective, which, in the Yugoslav case, pertained to national affiliation. In this sense, a citizen would exercise his right to vote as a *citoyen* at both the republican and federal levels. In the bicameral model proposed by UJDI, he would exercise this right in both houses. However, by adopting that constitutional model, UJDI became subject to criticism by those republics (Slovenia and Croatia) that wanted a democratic transformation, but did not want Yugoslavia, as well as by those that wanted Yugoslavia, but did not want a democratic system (Serbia).”⁶⁴³ This tension ultimately prompted the Belgrade wing to separate from UJDI. Given that it was operating in a narrow and marginalized intellectual space with an obvious deficit of political operability, UJDI proved to be an inefficient and overdue project.

On the other hand, as Dušan Janjić stated in “A Contribution to the Debate on the Causes and Forms of Manifestation of Nationalism in SR Serbia”,⁶⁴⁴ the majority of established intellectuals saw Greater Serbian nationalism as a need to realize the Serbian national interest, with the principal hypothesis being that Serbia and Serbs were threatened. They argued that this threat engendered a need to call

643 Mila Orlić, “Od postkomunizma do postjugoslovenstva. Udruženje za jugoslovensku demokratsku inicijativu”, *Politička misao: časopis za politologiju* 48, no. 4 (2011): 108.

644 Dušan Janjić, “Prilog raspravi o uzrocima i oblicima ispoljavanja nacionalizma u SR Srbiji”, in: *Savez komunista u borbi protiv antisocijalističkih delovanja i antikomunističkih ideologija* (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1986).

for the gathering of all Serbs with the goal of complete national unity of Serbia. They also argued that Serbia had never been in a more difficult position in recent history, being systematically destroyed by Albanian irredentism, provincial autonomism and anti-Serbian campaigns from other republics, with the aim of reducing it to the former Belgrade pashadom.

According to Sonja Biserko, the weakest point of the Yugoslav state was reflected in its failure to transform conflicts into open dialogues, negotiations and compromises during the collapse of the political system: "Unwillingness to resolve open issues and the resistance to change have led to the homogenization of the Serbian people on a national basis. They perceived the reconstruction of Yugoslavia under new circumstances as a process of losing their unified state. The instrumentalization of (Serbian) ethnic identity under the slogan 'the state first, democracy to follow' blocked democratization and prevented the necessary pluralization of interests. The Serbian elite was, once again, returning to its national program, which was being informally prepared as early as the beginning of the seventies. The national program was finally articulated in 1986, when the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy (SASA) was published."⁶⁴⁵

At the same time, the Kosovo drama began to unfold, which, as Biserko notes, fully and fundamentally exposed the Yugoslav crisis. The Kosovo problem was instrumentalized for the political mobilization of all Serbs, and activities were coordinated from Belgrade. Dobrica Ćosić took the leading role, something he eventually noted in his *Diary entries*. Ćosić organized the *Petition*, which was signed by 215 Serbian intellectuals (as well as several representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church), including Antonije Isaković, Tanasije Mladenović, Živorad Stojković, Mihajlo Đurić, Mića Popović, Predrag Palavestra, Vojislav Koštunica, Kosta Čavoški, Nebojša Popov, Zagorka Golubović

645 Sonja Biserko, "Srpska elita i realizacija srpskog nacionalnog programa", in: *Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere* (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006).

and others. It is interesting that the *Petition* mentioned, for the first time, the issue of “genocide” against Serbs, with the aim of creating an ethnically clean Kosovo, given that due to various pressures in the previous two decades, over 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins had emigrated from Kosovo.

In the fall of 1986, a strategic document was drafted, articulating “current social issues in our country”, namely, a document articulating the Serbian national program – the SASA Memorandum. A year earlier, at a session of the Academy held on May 24, 1985, a decision was made to draft a Memorandum, and on June 13 of the same year, a committee in charge of creating this document was formed. Among the 16 members of the Committee were Pavle Ivić, Antonije Isaković, Dušan Kanazir, Mihailo Marković, Dejan Medaković, Radovan Samardžić, Miomir Vukobratović, Vasilije Krestić, Kosta Mihajlović and Stojan Ćelić. The final paragraphs of the draft Memorandum clearly outlined the ambitions of its authors: “The basic precondition for our transformation and renaissance is the democratic mobilization of the entire moral and intellectual strength of the people, not only for the purpose of implementing decisions taken by political forums, but also for creating a program and projection for the future in a democratic manner, which, for the first time in recent history, would actually unite knowledge and experience, conscience and courage, imagination and responsibility on a social task of general importance, on the basis of a long-term program: on this occasion, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts expresses its readiness to wholeheartedly, and with all its strength, contribute to these momentous tasks, historical imperatives of our generation.”⁶⁴⁶ Dobrica Ćosić was not formally a member of this Committee, but, according to his own confession, he prompted, with a 16-page text, the creation of the text of the Memorandum.

The period between 1986 and 1999 could, therefore, be described as a period of intensive ideological preparation. The role of the creator of the “new reality” was taken by the intellectual elite, the most

646 SASA Memorandum, draft, Fall 1986.

popular writers, artists, scientists and journalists of the time.⁶⁴⁷ In that sense, we would agree with Olivera Milosavljević's formulation – that the activity and involvement of the intellectual elite gave the appearance of objectivity. At the same time it signified a departure from political speech and suggested the unchallengeable validity of “professional speech”. It thus bore more weight than the open and straightforward speech of political propagandists, although the content of all these statements boiled down to the same. “In order for the political imagination to be realized, and for the then still imaginary, new, nationally and territorially united and strong Serbia to become a historical fact and reality, it was necessary to accelerate the process of homogenization, primarily by stirring up fear of living together with others – using arguments from the past, recognized in the present and foreseen in the future.”⁶⁴⁸

Five years after the drafting of the Memorandum, academics, writers and scientists found themselves in a situation where they had to take a stance towards the war: in the statements of the majority of SASA members, the war was interpreted as a “necessity”, as an imposed destiny, yet another tribulation of the Serbian nation, which was forced to defend itself from aggression with aggression, and respond to “genocide” by “necessary defense”. In this context, the historian Vasilije Krestić stated: “History has shown that those who deny the Serbian people the right to their country, despite all the evidence that the country is theirs, are prepared for the genocidal destruction of that people. Serbs have become aware of that, so it is certain that they will defend their rights, their lives and their livelihood, and that includes their country, in a manner fitting the aggression.”⁶⁴⁹

647 For more detail see: Aleksandra Đurić Bosnić, *Kultura nacije: između krvi i tla* (Sarajevo: University Press, 2016).

648 Olivera Milosavljević, „Upotreba autoriteta nauke – javna politička delatnost SANU (1986–1992)”, *Republika*, no. 7 (1995).

649 Statements by writers and academicians, made public in the period from 1986 to 1992, are cited according to Milosavljević, „Upotreba autoriteta nauke”.

However, in November 1991, an appeal was issued by a group of academicians who explicitly opposed the war. They used formulations that denied its purposefulness and implied that not only those who waged war, but also those who “consciously or unconsciously fueled” it, should not be trusted, nor should the “victories” that generate new wars. With this appeal, the group of academicians called for “peace in which national, political or religious groups would not be persecuted or deprived” and “in which the propaganda of death would not prevail”.⁶⁵⁰

The Academy soon distanced itself from this declaration with the clearly stated position of the then Secretary General Dejan Medaković that this was not the official position of the institution. Some of the statements of Serbian academicians and writers, made during the period of ideological preparation in the late eighties, as well as throughout the “mass spread” of the new ideological concept and “apology” for war actions, published mostly in *Politika* and *Književne novine*, unequivocally point to their formative efficiency and socio-political appeal and acceptance. Today, these standpoints sound not only like “common places” of the then political-ideological practice, but also like initial points of a highly ideologized socio-cultural pattern, which soon became a reality.

Thus, in 1987, in an article published in *Književne novine* only a few years before he would become the president of FR Yugoslavia, Dobrica Ćosić posed the question: “Why are the Serbian people today, although in the most difficult position in Yugoslavia, the people most politically distrusted by neighboring peoples? Why are they forced into the role of the historical culprit, why are their values disrespected, why are they hated the most?”⁶⁵¹ Matija Bećković and Antonije Isaković had almost identical opinions on the issue. Bećković stated: “People who did not have their own states obtained

650 *Vreme*, 25. 11. 1991.

651 *Književne novine*, 1. 5. 1987.

them in Yugoslavia, while Serbs lost their own.”⁶⁵² In the same year, Isaković stated, also in *Politika*: “We will emerge victorious, because these past forty years the Serbian people have been in a subordinate position...”⁶⁵³

Ćosić claimed that, at the time, together “with Russian, Jews and Armenians”, the Serbian people were in the “most difficult position”,⁶⁵⁴ also pointing out the burning problem of “anti-Serbism”, and the creation of a global conspiracy against the Serbian nation. For Matija Bećković, Serbian issues were provoked by others: “They straightened us with their blows, sobered us up with their insults, woke us up with injustices, enlightened us and united us with coalitions ...”⁶⁵⁵ For Milorad Pavić, “Serbia was, once again (like Israel) surrounded by enemies.”⁶⁵⁶ And Čedomir Popov posed a rhetorical question: “Who knows, maybe the Christian civilization, to which we ourselves belong, needs a new sinful people who will repent for all the unforgivable sins of humanity.”⁶⁵⁷

According to Olivera Milosavljević, implementing these kinds of ideas, which formed the basis of the national program and renaissance, required an intensification of the process of homogenization. This process was enabled by “stirring up fear of living together with others.”⁶⁵⁸ Implementing national renaissance, conceived in this way, implied cooperation, coordination and unconditional compatibility in opinion and action between the elite, the leader and the people. which, during 1991, the people especially were given the role of main actor in the historical and political events of that time. The rhetoric of academicians, who had already been proclaimed the indisputa-

652 *Politika*, 21. 8. 1990.

653 *Politika*, 13. 9. 1990.

654 *Književne novine*, 1. 11. 1990.

655 *Politika*, 2. 8. 1991.

656 *Politika*, 13. 9. 1991.

657 *Politika*, 5. 9. 1992.

658 Milosavljević, “Upotreba autoriteta nauke”.

ble “intellectual elite”, was also adjusted to help this effective trinity operate efficiently. Writers Dejan Medaković and Antonije Isaković saw the correlation between the “people” of Serbia and the leadership, as a relationship of complete mutual support and understanding.

It is precisely in the context of analyzing the phenomenon of undeniably generated violence, which took place during the nineties on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, that Holm Sundhaussen pointed out the following: in future court proceedings, it would be necessary to establish criteria for measuring responsibility and distinguishing between “offenders who remained seated at their desks”, perpetrators, and those who were accomplices and observers from the very beginning. Because, as Sundhaussen believes, it was the “offenders seated at their desks” who, either out of conviction or opportunism, created the spiritual context that gave legitimacy, and thus impetus, to the use of violence in the broad social context: “These were the spiritual leaders, writers, scholars, who, out of conviction, need for endorsement, arrogance, or blindness, intimidated large sections of society with landmarks of genocide, threat scenarios, conspiracy theories, and who drove people to hysteria (or, as it was formulated later on, collective histrionic personality disorder).”⁶⁵⁹

Noting that, in the case of post-Yugoslav wars, the political innocence of art once again presented itself as a chimera, Sundhaussen explained the production of violence through culture, science and art was made possible by the development of a collective self-hypnosis – the self-perception of a collectively sacrificed people recreating “war memories”, myths about victims, and, above all, the myth about the 1389 defeat-victory in Kosovo. With memories and myths recreated in such a manner, the public was consistently ideologized and manipulated by the continuous creation of xenophobic amalgams.

According to Sundhaussen’s interpretation, violence is always and everywhere a consequence of a general crisis situation, interacting on several levels – anthropological, sociopsychological, but, inevitably,

659 Holm Zundhausen, *Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka*, Beograd: Clio, 2008, 484.

the cultural one as well. On this particular level, “the ‘software’ of the group enters into play, adopted as part of socialization and/or media indoctrination: socially mediated perceptions, patterns of interpretation and ‘experience’ (in a scientific sociological sense). This represents a Pandora’s box – with its scenario of threats, guilt theories and conspiracies, with perceptions of sacrifice, fantasies about defense and clichés of heroes.”⁶⁶⁰

When it comes to the problem of ideologized cultures in closed societies, the morphological, constructive structure of ideological matrices could be defined precisely as a series of socially mediated perceptions (attitudes), patterns, interpretations and purposely reshaped experiences, with the ultimate goal of directing and profiling “group opinion” towards concrete social engagement and action.⁶⁶¹

In July 2013, the historian Latinka Perović gave an interview for the weekly *Vreme*, with both an analytical and reconstructive overtone: “The masses mostly gathered around one goal: to create a greater state in which the entire Serbian people would live. This has always been a priority of Serbian politics, which, regardless of historical circumstances, has not changed since the nineteenth century: it determined not only relations in Yugoslavia, but also, if you will, Serbia’s attitude towards Europe (...). Serbia did not sleep through the fall of the Berlin Wall, although it would have been better for the country if it did. Unfortunately, Serbia reacted to this epochal change by reverting to its nineteenth-century dream: with a brutal war that has been prepared for a long time (...) we must not forget that Serbia started preparing for war at a time when no one expected the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is a very important fact. This was a consequence of the belief of the people who made preparations for the war that they would have Russia on their side in the Yugoslav conflict. Sometime in 1987,

660 Zundhausen, *Istorija Srbije*, 488.

661 In the context of the phenomenon of interdependence of group opinion and violence, Sundhausen refers to the study of Irving Janis *Victims of groupthink: Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, Boston, 1972.

I talked to the then vice-president of SASA, Antonije Isaković, whom I had occasionally been meeting until then. He immediately started explaining to me how Slovenes and Croats did not want Yugoslavia, and how the time had finally come for Serbia to resolve its issue... “Excuse me”, I interrupted him, “is it war that you wish for?” “Yes”, he confirmed, “but it will not be waged on the territory of Serbia (...) Some 86,000 people will die.” “But which 86,000 people, for the love of God?! Who are those to lose their heads?” I asked.⁶⁶²

Latinka Perović’s testimonies are, in fact, reconstructions of the ideological preparation and enthronement of an authoritarian regime, as well as its implicit features: inciting populism by fueling the energy of the masses, encouraging their mobilization (rallies, “happenings of the people”), mass purges of dissidents and illegal opposition media, promoting a distorted and ideologically functionalized understanding of patriotism and “betrayal”, and, finally, a clear commitment to war as “imposed” and “the only possible solution” in order to preserve the ultimate goal – territorial and national unity.

This “emancipation of the national collectivity” was realized very effectively through the instrumentalization of art. In the words of M. Dragičević Šešić, “not only the aggressive, but also the so-called positive nationalism” generated the necessary conditions for putting a nation on a pedestal, giving it significance, strength and power: “Starting with works that glorify the people, followed by works that laud its tragic fate, mystify or justify certain events, especially in literary form, and ending with newly composed songs, especially those considered ‘values’ in that domain.”⁶⁶³

These theoretical interpretations of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, along with the successful war-triggered destruction of the entire socio-cultural context that had been permeated for many years by ethical, aesthetic, ideological and political collapse, suggest several

662 *Vreme*, 18. 7. 2013.

663 Milena Dragičević Šešić, “Instrumentalizacija umetnosti”, in: *Interkulturalnost u multietničkim društvima*, Beograd, 1995, 365.

suppositions: firstly, the entropy that destroyed the cultural and social context in Serbia was a process planned and implemented by intellectual elites, based on ethnonationalist pretensions and ambitions, with the ultimate goal of self-isolation, which would secure the longevity and permanence of the established government. Secondly, the culture in Serbia in this period took on all the characteristics of a closed society (including the educational and media system) as the dominant state-ideological apparatus.

Being consistently closed, the cultural system in Serbia at that time became primarily static, characterized by animosity and fear of cultural systems originating in other times and from outside its insular environment. The system was shielded by pseudo-tradition and by re-established and purposefully revived and rewritten national myths aimed at maintaining collective unity. Furthermore, this system was not inclined to any form of critical thinking (due to it being potentially threatening) and, therefore, to any kind of pluralism, be it ethical and aesthetic or existential.

It is clear that in Serbia in the period between 1987 and 2000, the balance within the culture was severely impaired. The purpose of this impairment was to establish “cohesion” within the community, as a potentially suitable basis for the formation and maintenance of an ideological construct made feasible precisely by the successive development and full realization of self-isolation, for which, ironically, every “supply of nutrients” and every authentic and ideologically unconditioned cultural exchange with the environment represented a potentially devastating toxicity of openness. The consequences of such an intensely disturbed balance between closed, and open and an unequivocal commitment to self-isolation, would turn out to be extremely destructive, long-lasting and, in terms of their effects, devastating, not only for the socio-political, but also the cultural system of Serbia. And the descent into an orgy of aggression meant at the same time the inevitable descent into an orgy of banality, both in the ethical and in the aesthetic sense, both in existence and in creation. Such a transfer of national priority from the field of culture to

the sphere of politics, and vice versa, has remained an insurmountable challenge in Serbia to this day.

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Vera Katz

AN ATTEMPT TO MARGINALIZE INTELLECTUALS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

IN THE EIGHTIES, the Yugoslav society underwent a deep crisis in all areas, one that was reflected differently in specific republics and provinces. This paper analyzes, using the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the influence of the intelligentsia on public opinion, in relation to several events that caused stirring among the Yugoslav public, most important being the publication of the draft Memorandum of the 1985 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA), the election of the chairman of the Presidency of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia, comments on several books, civilian military service, rehabilitation of certain individuals, environmental movements... The (lack of) reaction of the Bosnian intelligentsia to these phenomena was analyzed on the basis of the daily *Oslobođenje*, the media outlet of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAWP BiH), a newspaper with the largest circulation and readership, through which the League of Communists of BiH (LC BiH) sought to create public opinion in Bosnian society. The opinion of a part of the intelligentsia about certain phenomena could only be inferred from published critiques of the leading Bosnian politicians, and the readers could understand these articles only if they were already familiar with the “talk of the bazaar”. For this chapter, issues of *Oslobođenje* for three months (September – November 1986, year XLIII) were reviewed on a daily basis, in the hope of finding comments by prominent intellectuals from BiH, with a reference to the aforementioned events in Yugoslav/BiH society.

Debates of varying intensity in artistic, and especially literary circles, extended back for years prior to 1986. These exchanges concerned their mutual relations in the Yugoslav context, but also relations with

artists and writers from abroad, presenting some novel outlooks on the modern world. However, readers of *Oslobodenje* were continuously informed only about what the League of Communists considered unacceptable, without naming the authors and their works, as for example:

“In the past period, there were misunderstandings between politics and art, that is, authors in this area. They were especially pronounced in individual cases when certain novelists, playwrights or filmmakers tackled topics from our recent history. Needless to say, not because of the topics – although the dramatic events of our past, especially our recent history, are still fresh in our memory, and certain connotations of these events are unpredictable when it comes to their consequences – but because of the non-artistic, i.e., political, or more often, politicized, approach to these topics. (...) At the same time, it was simply ‘forgotten’ that, for example, the French bourgeois revolution, the October Revolution, as well as our uprising in 1941 and AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) were, in the given time and under given circumstances, also a ‘matter’ of so-called daily politics; that the leftist intelligentsia also participated in all of it, either as a historical ally of the working class, or as an integral part of it, but never as the elite.”⁶⁶⁴

It is from the activities of the SAWP BiH, which the League of Communists viewed as the best possible channel for engaging the broadest societal level, that it can indirectly be inferred that a discussion about the language flared up. This discussion was very unpleasant for the government of BiH, always accompanying turbulent interethnic relations. Thus: “A Coordination Board of the Presidency of the Republican Conference of the SAWP BiH for language and language policy issues, as a social and professional body, was established in Sarajevo yesterday. This important social event was preceded by several discussions within the Central Committee of the LC BiH (CC LC BiH) and

664 H. Ištuk, “Na dnevnom redu – Politika i stvaralaštvo: Proroci ‘neumitnog sukoba’”, *Oslobodenje*, no. 13726 (5.9.1986): 2.

the Republican Conference of the SAWP BiH on current language and language policy issues, during which the proposal was made to establish a permanent body to monitor and analyze the overall language policy in the Republic.”⁶⁶⁵ The newspaper report from this meeting did not specify which problems prompted the establishment of this “expert-political body”, but it was clear that the intent was to bring these discussions under the control of the Committee, for which it was stated that (...) “it has a firm footing and a secure orientation in its work. These are the principles and conclusions of literary and language policy in BiH, confirmed, in the past ten years, through social practice, as being the only correct way to solve our complex language problems in a multinational community such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, our basic task will be the consistent implementation of the principles and conclusions of literary and language policy in the spirit of unity, persistently creating a distinction from separatist and unitarian aspirations.”⁶⁶⁶ The article did not mention, among other things, the objections of Croatian intellectuals that the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet predominated in Bosnian media, that the Croatian language was marginalized, as well as Croatian writers, but it emphasized that “among a number of current topics the Committee will tackle, we will mention the problem of learning and getting acquainted with the Macedonian and Slovenian language and the languages of the national minorities within the Serbo-Croatian language area, as well as a critical analysis of articles on language in the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia*, issues of standardization of Serbo-Croatian language, problems in teaching foreign language, teaching in Yugoslav correspondence schools abroad, the state of affairs and the problems of personnel development in BiH linguistics, etc.”⁶⁶⁷

665 L. Kršlak, “Iz RK SSRN BiH: Jezik – briga društva”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13748 (27.9.1986): 2.

666 *Ibid.*

667 *Ibid.*

namely, that the Board would discuss everything except those issues which were prevalent in the discussions among the writers.

The League of Communists presented visible Serbo-Croat disagreements in BiH, the loudest of which came from literary circles, as resolved: "All the predictions, made by skeptics, that trust and unity among Bosnian writers would not materialize, definitely fell into the water. At its recent meeting, the League of Communists Activist Group of the City of Sarajevo Writers' Branch adopted the draft of the new statute of the Association, finally resolving all the existing critical remarks about the Presidency of the Association and its commissions. The basic request, to assign a far greater self-government role to the Assembly, enabling writers to directly decide on all vital issues pertaining to the work of their guild-union association, and, finally, be able to make decisions in the widest forum, was also accepted. (...) The very fact that the attempts to present the struggle for greater independence and democracy in the work of the Association as a 'national conflict' were rejected, because none of the groups was or is 'nationally pure', showed and proved that writers in BiH were not divided on that basis, and that they now act in unison. (...) Writers of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have a good reputation with Bosnian publishers, they don't have a favorable status. This is in line with the petulant confession that they are 'not commercial', which speaks for itself. (...) Opening a genuine self-governing perspective, thwarting all 'scenarios', the possibility of criticizing all weaknesses, placing the decision-making process, as well as the elections, into the ancient forum – the Assembly of all members – will turn the Association of Writers of BiH, a social organization, into a new, more energetic one, which will find the strength and the means to solve its professional problems that will not give 'headaches' to the society."⁶⁶⁸

Soon after the adoption of the Statute, the Assembly of the Association of Writers of BiH was convened, and the report from the

668 Dž. Alić, "Stvaraoci i društvo: Protiv lažne 'monolitnosti'"; *Oslobodenje*, no. 13765 (14.10.1986): 5.

Assembly contained an interesting section that spoke about to the election of the chairman of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia, a controversy that had long been discussed in other republican associations:

“A good part of yesterday’s Assembly passed in the debate on the candidate for chairman of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia. Given that, after Maribor, the Association of Writers of Serbia nominated Miodrag Bulatović once again, and thus brought other associations to an impasse, yesterday, after an exhaustive discussion and different views on this issue expressed, followed by a vote (25 for, 13 against, 6 abstentions), Miodrag Bulatović’s candidacy was supported. Although Bulatović won a vote of confidence, the Assembly authorized its delegation to make a constructive effort in order to contribute to the resolution of the current situation in the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia and support the candidate who met the personnel policy criteria of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia,⁶⁶⁹ which Bulatović certainly did not.

At the October International Writers’ Meeting in Belgrade, where writers from 25 countries discussed the topic “Apocalypse as Fiction and Reality”, it became even more evident that the rift among Yugoslav writers was growing deeper. “Thus, while today writers from the USA, Canada, the USSR, Ghana (...) discussed how the Belgrade gathering showed a common concern for the fate of the world, with its participants expressing their wish that these messages reach the entire world, and their words the conscience of millions, some Yugoslav authors once again demonstrated, to the very same world, their constant obsession with the pastoral care for the fate of their own nation. If domestic writers could not do without that preoccupation, then, at least, they could have sorted it out among themselves.”⁶⁷⁰

669 Z. Vlačić, and J. Mašić, “Skupština Udruženja književnika BiH, Osvojeni novi prostori djelovanja”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13768 (17.10.1986): 6.

670 J. Kosanović, “Oktobarski susreti pisaca u Beogradu: Apokalipsa kao fikcija i stvarnost”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13772 (21.10.1986): 7.

Oslobodenje continued the story of Bulatović's candidacy with a report from the Assembly of the Association of Writers of Vojvodina, where he lost a vote of confidence (31 votes against, two in favor, and four abstentions).⁶⁷¹ As the Association of Writers of Serbia "entirely and unequivocally stood behind their candidate", at the session of the Presidency of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia, Husein Tahmišćić stated: "(...) that the Union was on the verge of disintegration at the Maribor Assembly, but that today it has already overcome disintegration", while "the representatives of Vojvodina, Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo – associations that voted against Bulatović – clearly emphasized that the rejection of Miodrag Bulatović's candidacy must not be transferred to interethnic relations. Thus, with the already well-known standpoints repeated, the eight-month long merry-go-round concerning the election of the chairman of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia continues. Four associations still support Bulatović, while four do not".⁶⁷² Although *Oslobodenje* continuously reported on this issue, exclusively from Serbia, no one provided even a short biography of the candidate, or a comment on why the Association of Writers of BiH supported Bulatović. Thus, this issue was left "to the bazaar gossip", which was how the government always characterized it, leaving readers of the official daily newspaper superficially informed, although the editorial board needed only to republish "Bulatović's interview given to an Italian newspaper, published by the then Sarajevo literary magazine *Dalje*".⁶⁷³

A very similar situation occurred again when the draft SASA Memorandum was published. Following the instructions issued by the newspaper founder, SAWP BiH, the editorial office of *Oslobodenje* refrained from voicing its own position on this document, but rather

671 D. Vijuk, "Skupština Društva književnika Vojvodine protiv kandidature Bulatovića: Kandidat za diobe", *Oslobodenje*, no. 13777 (26.10.1986): 5.

672 J. Kosanović, "Iz Saveza književnika Jugoslavije: Dokle status kvo?", *Oslobodenje*, no. 13786 (4.11.1986): 7.

673 D. Vijuk, "Skupština Društva književnika Vojvodine":5.

published the report from the session of the Commission of the CC LC Serbia for Ideological Action in Culture, where, at the very beginning of the introductory speech, the following was stated:

“Culture has always been and remains a suitable ground for the expression of nationalist, that is, in general, anti-communist tendencies and phenomena (...) The Union of Writers is not the only rostrum where anti-socialist ideas are advocated. Tendencies of various kinds appear among the members of other associations of artists as well as among cultural workers. What is the true purpose of the criticism directed at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Belgrade by some artists, which comes down to the request to change the Yugoslav character of this institution, and turn it into an exclusively Serbian institution of fine arts? (...) It is particularly concerning that the nationalist views are being spread in the daily lives of many people, including members of the LC. These range from showing overt sympathy for people who publicly express nationalist views, to reverting to some long-forgotten customs stemming from family and national traditions, which already have, or may take on, a nationalist over-tone (...)”⁶⁷⁴

The participants in the meeting of the aforementioned Commission fiercely attacked “the so-called Memorandum on the situation in Yugoslav society”, emphasizing that it was made public “in fear of the consolidation of the ranks of the League of Communists that is taking place after the 13th Congress of the LCY – the ideological opponents became impatient and took haste to voice their opinions on the political scene by all means possible. The fact that a personal union between a part of the management of the Association of Writers of Serbia and several members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts emerged, shows that none of this was coincidental. In this relationship, or better say collusion, attitudes were expressed that did not contain much new, but rather represent a certain codification of

674 “Komisija CK SK Srbije za idejno djelovanje u kulturi: Odlučnom akcijom protiv antisocijalizma i nacionalizma”, *Oslobodjenje*, no. 13760 (1986): 4.

well-known views from the position of the civil right-wing. In many of these views, the well-known opinions of certain people, who have long been in conflict with the policy of the LC, can be recognized".⁶⁷⁵ According to an extensive report, the meeting participants commented in detail on all allegations contained in the text of the Memorandum, which challenged socialist self-government, revolution, AVNOJ, Tito (...), as well as on "the largest part of the memorandum, dedicated to the problems of interethnic relations within the Federation, abundant with manipulations related to the position of the Serbian people in the Yugoslav federation throughout the post-war period".⁶⁷⁶ The conclusion of the meeting was that "by action and not just words, members of the LC, all its organizations and leaderships, must fight against all anti-socialist and nationalist actions, in every setting, as well as for strengthening democratic and national equality", as it was already concluded "that nationalism is also a result of a tolerant attitude towards such actions. As long as some temporary alliances with certain disguised proponents of nationalism are accepted, that kind of tolerance will take its toll. The number of 'text-writers' who are looking for instant fame has multiplied. The principle they adhere to in their writing is 'the more stupid, more nationalistic, more primitive and louder, the better'. They are also invited to become members of the Association of Writers of Serbia, in order to increase the voting numbers".⁶⁷⁷ In his editorial column, the editor-in-chief of *Oslobodjenje* referred to the political developments in Yugoslavia using the aforementioned report by Tanjug, albeit skillfully avoiding the word memorandum, but rather making a very sharp remark about part of the membership of the League of Communists:

"In fact, this 'contempt', expressed by a number of members of the League of Communists toward ideological and political struggle, as well as toward open and public, individual and organized, opposition

675 Ibid.

676 Ibid.

677 Ibid.

to ideologues and activists with obviously hostile orientations and platforms – either represents tragic naivety or, rather, a form of flirtation, that is, some sort of covert collaboration with those people with whom no one honest and well-meaning, and in particular communists and intellectuals, can be in the same Union, or in coexistence.”⁶⁷⁸

According to the report from the session of the Presidency of the CC LC BiH, its members did not openly denounce the opinions from the Memorandum, but rather stated, in a vague manner, “that various counter-revolutionary forces and ideologies, some of which are extremely anti-communist, have been escalating lately.”⁶⁷⁹ The Presidency of the CC LC BiH left the task of talking about specific cases of nationalist behavior to others, offering space in *Oslobođenje* to the Commission of the CC LC Serbia for Interethnic Relations,⁶⁸⁰ the Commission of the CC LC Serbia for Information and Propaganda,⁶⁸¹ and the Presidency of the New Belgrade SUBNOR (Union of War Veterans of the National Liberation Wars of Serbia) Committee.⁶⁸² These bodies unequivocally condemned the nationalist content of the Memorandum. In place of the Presidency of the CC LC BiH, albeit not without its knowledge, the editor-in-chief of *Oslobođenje* inspiringly wrote about the Memorandum:

“The alarm clock from the congress has been ringing for too long and, obviously, for those who did not wake up, a serious hearing test as to ideological and political movements should be provided”, because “that famous Memorandum – Frankenstein finally crawled out from subversive laboratories, in which experiments took place for a long

678 I. Mišić, “Ovom prilikom. Pouke i poruke”, *Oslobođenje – Nedjelja*, no. 13762 (11.10.1986):13.

679 “Predsjedništvo CK SKBiH: Neprihvatljivi koncepti opozicije”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13765 (14.10.1986):1.

680 “Međunacionalni odnosi u SR Srbiji. Bez nadvikivanja sa nacionalistima”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13766 (15.10.1986):4.

681 “Kriva prizma nacionalizma”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13769(18.10.1986):3.

682 “Povodom ‘memoranduma’ SANU: Borci traže ostavku A. Isakovića”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13770 (19.10.1986):2.

time, mixing bits and pieces of Cominform, attitudes of Đilas and Ranković, the 'sixty-eight's' and the dark Maspok years, as well as anarcho-liberalism and Kosovo nationalism. All along, knives were being drawn, sinners grew into apostates, with the clerical-nationalist God-pleasing ritual fumigation for the protection of the lost flock, and with foreign help at various moments. The Memorandum, emerging alongside these prayers, was supposed to turn the unfortunate past, its sins and delusions, deceptions, and losses, into deliverance, and towards the bright paths of 'civilizational achievements and the belated fulfillment of justice'. (...) The creators of Memorandum, who have long been diligently laboring to compromise the revolutionary achievements of the CPY/LCY, National Liberation Struggle, AVNOJ, resistance to the Informbiro, socialist self-government democracy, Tito's concept for solving the national question and who are, finally, enthusiastic advocates of de-Titoization ("The question of the constitutional structure of the SFRY cannot be raised until the question of Tito's role and responsibility is opened' – A. Isaković), tried to obtain a scientific habilitation for it, to provide it with dignity and authority by cladding it in the toga of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. However, in discussions that were initiated in the competent party bodies and bodies of other socio-political organizations in SR Serbia, Belgrade and other republics and provinces, the Memorandum has already been properly qualified and placed where it actually belongs – in the trash dump of subversive hoaxes."⁶⁸³

Thus, almost a month after the publication of the Memorandum (September 24 and 25, 1986, *Večernje novosti*, Belgrade), in lieu of the CC LC BiH, *Oslobođenje* published a concrete critique of this document by a Bosnian journalist, albeit after prominent writer and revolutionary Oskar Davičo gave an interview to *Oslobođenje*, during the literary manifestation "Meetings of Zija Dizdarević" in Fojnica. To the journalist's question: "We are interested in your view of the

683 I. Mišić, „Savez komunista. Vrijeme je za konkretnu akciju“, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13771 (20.10.1986):2.

latest attempts coming from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts to attack the foundations of AVNOJ?”, Davičo answered: “SASA, or the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, is not a scientific and artistic institution, it is a lair of chauvinism, nationalism, it is a filthy gang of scoundrels. I am saying this publicly, having in mind Antonije Isaković and his companions there, and their memorandum on AVNOJ, in which they deny its value and significance as a document on the new Yugoslavia, because allegedly there were no legal representatives of Serbia there. I wonder who they believe to be the legal representatives of Serbia – those, I trust, cannot be the followers of Draža, or the followers of Nedić and Ljotić.”⁶⁸⁴

In an interview for *Politika*, academician Pavle Savić said the following concerning the participation of the representatives of the Serbian people in AVNOJ:

“After all, among those in that famous picture taken after the First Session of AVNOJ, I am the only one still alive. Isn’t that proof that we were represented? I am the one with the shubara⁶⁸⁵, and Vlada Zečević, Veselin Masleša, Jovan Popović, Simo Milošević, Radovan Mijušković, and Milentije Popović were also present... I think that these are now just vagabond allegations.” He also called the omission of the names of Tito and Kardelj in the SASA publication, published on the occasion of its centenary – the most original hogwash. “My most intimate, fullest, deepest conviction”, he added, “is that we would not exist if it were not for the heroism of our people, the Communist Party and Tito at its head. (...) Many were silent when that giant was alive, and now they have started to cash in on their ‘contribution’ to the National Liberation Struggle. This is not science, it is profiteering. It has nothing to do with the scientific responsibilities of academicians. Many of them carry their heads on their shoulders only because the joint resistance enabled them to live. And we

684 J. Mašić, “Meni je teško boriti se”, *Oslobođenje – Nedjelja*, no. 13766 (15. 10. 1986): 6.

685 Male winter hat used by the Serbs in folk attire (translator’s note).

who live, live by chance, because others have fallen in our place.”⁶⁸⁶ Among other things, the academician Savić reminded *Politika*’s readers that “I was the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts for ten years, less two months (from 1971 to 1981), and even then, all the way until my resignation, I indicated to the public that there were hostile endeavors in the Academy, as well as forces which I did not want to cooperate with or cover for. So, I distanced myself. But, both then and today, the reputation of the Academy should always be preserved, and the grain separated from the chaff.”⁶⁸⁷

Visiting the University of Belgrade, Ivan Stambolić, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, expressed his opinion:

“According to the so-called memorandum, the Serbian people have no choice but to ‘rise up’ because Serbs are, supposedly, hated by their brothers, cursed to be losers, its leadership is prone to compromise. Thus, it follows that Yugoslavia is their Calvary, both in Kosovo and in Vojvodina, as well as in Croatia and Bosnia, namely, everywhere. In short, with a clear conscience and with far more accuracy, this document could be titled ‘in memoriam’, as a blow from the back to Yugoslavia, Serbia, socialism, self-government, equality, brotherhood and unity (...) In essence, it takes a standpoint contrary to the interests of Serbs in the whole of Yugoslavia.”⁶⁸⁸

The published articles from Serbia regarding the Memorandum were extremely critical and rejected the document as unacceptable, while no article of similar content from Croatia was published in *Oslobođenje* during the analyzed three months.

However, an article from Croatia was published about the initiative for the rehabilitation of Dr. Miloš Žanko, initiated by SUBNOR Croatia. Drago Dimitrović, Secretary of the Presidency of the CC LC

686 “Intervju Pavla Savića *Politici*: ‘Memorandum – tempirana bomba’”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13777 (26. 10. 1986):2.

687 *Ibid.*

688 “Ivan Stambolić na Beogradskom univerzitetu: ‘Memorandum – udarac s leđa Jugoslaviji’”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13782 (31. 10. 1986):4.

Croatia, spoke about this in an interview for *Slobodna Dalmacija*: “The very fact that the acknowledgment of Žanko came from SUBNOR Croatia, speaks volumes about Croatia’s attitude towards him. As for the attitude of the Presidency of the CC LC Croatia towards the veterans’ initiative, we could say that it does not want to act like some kind of tutor. That would not be in line with the social commitment that everyone should fulfill their own social role, even though we keep each other informed.” In the lengthy interview, the secretary of the Presidency of the CC LC Croatia spoke about the phenomenon of certain individuals, who used to be revolutionaries, but were now spreading the belief in the futility of the Yugoslav project through newspapers and books. “I don’t know what they would be saying if they were still holding their positions”, Dimitrović said. “Personally, I do not believe that living successfully alongside this revolution for 40–50 years, obtaining a high pension, and then renouncing it, is a serious contribution and behavior. Renouncing the revolution, of course, not the pension. I think these people are renouncing their lives. As for their visionary abilities, it is a pity that they did not use them when they were, beyond doubt, able to spot, from their positions, the seeds of today’s problems”, Dimitrović concluded.⁶⁸⁹

The Presidency of SUBNOR Belgrade also took a stand on the topic of rehabilitation of certain individuals: “The veterans’ organization has completed its part of the task when it comes to the rehabilitation of Dr. Miloš Žanko. By awarding the plaque of SUBNOR of Yugoslavia, it was made clear that Žanko was unjustifiably accused and politically disqualified at the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the CC LC Croatia, in 1970. We believe that it is now the League of Communists’ turn to take steps for further rehabilitation of Žanko – the introductory speaker Veljko Dimić pointed out. He added that the same should be done in other cases of political disqualifications, as was the case with Jova Šotra and others. However, we warn of the

689 “Drago Dimitrović o ‘slučaju Žanko’: Test jednog vremena”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13729 (8. 9. 1986):3.

danger, and there are certain indications to support this fear, that massive requests for rehabilitation may appear, even of persons who are trying to profit of everything.”⁶⁹⁰

These views were also confirmed by Dušan Čkrebić, member of the Presidency of the CC LCY: “The League of Communists has been reconsidering its views and, and when deemed justified, reversed its earlier decisions. Such cases have occurred in BiH, Serbia, Slovenia, as well as in other places. (...) In my personal opinion, Žanko remained dignified, restrained and discreet. As far as I know, he has never left the League of Communists and is still a member. I think that Žanko deserves full recognition for his honest, brave and communist attitude, regardless of some possible differences. He remained true to the League of Communists and did not seek any profitable alternatives. It is quite a different issue whether something else should be done regarding the 10th session of the CC LC Croatia and its assessments. However, this issue should be addressed by the CC LC Croatia, that is, if it believes that there is still more to be said.”⁶⁹¹ As for Šotra, Čkrebić said that he knew him personally and that he raised the issue of Šotra’s rehabilitation on four occasions at the highest forums in Serbia: “I was personally involved in this issue, as well as a number of comrades from the Presidency of the CC and SR of Serbia. We did not want it to go public at the time, because our belief and initial position was that it would enable the Provincial Committee of the LC Kosovo to make a decision on reviewing its former decisions more easily. To date, that has not happened, and my personal opinion is that this is not good. (...) When mentioning Šotra, it is inevitable to recall the fate of Kadri Reufi, who was expelled from the CC LC Serbia by the

690 “Predsjedništvo SUBNOR-a Beograda o idejnim kretanjima: Odlučno graditi jedinstvo”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13780 (29. 10. 1986):3.

691 “Dušan Čkrebić o rehabilitaciji: Nema potrebe za generalnim preispitivanjem”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13806 (24. 11. 1986):3.

decision of that body, and died in the meantime. That remains in the competence of the CC LC Serbia.”⁶⁹²

According to what appeared in *Oslobođenje*, SUBNOR of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not make a public statement about the heated controversies among writers, the Memorandum, rehabilitation of the aforementioned persons, or about the process of rectifying mistakes made towards certain individuals in BiH. Covering up the divisions within their ranks, and counting the war victims according to their nationality, they turned back to the revolutionary days and tried to pass on the experiences from the National Liberation Struggle on to young people. However, they adhered to the rhetoric from the fifties: “Neither the rain in Sarajevo nor the thick fog in Crepoljsko, where the 23rd meeting of SKOJ (Alliance of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia) was held, prevented many young people, led by Federation Council member Cvijetin Mijatović, to take a walk reviving the paths of memory. Yesterday, the pre-war SKOJ members, pioneers, youth and veterans, met again, and for a moment recalled the pre-war SKOJ meetings in Crepoljsko. Although as much as 40 years have passed since the whirlwind of war, the memories of Crepoljsko were vividly and impressively retold to the youth, in words that spoke of the past and for the future.”⁶⁹³ In the end, the journalist added that, after evoking memories of this event, the youth had some fun with pop-rock groups *Đino Banana*, *Maratonci* and *Urbana plemena* from Sarajevo, something they could certainly relate to much more than to the stories told by the revolutionaries. And while the veterans of New Belgrade loudly demanded the resignation of Antonije Isaković,⁶⁹⁴ the Presidency of the Republican Board of SUBNOR BiH discussed “information on the implementation of the 17th Congress *Youth Creativity on the topic of the National Liberation Struggle and the socialist revolu-*

692 Same.

693 R. Dautefendić, “Na Crepoljskom održan 'Skojevski sastanak': Prošlost poklonjena budućnosti”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13749 (28. 9. 1986): 2.

694 “Povodom ‘memoranduma’ SANU”: 2.

tion and the possibility of integrating this action with the action *Following Tito's Revolutionary Paths*. This idea is not a bad one, but presently seems difficult to realize, because the activity of *Following Tito's Revolutionary Paths* is intended for children in primary schools, while the action led by SUBNOR, and, as of this year, also by the Conference of Reserve Officers of BiH, is broader, and is intended for youth between 7 and 27 years of age. It was also noted that some municipalities are negligent towards this action. It is surprising that municipalities, such as Trebinje, Bihać, Livno, Mostar, Prijedor, Titov Drvar and some others, have failed to send any contributions on this topic during the last few years. This year's topic is the Republic of Foča. There is a reason for that, because the 45th anniversary of the Foča regulations is being celebrated. The fact that there are 78 open competitions on this topic was also discussed, and it was suggested that this multitude of competitions be reviewed within the SAWP BiH, and an attempt to find the right measure be made.”⁶⁹⁵ At the same session of the Presidency of Republican Board of SUBNOR, the following question was asked: “What was the reason why all execution sites were not properly marked in the previous period, 40 years after the war, in parallel with the erection of monuments to fallen fighters? The fact that there are 1,014 execution sites on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 446,717 registered victims, speaks for itself. It is also known that only 77,610 victims have been identified so far, i.e., their nationality indicated, while there is no such data on 367,107 victims. Only 36 municipalities fully marked all the execution sites. When asked whether, at the present times, execution sites should be marked and this issue revisited, the veterans resolutely stated that they should, for the sake of an object lesson and a message to the younger generations.”⁶⁹⁶

695 M. Vejzagić, “Predsjedništvo Republičkog odbora SUBNOR-a BiH. Stratišta opomene”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13768 (17. 10. 1986): 3.

696 Ibid.

Messages were also sent to the youth from the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the first federal youth action, the Brčko – Banovići rail line, on the occasion of which an exhibition of photographs was opened. A train to Belgrade, loaded with a thousand tons of coal from Banovići coal mines, was ceremoniously dispatched: “Young people from all over Yugoslavia worked on the railroad. For many of them, the railroad was a path to a new life, a great forge of brotherhood and unity, but also a school of self-government. The railroad inextricably connected the youth of all our peoples and nationalities, the same way they were twinned by the common national liberation struggle. With the construction of the youth railroad, all barriers that separated the economy of BiH from other parts of the country, were broken. From November 7, 1946 (when the first train departed) until today, thousands and thousands of trains and wagons, and thousands and thousands of passengers, who arrived and departed Banovići, travelled by that railroad, and the railroad is still there.”⁶⁹⁷

However, the young people born in the sixties, who SUBNOR BiH, the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists addressed, had completely different interests and worldviews, which were far away from the war generation and those born in the early fifties, with whom they did not share the same memories. These young people belonged to the modern world of education, behavior, entertainment, clothing, and worldview, influenced, among other things, by the TV series “Top lista nadrealista (Top List of Surrealists)”, which challenged, through satire and sketches, the social and political reality of Yugoslav/BiH society, as well as music groups *Zabranjeno pušenje*, *Bijelo dugme* and many others from BiH and Yugoslavia. At that time, an advertisement was also published daily in *Oslobodenje*: “Apple IIc computer, 128K working memory, built-in floppy drive, 80-column display, serial communication ports, BASIC interpreter in ROM, which fully meets the educational standard adopted for schools in SR Croatia – ten years

697 “Četiri decenije pruge Brčko–Banovići – mladost za primjer”, *Oslobodenje*, no. 13790 (8. 11. 1986):1.

of experience is a guarantee of quality. Contact us directly!!! VELEBIT APPLE..."⁶⁹⁸ Even if the majority of the youth did not have the opportunity to use new technologies, knowledge about them existed, as well as a desire to move in that direction.

The publication of numerous feuilletons testifies to the attempt to increase the significance of the revolution in socialist society. In three months, eleven feuilletons were published in *Oslobođenje*, each with an average of ten sequels, on the topic of the *National Liberation War*, for example, *Sjećanje na Miru Cikotu (Remembering Mira Cikota)*, *Tragedija u Kerestincu (Tragedy in Kerestinec)*, *Pod zastavom španske republike (Under the Flag of the Spanish Republic)*, *Sjećanje na Lazara Latinovića (Remembering Lazar Latinović)*, *KPJ u Bihaću od ustanka do I. zasjedanja AVNOJ-a (CPY in Bihać from the uprising to the 1st AVNOJ session)*, *Sjećanje na Miru Popara (Remembering Miro Popara)*, *Savjetovanje u Ivančićima (Conference in Ivančići)*, *Tako je nicala pruga (Thus grew the railway)*, *Božidar Jakac: Sjećanja na dane avnojevske (Božidar Jakac: Memories of the AVNOJ days)* and others. In addition to the feuilletons, promotions of editions with memories of the revolution were recorded,⁶⁹⁹ as well as books about the war,⁷⁰⁰ detailed information on scientific conferences held on the topic of the Party,⁷⁰¹ organization and linking of cultural and artistic events,⁷⁰² jubilee edition of Mladen Oljača's novels: *Molitva za moju braću (Prayer for my brothers)* and *Kozara*,⁷⁰³ etc. Regardless of the presence of numerous

698 "Računalo Apple II...", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13736 (15. 9. 1986).

699 Ms. Arnautović, "Promovisan zbornik sjećanja Hercegovina u NOB-u 1941–1942. godine: Svedočanstva o revoluciji", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13755 (5. 10. 1986):2.

700 "Govor člana Savjeta Federacije i narodnog heroja Uglješe Danilovića prilikom promocije knjige *Od ustanka do pobjede: Naknadne istine spletkaroša*", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13773 (22. 10. 1986):2.

701 I. Mandić and R. Preradović, "Završen naučni skup o radu i razvoju partijske organizacije u Bihaću: Odgovor na dileme", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13763 (12. 10. 1986):2.

702 A. Kebo, "Stalne kulturno-umjetničke manifestacije u Hercegovini: Veće programsko obogaćivanje", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13765 (14. 10. 1986):2.

703 M. J., "Nova izdanja Oljačinih romana", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13767 (16. 10. 1986):8.

contents from the National Liberation War, the Commission of the CC LC BiH for History and the Coordination Board of the Presidency of the Republican Conference of SAWP BiH, at their joint session, expressed dissatisfaction with the way important events and personalities were marked: "In some settings, standpoints are either disrespected or openly infringed. This joint session essentially initiated a serious discussion on the Calendar of marking significant events and personalities in SR BiH up to the year 2000."⁷⁰⁴ Numerous events from the National Liberation War were added to the Calendar. Although at one of the sessions of the Presidency of the CC LCY, an open warning was issued: "One does not live on glory. The League of Communists cannot live off of their work in the past",⁷⁰⁵ the Bosnian leadership nevertheless followed the established paths, appeared to be unprepared to accept the reality of socio-political life within the deep economic crisis.

The highest officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that, by influencing journalists, they could prevent articles unacceptable to the government, so they convened a conference on the current tasks of the media in BiH, organized by the Republic Conference of the SAWP BiH. The conference was attended by six hundred journalists, editors and correspondents of republic, municipal and associated labor media, as well as correspondents of newspapers published outside BiH. Due to the importance of the conference, *Oslobođenje* published the speeches of Kažimir Jelčić, President of the RC SAWP BiH and Milan Uzelac, President of the Presidency of the CC LC BiH. The main message was that "the media have important tasks in fulfilling the constitutional role of the Socialist Alliance, especially its role of social control (...) because, without the Socialist Alliance, the League of Communists would be separated from the people, just as

704 "NOB u zbornicima – Više uređivačke odgovornosti: Komisija CK SKBiH za istoriju razmatrala primjedbe na neke tekstove iz edicije *Hercegovina u NOB*", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13804: 4.

705 "Treća sjednica CK SKJ: Jak Front – jaka Partija", *Oslobođenje*, no. 13762 (11. 10. 1986): 2.

the Socialist Alliance, without the leading ideological and political role of the League of Communists, would be left to the influence of various opposition forces, which, especially lately, have been showing this intent more openly”.⁷⁰⁶ Given that educated people in BiH increasingly bought and read Belgrade publications *Politika*, *NIN*, *Duga*, *Književne novine* and, during their conversations, referred each other to certain articles, Kažimir Jelčić stated: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is an area that has always been open to the distribution of informative content from all parts of Yugoslavia, especially those in the Serbo-Croatian language, and it will remain so. Thus, it would be good to have more understanding for the distribution of newspapers and other publications from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the wider Yugoslav area. It is essential that we develop cooperation and communication between the media in Yugoslavia.”⁷⁰⁷ Jelčić also said that “within the so-called peace movement, civilian military service is advocated, as well as the abolition of sanctions for avoiding military service and the like. These actions are, in fact, in today’s global circumstances, aimed at weakening the Yugoslav National Army and the entire system of total national defense and social self-protection.”⁷⁰⁸ However, he refrained from mentioning the name of the initiator of that movement, and whether it had followers in BiH. In general, “some newspapers”, “some people”, “one of our republics” and the like were being mentioned, although a warning was already issued at the session of the CC LCY: “Advocating for a concrete, clear-cut discussion, Kučan assessed that, as a result of the generalities to which we are accustomed in our documents, they no longer annoy, provoke, or motivate anyone. Everyone thinks that it is about someone else, and not about them, and all of us think that it refers to the Federation (...)”⁷⁰⁹. The

706 Lj. Smajlović, A. Šarac, and E. Habul, “Riječ Kažimira Jelčića: Kritika koja nudi rješenja”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13783 (1. 11. 1986): 2.

707 Ibid.

708 Ibid.

709 “Treća sjednica CK SKJ”: 2.

leading official of the SAWP BiH did not answer the journalist's question about his opinion regarding the initiative of the Association of Journalists of Slovenia to delete the paragraph on the "conscious commitment to the idea of Marxism-Leninism" from the Code of Journalists of Yugoslavia? He answered vaguely: "The Assembly of Journalists of Yugoslavia also voted for changes to this document, so the initiative of Slovenian journalists should be considered within the scope of that discussion."⁷¹⁰ Although it was stated, as early as September, at a session of the CC LC Serbia, that "nationalists are moving along their own line on the social ladder – that is, from the Academy of Sciences to the football stadiums",⁷¹¹ Jelčić's statement on "negative events in sports", having BiH in mind, was: "The Socialist Alliance came out with clear-cut views in 1982, and there is no need to change or adjust them. Action is now underway in municipal conferences and sports organizations, pertaining to what was launched four years ago, and we can expect to obtain new ideas on how to overcome the accumulated problems".⁷¹² At the same conference, Milan Uzelac reiterated Jelčić's views, which was to be expected. Paraphrasing Kardelj, "where we are now, we did not arrive from the parliament, but from the revolution", and when asked by a journalist: "A significant part of the intelligentsia is passive. How much can this be related to the thesis about the alleged conflict of the intelligentsia with the League of Communists?", Uzelac answered: "I don't know who measured that passivity. I think that, on the contrary, the situation is quite the opposite, and that the intelligentsia is active, as are a better part of working people and citizens, and that it is dealing with the problems that society is facing. However, the LC is in conflict with one part of the intelligentsia, and this should be specified, clearly indicating where this

710 Lj. Smajlović, A. Šarac, and E. Habul, "Riječ Kažimira Jelčića": 2.

711 "Idejna borba u javnim glasilima: Bal bez maski", *Oslobođenje*, no.13744, Sarajevo, 23. 9. 1986.: 3.

712 Lj. Smajlović, A. Šarac, and E. Habul, "Riječ Kažimira Jelčića": 2.

conflict occurs and why.”⁷¹³ When asked whether Kosovo presented a problem for Yugoslavia, not just SR Serbia, Uzelac instead of answering, referred to the press: “that the media from BiH mainly reflected the position of the Republic, following the conclusions of the highest party and state bodies”. In addition, assessing how the media was reporting on the way the action was managed, he said that the press from BiH might have been writing insufficiently on these issues. However, Uzelac also said that “everything that is written about Kosovo does not always support the actions of the League of Communists”.⁷¹⁴ When asked by journalists about the failure of politicians from BiH to comment on certain current issues, the president of the CC LC BiH said: “There are whispers that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not take a stand on the Žanko case, and his rehabilitation. Bosnia and Herzegovina will not take any stand. And why would it? If there is a need, the stand should be taken by the CC LC Croatia and Yugoslavia”.⁷¹⁵ Considering *Oslobođenje’s* writing, these “whispers” about not taking a stand were not without reason, because the Bosnian leadership did not take a stand on the aforementioned events directly, but rather indirectly, by transmitting reports from meetings of socio-political bodies exclusively from SR Serbia. Thus, the readers of *Oslobođenje* were acquainted in detail with the socio-political situation in Serbia, without being informed about what was really happening in the BiH society. Uzelac was, by all means, aware of the seriousness of the echoes of Serbo-Croat relations in BiH, the increasing number of debates with a national background and the fact that the nations were growing apart from each other, but also the increasingly loud negative comments coming from other republics, and stated:

“The pressure on the League of Communists of BiH goes in two directions: in the foreground is the thesis about dogmatic, hard-line

713 Lj. Smajlović, A. Šarac, and E. Habul, “Riječ Milana Uzelca: Strategija se provjerava u praksi”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13783 (1. 11. 1986):2.

714 Ibid.

715 Ibid.

politics, dogmatic core, the hardest bastion of neo-Stalinism, etc. At the same time, the attack is aimed at breaking up interethnic relations, this great achievement that we built and created during the war and in the decades after the war, and which could be succinctly described as the policy of equality, brotherhood and unity, realized as common living, not living next to each other, as the humanized life of free people in a democratic community, rather than mutual tolerance of nationally fragmented, separated and closed entities. That is why there is a very fierce attack on common life in all spheres of work and decision-making, on common institutions in education, science, culture, information, and sports.”⁷¹⁶

The existence of interethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the ruling structures believed to be imported from other republics, was not made public, but rather an attempt was made to overcome them by advocating “intensified ideological and political work”. However, the communist leadership did not have the strength for such action, adhering to a vague rhetoric, because the overall ideological and socio-political turbulence was also reflected within the communist membership, which deprived the League of Communists of its “striking force”. When leading party politicians mentioned “sinners”, “renegades” and “knives” in their speeches (...), intellectuals knew to which book authors these allusions pertained, but were prevented from commenting in the largest-circulation newspaper in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the fact that they were not allowed to publish for a wide readership, intellectuals were also pushed to the bottom of the list of taxpayers: “Today, a very small number of workers are among the taxpayers. The same is the case with members of the so-called intellectual professions: medical doctors, university professors, engineers, and the like, who, not so long ago, were at the top of the tax paying lists, and today only some of them are there, namely, those who are good with money, benefit from fortunate circumstances, or possess exceptional creative productiveness. Freelancers:

716 Ibid.

artists, writers, filmmakers also barely make ends meet, and even in those cases when they do cross the non-taxable limit, they are often faced with drastic obligations that take up to 80 percent of their hard-earned royalties.”⁷¹⁷

Bosnia is often referred to as a “dark vilayet”, and in the period analyzed in this research, at a time when controversial debates in other republican newspapers and weeklies were taking place, *Oslobođenje* published selected content from these sources without offering actual comments, although the paper had excellent journalists, but also educated people, who would have something to say about the situation in Bosnian society. Editors and editorial boards were faced with a difficult task, stuck between their wish to produce a professional and up-to-date newspaper, and the BiH party structures, which dictated what was permitted. It was a time when officials from BiH were in the top of Yugoslav executive and party bodies – Branko Mikulić was president of the Federal Executive Council and Milanko Renovića president of the Presidency of CC LCY. At the same time, leading party officials in BiH presented the very serious situation by expressing their conviction that the Yugoslav/BiH crisis could be overcome by carrying out congressional decisions, nurturing memories of the revolution, “vigorously opposing the internal enemy”, “resolutely taking action against anti-socialism”, “fighting against messages of hatred”, “confronting truth with insinuations”, and so on. Despite the fact that the BiH government was responsible for the republic acquiring the epithet of “dark vilayet” – a place where nothing happens, intellectuals, or rather writers and artists, were an integral part of the Yugoslav scene. Literary magazines were launched, and fierce polemics were taking place about certain writers and their works, for example, about Andrić and Selimović; round tables were organized, theater performances were held, such as the premiere of the play *Hydrocentrala u Suhom Dolu* (*Hydro-electric Dam at Suhi Do*), by Ivo Brešan, on the eve of the November holidays, at the National Theater in Sarajevo, which

717 F. Muhić, “Intelektualci na dnu liste”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13753 (2. 10. 1986):3.

provoked unprecedented interest of the audience, but also negative criticism in *Oslobođenje*.⁷¹⁸

As in previous years, the celebration of the November holidays began in Mrkonjić Grad, where “citizens are proud of this historic night, 43 years ago, when this city, in the heart of enslaved Europe, facilitated the uninterrupted work of the first parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were 1860 fighters in the ranks of the national liberation war from the territory of this municipality, under the banner of freedom raised by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Comrade Tito on the battlefields throughout the country. During that glorious and difficult four-year armed struggle, 530 fighters, including three national heroes, from the territory of Mrkonjić municipality, laid down their lives in the struggle for freedom.”⁷¹⁹ In the presence of the delegation of SR BiH, “an exhibition of sculptures by academic sculptor Rade Gašić from Sarajevo was opened in Mrkonjić Grad, as well as an exhibition of photographs called *Epic of Kozara (Kozarska epopeja)*, with around 300 photographs faithfully depicting the suffering of the people of Kozara in World War Two. A literary evening was also organized, at which a collection of poetic works by the poet-peasant Đuro Stipanović from the village of Podbrdo near Mrkonjić Grad was promoted. The festivities in Mrkonjić Grad will continue tomorrow on the plateau of the ZAVNOBiH Memorial House, with a republican youth vacationers’ big history class called *O vrelom danu na dlanu što okom Titovim planu (Of a hot day in sight flared up by Tito’s eye)*, as well as the admission of students into the pioneer and youth organizations”.⁷²⁰ “Freedom ceremonies” served the purpose of responding to the “civil right-wing”, by listing the successes in eco-

718 B. Korenić, “Razorna moć jezika – Ivo Brešan: *Hidrocentrala u Suhom Dolu*, režija Jakov Sedlar”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13806 (24. 11. 1986):5.

719 Z. Žuna and P. Kelava, “U Mrkonjić Gradu obilježena 43-godišnjica Prvog zasjedanja ZAVNOBiH-a: Pod zastavom slobode”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13807 (25. 11. 1986):1.

720 Ibid.

conomic development, despite the economic crisis: "From the former poor Bosnian provincial town, Mrkonjić Grad has grown into a modern industrial city employing 5,400 workers. It should be pointed out that not a single organization of associated labor of Mrkonjić Grad has been operating with a loss in the nine-month period. Also, this year, the Upper Footwear Parts Factory was launched into operation, and will employ 450 people. Two residential buildings with 33 apartments have been completed, and the issue of city water supply has been resolved. A modern, well equipped veterinary station was put into operation, as well as another production plant for the second phase of sawmill wood processing in the Forestry and Wood Processing Work Organization, in which about 150 million dinars were invested. 50 young workers started work here. The aim is to increase the production of colonial chairs intended for the American market, and, by that, the production process is practically completed. In the current medium-term growth, through the realization of the production capacity modernization and expansion program, another 800 people will be employed. Also, by the end of this year, the completion of construction works on the main road Rogolji – Barači is expected. Finally, a telephone exchange in the local community of Barači, which will connect 1000 users to the automatic telephone exchange, will be launched into operation."⁷²¹

The main ceremony on the occasion of November 25 was held in Sarajevo in the presence of SFRY Presidency member Hamdija Pozderac, members of the Federation Council from BiH, delegation of the SR BiH Council, Constitutional Court, Sarajevo Army District Command, Republic Territorial Defense Headquarters, BiH Academy of Sciences and Arts, the City of Sarajevo and other organizations, associations and communities. Although November 25th was officially named Statehood Day of BiH, established as such in 1969, in 1986, *Oslobodenje* used the name "State Holiday of SR BiH" for the central event. At the ceremonial session under the slogan *The Reliance*

721 Ibid.

– *Revolution and Own Forces*, Mato Andrić, member of the Presidency of SR BiH, “first invited those present to observe a minute of silence to pay tribute to the deceased councilors of AVNOJ and ZAVNOBiH and deceased revolutionaries”, and pointed out in his speech: “With due respect and revolutionary responsibility, we must return to AVNOJ and ZAVNOBiH, and our revolution, as the source of immeasurable historical greatness and never sufficiently understood values. They have been, and remain, an inexhaustible source of inspiration for all those who fight for freedom and fairer social relations. It is also important for our further revolutionary path how we will defend, nurture and develop these achievements”. In response to the economic crisis, Andrić added: “Relying on our own strengths was, and remains, the main postulate of our orientation. This requires maximum mobilization of all organized socialist forces of our society on a united platform. That has, so far, enabled us to achieve results in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have significantly changed the working and living conditions, and represent a realistic basis for our republic to develop even faster in the coming period”. At the end of his speech he declared: “Walking in Tito’s footsteps, we are free to carry out our tasks, overcome the obstacles before us, and thus create space for a better life, on the basis of socialist self-government, brotherhood and unity, and equality of all our peoples and nationalities.”⁷²² As part of the Statehood Day celebration, the Museum of the Revolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo opened the exhibition *Life and Work of Isa Jovanović (1906–1986)*, in cooperation with the Museum of the Socialist Revolution of Vojvodina, “on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the birth of this prominent revolutionary and comrade Tito’s close comrade-in-arms.”⁷²³ Numerous short journalistic articles “from the field” were written about the events organized around the

722 “Svečana sjednica povodom 25. novembra, državnog praznika SR BiH: Oslonci – revolucija i vlastite snage”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13808 (26. 11. 1986):1.

723 “Juče u Muzeju revolucije u BiH u Sarajevu: Život i djelo Ise Jovanovića”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13807 (25. 11. 1986):10.

holiday, including one that stated: “For four days, in the second half of November 1966, Tito stayed in Sarajevo, the Tuzla basin, Posavina and Semberija. Remembering, even after 20 years, all the details of the cherished meeting with Tito, citizens of Semberija will today permanently mark this event with the unveiling of a memorial plaque at the Agricultural Estate *Semberija* in Novo Selo”.⁷²⁴ On the occasion of Statehood Day and Republican Day, in Bosanski Petrovac, the hometown of Skender Kulenović, the Memorial House of this prominent revolutionary and writer was opened, along with the already existing memorial museums: *Tito u petrovačkom kraju* (*Tito in the Petrovac area*), *Titov voz na planinskom prevoju Oštrej* (*Tito’s train on the Oštrej mountain pass*) and *Spomen muzej Jovana Bijelića* (*Jovan Bijelić Memorial Museum*).⁷²⁵ It was an opportunity for Milan Uzelac, President of the Presidency of the CC SC BiH, to respond to some unacceptable views coming from intellectual circles: “Precisely by the power of its authenticity, our National Liberation War and socialist revolution gathered the widest circle of intellectuals, everything that was progressive and talented in the cultures of all our peoples and nationalities. The great and dignified figure of Skender Kulenović, with his life and poetic work, stands as a warning that those who would like to pass judgements on history, namely, present our revolution as an unnatural mistake in the course of history, limit it and reduce its significance to party power struggle and the like. They will not, and must not, be allowed to act in such a manner. This is the logic of those who, under the guise of science or artistic creation, want to raise to the pedestal of history the cowardice of foreign servants and the moral misery of quislings, who were supposed to ensure the ‘normal’ civic flow of history. (...) A lot has been written about 1948 and Goli Otok and the conflict with Stalin. And Skender, true to himself, expressed long ago

724 F. Ademović, “Podsjećanja: Praznik u Semberiji”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13809 (27. 11. 1986):5.

725 J. Mandić, “Svečanosti u Bosanskom Petrovcu: Sloboda stvaralaštva iz kolijevke humanizma”, *Oslobođenje*, no. 13806 (24. 11. 1986):2.

his sharp words about these events, in the satirical poem *Zbor derviša* (*Choir of Dervishes*). One should keep this in mind for the sake of the times we live in, for clarifying the dilemmas we face, for faster and clearer recognition of revolutionary ideologies aimed at confronting art and revolution, politics and culture, the League of Communists and the intelligentsia. Needless to say, it would do no good to simplify the relationship between politics and culture, and deny that mistakes and misunderstandings are possible in this area, but it is therefore necessary to use critical thought to clarify all open issues of that relationship.”⁷²⁶ Alluding to the controversies in BiH regarding the life and work of Ivo Andrić and Meša Selimović, Uzelac stated: “Skender belongs to the literature of the people and nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the logic that every poet is linked to his homeland, with the topics he chooses and the language he first spoke, but Skender is a Muslim, Serbian, Croatian and Yugoslav poet, and, at the same time, a poet of our revolution.”⁷²⁷

While the need to “shed light on all open issues” was promoted at the already traditional celebrations of socialist holidays, organized according to the same 40-year old scenario, BiH society was flooded with different views of the past and solutions for the future, coming from those who followed party ideology, advocates of the view that Yugoslavia could overcome the economic and political crisis by an inter-republican agreement, as well as those that did not see the possibility of the survival of the Yugoslav state. In particular, members of the academic community at the universities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, showed the greatest differences in views on current policy and future solutions, with followers of nationalist ideas attracting the most public attention. Despite the fact that the governing structures prevented intellectuals from commenting on various phenomena, events and the

726 Ibid.

727 Ibid.

economic crisis on the pages of *Oslobodenje*, the BiH society was an active participant in the life of Yugoslavia during the mid-eighties.

Only two years after the 14th Winter Olympics in Sarajevo, when the image of a happy and successful society was broadcasted to the world, the bid of Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, for the 1992 Summer Olympics, which Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly supported, was passed over in favor of Barcelona. *Oslobodenje* only published a news story with the message: "We offer guests and audiences from all over the world an open Yugoslavia, without visas, without formalities, the opportunity for Belgrade, in 1992, to become a genuine meeting place of friendship between East and West, North and South."⁷²⁸ However, events started to develop very quickly, and by the time of the Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona, the state of Yugoslavia slowly started disappearing from the map of European countries. In the first issue of *Oslobodenje* in January 1990, the slogan "Comrade Tito, we swear to you" was deleted from the paper's masthead.

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Vladimir Milčin

MACEDONIA: UNFINISHED PAST

DOOMED TO TEMPORALITY

Did the politicians and citizens gathered at a Skopje square on 8 September 1991, the day of the declaration of independence, think that Republic of Macedonia would only be a temporary name? That it would become a member of the United Nations only on 8 April 1993 under the temporary designation Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)? That on 19 February 2019 it would be forced to change its constitutional name into Republic of North Macedonia in order to be admitted to NATO? And did they believe that on 7 December 2020 Bulgaria would block the beginning of accession negotiations between Macedonia and the European Union? This was preceded by the claims of the Bulgarian authorities that the Macedonian nation was the product of communist engineering, which was made official at the First Session of the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) on 2 August 1944, and that the 11 October celebration, that is, the Day of Uprising of 1941, was a political provocation. In the end, Sofia submitted a request to Skopje to replace the definition “Bulgarian fascist occupier” with “German Nazi occupier of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the provisional Bulgarian administration consisting mostly of Macedonians”!

For decades, the people living in federal Yugoslavia had been convinced that the questions – who are the Macedonians and to whom Macedonia belongs – were once and for all answered and that the past is gone. However, in the mid-1980s, people started publicly to write and speak about what had previously been only whispered about, or due to which people used to quarrel in a drunken state and even fight in the tavern that is still located below the premises of the Macedonian Writers’ Association in Skopje. There also began a public reexamination of the blank spots of Macedonian history, including silence

about some events, documents and human destinies or their distortion. The ice was broken by the weekly *Mlad Borec* (“young fighter”), whose new editor-in-chief was Nikola Mladenov.

AT THE BEGINNING, A DISPUTE ABOUT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR IN MACEDONIA

On 9 December 1943, an informal group of intellectuals⁷²⁹ gathered at the National Liberation Action Committee (ANOK) lodged an Objection to the Manifesto of the General Staff of the Macedonian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Partisan Detachments (PD) of Macedonia. The ANOK reproached the General Staff for not being competent to decide on the political issues, basic principles and goals of the struggle and that the only responsible body was the National Assembly – which still had not yet met. In other words, the Manifesto of the General Staff had only a provisional character and was subject to amendment by National Assembly with respect to some issues. This would diminish the authority of the Staff and the National Liberation Struggle in the eyes of the people and give a rhetorical hook to the opponents who claimed that the whole struggle was frivolous. “Therefore, it is necessary to clearly and precisely define the duties and rights of both bodies in advance.” The ANOK also complained that the Manifesto did not emphasize the connection between the National Liberation War and the previous phases of the Macedonian national liberation and unification struggle. Finally, the ANOK believed that the ultimate goal of the Macedonian national liberation struggle was not a free Macedonia within a free Yugoslavia, because it would bring freedom and equality to only one third of Macedonia, that is, the part within the borders of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia until 1941.

“At this moment, the earth is lighter to our dead, numerous fallen heroes whose bones are scattered throughout Macedonia. They

729 Including Kiro Gligorov, Blagoja Hadži Panzov, Emanuel Čučkov, Kiril Petrušev, Lazar Sokolov...

already see the dawn of our freedom, they see Goce Delčev's old Ilinden fighters and their successors today – the young Macedonian army, and they see the foundations laid for achieving the ideals of two generations, two epochs – a free and united Macedonia. (...) Macedonia has been divided, slavery has changed, but the struggle of the Macedonian people has never stopped. When all enslaved peoples of Yugoslavia stood up against today's enemy of all mankind, the Macedonian people joined the struggle. They saw it as an opportunity to help the general struggle of all enslaved peoples and all freedom-loving mankind achieve their centuries-old national ideals. As a result of the bloody three-year struggle, the Macedonian people tied their destiny to the destinies of all Yugoslav peoples, and helped the formation of a new fraternal, democratic and federal Yugoslavia with their blood and struggle. (...) Long live our dear Macedonian federal state! Long live the federal, democratic Yugoslavia, the common roof of the fraternal South Slavic peoples!" This was the keynote address delivered by the oldest delegate, Panko Brašnarov, at the opening session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Macedonia.

The President of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM), Metodija Andonov-Čento, was not a member of the CPY, but enjoyed a great reputation as a fighter for national liberation. He served a prison sentence during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, while the Bulgarian occupation authorities sent him to an internment camp in 1942. After getting out of the camp, he joined the partisans at the invitation of the General Staff. On 24 June 1944, accompanied by the Presidium members, Emanuel Čučkov⁷³⁰ and Kiril Petrušev,⁷³¹ Čento met with Tito on the

730 On 7 March 1945, he was appointed Minister in the Provisional Federal Government. However, his stance was assessed as nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Yugoslav. Therefore, he was removed from office in February 1946 and sent to Macedonia.

731 On 6 August 1944, he was appointed ASNOM Commissioner for Internal Affairs and thereafter, on 6 August 1944, he became the Minister of Internal Affairs in the first Macedonian Government. At the time of the Cominform Resolution,

island of Vis and raised the question of the unification of (Vardar, Pirin and Aegean) Macedonia, and Tito replied that this was not a priority and urgent question. Čento later had some disputes with Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo and Lazar Koliševski, and was against sending the 15th Macedonian Corps to the Srem Front and not to Thessaloniki. He resigned on 14 March 1946, but already on 14 July he was arrested outside his home in Prilep. The authorities announced that Čento was arrested at the Greek border while trying to flee to Greece. The judicial trio, Panta Marina, Lazar Mojsov and Kole Čašule, sentenced him to 11 years in prison.⁷³² He was released on parole after 9 years and 4 months. Until his death, he did not give up the idea of an independent and unified Macedonia.

The Vice-President of the Presidium, Brašnarov, who tried to reconcile the views of the ANOK and the PC CPY in his speech, was arrested on 11 December 1950. In early July 1951, he was sent to the island of Goli Otok where he died a few days later.

The majority of the members of the Presidium of the First and Second Sessions of the ASNOM were either in the Skopje prison or on Goli Otok. Veteran Dimitar Vlahov and Kiro Gligorov, the future President of the independent Republic of Macedonia, were sent to Belgrade. In 1991, Gligorov formulated the referendum question: "Are you for a sovereign and independent state of Macedonia, with the right to enter into any alliance with the sovereign states of Yugoslavia?" So formulated, the question is reminiscent of the dispute in 1944, which was not resolved by referendum but by directive.

he was the Minister of Labour. He was removed from position on 26 October 1948, expelled from the CPY, and retired.

732 All three of them had successful political and diplomatic careers at the republican and federal levels. In the 1990s, Čašule stated that the verdict was brought at the highest level, that is, by Vidoje Smilevski, Koliševski's left hand. His right hand was Strahil Gigov.

MACEDONIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

In the inter-war period, when Macedonia was part of the Vardar Banovina, the future Macedonian politicians, intellectuals and artists studied either in Sofia or in Belgrade. Few of them were able to study in Vienna or Moscow. A branch of Belgrade University's Faculty of Philosophy was launched in Skopje in 1920. Teaching was conducted in the Serbian language.

The Macedonian Literary Circle in Sofia functioned intermittently from 1936 to 1942. Poet Kole Nedelkovski and Venko Markovski⁷³³ wrote in Macedonian, while others, including poet Vapcarov, in Bulgarian – the language of their education. The Circle functioned semi-illegally until Vapcarov's execution by firing squad in the Sofia barracks and Nedelkovski's murder by the police. Venko Markovski, Georgi Abadžiev⁷³⁴ and Vasil Ivanovski⁷³⁵ joined the Macedonian partisans.

The first issue of *Nova Makedonija* was published on 29 October 1944. Five months after the liberation of Skopje, on 3 April 1945, the Macedonian National Theatre was opened and, on 29 November 1946, the Faculty of Philosophy, the nucleus of the future University of Skopje, was opened.

733 Poet, member of the General Staff and delegate to the First Session of the ASNOM. Due to his support for the Cominform Resolution, he was incarcerated in the Skopje prison, while due to his poem *Suvremeni paradoksi* (*Contemporary Paradoxes*, 1956) he was sent to Goli Otok. In 1965, he went for medical treatment to Bulgaria where he was showered with honours. In 1984, he published *Goli Otok – ostrovot na smrtta* (*Goli Otok – the Island of Death*).

734 Director of the Institute of National History in Skopje, 1951–1952. He wrote the script for the film *Mis Ston* (*Miss Stone*) and several historiographical novels.

735 The author of the book *Zošto nie Makedoncite sme posebna nacija* (*Why We Macedonians Are a Separate Nation*) and member of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist). In 1942, the Bulgarian court sentenced him to 15 years in prison. On 20 June 1944, he escaped from prison and joined the partisans in Macedonia. He was a delegate at the First Session of the ASNOM and the first editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper *Nova Makedonija*. In November 1945, after the conflict with Koliševski, he returned to Bulgaria where, in 1949, at the trial of the so-called Titoists was sentenced to 12 years of strict imprisonment.

A significant part of the Macedonian intelligentsia originates from Aegean Macedonia. Among the writers, painters, directors, journalists, historians and university professors, there were some (aged 2–24) who were evacuated in the spring of 1948, before the defeat of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) in the Greek Civil War. The largest number of them, about 11,000, were received by Yugoslavia. After the Cominform Resolution, Yugoslavia closed its border with Greece, while after their defeat in 1949, the fighters of the DAG and Macedonian National Liberation Front were transported to the Eastern bloc countries via Albania.

In the 1970s, the first films dedicated to the Aegean theme were made: *Crno seme* (Black Seed) based on the novel by Taško Georgievski, who was of Aegean Macedonian descent, and directed by Kiril Cenevski, the documentaries *Avstralija, Avstralija* (Australia, Australia), directed by Stole Popov, and *Tulgeš*, directed by Kole Manev, who was sent to Romania as a refugee child. The last film about the Aegean drama was *Crveniot konj* (The Red Horse, 1981), also based on Taško Georgievski's novel and directed by Stole Popov.

Cinematography has abandoned this theme since, but literature has not. The novel *Nebeska Timjanovna* (1988) by Petre M. Andreevski (who was not of Aegean Macedonian descent) is about the Golgotha of a group of Macedonian leaders who were arrested in Albania on 3 October 1948 on charges of being Tito's spies and transferred to the Lubyanka prison in Moscow. At the trial in Moscow in 1952 they were sentenced to between 8 and 25 years in prison, that is, the Vorkuta camp in the Soviet Arctic. They were released in 1956 and returned to Macedonia in 1957. P. M. Andreevski previously (1980) published the most widely read novel *Pirej* (Piraeus) about the divisions of Macedonia and the Macedonians during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Both novels by this author also had their stage life at the Bitola National Theatre.⁷³⁶

736 Dramatization and direction by Vladimir Milčin.

KOLIŠEVSKI AND KOLIŠEVISM

Lazar Koliševski was the most powerful person in Macedonia from 1945 to 1989, with a break from 1963 to 1972, when Krste Crvenkovski was the President of the League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM). Tito entrusted him to settle accounts with Aleksandar Ranković and the State Security Service (UDB). However, Crvenkovski was ousted as early as 1970, during Tito's showdown with the so-called anarcho-liberals /nationalists/ civil right wing. Koliševski's power was restored and remained almost untouched until 1989, when the LCM obtained a new name⁷³⁷ and a new leader, Petar Gošev.

After the publication of *Borba za Balkan* (The Struggle for the Balkans) by Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo in 1981, the Institute of National History organized a debate about the book to which Tempo was also invited, but he did not respond. Ten years later, a polemical response, that is, the book titled *Pismo do Tempo* ("A Letter to Tempo") by Vera Aceva was published. "Tempo's book that deals primarily with the events during the National Liberation War in Macedonia challenged me to write this letter and send it to him". Its author, the holder of the Partisan 1941 Medal and the Order of the National Hero, wrote this in the preface. She finished the book on 8 April 1988 and sent the manuscript to Tempo, but he did not respond for 14 months. She had to wait for more than two years for her book to be published, because publishing companies in Macedonia (their directors and editors were usually writers) were not allowed to publish memorial materials without Koliševski's approval.⁷³⁸

On 14 April 1945, the Third Session of the ASNOM handed over the executive functions to the Government led by Koliševski, who was born in the town of Sveti Nikola, but grew up in Kragujevac, in central Serbia. The most important event in his life happened in Belgrade

737 LCM–PDP (League of Communists of Macedonia–Party for Democratic Change).

738 In one footnote, Aceva mentions her conversation with Veselinka Malinska, an influential politician, who told her confidentially that there is a group within the CC LCM which approves what can be published, but memorial materials are approved personally by Koliševski.

on 27 July 1941. Namely, he alerted Cana Babović that Gestapo agents were taking the injured Aleksandar Ranković into custody. The Organizing Secretary of the CC CPY was rescued in a daring raid by a group of Skojevci (members of the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia – SKOJ). This is how Koliševski obliged the powerful Ranković, who said of their friendship: “I may have been somewhat sentimental as a human, but – my life was at stake. It has happened and is remembered!”

In early August 1941, Koliševski received a directive from Ranković to go to Macedonia with the CC CPY delegate, Dragan Pavlović Šilja, in order to “clear up the matter” with the Secretary of the Provincial Committee, Metodija Šatorov – Šarlo. Šarlo’s guilt was that he carried out the Comintern’s directive to have Macedonian communists join the Bulgarian party after the capitulation of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian occupation of eastern and central Macedonia.⁷³⁹ As early as September 1941, Koliševski was appointed a member of the PC CPY, although nobody knew him either in the party or in Macedonia. On page 48 of his book *Borba za Balkan*, Tempo wrote that a new leadership was formed and that Koliševski had played a decisive role in it. However, Vera Aceva asked: “How could he play such a role when the new leadership was formed on 21 September and Koliševski was arrested already on 7 November?” But Koliševski still did something. In the article “Bele mrlje makedonske povijesti” (White Stains of Macedonian History), published in the Zagreb weekly *Start* on 19 August 1989, Antun Kolendić⁷⁴⁰ wrote that before 11 October, in a note signed under the pseudonym *Mitre*, Koliševski ordered the dissolution of the party cell of the Skopje Partisan Detachment due to *factionalism and the lack of discipline* and because the communists in this detachment were *Šarlovists* and *autonomists*. Koliševski never admitted that the

739 The directive was annulled after the attack of the Third Reich on the Soviet Union and Tito’s protest.

740 Kolendić was a member of the Local Committee of the CPY in Skopje in 1941 and the head of the party cell of the First Skopje Detachment.

First Skopje Detachment existed, although it consisted of more than 40 partisans, communists and Skojevci.

In 1980, author Dimitar Solev, who belonged to a group of modernists rallied around the magazine *Razgledi* (“Observations”), published a novel about Vasil Antevski – Dren, a Skopje Detachment fighter who fell into the hands of the Bulgarian police after the dissolution of the detachment and, together with his comrade-in-arms, Periša Savelić, Secretary of the Local Committee, was sentenced to death by hanging. The verdict was carried out in the Sofia prison on the night between 18 and 19 August. The novel *Dren* was a step out of the imposed silence about the existence of the detachment, which was undefeated by the occupier, but was disbanded by the decision of a powerful man.

On 7 December 1941, Koliševski submitted a pardon application to Bulgarian Emperor Boris III and his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He was released on 7 September 1944. Consequently, he was not in Macedonia on the day of the uprising, 11 October 1941, or at the First Session of the ASNOM on 2 August 1944. However, on 2 August 1952, he was awarded the Order of National Hero without having tasted real battle. In the 1950s, the citizens of Macedonia shouted: “We the Macedonians love Tito!” as well as “Tito – Lazo!” The author of this text remembers that in 1952 he attended the Lazar Koliševski Kindergarten, which later changed its name to the 13 November Kindergarten (the day of the liberation of Skopje).

WE THE MACEDONIANS LOVE TITO!

At a solemn session held on 2 August 1969, “deeply aware of the greatness of his work and historical significance for the creation of the Macedonian state, and expressing the immense gratitude of the Macedonian people”, the Assembly delegates made the decision to award Josip Broz Tito with the newly instituted ASNOM Commemorative Gold Medal. “Marking the 25th anniversary of the First Session of the ASNOM, the day when the Macedonian people, in the joint struggle of all Yugoslav peoples, achieved their centuries-old ideal of national liberation and state formation, and continued to pursue the

ideals of Ilinden and the decisions of the First Session of the ASNOM to affirm and promote national culture in Macedonia, they also made the decision to build memorial cultural centres in the lasting memory of the First Session of the ASNOM in 25 cities of SR Macedonia during the period 1970–1975.”

The building of the memorial cultural centre in Bitola was delayed. It started after Tito's death, in July 1980. The last performance in the old theatre building was the Yugoslav premiere of Ivo Brešan's *Svečena večera vo pogrebalnoto pretprijatje* (Gala Dinner at the Funeral ParLOUR). Someone from the theatre informed the municipal officials about the production of a “reactionary black comedy” just after Tito's death. The Central Committee was also informed, and it sent three members of the Ideological Commission to attend the dress rehearsal. Thereafter the actors were asked to meet with them. I do not remember whether I, as the director of this play, was also summoned, but the actors insisted that I go with them too. The members of the Ideological Commission⁷⁴¹ tried to convince the actors that the play was destructive and too negative and that it should not be performed. The actors were offered forgiveness, because they were “manipulated by the author and the director”. However, they unanimously refused to renounce the play: “Do you think that after two months of work we don't know what we are performing?”

At the end of the decade, in May 1989, the premiere of Blagoja Risteski's drama *Spiro Crne* (“Black Spiro”) was presented at the Macedonian Theatre Festival in Prilep.⁷⁴² It was not proclaimed the best play, although it won the awards for best text, best direction, best stage design and best music, as well as one award for best actor. After the Festival, the Society for Science and Arts, Society of Historians and Society for the Macedonian Language from Prilep openly demand-

741 Dimitar Solev, Director of the National and University Library, Georgi Stalev, author and professor at the Philological Faculty, and Strašo Todorčevski, Secretary of the Ideological Commission.

742 Poet and playwright, insufficiently known in the Yugoslav space. The director was Vladimir Milčin.

ed that the play be removed from the repertoire as “anti-Macedonian and harmful to Macedonian history, because it promotes the idea that is contrary to the interests of the Macedonian people and historical truth, and disparages, minimizes and mocks the lustrous figures and tradition of Macedonian history”. The Presidency of the Veterans’ Association from Prilep also supported their views and request for the unconditional removal of this play from the repertoire. The weekly *Ekran* (“Screen”) organized the so-called public trial after the guest performance of the play in Skopje. The daily *Večer* (“Evening”) quoted Blagoja Ivanov, a writer and theatrologist: “(...) there are times and generations that live and die with myths. However, other generations are coming and they are tired of these myths. Thus, demythologization begins. This text is such an example. That is why nobody can ban a performance except the audience, which does it simply – by not watching it”. After almost two decades, Aleksandar Aleksiev felt the need to publicly apologize to director Ljupčo Tozija for the trial of his play *Hamlet od Dolno Gaštani* (“Hamlet from Mrduša Donja”) in the autumn of 1970: “At that time, various ideological commissions forced people with dignity and authority to speak out against themselves. That time must not be repeated, it leads nowhere, let it remain a distant past. However, at that time, we were the victims of individuals and in this particular case there were no ideological commissions, but scientific societies, historians... It is even scarier for me if there are some other, more subtle manipulations. But I believe that only individuals are behind this farce.” As a 21-year-old, Aleksandar Aleksiev was sent to Goli Otok in 1949 on charges of being a “member of an illegal student Cominform organization”, but was released after a year.

THE GOLDEN YEARS OF THEATRE WITHOUT A HAPPY ENDING

The theatre production in Macedonia in the 1980s was one of the pillars of Yugoslav theatre. Theatrical performances toured Yugoslavia for guest appearances or for participation in festivals from which they returned with awards. Goran Stefanovski’s plays were performed in all languages. Slobodan Unkovski often directed at the Yugoslav Drama

Theatre, Ljubiša Georgievski cruised throughout Yugoslavia, while the author of this text directed three plays in Albanian in Priština. Macedonian theatres were open to playwrights and directors from all republics.

The Skopje Theatre of the Nationalities (Albanian and Turkish Drama) crossed the republican borders with its multiple participation in the MESS International Theatre Festival in Sarajevo with the performances based on texts by Macedonian Albanians and Turks.⁷⁴³

George Orwell's books were still not translated into the Macedonian language when, in 1981, the alternative FF Theatre Workshop performed *Kako trupata Sina bluza će ja prikažeše Životinskata farma od Džordž Orvel* ("How the Blue Blouse Troupe Would Present George Orwell's Animal Farm") in the crowded auditorium of the Faculty of Philosophy (FF) in Skopje. From 1980 to 1984, the FF Theatre Workshop produced four plays⁷⁴⁴ with which it toured Yugoslavia from Nova Gorica (Slovenia) to Titograd (Montenegro).

Macedonian theatre became impoverished in 1987 when the extremely successful alternative Roma Theatre Pralipe, founded by Rahim Burhan in the early 1970s, moved to Muelheim upon invitation of Roberto Ciulli, where it was given much better financial and spatial conditions for its work.

In the autumn of 1988, the President of the Kumanovo Municipality and the President of the City Committee decided to shut down the theatre. The unofficial explanation was that the citizens of Kumanovo did not need a theatre performing in an incomprehensible literary Macedonian language. Neither of them expected a fierce reaction from the public, while the public was surprised with a lukewarm reaction from the theatrical guild. After the intervention of the top party leadership, a working group was formed to prepare the study for a new theatre within the Cultural Centre. After 12 months, the Executive Council of the Kumanovo Municipality announced that

743 Teki Derviši, Džabir Ahmeti, Resul Šabani and Irfan Beljur.

744 It was directed by Vladimir Milčin.

“intensive work is underway on the formation of a new theatre and that all protests and insinuations made by some cultural workers that the shutting down of the theatre in Kumanovo is a consequence of the bureaucrats’ short-sightedness and arrogance are unacceptable and resolutely rejected!”

OLD NICK AT THE FACULTY OF LAW

In June 1974, the party organization of the Faculty of Law expelled Professor Sociology Slavko Milosavljević, after which his employment was also terminated. After the fall of Ranković, Milosavljević was made a member of the Executive Committee of the CC LCY and, in 1969, was elected Secretary of the CC LCM. Amidst the campaign against liberalism and nationalism, he came under attack and resigned at the request of the new LCM President, Angel Čemerski. During the 1990s, he published a dozen books of which the two-volume *Sociologija na makedonskata nacionalna svest* (Sociology of Macedonian National Consciousness) and *Našiot pogled za vremeto na Koliševski* (Our View on the Time of Koliševski), co-authored with Crvenkovski, resonated strongly with the public. Professor of Criminal Law Đorđe Marjanović fell into disfavour in 1983. In the keynote address given at the 21st Conference of the Yugoslav Association for Criminal Law and Criminology, Marjanović pleaded for the abolition of “verbal delict” (statements against the socialist order, defined broadly). He was harshly attacked by the establishment and punished by the party after which he left the League of Communists and became the President of the League for Democracy, the party founded on 21 November 1989.

Three law professors who participated in or passively observed the attack on Milosavljević and Marjanović progressed inexorably in their academic and political careers. Kambovski, Klimovski, and Beličanec were the members of the republican Executive Council in the second half of the 1980s, at the time of a brutal police intervention in Vevčani (addressed later in this chapter). Their careers were not affected even after the introduction of a multiparty system.

Kambovski was the Minister of Justice in the coalition government comprised of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, the Democratic Alternative and the Democratic Party of Albanians (VMRO-DPMNE, DA and DPA)⁷⁴⁵ and is still inescapable as a government consultant. At the height of his political career, Klimovski was the President of the Assembly from 1998 to 2000. Beličanec was a member and the Vice-President of the republican Executive Council from 1986 to 1991. From 1985 onwards, he lectured on self-managing associated labour. In late 1991, he switched to more lucrative business law. He also “rose to fame” as one of the “brains” of privatization.

From 1983 onwards, Vasil Tupurkovski taught international law. His rise from the first youth to a member of the LCY Presidency and SFRY Presidency was faster but shorter than Koliševski’s career. The phrase “unprincipled coalition”, which he said at the 18th Session of the CC LCY in October 1988, catapulted his photographs onto truck windshields in Serbia and banners bearing the slogan “Tupurkovski – how proud it sounds!”. But when he stood against the imposition of a state of emergency in Serbia, after the riots of 9 March 1991 in Belgrade, at the meeting of the SFRY Presidency, he was labelled as one of the “grave diggers of Yugoslavia”. On 4 March 1991, while still a member of the SFRY Presidency, Tupurkovski organized the manifestation “Peace in the World – Peace in the Country! Give a Hand, Announce Peace!” at the Macedonian National Theatre, with the participation of artists from all republics and provinces. In 1993, he published the book *Istorija na Makedonija: od drevnina do smrtta na Aleksandar Makedonski* (History of Macedonia: From Antiquity to the Death of Alexander the Great) and children’s picture books about Alexander and his horse. Tupurkovski was the initiator of populism in Macedonian politics.

745 Leaders: Ljubčo Georgievski, Vasil Tupurkovski, and Arben Džaferi.

THE FUNERAL OF A LIBERAL

The purge of liberals and nationalists, that is, the so-called civil right wing continued in the 1980s. The State Security Service kept the group file titled “Blue 9”. Krste Crvenkovski, Vera Aceva, Slavko Milosavljevski, Čamuran Tahir, President of the LCM City Conference, Tomislav Čokrevski and Milan Netkov, professors at the Faculty of Law, and Dimitar Dimitrov, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, were also under surveillance.

At the pedestrian crossing near the building of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences, on 17 September 1985, a JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) vehicle ran over Nešo Markoski,⁷⁴⁶ the bearer of the Partisan 1941 Medal and editor-in-chief of the Macedonian edition of *Komunist* until 1972, when he was suspended and held at disposal. The next morning, a group of lower-ranking officials came to the Markoski family’s apartment to express their condolences to his wife and daughters, but ran away in panic through the kitchen in order to avoid meeting the friends and like-minded of the deceased from the “Blue 9” group file. At the funeral, one could notice the members of the State Security Service who zealously photographed everyone who attended the funeral of a liberal.

THE TURNING POINT: VEVČANI, 1987

On 21 October 2020, Keith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University, who is a keen connoisseur of Macedonia, published the text titled “From Macedonia to America: Civics Lessons from the Former Yugoslavia”:

In August 1987, Communist party leaders imposed, without local input, a major infrastructure project in the village of Vevčani to redirect water from its springs to other settlements. The villagers saw the lack of consultation as a betrayal. They also viewed the loss of control over water resources as a threat to their children. So, they resorted to

746 By a turn of fate, the accident happened before the eyes of actor Branislav Lečić, who appeared as a witness before the Military Court in Skopje.

*civil disobedience. They blocked village streets with makeshift barricades and their bodies. They held up the pictures of Tito, the Yugoslav leader who had died seven years earlier, to signal their loyalty to the country's ideals. Their fight was against the abuse of state power. The authorities responded by deploying the militia. They used physical force, including stun batons, to disperse the peaceful demonstrations. (...) Faced with citizen anger, the ruling party spewed disinformation to sow doubt about the protesters' character and motives. The party retaliated against village leaders, blocking access to educational or employment opportunities for them and their families. Vevčani villagers defied further efforts to silence them. They pursued a campaign of creative, nonviolent protest to build a coalition of allies across Yugoslavia. They enlisted artists, poets and journalists to their cause. Theater director Vladimir Milčín, for example, published a powerful critique of Macedonian intellectuals' complicity with the regime⁷⁴⁷ and helped Vevčani's amateur theater troupe⁷⁴⁸ reach broader audiences. Slovenian poet Dane Zajc spoke out against government-sponsored violence.⁷⁴⁹ Montenegrin filmmaker Krsto Škanata told Vevčani's story in his award-winning short film *Thank you for Freedom*. (...) By persistently asking party leaders a simple, direct question – who gave the order to use violence? – the villagers confronted authoritarianism. They called out those they judged responsible, listing their names on a mock gravestone in the village square. (...) The solidarity was fully displayed in May 1989. Vevčani's leaders organized a mass march from the village to the central party headquarter in Skopje, over 100 miles away. More than 2,000 people assembled to demand a face-to-face meeting with the party leadership and full inquiry into the infrastructure project. By this time, a number of influ-*

747 "Nemoralno je biti pristojan", an interview with the Zagreb daily *Danas*, 22 September 1987.

748 The *Pokloni se i padni!* (Bow and Fall!) Troupe performed at the Young Open Theatre Festival in the Youth Centre in Skopje.

749 "Skepsa prema moći", an interview with the Zagreb weekly *Danas*, 15 September 1987.

ential, reform-minded journalists and politicians had embraced the villagers' cause. Within a month, following a parliamentary debate and broad media coverage, the government's interior minister and his deputy were forced to resign.

In the spirit of Vevčani's ancient carnival tradition, on 8 August 1990, that is, the third anniversary of police intervention in Vevčani, the municipal dustman swept with the broom the concrete slab covered with corn leaves on which, after the inscription *May God kill you, loathsome renegades*, the names of the republican and municipal officials responsible for police violence were listed: L. Koliševski, J. Lazaroski (CC LCM President), G. Gogovski (President of the Executive Council), A. Andonovski (Republican Secretary for Internal Affairs) and others.

THE MACEDONIAN PARADOX: DISSIDENTS IN THE SECRETARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

On 7 September 1989, the members of the 4th Basic Organization of the LC in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs initiated the proceedings to establish the responsibility of the President of the Executive Council, Gligorie Gogovski, for a difficult social and economic situation, tolerance for law violations in the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, use of privileges and hasty application of force and repressive measures in the Vevčani case, when stun batons were used for the first time. Responsibility was also sought for the lukewarm reaction of the Republican Executive Council to the silence of the Yugoslav press about Reunion of Child Refugees of Aegean Macedonia, which took place in Skopje in July 1988. The Executive Council also did not react to the position of the Yugoslav delegation at the international conferences on human rights in Paris and Geneva in May and June 1989, which failed to raise the question of the Macedonian national minorities in the neighbouring countries (Greece and Bulgaria), or to the initiative of the Assembly of SR Serbia to revise the Law on Colonist Land Allocation in Macedonia and

the Region of Kosovo and Metohija. The reaction only came from the Macedonian Writers' Association.

“For the centres of political power raising some of these ‘hot’ questions by the employees of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs meant public distrust in the supreme principle on which the Macedonian party-police project (whose political metaphor was the cult of Lazar Koliševski) was based. Hence the reaction to such an act was logical – a violent political repression of the *Eight*⁷⁵⁰, which symbolized the revenge of the powerful and also posed a direct threat to anyone who would try to question the infallibility of this concept. Indifference towards the continuation of this practice, in the dawn of the democratic rebirth of society, represents a mortgage and threat to the future”, wrote Aleksandar Dinevski, a State Security Service analyst.⁷⁵¹ On 20 March 1990, the *Eight*, who were held at disposal in the meantime, sent an open letter to the Assembly delegates: “One of the basic dilemmas is whether the disclosed abuses and deviations are of paramount importance, or it is about much more subtle questions: to whom the Security Service belongs, who is pulling the strings in this intricate theatre and, finally, how Lazar Koliševski managed to lead it for decades?” “Shouldn’t we speak openly about rigged political and judicial trials and the perennial purge of the Macedonian intelligentsia, and can we still be indifferent to the tragic fate of the people?”

A BELATED DEBATE ABOUT CULTURE

The leadership of the forgotten Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Macedonia (SAWPM)⁷⁵² convened the Assembly of Cultural

750 Slobodan Bogoevski, Pavle Trajanov, Bedžet Bedžeti, Stanoja Bogeve, Grozdan Cvetkovski, Jovan Čaminski, Aleksandar Dinevski and Mile Ilievski.

751 “10 tezi – Še beše tajna!?” published in the weekly *Mlad borec* in the autumn of 1989. The dailies *Nova Makedonija* and *Večer* rejected to publish the letter.

752 In 1991, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Macedonia was transformed into the Socialist Party of Macedonia.

Workers of SR Macedonia on 5–6 October 1989.⁷⁵³ It was a desperate and belated attempt to freeze time and preserve the system of political control over culture. The Assembly was to grow into a “permanent form of socio-political, cultural and creative action”. It was announced that the national cultural development programme would be adopted at the session to be held in May 1990. Of course, this never happened. The Socialist Party of Macedonia,⁷⁵⁴ founded on 22 September 1990, declared itself a legal successor to the dissolved Socialist Alliance! Here are the excerpts from several speeches.

“This is a great day for Macedonian culture. For the first time, we the creators and cultural workers in all cultural fields gathered to express ourselves on the essential issues and problems we face on a daily basis and to find a roadmap for the future through democratic dialogue at this free forum. A wise man said: ‘My language is my homeland.’ Today we will extend this thought to: ‘Our common homeland is our culture.’ Namely, culture, that is, the common national feeling is something that brings together the scattered Macedonian people, no matter in which, near or far, part of the world they live. (...) If we do not protect our wealth with watchful eyes and brave heart, if they take it from us by surprise and insolently, we will remain empty-handed, deaf, dumb, and blind. We will become orphans in the world and history will be our stepmother. This is why we gathered here, to see each other, to count how many of us there are, to measure our course, as one poet says, and to step forward, as another poet says. We extend a fraternal hand to all cultural workers of Yugoslavia in order to overcome all damn things, all intricate events and all symbols of evil wishing to pull us back, put us in the old shackles, return our national shame and destroy the dignity of human freedom, the greatest achievement of the Yugoslav revolution. We are for

753 In the double issue 7–8/1989 of the journal *Kulturen život*, which was published by today’s non-existent Cultural and Educational Community of Macedonia, there was a supplement containing the presentations.

754 The founder was the eternal federal and republican delegate Ljubisav Ivanov Dzingo, one of the most powerful tycoons in independent Macedonia.

the left march of history!" (Paskal Gilevski,⁷⁵⁵ Secretary of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Macedonia and member of the Macedonian Writers' Association).

"At which level of civilizational, cultural and democratic development are we? How far are we from achieving the class-revolutionary liberation cultural goals so that we can perceive the cultural development paths ahead of us in the best way? What are the most significant trends and the most current questions of cultural development and where are and what are our mutual coordinates of the unique Yugoslav space and our universal communication? What is the relationship between cultural creativity and cultural policy?" (Tome Momirovski, writer, President of the Cultural and Educational Community and one-time Republican Secretary for Culture)

"It cannot be said that during these forty-five years of free life it was not possible to create enough names of the figures of authority in the field of arts and culture. On the contrary, among them there is a large number of powerful people who have become a part of political life, who have distanced themselves from life and people, so that they are not interested in their fate or life tomorrow. They stood out complacently and selfishly, and mixed up the criteria in creative work." (Petar Mazev, painter and professor at the Faculty of Fine Arts)

"It is not enough to say that the existence of Macedonia is historical reality; it should be emphasized that, as an independent national entity, Macedonia is a historical fact whose main protective argument is the existence of its rich cultural past and very productive present, regardless of the current crisis periods. (...) Unfortunately, the lack of a more stable national programme slows down our historical development. However, we will immediately repeat and underline that culture appears here as an innovative and efficient supplement, a special compensation, a replacement for the missed, unfinished, unperceived, undefined. The protean power of culture to play the role of absolute substitution in the

755 President of the Board of the Struga Poetry Evenings at the time of the Vevčani affair.

logic of the national development process is the basic fact. It can sometimes be thought that the Macedonian standpoint, even under the conditions of unhindered national development, was quite often blurred, limited and blocked in some developmental stages. There is no doubt that culture was also disparaged, made meaningless, left without a concept and visions, and discredited. It is not out of place to remind ourselves that in our memory there are still modest data about the powerful individuals who had massacred the culture of SR Macedonia by severely and mercilessly ousting capable cadres, by demagogically advocating the equalization of creative work in the spirit of some distorted Marxism (by declaring the manual worker to be the only creator), by repression against the creators cherishing the national theme, which was carried out by high party and state officials. ...) But today, the denials of Macedonian identity and the Macedonian state and nation are gradually shifting from the outside to the inside. The destruction of Macedonia, its truth and stability (economic, political, cultural) has begun insidiously, perfidiously and cunningly through new fifth columns and Trojan horses. Here, too, culture as the most liberal territory of the spirit should offer the first insights into the method of Macedonian self-protection. It is publicly claimed that SR Macedonia is a bankrupt republic, that the Macedonian nation is an imposed Cominform-Vatican compromise solution, that the Macedonians in Yugoslavia are a parasite and unprofitable nation spoon-fed by the Federation. Other anti-Macedonian centres in Yugoslavia are inventing the hotbeds of Serbophobia in SR Macedonia in order to have the possible pretext for any justified form of aggression and intervention. Some of our Belgradocentrists participate in such nonsense by denying something that is most treasured in our literature – the Aegean theme. And that is how the current problems are unfolding, but we have closed our eyes and ears to the numerous improper threats.” (Gane Todorovski,⁷⁵⁶ writer and professor at the Philological Faculty)

756 President of the Macedonian Writers' Association, President of the Council of the Struga Poetry Evenings and member of the Macedonian Academy of

The author of this text, Vladimir Milčin, was given the floor after the departure of the officials: *“The assembly of cultural workers is held at the time of the culmination of a crisis in our country, which is at the crossroads between the old and the new. The horizon has been dramatically affected by various threats upsetting us because of the dark perspective of having the past come back to us as the future. Our present is grotesque: the answers with which they tried to convince us and almost succeeded – that they are eternal and universal – proved to be delusions. What used to be held back for a long time has now assumed the form of curses, while something that used to be said out loud as a slogan now sounds like nonsense to us. Nevertheless, it seems that this environment still lives by the inertia of the already dead canons. The exceptions, the germs of a new way of thinking and action, only confirm the prevailing orientation that is trying to maintain the unsustainable state of affairs with all its strength. This orientation, dictated by politics, politicians and ideologists, still has its supporters and fans in other social strata, so that there are also among us cultural workers. Those who still hope for culture to be an eternal companion of politics, no matter what pretext they offer, even the one about politics as the first and supreme defender of national identity, make us all accomplices in the marginalization of Macedonia, Macedonians and nationalities living in it. In recent years, this marginalization has made us the spiritual periphery of Yugoslavia. And Europe is only a distant dream, because some consider Europeanization as something evil because it threatens their incompetence. The domination of politics over culture has left deep scars in our consciousness, which has only recently been trying to establish the continuity and unity of national history and culture of all Macedonians, regardless of the state borders. Culture has only partly compensated for the lack of political interest in the fate, feelings and self-awareness of Macedonians outside SR Macedonia. This indifference was dictated by an inferior policy, whose main preoccupation was to instill a sense of satisfaction and happiness in its subjects, because they live in the most perfect of all*

worlds under the leadership of those whose foresight and wisdom abolish the need and obligation for us the subjects to think critically about this small world. Until yesterday, it was very important for us that top cultural events were attended by third-rate officials. Aren't we ashamed to listen to their worn-out and faded speeches before the performance of the world's greatest poets? Wasn't poetry offended by the presence of the municipal thugs in the honorary rows at the Struga Poetry Evenings? We must prove that this forum is free, we need to win that freedom, and that means to acknowledge our own merits and mistakes, and overcome the pathos and melodramatics of the romantic and socialist realistic, which still resonate here in the long-lost stage design made of sea foam and plants. I wonder whether we really recognize the time in which we live?"

THE BIRTH OF THE NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTOR

After a short and belated episode with the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), whose Macedonian branch was founded in October 1989, intellectuals played a leading role in the formation of numerous nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations that brought together citizens of all nationalities. The priorities included the recognition of the European Community and the internal integration of multiethnic and multicultural Macedonia. In November 1992, more than 400 participants in the International Peace Conference, organized by the *Helsinki Citizens' Parliament* and the *Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe*, gathered in Ohrid. One of the conclusions contained the request for the urgent recognition of Macedonia, which was only not supported by the participants from Greece.

BREAKUP

The selector of the 1992 Sterijino Pozorje Festival, Vida Ognjenović, selected the play *Černodrinski se vraća doma* (Chernodrinski Comes Home) by the Goran Stefanovski – Slobodan Unkovski tandem, which is performed by the Skopje Drama Theatre, and the premiere of Biljana Jovanović's play *Centralen zatvor* (Central Prison), directed

by Vladimir Milčin and performed by the Bitola National Theatre. In April 1992, both Macedonian theatres cancelled their participation at the Sterijino Pozorje Festival. The collapsing Yugoslavia became the theatre of war. The theatres from the already independent Macedonia, which was regarded by many as an oasis of peace at that time, could not ignore bloodshed, in the fire set by Milošević. The alliance of sovereign states from the second part of the referendum question was no longer possible.

EPITAPH

An epitaph to something that has disappeared from maps. There are countless chances for slavery, but none for freedom. The outer walls are collapsing, so what? The new, inner, strong walls are springing up deep within ourselves. Illusions attract, while freedom frightens and repels. The eruption of freedom? It was revealed to us as the shortest path from one prison to another. The central prison has walls but not boundaries. Those who will flee after its demolition will sow the seeds of nonfreedom. The victim's dream to be an executioner.⁷⁵⁷

757 From Biljana Jovanović's play *Central Prison*.

Marko Zajc

SLOVENIAN CRITICAL INTELLECTUALS AND THE YUGOSLAV PUBLIC

ACTORS

There is no doubt that Dimitrij Rupel and Tomaž Mastnak ranked among the most prominent critical intellectuals in Slovenia (and Yugoslavia) in the 1980s. It is also well known that they came from different intellectual backgrounds, had different drives and motives, as well as different roles in civil society, within the political alternative of “post-Tito” Yugoslavia and Slovenia. But despite all that, they often came together – both in an intellectual and spatial sense. The closer the ninth decade of the 20th century was nearing its end, the more they were appearing at the same forums and in the same publications. That proximity was certainly not pleasant, so it is not strange that it did not last long. Between late spring and autumn in 1986, they had something interesting in common: due to speaking openly in public, they both found themselves under the microscope of the media public and the authorities in Slovenia and Yugoslavia.

Although the age difference between Dimitrij Rupel and Tomaž Mastnak was not big, they belonged not only to different intellectual currents, but also to different generations of intellectuals. In 1986, Dimitrij Rupel (b. 7 April 1946) was 40 years old, while Tomaž Mastnak (b. 25 October 1953) had yet to turn 30. Rupel was old enough to participate in the intellectual turmoil during the second half of the 1960s. In 1964, he enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy in Ljubljana where he studied comparative literature and sociology. In 1966, he studied in the United Kingdom. Upon his return to Ljubljana, he took up the position of the editor of *Tribuna*. He was also its editor in the autumn of 1968, when the partisan generation of cultural workers

(Josip Vidmar, Matej Bor, Tone Svetina and others) protested against its writing, including a public appeal titled “Democracy – yes, disintegration – no”. The reason for the reaction of cultural luminaries was the publishing of Ivo Svetina’s poem *Slovenačka apokalipsa* (Slovenian Apocalypse), a dark, parodic critique of partisanship, and Vojin Kovač’s *Manifest kulturne revolucije* (Manifesto of the Cultural Revolution), a critique of the respectable cultural elite.⁷⁵⁸ Rupel graduated from university in 1970 and enrolled in postgraduate studies (sociology of knowledge) in Boston in 1971. In 1972, he was conscripted for compulsory military service. Due to his pro-American views, he was expelled from the League of Communists. In 1976, he earned a doctoral degree with the thesis *Slovenačka beletristika kao oruđe nacionalne emancipacije* (Slovenian Fiction as a Tool of National Emancipation). In 1980, he became assistant professor at the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism (FSPNN). At the same time, he took part in the founding of *Nova revija* (1982),⁷⁵⁹ which was closely monitored by the State Security Service.⁷⁶⁰

Tomaž Mastnak studied at the FSPNN and graduated in 1977. As a student he contributed to *Tribuna* and *Časopis za kritiku nauke*.⁷⁶¹ His journalistic activity brought him very early into conflict with the authorities. He was denounced for the first time for “spreading fake news” in 1975. In the same year he was sentenced to 20 days in prison on probation for “inciting religious intolerance” in an article published in *Tribuna*⁷⁶². From 1977 to 1982 he was an editor in charge of

758 Vojin Kovač Chubby, “Manifest kulturne revolucije”, *Tribuna*, 23 October 1968, No. 2, 2; Ivo Svetina “Slovenska apokalipsa”, *Tribuna*, 23 October 1968, No. 2, 10.

759 Dimitrij Rupel (b. 7 April 1946), *slovenska pomlad*. si:<http://www.slovenska-pomlad.si/?id=168&highlight=rupel>, accessed on 15 August 2020.

760 Ana Šela, Darko Friš, “Nova revija v primežu Službe državne varnosti”, *Annales* 27 (2017), No. 4, pp. 823–836.

761 Tomaž Mastnak (b. 25 October 1953): *slovenska pomlad* si. <http://slovenska-pomlad.si/?id=128&highlight=mastnak>, accessed on 15 August 2020.

762 “Karakteristike novih družbenih gibanj u Sloveniji” (Analiza SDB, 1986), in: *Viri o demokratizaciji in osamosvajanju Slovenije* (I deo: opozicija i vlast), ed. Božo

Marxist and social literature at Cankarjeva založba; from 1982 until the mid-1980s he worked at the Marxist Centre of the League of Communists of Slovenia and thereafter at the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (NIC SANU). In 1981, he earned his master's degree with the thesis titled *Problems of Marxist Analysis and the Interpretation of Stalinism*. The book *Ka kritici staljinizma* (Towards a Critique of Stalinism), written by Mastnak on the basis of his master degree's thesis, was published by the Krt Foundation on the occasion of the 11th Congress of the Socialist Youth Alliance of Slovenia (ZSMS) in Novo Mesto in October 1982. Mastnak could be defined as a "theorist and practitioner of social movements, one of the driving forces behind a peace movement, as well as a member of several international associations".⁷⁶³

While Dimitrij Rupel was very early labelled as belonging to the "bourgeois right" by the authorities due to his close proximity to the Western models, Tomaž Mastnak earned the status of a critical intellectual through leftist currents. The Marxist criticism of Stalinism (in the atmosphere surrounding the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, 1980–1981) acquainted him with West European revisionist Marxism,⁷⁶⁴ which evolved, by the mid-1980s, into a post-Marxist idealization of civil society as an alternative to Yugoslav socialism (according to Mastnak: local forms of Stalinism). By the mid-1980s, in addition to his writing activity, Dimitrij Rupel also established himself in the Yugoslav public as one of the most recognizable debaters on the national question. For example, at the well-known public forum of the Slovenian Writers' Association titled "Slovenian Nation and Slovenian Culture", which was held on 9 and 10 January 1985, he present-

Repe (Ljubljana, 2002), 95.

763 Tomaž Mastnak (b. 25 October 1953), *slovenska pomlad.si*.<http://www.slovenska-pomlad.si/2?id-mastnak>, accessed on 15 August 2020.

764 Balazs Trencseny, Michal Kopeček, Luka Lisjak, Maria Falina, Monika Baar and Maciej Janowski, *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe: Volume II Negotiating Modernity in the 'Short Twentieth Century' and Beyond*, Part I: 1918–1968 (Oxford, 2018), 371.

ed a paper of the same name.⁷⁶⁵ In November 1985, he participated in the work of the 13th Plenum of Cultural Workers of the Liberation Front in Nova Gorica, where the common Slovenian cultural space was discussed.⁷⁶⁶ Like other members of *Nova revija*, Rupel viewed the Slovenian national question in terms of long historical duration. As early as 1976, he formulated a thesis on the “Slovenian cultural syndrome”. In the past, due to the absence of a social division of labor and social superstructure, Slovenian literature had a number of non-literary, that is, non-artistic functions. Rupel pointed out that, due to such an important function, literature secured a privileged status⁷⁶⁷ During the 1980s, Rupel problematized the issue of conversion as the main instrument of Slovenian national liberation in the past. Conversion occurred at the very beginning of the existence of the Slovenian people (the adoption of Christianity by Caranthian Slovenes). Rupel saw the last conversion as the “conversion into (militant) atheism”. In view of the fact that the then Socialist Republic of Slovenia came the closest to the ideal of the Slovenian state, Rupel concluded that none of the conversions the Slovenes had gone through had caused them to regress. In fact, they enabled them to survive and thrive. The principle of conversion also enabled the formation of a special adjustment and sublimation mentality as well as rationality and openness.⁷⁶⁸ Bearing in mind his publicist activity at that time, we can define his views on the nation as perennial. In his work, Rupel refers to the Slovenian nation as a relatively homogeneous entity that has developed and transformed itself throughout history.

765 Dimitrij Rupel, “Slovenski narod in slovenska kultura”, in: *Slovenski narod in slovenska kultura*, ed. Tone Partljič (Ljubljana, 1985), 16–30.

766 Dimitrij Rupel, “Prispevek za 13. plenum kulturnih delavcev OF o enotnem slovenskom kulturnem prostoru”, in: *Skupni slovenski kulturni prostor*, ed. Lojze Gostiša (Nova Gorica, 1985), 103–114.

767 Dimitrij Rupel, *Besede in dejanja: od moderne do postmodernizma* (Koper, 1981), 210.

768 Dimitrij Rupel, *Besede božje in božanske*, (Ljubljana, 1987), 105.

During the same period, Tomaž Mastnak established himself as an international peace activist. Since 1984, he has cooperated with the European Network for East-West Dialogue. Mastnak has devoted great attention to the issue of civil society in Yugoslav socialism. As he wrote in his paper presented in London in 1986, to speak about civil society in socialism means to speak about the formation of civil society in socialism and not about a socialist civil society. In his opinion, the formation of civil society in socialism is possible only within the scope of opposition activity, because it constitutes an autonomously organized civil society vis-à-vis the state. Mastnak understood the term “opposition” in a social, not a political sense. The main characteristic of such an understanding of civil society is its diversity. Civil society is “plural and diversified; at the same time, it is partial, fragmented, fragile, punctual and episodic, limited and direct. It is neither general nor a general project, and it cannot be spoken about in general”.⁷⁶⁹ Mastnak primarily targeted the part of civil society which found its way into the existing political system between 1982 and 1986 within the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (ZSMS), under the label of new social movements (NDGs) – youth subculture, peace activists, feminists, gay activists, environmentalists, new spirituality seekers and the like.⁷⁷⁰ In the mid-1980s, the term “civil society” obtained the right to be used in the media and in political discourse. Later (1992), Mastnak concluded that Slovenian communists tried to indigenize the notion of civil society, rejecting only what could not fit into the ideology of socialist self-management, while the federal League of Communists resolutely dismissed the idea of civil society as a compromise between bourgeois restoration forces and statist-bureaucratic forces. In 1992, among civil society supporters, Mastnak differentiated between advocates of political civil society and advocates of non-

769 Tomaž Mastnak, “Perspektive demokracije v Jugoslaviji”, *Problemi* 24 (1986), No. 262, 41–43.

770 Blaž Vurnik, *Med Marxom in punkom, vloga Zveze socialistične mladine pri demokratizaciji Slovenije 1980–1990*, (Ljubljana, 2005), 259.

political civil society. As can be seen from the above statement, he himself belonged to the second group. According to Mastnak, claims that NDGs were non-political did not signify the negation of politics. NDGs were not non-political because politics is something bad, but because they were NDGs and politics was something else. In the meantime, the proponents of politicality understood civil society to be a new political paradigm (for example, Frane Adam). The third group of civil society advocates included those who saw civil society as part of the Slovenian national programme. Mastnak identified Dimitrij Rupel as its first advocate and cited the interview with Dimitrij Rupel and Niko Grafenauer in *Teleks* magazine (10 June 1986).⁷⁷¹ In that interview, Rupel emphasized the importance of *Nova revija* as the “space in between”, which does not seek to be an apology or opposition, because it is a “prerequisite for the constitution of the Slovenian nation as a civil society in the long run”.⁷⁷² Civil society would be considered as a normative category, a goal to be achieved, thus enabling Slovenes to live a normal life.⁷⁷³

THE MASTNAK CASE

The year 1986 was marked by the elections and regular congresses of socio-political organizations (the League of Communists, Socialist Youth Alliance, trade unions), at both the republican and federal levels.⁷⁷⁴ In January, in *Mladina* weekly, which already enjoyed status as a critical thinking magazine, Miha Kovač clearly explained the role of the spring elections in self-managing socialism, based on the delegate system: “... we will elect those, who will elect those, who will elect those, who will elect those, who will then make decisions in

771 Tomaž Mastnak, *Vzhodno od raja. Civilna družba pod komunizmom in po njem* (Ljubljana, 1992), 63.

772 Janko Lorenci, “Nova revija: nočemo biti ne opozicija ne apologija”, *Teleks*, 10 July 1986, No. 28, 24.

773 Tomaž Mastnak, *Vzhodno od raja*, p. 63.

774 Veljko Rus, “Družba slabi, družba oživlja”, *Teleks*, 1 January 1987, No. 1, 6.

Belgrade...” Kovač concludes that the possibility for a self-managed voter to be “deceived” is four times greater than for his capitalist colleague.⁷⁷⁵ Also in January, the newspaper *Delo* announced that the Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SSRN) would support the initiative of the SFRY Presidency to propose Branko Mikulić as a candidate for President of the Federal Executive Council (SIV).⁷⁷⁶ *Delo* wrote that the citizenry – i.e. working people – would decide on the future head of the SIV: “They will have the opportunity to get thoroughly acquainted with the results of his work so far and express their opinions.” Up until that time, citizens were not accustomed to discussing the qualifications of candidates in Yugoslavia, thus, the introduction of such a practice was supposed to be a step towards the democratization of cadres policy.⁷⁷⁷ The citizen Tomaž Mastnak took the government’s call for a public debate seriously. He wrote *A Step Closer to Democratization* for Radio Študent and *Mladina*. Mastnak’s opinion about the candidate for the highest executive function was not rosy:

“We can especially emphasize Mikulić’s contribution to repression, which manifests itself as the repression of intellectuals. It is not just about trials but, rather primarily, about the shameful sentencing of Šešelj to eight years in prison, then the sentencing of Tuzla sociologist Soklić to five years in prison, then the trial of so-called Islamic fundamentalists, which sparked a wave of protests, anxiety and resentment. It is also about the banning of books and, in particular, the flight of intellectuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina into exile, primarily to Serbia.”⁷⁷⁸

Mastnak’s text was read on Radio Študent on 14 January, while *Mladina* was supposed to publish it on 17 January. Due to pressure

775 Miha Kovač, “Volitve na sončni strani Alp”, *Mladina*, 17 January 1986, No. 2. 15.

776 “Branko Mikulić kandidat za predsednika zveznega izvršnega sveta”, *Delo*, 7 January 1986, No. 4. 1.

777 Branko Podobnik, “Mandat na rešetju”, *Delo*, 8 January 1986, No. 5. 4.

778 Bojan Plešec, “Privilegirani in preganjani”, *Teleks*, 17 January 1986, No. 29. 13.

from political forums, the editorial board withdrew it (together with two other texts). Due to the sudden withdrawal of this text, it was impossible to finish the magazine on time, so that the second issue of *Mladina*, dated 17 January 1986, came out on 24 January 1986, and the third issue was not published at all.⁷⁷⁹

As newspapers later reported, in late January 1986, the Ljubljana Public Prosecutor's Office issued a proposed indictment against Mastnak in accordance with Article 112 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. Mastnak was accused of "defamation of the highest representative of another republic". The court hearing was scheduled for 13 June but, due to the busy schedule of Mastnak's lawyer, had to be adjourned until 10 July.⁷⁸⁰ During June and July 1986, the impending court hearing provoked critical reactions. The debate on the trial of Tomaž Mastnak flared up in the Slovenian public discourse at the same time the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was taking place (25–28 June 1986). Demands for the withdrawal of the indictment against Mastnak were made by researchers from the ZRC SAZU Institute for Marxist Studies, the Board of the Slovenian Philosophical Society, members of the joint Executive Board of ŠKUC FORUM, the editorial board of *Problemi* magazine, members of the League of Communists in Radio Študent, as well as members of the independent peace movement gathered at a peace plenum in Ljubljana.⁷⁸¹

On 10 July 1986, the courtroom of the Ljubljana Basic Court was filled to capacity.⁷⁸² Tomaž Mastnak was well prepared for his defense. In October 1986, the full text of his defense was published by *Katedra* student magazine from Maribor. Mastnak argued that one count in the proposed indictment was not correct. It alleged that in the

779 Uroš Mahkovec, "Uvodnik", *Mladina*, 17 January 1986, No. 2, 1.

780 "Preloženo sojenje obtoženemu avtorju", *Delo*, 14 June 1986, 5.

781 *Katedra*, June 1986, No. 5/6, 1.

782 "Neznatna družbena nevarnost, Tožilec umaknil obtožni predlog", *Delo*, 10 July 1986, No. 159, 9.

incriminating paragraph he mentioned Branko Mikulić in connection with his function as President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time the text was published Branko Mikulić was not the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the Criminal Code does not stipulate that former representatives of the highest republican and provincial bodies are entitled to protection under Article 112. The eloquent theorist Mastnak afforded himself a subtle criticism of the authorities. He argued that his text was not a polemic against Mikulić, but rather a polemic attacking the merits of the proposal for Mikulić's candidacy for President of the Federal Executive Council. The incriminating text does not mention Mikulić as a person, nor as the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina: "*In my text, Mikulić appears only as a literary character who was invented by others* (underlined by T. M.)." The defendant specified that all the facts in his text had already been publicized by the Yugoslav media. According to Mastnak, the only term in the disputed text which could fall under Article 112 was "repression". In his opinion, "repression" could in no way be an embarrassing qualification. In a lexical sense, there is no Slovenian dictionary in which the term "repression" is associated with insults or defamation. In addition, the term "repression" has no negative connotation in the political culture of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mastnak continued. On the contrary, repressive measures are presented as having political value. In his numerous public appearances, Mikulić advocated the use of repression, admitted that it was used in Bosnia and Herzegovina and promised that it would also be used in the future.⁷⁸³

The Public Prosecutor insisted that the defendant's act had all the formal characteristics of a criminal offense. However, given the new circumstances, the danger to society of Mastnak's words should be reassessed. "Taking into account all the accumulated problems in our society, which are much more important than this hearing, as well as the critical assessments accompanying these problems, the

783 Tomaž Mastnak, "Zagovor obtoženega", *Katedra*, October 1986, No. 1, 10.

defendant's offensive criticism appears to be less important." Thus, the Public Prosecutor applied the judicial concept of "insignificant social damage" and withdrew the proposed indictment. According to a *Delo* journalist, the hearing ended with a storm of applause.⁷⁸⁴ Media commentators were intrigued by the trial's unusual outcome. *Mladina* journalist Darko Štrajn asked why Mastnak was summoned to a hearing where he read his response to the proposed indictment and then heard the State opine that he was actually not dangerous. It is true that the State's behavior at the trial demonstrated signs of reason, but at the same time the Public Prosecutor's words can be interpreted as a symptom of the fact that the State does not recognize intellectuals as equals in public debates. Štrajn was convinced that something like that could not happen in developed democracies.⁷⁸⁵ Why did the trial finish in such an unusual way? The question was answered by the defendant himself in *Mladina*. On 20 August, Belgrade's magazine *Svet* wrote that the Slovenian Public Prosecutor received a letter from the chief of staff to the President of the Federal Executive Council allegedly containing Branko Mikulić's opinion. According to Mikulić, the trial of Mastnak under Article 112 of the Criminal Code of Slovenia, should not have been conducted. A Belgrade journalist asked the Ljubljana Public Prosecutor who initiated the proceedings against Mastnak whether he respected Mikulić's opinion. The prosecutor confirmed that he had stopped the proceedings against Mastnak at the SIV President's request. He conceded to this journalist that in future cases involving defamation of a high-ranking official he would first contact the injured party to learn whether he wanted the perpetrator to be prosecuted. If the injured official were against it, the proceedings would not be initiated. Was Tomaž Mastnak grateful to the SIV President? Not at all. He was indignant. The SIV President

784 "Neznatna družbena nevarnost. Tožilec umaknil obtožni predlog", *Delo*, 10 August 1986, No. 159, 9.

785 Darko Štrajn, "Ali je predstava indikator demokracije?", *Mladina*, August 1986, No 25/26, 18.

interfered in the judicial proceedings; his gesture was by no means democratic. "I would feel safe if I could count on legality rather than on the benevolence of government officials", Mastnak explained. "I would not feel any better by having to be afraid that a certain government official was in a bad mood at a crucial moment."⁷⁸⁶

THE RUPEL CASE

During 1985–1986, Yugoslav policy makers were becoming increasingly concerned about the Kosovo problem⁷⁸⁷ which, in Nick Miller's opinion, became the Serbian national obsession during 1985. After the "Martinović case" exploded in May, the Serbian press began paying increasingly greater attention to events in Kosovo. There followed reports of abductions, rape, killings and pressure by Albanians aiming to expel the Serbian population from Kosovo. Serbian "nonconformist" writers and intellectuals took an active part in the debates on "genocide against Serbs".⁷⁸⁸ In January 1986, "almost all Serbian critical intellectuals" wrote a petition asking for protection for Serbs in Kosovo. As Nick Miller concluded, two Serbian intellectual opposition currents were poured into this petition: the legalistic and rational current based on freedom of expression, and the mythomaniac current committed to the defense of Serbs in Kosovo.⁷⁸⁹ On 26 February 1986, while the Federal Assembly was debating problems related to the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, the representatives of Kosovo Serbs stormed the Assembly demanding the declaration of a

786 Tomaž Mastnak, "Korak naprej k demokratizaciji", *Mladina*, 5 September 1986, No. 27, 14.

787 Jurij Hadalin, "Odnos varnostno-obveščevalnih služb do albanske manjšine v Jugoslaviji po izbruhu demonstracija na Kosovu leta 1981", *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*, 51 (2011), No. 1, 323–328.

788 Jasna Dragović Soso, *Saviours of the Nation, Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism* (Montreal & Kingston, 2002), 115.

789 Nick Miller, *The Nonconformists: Culture, politics and nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circle, 1944–1991* (Budapest – New York, 2007), 267.

state of emergency and the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy.⁷⁹⁰ Serbs organized a meeting in Priština on 20 June,⁷⁹¹ while Yugoslav communists discussed the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins at the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Congress passed a special resolution on Kosovo in which it expressed concern over the exodus of Serbs and attributed the bulk of responsibility for the problem to the majority Albanian population, although members of other nations were responsible as well.⁷⁹²

At a time when tensions over Kosovo were rising, the Belgrade magazine *Duga* published an interview with the Slovenian writer and professor Dimitrij Rupel under the sensationalist title "Who Makes Serbs and Slovenes Quarrel". In a five-page interview, the journalist Zdenka Aćin and Dimitrij Rupel raised several burning issues such as the Slovenian cultural syndrome, Slovenia's problematic position, Slovenia's attitude towards "Bosnians"⁷⁹³ and freedom of speech. Rupel expressed his disagreement with the opinion of Serbian intellectual Ljubomir Tadić, who defined Yugoslavia as a confederate creation, dominated by national bureaucracies and republican etatisms. Rupel showed a some understanding for Tadić's sensitivity towards Kosovo however, a Slovene reading it would understand it as an attack on Slovenian statehood. In addition, Slovenes look at the Kosovo problem differently than Belgrade. In Rupel's opinion, the fact that legality in Kosovo was in crisis was not a problem of (inter-)ethnic relations, but of the rule of law. In general, it seemed to Rupel that the authorities were too sensitive towards Albanian nationalism. On the eve of the First World War, Ivan Cankar was sentenced to one week in prison

790 "Sami se moramo potruditi za ponovno zaupanje na Kosovu", *Delo*, 27 February 1986, No. 48, 5.

791 "Sporočilo PK ZK Kosova", *Delo*, 21 June 1986, No. 144, 1.

792 "Premagovanje predsodkov in nacionalističnih strast", *Delo*, 30 June 1986, No. 151, 6.

793 A popular pejorative term for immigrants in Slovenia from other Yugoslav republics.

for his statement about Austria and shit, while young Albanians were given long prison sentences.⁷⁹⁴ He simply admitted:

“Young men shouting ‘Kosovo – republic’ don’t excite me. What do I care if a boy out there shouts such slogans? And what about someone who sings it in a pub? Why should the state be concerned about that? In this respect, sensitivity in our country is very high, so that in this way we only rekindle a fire and cause a crisis situation which we will find increasingly difficult to handle. In my opinion, Serbs must reach an agreement with Albanians on how to live in the state and the common republic...”⁷⁹⁵

One did not need to wait long for the reaction of the Serbian intellectual and general public. Ljubomir Tadić’s answer (in a decent tone) was published in the next issue of *Duga*.⁷⁹⁶ He repeated the thesis which, in his own words, he had been repeating for nineteen years: instead of democracy in Yugoslavia, there is “natiocracy”, that is, the rule of eight national oligarchies. Since nation and nation state are the alpha and omega of every politics, socialism and democracy are just labels. According to Tadić, Rupel argues that the only prospects for Yugoslavia lie in confederation, while he (Tadić) pleads for federation. In Tadić’s opinion, the confederation was already created by the 1974 Constitution. It is a retrograde process. The whole world knows

794 Zdenka Aćin, “Ko svada Slovence i Srbe”, *Duga*, 28 June 1986, No. 332, 39.

795 Igor Tratnik, “Kdo neti prepri med Slovenci in Srbi?”, *Teleks*, 13 August 1986, No. 33. 14.

796 Ljubomir Tadić (1925–2013), philosopher, born in Montenegro, participant in the partisan struggle, professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade from 1963 to 1975, sympathizer of the 1968 student movement, *Praxis* member, considered a dissident since 1975, associate of the Centre for Philosophy and Social Theory within the Institute for Social Sciences in Belgrade since 1981, one of the founders of the Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression in 1984, cofounder of the renewed Democratic Party in 1989 (he was the father of Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, 2004–2012). See: Ljubomir Tadić, *COURAGE, Collecting Collection*, <http://cultural-opposition.eu/registry/?uri=http://courage.btk.mta.hu/courage/individual/n7961&type=collections>, accessed on 23 September 2020.

about the evolution from confederation to federation; only in Yugoslavia a reverse process is underway (antidemocratic centralization). The Kosovo problem is a manifestation of the crisis of Yugoslav society, which has a direct causal link to the creation of the “Yugoslav confederation” and the constitutional status of the Serbian provinces. Tadić has nothing against the Slovenian nation’s commitment for or against Yugoslavia, but warns that the political solutions imposed on the Serbian nation (and not only them) with the “confederalization” of the state have put them in an unequal position vis-à-vis other Yugoslav nations. As Tadić emphasizes, his stance is based on an elementary sense of justice and not a narrow national sentiment. He himself has always condemned the repressive measures against young Albanians. Those who intend to separate Kosovo from Serbia and have pushed the masses of young Albanians into revolt are still, in Tadić’s opinion, “protected as rare wild beasts”.⁷⁹⁷

The interview with Rupel and Tadić’s response triggered an avalanche of reactions. Jasna Dragović Soso, a renowned researcher specializing in Serbian critical intellectuals, has defined the ensuing debate as “one of the biggest debates in the Yugoslav press after the Second World War”. In her opinion, after the debate, Rupel and Tadić “officially gained the status of nationalists”.⁷⁹⁸ In the next issue, *Duga* published nine direct reactions to Rupel’s interview as well as a *feuilleton* about the 1945 military administration in Kosovo, which was also prompted by Rupel’s interview.⁷⁹⁹ *Duga*’s editorial board admitted that it expected a stormy public reaction. Nevertheless, despite not agreeing with many of Rupel’s views, the board never hesitated as to whether to publish the interview. Just as it would be foolish to claim that the Slovenes shared Rupel’s views, it would be naive to think that his views were unfounded. According to the *Duga* editorial board, Rupel answered bravely and honestly. It emphasized that,

797 Ljubomir Tadić, “Svađaju nas plotovi”, *Duga*, 12 July 1986, No. 324, pp. 67–70.

798 Jasna Dragović Soso, *Saviours of the Nation*, 151.

799 Savo Drljević, “Poziv na pobunu”, *Duga*, 26 June 1986, No. 324, 67–70.

if we really wanted to know each other better, we should not be deaf to different views.⁸⁰⁰ Among the reactions published in *Duga* we also come upon Matevž Krivic's reaction. In his opinion, fueling the conflict between Slovenes and Serbs works for both the Slovenian politicians who stubbornly defend the *status quo* in Yugoslavia and resist democratization and for some Serbs who ridicule Slovenian writers as nationalists.⁸⁰¹

Rupel himself was surprised by the reactions. In his later interview (1989) with *Start* magazine, he admitted that, after his interview with *Duga*, he was not invited to any meeting of cultural workers in Belgrade. He received more than 50 threatening letters as well as threatening phone calls. "There were also some disgusting things: I received a press clipping with my picture, smeared – you can imagine with what..."⁸⁰² In response to these brisk reactions, he wrote a text, which was published by *Duga* on 8 August 1986. Rupel now prepared himself much better, examining both the historical and sociological perspective. He admitted that he was a stubborn person and did not speak on anyone's behalf except his own, and that he primarily did not want to provoke or insult anyone. It seemed strange to him that among those assuring him that he did not understand Kosovo there were no Albanians – only Serbs. In his interview he primarily tried to present the problem of political and epistemological arrogance, thus he spoke about intellectuals and understanding (according to Max Weber's "Verstehen" theory). Arrogance is not only a characteristic of great nations: Serbs treat Albanians as second-class citizens; an Albanian persecutes his Serbian or Montenegrin neighbor; a Slovene is superior to a "Bosnian". In this case, all Yugoslav nations resemble the British in India. Rupel was convinced that the difficulties at the majority-minority level (where Albanians and Slovenes are occasion-

800 Editorial Board "Popevka na fruli", *Duga*, 26 July 1986, No. 324, 36.

801 Igor Tratnik, "Kdo neti prepri med Slovenci i Srbi?", *Teleks*, 13 August 1986, No. 33, 15.

802 Zoran Petrović Piroćanac, "Dimitrij Rupel", *Interview Start*, 1989, No. 1, 27.

ally either a minority or a majority) should be resolved with a great deal of sensitivity and caution. According to him, the fact that we live in the same country should ensure an amicable and legalistic settlement of disputes. Violence, be it in Kosovo, Slovenia or Belgrade, is the same criminal act. Rupel is afraid that the rule of law will not be affirmed as long as the courts are under political control, enterprises are not independent economic entities and the nations have no full control over their destiny.⁸⁰³

When Rupel spoke about the Albanian youth shouting national romantic slogans, he was primarily thinking about the short-sightedness of verbal delict; in a country where one is punished for a few simple-minded words democracy is at a minimum. According to Rupel, he was using the interview to point out that the principle of the guilt or innocence of an entire people was not acceptable. Rupel was aware of the complexity of the situation in the federal Yugoslav state. What should be done when some controversial phenomena in one republic imposes a burden on the entire country? The logical answer would be to use some supra-republic mechanism to mediate in such a case. In the Yugoslav case, the federal institutions are originally republican (under the influence of Yugoslav federal units – republics), while the really impartial instances have yet to be established. Supra-republic mediation usually turns into arbitration by one republic (or more of them) in the dispute of another republic.⁸⁰⁴

The polemic continued in the Slovenian weekly *Teleks*. *Teleks* was founded by Delo Publishing House in 1977. As early as the late 1970s *Teleks* attracted columnists and external associates with diverse agendas. Its contributors were both official communist intellectuals and members of the intellectual opposition. The editorial board organized public debates on burning social issues with a variety of participants on several occasions. One of the first *Teleks* editors, Jure Apih,

803 Dimitrij Rupel, "Identitet nije žeton u igri", *Duga*, 9 August 1986, No. 325, 36.

804 Ibid.

defined the magazine as a medium through which society communicated with itself.⁸⁰⁵

With Rupel's answer, the polemic began in earnest. The Slovenian weekly *Teleks* compared *Duga's* editorial choice with the summer silly season. With the onset of heat, strong spices are the best for the beach. The question "Who is fueling the quarrel between Serbs and Slovenes?" left no dilemma about the existence of a quarrel; the only question was who was fueling it.⁸⁰⁶ The polemic between Tadić and Rupel also led to a polemic between the Belgrade magazine *Duga* and Zagreb's weekly *Danas*. *Danas*, which was published by *Vjesnik* Media House also highlighted the sensationalist character of the interview. It paid special attention to Rupel and Tadić's understanding of the Yugoslav federation. Commentator Gojko Marinković primarily directed his critical words at Tadić's theses. It is true that Serbia differs from other republics due to its two provinces, but it is the only republic that has three votes in the federation. Tadić argues that he starts from class foundations. Would anything really change in Yugoslavia in a class sense if the provinces no longer had their votes in the federation? Under the Constitution, Yugoslavia was not only a community of equal nations, but was also a community of associated labor.⁸⁰⁷ Serbia's demands to be equal with other republics are abso-

805 Interview – Jure Apih, <http://www.apih.si/intervju-jure-apih-casnikar/>.

806 Igor Tratnik, "Kdo neti prepri med Slovenci in Srbi", *Teleks*, 13 August 1986, No. 33, 15.

807 After a split with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia had by the 1960s come to place greater reliance on market mechanisms. A distinctive feature of this new "Yugoslav system" was "workers' self-management," which reached its fullest form in the 1976 Law on Associated Labour. Under this law, individuals participated in Yugoslav enterprise management through the work organizations into which they were divided. Work organizations might be either "Basic Organizations of Associated Labour" (the subdivisions of a single enterprise) or "Complex Organizations of Associated Labour" uniting different segments of an overall activity (e.g., manufacture and distribution). Each work organization was governed by a workers' council, which elected a board of management to run the enterprise. Managers were nominally the servants of the workers'

lutely legitimate. However, some forget that in such a case nothing relevant would change – only that three oligarchies would be replaced by one. In Marinković’s opinion, it is hypocritical, to put it mildly, to consider oneself a Marxist but use the language of pragmatism. It is hypocritical to advocate for the development of self-management but in reality demand a strong state. Likewise, it is hypocritical to criticize the bureaucracy for subordinating class issues to national ones and then stick to the national paradigm. Who exactly is fueling a dispute between Serbs and Slovenes? Nobody, Marinković answered. Rupel is a Slovene. Tadić is a Serb. “It can’t be that they are the Serbian and Slovenian nation”.⁸⁰⁸

Ljubomir Tadić appeared again in *Duga* and, in essence, repeated his theses on the “antidemocratic decentralization” of Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution and the limited sovereignty of Serbia.⁸⁰⁹ The editor-in-chief of *Duga*, Grujica Spasović, commented on how the polemic was covered by other media. *Nedeljna Borba*, Ljubljana’s *Dnevnik*, Belgrade 202, *Teleks*, *Nedeljna Dalmacija*, *Politika* and TV Belgrade reported about it correctly. Two media players did not. In *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, journalist Viktor Meier⁸¹⁰ wrote “nonsense” about Slovenes who no longer like newcomers from other republics, except Albanians who make good ice cream. Spasović also accused *Danas* commentator Gojko Marinković of showing sym-

councils, although in practice their training and access to information and other resources gave them a significant advantage over ordinary workers. Britannica.com, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003#ref759937>, accessed on 15 November 2021.

808 Gojko Marinković, “Tko se spotiče o federaciju?”, *Danas*, 19 August 1986, No. 325, 20.

809 Ljubomir Tadić, “Nemam nikakve štake”, *Duga*, 6 September 1986, No. 327, 36.

810 Viktor Meier (1929–2014), Swiss journalist and correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* daily for SFR Yugoslavia who, in 1995 (in 1999, in English), published one of the best known books on the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1995 (in English in 1999). Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia, A History of Its Demise* (London, 1999).

pathy for Rupel's views, attributing some statements to Tadić which he did not make, confining the polemic to the disagreement of some Serbs with Rupel. Marinković also insinuated that *Duga* wanted to divide Slovenes and Serbs when, in fact, *Duga* did something quite opposite. It published 21 letters on this topic from citizens from all the republics and provinces.⁸¹¹ Naturally, Gojko Marinković dismissed the accusations of his Belgrade colleague. He complained that he had been unable to polemicize with *Duga* magazine for a long time, because it was "always right". He claimed to have distanced himself from Rupel and Tadić's recipes for the future of Yugoslavia. It was a question of two individuals having diametrically opposite views representing two poles: a vision of a unitary and monolithic Yugoslavia as opposed to a vision of a fragile and confederate Yugoslavia.⁸¹²

CONCLUSION

The first conclusion we can draw from the analysis of both cases is that the "Rupel case" had a much greater impact on the Yugoslav public than the trial of Mastnak. Does this mean that nationalism and federation were "hotter" topics than the issues of civil society and freedom of speech? The Yugoslav context is of paramount importance for both cases. The cases are influenced by the Yugoslav context, each in its own way. The Mastnak case involved legal and democratic legitimacy, while the Rupel case dealt with the national question within the Yugoslav state.

The "Rupel case" was only possible due to the existence of the all-Yugoslav public, while the Mastnak affair (and its end) could only have been possible during the late system of the Yugoslav federation. This raises the question of delineating the Slovenian and Yugoslav public – can we speak about a unified public, or about the Slovenian public and Yugoslav public as some kind of extension? Can we separate both publics? And conversely, can we present the Slovenian

811 Grujica Spasović, "Neko je, ipak, slep", *Duga*, 6 September 1986, No. 327, 39.

812 Gojko Marinković, "Polemika nije uzaludna", *Danas*, 9 September 1986, No. 238, 44.

public without the Yugoslav one? The focus of the public is also relevant. Slovenian magazines were thematically focused on Slovenia (their content was also Slovenian), while Yugoslav topics were treated either from the Slovenian viewpoint, or as a zone in the interspace between domestic and foreign policy. Magazines like *Danas* and *Duga* were published as Yugoslav newspapers for the Yugoslav media market, although they were also determined by the republican environment in which they appeared. The Yugoslav public was not structurally unified and clearly delineated by the republics and provinces, thus having different attitudes towards the symbolic center. The problem of nationalism, that is, the national question, can be singled out as crucial. At that moment, all those involved in the polemic shook off nationalist labels, although the interpretation of the national question was in the focus of their agenda. As for the polemic arising from Rupel's interview, it can be observed that all the participants refused to equate the acts of individuals with the entire nation. All claimed to be advocates for democracy and all pleaded for the rule of law and righteousness in Yugoslavia.

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Marko Zajc

“NOVA REVIJA” AND RELATIONS WITH SERBIA

NOVA REVIJA HAS maintained an “oppositional” tone since its founding in 1982. At first, it could be felt in between the lines, but with each new issue the magazine became more and more open. Its critical stance towards the existing system became the red thread linking otherwise ideologically different contributions to the magazine. As a rule, its contributors were resolute supporters of Slovenianism and critics of Yugoslavism. Despite this, the magazine remained open to writers from throughout the Yugoslav state. It regularly published the contributions of dissident and banned authors, especially those from Serbia. Nevertheless, it seems that its oppositional attitude had an advantage over emphasizing Slovenianism, although the topics were mostly related. Consequently, the existing “party” monopoly system does not enable real democracy or resolving the national question in a satisfactory manner.

Most (not all) contributors to *Nova revija* were linked by their similar stance towards the nation-nationality phenomenon. The *Nova revija* theorists of nation were not neutral but, in principle, they used unbiased philosophical, that is sociological theoretical, tools for “national goals”. The original mixing of different levels of analysis is characteristic. Comprehensive analyses of theoretical debates are combined with personal experiences and anecdotes. Historical examples are intertwined with descriptions of the difficulties inherent in a socialist society. Their writings often featured ambitious theses on the nature and character of the Slovenian people that used history to bolster their arguments.

The contributors understood the nation in terms of perennialism (as a permanent, natural phenomenon) or even primordialism,

(as a group of ethnically defined individuals of the same origin/nation).⁸¹³ The idea of the nation was a synthesis of ethnic and socio-economic patterns. The nation was a system of power and historical subject (Ivan Urbančič).⁸¹⁴ The thesis is based on Dušan Pirjevec's philosophical treatise titled "Vprašanje naroda" (The Question of the Nation), published in the *Problemi* magazine in 1970. Even though Pirjevec did not distinguish between people and nation, he still identified two levels at which nations manifest themselves: as a "synthesis of the ethnic, native and national, in short, as a language-cultural community" and as an "organized community, as the question of power, rationalization and governance".⁸¹⁵ Although it is similar to the argumentation advocated by Urbančič, Pirjevec's interpretation of the nation leaves a different impression. According to Pirjevec, the openness that arises in the interspace between the nation and people is something positive: "The more reliable the separation between the nation and nation, the more reliable the destiny of language and culture, which will no longer be the traditional language and culture".⁸¹⁶ Urbančič's discourse is different and openly nationalistic. He emphasizes the nation as a system of power whose identity stems from the original, primordial nation and "culminates in the establishment of its own state".⁸¹⁷

The *Nova revija* intellectuals had close contacts with the dissident intellectuals in Yugoslavia. However, was it about Yugoslavism?

813 In the first footnote of the 57th issue of *Nova revija* (in further text *NR*), Tone Hribar defines the notions: "People are a multitude of nationally undefined individuals; nation is a group of people of the same origin; people as a nation form an ethnicity; a state is a sovereign political power, while a nation is a cross-section of a state and nation." See: *NR*, 57, p. 3. In our opinion, Hribar's definition of these notions can be considered perennialistic and/or primordialistic.

814 *NR*, 57, January 1987, p. 30.

815 Dušan Pirjevec, *Vprašanje o poeziji; vprašanje naroda*, (Maribor: Založba Obzorja, 2014), 132.

816 *Ibid.* See also Tone Hribar's text in *NR*, No. 57.

817 *NR*, No. 57, p. 30.

It seems that the *Nova revija* intellectuals were "directly" connected with each other, without meandering through Yugoslavism. As they believed in national subjectivity, they were not connected with each other through or with help of some kind of Yugoslavism. Instead, they established equitable relations with the representatives of another national subject. It is evident that one national subject had a more significant role: the Serbs. In *Nova revija* the greatest attention was devoted to Serbian dissident intellectuals. Yugoslavia was fading out and the center was occupied by Slovenian-Serbian relations, which has the characteristics of relations between two sovereign national entities.

According to American historian Nick Miller, a researcher of Serbian intellectual circles, one of the more penetrating historical "truisms" in Yugoslavia was the idea that Serbs and Slovenes were the main axis of stability in Yugoslavia – if they cooperated, Yugoslavia would be stable. In Miller's opinion, the Serbian writer and national ideologist, Dobrica Ćosić⁸¹⁸, also relied on this idea during the 1980s.⁸¹⁹ We can be grateful to the State Security Service for keeping their records about the famous meeting between Serbian intellectuals (D. Ćosić) and the *Nova Revija* intellectuals in the *Mrak* tavern on 15 November 1985.⁸²⁰ Here the Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals allegedly "split up", which is almost certainly true as far as the interpretation of Yugoslavism is concerned, but not in terms of their common opposition platform: opposing the "Bolshevik" regime in Yugoslavia.

It is a fact that the Serbs were given a special place in the famous 57th issue of *Nova revija*. Spomenka Hribar was the only one who

818 See more about Ćosić and his stance towards the Slovenes in: Latinka Perović, *Srpski književnik, nacionalni ideolog i političar o Sloveniji i Slovencima*. See: Aleš Gabrič (ed.): "Slovenački put iz jednopartijskog u demokratski sistem". See: *Pogledi*, 5, Institute of Contemporary History, Ljubljana 2012, 191–202.

819 Nick Miller: *The Nonconformists, Culture, Politics and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944–1991*. (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2007), 310, 311 (in further text: Miller, *The Nonconformists*).

820 Arhiv Slovenije (AS), fond 1589/IV, tehnička jedinica (t.j.) 2637/37. I express my gratitude to Dr Aleš Gabrič for the archival materials.

clearly expressed a desire for the Slovenes to achieve a future within Yugoslavia.⁸²¹ Of course, she stipulated the assumption that certain conditions were met: the end of Leninist national identity deprivation and the sovereignty of Slovenes, including the right to secede and renounce Yugoslavism.⁸²² The image of Serbs in the 57th issue is rather bright. France Bučar defined the Kingdom of Serbia before 1918 as a state with a rich parliamentary tradition and a number of democratic elements and, at least formally, as a democratic state based on the rule of law.⁸²³ Pleading for the national principle, Marjan Rožanc enthusiastically wrote: “As long as the national is still national, the Serb is the bearer of *Dušan’s Code* (...), a serf and a national fighter to whom the best European poets write immortal odes, a martyred retreat through the Albanian mountains and a thousand-time personified patriotism.”⁸²⁴

Ivan Urbančič’s stance on the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts is also interesting. It is true that in the second footnote in his text about the Memorandum, Urbančič stated that it was evidently flawed and incoherent, because it “deletes the divide between normal Serbian nationalism and Yugoslav unitarism”. Nevertheless, Urbančič accepts it “as an initiative for debate” and argues that it is a “positive act and an expression of the desire to overcome the current crisis”.⁸²⁵ Moreover, Urbančič is appalled by the public debate about the Memorandum, which he defines as “superficial press

821 NR, 57, p. 90.

822 NR, 57, p. 101.

823 NR, 57, p. 151.

824 NR, 57, p. 206.

825 Peter Vodopivec points out that the Memorandum of Serbian academicians contained “a number of unfounded and generally known critiques of the communist regime and the Yugoslav political system”. See: : Vodopivec, *Od Pohlino-vog rečnika*, 477. In addition to the controversy over the “Serbian question”, the Draft Memorandum also criticized the Yugoslav political and economic system. See: Soso Dragović, *Spasioci nacije*, 261.

sensationalism" and "an undisguised showdown".⁸²⁶ It is interesting to note that in the 57th issue of *Nova revija* there were almost no Croats. Nobody discussed them, but Urbančić dedicated some space to the Macedonian, Montenegrin and "Bosnian-Herzegovinian" nations. He argued that they did not have enough strength to persevere as nations within a federation and therefore were kept together by the federal state.⁸²⁷ The intellectuals of *Nova Revija* apparently agreed with some of the ideas of Serbian nationalist intellectuals.

How did the *Nova revija* intellectuals see the problem of nationalism? In an interview with *Mladina* in October 1987, France Bučar argued that in Yugoslavia all those "enemies", including statist, left-wing extremists, anarcho-liberals and right-wingers, received the same denominator – nationalists.⁸²⁸ In the 57th issue of *Nova revija* there appeared two theses on nationalism in Yugoslavia. In Marjan Rožanc's opinion, there was no nationalism at all. Yugoslavia was facing difficulties not because of nationalism, but "because there is no national in Yugoslavia; the national in Yugoslavia was killed a long time ago and is dead".⁸²⁹ Urbančić developed a thesis on the system of real socialism, which seems to be nationalistic due to the dominance of the political system/bureaucracy over society. This unitarist nationalism provokes "republican" and "separatist" nationalisms, thus closing the circle of mutually encouraging nationalisms. In short, the Yugoslav political system, which positions itself above and against the nations, is to blame for nationalisms.⁸³⁰

826 *NR*, 57, p. 39, footnote 2.

827 *NR*, 57, 45.

828 *Mladina*, 2 October 1987, 9.

829 *NR*, 57. 205.

830 *NR*, 57, p. 38.

Dr Radenko Šćekić

MONTENEGRIN INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE LAST DECADE OF THE SFRY

AT THE TIME it appeared, the word “intelligentsia” was used in a social sense to denote an educated part of society that did not belong to the aristocracy. Its members, intellectuals, rose to the top of society thanks to their scholarship and culture rather than genealogy. Later attempts to define the term “intellectual” implied a high level of education, culture and various other virtues.⁸³¹ An intellectual became synonymous with a very educated individual, with high culture and ethics, a person of principle and not a weakling. Naturally, in reality there are not many examples of such theoretical definitions, especially in totalitarian or ideological one-party systems where anyone with an inclination toward critical thinking is labeled a dissident, reactionary and arch enemy. The common denominator for many social systems throughout history has been the struggle against critical, free spirits and ideas, especially those transferred into something lasting and that can be spread, like a book.⁸³² The tragedy of intellectuals,

831 Sima M. Ćirković, *Živeti sa istorijom* (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2020), 454.

832 Hayek’s definitions of (public) intellectuals as “professional second-hand dealers in ideas,” who are proud “not to possess special knowledge of anything in particular,” who do not assume “direct responsibility for practical affairs” for which it is not even necessary “to be particularly intelligent” to in carrying out the anticipated “mission.” More than a century ago, that is, before the current domination of electronic media, Hayek was aware of the enormous power of intellectuals in shaping public opinion and warned us that it was merely a “question of time until the views now held by the intellectuals become the governing force of politics.” The question is whether intellectuals are neutral in the choice of ideas they are ready to deal with. Do they not look for the ideas that enhance their role in the

writers and poets is a characteristic of most epochs, especially the socialist epoch during which romantic revolutionary visions, love themes and disenchantment with the system in a permeated each other spirit of mimicry. In totalitarian and autocratic regimes, “court” intellectuals, historians, writers and poets have played a marketing role. They have been used for the promotion of certain political ideas. They have been persecuted for being disobedient, dissidents, renegades, critics and enemies of the system. The covert authoritarianism of modern society, controlled and directed through the mass media as a means for the promotion of desired ideas, brings a potentially critical spirit into the state called “ketman” (mimicry).⁸³³

During the socialist decades, the Montenegrin intellectual elite was mostly in the service of the government and its apologists. It also provided support for the public confirmation and affirmation of ideological policy and party decisions in the fields of education, science and culture. It is evident that one can speak about some critical distancing, political resistance, intellectual awakening, action and influence in the public and political life of numerous Montenegrin intellectuals only since the early years of multiple parties.

state because the state is usually their main employer, sponsor or donor? In his book *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (*L'Opium des intellectuels*), Raymond Aron analyzed not only the well-known difference between revolutionary and reformist ways of thinking, but also – which is more relevant in this context – between the “prosaic” and the “poetic.” – See more at: Vaclav Klaus, *Intelektualci i socijalizam* (*Intellectuals and Socialism*) 2005, on: <http://katalaksija.com/2005/09/10/intelektualci-i-socijalizam-pogled-iz-ugla-jedne-post-komunisticke-zemlje-smestene-u-dominantno-post-demokratskoj-evropi/>.

833 This term is linked with Czeslaw Milosz's book *The Captive Mind*, which depicts the position of an intellectual in the authoritarian regime, in which he keeps his beliefs for himself, while at the same time publishing what the political elite requests from him. In more modern terms, this intellectual positioning in society is called “mimicry,” that is, covering up one's personal and professional beliefs in order to survive. See more in: Radenko Šćekić, *Mediji i geopolitika* (Nikšić: Medijska kultura, 2019), 364.

IDEOLOGICAL INTELLECTUAL APOLOGETICS AND THE NONCONFLICTING INTELLECTUAL ELITE

After the monarchy period, namely after 1945, Montenegrin society was faced with an ideological state which controlled and directed public life, education, social thought and, thus, intellectual activity to the greatest possible extent. The postwar decades in Montenegro were characterized by the process of forming a new system of government and new educational and cultural institutions, which had not existed in the past. After the formation of a new social system, the Directorate for Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CK KPJ) took ideological control over culture, science and education and thus over the activities of intellectuals. Thus, cultural and educational policies were rigidly politicized and subordinated to the performance of ideological tasks. Intellectuals became part of the state and party system as institutional employees. In this way they tied their existence and creativity to the government, thus entering its service. In accordance with the nature of the totalitarian system, intellectuals also formed part of a controlled and ideologically functionalized social group, which served to affirm and promote party opinions. The period of so-called self-management socialism brought a certain degree of decentralization and transfer of certain competencies from the federal to the republic authorities. These changes and the changes in the constitutional system had a most direct impact on directive management in the fields of culture and ideology, but not on a shift from dogmatic opinion or the model of party control over all areas of public life.⁸³⁴

834 “In June 1956, Agitprop was replaced by the Commission for Ideological Work within the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro (CK SKCG) and until 1958 the commissions were formed within SKCG municipal committees. These commissions were tasked with monitoring scientific work in Montenegro, especially in the field of social sciences, and directing all cultural, scientific and educational activities towards Marxism and socialist self-management. The activities of these commissions also included the monitoring of the work of newspaper and magazine editorial offices, theaters, cinemas,

The postwar decades brought different forms of intellectual participation in the implementation of official ideology in which Montenegrin intellectuals also participated.

The results of the 20th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro (CK SKCG) in 1970, when the document “Current Ideological and Socio-Political Issues of Montenegrin Culture and Its Development” was adopted, had a special influence and implications. It was the most important programmatic document on cultural development in Montenegro during the socialist period. It anticipated the founding of new higher education institutions (and then the university), the establishment of the republic’s television studio, a daily newspaper, a strengthening of the radio network, the publishing of *The History of Montenegro*, it created the conditions for preparing *The Encyclopedia of Montenegro*, and strengthened publishing activities, scholarship and specialization programs for young talent, scientific research and the Marxist evaluation of the past and cultural and historical heritage.⁸³⁵ Although intellectual involvement also implies an occasional critical attitude towards reality and phenomena, during this reevaluation period there was no public disagreement with official views. At that time, it was already possible to speak about the long tradition of intellectuals serving the government system and ruling party in Montenegro, namely about

bookstores, libraries, cultural and artistic societies, radio, and political schools. In 1958, the Montenegrin authorities formed the Commission for History, which was in charge of historical science in Montenegro. This was the only Commission within the Central Committee which dealt with the issues of only one science. The Commission set research priorities, decided on the work of the Historical Institute and controlled the work of Montenegrin historians”. (Dragutin Papović, “Institucije SK Crne Gore za definisanje i sprovođenje ideologije (1950–1989)” [Podgorica: Matica, 2015])

835 Živko Andrijašević, “O intelektualcima, ideologiji, totalitarizmu” (Nikšić: MJSS, 2017), 92–100.

the “ideologically nonconflicting intellectual elite” that functioned as the educated servants of a one-party regime.⁸³⁶

The Presidency of the CK SKCG formed the Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work and Ideological Education in the League of Communists, which was assigned to engage magazines in its efforts to implement the new constitution and decisions of the 10th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) and the decisions of the 6th Congress of the SKCG. This included carrying out the reform of the systems of childhood upbringing and education in accordance with self-management principles, to develop ideological and educational work on the basis of the Marxist ideology and the practice of self-management socialism, and to launch a marketing campaign against all anti-self-management and antisocialist forces. The Commission analyzed the textbooks, curricula and syllabi of educational institutions, and monitored and directed publishing activities in Montenegro. Using these legal regulations, it was able to assert ideological control over the media and publishing, thereby enhancing the public appearance of intellectuals.⁸³⁷

During the 1980s, the League of Communists of Montenegro expanded the network of Marxist centers in order to improve the spread of its ideology in the political system, culture, science, education and public information. The Marxist centers and their sections gathered a significant number of Montenegrin intellectuals and participated in writing the most important program documents, including materials and resolutions for party congresses.⁸³⁸ Republic insti-

836 See more in: Dragutin Papović, “Intelektualci i vlast u Crnoj Gori 1945–1990” (Podgorica: Matica, 2015).

837 Andrijašević, “O intelektualcima,” 98.

838 Until 1985 there were 14 Marxist centers: the CK SKCG Marxist Center, the Marxist Center of Veljko Vlahović University, Nikola Kovačević Marxist Center in Nikšić, Milun Božović Center for Marxist and Socio-Economic Education in Titograd, and Marxist Centers within the SK municipal committees in Ulcinj, Bar, Budva, Kotor, Herceg Novi, Cetinje, Bijelo Polje, Ivangrad, Plav and Pljevlja. Together, they engaged numerous intellectuals. In 1986, the President of the

tutions, self-management organizations, ideological party commissions and centers, legal censorship and the mass media constituted a huge apparatus supporting the efforts of the government, namely the League of Communists, to achieve its political goals. Intellectuals played an important role in this apparatus by affirming the political and party system and its values.

During the 1980s, the League of Communists of Montenegro maintained the continuity of its cultural, scientific and educational policies. The goals set by the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro in these areas only reaffirmed the decisions of the 7th Congress. Pursuant to the Resolution of the 8th Congress, the goal of cultural policy was to completely transform culture on a self-management basis.⁸³⁹ Party commissions and Marxist centers organized numerous consultations and round tables from which they called for the preservation of socialism and to overcome crisis. In September 1982, the CK SKCG Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work concluded that it would be necessary to strengthen the ideological criteria in all spheres of activity in order to suppress nationalism and affirm socialist values.⁸⁴⁰ In October 1982, the struggle against ideological opponents, especially nationalists, was given support by the Council of the CK SKCG Marxist Centre.⁸⁴¹ It was also decided to reaffirm socialist ideology in the fields of science and culture due to a

Council of the CK SKCG Marxist Center was Dr Radovan Radonjić, political scientist and professor at the Faculty of Law, while its members included, among others, publicist Milija Stanišić, sociologist Dr Novo Vujošević, lawyer Dragan Vukčević (MA), economist and lawyer Dr David Dašić, sociologist Dr Risto Kilibarda, physicist Dr Perko Vukotić, writer Gojko Dapčević and educator Dr Ratko Đukanović (Papović, "Institucije SK Crne Gore," 246).

839 Ratko Đukanović, "Kulturna politika između ciljeva i stvarnosti" (Titograd: Ovdje, 1985), 5.

840 "Ima zalutalih u Savez komunista," *Pobjeda*, September 18, 1982, 5.

841 "Mnogo teorije, ali kakve?" *Pobjeda*, October 9, 1982, 5.

surge of nationalist and religious feelings.⁸⁴² On May 13, 1985, the CK SKCG Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work held a debate on the ideological and political issues related to the transformation of Montenegrin culture on the self-management basis and numerous intellectuals were invited.⁸⁴³ One of the important conclusions of this debate was that the League of Communists was obliged to pursue a cultural policy in accordance with Marxist values. In early 1986, the CK SKCG Marxist Center organized two scientific meetings dedicated to socialist self-management. At the first meeting, the “development of socialist, self-management socio-economic relations” was discussed with the goal to affirm self-management in the economy. The topic of the second meeting was “a critical analysis of the functioning of the political system based on socialist self-management.”⁸⁴⁴ In 1986, the 9th Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro adopted the stance that all socialist forces would fight for the development of self-management in the field of culture, ideological

842 On September 9, 1983, the CK SKCG Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work and Commission for SK Development and Personnel Policy organized the session dedicated to “The Problems of the League of Communists in Ideological and Theoretical Work.” In December 1983, the CK SKCG Marxist Center, the Marxist Center of the Veljko Vlahović University and the Teaching Faculty in Nikšić held a meeting titled “Marxism and Socialist Practice in Yugoslavia.” In October 1984, the CK SKCG Marxist Center organized a debate on “Ideological and Action Unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as an Internal Driving and Cohesive Force of Socialist Self-Management” (Papović, “Intelektualci”).

843 CG-DACG, OSIO-PG, CK SKCG, Komisija za idejno-teorijski rad, Rezime sa sjednice održane 13. maja 1985 (Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work, Summary of the Session held on May 13, 1985), from the State Archives of Montenegro, Archives Department Podgorica.

844 Vidoje Zarkovic, U susret Trinaestom kongresu SKJ, *Praksa*, no. 2 (1986): pp.22

consistency and Marxist criticism.⁸⁴⁵ After this Congress, it also elected new members for its ideological commissions.⁸⁴⁶

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Montenegrin party leadership had launched a public debate on Montenegrin national identity and culture with the participation of numerous intellectuals.⁸⁴⁷ Compared with the number of intellectuals from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegrin intellectuals were most represented in Tito's movement. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the communist regime had a strong foothold in post-war Montenegro, where perhaps the most radical form of communism was prevalent compared to other republics constituting Tito's Yugoslavia.⁸⁴⁸ In Monte-

845 "The 9th Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro" (Titograd: SK Crne Gore, 1986), 69.

846 "Manje sastanaka više akcija," *Pobjeda*, June 12, 1986, 5. Among others, the following were elected to the Commission for Ideological and Theoretical Work: publicist Marko Špadijer (chair), anthropologist Dr Božina Ivanović, journalist Veseljko Koprivica, culturologist Novica Samardžić and sociologist Dr Božidar Tadić. Among others, the following were elected to the Commission for the Ideological and Political Issues of the Development of the Political System Based on Socialist Self-Management: Budimir Barjaktarević (chair), lawyer Dragan Vukčević (MA), lawyer Slavko Lukić, political scientist Dr Damjan Šečković and lawyer Dr Mijat Šuković, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council. Among others, the following were elected to the Commission for Ideological and Political Issues of Education, Science and Culture: economist Vesna Karadžić (chair), writer Janko Brajković, writer Ratko Vujošević, educator Dr Ratko Đukanović, electrical engineer Novak Jauković, writer Isak Kalpačina, biologist Dr Gordan Karaman, politician Matija Novosel and painter Slobodan Slovinčić (Papović, "Intelektualci").

847 After a meeting titled "Ethnogenesis of Montenegrins and the Marxist Determination of Nation" held at the Marxist Center in June 1980, it was shown that this issue deeply divided the Montenegrin public into two irreconcilable poles. See more in Jadranka Selhanović, *Crnogorska vlast i crnogorsko nacionalno pitanje* (Podgorica: Državni arhiv, 2015), 17.

848 After a short lull caused by the "White Paper" issued by the Montenegrin communist authorities in 1973, "identity issues" resurfaced in the second half of the 1980s when the general crisis of Yugoslav socialism ensued. The 1986 dispute

negro, despite the increasingly obvious problems in the functioning of the political system and the state in general, the public discourse of intellectuals remained unchanged. They continued to maintain the stance that the Yugoslav political system was good.⁸⁴⁹ This attitude of Montenegrin intellectuals towards the system of government was not the rule in other Yugoslav republics however. In some republics very dissonant intellectual voices rose concerning the system and social reality. In Montenegro there was no such phenomenon, which raises questions about their intellectual credibility. Thus, it can be concluded that intellectuals were only the most educated layer of a dogmatic, single-minded and apologetic circle.⁸⁵⁰ Naturally, the subsequent period of pluralism during the turbulent 1990s brought about an ideological differentiation in the Montenegrin intellectual elite, which would, however again evolve into the service of some other ideology or policy.

IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS

The end of that system began with rallies and media manipulations in October 1988 and in January of the following year, the Montenegrin party and state leadership was overthrown in the so-called AB

between representatives of two conflicting parties – some advocated the uniqueness of the Montenegrin nation, others defended their Serbian roots – within the circle of Montenegrin intellectuals, Savo Brković and Batrić Jovanović, hinted at the groundbreaking events in the future of the smallest Yugoslav republic. Stipe Kljajić, book review of “Intelektualci i vlast u Crnoj Gori 1945–1990” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* (2020): 335– 338.

849 “In that chorus of adoration there were intellectuals who argued that socialism would survive and that only a few reform moves were needed to get out of the crisis. They rejected the multi-party system and considered the so-called “pluralism of socialist interests” to be the best solution for Yugoslav society. In fact, the day before the fall of the Berlin Wall, intellectuals argued that the legacy of the revolution and Titoism were the values on which Yugoslav and Montenegrin societies should rely.” See more in Andrijašević, “O intelektualcima,” 92–100.

850 Andrijašević, “O intelektualcima.”

(anti-bureaucratic) revolution.⁸⁵¹ The change of the party and state leadership, coupled with the rejection of the previous ideology, gave to many intellectuals, faithful executors of party directives, and an opportunity to radically distance themselves from the ideology they had supported.⁸⁵² On October 28, 1988, the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts (CANU) held a session dedicated to science and technology. In his address, Academician V. Strugar called the protest rallies “the people’s political uprising.” As for the possible unification of Montenegro and Serbia, he said: “The defenders of the institutions of the system in Montenegro are trying their best to not allow Montenegrins to identify with Serbs” Therefore, “for

851 In the aftermath of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” intellectuals organized a peculiar democratic forum. Its participants expressed different views on the results of the AB revolution: N. Kilibarda defended young Montenegrin leaders, arguing that “they impressed people not only with the purity of their language, wisdom and courage, but also because they overthrew the hated regime rather than reform communism.” They advocated the thesis that the sovereignty of the people is the source of all sovereignties. According to B. Šijaković, in Montenegro neither the people, nor any individual, nor any institution is sovereign. He also said that in Montenegro there was neither democracy nor democratization, but only liberalization. He also spoke critically of the League of Communists. Ž. Rakčević, a member of the Presidency of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (RK SSRN), put the central question as to whether the actions of the previous January meant a struggle for power or a radical change of the system, adding that he fought for the latter. M. Popović, a member of the Executive Board of UJDI in Titograd, agreed with the introductory speech that “on January 10 polarization occurred not only in the leadership, but also in the general public.” S. Perović expressed reservations about some theses and praise concerning the January events in Montenegro, considering them in the context of wider European events. Moreover, he decided to return his party booklet “because he was the victim of both the old and new policies and because the decisions taken by the 10th Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro were not carried out.” (Branko Vojičić and Veseljko Koprivica, *Prevrat 89* (Podgorica: LSCG, 1994), 315).

852 Andrijašević, “O intelektualcima”

Montenegrin communists the creation of their own nation is a party assignment.”⁸⁵³ Intellectuals, who had supported a one-party system for decades, became the proponents of a multi-party system and parliamentarianism in less than a year. Some of them turned from Marxist and self-management theorists into liberal theorists and market economy supporters, while some former doctrinaire Marxists became nationalists and reawakened believers. Their ideological trajectory outlined the direction that the majority in Montenegro then followed in the early 1990s.⁸⁵⁴ As early as 1989, open conflicts in cultural institutions emerged based on intellectuals’ ideological differences. Moreover, there were calls for the persecution and removal of those thinking differently, that is, who did not follow “the new line.”⁸⁵⁵

Montenegro’s strong attachment to the Milošević regime in Serbia and its ideological shift from socialism to Serbian nationalism brought an end to the socialist period in Montenegro. Apart from the Montenegrin–Serbian divisions in Montenegro, a strong feeling of “Yugoslav socialist patriotism” also prevailed in this republic in particular. Thus, Milošević’s Yugoslav vision in the late 1980s also attracted forces that did not declare themselves exclusively to the pro-Serbian spirit.⁸⁵⁶ The disappearance of a socialist compromise brought Serbian and Montenegrin nationalisms to the surface, through the political dynamics around the attitude towards the communist lega-

853 In an interview for *Pobjeda* a few years later, while speaking about his book *Velika buna Crne Gore 1988–1989* (*The Great Rebellion of Montenegro, 1988–1989*), academician Strugar emphasized: “Has the communist creation of a political people ever faced a more difficult transformation of the spirituality of a blood-related people than the processing of Montenegrins in order to become a separate nation, separated from Serbdom? During a long communist rule, Montenegrins who did not want to be called or labeled Serbs multiplied Montenegro is a country and a people, a society and a state within Serbdom; Montenegrins are Serbs” (V. Konatar, “Velika buna”, *Pobjeda*, February 26, 1992, 7).

854 Andrijašević, „O intelektualcima.“

855 Papović, „Intelektualci,“ 434.

856 Kljajić, “Intelektualci i vlast.”

cy is also reflected.⁸⁵⁷ Over time, the gap between the two poles of the intellectual elite increased. In accordance with its political needs the League of Communists – that is, its successor, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) – has given primacy to one or the other pole. Primacy has been reflected in financial support, institutional strengthening and media logistics. At the same time, the “other pole” of the intellectual elite would be demonized in the media.

A direct and open advocacy of political ideas and views was the basic type of propaganda activity in Montenegro during the long one-party period and in the first years of multi-party politics. However, although diffuse propaganda is more characteristic of societies with a longer tradition of political pluralism and more advanced and more perfidious forms of persuasive activity, Montenegro has not been immune to their use. As the formal successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro, the DPS sought to survive by maintaining a balance within its diverse electorate.⁸⁵⁸ By distancing itself from Belgrade’s politics in the second half of the 1990s and moving closer to Slobodan Milošević’s opponents, the stance on the status of Montenegro also began to change. By carrying out indirect propaganda activities and relying on diffuse marketing, the ground was slowly prepared for the public to accept the idea of independence, a specific taboo topic “demonized” by the DPS for many years. To that end, it focused on changing the consciousness of the majority of citizens. Although a continuation of the state union with Serbia has been publicly declared, the establishment of new and support for existing organizations and institutions promoting the differences between the Montenegrin and Serbian national identities, and minimizing

857 Boris Ristović, “Šta je nama 13. jul,” *Vijesti*, July 13, 2020.

858 Even during the turbulent years of 1988, 1989 and 1990, various feuilletons, interviews and themes (like the feuilletons about Goli Otok, Milovan Đilas, “Greater Albania,” the communist “leftist errors” in Montenegro, the Brioni Plenum, the lives of the wives of Josip Broz, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković and the like) appeared in the state press and were promoted through Budva’s Theater City and Square of Poets, thus preparing the public for a certain planned policy.

the “Serbian being” in Montenegro have continued.⁸⁵⁹ By focusing on church, language, historical and cultural issues, it has also sought to turn attention away from topics such as the economy, smuggling, crime and the like, favored by the opposition and dealt with both in the public and the media, as well as in the Montenegrin parliament.

During the last decade of the 20th century, a policy change by the then Montenegrin elite was manifested in the fields of culture and education. As part of the education and collective memory of a people, historiography also provided a ground for propaganda. In initiating radical educational reforms, including in primarily language and history, one can recognize the tendency towards indoctrinating youth: in particular, influencing the emotions and emphasizing patriotism, love for Montenegro, its chivalrous history, importance in international relations and the like. “Over the decades, everything Montenegrin has been challenged through education; in school textbooks the facts have been deliberately ignored or distorted in order to negate the Montenegrin national being, the state and the essence of Montenegrin history,” said Montenegrin Minister of Education and Science D. Kujović.⁸⁶⁰ Many existing and newly established organizations,

859 “Will Montenegrins preserve the supremacy characteristics of their noble tribal spiritual aristocracy and are we authoritarians as individuals and democrats as a people?” These are just some questions dealt with by the well-known Montenegrin neuro-psychiatrist and then Director of the Federal Institute of Health, Todor Baković. In an interview for *Pobjeda* he said, among other things: “The Montenegrin breathes in deep amplitudes. A long silence is followed by a sudden jump. Just in these years, the Montenegrin has started waking up from the past that had tamed and deceived him. Instead, he is increasingly conquering the unimagined spaces of the future. He is beginning to get accustomed to it, because it has waited for him for a long time” (R. Tomic, “Montenegrin diše u dubokim amplitudama” *Pobjeda*, April 12, 1998, 7). Such and similar texts and statements have promoted the distinctiveness, specificity and strength of the Montenegrin ethos.

860 Montenegrin Minister of Education D. Kujović pointed out even earlier that the “critical re-examination of the history program and textbooks is not merely a postulate of time, but is also liberation from the layers that can be a shield

associations, publishing companies, cultural and artistic events and the like, with media coverage and space provided by the authorities, used propaganda to promote the perspective of the impossibility of living further with Serbia and the need to be independent, to split from the common state. The balance based on the dichotomy of Montenegrin identity versus Serbian identity is the legacy of the communist technology of rule, as has been stated by M. Đilas: “A state of balance is the best for Montenegro, because it is like a pendulum. If you push it towards Montenegriness it will return to Serbianness and vice versa.”⁸⁶¹

However, the post-war communist elite, prompted by the motto “a republic is equal to a nation,” sought to contribute to its independence by establishing the institutions dealing with Montenegrin history and culture. Institutions such as the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts (CANU), the University of Montenegro, the Historical Institute and others made an immeasurable contribution to the affirmation of the cultural and historical heritage of Montenegro.⁸⁶²

against a clear observation of history. History teaching is an important factor in constituting national identity and, therefore it must be freed from negative stereotypes in relation to other nations, which lead to ethnocentrism” R. Tomić, “Crnogorsko obrazovanje” *Pobjeda*, February 2, 2000, 5).

861 This is according to Momir Bulatović, “Pravila ćutanja (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga-Alfa, 2004), 169

862 Petar II Petrović Njegoš is also perceived through the prism of the current communist policy: “We are obliged to free the interpretation of his poetic and statesman’s work from the ballast of romantic and folklore naivety, Orthodox and civic mythomania,” said Veljko Milatović at the opening of Njegoš’s mausoleum in 1974 (V. Milatović, “Njegošev mauzolej”, *Pobjeda*, August 1, 1974, 2). In 1924, the 5th Congress of Comintern passed a resolution on breaking up the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the creation of independent republics. The 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, held in Dresden in 1928, passed the Resolution on the Creation of an Independent state of Montenegro: “The Party will most fully support all actions of the masses conducive to the formation of an independent Montenegro.” In 1937, Tito wrote from Paris to Milovan Đilas in Yugoslavia: “Now is not the right time to discuss whether the

The “use” of intellectuals, publicists, experts, historians, writers, analysts, physicians and others to support and give legitimacy to a certain political stance, program and idea is symptomatic. Thus, until the second half of the 1990s, it was lucrative to “trade on Serbdom,” togetherness with Serbia, the Kosovo question or Yugoslavism. The beginning of the new millennium also imposed new intellectual “patterns” in accordance with the new policy proclaimed by the ruling elite. Publishing and promoting numerous historiographical editions dealing with Montenegro’s modern history as well as prime time media coverage of forums, gatherings, interviews, literary meetings and the like it has sought to daily influence public perception. Social reforms in Montenegro during the 1990s were conditioned by specific factors. Politically, Montenegro was faced with challenges that came with the introduction of the post-communist multi-party system (1990), the consequences of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro as the only two federal member states (1992)³. However, significant change in the political and economic orientation of Montenegro followed the 1998 parliamentary election when the country’s political establishment pursued a new political agenda of restoring the country’s independence with the aim of joining the ‘euro-atlantic’ integration process, including EU and NATO memberships. After the restoration of independence in 2006, the state of Montenegro has started at full cultural capacity.

national question exists or not in Montenegro” (Josip Broz Tito, *Sabrana dela*, Vol. III, [Belgrade: Narodna knjiga 1977], 140–141, as quoted in Vladimir Jovićević and Budimir Aleksić, *Crnogorsko pitanje* [Cetinje: Svetigora, 2003], 8).

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IX

**RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITIES**

Srđan Barišić

TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

THE CONSTITUTION OF the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted on 31 January 1946, proclaimed full separation of religious communities and the state. Article 25 of the Constitution, proclaiming separation between church and state, was also included in the new Constitution of 13 January 1956. The new political authorities soon demonstrated their negative attitude towards religion and religious communities by adopting a set of systemic regulations that marginalized, demonopolized, depoliticized and economically further weakened all religious organizations in the country. The ban on religious education in public schools directly diminished the economic, public, political and cultural influence of church hierarchy and religion on the population.⁸⁶³ This post-war policy was characterized by an antagonistic relationship between the state-party bureaucracy and religious communities. The state asserted its control by quickly narrowing down the scope of activities of religious communities, and putting them under its supervision and control.⁸⁶⁴

The entire period 1945–1970 can be divided into two phases: (1) the phase of overt governmental repression against religious communities on the one hand, and their visible resistance until 1953–1954 on the other hand, and (2) the phase of adjustment and search for a sustainable relationship model, from the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s. During the second phase, after 1953–1954, ideological pressure

863 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, (Beograd: IFDT, Filip Višnjic, 2005), 160.

864 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 165–166.

was gradually easing.⁸⁶⁵ During the mid-1960s, political pressure on religious communities further eased concurrent with the economic and political liberalization of socialist society in general. At the same time, religious communities took a more loyal and cooperative attitude towards the socialist state.

FROM ATHEIZATION TO DESECULARIZATION

The atheization process was launched immediately after the Second World War and had an important role in legitimizing the new socialist order. It was meant to depoliticize and de-nationalize the traditional ethnic and religious conflicts inherited from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia. Initially, the atheization process did not achieve any radical results, due mostly to the South Slavic peoples' deep-rooted identification with the traditional churches and conventional religiosity of the masses. The effects of atheization became evident only in the mid-1950s, but one should not disregard the significant structural changes taking place in society at the same time: the modernization of traditional society, systemic and massive industrialization, urbanization and deagrarianization.

The effects of atheization and secularization were greatest in predominantly Orthodox areas. In other words, it turned out that Orthodoxy was the least resistant to state interventionism. According to Dragoljub Đorđević, the three factors that had a decisive influence on the secularization of Orthodox religiosity were also the main reasons for people's "escape from the church": (1) suffering during the Second World War; (2) failure by the Bolshevik regime to treat all religions, confessions and religious communities, equally in the distribution of official grace; (3) institutional weaknesses within the Church.⁸⁶⁶ To

865 Radmila Radić, "Odnosi između Srpske Pravoslavne crkve i Katoličke crkve u poslednjim decenijama pred raspad jugoslovenske države", *Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: Videnje srpskog faktora*, ur. Mile Bjelajac, (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007), 285.

866 Dragoljub B. Đorđević, Bogdan Đurović, "Sekularizacija i Pravoslavlje: slučaj Srba", *Povratak svetog?*, ur. Dragoljub B. Đorđević, (Niš: Gradina, 1994), 221.

this ambiental framework the authors added two specific factors that contributed to the secularization of predominantly Orthodox areas: (4) injection of ideology into social relations and (5) atheistic education and upbringing.⁸⁶⁷

The post-war census results of 1953, which included a question about one's confessional affiliation, revealed that, initially, the process of atheization was not very efficient. No less than 88 percent of the total population still declared itself religious, while only 12 percent declared itself nonreligious or atheist.⁸⁶⁸ The census highlighted the differences among the constituent republics, which were later confirmed by empirical studies of religiosity and people's attachment towards religion. For example, the highest number of nonreligious people was recorded in Montenegro (32 percent). In comparison with other parts of the country, Belgrade also had a high number of nonreligious people (29.5 percent), while the highest number of religious people was recorded in Kosovo and Metohija and in Slovenia.⁸⁶⁹

Considering the methodological limitations, that is, the lack of a comparable synthetic indicator of religiosity (a scale or an index), the findings of systemic studies of religiosity in socialist Yugoslavia (which tended to focus primarily on Catholic areas), can only provide the most basic insight into the tendencies of specified confessional areas. As early as 1964, about 70 percent of the total population declared itself religious, while about 30 percent did not specify its religious affiliation (nonreligious or atheist). At the end of the same decade, in 1968, a public opinion poll showed that nonreligious persons constituted a majority: 51 percent of respondents declared themselves atheist and 39 percent religious. Additional studies led to the conclusion

867 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 177.

868 It is interesting to note that the question about religious affiliation was omitted from the censuses taken in socialist Yugoslavia from 1953 until 1991, that is, during the period when the general situation associated with the religiosity of the population was in favor of the state-party policy of promoting atheism (Blagojević, 2005:167).

869 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 168.

that, in comparison with the predominantly Catholic, Muslim and religiously mixed areas, conventional religiosity in predominantly Orthodox areas, such as so-called Serbia proper and Montenegro, was recording a significant decline. This conclusion was further confirmed by research conducted during the 1970s.⁸⁷⁰

The empirically confirmed record-breaking number of people turning away from religion and the Serbian Orthodox Church in the homogeneous Orthodox areas of Montenegro and Serbia proper, and the multireligious areas of Vojvodina and Croatia, resulted from the fact that Orthodoxy had lost its importance as the weft of morality motivating people's behavior. Less and less people were attending church services and participating in church life in general.⁸⁷¹ In his Christmas and Easter Epistles in 1970, Patriarch German pointed to an "abrupt and horrible abandonment of the faith" and "fallen piety".⁸⁷²

However, the increasingly conspicuous political and economic crisis of the Yugoslav socialist system during the 1980s reversed the downward religious trajectory of the population, even in the homogeneous Orthodox areas – Serbia and Montenegro. Public opinion polls from the era enable us to gain a relatively reliable insight into the trend, despite their numerous methodological limitations. At the end of the 1980s, research conducted on a sample of the young population revealed 34 percent considered themselves to be religious. This constituted a significant increase when compared to 1974 findings from a survey of youth religiosity in central Serbia, (11 percent) or a year later (17 percent), estimated youth religiosity at 26 percent. It is interesting to note that youth religiosity in Vojvodina amounted to 34 percent and measured as high as 48 percent in Kosovo.⁸⁷³

870 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 169–170.

871 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 174.

872 Đoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Lawslavne crkve III: Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata i posle njega*, (Beograd: JRJ, 2002), 143.

873 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 224.

According to a public opinion poll conducted in mid-1990, the difference between minority religious respondents and others declined dramatically, while the levels of religiosity in the various territorial-national areas remained unchanged. The most religious population was found in Kosovo (67 percent), followed by Slovenia (58 percent), Macedonia (51 percent), Croatia (46 percent) and Montenegro (39 percent). According to the survey, 84 percent of respondents specified their religious affiliation and, surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the previously least religious population identified itself with Orthodoxy: 91 percent of Montenegrins specified their confession, more than Albanians (90 percent), Croats (87 percent), Serbs and Macedonians (86 percent each).⁸⁷⁴

The survey showed a high degree of identification with the predominant religion and a higher percentage of believers among the members of the national minorities than among the majority population in local communities or among their compatriots in the "home" republics. Such was the case, for example, with Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, Albanians in Macedonia, Muslims in Serbia, and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which could be attributed to the homogenizing role of their confessions and religions. The revival of religiosity in the early 1990s was most evident among the Orthodox people, considering their decades-long distancing from the religious-church complex.⁸⁷⁵

Following its rise in the 1980s, conventional religiosity in socialist Yugoslavia, measured by the indicator of self-estimation, reached its peak in the early 1990s. The confessional self-identification of all nations in Yugoslavia was traditionally high in percentage terms and regularly exceeded 80 percent. However, by making the indicators of religiosity more precise, it becomes clear that conventional religiosity cannot only be measured by self-identification. According to a public opinion poll conducted in central Serbia, 83.5 percent of respondents

874 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 226.

875 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 229.

declared themselves Orthodox, almost 30 percent declared themselves religious, almost 20 percent of respondents believed in God and only 3,8 percent of respondents went to church once a week.⁸⁷⁶⁸⁷⁷

THE CONTEXT OF COUNTER-SECULARIZATION TENDENCIES

In the mid-1970s, in Catholic confessional areas and, almost a decade later, in Orthodox ones, atheism appeared to be on the decline. This trend was contextualized by the deepening political and socio-economic crisis during the 1980s and the increasingly difficult material status of the younger generation in particular. According to Dragomir Pantić, the rapid rise in youth religiosity in the second half of the 1980s was the result of the deepening social crisis, which gave rise to high unemployment and feelings of pessimism.

However, it is also important to point to the territorial and national homogenization of young people, whereby religion began to serve as a safeguard of national identity. The ethno-religious legitimization of the newly created states in the Yugoslav armed conflict contributed majorly to a mass return to tradition, religion, nation, national heroes and state-building ideas.⁸⁷⁸

The increase in people's religiosity and, in particular, their growing identification with religion, also had a broader, supranational context that should not be overlooked: the general political and cultural pluralization of society during and after the collapse of socialism at the global and, notably, European level, the general tendency towards desecularization throughout Eastern Europe, the collapse of generally accepted values, the increasing differentiation of spiritual offers

876 The indicators of religiosity, which refer to the most important duties of believers and desirable religious behavior in a particular religious organization (church and liturgy attendance, communion, fasting, prayer) are a "stronger" indicator of conventional religiosity. In terms of prevalence, the mentioned behaviors are ranked below confessional identification, self-declared religiosity and belief in God.

877 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 230.

878 Mirko Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva*, 180.

on the religious market, the different spiritual needs of many people, and the need for God in the quest for happiness, hope, consolation and the like.

The importance of religious traditions for the preservation of ethnic and cultural identity led to the emergence of religion as a political fact. The transformation (so-called transition) of Yugoslav society, occurred in the context of a liberalization of relations between post-communist countries and religious communities during a period of a strong revival of nationalism. This atmosphere opened the possibility for the reinstrumentalization of religion for political ends. The renewal of religiosity was aimed at legitimating, homogenizing and mobilizing nations and states. On the one hand, we have new political elites who were using religion for their own legitimation and as a tool for manipulating the wider strata of the population. New political elites were pushing a national (or, more precisely, nationalistic) ideology within which religion had a very important role. On the other hand, religious communities saw the return of nationalism as a possibility for their rehabilitation, that is, reaffirmation. They embraced nationalism as an opportunity for their own return to the social (public) scene after five decades of living on the margins of a secularized, atheist society. The nationalistic programme brought religious and ruling political structures closer together. The monopolization of the victim, mythologization and glorification of national history and sacralization of politics and history predominated the wording of the church-political national programme.

The first outlines of desecularization were recognizable in Yugoslavia in the early 1980s. Its scope and effects can still be observed in all post-Yugoslav societies. Like Peter Berger or, more precisely, Vyacheslav Karpov, we can characterize the process of desecularization as counter-secularization. Counter-secularization is a desecularizing process that mimics the effects of secularization and emerges as a specific reaction to either the past, current secularization or atheization. The process is directly linked to specified secularization tendencies.

Since the beginning of the process of desecularization in Yugoslavia, all the components (tendencies) of counter-secularization have been increasingly evident: (1) the rapprochement of previously secularized institutions to religious norms, both formally and informally; (2) the revival of religious beliefs and practices; (3) the return of religion to the public sphere (deprivatization); (4) the revival of religious contents in various cultural subsystems (art, philosophy, literature, etc.); (5) religion-related changes in “social substrate” (e.g., religion-related demographic changes, and the redefinition of territories and population based on religious criteria).⁸⁷⁹ In his analysis of religion-dependent changes in post-communism, Milan Vukomanović also pointed to this “reactionary” character of desecularization in the former Yugoslavia, emphasizing that during the revitalization of religion in Yugoslavia the negative politicization of religion shifted towards positive politicization. After a half-century long process of “religization of politics” or, in other words, the forced “hyperpoliticization” of almost all aspects of social life, including religion, which was ideologized in a negative sense, this process changed direction. The “return” to traditional religion, even to conservative religiosity, emerged as a major factor in the preservation of national identity, whereby a positive evaluation of tradition and the veneration of the national and religious past led to a political abuse of the relationship between religion and nation.⁸⁸⁰ In his analysis of “desecularizing regimes”, Karpov pointed to the same potential function of the process of desecularization. He specifically pointed to the regimes supporting counter secular tendencies for nonreligious reasons: religion as a resource of strength or defence of endangered culture was used in the conflict-affected territory of the former socialist Yugoslavia for the purpose of homogenization of national-religious groups.

879 Vyacheslav Karpov, “Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework”. *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 52, No. 2/2010, 250.

880 Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo*, (Beograd: Čigoja, 2001), 99.

The traditional religious communities emerged as the resolute “activists of desecularization”, while the “actors of desecularization”⁸⁸¹ mostly reacted to the establishment of a “desecularizing regime” in two ways: by converting to a “legitimate” religion and by ritual “belonging without religion”⁸⁸² This traditional and conventional attachment to religion and church, as well as the fact that confessional/religious affiliation is not identical with religiosity were also pointed out by Srđan Vrcan⁸⁸³ and Dragoljub Đorđević, who singled out almost identical forms of confessional identification: (1) traditional attachment to a certain religion, which is nonreligious due to the identification of religion with ethos, but with clear consciousness about the confessional background and (2) recognition of one’s confessional origin, “religion by birth”, despite the lack of rational consciousness about it and one’s nonreligiosity.⁸⁸⁴

THE MANIFESTATION OF COUNTERSECULARIZATION

Yugoslavia and the Holy See did not have diplomatic relations from 1952 until the mid-1960s when Belgrade and the Holy See entered

881 Karpov makes a distinction between the activists of desecularization and the actors of desecularization: the activists of desecularization are individuals and groups who are directly and actively included in the process of reviving the importance of religion for social institutions and culture, while the actors of desecularization are broader social groups whose interests, norms and values coincide with the interests and values of the activists of desecularization who provide passive support to desecularization or, more precisely, represent the political and social base of countersecularization. (Karpov, 2010:251–252; Blagojević, 2015:22–24).

882 Karpov distinguishes several types of mass reactions to the establishment and functioning of desecularizing regimes: (1) conversion to a “legitimate” religion; (2) finding innovative alternatives; (3) ritual “affiliation without religion”; (4) religious indifference; (5) secularist rebellion (Karpov, 2010:258–259; Blagojević, 2015:26).

883 Srđan Vrcan, *Od krize religije k religiji krize*, (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1986)

884 Dragoljub B. Đorđević, “Sociološki uvid u kulturu Lawslavlja (Srpsko Lawslavlje i SPC)”, *Teme*, Vol. XXIV, br. 1–2/2000, 164.

into negotiations and, in 1966, signed the Protocol on Talks Between the Representatives of the SFRY and the Representatives of the Holy See.⁸⁸⁵ They established diplomatic relations four years later. The culmination of a long reconciliation process was the visit of President Josip Broz Tito to Pope Paul VI in the Vatican in March 1971.⁸⁸⁶⁸⁸⁷ At the same time, there was a more general liberalization in church-state relations. The Catholic Church resumed its publishing activity, including the publishing of its newspaper *Glas koncila*, which later became very influential. It subsequently resumed its social programmes for young people and the like.

In Solin near Split, in September 1975, there began a celebration of a series of anniversaries, which was organized by the Bishops' Conference of Yugoslavia. Its Chairman was Archbishop of Zagreb (Cardinal since 1983) Franjo Kuharić and Vice-Chairman Frane Franić, Archbishop of Split-Makarska and Southern Croatia. In October, the original celebration of the "Croatian Marian Year" (or "Jelena's Year"), which was meant to honour the 1,000th death anniversary of Croatian Queen Jelena (975–1975) as well as the 1,000th anniversary of the building of the Church of Our Lady of the Island in Solin where Queen Jelena was buried, was transformed into a much more far-reaching anniversary, dedicated to "Thirteen Centuries of Christianity in Croatia". It was conceived as a multi-year anniversary celebration series, encompassing the coronation of Croatian King Zvonimir in 1075 and the proclamation of Croatian Prince Branimir as ruler in 879.

885 The Protocol committed the Yugoslav authorities to respecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights to all believers and religious institutions and to recognizing the jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. The Holy See committed itself to restraining the political activities of the clergy and reacting to any anti-Yugoslav actions of émigré Croatian Catholic priests (Klasić).

886 Josip Broz Tito was the first president of a socialist state to be officially received by the Pope.

887 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, (Westview Press, 2002), 92.

At the same time, in the early 1980s, when the Kosovo question was raised, a group of younger Serbian Orthodox theologians appeared on the scene, calling on the Church to be more active and to awaken from lethargy. Since 1981, priests and theologians have intensified their pressure on the heads of the Serbian Orthodox Church to take a more resolute stand vis-à-vis the government. The clergy has also sent appeals, petitions and messages to church dignitaries, calling on the Serbian Orthodox Church to come out of isolation and be more actively present in society.

In the relevant literature, the year 1982 is often mentioned as the year in which the Serbian Orthodox Church began returning to the public scene. It also marks the year of the “Appeal” signed by 21 priests⁸⁸⁸ and addressed to the highest governing bodies of Serbia and Yugoslavia, the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod. The “Appeal” pointed out the necessity of protecting the spiritual and biological being of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija.⁸⁸⁹ The return of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the public scene came about amidst the political crisis sparked by the well-known events in Kosovo the previous year. After this public appearance, prompted by the deepening political and economic crisis within the Yugoslav socialist system, the Serbian Orthodox Church adopted the Kosovo question as its primary political theme and began speaking out on the issue more frequently. A second topic of concern was the status of Serbs living in other parts of Yugoslavia, especially Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The period during which Naim Hadžiabdić was the Grand Mufti of the Islamic Community in Yugoslavia (1975–1987) coincided with a revival of activities within the Islamic Community. They included the mass construction of mosques, priority development of relations with

888 The signatories also included the three most prominent monk-theologians, Atanasije Jevtić, Irinej Bulović and Amfilohije Radović.

889 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, I–II, (Beograd: INIS, 2002). 303.

the Muslim world and affirmation of the “Muslim nation” and its culture.⁸⁹⁰ The 1970s and 1980s, recorded a relatively intensive building and restoration of mosques in Yugoslavia. The newly built mosques were mostly the result of the Muslims’ growing power and improvements in their standard of living, especially in rural areas. Financial support from foreign Muslim organizations was symbolic and generally earmarked for large projects such as the Islamic Centre in Zagreb and the restoration of the Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque in Sarajevo.⁸⁹¹

During the 1970s, there emerged a new generation of Muslim intellectuals, who came not only from Middle Eastern universities, but also from Yugoslav state universities. The first masters and doctors of Islamic sciences returned to Bosnia from Cairo’s Al-Azhar University, Universities of Baghdad and Kuwait, as well as other Muslim institutions of higher learning abroad.⁸⁹² In addition, global trends in the Muslim world coupled with a new wave of religious awareness, which started in November 1979, contributed to the new self-perception of Muslims in Yugoslavia.

Out of a hundred madrasas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, only two remained after 1945: the Gazi Husrev-Bey Madrasa in Sarajevo and the Alauddin Madrasa in Priština. In 1984, on the wings of the Islamic revival, the Isa-Bey Madrasa was opened in Skopje and the Islamic Theological Faculty and the Women’s Department of the Gazi Husrev-Bey Madrasa were opened in Sarajevo.⁸⁹³

After 1970, Islamic publishing in Yugoslavia was rapidly growing and its centre was Sarajevo. Apart from the translation of the Quran, hadiths and works of classical and contemporary Muslim authors, many new periodicals were also published. In addition to *Glasnik*,

890 Dragan Novaković, *Islamska verska zajednica na jugoslovenskom prostoru 1878–1991*, (Niš: JUNIR, 2015), 453.

891 *Muslimani Balkana: Istočno pitanje u XX veku*, prir. Fikret Karčić, (Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2017), 112.

892 *Muslimani Balkana: Istočno pitanje u XX veku*, prir. Fikret Karčić, 109.

893 *Muslimani Balkana: Istočno pitanje u XX veku*, prir. Fikret Karčić, 113.

the official gazette of the Supreme Eldership/Riyaset published since 1933, *Zemzem*, the newspaper of the Association of the Students of the Gazi Husrev-Bey Madrasa, and the biweekly magazine *Preporod* also began being published in Sarajevo, in 1968 and 1970 respectively. *Preporod* eventually became the main promoter of the Islamic revival. In the same decade, the monthly magazine *Islamska misao* began publication, while the Sarajevo-based Association of Muslim Scholars (Ilmija) regularly published the annual calendar *Takvim*. In 1980, there appeared *Educata Islame* in Albanian in Priština, *Elif* in Titograd and *El-Hilalin* in Macedonian, Turkish and Albanian in Skopje.⁸⁹⁴

The most evident desecularization shifts were initially recorded in SR Slovenia, where the Catholic Church⁸⁹⁵ and the state established friendly relations for the first time. In December 1986, Ljubljana Archbishop Alojzij Šuštar became the first Yugoslav to be allowed to congratulate Easter on public radio. Soon thereafter, it was announced that Easter would become a national holiday, at least in Slovenia, and that the Theological Faculty would again be part of the University of Ljubljana among other things. In Slovenia, people started talking openly about the priests killed during Tito's times.⁸⁹⁶ Publishing activities were also significantly revitalized. For example, before the Second World War, the Catholic Church published hundreds of periodicals, while during the period 1945–1953, it published only three

894 *Muslimani Balkana: Istočno pitanje u XX veku*, prir. Fikret Karčić, 115.

895 Pavel Mojzes pointed out and testified about the Catholic clergy's separate "national" approaches in Slovenia and Croatia or, more precisely, about the lack of cooperation and joint action (Mojzes, 1993:15). A similar situation also can be observed in the relations between the national structures of the Islamic Community in Yugoslavia, where the Albanian part of the structure does not maintain any noticeable cooperation with its Bosniak counterpart.

896 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 95.

(*Blagovest, Dobri pastir* and *Oznanilo*). In 1987, the Catholic Church published 134 periodicals in Croatia alone.⁸⁹⁷

In an interview for the church magazine *Veritas*, in March 1987, the Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, characterized the Belgrade Protocol of 1966 as being obsolete and indirectly pleaded for the conclusion of an international agreement, that is, a concordat between the Holy See and Croatia, namely Yugoslavia. He also strongly condemned the system of government in SFR Yugoslavia and SR Croatia, which was based on a Marxist ideology and atheism that made believers feel like “second-class citizens”. One month later, in the Easter sermon in the Zagreb Cathedral, the Cardinal “stood up for Dobroslav Paraga and human rights, especially those of believers”, while at the spring session of the Bishops’ Conference of Yugoslavia he put on the agenda the “Proposal to the SFRY Presidency and the Federal Executive Council to amend the constitutional provisions about the protection of the rights of religious citizens”.⁸⁹⁸ At the same time, Cardinal Kuharić and many bishops pressed for the exclusive use of the Croatian language and alphabet within their society and for the creation of a Croatian Orthodox Church, independent from Serbian Orthodoxy.⁸⁹⁹

In November 1989, the Commission of the Bishops’ Conference of Yugoslavia issued a release calling for progress in repluralization, giving special emphasis to the key role of judicial independence. That same year, the Association of Catholic Journalists in Yugoslavia was

897 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 91.

898 Darko Hudelist, “Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj u XX stoljeću”, dostupno na https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/kultura_religija_txt00c4.html.

899 David Steele, “Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?”, *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 14: Iss. 5, Article 1, 1994. Dostupno na <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol14/iss5/1.12>.

also established in Zagreb.⁹⁰⁰ In Croatia and Slovenia, Catholic prelates demanded the reintroduction of (Catholic) catechesis as a compulsory subject into public schools and the delegalization of abortion.

In an editorial published in *Glas crkve* on the occasion of St Vitus' Day in 1989, the journal of the Serbian Orthodox Church expounded its "Draft Serbian Church-National Programme" stating among other things: "The fact remains that over the past two years the relationship between the Serbian Church and Serbian politics has changed as much as it had not in half a century from the war onwards. We could not have expected more for the time being. However, we should not call it a day. There is no need to be afraid or shy away from the Church, which has been the strongest pillar of the Serbian nation for centuries. Not now as it never has, the Serbian Church does not want to be a partner to the state nor does it want a share in its politics. This is alien to its spiritual purpose. Although it is not specifically supportive of any socio-political system or political party, it cannot be entirely apolitical... Therefore, we ask the Serbian political leadership that advocates the programme for building a democratic European state to make it possible for the Church to resume the role that had been unjustly and violently seized from it and thus fill the social gap its neglect had created. For there can be no strong state without a strong Church!"⁹⁰¹ Articles favouring the Serbian leadership's activities began appearing more often in church publications.

In a press release issued after the meeting of the members of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the President of the Presidency of SR Serbia in mid-June 1990, the following was stated: "We are pleased to say that the meeting between the leader of a new Serbia and Serbian Orthodox Bishops, members of the

900 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 95.

901 *Glas crkve*, No. 3, 1989.

Holy Assembly of Bishops, will prove that a difficult and ugly period in the life of the Serbian Orthodox Church is over, at least in Serbia.”⁹⁰²

At the beginning of 1990, the Christmas liturgy in the Cathedral Church in Belgrade was broadcast live; two and a half months later Easter was celebrated “publicly and freely as a general holiday” and enhanced by the opening of the St Sava Temple where the first Easter liturgy was held. That same year, the St. Sava Ball and St. Sava Academy at the Sava Centre were also organized for the first time following the Second World War. It also marked the first time that the students of the Theological Faculty prevented the performance of a play, while the Serbian Orthodox Church strongly and successfully demanded its removal from the repertoire.⁹⁰³

In 1988, while preparing to mark the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, one of the most important events in Serbia’s history according to the highest church officials, Prince Lazar’s relics were carried from the Ravanica monastery through the Dioceses of Zvornik and Tuzla, Šabac and Valjevo, and Šumadija and Žiča, to the Gračanica monastery in Kosovo. In an epistle issued by Bishop Jovan of Šabac and Valjevo on the occasion of the arrival of Prince Lazar’s sacred relics, the term “heavenly Serbia” was used for the first time. The anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was also marked in Dalmatian Kosovo, on Mount Romanija and in Drvar.⁹⁰⁴

Kosovo became a regular topic in all the newspapers published by the Serbian Orthodox Church. The most prominent among several outstanding authors was the then hieromonk Atanasije Jevtić, whose articles were given an increasingly prominent place and importance in official church publications.⁹⁰⁵ During the entire mentioned peri-

902 *Lawslavlje*, No. 559, 1990.

903 *Lawslavlje*, No. 558, 15 June 1990; No. 559, 1 July 1990.

904 *Lawslavlje*, No. 537/8, 1–15 August 1989.

905 The well-known articles include among others “Sa Kosova i oko Kosova” (From Kosovo and Around Kosovo), 1982, in which he wrote about the extermination of the Serbian people in the southern Serbian province (*Lawslavlje*, No. 366,

od, archival documents and photographs relating to the crimes committed against the Serbian population were regularly published. In a press release issued after the session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops in 1987, the term “genocide” was for the first time used in relation to the plight of the Serbian people in Kosovo and south-eastern parts of Serbia.

As early as 1984, in parallel to the prevalent topic of Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Church began to publish stories about the suffering of the Serbian population during the Second World War in the Independent State of Croatia and especially in the Jasenovac concentration camp. The concrete reason for the publishing of such stories was the consecration of the Jasenovac church when Patriarch German appealed for forgiveness but not for oblivion. In the second half of the 1980s, the topic of genocide during the Second World War began to accompany articles about present-day threats to the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In February 1990, on the eve of the first multi-party elections in SR Croatia, the Bishops of the “Church among Croats” held a meeting at which they unanimously agreed on the necessity to vote against the reformed communists (led by Ivica Račan). They further agreed that, in principle, the Croatian national and Christian Democratic option should be supported, but they did not favour any of the Croatian politicians.⁹⁰⁶ With their presence at the opening of parliament and

15 June 1982), the feuilleton “Od Kosova do Jadovna” (From Kosovo to Jadovno), published in late 1983, which draws parallels between the sufferings of the Serbian people in various parts of Yugoslavia (*Lawslavlje*, Nos. 400, 404, 405, 1983 and 1984), the article “Kosovski zavet” (The Kosovo Covenant), published in installments during 1987 (*Glas crkve*, No. 2, 1987), the feuilleton “Krstovdan Srba na Kosovu – crni kalendar – kosovska hronika stradanja Srba od šiptarskih zuluma” (The Holy Cross Day of Serbs in Kosovo – A Bleak Calendar – Kosovo Chronicle of Serbs’ Suffering at the Hands of Shiptar Oppressors), published from October 1988 throughout 1989.

906 According to some authors, the Catholic Church in Croatia explicitly supported Franjo Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) at the elections held in April and May 1990: “Parish priests were told by Kaptol to instruct believers

appearance with state officials in the media, the Catholic leadership displayed almost unconditional support for the new government and its nationalistic policies.⁹⁰⁷ In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1990, Herzegovinian Franciscans demanded the lifting of a ban on political association based on religious or ethnic affinities.⁹⁰⁸

The first state to recognize Croatia, on 13 January 1992, was the Vatican. On the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Croatia, the following was published in the bulletin of the Holy See Press Office on 8 February 1992: "Having achieved freedom and the recognition of its independence by the international community, Croatia, faithful to its roots, is rediscovering its unity with the Apostolic See, which has been lasting for thirteen centuries, wishing to open a new era in these relations. Based on the precious treasure of faith and history, Croatia is now opening itself to the future, wishing it to be the future of peace, progress, justice and true ecumenical activity. The desire is spontaneously born that the cavalry of the Croatian people, caused by the cruel war soaking their lands with blood for several months, turns into the dawn of a new resurrection for all the citizens of this beloved state."⁹⁰⁹ According to the people from *Veritas*, the Holy See itself supported the independence of Croatia: "This was truly again a real war for the 'honored cross and

during the Mass and from the altar to go to the polls in as large a number as possible (...) and vote for the HDZ" Darko Hudelist, "Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj u XX stoljeću", dostupno na https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/kultura_religija_txt00c4.html.

907 David Steele, "Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?"

908 "Herzegovinian friars have been in conflict with the diocesan part of the Catholic Church in Croatia (i.e. the Zagreb Kaptol) and have, in a political sense, advocated the ideology of Croatian national reconciliation" Darko Hudelist, "Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj u XX stoljeću", dostupno na https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/kultura_religija_txt00c4.html.

909 Darko Hudelist, "Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj u XX stoljeću", dostupno na https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/kultura_religija_txt00c4.html.

golden liberty', for the return of Christ and liberty to Croatia. (...) The Church is glad for the return of its people from twofold slavery – Serbian and communist".⁹¹⁰ The Vatican's involvement in gathering international support for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was one reason behind Serbia's claim that the Catholic Church was part of an anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox conspiracy.⁹¹¹

During 1990, the statements on difficult and "almost occupation-like conditions" faced by the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia and Slovenia were issued on two occasions. After its May 1990 session, the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church submitted a request to the competent authorities for exhumations from pits of World War II victims and their official reburials. Throughout the year, reports on memorial services held for genocide victims, digging up bones and reburying them, were coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This practice was intensified during 1991, the year chosen by the Holy Assembly of Bishops for a liturgical prayer marking the 50th anniversary of the suffering of the Serbian Orthodox Church and genocide.⁹¹² The burials of the victims of Ustashe terror in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Žitomislić, Prebilovci, Ljubinj, Trebinje, Majevisa, Banjaluka, etc.) were taking place throughout the year.

At the regular session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church in May 1991, the situation in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina) and Croatia was also discussed and the flock was called upon to help exiles from Croatia. Serbs were also warned to be "sober and humane" in the event of wider conflict.⁹¹³

910 Paul Mojzes, "The Role of the Religious Communities in the War in Former Yugoslavia", *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 13, Iss. 3, Article 4, 1993. Dostupno na <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol13/iss3/4>. 17.

911 David Steele, "Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?", 12.

912 *Lawslavje*, No. 570, 15 December 1990.

913 *Lawslavje*, No. 581, 1991.

In October 1991, Patriarch Pavle sent a letter to Lord Carrington, Chairman of the International Conference on Yugoslavia, claiming that, due to the past genocide against the Serbs in Croatia and the current problems in that region, Serbs cannot remain in any independent Croatia; they must live together under one roof with Serbia and all Serbian regions. "It is time to realize that the victims of genocide cannot live together with their past and perhaps also their future perpetrators". In early November of the same year, a similar letter was sent to the Chairman and all participants of the Peace Conference in The Hague. After the extraordinary session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, its delegation paid visits to the Vice-President of Yugoslavia's Presidency, Dr Branko Kostić, and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to demand they not allow the Presidency or representatives of Serbia and Montenegro to have the "most tragic solution to their issue be imposed" on the Serbian people either in The Hague or anywhere else.⁹¹⁴

Those who organized and participated in various memorial ceremonies on the occasion of unearthing the bones of the Serbs killed during the Second World War, carrying the relics of Prince Lazar through several dioceses and transferring the earthly remains of Nikolaj Velimirović from America to Serbia⁹¹⁵ meant to evoke old fears and myths, thus mobilizing and homogenizing the Serbian ethnos in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The basis for understanding contemporary Serbian nationalism can be found in the writings of Nikolaj Velimirović, who became the most quoted theologian in the speeches of the Serbian Orthodox clergy. Excerpts from his best-known works *Nacionalizam Svetog Save* (Nationalism of Saint Sava) and *Srpskom narodu kroz tamnički prozor* (To the Serbian People Through the Dungeon Window) became the primer of Serbian nationalism and phyletism, while the Church did everything to "finally" return Nikolaj's earthly remains from America to Serbia in 1991.

914 *Lawslavje*, No. 591, 592, 1991.

915 The process of canonization of Nikolaj Velimirović began in 1985/86.

THE WAR PERIOD

During the armed conflicts in the territory of socialist Yugoslavia, religious dignitaries met on several occasions and issued joint appeals for peace. Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Franjo Kuharić met in Sremski Karlovci in May 1991 and in Slavonski Brod a few months later. In late September 1992, the Conference of European Churches and the Council of European Bishops' Conferences arranged a meeting between Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharić in Château de Bossey near Geneva from which they called for an immediate end to fighting. Reis-ul-Ulema Jakub Selimoski could not attend the meeting being a hostage to the siege of Sarajevo. At the end of November of the same year, Reis-ul-Ulema Selimoski, Patriarch Pavle and the then Archbishop of Sarajevo, Vinko Puljić, met in Zurich and issued a joint appeal.⁹¹⁶ "The Appeal for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina" called for the termination of armed conflicts, unhindered distribution of humanitarian aid, closure of all camps and release of prisoners-of-war, ending ethnic cleansing and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Several independent statements were also issued by religious community officials, calling for the protection of human rights and termination of conflicts. Thus, for example, at their autumn meeting in 1991, the Catholic Bishops spoke of the "evil of war" and upheld the "minority rights within the established borders".

In addition to the mentioned statements expressing general concern about peace and human rights, there were also cases of confession and regret concerning certain crimes committed by members of one's own ethnic group as well as personal restraint concerning the accusations of others of being guilty. Bishop Jefrem of Banjaluka signed an appeal condemning the Serb nationalistic forces for slaughtering Muslim believers at worship in a mosque. Cardinal Kuharić expressed sorrow and protest over the attack on the museum and

916 *Religija, odgovornost i tranziciona Pravda*, prir. N. Knežević, B. Pantelić i S. Sremac, (Novi Sad, Beograd: Centar za istraživanje religije, politike i društva, Hrišćanski kulturni centar dr Radovan Bigović, 2014), 9.

residence of the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Zagreb, claiming that this act was a crime against God's command and against Croatian democracy. An interesting illustration of restraint comes, perhaps most appropriately, from the Mufti of Belgrade after a bomb had exploded in the courtyard of his mosque. When asked who was to blame, he stated: "I do not know who placed the bomb, but I know that Serbs put out the fire".⁹¹⁷

The relations between the two largest religious organizations in Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, were of utmost importance for a multinational and multireligious country with a distinct traditional ethno-confessional identification. Relations between the two Churches had a decisive influence on the relations between the two largest nations. Neither the Serbian Orthodox Church nor the Catholic Church were directly responsible for starting and waging the wars, but their inability to engage in a dialogue affected the general atmosphere in the country and opened the question of their moral responsibility and the imbalance between their roles as Christian and national institutions.

When the common Yugoslav state was established, instead of the privileged position they used to have within the previous state and socio-political frameworks, the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church became equal religious communities. The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church was characterized by "the innate psychological barriers"⁹¹⁸, that is, plenty of inherited prejudices on both sides. In addition to doctrinal differences, involving primarily *filioque* and *pontifex maximus*,⁹¹⁹ it is generally difficult for the Orthodox to overcome past experiences, such as the

917 David Steele, "Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?", 4.

918 Timoti Ver, "Lawslavna crkva i ponovno ujedinjenje svih hrišćana", *Lawslavlje između neba i zemlje*, prir. Dragoljub B. Đorđević, (Niš: Gradina, 1991), 72.

919 The decisions of the Vatican Council of 1870 left a deep imprint on the Orthodox who could not accept the primacy and infallibility of the Pope, although Catholics agreed that these Vatican provisions were incomplete and one-sided, while

Crusades, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the schism in Antioch in the 18th century, the persecution of the Orthodox Church by a Polish Catholic government in the inter-war period and the like. In addition, the suffering of Serbian Orthodox believers, clergy and bishoprics during the Second World War in the Independent State of Croatia and the attitudes of both the state leadership and Catholic clergy towards it marked the relationship between the two religious organizations throughout the second half of the 20th century.⁹²⁰

Until the early 1960s, it was very rare for Orthodox and Catholic clergymen to communicate with each other, let alone for bishops of the two churches to meet.⁹²¹ A wider context for inter-religious dialogue in Yugoslavia was undoubtedly provided by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), which gave impetus to the ecumenical idea in Catholicism and laid the foundation for inter-Christian dialogue. During the 1960s, Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras I of Constantinople met three times: in Jerusalem in 1964, and in Istanbul and Rome in 1967, while the mutual anathemas of 1054 were lifted on 7 December 1965. The Serbian Orthodox Church joined the World Council of Churches in Geneva in 1968, while Patriarch German was elected as one of its six chairpersons in 1968.⁹²²

the Second Ecumenical Council adopted a dogmatic decision on the authority of bishoprics.

920 Such a relationship between the Catholics and the Orthodox is primarily characteristic for inter-religious relations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Slovenia, the meetings of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Slovenian Catholic Church were more frequent and more cordial due to historical uncumberedness.

921 Radmila Radić, "Odnosi između Srpske Pravoslavne crkve i Katoličke crkve u poslednjim decenijama pred raspad jugoslovenske države", 286.

922 The Serbian Orthodox Church was one of the last Orthodox Churches to join this international ecumenical association. Patriarch German was criticized by church zealots for cooperation with an organization dominated by schismatic Protestants. Otherwise, the Serbian Orthodox Church was receiving financial assistance from the World Council of Churches for years.

The first ecumenical activity in his diocese was organized by Bishop Stjepan Baeuerlein of Đakovo and Bosnia-Srijem, the successor of Josip Juraj Strossmayer, a great proponent of Christian unity. Namely, he established the Diocesan Committee on the Unification of the Churches in 1964. The pioneers of interreligious dialogue also included young theology students from Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade, who maintained correspondence with each other and exchanged congratulations on religious holidays. During the Second Vatican Council in 1963, the students of the Theological Faculty in Ljubljana visited their peers in Belgrade, while a delegation of Zagreb theologians paid a visit to Belgrade the following year. The Zagreb visit was returned in the same year.⁹²³

At the end of January 1966, Archbishop of Split Frane Franić staged the first ecumenical liturgy in the Split Cathedral together with an Orthodox priest. In January 1984, the “Ecumenical Prayer Walk in Zagreb” was organized with the participation of Catholics, Orthodox, Evangelists and Baptists. The Prayer Movement of Christian Women, founded by Reformists and Catholics, already had been functioning in Vojvodina since 1975. In 1977, Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Evangelists and Methodists joined the movement.⁹²⁴

Influential, radical antiecumenical theologians within the Serbian Orthodox Church were undermining interreligious cooperation. One of the most influential among them was a former professor at the Theological Faculty, Justin Popović, who lived in isolation in the Monastery of Čelije near Valjevo. His epistle published in Paris in 1971 and his study of ecumenism published in Greece in 1974 resounded on all sides. He condemned both groups of the global ecumenical movement: the so-called “Geneva ecumenism” and “Roman ecumenism”. He argued that ecumenism was possible only if all other Christians accepted the Orthodox teachings, never the other way.

923 Juraj Kolarić, “Katoličko-Lawslavni odnosi (1965–1990)”, *Lawslavlje između neba i zemlje*, priredio Dragoljub B. Đorđević, (Niš: Gradina, 1991), 177.

924 Juraj Kolarić, “Katoličko-Lawslavni odnosi (1965–1990)”, 181.

Another influential antiecumenical theologian of the Serbian Orthodox Church was Nikolaj Velimirović. They both criticized humanism, European civilization, the spirit of materialism and the like.

Atanasije Jevtić, Justin Popović's student and one of the leading theologians of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was also a strong opponent of interreligious cooperation. In 1975, as an archimandrite and a professor at the Theological Faculty in Belgrade, he stood against an ecumenical conference and ecumenical prayers. With a few exceptions, most Serbian Orthodox theologians shared Jevtić's views⁹²⁵, although they were never the official stance of the Serbian Orthodox Church.⁹²⁶

At a meeting between the Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Franjo Šeper, and Patriarch German in Sremski Karlovci in late June 1968, the Cardinal suggested the establishment of a joint Orthodox-Catholic committee that would be tasked with solving the problems of mixed marriages. In September 1985, Patriarch German accepted the initiative, but the first meeting of this committee, planned for 1986, never took place because in the meantime a delegation from the Serbian Orthodox Church temporarily left the Fourth Meeting of the Commission for Dialogue Between Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Bari (Italy) in May-June 1986, in protest against alleged proselytism by the Catholic Church and the alleged recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church by the Vatican.⁹²⁷

925 Radmila Radić, "Odnosi između Srpske Pravoslavne crkve i Katoličke crkve u poslednjim decenijama pred raspad jugoslovenske države", 291.

926 Of all the Western churches, the Serbian Orthodox Church had the most friendly relations with the Anglican Church. As early as 1930, a delegation from the Serbian Orthodox Church participated in a conference of Anglican and Orthodox theologians within the Lambeth Conference in England as well as in a joint Anglican-Orthodox Commission in London the following year. The dialogue started in 1973, but fell into crisis by 1977–1978 due to the ordination of female priests in several Anglican Churches.

927 Juraj Kolarić, "Katoličko-Pravoslavni odnosi (1965–1990)", 182.

Inter-faculty symposiums with the participation of representatives of the Catholic Theological Faculty in Zagreb, the Faculty of Theology in Ljubljana and the Orthodox Theological Faculty in Belgrade had been organized since 1974. The Ninth Ecumenical Symposium in the autumn of 1990 was held without theologians from Zagreb.⁹²⁸ The same year, the Serbian Orthodox Church refused to participate in the previously mentioned “Ecumenical Prayer Walk in Zagreb”.

In the meantime, the polemic with *Glas koncila*, started by Atanasije Jevtić in the autumn of 1988, flared up. In 1990, this journal started running fiery articles about the number of victims in the Jasenovac death camp, the massacre of Serbs in Livno and the like. During that period, *Lawslavlje* had already widely published archival documents about the genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia.

A press release issued by the Conference of the Serbian Orthodox Bishops and clergy from the Republic of Croatia in September 1990 stated that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia worked “under most aggravated and almost occupation-like circumstances” and blamed Croatia’s state authorities for it. *Glas koncila* and the Catholic Church were also accused of openly supporting the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the release railed against the ill-treatment of Serbian Orthodox people in Croatia.⁹²⁹

According to some sources, in late May 1989, Cardinal Kuharić proposed a dialogue between the two Churches. The Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church responded affirmatively in late June, but there was no further reaction by the Catholic Church.⁹³⁰

The Serbian Orthodox Church primarily criticized the Catholic Church for: the support of its press, Radio Vatican and some Catholic representatives, for the Albanians’ demand for the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija; the Vatican’s support of the Macedonian Orthodox Church; the campaign for the beatification of Alojzije Stepinac;

928 Juraj Kolarić, “Katoličko-Lawslavni odnosi (1965–1990)”, 183.

929 *Lawslavlje*, Nos. 555 and 556, 1990.

930 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, I–II, 319.

the polemic about the number of Ustashe victims in the Jasenovac death camp; and the suffering of the Serbian people in the Independent State of Croatia.

Naturally, the weak potential of dialogue manifested itself very soon and the period that followed was characterized by mutual provocations, accusations and condemnations, as well as the monopolization of the victim. Reis-ul-Ulema Jakub Selimoski accused the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church of saying one thing and doing another. Namely, although he signed an agreement condemning war crimes, he justified the massacre of Muslims by claiming that Serbs and Orthodoxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina were endangered. Croatian church officials also accused Patriarch Pavle of blessing the foundation of a new Orthodox church in Lovas, a town in eastern Slavonia which was occupied by Serbs and where there were no Orthodox inhabitants before the Second World War. Both Serbs and Croats accused Muslims of building an Islamic theocracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian Orthodox Bishops argued that a democratic, inclusive and multiethnic state spoken of by President Izetbegović and his government was simply a cover for their real goal of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.⁹³¹ In December 1992, the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued the “Statement about False Accusations against the Serbian Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” in which, contrary to the careful documentation of internationally recognized organizations, the Bishops decried alleged propaganda aimed at demonizing the Serbian people.

In September 1991, a Catholic youth magazine carried this message on its front page: “We are ready to die for our Homeland.” The Bishop of Split, Ante Jurić, stated that “It is the duty of every Catholic to

931 David Steele, “Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?”, 7.

defend his Fatherland actively. In a moment like this, a false pacifism is indirectly strengthening the aggressors and the bandits".⁹³²

The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana received menacing letters from the Veterans' Society of Croatia stating that the first to be attacked would be all Serbian Bishops. Finally, Catholic priests, many of whom were refugees from the occupied territories of Croatia, were sent as army chaplains to bless soldiers and weapons on the front lines. A few priests and numerous former Catholic seminarians in Sarajevo carried guns and accompanied troops into battle.⁹³³ When Cardinal Franjo Kuharić was asked⁹³⁴ for his opinion about Fra Duka, a gun-toting Franciscan chaplain who had accompanied Croatian troops into battle, he answered that Fra Duka was not doing this as a representative of the Church, but as a private matter. The chaplain went unpunished by the church authorities.

Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana Jovan, Bishop of Srem Vasilije, Bishop of Žiča Stefan and Bishop Lukijan of Osijek-Dalj-Baranja visited the Training Centre for Serbian Volunteers in Erdut where, during a meeting with their commander Željko Ražnatović Arkan, it was "stated that the Holy and Great Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church advocates a peaceful solution, but not to the detriment of the Serbian people, once again a target for Ustashe crimes". A report on this meeting quotes that the church representatives "were especially pleased to learn that the Training Centre keeps the tradition of the Serbian people not in order to fuel nationalism, but to awaken Orthodoxy that has been stifled for decades".⁹³⁵

932 David Steele, "Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?", 6.

933 David Steele, "Former Yugoslavia: Religion as a Fount of Ethnic Hostility or an Agent of Reconciliation?", 13.

934 Darko Pavičić, "Svećenik nije komesar", *Danas*, Vol. 10, No. 503 (8 October 1991), p. 28.

935 *Dnevnik*, 10 December 1991.

Each traditional religious community carefully, quickly and accurately recorded and pointed to the crimes of the members of other ethnic groups, while at the same time skilfully and silently ignoring the same misdeeds of the members of its own ethno-confessional community.

THE SACRALIZATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

The syntagm “Church among Croats”, which has often been used just like the expression “Bishops of the Croatian linguistic area”, has been used within the Catholic Church as an alternative to the formal expression “Bishops’ Conference of Yugoslavia”. The term “Church among Croats” has been promoted especially by the Editorial Board of *Glas koncila*. The phrase is significantly broader than the terms “Catholic Church in Croatia” and “Bishops’ Conference of Yugoslavia” and incorporated all Croats, both in Croatia and the region, as well as in the diaspora. The syntagm “Church among Croats” has emphasized the national engagement of the Catholic Church in Croatia, especially during the period when Croats did not have their own state and the Croatian Catholic Church was a specific substitute for statehood and unity, as well as the very survival of the Croatian ethnos. There has been a certain sacralization of the ethnic community because by Christianization, according to such an understanding, Christ himself is embodied or incarnated in the national being, thus necessarily giving a theological aspect to the history and development of that ethnos. “The history of the Croatian people is also the history of their salvation.” The doctrine about the incarnation of God and Jesus Christ in the Croatian national being has reconciled the universality of the concept of the Catholic Church with the national-political engagement of the local church organization.⁹³⁶

A very interesting and inspiring effort to draw an analogy between the Croatian Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church was

936 Darko Hudelist, “Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj u XX stoljeću”, dostupno na https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/kultura_religija_txt00c4.html.

made by Kustić in his commentary titled “The Ecumenical Courage and Sincerity of Our Bishops”, published in *Glas koncila* on 17 January 1974. Namely, he stated that if the Serbian Orthodox Church can be explicitly and with no complexes nationally oriented, then the Catholic Church in Croatia can also be the same – especially, as he emphasized, when it was “awakened by the conciliar spirit” and thus “increasingly (...) aware, both theoretically and practically, that it cannot exist in any other way except as being embodied in a particular people”. Kustić also said: “The Church rooted in the Croatian people is really the Church among Croats. That is so and must be increasingly so. The same applies to the Church rooted in the Serbian people and, naturally, the Church of the Slovenian people.”

National identity, the cult of national and religious heroes and, in general, national history, national alphabet⁹³⁷ and traditional customs and values are cherished under the auspices of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The deepening of the general crisis and disintegration of the system made Orthodoxy increasingly important for the cultural and national identity of the Serbian people and their homogenization and identification vis-à-vis other national and confessional affiliations; all this contributed to citizens turning to the Church and religion to express some of their latent dissatisfaction, thus imparting to them a certain political charge. The Church, therefore, became a refuge for a part of the political and cultural opposition and gave legitimacy to a sector of nationally oriented intelligentsia.

The Serbian Orthodox Church is continuously claiming that it has always been the only guardian of the Serbian people and has never abandoned them. Therefore, it is above the state and represents the supreme moral arbiter whose intentions and stands cannot be questioned.⁹³⁸ The Church and Serbian Orthodoxy, with their Slavophile

937 Since the marking of the 200th death anniversary of Vuk Karadžić in 1987, a constant topic within the Serbian Orthodox Church has been the endangerment of the Cyrillic alphabet and insistence on its urgent revival.

938 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, I–II, 338.

version of European organic-organicist thought, conciliarity and St Sava teachings, emerge as the basic source of the nation and as the privileged guardians of national tradition, culture, historical experience, language and the like.⁹³⁹

Using Kosovo as an unresolved problem within Serbia and Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church has offered itself as a mainstay of traditional national security and the centre of national life. It makes this assertion based on its centuries-long experience, as the only institution that “has never let down the Serbs throughout history”. Apart from the justified concern about sacral buildings and emigration, and about the decreasing number of believers, Kosovo has provided some hierarchs with the anchor for the Church’s final return to the public scene. Voices proclaiming the “tragic position of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia” could be more often heard.

On the eve of the war in Yugoslavia, especially in the period 1989–1991, the Serbian Orthodox Church played an important role in mobilizing public opinion for the Serbian national interests promoted by the political leadership headed by Slobodan Milošević. The Church’s return to the political scene ran parallel to the rise of nationalistic elites, as is also testified by the “Draft Serbian Church – National Programme”, published in *Glas crkve* in 1989. Two years later, apart from the statement that there is no “strong state without a strong Church”, one could also read that there would be no people either: “While reviving our spiritual foundation we should start from the fact that Orthodoxy had given birth to Serbdom, which could not be kept alive without it. Serbs who stopped being Orthodox stopped being Serbs.”⁹⁴⁰

Due to its traditional social role in defining the national subjectivity of the Serbian people as well as its involvement in the government

939 Radmila Radić, “Odnosi između Srpske Pravoslavne crkve i Katoličke crkve u poslednjim decenijama pred raspad jugoslovenske države”, 293.

940 *Glas crkve*, 1/1991.

apparatus with which it is traditionally in a symbiotic relationship⁹⁴¹, the Serbian Orthodox Church was not building its political identity independently and separately from the identities of the state and nation. After the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church “grown into its glorious tradition and imbued with the devotion to the state to the creation of which it had also contributed so much, could not understand that the new state was no longer Serbia and that its national role in the new circumstances was no longer what it used to be”.⁹⁴² Since its creation in 1918 there have been “two different state-building principles” in Yugoslavia, one in which it was seen as an extended Kingdom of Serbia and the other viewing Yugoslavia as a union of South Slav peoples. Considering itself a religious and national guardian of the Serbian people, the Serbian Orthodox Church advocated the first principle.⁹⁴³ Having identified itself fully with Serbia as a state and the Serbs as a nation, the Serbian Orthodox Church represented a national rather than just a religious institution, while Yugoslavia was experienced as the loss of Serbian statehood and national identity. The identification of nation with religion or ethnicity with confessional affiliation is based on a belief that the church is deeply rooted in the national being and that the nation cannot survive without its church. This symbiosis between “ecclesiastical and political nationalism” imparts a transcendental value and significance to the nation itself.⁹⁴⁴

In mid-May 1968, one of the conclusions of the session of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina was as follows: “Practice has revealed the harmfulness of various forms of pressure

941 Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo*, (Beograd: Čigoja, 2001), 103.

942 Đoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Lawslavne crkve III: Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata i posle njega*, 6.

943 Radmila Radić, *Verom protiv vere (država i verske zajednice u Srbiji 1945–1953)*, (Beograd: INIS, 1995), 324.

Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, I–II, 337.

944 Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo*, 101.

and insistence in the earlier period that Muslims should declare themselves as Serbs or Croats, because it has already been shown and today's socialist practice has confirmed that Muslims are a separate nation".⁹⁴⁵ Six years later, the Muslim nation, that is, the category "Muslims" was incorporated into the new Yugoslav constitution as the sixth Yugoslav constituent nation. Since then there have been three constituent nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, none of which could identify itself with the federal republic. However, the Muslims have been Yugoslavia's only constituent nation not directly identified with any of the constituent federal republics, so that it could not have its own national institutions.⁹⁴⁶

In this context, the Islamic Community (IZ) has rapidly become a substitute for the national institution of Bosnian Muslims. The central role of Islam in expressing Muslim national identity explains how the Bosnian pan-Islamic current, which was reactivated within the Islamic Community during the 1960s and subjected to repression by the communist authorities in 1983,⁹⁴⁷ succeeded in taking the lead in the national mobilization of the Bosnian Muslim population in the last decade of the 20th century.⁹⁴⁸ After 1980, the Islamic Community was the only national institution of Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁴⁹

945 Xavier Bougarel, "Od 'Muslima' do .Bošnjaka': pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima", *Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka: zbornik radova*, (Sarajevo: Institut za historiju, 2009), 122.

946 Xavier Bougarel, "Od 'Muslima' do .Bošnjaka': pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima", 123.

947 The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was founded on 26 May 1990 and Alija Izetbegović, one of the pan-Islamist activists sentenced to prison in 1983, was elected President.

948 Xavier Bougarel, "Od 'Muslima' do .Bošnjaka': pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima", 123.

949 Dženita Sarač, "Neuspjeh sekularizacije i jačanje religijskog identiteta početkom 1980-ih godina u Bosni i Hercegovini", *Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka: zbornik radova*, (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2009), 154.

The Party of Democratic Action, which was influenced by the pan-Islamist current, sought to represent the entire “Muslim historical-cultural circle” in Yugoslavia and thus ensure the political unity of Muslims in Yugoslavia. However, the formation of Albanian, Turkish and Roma political parties ended these pan-Islamist ambitions of the Party of Democratic Action, which succeeded in exerting a decisive influence only in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak, that is, in the parts of the jurisdiction of the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia where Bosniak national identity was predominant.

In the intra-party conflict between neo-Bosniak and pan-Islamist proponents, the pan-Islamist current was favoured not only by the leaders of the Islamic Community, which held that Islam should be put in the centre of Muslim national identity, but also by the former communist intellectuals who feared that the adoption of the national name “Bosniak” would upset the delicate balance among the constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁵⁰

According to one thesis, Bosniak identity is characterized by four constants: Slavic ethnic origin, language, Bosnia as a cultural and political space and Islam as a religious and civilizational affiliation.⁹⁵¹ However, preference is often given to the religious factor of ethnic determination and connection. In other words, a thesis has been developed that the Muslim or Bosniak nation has historically been developed through religious acculturation as a religious-cultural confessional community, secondly as a social community and finally as an ethnic community. Thus, Islam has driven the ethnic awareness of common destiny through a series of socio-historical and cultural intermediations.^{952 953}

950 Xavier Bougarel, “Od ‘Muslima’ do .Bošnjaka’: pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima”, 124.

951 Mustafa Imamović, “Identitet Bošnjaka u XX stoljeću”, in: Godišnjak BZK Preporod, Sarajevo, 2003, 9.

952 Fuad Saltaga, *Muslimska nacija u Jugoslaviji*, Sarajevo, 1991, 7.

953 Dženita Sarač, “Neuspjeh sekularizacije i jačanje religijskog identiteta početkom 1980-ih godina u Bosni i Hercegovini”, 161.

According to Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Cerić, “without Islam, without Islamic civilization, without Islamic culture– we are nobodies”.⁹⁵⁴ Hilmo Neimarlija, second in importance in the Islamic Community, tried to define more precisely the relationship between Islam and Bosniak national identity at a conference held in Zagreb in April 1994: “Bosniaks are Muslims. By tradition, by culture, by the faith of their ancestors, by the faith of a great majority of Bosniaks whose own practice also testifies to that both innately and intimately. Bosniaks are Muslims in the way Croats are Catholics. (...) We simply cannot allow anyone anymore, especially ourselves, to be in a dilemma (...) because our national being, our national identity, has been defined by Islam, not as a religion but as one of the three great or high world cultures”.⁹⁵⁵

On the occasion of the establishment (renewal) of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was emphasized that it includes “all Muslims living in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as all Bosnian Muslims living temporarily or permanently abroad”⁹⁵⁶. This ethnic dimension was later more specifically institutionalized in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted in late November 1977 in Sarajevo: “The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the sole and unique community of Muslims living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks living outside the homeland and of other Muslims who accept this community as their own.”⁹⁵⁷

954 Xavier Bougarel, “Od ‘Muslima’ do .Bošnjaka’: pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima”, 131.

955 Xavier Bougarel, “Od ‘Muslima’ do .Bošnjaka’: pitanje nacionalnog imena bosanskih Muslima”, 131.

956 The statement by the Renewal Assembly of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in the journal *Ljiljan*, Vol. II, No. 19 (10 May 1993), p.23.

957 Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://www.islamskazajednica.ba/images/stories/Ustavi/Ustav_IZ-e_iz_1997.pdf.

Being aware of the national potential of religious communities, the socialist authorities were suspicious, cautious and distrustful vis-à-vis traditional religious communities and tried in various ways to prevent any nationalistic activity by them, endeavoring to exert intensive control over as many parts and ranks of the hierarchy of each religious community as possible.

Thus, for example, the reports of the Commission for Relations with the Religious Communities of SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those covering the period 1980–1990, warn about the politicization of the religious communities, which oppose socialist development, politicize religion, manipulate religious freedoms and religious facilities, identify religion with nation, maintain contacts with nationalistic and antisocialist forces, institutionalize religious education, divide citizens into believers and nonbelievers and the like.⁹⁵⁸

However, the previous example of Muslims clearly shows that certain activities, carried out by the republican and federal authorities to prevent further maintenance and resumption of traditional relations between ethnic and confessional identities, had exactly the opposite effect. In an effort to direct Muslims towards common republican institutions, which would be shared on an equal footing with the other two constituent national identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims remained the only constituent nation without national institutions. Due to such an approach, Muslims turned to the Islamic Community, which was not only the closest institution in identity terms, but also the only Muslim institution. This became especially evident in the 1980s.

As for distrust towards the Catholic Church, even if we consider that the local clergy was divided over the issue of Ustashe and Croatia's independence, it was certainly enough that the Vatican had a clear stance with respect to communism. The difficulties faced by the

958 Dženita Sarač, "Neuspjeh sekularizacije i jačanje religijskog identiteta početkom 1980-ih godina u Bosni i Hercegovini", 167.

Church in the Soviet Union left a deep mark and Pope Pius XII took a very strong anti-communist stance.⁹⁵⁹

The problems between the Yugoslav communist authorities and the Catholic Church began immediately after the Second World War. Within the scope of the general process of atheization and distancing of the public sphere from religious institutions, this relationship was additionally burdened by the collaboration of some Catholic priests with the Ustashe authorities during the Second World War and the role of the Vatican in helping the Ustashe to flee after the war. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war, many Catholic priests were killed, convicted and imprisoned, while a good part of Church property was confiscated and nationalized. The key moment in the radicalization of relations between the authorities and the Catholic Church was the trial and imprisonment of Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac. His appointment as Cardinal by Pope Pius XII in 1952 was used by the Yugoslav authorities to sever diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In the years that followed, until the deaths of Pius XII (1958) and Alojzije Stepinac (1960), the mutual distrust was ubiquitous. The communist authorities continued their pressure on the Church in the country, while the Holy See used every opportunity to harm Yugoslavia's reputation in the world through official and unofficial diplomatic activities. As already mentioned, mutual relations "warmed up" after the Second Vatican Council and the signing of the Protocol in 1966, as well as Tito's visit to the Vatican in 1971.

Immediately prior to and during the Second World War, the Serbian Orthodox Church was not inclined towards communists as it saw them as infidels. It was pro-monarchist and sided with the nationalistic right-wing and Draža Mihailović's Chetnik movement. It also manifested its preference during rituals; even after the war, the King's

959 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 84.

name was mentioned in every liturgy.⁹⁶⁰ The socialist state's resolute showdown with the Chetnik movement and monarchism after the Second World War deprived the Serbian Orthodox Church of the state's ideological-political and financial support.

During its historical development, the Serbian Orthodox Church was closely linked to the state: it was financially dependent on it and poorly resistant to its pressure. Two centuries of Serbia's modern history were marked by caesaropapism, which remained as the official policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia for all religious communities, including the Serbian Orthodox Church, until the vanishing of this state. After the Second World War, disorganized and thinned, materially destroyed, lacking international backing and labelled as the bearer of Serbian hegemonism, the Serbian Orthodox Church found itself for the first time in a totally secular system, which not only ignored its historical merits and national importance, but stigmatized these characteristics as socially undesirable. In the second half of the 20th century, the Serbian Orthodox Church was confined to its basic function, which was reduced and placed under the control of the state.⁹⁶¹

We will only mention the formation of "associations of priests" within both Orthodox and Catholic organizational structures in order to show one method government used to exert control over religious communities. So, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Union of Associations of Orthodox Priests of the SFRY was established. The Union had been deepening the gap between the lowest and highest ranks of the Serbian Orthodox Church for decades. The Bishops did not agree with such an organization of the clergy, although it had been approved by the government

960 One should not lose sight of the fact that membership in partisan units included Orthodox priests and a large number of Orthodox believers, especially those living outside Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

961 Latinka Perović, . "Sociopolitička i etničko-religijska dimenzija ratova u Jugoslaviji", *Nasilno rasturanje Jugoslavije: uzroci, dinamika, posledice*, prii. Miroslav Hadžić, (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004), 124.

authorities. The Holy Assembly of Bishops refused to recognize the associations established in the republics and called for the renewal of diocesan associations, which had been included in the Union of Associations through the Union of Diocesan Associations.

Among other things, Union members criticized clericalism in the Church. They called for the democratization of church administration, as well as revisions to the 1947 Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church and to the entire church legislation in general. As was to be expected, the Union, itself not recognized by the Serbian Orthodox Church, sided with the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which was also not recognized by the Episcopate.

The Union of Associations of Orthodox Priests, established by the priests who had participated in the partisan movement, had a very hostile attitude towards the Episcopate.⁹⁶² They claimed that “none of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, alive at the time, had any affinity for the partisan struggle”.⁹⁶³ The Union of Associations of Orthodox Priests ceased to exist in 1990.

The establishment of priests’ associations functioning outside the authority of the higher ranks of the church hierarchy was also one of the strategies applied to the Catholic Church. Immediately after the Second World War, the first such association was established in Istria and then in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As early as late 1952, almost all Istrian priests were members of the association, in addition to about 80 percent of priests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 60 percent in Slovenia.⁹⁶⁴ The following year, three more associations of priests were established – in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. These associations were established parallel to the republican struc-

962 Slobodan G. Marković, “Srpska Lawslavna crkva u Srbiji i država: klerikalizacija ili cezaropapizam”, *Vera, znanje, mir*, ur. Milan Sitarski i Marinko Vučinić, (Beograd: BOŠ, 2005), 168.

963 Đoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske Lawslavne crkve III: Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata i posle njega*, 189.

964 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 89.

tures and served, among other things, as channels for state subsidies aimed at restoring what had been destroyed by war. The associations of priests were integrated into the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ).⁹⁶⁵ These associations functioned until the end of the 1970s.

PROTECTION OF JURISDICTION - THE CASE OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Serbian Orthodox Church and political elites came to be at odds when the first peace agreements were signed in socialist Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s. In January 1992, the Holy Assembly of Bishops convened an extraordinary session when the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, accepted Cyrus Vance's peace plan,⁹⁶⁶ after which it released the following: "Nobody's deals with the Serbian authorities, who are unauthorized to represent the entire Serbian nation, or with the bodies of the Yugoslav federation, or the commanders of the Yugoslav Army, oblige the Serbian people as a whole without their consent and without the blessing of their spiritual Mother, the Serbian Orthodox Church. "The release supported "the demand of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a life in freedom and independent political arrangement".⁹⁶⁷

Soon afterwards, the long regular (May) session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops released the Memorandum of the Serbian Orthodox

965 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 90.

966 The regular sessions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops are traditionally held once a year, between Easter and Pentecost. Since December 1990, when the first multi-party parliamentary elections were held in Serbia and when the new Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Patriarch Pavle) was elected, one extraordinary session has been convened every year, after the first regular session in May. In 1992, as an exception, two extraordinary sessions were convened (one in January, before the regular session, and the other in December, after the regular session). The reason was the acceptance of Vance's plan.

967 *Lawslavlje*, No. 598, 1992.

Church, whereby the Church “openly distances itself from this and such government and its leaders”, because the parties in power in Serbia and Montenegro, as the successors to the structure, bodies, funds and principles of the post-war communist system, stand in the way of an unbiased democratic dialogue within society, shared responsibility and cooperation with others, and allowance of the Church to take its proper place in the society to which it belongs. The Memorandum also condemned crimes committed by any army and attacks on humanitarian convoys.⁹⁶⁸

Throughout 1992, the Serbian Orthodox Church distanced itself from official state policy and criticized its promoters. Patriarch Pavle’s presence at the ceremony of the proclamation of FR Yugoslavia, on 27 April 1992, was condemned not only within the predominant Church, but also outside of it. The Patriarch responded that it was nothing else but a mere protocolary event. *Lawslavljje* also published an editorial under the headline “The Church Is Above Parties”, arguing that the Serbian Orthodox Church in some cases should be represented *ex officio*, which does not imply its siding with the ruling regime.⁹⁶⁹ In terms of the Church’s distancing itself from state politics, the following events were most illustrative: Patriarch Pavle’s address in front of the Cathedral Church on 14 June and his presence at the St Vitus’ Day manifestation staged by the democratic opposition in Serbia, the editorials in *Lawslavljje*, articles in *Glas crkve*, the June letter of support by Bishop of Raška and Prizren Artemije addressed to the student protesters (...) In essence, the Serbian Orthodox Church was dissatisfied with the level of assistance provided by the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities to the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁷⁰

The ruling regime was also strongly criticized at the session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops in 1993. That same year, on the occasion of St Vitus Day, Bishop Atanasije Jevtić delivered an “Appeal” against

968 *Lawslavljje*, No. 605, 1 June 1992.

969 *Lawslavljje*, No. 603, 1 May 1992; No. 605, 1 June 1992.

970 Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970*, I–II, 331.

“sacrificing Eastern Herzegovina” in the negotiations with the Croatian side and in various versions of the Vance-Owen plan.⁹⁷¹ The regime was also accused of having a lenient attitude towards the international community in the defence of the interests of “Serbs on the other bank of the Drina”.

Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović’s statement given at that time best illustrates the attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the Serb-populated territories that remained outside the borders of FR Yugoslavia, especially the Republic of Srpska: “The backbone of those united lands is already known and is being reshaped despite all difficulties. Serbia and Montenegro make up this backbone, together with Eastern Herzegovina, a part of Bosanska Krajina, Srpska Krajina (...)The contours of those Serbian lands have clearly shown themselves in all these developments and it is such a pity that cries and screams by Srpska Krajina have not been duly responded (...)”⁹⁷²

In May 1993, in addressing believers in the Foča Church on its Patron Saint’s Day, Metropolitan Jovan stressed the significance of the assistance the Holy Assembly of Bishops gave to the Republic of Srpska to support the Serbian people’s struggle for their own state.⁹⁷³ Metropolitan Nikolaj and Bishops Vasilije and Atanasije attended the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska in Pale discussing the Contact Group’s peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bishop Atanasije conveyed the message of the Serbian Orthodox Church to Bosnian Serbs that they should not accept being decimated once again, while Metropolitan Amfilohije sent a telegram of support to the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska in early July 1994.

On 5 July 1994, commenting on the negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina or, more exactly, the Contact Group’s peace plan, the Bishops’ Conference of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued an “Appeal to the Serbian People and International Public”, emphasizing

971 *NIN*, 4 June and 9 July 1993.

972 *Duga*, 20 April 1992.

973 *Lawslavlje*, No. 633–4, 1–15 August 1993.

the following: "Fully responsible to God and our people and human history, we appeal to the Serbian people to stand up and defend their centuries-old rights and freedoms, and interests that are vital to their physical and spiritual survival in their ancestral lands." As was expected, the Bishops turned down the proposed maps and argued that the people should decide their future fate with a referendum.⁹⁷⁴

The decision of the Government of FR Yugoslavia to break off political and economic relations with the Republic of Srpska (1994) was the reason for an emergency extraordinary session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops. Its press release triggered numerous commentaries at home and abroad, including the World Council of Churches' strong criticism of the Serbian Orthodox Church for its publicly expressed nationalism. A few days before the extraordinary session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral appealed to the members of the Assembly of Montenegro demanding them to vote against the decision of the Government of FR Yugoslavia.⁹⁷⁵

Yet another interesting detail should also be mentioned. Patriarch Pavle's presence at the meeting between Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić in late August 1995 and especially his signature on the disputable document authorizing Slobodan Milošević to negotiate on behalf of all Serbs caused a serious crisis in the Serbian Orthodox Church and some of the clergy even called for his dethronement. The extraordinary session of the Holy Synod of Bishops, held on 21 and 22 December 1995, declared the Patriarch's signature invalid. The Holy Synod of Bishops expressed its deep concern over the Dayton Peace Accords: "By issuing this release for our public and international factors because of the present dilemmas or misinterpretations – either benevolent or malevolent – the Holy Synod of Bishops also considers its duty to inform the public that the recent signature of His Holiness Patriarch of Serbia below the agreement between the

974 *Glasnik SPC*, October 1994.

975 *Lawslavlje*, 11 August 1994; *NIN*, 12 August 1994.

representatives of the Republic of Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Srpska does not mean in any way that he or the Church as a whole support the concrete initiatives by the signatories.”⁹⁷⁶

The regular session of the Holy Assembly of Bishops in May 1996 brought the following decision: “Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Versailles-made Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church still extends to all Orthodox believers in that territory.”⁹⁷⁷ The dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church insisted on the monopolization of the victim, that is, the argument that for the second time in their history the Serbian people experienced genocide and that it happened in the context of a defensive and just war. They argued that the only solution to the national question was the unification of the entire Serbian people, that is, the preservation of the consolidated spiritual jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

During the war, the Serbian Orthodox Church oscillated between declarative ecumenical, anti-war stances and actual support for ethno-nationalistic political forces, especially in the Republic of Srpska. It strongly condemned crimes, but most often interpreted those committed by the Serbian side as excesses. Appeals for peace, negotiations and the search for just solutions characterized, as a rule, the discourse of church representatives, but their notion of a “just solution” usually implied only what was in the interest of the Serbian nation. The Bishops did not exactly speak as one about many issues, but the absence of a clearly defined stance by the Serbian Orthodox Church on the ongoing chaotic developments caused many individual and collective prowar actions to both be done and not done “in the name of faith”. The clergy blessing paramilitary troops in battlefields, photographs of priests with weapons in their hands and, more often, with “Serbian heroes” went hand in hand with the persistent theory of a “defensive” or “just” war.

976 *Lawslavlje*, No. 690, 1995.

977 *Glasnik SPC*, June 1996.

In his address to Lord Carrington and government officials in 1991, the Patriarch himself said that Serbs would “fight with arms to remain in the same state with the core of the Serbian people” and that the state had to “protect the Serbian brothers in Croatia using all legitimate means, including the armed self-defence of Serbian lives and all Serbian regions”. The “Appeal to the Serbian People and the International Public” issued by the Bishopric Conference of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1955, states that “Today, as the people and the Church, deeply rooted in the tormented land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we cannot accept the decisions on the percentages and maps imposed on us in Geneva, which would deprive us of our Žitomislići on the Neretva or the Cathedral Church in Mostar or the Sopotnica Church on the Drina, Krk and Krupa Monasteries in Dalmatia, Ozren and Vozuća in Bosnia, Prebilovci in Herzegovina or Jasenovac in Slavonia”.⁹⁷⁸

The “defensive war” theory was rounded off and systematized in 1996, one year after the termination of the armed conflicts, and presented in printed form at the “Second Theological-Philosophical Symposium” held in honour of St Peter of Cetinje, “bishop and warrior”. It consisted of a collection of papers entitled *Lamb of God and the Beast from the Abyss – the Philosophy of War* (Jagnje Božije i zvijeri bezdana – filozofija rata), published by “Svetigora”. The collection contains the writings of the best-known theologians of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who developed the “philosophy of war” during the 1990s. Probably the most interesting author is Bishop Atanasije who argues that “some wars bring one closer to God” and that “a war is better than a peace that separates us from God”. However, the sections about historical responsibility in his writing are probably the most interesting: “We do not deny that this was our war and that it was waged by Serbs. Responsible for it is also Emperor Dušan who let go Konavle, Dubrovnik Littoral and the Pelješac Peninsula, as much as Milošević

978 *Glasnik SPC*, October 1994. Quoted from: Milorad Tomanić, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Belgrade: Krug, 2001, p. 123.

who betrayed the Serbs and did not wage the war he had started until the end. Karadžić and Mladić are 'mythic figures' because they set off a holy act of war with which 'death enters the third millennium.'

EPILOGUE

According to the data provided by the religious communities, during the 1992–1995 wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 1,000 mosques, 600 Catholic churches and chapels and dozens of Orthodox churches and monasteries were demolished or damaged. According to the report of the Commission for the Preservation of National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 700 mosques were completely destroyed.⁹⁷⁹ For example, in the area of the city of Banjaluka, during 1993, all 15 mosques were destroyed, including Ferhat Bey Mosque, one of the most significant and most beautiful cultural monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the early 1990s, in Kosovo, there were more than 500 active mosques, but more than 200 were destroyed during the 1998–1999 armed conflicts.⁹⁸⁰ For example, during 1998–1999, in the municipality of Peć, damage was done, in whole or in part, to 36 mosques (half of which was built from the 15th to the 18th century), two Sufi temples (tekkes or dervish buildings), one 17th century madrasa, one 15th century hamam, all nine mektebs and the Archives and Library of the

979 About 600 Catholic and 120 Orthodox buildings were damaged. Only the Jewish community in Bosnia and Herzegovina saved its synagogues. Radio Free Europe, 5 April 2004.

980 According to the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of Serbia, from 1998 and the first conflicts in Kosovo until the present day, 15 buildings belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church have been destroyed. There are no precise data on the number of destroyed Islamic religious buildings in Kosovo. The Institute for the Protection Cultural Monuments estimates the number to be around 400 mosques (RFE, 5 April 2004).

Islamic Community.⁹⁸¹ During the second half of 1999, 76 Orthodox temples in Kosovo and Metohija were either damaged or destroyed.⁹⁸²

In general, temples were destroyed not for their roles as religious buildings, but rather for being national/ethnic symbols of the presence of a certain community in a certain territory.⁹⁸³ Sacral architecture plays a strong role in conveying religious messages. Church towers, bell towers and minarets have very important communication functions. Apart from the visual religious message sent by their dominant features, their bells and calls to prayer also coordinate time and integrate the community in space. By integrating believers into one space, sacral buildings showed the presence of the other, the hostile entity, and the war aim that reshaped history. The destruction of these symbols destroyed the spirit and the most significant integrative element of community. "The sacralization of national identity led to the absurdity that the destruction of (someone else's) temple is also considered an act of 'piety' and an act of 'fighting for the faith'".⁹⁸⁴

The revitalization of religion in our region was part of the broader social processes taking place in the world and especially in post-socialist countries. The penetration of the sacred into the public sphere was manifested in two parallel modalities: in the politicization of religion and the religious in general, and in the religization of the political and politics. As in some other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (for example, in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia), the "return" of the Yugoslav peoples to religion occurred during a protracted economic, social and political crisis, whereby the turn to a traditional religion and even conservative religiosity emerged as an

981 "Razaranje kulturne baštine na Kosovu, 1998–1999", <http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/cases/milosevic/documents/docpros/expert/kos-des-b.htm#7>.

982 <http://www.kosovo.net/sk/crucified/default.htm>.

983 Milan Vukomanović, „Religijska dimenzija jugoslovenskih sukoba“, *Vera, znanje, mir*, ur. Milan Sitarski i Marinko Vučinić, (Beograd: BOŠ, 2005), 128.

984 Ivan Cvetković, *Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini*, (Zagreb–Sarajevo: Synopsis, 2006), 229.

important factor in the preservation of the ethnic, cultural and historical identity of these nations.⁹⁸⁵ At the time of the revitalization of religion during the 1990s, there occurred a peculiar shift from a negative politicization of religion to a positive one, whereby the positive evaluation of tradition, veneration of the national and religious past led not only to a stagnation in the process of modernization (the crisis of the spirit of modernity), but also to the political abuse of the link between religion and nation.⁹⁸⁶ One should not lose sight of the fact that the chances for the revitalization of religion multiply to the extent to which secular answers fail.

The importance of religious traditions in the preservation of ethnic and cultural identity led to the appearance of religion as a political fact. The transformation (so-called transition) of Yugoslav society, which included the liberalization of relations between post-communist states and religious communities, concurrent with a strong revival of nationalism(s), opened the possibility for reinstrumentalization of religion for political reasons. The revival of religiosity came in service to the legitimization, homogenization and mobilization of nations and states. New political elites used religion to earn their legitimacy and manipulate the broader social strata, while religious communities saw an opportunity for their rehabilitation, that is, reaffirmation in the return to nationalism. New political elites promoted a national (or, more precisely, nationalistic) ideology within which religion had a very important role, while religious communities saw nationalism as a means to return to the social scene after five decades of marginal life in a secularized atheistic society.

The war in Yugoslavia, 1991–1995, was not a religious war *par excellence*,⁹⁸⁷ since religious issues were not even nominally its cause.

985 Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo*, 99.

986 Milan Vukomanović, „Religija, konflikt, identitet“, *Filozofija i društvo*, br. XVI, 2000. 44.

987 See the analyses in: B.Stojković (1994), „Sukob identiteta: Religijsko i nacionalno kao izvor i povod ratnih konflikata” in the collection of papers *Religija–rat–mir*,

Instead, religion served primarily as the only manifest difference between ethnically related peoples. However, we must not overlook the importance of religious traditions in the Balkans in the preservation of ethnic and cultural identity. Accordingly, although the religious institutions in the SFRY did not directly participate in instigating the conflict, they cannot be relieved of a part of the responsibility for their insufficiently resolute efforts to prevent the deepening of the conflict. The consequences of the conflict serve as a warning that everyone should contribute to the prevention of such escalations as much as possible.

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X

CULTURE

Nenad Makuljević

IDEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF ART AND CULTURE

THE LIFE AND development of cultural concepts and artistic practices are closely related to the social and state context. Depending on the prevalent ideologies, civil liberties or economic relations, diverse artistic conceptions were developed, accepted or rejected. During the second half of the 20th century, the dependence on the ideological and socio-economic system strongly shaped and divided the understanding of culture and artistic practice of socialist and capitalist/one-party and democratic societies. In such a two-bloc world, the culture and art of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were specific and recognizable. The unique and joint ideological and social context of Yugoslav culture during the 1980s was characterized by the proclaimed freedom of creativity, socialist ideology, cult of Josip Broz Tito and culture of remembrance of the National Liberation War. At the same time, nationalism was on the rise, which had a strong impact on cultural production, but its strength was not the same in all republics.

IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: BETWEEN THE FREEDOM OF CREATIVITY AND PARTY CONTROL

The emerging culture in Yugoslavia was closely related to the official socialist ideology. After the split with Stalinist politics in 1948, the freedom of creativity became one of the characteristics of the country's cultural policy, which significantly contributed to the development and emancipation of all forms of artistic expression and rich cultural life. The liberal attitude towards art, which differed substantively from the practice in the Soviet Union and other communist countries, was probably most clearly formulated by Miroslav Krleža in

his speech at the Writers' Congress in Ljubljana in 1952.⁹⁸⁸ He pointed out that the Soviet socialist realist and Western aesthetic models should not be followed. He advocated the creation of a distinctive art that would express Yugoslavia's socialist reality.⁹⁸⁹ The break with programmatically organized socialist realism brought about the development of artistic activities in the Yugoslav space in the 1960s, whose leading line, despite some criticism from the top-level authorities,⁹⁹⁰ was synchronously integrated into the global modernist trends.

The important characteristic of Yugoslav culture was derived from its economic fundamentals. All major cultural institutions, museums, galleries, publishing houses, film companies and music industry were state – or socially-owned. This significantly influenced the outcome that the choice of artistic production, which would be financially supported, purchased and promoted, did not depend on market laws, but primarily on expert commissions.

Yugoslav art and culture, freed from ideological constraints and market pressure, experienced not only a rise, but also a kind of peak in the 1980s. In that period, a strong cultural infrastructure had already been created, including museums, galleries, theatres, cinemas, cultural centres and the like. Many Yugoslav artists received international accolades and had international careers. The cultural offerings also included numerous domestic and international festivals such as the Dubrovnik Summer Festival, Struga Poetry Evenings, Ohrid Summer, FEST and BITEF. At that time, the Yugoslav literary horizon was composed of Danilo Kiš, Mirko Kovač, Filip David, Vidosav Stevanović, Dubravka Ugrešić, Slavenka Drakulić, Igor Mandić, Miro Gavran and Abdulah Sidran, among others.

988 Miroslav Krleža, "Govor na kongresu književnika u Ljubljani", *Republika* 10–11, Zagreb 1952, 205–243.

989 *Ibid.*, 241–243.

990 Tito condemned abstract art in 1963, but the development trends of modern art were not interrupted. Jerko Denegri, "Novi momenti oko političkog napada na apstraktnu umetnost početkom 1963", *Zbornik radova Akademije umetnosti* 2/2014, 20–26.

During the 1980s, an abundant Yugoslav cultural production was created, including all areas of creativity, from literature and art to film and comics. In the artistic centres, such as Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo and Ljubljana, the young generations of artists were maturing and redefining the concepts of artistic creation in line with the requirements of their time. They worked side by side with older modernist and conceptual artists, and included Nina Ivančić, Igor Rončević, Breda Beban, Hrvoje Horvatić, Damir Sokić, Zvezdana Fio, Zdravko Joksimović, Mrđan Bajić, Mileta Prodanović, Aleksandar Rafajlović, Milan Erič, Jože Slak, Živko Marušič, Andraž Šalamun, the IRWIN group from Ljubljana (part of a larger project known as Neue Slowenische Kunst), Zvono group from Sarajevo...

The abundance and complexity of cultural production contributed to the fact that contemporary Yugoslav art acquired specific characteristics, including distinct local scenes (Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo...),⁹⁹¹ and became completely in line with global trends in art. During the 1980s, large group exhibitions were staged that truly showed high artistic achievements. The most interesting and important exhibitions included the so-called “Yugoslav Documents”, organized in Sarajevo in 1984 and initiated by Jusuf Hadžifejzović, Saša Bukvić and Radoslav Tadić.⁹⁹² The last “Yugoslav Documents” exhibition was held in 1989.⁹⁹³ It was also the last joint Yugoslav art exhibition before the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia.

991 See: Zvonko Maković, “Nova slika, Hrvatsko slikarstvo osamdesetih godina”, *Život umjetnosti* 33–34/1982, 7–19; Andrej Medved, “Nove slike slovenskog slikarstva”, *Život umjetnosti* 33–34/1982, 31–45; Lidija Merenik, *Beograd. Osamdesete*, (Novi Sad: Prometej, 1995); Jovan Despotović, *Nova slika*, (Belgrade: Clio, 2006); Ješa Denegri, *Srpska umetnost 1950–2000. Osamdesete*, (Belgrade: Orion Art-Topy, 2013).

992 Budo Vukobrat, Hadžifejzović, “Stopama Jugoslovenskih dokumenata”; accessed on 17 March 2021: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/jusuf-hadzifejzovic-stopama-jugoslovenskih-dokumenata/28115002.html>.

993 *Jugoslovenska dokumenta '89*, Exhibition Catalogue, (Sarajevo: Olimpijski centar “Skenderija,” 1989).

During the 1960s and 1970s, apart from classical art forms, various forms of popular culture were developed under a great “Western” influence,⁹⁹⁴ which became the object of scrutiny by Yugoslav socialist theorists and ideologists.⁹⁹⁵ The 1980s were marked by the New Wave, which had significant local centres in Rijeka, Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade. Pop-rock music was accepted, and not only as an alternative form of entertainment. Moreover, the most famous music groups received prominent social awards and were invited to perform at official social events. The Seven Secretaries of SKOJ Award for Youth Creativity was given to Lačni Franz in 1981, Pankrti in 1982, Luna in 1984 and Ekatarina Velika in 1986.⁹⁹⁶ Rock music also achieved social affirmation due to the concerts of this music at important and socially useful events such as youth work actions.⁹⁹⁷

As a significant emancipatory achievement, the freedom of artistic creativity became one of the recognizable characteristics of Yugoslav society and contributed to the international promotion of the country. Miodrag B. Protić, Director of the Contemporary Art Museum in Belgrade, emphasized Yugoslavia’s specific position at the CSCE

994 Radina Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam: amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2020).

995 See: Reana Senjković, *Izgubljeno u prijenosu: pop iskustvo soc kulture*, (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 2008), 49–89.

996 Reana Senjković, *Svaki dan pobjeda. Kultura omladinskih radnih akcija*, (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku: Srednja Europa, 2016), 228.

997 Bijelo Dugme performed for the volunteers of the Palić 1979 youth work action; Parni Valjak performed for the volunteers of the Sava 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1986 youth work actions. Concerts for youth work volunteers were also performed by Đorđe Balašević in 1980 and Riblja Čorba and Prljavo Kazalište in 1986. Riblja Čorba also performed for the volunteers of the Đerdap 1986 youth work action and, on that occasion, recorded a live album titled “Concert for Brigadiers” (Koncert za brigadire). Prljavo Kazalište performed for youth work volunteers in Knin and Sisak in 1982. YU Grupa, Kerber, Poslednja Igra Leptira and others performed for the Niš 1982 and 1983 youth work volunteers. Reana Senjković, *Svaki dan pobjeda. Kultura omladinskih radnih akcija*, Zagreb: Srednja Evropa, 228–229.

Cultural Forum in Budapest in October 1985.⁹⁹⁸ The Congress was a foreshadowing and preparation for the rapprochement of the two blocs, and was attended by numerous joint artists.⁹⁹⁹ In his paper, Miodrag B. Protić presented the Yugoslav experience and advocacy for the freedom of creativity, because “without unfettered subjectivity in this distinctly human area, the objective image of man, his nature and his history would vanish...” At the same time, he rejected the idea that “certain environments should always create concepts, while other ones should accept and elaborate them”.¹⁰⁰⁰ Protić’s Yugoslav position differed clearly from the opposing positions and cultural-political tendencies of the Eastern and Western bloc countries. Freedom of creativity was still restricted in the Soviet Union, while the “Western world “constantly and propagandistically presented itself as an absolute source and normative model of modern culture and art.” Protić’s approach offered a different model – the freedom of individual creativity and global cultural polycentricity, in which Yugoslavia also found its place.

Although artistic freedom was officially promoted, it was not absolute and had ideological restraints. It was not allowed to promote ideas that challenged the National Liberation War and opposed the socialist system.¹⁰⁰¹ Within the League of Communists at the municipal, republican and federal levels there were bodies/commissions in

998 CSCE Cultural Forum Budapest <https://www.osce.org/node/58534>. The Yugoslav delegation included Kole Čašule (the head of the delegation), Miodrag B. Protić, Dejan Medaković, Andrej Mitrović, Ciril Zlobec, Kosta Spaić and Vladimir Pogačić. Miodrag B. Protić, *Nojeva barka II*, (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruža, 2000), 562.

999 It was attended by numerous artists, including Günter Grass, Mario Botta, Max Bill and Galina Ulanova, among others. *Ibid.*, 563.

1000 *Ibid.*, 562–571.

1001 About censorship in the SFRY see: Radina Vučetić, *Monopol na istinu: partija, kultura i cenzura u Srbiji šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina XX veka* (Belgrade: Clio, 2016).

charge of cultural policy,¹⁰⁰² but there was no centralized and coordinated censorship policy. Until 1980, dozens of books, films and exhibitions were banned.¹⁰⁰³ The thresholds of tolerance and political acceptability differed from one republic to another. So, for example, Slovenia was seen as the most liberal republic.

During the 1980s, certain works continued to be banned.¹⁰⁰⁴ A strong party reaction was provoked by Gojko Đogo's poetry book *Vunena vremena* (Woolen Times) and Jovan Radulović's drama *Golubnjača* (Dovecote). Đogo's book was seen as a criticism and insult to the late President Tito, and he was sentenced to prison, while *Golubnjača* was labelled "nationalist".¹⁰⁰⁵ Various pressures from the communist party ranks provoked a reaction. In 1982, the Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Artistic Creativity was formed within the Writers' Association of Serbia. Thereafter, the Committee for the Protection of the Freedom of Thought and Expression was also formed.¹⁰⁰⁶

Party debates on cultural issues were even held in the last decade of Yugoslavia. In 1984, by Stipe Šuvar's order, a working guidelines / brochure was prepared. Known as the *White Paper* (Bijela knjiga), its full title was *On some ideological and political tendencies in artistic*

1002 Bogdan Bogdanović states that Slobodan Milošević proposed that he become the Chairman of the Commission on Ideological Issues in Culture, which he refused. Bogdan Bogdanović, *Ukleti neimar*, (Novi Sad: Meditteran Publishing 2011), 218–219.

1003 See: "Kratka hronologija zabrana i progona u Srbiji 1944–1991", in: *Bela knjiga-1984: obračun sa "kulturnom kontrarevolucijom" u SFRJ*, prepared by Kosta Nikolić, Srđan Cvetković and Đoko Tripković, (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2010), 253–271.

1004 *Ibid.*, 271–279.

1005 *Ibid.*, 30–36; 39–46; 71–83; 96–103.

1006 The members of the Committee for the Protection of the Freedom of Thought and Expression included Dobrica Ćosić, Dragoslav Mihailović, Borisav Mihajlović Mihiz, Predrag Palavestra, Dragoslav Srejšević, Vesna Pešić, Zagorka Golubović and Vojislav Koštunica, among others. The work of this Committee was supported by Rudi Supek and Taras Kermauner. *Ibid.*, 60.

*creation, literary, theatrical and film criticism, and on the public appearances of a number of cultural creators containing politically unacceptable messages.*¹⁰⁰⁷ The White Paper was probably the last--and entirely dogmatic--attempt to control cultural production. It condemned straying from the Party line and the authors from the entire Yugoslav space who held different or completely opposite ideological views, such as: nationalists, non-dogmatic socialists and pro-democrats. It condemned inter alia the activities of Dobrica Ćosić, Matija Bećković, Gojko Ćogo, Vojislav Šešelj, Mića Popović, Dimitrije Rupnik, Živojin Pavlović, Igor Mandić, Predrag Matvejević, Želimir Žilnik and Dušan Makavejev.

The *White Paper* was the preparatory material for the Conference on the Ideological Struggle in the Sphere of Culture and Creativity, which was organized by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and was attended inter alia by Božidar Gagro, Lordan Zafranović, Perko Kvesić, Vatroslav Mimica, Kosta Spaić, Enes Kišević, Joža Horvat and Milan Rakovac. At this party conference, the views from the preparatory material were not fully adopted.

The *White Paper* criticized already published works, while some of the authors, like Dobrica Ćosić, already held prominent positions in their settings. A few years later, after the Eighth Session of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987, "Ćosić's programme" and nationalist views were adopted by the Serbian leadership, headed by Slobodan Milošević, which clearly points to the failure of the *White Paper*, and to the rise of nationalism.

The view on art and the freedom of expression in Yugoslavia during the 1980s points to a peculiar dichotomy. On the one hand, the freedom of artistic creativity was promoted and cherished, and contemporary art trends were adopted. On the other hand, party and ideological criticism, as well as efforts at control, persisted. Such a cultural and artistic "landscape" corresponded to the character of Yugoslav society, which promoted and accepted the modernization of the

1007 *White Paper* was reprinted in: *Ibid.*, 61–251.

country in all areas, while at the same time preserving the ideological system and monopoly of the communist party.

AFTER TITO - TITO

The death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 brought about a new phase in the building of his cult,¹⁰⁰⁸ which has survived in various forms to this day.¹⁰⁰⁹ The propaganda image of Tito as war commander and lifelong president was cherished and developed from the Second World War and National Liberation War onwards. Tito's picture held a prominent place in all public spaces, but making him ubiquitous, in the way the Soviet leadership was promoted, was avoided. The way Tito was popularized also showed the difference between the Yugoslav and Soviet models of communism. Avoiding the dominance of Tito's image is best seen in the policy of designing urban public spaces. In every Yugoslav settlement there was some kind of monument that promoted the partisan struggle and socialist system. However, there were not many public monuments to Tito during his lifetime. They were primarily erected in the cities bearing his name.¹⁰¹⁰

The death of Josip Broz Tito was a turning point in Yugoslavia, which also had an impact on the shaping of state cultural policy. One of the official state slogans was "After Tito – Tito". Although Tito's image could be used for various forms of manipulation and justifying "the most diverse interests (party, state, centralist and confederal, unitary and chauvinist-secessionist)", he represented the "symbol of state unity for a good part of the population".¹⁰¹¹ This implied the preservation and strengthening of the cult of Josip Broz Tito, as the

1008 See more about the cult of Tito in: Todor Kuljić, *Tito: sociološkoistorijska studija*, (Zrenjanin: Kulturni centar Zrenjanin, 2012), 216–243.

1009 See more about the contemporary views on J.B. Tito in: Mitja Velikonja, *Titostalgija*, (Belgrade: XX vek, 2010).

1010 See more about Tito's monuments in: Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja, Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989*, (Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, Čigoja štampa, 2014), 271–276.

1011 Todor Kuljić, *Tito: sociološkoistorijska studija*, 241.

founder and symbol of Yugoslav socialist society. Thus, various forms of cultural production could serve the purpose to a significant extent. The use of Tito's name and image was legally codified as early as 1977, but in 1984 the very rigid Law on the Use of the Name and Image of Josip Broz Tito was adopted. It stipulated that "the objects with the image of Josip Broz Tito (photographs, busts, sculptures, reliefs, statues, tapestries and the like) shall be displayed upon prior approval" in all state institutions, facilities of the Yugoslav National Army, socio-political organizations, and labour and social organizations.¹⁰¹² This law also introduced control over the use of Tito's image, banned its inappropriate use and uncontrolled distribution, and stipulated sanctions against offenders.¹⁰¹³

The central place of Tito's posthumous cult became the "House of Flowers", built in 1975 as a winter garden within his residence at Užička Street in Belgrade, according to Stjepan Kralj's design. In 1976, Tito expressed his wish to the leadership of SR Serbia to be buried in that area. He also wished to have a monument complex dedicated to his life and formed in Belgrade. It seems that Tito's wish was inspired by his visit to the grave of US President Franklin Roosevelt in 1960.¹⁰¹⁴ Roosevelt was buried on the family estate, in the Rose Garden, and his grave is marked with a white marble tombstone.¹⁰¹⁵

After Tito's death, the House of Flowers was readapted (the fountain was removed and the tomb was prepared) and turned into a mausoleum. A white marble tombstone, like Roosevelt's, is placed over the

1012 Quoted from: Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja, Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989*, 285.

1013 *Ibid.*, 285–286.

1014 Goran Miloradović, "Prah prahu: staljinistički pogrebni rituali u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji", *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* 1–3/2007, 92; Lada Stevanović, "Rekonstrukcija sećanja, konstrukcija pamćenja. Kuća cveća i Muzej istorije Jugoslavije", in: *Spomen-mesta-istorija-sećanja*, edited by Aleksandra Pavićević, (Belgrade: Etnografski institut SANU 2009), 103.

1015 See more about Roosevelt's grave in: <https://www.nps.gov/places/burial-site-of-franklin-and-eleanor-roosevelt.htm>. Accessed on 17 March 2021.

grave on which only “Josip Broz Tito” is written. There is no ideological feature, that is, the five-pointed star commonly used by Yugoslav communists. Due to his funeral in a winter garden – the House of Flowers – the memory of Josip Broz Tito and his eternal monument have been connected to his living space, thus adding to it a specific private character.

The House of Flowers did not exactly follow the trends of commemorating important communist leaders. Namely, the cult of Tito was not emphasized by having his body lie in state, while the similarity of his tombstone with that of Roosevelt is evident. By combining the design of Roosevelt’s tomb with the mausoleum funeral practice characteristic for Soviet leaders, the House of Flowers acquired its own American-Soviet hybrid character.¹⁰¹⁶

The House of Flowers became the place of honour for Josip Broz Tito, so that it attracted a huge number of visitors during the first years after his death. The official state character of Tito’s grave was emphasized by the presence of an honour guard. There was also a huge number of organized visits of workers, students, veterans and citizens from all parts of Yugoslavia to the House of Flowers, while many came on foot to express their respects to Josip Broz Tito;¹⁰¹⁷ such visits were often covered by the media. Tito’s resting place was also visited by foreign delegations, which laid flowers and signed the condolence book, according to the established ritual. Thus, the House of Flowers became the central ideological and symbolic structure of Yugoslav socialist society and a central point of the collective memory of Tito.¹⁰¹⁸

1016 Goran Miloradović, “Prah prahu: staljinistički pogrebni rituali u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji”, 91–94.

1017 Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja, Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989*, 299.

1018 Lada Stevanović, “Rekonstrukcija sećanja, konstrukcija pamćenja. Kuća cveća i Muzej istorije Jugoslavije”, 105–107.

In 1982, the Josip Broz Tito Memorial Centre was founded, integrating the 25 May Museum. The Yugoslav Assembly also adopted the Law on the Memorial Centre, stipulating that “this institution has been created with the assignment to promote the functions of the Federation and the common interests of all peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, as well as to contribute to the maintenance and nurturing of the memory of Josip Broz Tito, and the researching of his life.”¹⁰¹⁹

The Centre was also in charge of Josip Broz Tito’s birth house in Kumrovec, the 25 May and 4 July Museums in Belgrade, and the House of Flowers.¹⁰²⁰ The 25 May Museum was built and given to Tito as a birthday present in 1962. It exhibited numerous relay batons and domestic and foreign gifts to Tito.¹⁰²¹ The 4 July Museum was established on 4 July 1950. It was formed in the Ribnikar family’s house in which, on 4 July 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held a meeting chaired by Josip Broz, at which it was decided to launch an armed uprising. The house was also a hiding place for prominent communists, including Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Ranković, Ivo Lola Ribar, Milovan Đilas and others. The 4 July Museum functioned as a memorial space evoking the time of illegal operations and the historic decision to start an uprising.¹⁰²² The formation of the Memorial Centre also institutionalized and centralized the remembrance of Josip Broz Tito. The entire act had a federal character and integrated the relevant facilities in SR Croatia and SR Serbia.

With the integration of different museum facilities and the House of Flowers with its residential space, the largest museum collection

1019 Bratislav Stojanović, “Memorijalni centar ‘Josip Broz Tito’. Prostorni okviri i perspektive mogućnosti”, *Godišnjak grada Beograda* XXX/1983, 170.

1020 Ibid., 170; Gorica Erceg-Sarajčić, “Memorijalni centar ‘Josip Broz Tito’ – muzejsko-memorijalni sadržaji”, *Informatica museologica*, Vol. 20, 3/4 /1989, 13–16.

1021 Aleksandar Ignjatović, “Otvaranje i popularizacija. Muzej 25. maj i transformacija prostora Dedinja”, in: *Tito – vidjenja i tumačenja*, edited by Olga Manojlović Pintar, (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije 2011), 604.

1022 B. Stojanović, “Memorijalni centar ‘Josip Broz Tito’. Prostorni okviri i perspektive mogućnosti”, 171–172.

in Yugoslavia was created. Thus, visitors could see a wide spectrum of exhibits, including objects related to Tito's life and work, numerous gifts and representative works by Yugoslav artists. After the breakup of Yugoslavia the Memorial Centre was transformed. It functioned without Tito's birth house in Kumrovec until 1996, when it changed its name to the Museum of the History of Yugoslavia.¹⁰²³

The central event dedicated to Josip Broz Tito was the celebration of the Youth Day, which was held on 25 May, the day of his birth. As part of the celebration the baton was carried in a youth relay race that ended with a sports event at the Yugoslav National Army Stadium in Belgrade, where it was ceremonially given to Tito. These relay race batons were kept at the 25 May Museum. The youth relay race started from the Yugoslav republics and provinces. The first and last relay race baton carriers were pioneers and prominent young people – workers, students and athletes.¹⁰²⁴ At the time of Tito's death, the relay race baton was carried through Croatia, so that it was put on his bier in the Yugoslav Assembly. After Tito's death it was decided to continue with this baton relay race. Its significance was changed, so that it became one of the events that maintained the memory of Tito and promoted his ideas. The relay race baton was given to the President of the Yugoslav Socialist Youth Union below Tito's portrait.¹⁰²⁵ The organization of the baton relay race and celebration of the Youth Day also became the object of public criticism. At the 1983 stadium event, there appeared a 9.60 metre high sculpture of Tito, which was criticized as an inappropriate perpetuation of his cult.¹⁰²⁶ The baton relay race was held until 1987, when the last such event, called "Turn

1023 Accessed on 17 March. 2021: <https://www.muzej-jugoslavije.org/o-nama/>

1024 Veselinka Ristić-Kastratović, "Proslave u čast Titove štafete – Štafete mladosti", in: *Titova štafeta – štafeta mladosti 1945–1987*, (Belgrade: Muzej istorije Jugoslavije 2008), 23–29.

1025 Ana Panić, "Štafeta – simbol zajedništva", in: *Titova štafeta – štafeta mladosti 1945–1987*, (Belgrade: Muzej istorije Jugoslavije 2008), 18.

1026 Veselinka Ristić – Kastratović, "Proslave u čast Titove štafete – Štafete mladosti", 34.

on the Light”, was organized. That same year, there was also a social scandal with the Youth Day poster made by Slovenia’s Novi kolektivizam group.¹⁰²⁷

After 1980, new initiatives for building a monument to Tito were also launched. Probably the first posthumous monument was cast by Zenica Steel Plant workers. At the time of Tito’s funeral on 8 May 1980, they cast two ingots on which the words of the poem “Comrade Tito we swear to you not to stray from your path” were inscribed. One ingot was placed in the park in front of the Steel Plant (it was later moved to Papirna Park), while the other was donated to the 25 May Museum.¹⁰²⁸

One of the first memorial initiatives after Tito’s death was the opening of the Josip Broz Tito Memorial Museum in Veliko Trojstvo on 24 May 1980, as part of the City Museum in Bjelovar.¹⁰²⁹ In 1988, an initiative was also launched to integrate this museum with the Josip Broz Tito Memorial Centre.¹⁰³⁰

In 1982, the design competition for the Monument to Comrade Tito and the Centuries-Old Struggle of Zadar was announced. The monument was to be located in the historic centre of the city, in front of the Church of St Donatus. Yugoslavia’s most renowned authors of memorial sculpture were invited to compete, including inter alia Vojin Bakić, Bogdan Bogdanović, Dušan Džamonja, Kosta Angeli Radovani and Miodrag Živković. However, nobody’s design was accepted, although

1027 Ana Panić, “Štafeta – simbol zajedništva”, 18.

1028 “Zeničani odali počast Titu”, *Novosti*, 3 March 2014. Accessed on 17 March 2021: <https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:489890-Zenicani-odali-pocast-Josipu-Brozu-Titu>.

1029 Magdalena Bulić, “Spomen-muzej Josipa Broza Tita Veliko Trojstvo”, *Informativa museologica* Vol. 11 4/1980, 18–25.

1030 Božidar Gerić, “Uključivanje ‘Spomen-muzeja Josipa Broza Tita’ u Velikom Trojstvu u Memorijalni centar ‘Josip Broz Tito’ u Beogradu”, *Muzejski vjesnik* 11/1988, 60–63.

the response to the invitation was good and the authors invited created a number of conceptual designs dedicated to Tito.¹⁰³¹

The public competition for the monument to Tito in Zagreb, which was announced in 1986, attracted a great deal of attention in artistic circles. Eighty proposals by the most prominent Yugoslav artists were submitted for participation in the competition. The victory was won by a sculptural architecture design of Vojin Bakić and his son Zoran. It conceived of an extremely monumental entity, consisting of a 36 metre high central structure and 4 metre high sculpture of Tito placed in front of it. The structure had an abstract form and a passage through it. Bakić offered an interesting depiction of Tito. It was a “compromise between a figurative portrait and one made of sharply cut sheets joined at straight edges.”¹⁰³² In this way, he tried to reconcile the different views and tastes of the jurors. The monument was to be placed in the Square of Revolutionaries (now Stjepan Radić Square) and finished for the 100th anniversary of Tito’s birth in 1992. However, work on the monument was halted after the change of government in Croatia.¹⁰³³

Bakić’s monument was meant to be distinctly imposing and larger than the existing monuments dedicated to Tito, and other socialist memorials in urban areas. This clearly points to the ideological aspiration to maintain and emphasize the cult of Tito. At the same time, this was the clear sign of a political crisis, so that it was necessary to remind the public of Tito’s significance and role with the help of monumental size. The strong response of Yugoslav artists to participate

1031 Antonija Mlikota, “Natječaj za Spomenik drugu Titu i vjekovnoj borbi Zadra za slobodu iz 1982. godine”, *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 32–33/34–35/ 2015, 299–320.

1032 Nataša Ivančević, “Svjetlonoša i bik”, in: *Svjetlonosne forme*, (Zagreb: MSU 2013), 103; Zvonko Maković, “Spomenička plastika Vojina Bakića”, in: *Svjetlonosne forme*, (Zagreb: MSU 2013), 209; 211.

1033 Darija Alujević, Andreja Der-Hazarijan Vukić, Jasenka Ferber Bogdan, “Zagrebačka javna skulptura – inicijative i realizacija osamdesetih”, *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 21–25/2006, 457–458; Nataša Ivančević, “Svjetlonoša i bik”, 103.

in the competition in 1986 shows that the socialist memorial programmes were not ignored, but were accepted by them.

The public memory of Josip Broz Tito was also realized by planting eighty eight roses in numerous parks throughout Yugoslavia.¹⁰³⁴ The number of roses symbolized the eighty eight years of Tito's life.

The promotion of Josip Broz Tito also included the organization of appropriate exhibitions. In 1983, the permanent exhibition titled "Tito to Varaždin – Varaždin to Tito" was opened at the City Museum in Varaždin, which was meant to be an expression of mutual appreciation.¹⁰³⁵

The cult of Josip Broz Tito was promoted through various forms of popular and visual culture. One such form that strongly popularized Tito's image was the publishing of richly illustrated books and photo monographs dedicated to his life and work. Unlike imposing monuments, these books were purchased by city, school and other libraries, work organizations, barracks and citizens. In this way, the distribution of Tito's cult was maximal. The photo monograph titled *Bilo je častno živjeti sa Titom* (It Was an Honour Living with Tito) contained the journalist and photographic notes on "Tito's last drama" and "the saddest seven days of Yugoslavia".¹⁰³⁶ The photo monographs *Tito: ilustrovana biografija* (Tito: An Illustrated Biography),¹⁰³⁷ *Tito u*

1034 Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja, Spomenici i identiteti u Srbiji 1918–1989*, 299.

1035 The author of the exhibition was Ivanka Štager: Ivanka Štager, "Stalni postav 'Tito Varaždinu – Varaždin Titu' u Gradskom muzeju Varaždin – odjelu Muzej narodne revolucije", *Muzejski vjesnik* 7/1984, 19–22.

1036 *Bilo je častno živjeti s Titom: kako su Jugoslavski novinari i foto-reporteri zabilježili dramu posljednje Titove bitke i sedam najtužnijih dana Jugoslavije*, Editor Sead Saračević, (Zagreb: Vjesnik: Mladost: Prosvjeta 1980).

1037 Branibor Debeljković, *Tito: ilustrovana biografija*, (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska revija: "Vuk Karadžić" 1980).

Titogradu (Tito in Titograd),¹⁰³⁸ *Tito u Zadru* (Tito in Zadar)¹⁰³⁹ and *Tito i more* (Tito and the Sea)¹⁰⁴⁰ were also dedicated to Tito's life.

One part of music production represented a specific form of expressing and promoting an oath to Tito. The Indexi group sang the song "Tito poslije Tita" (Tito After Tito), while Đorđe Balašević and the Rani mraz group sang "Triput sam video Tita" (I Saw Tito Three Times). Special thematic editions of records were also produced. In 1985, *Jugoton* published a compilation of ten songs dedicated to Tito. Probably one of the most popular songs from that period was "Comrade Tito We Swear to You" performed by Zdravko Čolić. Tito's image and specific signature could be found on many accessory items such as T-shirts, pins and badges, which contributed to the preservation of the memory and popularization of his image.

The extent to which Tito's cult was strongly present was also testified very critically by Vidosav Stevanović in his diary: "...the cult has not diminished, it has just somewhat changed: the object of the cult has only been an object, a photograph, a book, a film, a television show, a newspaper text, the speechifying of someone from a wood-cutting committee... The youth relay baton dedicated to a deceased old man is still carried; the ceremony is held at the Yugoslav National Army Stadium every 25 May, the presumed date of birth of someone who is no more, except that he is too much everywhere...".¹⁰⁴¹

1038 *Tito u Titogradu*, (Titograd: Muzeji i galerije: Centar OKSK za marksističko obra-zovanje 1980).

1039 Ante Brkan, *Tito u Zadru*, (Zadar: Općinska konferencija Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Hrvatske : Narodni list 1984).

1040 Milorad Kovačević, *Tito i more*, (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani: Zagreb: Spektar, Lju-bljana: Mladinska knjiga 1983).

1041 Vidosav Stevanović, *Dnevnik samoće*, (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik 2011), 65–66.

SOCIALIST CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE: PARTISAN STRUGGLE AND WAR VICTIMS

An important place in Yugoslavia's ideological system was held by maintaining the memory of the National Liberation War and victims of fascism in an organized way. It was primarily maintained through the creation of monuments and memorial parks, as well as through other media such as film.

Monuments and Memorial Parks

Public monuments were built in order to promote and strengthen the socialist system. They represented one of the most important visual aids in creating public space identity and political propaganda, because they simultaneously memorialized persons and events, and influenced the shaping of observers' emotions and attitudes.¹⁰⁴² Yugoslavia's monument culture was exceptionally developed and created on the basis of various initiatives which could be launched by federal bodies, republican institutions, veterans' organizations, professional associations and local authorities. As Heike Karge pointed out, it was not created by a single decree, but it was regulated.¹⁰⁴³

Yugoslav monument-building practice was closely associated with modern art trends.¹⁰⁴⁴ It completely departed from socialist realism, so that the imposing monuments by Miodrag Živković, Bogdan Bogdanović and Dušan Džamonja represented not only memo-

1042 There is extensive literature about monument-building practice in Yugoslavia. Here we single out Hajke Karge, *Sećanje u kamenu-okamenjeno sećanje?*, (Belgrade: XX vek 2014); Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja. Spomenici i identitet u Srbiji 1918–1989*, 271–390; Sanja Horvatičič, *Spomenici iz doba socijalizma u Hrvatskoj – prijedlog tipologije*, PhD thesis (Zadar: Sveučilište u Zadru 2017).

1043 Hajke Karge, *Sećanje u kamenu-okamenjeno sećanje?*, 18.

1044 The monument culture of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has now been internationally revalorized and recognized as a specific modernist practice, which has become evidenced by the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York: *Toward a Concrete Utopia: Architecture in Yugoslavia 1948–1980*, Edited by Martino Stierli – Vladimir Kulić, (New York : MOMA 2018)

rial entities, but also extremely successful modern works of art. During the 1980s, socialist monument culture continuously developed in the Yugoslav space, but this last period has so far been studied the least.¹⁰⁴⁵

Memorial parks were one of the significant spatial entities which had a memorial character and where the most representative public monuments were built. They were formed at the sites of historical events and the suffering of the civilian population during the Second World War.

Memorial parks contained one or more monuments and designed natural spaces. They could also have additional contents for visitors. Their appearance was not static. Over time, they were reorganized and enriched with new monuments or new ambient designs. Some of the most important Yugoslav monuments were built just in memorial parks such as Tjentište and Kadinjača.

One of the best-known Yugoslav memorial parks was the October in Kragujevac Memorial Park in Šumarice near Kragujevac.¹⁰⁴⁶ It was the venue of the “Great School Class” event, which was held in memory of the execution of students and citizens in Kragujevac in October 1941. The “Great School Class” was one of the most important Yugoslav anti-fascist events, which was held every year. The October in Kragujevac Memorial Park contains the Monument to the Executed Students and Teachers by Miodrag Živković, some other memorials and the 21 October Museum built in 1976. The Memorial Park was of nation-wide importance, so that the sculptures for it were donated from various parts of Yugoslavia. During the 1980s, new sculptures were also erected. The “One Hundred for One” monument was created by Nandor

1045 Probably the most complete overview of the partisan monuments in Yugoslavia is given in the Spomenik Database at: <https://www.spomenikdatabase.org/>, which was accessed on 18 March 2021. The work on this project also resulted in Donald Niebyl's book *Spomenik Monument Database*, (London: Fuel Publishing 2018).

1046 Hajke Karge, *Sećanje u kamenu-okamenjeno sećanje?*, 159–176; Olga Manojlović Pintar, *Arheologija sećanja. Spomenici i idenditet u Srbiji 1918–1989*, 373–377.

Glid, the author known for his monument in Dachau.¹⁰⁴⁷ This monument, erected in memory of the execution of one hundred civilians for every German soldier killed, was a gift from the town of Modriča. The memorial from the people of Croatia, “Circles”, was created by Vojin Bakić in cooperation with Josip and Silvana Seissel, between 1978 and 1981. The monument consists of a series of seven massive interconnected discs varying in size and position. It is made of stainless steel, which produces strong light effects and reflection, mirroring the space of the sky.¹⁰⁴⁸ The monument is located at the site of three tombs, and in its vicinity there is a slab with Jure Kaštelan’s verses that contribute to the understanding of Bakić’s monument: “The secret of the circle/ Of eternal births / A many-branched tree / Of light. “

The Jajinci Memorial Park continued to take shape during this period. The competition for its completion was announced in 1981 and the first prize went to the postmodern design of Slovenian architect Marko Mušič.¹⁰⁴⁹ However, his design was not realized and it was not until 1988 that the central monument was created by Vojin Stojić, while the accompanying memorials and green spaces were designed by Branko Bon and Brana Mirković.¹⁰⁵⁰

A memorial park dedicated to the formation of the first partisan detachment was created in the Brezovica forest near Sisak. In 1981, the central abstract monument, designed by sculptor Želimir Janež, was erected. The monument incorporated the existing commemorative plaque. The shape of the monument evoked the shape of an elm

1047 See more about N. Glid in: Irina Subotić, *Nandor Glid*, (Beograd: Fondacija Vujačić kolekcija 2012)

1048 Zvonko Maković, “Spomenička plastika Vojina Bakića”, in: *Svjetlonosne forme*, 203.

1049 Sanja Horvatinčić, “Povijest nemogućeg spomenika. Podizanje spomenika žrtvama fašizma u Jajincima”, *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 32–33/34–35 / 2015, 269–270.

1050 Nenad Žarković, *Spomen park “Jajinci,”* (Belgrade: Gradski zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture, 2009) 4; Sanja Horvatinčić, “Povijest nemogućeg spomenika. Podizanje spomenika žrtvama fašizma u Jajincima”, 260–270.

tree and in its interior were plaques with the names of the fighters of the First Partisan Detachment.¹⁰⁵¹

In 1981, Vojin Bakić created the Monument to the Uprising of the People of Banija and Kordun for the memorial park on Petrova Gora.¹⁰⁵² The monument was designed in cooperation with architect Berislav Šerbetić and represents a unique sculptural-architectural entity. Bakić's external design was derived from his earlier practice. The interior of the monument was conceived as an exhibition space, extending spirally from the ground floor to the top. At the top there is an open-air platform from which visitors can look at the surroundings.¹⁰⁵³

The Popina Memorial Park was formed on an area of 12 hectares in the region of Štulac near Vrnjačka Banja. The central monument and the park were designed by Bogdan Bogdanović between 1978 and 1980. This memorial area commemorates one of the partisans' first frontal battles against the occupier.¹⁰⁵⁴ During 1980, Bogdan Bogdanović also finished the Memorial Park of Struggle and Victory in Čačak.¹⁰⁵⁵

1051 Accessed on 19 March 2021: https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spomen-park_Brezovica.

1052 The monument was dismantled in 1995: Zvonko Maković, "Hoće li Hrvatska ostati bez ijednog djela velikog kipara Vojina Bakića?", *Globus* 492/ 2000, 78–79; Zvonko Maković, "Spomenička plastika Vojina Bakića: juče, danas, sutra", *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 21–25/2006, 404–420; Rhea Silvija Ivanuš, "Spomenici na meti novih revolucija", *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 32–33/34–35/ 2015, 350; Zana Dragičević, "Spomenik na Petrovoj gori – prilog istraživanju i revalorizaciji", *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 32–33/34–35/ 2015, 385–404.

1053 Zvonko Maković, "Spomenička plastika Vojina Bakića", 205–207.

1054 M. B. Protić states that the renovation of Vrnjačka Banja and the creation of the Popinci Memorial Park are the result of a local initiative in which he also participated. Miodrag B. Protić, *Nojeva barka II*, 521.

1055 Accessed on 19 March 2021: <https://www.arhivamodernizma.com/spomen-park-borbe-i-pobede-u-cacku/>
Nikola J. Baković, "Konačan odabir idejnog rešenja za projekat spomen-parka u Čačku (1970–1974)", *Izvornik: grada Međuopštinskog istorijskog arhiva* 33/ Čačak 2017, 315–341.

That same year he also created memorial structures in Dudik Memorial Park near Vukovar. The monument was erected in memory of the fallen fighters and victims of fascism in Čačak. In the centre of the memorial park is the mausoleum building designed in the shape of a megaron and clad with 620 stone griffons.¹⁰⁵⁶ In 1982, Bogdanović finished the Garavice Memorial Park near Bihać.

In the early 1980s, Bogdan Bogdanović gradually finished his architectural projects and became the mayor of Belgrade (1982–1986). He was one of the first intellectuals to openly oppose Slobodan Milošević's policy after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the LCS.¹⁰⁵⁷ This caused campaigning against him in public, which even led to the destruction of some of his monuments and his departure from Serbia.¹⁰⁵⁸

The Vraca Memorial Park is dedicated to the fallen fighters of the National Liberation War and the victims of fascism in Sarajevo. It was built at the site of an old Austro-Hungarian fortress where thousands of civilians were executed during the Second World War. The development of the memorial park began in 1980. It was opened on 25 November 1981, on the day of the First Session of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBIH) in 1943. The memorial park is the work of designer Vladimir Dobrović, sculptor Alija Kučukalić and landscaper Aleksandar Maltarić. It contains several monument entities and the Memorial Ossuary of the National Heroes of the City of Sarajevo, which was moved to it.¹⁰⁵⁹

1056 Bogdan Bogdanović, *Ukleti neimar*, (Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing 2011), 242–244.

1057 See: Latinka Perović, *Dominantna i neželjena elita: beleške o intelektualnoj i političkoj eliti Srbije (XX-XXI vek)*, (Belgrade-Novı Sad: Dan Graf – Javna medijska ustanova “Radio –televizija Vojvodine” 2015), 581–631.

1058 “The morning report from Vlasotinci, eastern Serbia. As soon as the political campaign against me started, the activists put a large wooden five-pointed star on top of the stone monument and painted it red.” Bogdan Bogdanović, *Zelena kutija: knjiga snova*, (Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing 2009) 37.

1059 Accessed on 20 March 2021: http://old.kons.gov.ba/main.php?id_struct=6&lang=1&action=view&id=2559.

The Danica Memorial Park is located in the area of Koprivnica where the first Ustasha concentration camp was established in 1941. In 1977, the Danica Development Board commissioned the Zagreb-based architect Lenko Pleština to make a conceptual design, which was finished in 1979. It envisaged the adaptation of the camp inmates' building into a memorial museum and the development of the park area. The Danica Memorial Park was partly completed in 1981.¹⁰⁶⁰

The Čačalica Memorial Park near Požarevac commemorates the victims of the shooting in this area during the Second World War, that is, partisan fighters and Soviet soldiers who were killed in that area during the liberation actions in 1944. In 1985, a monument on top of the Čačalica hill was erected. Its author was Milorad Tepavica.¹⁰⁶¹ The monument consists of rods and represents a moving three-dimensional five-pointed star.

The last large memorial complex dedicated to the National Liberation War was the Srem Front Memorial Complex (near Adaševci). The new conceptual design was made by sculptor Jovan Soldatović. The architectural design was made by Mirko Krstonošić, while the horticultural entity was designed by Professor Milan Sapundžić. The memorial complex was built from 1985 to 1988. It stretches over an area of 28 hectares and is shaped by earth, grass and bricks commemorating the conditions faced by soldiers on the Srem Front. In the central part, that is, on the front breakthrough line, there is a memorial-museum complex which has three parts – the Gathering Place, the Walk of Honour and the Museum. The Gathering Place is made of bricks and has a circular shape. It is meant for gathering and commemorating the partisan units that fought on the Srem Front. On the subwalls along the Walk of Honour there are about 13,500 bronze plaques with the inscribed names of the Yugoslav soldiers who were

1060 Franjo Horvatić, "Uređivanje spomen parka na 'Danici'", *Muzejski vjesnik* 4 /1981, 6–8; Decision on the Designation of the Vraca Memorial Park in Sarajevo as a National Monument of Bosnia and Herzegovina; accessed on 15 December 2020: <https://www.muzej-koprivnica.hr/o-nama/objekti-i-zbirke/danica/>

1061 Accessed on 21 March 2021: <https://www.spomenikdatabase.org/pozarevac>.

killed, as well as the fallen Soviet, Bulgarian and Italian fighters. The central memorial place is the Museum. It has a circular shape and is buried in the ground in order to be reminiscent of dugouts and trench warfare. In its centre there is a composition consisting of the captured enemy weapons. Apart from the exhibition dedicated to the Srem Front, there is also a scenic exhibition with Jovan Soldatović's sculptures, reminiscent of the horrors of war, including the musical-scenic effects designed by Vera Crvenčanin and Vuk Kulenović.¹⁰⁶²

Vojin Stojić created the Monument to the Kosmaj Partisan Detachment. Drago Tršar's Monument to the Revolution was erected in the Vukosavci Memorial Park near Lopare. The Monument to the Victims of Jadovno was created by Ratko Petrić in 1988.¹⁰⁶³

The Monument to the Fallen Fighters, built underneath Trebješa Hill near Nikšić, commemorates the execution of 32 partisan patriots. One of the victims was Čedomir Ljubo Čupić, who was photographed with a smile on his face and hands in chains just before the execution. The monument was built according to Ljubo Vojvodić's design from 1985 to 1987, and was unveiled on 18 September 1987, on the day of the liberation of Nikšić in 1944.¹⁰⁶⁴ The monument represents a very complex and imposing concrete structure with the base in the form of a stylized five-pointed star. The raised concrete structure carries a circular disc, the front of the monument, which is decorated with a floral arrangement and five-pointed star.¹⁰⁶⁵ One explanation for the

1062 Vojislav Subotić, Miro Čavaljuga, Zoran Panović, *Spomen-obeležje Sremski front*, (Belgrade: SUBNOR Srbije 2004); Predrag M. Vajagić, "Kultura sećanja – Sremski front", *Vojno delo* 3/2017, 423–425.

1063 The monument was destroyed during the war in the 1990s and was restored in 2011 and unveiled in the presence of Serbian President Boris Tadić: Rhea Silvija Ivanuš, "Spomenici na meti novih revolucija", *Anali Galerije Antona Augustinčića* 32–33/34–35 /2015, 350.

1064 Slavica Stamatović Vučković, *Spomenici Drugog svjetskog rata u Crnoj Gori*, (Kotor: EXPEDITIO 2020) 13–16.

1065 Slavica Stamatović Vučković, "Spomenici Drugog svjetskog rata u Crnoj Gori", 14–15.

symbolism of this monument is that, “due to its monumentality and artistic design it symbolizes the smile of the fighters at the execution site as a reflection of their pleasure of dying for freedom, while the floral rosette symbolizes struggle and victory, and the massiveness of the monument – the people’s strength.”¹⁰⁶⁶

During the 1980s, monuments dedicated to the victims of the Second World War were also erected in the area of Belgrade. In 1983, the monument to the patriots hanged in 1941 was erected on Terazije. It was sculpted by Nikola Koka Janković. The monument has the shape of a pillar on which the images of the hanged and Vasko Popa’s verses are inscribed. The initiative for the erection of a monument at the Staro sajmište site was launched in the 1980s. It was originally planned to be unveiled in 1989. However, this took place only in 1995. The author of the monument is sculptor Miodrag Miša Popović, professor at the Faculty of Fine Arts in Belgrade.

The monument culture of the SFRY in the 1980s was a continuation of the previous experiences and was interrupted only by political changes. The monument designs were based on modern expression and followed the current art trends. Their symbolism was not derived from some bureaucratized and dogmatized perception of the past. Instead, it was based on a humanistic approach to commemorating the suffering of the population and partisan fighters under the fascist occupation.

The monuments and memorial complexes built throughout Yugoslavia created a unique anti-fascist identity of the community and were the sites of cherishing the memory of concrete persons and events. Their construction involved all social factors. Apart from architects and sculptors, monument-building commissions were also very significant. They included the members of the veterans’ organization and representatives of the republican and/or local authorities, which

1066 Accessed on 20 March 2021: <https://www.facebook.com/turistickaorganizacija.niksic/videos/spomenik-pod-trebjesom/865139027286168/>.

initiated the creation of a monument. However, the work of expert commissions was not significantly affected by political decisions.

The ceremonies connected with the opening of memorial parks and unveiling of monuments were significant social events, which were attended by the highest political leaders. Every year, the memory of the events to which they were dedicated was marked and appropriate ceremonies were held. Numerous student excursions also regularly included visits to these sites.

The work on the design of memorial parks and monuments involved a large number of architects and sculptors, and required significant financial resources. Monuments were considered as one of the most important forms of maintaining the memory of the National Liberation War and promoting socialist and anti-fascist social ideals.

Partisan Film

Film also played a big role in spreading and promoting the ideals of the Yugoslav socialist society and cherishing the memory of the partisan struggle. Partisan/war film became one of the major genre characteristics of the Yugoslav film industry¹⁰⁶⁷ and was strongly supported by the state. Thanks to the collective viewing of such films, which was organized for students, soldiers and youth work volunteers, they could reach a large number of citizens.

Great war spectacles were filmed during the 1970s and this practice continued after Tito's death. During the 1980s, several partisan films were made: "13. jul" (The 13th of July), a film about the uprising in Montenegro, directed by Radomir Šaranović (1982); "Igmanski marš" (Igman March), a film about the march of the First Proletarian Brigade amid harsh winter weather in late January 1942, directed by Zdravko Šotra (1983), and "Veliki transport" (Great Transport), a film about the transport of fighters from Vojvodina to the territory of Bosnia in 1943, directed by Veljko Bulajić (1983).

1067 Milutin Čolić, *Jugoslovenski ratni film*, Vol. I (Belgrade –Titovo Užice: Insitut za film-Vesti 1984), 167–215.

There were also war films which did not depict specific historical events. Fascism was clearly condemned in these films, but their focus was on a humanistic analysis of the fate, suffering and passions of people during wartime. Such films are “Do viđenja u sledećem ratu” (See You in the Next War), directed by Živojin Pavlović (1980), “Osam kila sreće” (Eight Kilos of Happiness), directed by Puriša Đorđević (1980), “Luda kuća” (Crazy House), directed by Ljubiša Ristić (1980), “Pad Italije” (The Fall of Italy), directed by Lordan Zafranović (1981), “Samo jednom se ljubi” (You Love Only Once), directed by Rajko Grlić (1981), “Berlin kaput” (Berlin kaputt), directed by Mića Milošević (1981), and “Progon” (Persecution), directed by Predrag Golubović (1982).¹⁰⁶⁸

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The unique ideological and sociological context conditioned the modernist forms and complex functions of culture and art in socialist Yugoslavia during the 1980s. The proclaimed freedom of creativity contributed to the unique development of all art forms. At the same time, party control was directed towards the contents found inappropriate by some individuals and commissions. Cultural forms were also used to maintain the cult of Josip Broz Tito, as well as to institutionalize and preserve the memory of the National Liberation War and suffering of the civilian population. During the 1980s, the modernist monument practice that characterized the culture of remembrance in socialist Yugoslavia also continued to be nurtured.

1068 Ibid., 210–215; 335–338.

Tomislav Marković

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND MONISM

BETWEEN POLYPHONY AND THE SPIRIT OF ABSOLUTE UNITY

Vuk Perišić begins his essay “The Demon of Nationalism” (Demon nacionalizma), which is centered on Slobodan Milošević, with a short overview of Yugoslav society at the time that Milošević entered the scene. The essay is worth quoting more extensively: “He appeared at a time of slow but steady liberalization of the regime, thus raising hopes that an obsolete political and economic system would evolve towards a society of a Western European type. Notions that the rule of law, free markets, European integration and the freedom and well-being of the Citizen, could become the source of political legitimacy began acquiring the right to exist in public discourse, while conservative and dogmatic forces seemed to be on the defensive. The media were becoming increasingly free. The deconstruction of the regime’s mythology began in Ljubljana and the question of the army, the only untouchable institution thus far, was raised. The Belgrade press took the lead in affirming market and civic liberalism. In Zagreb, efforts by the dogmatic party faction to stop free-thinking trends in culture and art turned out to be ridiculous. (...) In larger cities, which had already become centers of the individualistic and Western European way of life in the 1960s, culture and arts were flourishing, especially theatre, film and rock music. Communication and cooperation among Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade were carried out intensively and spontaneously through the non-national and urban contents, without the influence of political groups and often despite them. The general public considered nationalism the whim of marginal weirdos,

untalented writers, scum from the suburbs and, in general, people having problems with the perception of their own identity."¹⁰⁶⁹

From today's perspective, the image of the 1980s, given by Perišić, appears at first sight to be too bright and optimistic, like the mythical narrative of a "better past". However, such an impression is formed precisely due to the interval that separates us from that period of time as well as the catastrophes that happened in the meantime: the triumph of nationalism, the collapse of the SFRY, wars, war crimes and genocide.

Today's researcher is primarily focused on the national *reconquista*, the flourishing of populism and nationalism during the 1980s which arose from the enthusiasm for populism that started in the intellectual circles gathered around Dobrica Ćosić and then spilled over into the sphere of politics when the regime of Slobodan Milošević took adopted the national program and began to implement it in practice. After living more than 30 years in the grip of nationalism, it seems that nationalism is our destiny. The irrevocability of historical events can easily deceive the observer, so that they seem inevitable to him, as if the course of history could not have turned in a different direction. It is easy to fall for the illusion that the subsequent sequence of events was the only possible one. Historical events get a halo of logic and the illusion of uninterrupted continuity only post festum, that is, from today's perspective. The problem with such a teleological view of the past is that any other sequence of events would also seem logical as part of some historical continuity. At the moment when history is unfolding, it is absolutely uncertain which direction it will take, while the illusion of inevitability comes from a secularized faith in divine providence that has turned into the "meaning of history". To paraphrase the Russian liberal thinker Alexander Herzen history has no predetermined libretto.¹⁰⁷⁰

1069 Vuk Perišić, *Od Weimara do Vardara*, (Zagreb:Fraktura, 2015)

1070 According to: Isaija Berlin, *Ruski mislioci*, translated by Ivan Radosavljević, (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2013)

As a consistent liberal and champion of human freedom, Perišić stands up against just that – frequently unconscious historical determinism. According to him, history “is not a determined sequence of inevitable events which is controlled by the productive forces and relations of production, national ‘beings’ or national ‘fate’”. The Yugoslav space could avoid hatred, poverty and war until the political coterie led by Slobodan Milošević launched a chain reaction nationalism”.¹⁰⁷¹ Hence this pictorial point: “Fire is just one of the possible fates of the forest”¹⁰⁷² It is often difficult for us, fire victims amidst the remnants of the fire, to get rid of the scene to which our eyes are fixed: due to burned trees we do not see that there was a possibility that the arsonist would not come into possession of a lighter and petrol.

PLURALISM AND ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE WEST

Even a brief overview of the most important movements, currents, creative figures and artistic works from the 1980s shows that it was the period when cultural pluralism reached its peak in the second Yugoslavia. Lidija Merenik’s text “Selektivna hronologija: nove pojave u slikarstvu i skulpturi u Srbiji 1979–1989” (Selective Chronology: New Phenomena in Painting and Sculpture in Serbia 1979–1989) is characteristic. The author first criticizes the nostalgic, pathetic and mystifying attitude towards this period, which she counters with scientific facts and gives a brief overview of some 500 solo and group exhibitions, that is, about one per week. One could say that this number is quite sufficient for nostalgia, especially from today’s post apocalyptic perspective. Merenik writes: “It is the fact that Serbian art experienced the bright moments of its emancipated European urban speech during the 1980s. New performance art, 1979–1989, represented by the works of three generations of artists, played an important role in the reception of postmodernism in this environment and produced

1071 Vuk Perišić, *Od Weimara do Vardara*, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2015)

1072 Ibid.

unavoidable works being crucial for the interpretation of postmodernist art strategy.”¹⁰⁷³

The basic characteristics of Yugoslav art and culture in the 1980s included Europeanness, urbanity, openness to the communication with the world and with contemporaneity on equal terms, and orientation towards the West. Nineteen eighty-four saw the emergence of the art group *Neue Slowenische Kunst* (NSK), which was founded by the *Laibach* music group, visual artists from the IRWIN group and the *Scipion Nasice Sisters Theatre* (*Gledališče Sester Scipion Našice*) founded by director Dragan Živadinov. These were later joined by other artistic and intellectual groups. In contrast to the majority of other artists and artistic groups from this period, the NSK opted for ideology as their object of artistic treatment, playing with ideological concepts, especially totalitarian kitsch. In the early 1990s, the NSK declared itself an independent state “without territory or state borders”, issued passports and opened consulates. Later, *Laibach* also recorded the NSK state anthem. The NSK performed its most radical political intervention in 1987, when its poster design won the contest for the Day of Youth celebration poster. A scandal broke out when it was revealed that its visual design was a palimpsest. Namely, it used a painting by Nazi artist Richard Klein and replaced the Nazi symbols in it with Yugoslav ones.

Conversely, the influence of political processes on visual art was not of crucial importance. Ješa Denegri states: “Since the early 1980s, political events, which will announce and end disintegration processes within the social system on which the second Yugoslavia was based, have accelerated their pace. However, in such circumstances, the Yugoslav art space still remained whole. There were more joint exhibitions of artists from all parts of Yugoslavia than ever before.”¹⁰⁷⁴ Visual art managed to preserve its autonomy, except for a few paint-

1073 *Umetnost na kraju veka*, prepared by Irina Subotić, (Belgrade: Clio, 1998).

1074 Ješa Denegri, “Jugoslovenski umetnički proctor”, *Sarajevske sveske* No. 51, Sarajevo, 2017.

ers who succumbed to the nationalist wave, but these cases were rare and quite specific, at least in the first half of the 1980s

The situation was similar with respect to other art disciplines: the basic characteristics of this period included cooperation with their peers from other republics and openness to the world's art scene. Such a concept is contained in the very name of the KPGT (Kazalište, Pozorište, Gledališće, Teatar), which was founded in Zagreb by Ljubiša Ristić (Belgrade), Nada Kokotović (Zagreb), Rade Šerbedžija (Zagreb) and Dušan Jovanović (Ljubljana), and in its first performance *Oslobodjenje Skoplja* (*The Liberation of Skopje*). The play was performed in several Yugoslav languages throughout Yugoslavia. Since its founding in 1967, the Belgrade BITEF Festival has been the scene of "new trends" in theatre from all parts of the world as well as from other republics. The above-mentioned theatre of Dragan Živadinov has been a guest at BITEF for years as has the alternative Kugla Glumište from Zagreb.

The 1980s have also been characterized as a period of thriving youth and student press, such as *Mladost*, *NON*, *Student* and *Vidici* in Belgrade, *Polet*, *Pitanja* and *Studentski list* in Zagreb, *Omladinska iskra* in Split, *Grafit* in Niš, *Val* in Rijeka, *Mladina* and *Tribuna* in Ljubljana, *Naši dani* in Sarajevo, *Stav* in Novi Sad, *Mladi borec* in Skopje, *Bpta e Re* in Priština, and *Omladinski pokret* in Podgorica. The youth press was open to under-recognized arts, such as comics, and especially to rock music, primarily new wave groups that were experiencing a real expansion. The youth newspapers not only wrote about the new wave, but some of them, such as *Polet*, also organized concerts by these bands. This made them active participants in the creation of the music and cultural scene. There were also rock music magazines, such as *Džuboks*, which was published until the mid-1980s; when it ceased to exist, most of its contributors joined *Rock*, which was published from 1982 until 1990.

In this case it was not a question of marginal phenomena. At one point, *Rock* had a circulation of 100,000 copies, and *Polet* 80,000, while in the late 1980s even the members of a fairly exclusive and intimistic

band, such as *Ekaterina Velika* could make a living solely from their work. Former *Grafiti* journalist Velibor Petković perhaps best summarized what has made the 1980s so special for a number of generations that reached maturity during the decade: If we exclude nostalgia for lost youth, then the “spirit of freedom” garnered first place, followed by the new wave “which was not only a genre of music, but also released creativity in ourselves, ordinary young people with no art degree”. The final reason was “because it seemed to us that Yugoslavia would become a normal democratic country”.¹⁰⁷⁵ Despite the crisis, unrest in Kosovo and the rise of populism and nationalism, the young and more urban population seeking its roots in the culture of the developed West found the 1980s to be a period of hope.

The literary scene was also vibrant and diverse. Profitability was not the first criterion for publishing a book, but book circulation data show that Yugoslavs’ cultural appetites were at a high level. Translations of classical works published by *Rad* in its “Reč i misao” series had regular circulations of 20,000 copies. At the same time, the books of great poets such as Zbigniew Herbert were published by Sarajevo’s *Svijetlost* in print runs of 10,000 copies, which is absolutely unthinkable today. Every writer had at his disposal dozens of literary magazines to which he could contribute for a decent fee, not to mention other media like radio and television. In the event of political persecution or conflict with the environment in which they lived, writers were given the opportunity to work for media in other republics. For example, after his novel *Ljudske slabosti* (Human Weaknesses) was banned, Radio Belgrade terminated its cooperation with Predrag Čudić, but he immediately began writing for the Zagreb magazine *Oko*. Its editor-in-chief Goran Babić was a hardline communist, but a different political conviction did not prevent him from giving a column in his magazine to the writer who was a hardcore anticommunist. In the second half of the 1980s, Slobodan Blagojević left Sarajevo for Belgrade where he became the editor-in-chief of the magazine

1075 Velibor Petković, “Jedna mladost u socijalizmu”, *Pressing* No. 62, Niš, 2017

Delo and published some of the best *thematic* issues in the history of that magazine (for example, “Postmoderna aura” /The Postmodern Aura/). “The Sarajevo cultural and political establishment was letting me know for years that I did not belong to that environment”,¹⁰⁷⁶ explained Blagojević about the reason for his leaving Sarajevo, adding that he was constantly criticized for his exceedingly high standards. Consequently, there was enough space for the development of one’s intellectual and artistic potentials, if not in one’s own republic then in another one.

The polyphony of poetics, styles and methods was also the basic determinant of literature in this period. “In the 1980s, Croatian literature was characterized by a pluralism of styles, literary concepts and models. Namely, there was no single dominant literary paradigm; rather, it is possible to speak about a fruitful imitation and mixture of the previous styles, about the simultaneity of heterogeneous processes, about the affirmation of various individual poetics and projects, about the dissolution of homogeneity”¹⁰⁷⁷, writes Krešimir Nemeć. The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the birth of “young Serbian prose”, written by a group of younger writers led by David Albahari and centered around the magazines *Književna reč* and *Vidici*. The writers included Svetislav Basara, Radoslav Petković, Mihajlo Pantić, Nemanja Mitrović, Vladimir Pištalo, Sava Damjanov, Sreten Ugričić and others. One of the basic characteristics of postmodernism is the rejection of great narratives in favor of polyperspectiveness. In postmodernity Slobodan Blagojević sees an auxiliary term that designates a new historical situation in which “it is simply no longer possible for one thought or one project to gain an absolute power that will be the measure of all things until the next revolution or counterrevolution when a new measure of all things will emerge and so on.”¹⁰⁷⁸ Instead of aspiring towards the monolithism inherent

1076 Slobodan Blagojević, *Tri čiste obične pameti*, (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1996)

1077 Krešimir Nemeć, “Postmodernizam i Hrvatska književnost”, *Croatica XXIII/XXIV*, Zagreb, 1992/1993.

1078 Slobodan Blagojević, *Tri čiste obične pameti*, (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1996)

in authoritarian ideological projects, a glorification of polyphony and a coexistence of different artistic and intellectual views, concepts and practices entered the scene.

THE ORDER TO SERVE HIGHER GOALS

Many actors who were a part of the cultural scene in the 1980s are routinely accused of escapism, social indifference, disinterest in socialist society and all the unrest that led to catastrophe. From today's point of view, it may seem a bit strange that at the moment when nationalist aggression entered the scene and Milošević came to power, there was the smell of gunpowder in the air and the future was quite uncertain – writers dealt with the ontological unfoundness of the world, man and literary heroes, while musicians were singing: *The wind breathes where it wants and I hear its voice | I don't know where it comes from or where its end is*. However, if we look at things from a broader diachronic perspective, it is easy to observe the dominant tendency in the poor cultures of the Yugoslav space which is reflected in the constant ideological pressure to subjugate art to one's own needs.

Throughout history, artists and, in particular, writers have almost never been able to freely engage in creative activities because the social order to serve “higher goals has always hovered over them – the ideology of the medieval state, national liberation, nation building, national interest, the building of socialism, designing a communist utopia... In the essay “Između orla i vuka” (Between an Eagle and a Wolf) in which he wrote about the poetic destiny of Branko Radičević, Milan Kašanin writes: “In the literary sense, the influence of folk poetry and national history not only on Branko Radičević, but also on all our poets in the 19th century was more harmful than useful.”¹⁰⁷⁹ Kašanin says that Branko was not the only victim of that “holy struggle for freedom”. He was just the first one. “Almost all our poets were

1079 Milan Kašanin, *Sudbine i ljudi: ogledi o srpskim piscima*, (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2004)

doomed, so to speak, to write for someone else's glory, not for their own, and there is probably no one among them who did not begin writing poems about himself, about love and God's sun and then got his knuckles rapped for his egocentrism and selfishness and was instructed to contrive combats, traitors, fairies and haiduks for a piece of bread and a glass of wine"¹⁰⁸⁰, says Kašanin.

In his dispute with Marko Ristić, which took place in the magazine *Danas* in 1961, Radomir Konstantinović wrote an essay titled "Šta tu filozofiraš?" (What Do You Philosophize About?) in which he mentioned the excessive price paid by the writers who obeyed the engagement order, thus forever losing countless poetic possibilities. "We do not know and will probably never know how Isidora Sekulić looked to herself at the time she was writing her major book *Saputnici* (Fellow Travelers) instead of calling for revenging Kosovo. Dis's case is tragically clear: no, he did not write *Mi čekamo cara* (We Are Waiting for the Emperor) because he was scared of the terrible Skerlić, but because, *as a Serbian citizen, who cared about Serbia like everyone else in Belgrade at that time, he was afraid of himself as the poet of Nihilism*. Did not Dis look at himself, due to his *Utopljene duše* (Drowned Souls), if not as a traitor then, at the very least, as a man who is concerned with luxury, while others dedicate themselves to 'national work'?"¹⁰⁸¹

The extent to which the terror of serving to benefit society is incorporated into our cultural model is shown in some of Dis's verses, which now sound like pure blasphemy. For example: *Volim oblak, cveće, kad cveta i vene, / Al' nikako ljude što ropću i pište; / Što drugoga boli, ne boli i mene; / Mene tuđi jadi nimalo ne tište* (I like a cloud, flowers, when they blossom and wither away, / But not the people who grumble and scream; / What hurts others doesn't hurt me; / Someone else's griefs do not touch me at all). Like it or not, the reader feels a little embarrassed by the poet's indifference to the fate of the society in

1080 Ibid.

1081 Radomir Konstantinović, *Neispisano vreme*, (Šabac – Belgade: "Stanislav Vinaver" Foundation and Dan Graf, 2018)

which he lives. It took a lot of courage to write the final verse, especially because it was written in the epoch marked by Šantić's *Mene sve rane moga roda bole* (All wounds of my people hurt me).

The 1980s are one of the rare periods in history in which the steel grip of social demands on artists was loosened. The spirit of freedom that Petković is speaking about emerged because the government was more concerned about itself than society. Therefore, the control it exerted over the cultural sphere was relaxed. This created an atmosphere in which artists could deal more freely with their obsessions and daydreams, without fearing too much that they would be sanctioned or get their knuckles rapped for not dedicating themselves to "national work". In general, it can be said that the important cultural works of the 1980s were created by Bogdan Bogdanović's "night man" who finally got rid of the need to serve the Day and its limited necessities. Bogdanović makes a clear distinction on the basis of his own life experience: "The day man must work for his family and be involved in politics, while the night man is alone and belongs to himself. The major wealth of a person is derived from this nocturnal sphere."¹⁰⁸² Naturally, while art also has some ideological implications, it cannot be confined to ideology or to serving nonartistic goals. The opposite view would be that art should not exist at all. Party programs, ideological textbooks, religious catechisms and political pamphlets would be sufficient. Mirnes Sokolović sums up this complex issue thusly: "To believe in the autonomy of literature does not mean to understand a literary work solely as a miracle of language, some lyrical weaving devoid of social implications; instead, it means pleading for literature that is not dependent on civic utilitarianism, stylistic didacticism or ethical propaganda as the goals of nonliterary authorities"¹⁰⁸³.

Nevertheless, the fact that artists are not indifferent to the society in which they live came to light when the pressure of historical

1082 Bogdan Bogdanović, *Glib i krv*, prepared by Latinka Perović, (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001)

1083 Mirnes Sokolović, "Džaba ste krečili", *Beton* No. 142, 2013.

catastrophe became unbearable. Many postmodernists, like Radoslav Petković and Svetislav Basara, were directly involved in the political struggle against the Milošević regime. Meanwhile, Milan Mladenović wrote and composed antiwar songs for the albums “Dum dum” in 1991 and “Angel’s Breath” in 1994. During the 1990s, Basara wrote a series of novels dealing with the current reality and its creators among Association of Writers (*Ukleta zemlja* /Haunting Ground/, *Looney Tunes*, *Sveta mast* /Holy Lard/). Albahari also changed his poetics and began writing about the social and political reality in the novels *Snežni čovek* (Snow Man), *Mamac* (Bait), *Mrak* (Darkness), *Gec i Majer* (Götz and Meyer) and, a little later, *Ludvig* (Ludwig), a novel about the involvement of writers in the nationalist project. There were also other examples: in 1989, Mihajlo Pantić participated in the formation of an association of independent writers (Serbian Literary Society), together with Radomir Konstantinović, Pavle Ugrinov, Slobodan Blagojević and other antinationalists. However, a little later, he wrote panegyrics to nationalist bards, such as Rajko Petrov Nogo and Matija Bećković. In his case, it was not a question of intimate ideological commitment, but of mere opportunism. Had the historical cards been differently distributed, he would have written a panegyric to *Jadi srpske duše* (Woes of the Serbian Soul) by Miodrag Stanisavljević.

Finally, postmodern poetics implicitly contains a certain political agenda. When translated into political language, giving up big grand narratives means giving up all giving up all utopias and monoliths, both communist and national and religious. The polyphony of different artistic practices, styles and commitments in politics would imply a multiparty, democratic system. Rejecting the existence of only one saving truth inevitably leads to a social system based on respect for the rights of each individual, respect for others and dialogue. The embryos of an open and democratic culture already existed. Only their concrete political form was missing. If the political leadership, which held absolute power in its hands, had moved the country toward real democratization, liberalization, pluralism, respect for individual rights and freedoms, and European integration, there

would have been quite a number of people who would have supported it and welcomed such developments as desirable and natural.

The flourishing of culture in the 1980s was not a gift from heaven; instead, it naturally flowed from the achievements of the previous generations. It could also be considered as a final act of liberation from dogmatism, a process that started with Krleža's speech at the 1952 Ljubljana Congress of Writers, although it also has its roots in the polemics carried out by Krleža and Marko Ristić just before the Second World War on the pages of the magazines *Danas* and *Pečat* with the party intellectuals gathered around Milovan Đilas. The decades of work in the fields of culture, education, urbanization, enlightenment and modernization led inevitably to such results.

Such phenomena would have been impossible without the huge government investments in cultural infrastructure and education. In just three and a half decades, Yugoslavia was transformed from an illiterate, poor and uneducated country into a state with a whole network of libraries, bookshops, cultural centers, youth centers, universities, publishing houses, galleries, museums, cultural magazines, and daily and weekly newspapers. Given the situation in 1945, such progress cannot be overestimated or overpraised. In *A History of Yugoslavia*, Marie-Janine Calic provided concrete data. At the end of the Second World War, half of the population was illiterate, while by 1961 this number had dropped to less than 20 percent. In 1945, there were only three universities and two colleges in Yugoslavia, while 30 years later there were 158. According to the number of students, the SFRY held fourth place in Europe, after Sweden, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union. Between 1945 and 1960, the number of university-educated people increased tenfold, that is, to 500,000 people. Calic also highlights that during the 1960s, 381 state museums were visited by eight million Yugoslavs, while theaters boasted audiences totaling 4.3 million people. Calic writes that never before had the state invested so much in the education of its people as it did after 1945. First priority was given to the eradication of illiteracy in rural areas, health education, the introduction of compulsory primary education and building

of adult education centers, libraries and cultural organizations,¹⁰⁸⁴ Let me paraphrase Dušan Matić: when you have an organ or at least a harpsichord in every church for centuries, and when musical art is perfected on them all that time, it is logical that Bach appears in the end. Or, in our case, *Biće i jezik* (Being and Language) by Radomir Konstantinović, *Doktor Krleža* (Doctor Krleža) by Bora Ćosić, Haus-tor's *Treći svijet* (Third World), *U ime naroda* (In the Name of the People) by Živko Nikolić and other major works of the 1980s.

POETS, WRITERS AND NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION

In the general polyphony and pluralism of the 1980s, a group of writers and intellectuals – supporters of absolute unity, or national unity in this case, as well as sworn opponents of polyphony and diversity – stood out. This group, gathered around Dobrica Ćosić, had begun its striking reactionary work in the previous decades and achieved triumph in the 1980s by overrunning everything else on the stage and providing ideological weapons for Slobodan Milošević. Ćosić's coterie did not restrict its actions to the cultural sphere which had never really interested it. The cultural sphere merely served as a surrogate for a chauvinist party which it could not found. Instead, many members of this circle became direct political actors in the demise of the SFRY: Jovan Rašković, Radovan Karadžić and Ćosić himself, who became the President of Yugoslavia in 1992. The history of Ćosić's group, its march through the institutions, from Srpska književna zadruga to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts is well known and described in detail, probably best in the first volume of *Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere* (Forging Anti-Yugoslav Conspiracy) by Sonja Biserko.

It is interesting to provide some details from the turbulent history of the domestic intellectual Vendée which, unlike the French original, ended in an absolute victory and the destruction of society and

1084 Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*, translated from German by Ranka Gašić and Vladimir Babić, (Belgrade: Clio, 2013)

the state. One detail concerns the thesis that the nationalist intelligentsia had a certain democratic potential that included even the Kosovo issue and that its radicalization occurred only in the mid-1980s. This thesis is advocated by Jasna Dragović-Soso in *Saviours of the Nation* (Spasioci nacije) as well as Taras Kermauner in *Pismima srpskom prijatelju* (Letters to My Serbian Friend), where he writes: “I had no idea that around 1986 you would move from democratism, otherwise abstract and humanistic but I still consider it fair, almost to fascism.”¹⁰⁸⁵ First of all, Ćosić was not a mere observer of the events in Kosovo, but actively participated in shaping the Kosovo problem. In 1986, as he himself admitted in his autobiography, he organized a meeting with fifteen Kosovo Serbs in the garden of the *Trandafilović* restaurant in Čubura. There, he proposed that they write a petition including their requests. He helped create the content and then edited and supplemented the petition. He said: “My conspirative name for Kosovo Serbs was ‘Granpa’. Even my peers and elders called me ‘Granpa’.”¹⁰⁸⁶ Analyzing Ćosić’s acknowledgement of his involvement in organizing the first protests of Kosovo Serbs, Vuk Perišić says: “With one record, the writer recklessly dismantled the propagandistic mantra about the spontaneity of the first rallies. But that is less important. None other than Dobrica Ćosić himself knocked over the first domino. He put down his pen, got up from his desk, picked up the phone and issued operational instructions and orders.”¹⁰⁸⁷ Ćosić mediated between the Kosovo group of Miroslav Šolević and Kosta Bulatović, and Serbia’s Presidency, and coordinated their activities, pulling the strings of turbulent events behind the scene. Consequently, he also did a bit of directing the political performance that was taking place on the large stage of the whole state.

A second element of this history was the nationalist ideology, which became dominant in the 1980s, filling the ideological vacuum

1085 *Vreme* No. 289, Belgrade, 4 May 1996.

1086 Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi 3 (1981–1991)*, (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2002)

1087 Vuk Perišić, *Od Weimara do Vardara*, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2015)

created by the gradual weakening of the communist narrative. The ideology was developed in considerable detail in the 1970s. “Already in the previous decade – the most influential example is Dobrica Ćosić’s tetralogy *Vreme smrti* (Time of Death, 1972–1979) – one can trace the beginnings of the crucial views and stereotypes of nationalism that will later crystallize as the dominant ideology in society: the exceptionality of the Serbian people in history, primarily with respect to the number of victims and suffering; eternal encirclement by enemies and struggle for survival; international politics as an ‘international anti-Serb conspiracy’; Yugoslav unification as a fatal mistake, as a political project doomed from the beginning; crystallization of the figure of *domestic traitors* as *foreign mercenaries*; the members of other nations and religions are viewed solely as a threat, which leads to national autism where the Other is always and only the Enemy; conscious commitment to war and suffering as the commitment to the *heavenly kingdom*”.¹⁰⁸⁸ This is how Goran Lazičić sums up Dobrica Ćosić’s political program that was presented, lo and behold, in one novel cycle, that is, in the literature of fiction.

The above list of ideological platitudes is quite sufficient for the future incitement of nationalist passions, preparations for war and disintegration of the country, while some remaining details can be worked out along the way, as was done by nationalist intellectuals with enthusiasm and passion during the 1980s. Ćosić’s basic postulates were further elaborated by Danko Popović in *Knjiga o Milutinu* (The Book of Milutin, 1985), a crucial and extremely popular book belonging to “populist wave literature” (Mirko Đorđević’s term). It had 20 or so editions, 17 of which were published prior to the end of 1986. The unusual popularity of Popović’s novel is also evidenced by the fact that “the cases of group memorization, ritual recitation at public gatherings – especially

1088 Goran Lazičić, “Smrt autora i rađanje nacije: književna postmoderna i nacionalizam u Srbiji”, in: *Sreten Ugrčić: Pisac, astronom, terorista*, prepared by Svetlana Gavrilović and Saša Ilić (Belgrade, 2021)

at some local political gatherings – have been recorded”.¹⁰⁸⁹ Many other writers also distinguished themselves in understanding literature as an ideological weapon: Matija Bećković, Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, Predrag Palavestra, Miodrag Perišić, Milan Komnenić, Brana Crnčević, Ljubomir Simović, Momo Kapor, Miroslav Toholj, Vuk Drašković, Slobodan Rakitić, Milorad Pavić, Gojko Đogo, Rajko Petrov Nogo, Milovan Danojlić... It is impossible to mention all of them. Their name is Legion.

STRIVING FOR CLOSEDNESS AND PROVINCIALISM

The incorporation of the nationalist narrative through a side door into the literary sphere can be traced even further into the past, regardless of Ćosić's coterie. As early as 1961, in the weekly *NIN*, Marko Ristić warned about the falsification of Rastko Petrović for whom Zoran Mišić claimed that “in the Kosovo commitment he saw the way to overcome his biological and existential problems”. He asked Mišić: “What is the ‘Kosovo commitment’ in general?”¹⁰⁹⁰ Five years later, Ristić speaks about “the renewal of totally anachronic Serbian and Orthodox nationalism”, stating that “*from a political point of view* it is simply and clearly a question of chauvinism”.¹⁰⁹¹ Ristić is even more explicit in the interview he gave to Slobodan Blagojević for the student newspaper *Naši dani* on 5 May 1973. He lists the ingredients of that tradition which are “usually the same: nationalism, religion, pompierism, obscurantism”; there are always “those Kosovo peonies and that Serbian wreath, that Kosovo commitment, that St Vitus Day Temple, that holy water and that wine from Marko's glass, those funeral services, those memorial services, those royal courts, that heavenly kingdom and that patron saint's day, the terrible sun of the martyrs and that patron saint's day cake, baptismal name (it helps him)... let us exclaim with love to the saint and to the entire Nemanjić family in

1089 Mirko Đorđević, “Književnost populističkog talasa”, in: *Srpska strana rata*, prepared by Nebojša Popov, (Belgrade: Republika, 1996)

1090 Marko Ristić, *Prisustva*, (Belgrade: Nolit, 1966)

1091 Marko Ristić, *Svedok ili saučesnik*, (Belgrade: Nolit, 1970)

general, heartbreaking lamentation and confusion in the head, basil and blue hyacinths".¹⁰⁹² In the end, Ristić warns of what lies behind the uncritical attitude towards the national tradition and where it may lead: "And that glorification, at any cost, of the national tradition, whatever it may be, if only it is national, is nothing else in the final analysis, in the final consequence, but a concrete form, that is, concrete manifestation of that ultra conception which was defined as the philosophy of 'Blut und Boden'. But, let us be clear: I do not want to say that every sentimental patriot, every well-meaning conservative patriot is therefore a ready-made fascist. But, as it has long been known, the road to hell is paved with good intentions."¹⁰⁹³

This line could also shed light on the persistent refusal of the conservative part of the cultural establishment to accept Radomir Konstantinović's work, including its specific argumentation. Radivoj Cvetičanin meticulously listed all the crucial instances of this resistance in the book *Konstantinović. Hronika* (Konstantinović. Chronicle). It began immediately after the publication of Konstantinović's first novel *Daj nam danas* (Give Us Today) in 1954. Predrag Palavestra accused him of relying on "something that is not entirely for our climate, does not take root in our country and barely survives, cultivated in pots in warm rooms". Consequently, he is not our fellow countryman. He is under foreign influence. We also learn that there are such artistic phenomena elsewhere, but they are not for our cultural climate. I suppose that they do not like the dark vilayet, because they cannot grow freely. In short, we are not for high culture nor is high culture for us. If the spirit of closedness and parochialism, inherent to nationalism, has ever found its ideal expression, it has found it in the words of Palavestra. In 1961, on the occasion of the publishing of the novel *Izlazak* (Exodus), the same critic wrote about the "proverbial eccentricity of the literary stance and procedure of Radomir Konstantinović" who, in his previous two novels, "developed

1092 Marko Ristić, *Za svest*, (Belgrade: Nolit, 1977)

1093 Ibid.

his *extremist* ideas about the structure and character of the modern novel to the point of absurdity". Everything that is different from the usual, generally accepted, clichéd and, in particular, somewhat more radical ideal is immediately labelled as perverted and extremist. And this happens to literature where originality is valued.

In early 1981, on the occasion of Nolit's book series "Pedeset romana srpske književnosti" (Fifty Novels in Serbian Literature), Radomir Smiljanić protested: "Why should readers read Radomir Konstantinović's novel *Daj nam danas*, as the best Serbian novel, with the so-called eternal theme of man, least of all of a Serbian man." In the text titled "Haračlije književnog provincijalizma" (Harachlije of Literary Provincialism),¹⁰⁹⁴ Branko Aleksić attacks Smiljanić, reminding him that the novel is about Eduard Kraus, Belgrade's German, who refused to join the occupier in 1941 and thus committed suicide. He further says that Smiljanić's reasoning is the same as that which pushed Kraus to suicide, that is, fascist. Finally, in 1983, after the publishing of Konstantinović's eight-volume *Biće i jezik* (Being and Language) on which he worked for 15 years, Miodrag Perišić accused the author of "ahistorical will" to which "neither the canons of history nor the classification of literary axiology" apply. Consequently, there is some established, unquestioned, God-given canon of values which cannot and must not be questioned; today's essayist must obey the scale of values established once and for all, and must not engage in dubious endeavors such as the revaluation and different reading of tradition. Doubting one unquestionable truth – both in politics and literature – is an unforgivable crime. All these remarks could be easily classified as a typical manifestation of the provincial spirit, so that it is no wonder that every now and then Konstantinović's *Filosofija palanke* (Philosophy of the Province) is attacked.

This short survey shows that the efforts of Ćosić and his associates fell on fertile ground: in our culture there is a constant tendency

1094 Branko Aleksić, *Lira i motika*, (Belgrade: Studentski izdavački centar Univerzitetske konferencije SSO, 1981)

towards closedness and provincialism, towards the idealization of local soil and xenophobia, towards monolithism and unanimity, towards absolute unity. In his speech at the Congress of Cultural Action in 1971, Konstantinović warned of this danger: "It is always an aspiration to view the world of conflicting forces as an expression of demonism, if not the apocalypse itself." It is not necessary for this aspiration to be always shrouded in the same ideological form. It changes its clothes, but its essence remains the same. This is why it was so easy for Ćosić to turn from a supporter of unitary Yugoslavia and integral Yugoslavism to an advocate of Greater Serbian nationalism. Hence the incredible gallimaufry of the seemingly irreconcilable ideological narratives that initially gathered around Milošević's program: the supporters of the rehabilitation of quislings, Stalinists, Russophiles, Orthodox obscurants, conspirators of delusional theories about Serbs as the oldest nation, Yugoslav centralists and supporters of Greater Serbia... According to Vuk Perišić, all of these diverse groups were united by hatred "towards human rights, free trade, civic liberalism, individualism and cosmopolitanism".¹⁰⁹⁵ In other words, towards an individual, his inviolable freedom and therefore pluralism, polyphony and the coexistence of differences.

Ćosić was not the only one who tried his hand at directing; others also dedicated themselves to the creation of an extraliterary reality. The populist wave of literature was in full swing, many marginal writers joined it voluntarily, many writers were caught up in a collective fervor, while some had to be persuaded. Pavle Ugrinov recorded such a case in his memoirs *Egzistencija* (Existence). He recounted his conversation with Mihiz in 1982: Mihiz asked him to "write a historical novel about Serbs in the 18th and 19th centuries".¹⁰⁹⁶ "You could do it excellently! The direction was given by Crnjanski in *Seobe* (Migrations)! Write the sequel to it!", Mihiz was explicit. As Ugrinov resists being ordered about what theme to take up in order to satisfy

1095 Ibid.

1096 Pavle Ugrinov, *Egzistencija*, (Belgrade: Prosveta, 2006)

the needs of the moment, Mihiz becomes increasingly open: “Your book *Domaja* (Homeland) has prompted me to start this conversation! There you have delved into our past and have proved that you can do that. And this is why I entrust you with this duty!” To Ugrinov’s statement that this novel, published in 1971, went unnoticed, Mihiz has a ready argument: “Well, the communists were not interested in the past at all, they only talked about the future! But you need to move on and everything will fall into its place.” Ugrinov says that this sounded to him as if Mihiz wanted to promise something, which he confirmed: “I guarantee you!” Ugrinov did not accept this indecent offer, but left a written record of how national enthusiasm was directed in the early 1980s. Who knows how many similar conversations were held and who knows how many of them agreed to put their writing skills into the service of the nationalist struggle, so that “everything falls into its place”, as lucratively as possible. Thereafter, we will have scientific researchers and literary historians speaking about the increased interest of writers in Serbian history, about the opening of taboo topics, about the Kosovo commitment, about spontaneous literary trends, “in the sphere of absolute spirit”.

“HUMANE RESETTLEMENT” OF MINORITY CULTURES

During the 1980s events signaled the emergence of a polyphony–monophony dichotomy, which was marked by a gradual suppression of everything that could not fit into the new unanimity, until that single voice turned into the sound of a war trumpet. Such was the case with minority cultures. Until the second half of the 1980s, they were part of the pluralistic wealth of the cultural scene, and then everything changed. A characteristic example of this process is *Új Symposion*. It was the magazine of Vojvodina Hungarians, which “definitely freed contemporary Vojvodina literature from the grip of almost compulsory provincialism and rustic local-color literature, and brought the breath of modern spiritual currents from the West into Hungarian

(not only Vojvodina-Hungarian) literature”.¹⁰⁹⁷ Significant poets and painters were discovered by the magazine. István Domonkos published his first poems in it. Since the cultural climate in Yugoslavia was much more liberal than behind the Iron Curtain, the magazine also served as a platform for many writers from Hungary who could not publish their works in their own country.

“In the late 1980s, the magazine was headed by promising younger forces of Vojvodina’s Hungarian literature: Attila Balázs, Péter Bozsik, István Ladányi, István Beszédes and others who intended to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors Ottó Tolnai and János Sziveri,”¹⁰⁹⁸ writes Marko Čudić. However, their intentions were thwarted by the outbreak of war and the emigration of numerous editors and writers to Veszprém in Hungary, escaping from the horrors of war and the possibility of being drafted and sent to the battlefield. They included Attila Balázs, Péter Bozsik, Roland Orcsik, Ottó Fenyvesi, György Szerbhorváth and many others. After the members of its editorial board left Vojvodina, the magazine ceased to exist. Thus, Yugoslavia lost *Új Symposion*, which had been published since the 1960s, while Hungary obtained *Ex Symposion*, a magazine founded by emigrants and strengthened by the essayists János Gécz and István Ladányi, which became the successor of the late *Új Symposina*. This is how the phenomenon, which Marko Čudić calls “minority literature that emigrated to its home country”, happened. The dominant cultural public sphere, deeply entrenched in nationalist delusions at that time, was not much shaken by this loss.

The culture of the Albanian minority in Kosovo fared even worse as anti-Albanian sentiment in Serbian public and cultural circles had been fueled since the early 1980s. For example, from 1968 to 1978, one of the most famous Kosovo poets, Ali Podrimja, had four poetry books translated into Serbian and published by major Serbian publishers (Matica srpska, Nolit, Bagdala, Gradina), while Prosveta published

1097 Marko Čudić, “Nastavljanje nenastavljivog”, *Beton* No. 46, 2008.

1098 Ibid.

his selection of the latest Kosovo Albanian poems. Thereafter – nothing. To date, not one book written by Podrimja has been published in Serbian. The situation is similar with respect to the poet and translator Esad Mekuli. From 1962 to 1979 nearly 40 of his works were published in Serbian: they included his own books and translations of anthologies and collections from Albanian. After this intensive publishing activity there ensued total silence during the 1980s. The situation has not changed up to the present day. Serbian culture has closed itself to Albanian culture. The Albanian has slowly become the arch-enemy; mass propaganda has begun to demonize Albanians, so that the voices of Albanian writers from Kosovo could only damage the dominant image.

Ethnic cleansing first began in the cultural sphere and then took a much more terrible form – killings and persecution during the aggression against Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. The physical annihilation of the other and the different was preceded by a ritual expulsion from the cultural memory of everything that “is not entirely for our climate and does not take root in our country”, as Palavestra put it. Ćosić’s concept of “humane resettlement” was naturally first tested in the cultural sphere, bearing in mind that the idea came from a writer, albeit a retrograde nationalist realist.

The prevalent atmosphere of chauvinistic hatred and war-mongering rampage drove away many “nationally unfit” authors who had lived and worked in Serbia for decades. After Šešelj’s supporter smashed his head with a camera, Mirko Kovač left Belgrade for Istria. In the early 1990s, Daša Drndić also left Belgrade for Rijeka. In the text titled “Farewell to Belgrade”, Drndić writes about the atmosphere surrounding Belgrade’s cultural figures of the time: Serbianized overnight, in the city in which she had lived since she was seven: “I brought a chocolate cake to my Drama Department for saying ‘good-bye’ to my colleagues. The then editor-in-chief, Zoran Popović, says: ‘It’s good that you are leaving, you love the sea’. Editor Radmila Vidak says: ‘It’s good that you are leaving. One can see from your face that you are not a Serb.’ Vojislav Donić sheds a tear: ‘Did I contribute to

your leaving?’ Before that, Boda Marković used to call me ‘an Usta-sha cunt’.”¹⁰⁹⁹

Ibrahim Hadžić was receiving death threats and his apartment was robbed, but the thieves were never found. In the end, he had to leave his job in TV where he had worked as the editor of the School Programme for many years and was a legend. About that time, Hadžić says: “It is difficult to face the fact that your name and your existence stir up the feelings of indescribable hatred and contempt in others. Certain people have specialized in annihilating others and those who are different. My name was regularly deleted in the *Politika* cultural supplement, which included a survey of literary magazines. Today, that ‘wiper’ is still in the *Politika* cultural section and behaves as if it is his property. None of his scribbles goes unnoticed or uncommented. How to experience, that is, survive the fact that all books from the Prosveta annual production were displayed in the Geca Kon bookshop in Knez Mihailova Street, except mine?”¹¹⁰⁰

Ranko Munitić also left a testimony about his own expulsion from the Belgrade press. In the text titled “What Is Happening to Me – Nationally Unfit” (*Šta mi se događa: Nacionalno nepodoban*), published in November 1990, Munitić wrote: “When I moved to Belgrade twenty or so years ago, it was easy to become a citizen of Belgrade: you were worth as much as you were worth as a person and as much your work was worth. They judged you by that and accepted you or rejected you by that.” Munitić contributed to the major cultural media for a quarter of a century. However, everything changed overnight: “A few years earlier this cooperation was interrupted or, better said, extinguished. There was no space for my texts? No. I was offered to write under a pseudonym on two occasions. So, there was no place for me anymore.” Munitić does not complain. He only reveals something that is not spoken about, but its essence consists of the following: “On

1099 Daša Drndić, “Rastanak s Beogradom”, *Beton* No. 100, 2010.

1100 Ibrahim Hadžić, “Moja nemoć da bilo šta spriječim, iscurila je na uši”, *Aljazeera Balkans*, 22 January 2017.

the one hand, the environment that betrays itself by such actions also betrays the dominant cosmopolitan tradition of the city which, just due to the absence of national prejudices and exclusiveness, has become a spiritually rich, creatively diverse, wide and fruitful environment. On the other hand, among my former colleagues from the industry that has also carelessly betrayed its cosmopolitan vocation, the industry that has suddenly replaced the cultural criterion with the tribal one and the traditional value selection with non-value-based elimination, the ability not to mix the national and the cultural in a wrong sense, has been lost.”¹¹⁰¹

SAVING THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL CULTURE

Indeed, Belgrade had long been known as an open and cosmopolitan city but, after the triumph of the nationalist program, first in the cultural sphere and then in the political one, everything changed. In the first half of the 1980s, it seemed that the narrow concept of national culture was dying out throughout the SFRY. Cooperation among writers, artists, magazines and music groups had never been so vibrant. Cultural exchange and permeation were also intensive. Slovenian poet Tomaž Šalamun, for example, had a decisive influence not only on Slovenian poets, but also on a number of Serbian and Croatian poets, which extends to the present day. For example, Marko Pogačar's poetic opus is inconceivable without Šalamun. Apart from Marko Ristić, Miroslav Krleža also had a decisive influence on the formation of Bora Ćosić. Ćosić even wrote the entire Krležian trilogy (*Poslovi, sumnje, snovi Miroslava Krleže* /Assignments, Suspicions, Dreams of Miroslav Krleža/, *Zagrebačka analiza* /Zagreb Analysis/, *Doktor Krleža* /Doctor Krleža/). In his last novel, Ćosić created a peculiar novelesque form, emulating and parodying Krleža's style, while the narrator in the novel is Krleža himself but, in the Ćosićean adaption, he was transformed into a man who gave up writing and

1101 Ranko Munitić, “Šta mi se događa: Nacionalno nepodoban”, *Vreme* No. 5, Belgrade, 1990.

dedicated himself to psychotherapy in the world of alternative history. As Predrag Brebanović writes about the novel, “parallelism is certainly most striking on a linguistic plane: moving in an incredibly wide range from pathos to farce, Ćosić made abundant use of an almost integral diapason of the recognizable Krležian narratives and stylistic patterns and turnabouts”.¹¹⁰²

The dynamics of the early eighties scene is best illustrated by the tours of music bands throughout other republics. Branimir Džoni Štulić, for example, says that *Azra* had concerts in at least 17 cities in Serbia: Niš, Pirot, Prokuplje, Kragujevac, Čačak, Svetozarevo, Užice, Smederevo, Pančevo, Ruma, Beograd, Subotica, Kikinda, Zrenjanin, Sombor, Sremska Mitrovica and Novi Sad. In some cities they performed several times. In Belgrade, they had as many as 32 concerts. A significant number of young people in Serbia would give complete works of Njegoš, Dučić and Rakić for Rundek and Štulić’s few songs. The same applies to young people in Croatia who would barter Krleža for Milan Mladenović. Normal cultural development in peacetime led to an increasingly extensive formation of common, Yugoslav culture. If such a development continued, it is difficult to imagine that the closure of national cultures would last.

Tribal spirits had to act using all possible means. There was no more time to wait as there was a serious danger that new generations could be totally alienated from their roots, surrender to the influence of the neighboring “fictional nations” and indulge in hedonistic enjoyment of worldwide cultural products from the “rotten West”. Instead of promoting suspicious artistic works of dubious foreign origin, the new cultural elite offered works that openly spread chauvinistic hatred. A typical example is Vojislav Lubarda’s novel *Vaznesenje* (Ascension), which dealt with the massacre of Serbs in Bosnia during the Second World War (about what else?) and won the NIN Award for Best Novel of the Year in the SFRY in 1989.

1102 Predrag Brebanović, *Podrumi marcipana*, (Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga, 2006)

In analyzing Lubarda's novel in detail, Nenad Veličković writes about the author's black-and-white image of nations, imposing stereotypes in the service of a new nationalist ideology. "Serbs are a healthy nation, sturdy and heroic, wearing their tight folk costumes like a knight's armor, while Muslims are sick, complex-ridden, frustrated and genetically inferior. Lubarda does not question this basically Nazi thesis about Serbs being genetically superior to Muslims in his novel. No, evidence is not expected from a modern prose writer",¹¹⁰³ Veličković writes. He refutes the thesis of the NIN jury (which also included Novak Kilibarda, Svetozar Koljević and Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz) about *Vaznesenje* as an "Andrić-Selimović synthesis" and a modern polyphonic novel. So why did a bad novel receive the NIN Award, "less than two years before the war in Bosnia"? Veličković concludes: "The answer is simple: due to its ideological fitness. No other novel was better at identifying the enemy and giving the arguments for his final destruction. In Bosnia, Muslims, that is Turks, are the enemy. Even behind such an obsolete and wrong identification there is an epic and insurgent call to finish the unfinished job. If somewhere there appears the thought that Bosnian Muslims are not Turks and that they should not be killed or expelled to Turkey, the reader is warned immediately thereafter that Bosniaks are even worse."¹¹⁰⁴ Thus, literature became even more ideologically radicalized, took off its gloves and openly started warmongering and making preparations for ethnic cleansing and genocide. The previous year, the NIN Award was given to Dubravka Ugrešić for *Forsiranje romana rijeke* (Fording the Stream of Consciousness). In the meantime, the nationalist concept took over all levers of power and won a definitive victory over culture and literature for which tribal writers and intellectuals are mostly responsible.

¹¹⁰³ Nenad Veličković, "Slika drugog u romanu *Vaznesenje* Vojislava Lubarde", Reč 74/20, Belgrade, 2006.

¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

LINGUISTIC UNITARISM

The core group of writers and intellectuals who promoted the nationalist concept in the 1980s, included many old acquaintances from the time of linguistic clashes with Croats in 1967. They were the signatories of the “Proposal for Thinking”, the document created as a response to the Croatian “Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Literary Language”: Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, Antoni-je Isaković, Matija Bećković, Ljubomir Simović, Slobodan Stojanović and Milorad Pavić. By that time, they had already begun fighting in defense of the Cyrillic alphabet – a fight that lasts to this day – as well as advocating for a pure national culture. In the “Proposal” they demanded that “Radio Television Belgrade stop playing the role of the central Yugoslav studio without authorization, and use the Cyrillic alphabet in its local program”. They also demanded the “incorporation of the regulations in the Constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of Croatia that will give all Croats and Serbs the right to education in their own language and use their own alphabet, in accordance with their national programs”. During that period, it was necessary to begin implementing the nationalist concept in an indirect manner, that is through linguistic issues.

Eventually, the linguistic issues receded into the background. There were more important, inflammatory topics on the agenda. However, there is still one interesting case dealing with linguistics from the 1980s. Namely, in the mid-1980s, the group gathered around Dobrica Ćosić sought to persuade Slovenian intellectuals to agree to the centralization of Yugoslavia. Taras Kermauner writes that the first demand of the Serbian academicians was that Slovenes focus their language “on writing lower, populist literature which will, in time, switch to Serbian and that Serbian be used in public life and higher culture”¹¹⁰⁵ Such a proposal made Kermauner’s hair stand on end: “I replied to Popov and, through him, to Serbian academicians that the Italians under fascism in 1941–1943 and the Germans in 1943–1945 offered greater autonomy

1105 *Vreme* No. 289, Belgrade, 4 May 1996.

to the Slovenes in the Ljubljana province. No Slovene will accept such demands: we will rather start a new national liberation war."¹¹⁰⁶

At that moment, he captured a vision of the future, because it was clear where this logic of the Serbian nationalist intelligentsia would lead: "Then I realized what would happen to Yugoslavia. The ideas of the Serbian academicians were as follows: the Slovenes cannot have their own state, because they are incapable of running it. The Croats cannot have it either, because they are genocidal by nature. The Bosniaks cannot have it, because no new nations can be created in Europe at the end of the 20th century. The Macedonians cannot have it, because they are Serbs. The Croatian nobility and historical independence are fabrications and so on."¹¹⁰⁷ The pursuit of the idea of Serbian national supremacy required that all available means be used to support it, starting from language, to historical forgery, to all possible stereotypes about others. The linguistic upheavals then subsided for a while, giving way to other kinds of typical nationalist rhetoric. However, they returned in full glory after the wars and have not ceased up to the present day.

NATIONALIST CULTURE IN POWER

The shattered communist government mostly reacted with confusion and inertia to the turbulent ongoing processes. Magazines and books were still occasionally banned. Editorial boards were changed. Nationalists with dangerous ideas came under fire, as also did those who were truly democratically and liberally oriented like Milan Milišić. Bans that were totally absurd, even from the hardline party viewpoint, were also implemented. In 1986, for example, one issue of *Književne novine* was banned because of Predrag Ćudić's *Naša pesma* (Our Poem), the poem warning us of the danger of the spread of chauvinism. *Vi ste nas u periodu od do, sa manjim prekidima./ Međutim, vi ste od samog početka, pa do pred sam kraj./ (...) Slažete se, dakle, da ste vi nas mnogo više./ Ako se i vi slažete da biste i vi nas da ste samo mogli./ (...) Manje-više znamo kad znamo i kako./*

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

Ostalo je da se dogovorimo koliko./Jer ako se ne dogovorimo pustićemo naš narod na vaš./Pa da vidite kako naš narod ume da grize (You are us in the period from to, with minor interruptions/, However, you did it from the very beginning until almost the very end./ (...) Consequently, you agree that you are much more than us./ If you also agree that you would us if only you could./ (...) We know more or less when and how./ It remains to be agreed on how much./ Because if we don't agree, we'll sick our people on yours./ So, you'll see how our people know how to bite). Čudić wrote about a horrible foreboding of the coming events. Later, recalling that time, Čudić said that the prosecutor “understood *Our Poem* as a call for showdown and requested its urgent ban so as not to disturb the public. Consequently, the one who warns of the disastrous tendency of the state media, the only one who has *seen through* their intentions and tried to report them on time and publicly disclose their legacy for the future, is guilty, because he *declares all Serbs to be Chetniks, and all Croats to be Ustashe* and by divulging that he calls for a showdown between the two sides. An easy yet transparent replacement of theses.”¹¹⁰⁸

The ban on *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* was even more absurd. It was triggered by the text in its satirical supplement *Feral* in which Predrag Lucić and Boris Dežulović made fun of Milošević's efforts to centralize Serbia. Predrag Lucić recalls that event: “We wrote a joke about the relations in Yugoslavia at that time, with emphasis on Serbia. By then, Milošević had already ceased power. We dealt with this topic by telling the story about the relations within the Split City Association of Municipalities – Split was Serbia Proper and Solin and Kašteli Vojvodina and Kosovo respectively. The first wants centralization and the other two want more autonomy. Such were the relations in this city association. The issue came out and the public prosecutor banned *Nedjeljna* the same afternoon and ordered the withdrawal of this newspaper from newsstands.”¹¹⁰⁹

1108 Predrag Čudić, “Rodoljubiva književnost je posebna vrsta prostitucije”, *Al Jazeera Balkans*, 26 February 2017.

1109 Predrag Lucić, “Bezgrešno začće Ferala, sirovina Tuđman, Robi K. u drugom razredu...”, *Žurnal.info*, 2012.

The Serbian government led by Ivan Stambolić repeatedly tried to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the emerging nationalist forces. As Radivoj Cvetičanin writes, Stambolić's idea was to "include the most prominent creative figures in order to counteract the Belgrade dissident scene, imbued with Serbian nationalism".¹¹¹⁰ Thus, Bogdan Bogdanović became the Mayor of Belgrade in 1982, while Radomir Konstantinović and Ljuba Tadić were coopted into the Presidency of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia in 1986. Stambolić's effort was not particularly successful. The nationalist mobilization was in full swing and the person who would eventually use it as a propellant to stay in power and to wage armed conflicts was brought to his position by Stambolić himself.

After the Eighth Session and Milošević's coming to power, the relationship between the government and culture was fundamentally changed. The media embraced nationalist-oriented intellectuals: the state gave them literary and art awards, and doors throughout society opened to them. It became obvious that their time had come. Writers, artists and intellectuals raced each other to see who could praise Milošević the most, considering him a political powerhouse who would accomplish their program. Milovan Danojlić wrote him a panegyric on the front page of *Književne novine*. Antonije Isaković claimed that "Milošević speaks about the ideas which are here and which the people feel"¹¹¹¹, while Matija Bećković said inspirationally that Milošević's name and surname contained the two most expensive Serbian words – "Sloboda" (freedom) and "Miloš".¹¹¹²

In an interview for *Intervju* published on 1 September 1989, Antonije Isaković openly spoke about the symbiosis between the nationalist intelligentsia and the Milošević regime: "The Serbian reality cannot be

1110 Radivoj Cvetičanin, *Konstantinović. Hronika*, (Belgrade: Dan Graf and Fondacija "Stanislav Vinaver", 2017)

1111 See: "Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere", Vol. 1, prepared by Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade, 2006.

1112 Predrag Čudić, *O prirodi stvari*, Levo krilo, Belgrade, 2015.

fully understood if we do not see and observe the three nuclei, each of which participated in its own way and contributed to the transformation of Serbia. Those are (I do not list them in order of importance): Francuska 7, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Serbian Orthodox Church.”¹¹¹³ The academician listed the most influential institutions responsible for the nationalist homogenization of Serbia under the new leader who was welcomed as the Messiah. Isaković sees this homogenization as a dream come true, and Milošević as the result of national unity: “Yes, the process (of homogenization) is underway because we really got fed up and I’ll say right away that this monolithism was not created by a group of people or Slobodan Milošević. On the contrary, monolithism created Milošević. It is a question of feedback.”¹¹¹⁴

The idyllic alliance between Milošević and the nationalist clique lasted⁷ for a while before many turned their backs on him. Nevertheless, monolithism and national unity remained a lasting legacy of this synergy, serving as supreme ideals that annihilated all contrasting voices and pluralism: be it cultural, ethnic, ideological, intellectual, or aesthetic. The spirit of absolute unity once again triumphed over polyphony, to use the terms of Radomir Konstantinović. With the help of repression, violence and wars, the nationalist program was introduced as the one and only truth, and the trite clichés from the works of nationalist writers and publicists became the unquestionable dogmas of public, media and cultural life. The dominant ideas in the political and social spheres did not leave the banal circle outlined by Dobrica Ćosić and his coterie: we still live in the *time of death* and the *time of evil*.¹¹¹⁵

1113 See: “Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere”, Vol. 1, prepared by Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade, 2006.

1114 Ibid.

1115 Titles of author’s books

XI

**HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF YUGOSLAVIA**

Šerbo Rastoder

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND YUGOSLAVIA

INTRODUCTION

If we proceed from Lucien Febvre's statement about "history as the daughter of time" – which essentially means that any history that is not at least indirectly connected to the present is dead, because it cannot answer the life questions of modern people – we not only bury the illusion of traditionalists about absolute objectivity, but we must also contextualize any reflection on the development of historiography in the former present within which it emerges. Hence the relationship between historiography and Yugoslavia can be considered in two ways. The first is elitely historiographical: the "defence of historical science" is viewed in terms of the genetic development of historiography as an autistic phenomenon within society, standing above and beyond it like a righteous judge of the "past as the former present," being convinced that our present is only a logical continuation of that past.¹¹¹⁶

However, experience has shown that this is not necessarily always the case. Thus, we must reach for a much broader contextualization of the question, within which it is possible to identify the different aspects of this problem. Exploring the development of Yugoslav historiography, Dr. Ljubodrag Dimić observes several phases, the first of which is related to the post-World War II generation, which was "fascinated and connected with events" and was limited in explaining relevant phenomena, so that their works are positioned between politics and science. According to this author, the works of Vladimir

1116 See also: Šerbo Rastoder, *Buduća prošlost* (Podgorica: Nikšić, 2012); Mirjana Gross, *Suvremena historiografija. Korijeni, postignuća, traganja* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2001); Šarl Olivije Karbonel, *Istoriografija* (Belgrade: Plato XX vek, 1995); Ernst Brajzah, *Istoriografija* (Belgrade: Clio, 2009).

Ćorović, Ferdo Šišić, Slobodan Jovanović, Jovan M. Jovanović, Stanoje Stanojević, Viktor Novak, Anton Melik, Vasa Čubrilović, Vladimir Dvorniković, Herman Wendel, Robert Seton-Watson, Carlo Sforza¹¹¹⁷ and others fall into this category. Here is an interesting question: if the founders of Yugoslav historiography, like Vladimir Ćorović (1933),¹¹¹⁸ followed the mostly traditional pattern of some (mostly German) European historiographical schools, how can one explain the fact that their influence was the greatest at the beginning and the end of the Yugoslav state? Bear in mind that almost all works of the authors mentioned had one or more reprint edition during the 1990s. Does it mean that “there was a return to the beginning” or that historiography made a circle from modernism to traditionalism when Yugoslavia was in question?

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS

The post-war historiographical pattern permeated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and a search for the history of the revolutionary subject (the working class) introduced into historical science the socio-economic aspect of the development of society and the relentless search for factography, which turned into “historical facts” on which the historiographical exposition was based in the attempt to move away from an ideological re-examination. This encouraged the work to publish editions of historical sources as the foundation of historical knowledge. Here it is important to observe the following: how did it happen that the protagonists of the Marxist pattern accepted Vladimir Ćorović’s postulates when considering the historiographical notion of “Yugoslavia”? Ćorović proceeded from the following: “As a political notion, Yugoslavia is of quite recent date; as a state, it has been in existence for only fourteen years, since 1 December 1918, and

1117 Ljubodrag Dimić, “Jugoslovenska država i istoriografija,” *Tokovi istorije* 1, no. 1 (1999), 326–339.

1118 Vladimir Ćorović, *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Mostar i njegova srpska Law-slavna opština, 1933).

it officially obtained its present name only on 3 October 1929. But, if the Yugoslav state is a new creation, the Yugoslav ideology is not of recent date nor are the tribes that created today's Yugoslavia new in history."¹¹¹⁹ The concept, according to which the history of Yugoslavia began with the dawn of the "tribes" that had entered its territory, was also preserved in Marxist-Leninist ideological discourse for a long time. The only difference was that in the meantime, in line with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) policy, the number of "tribes" increased, thus expanding the historical basis by the "new" recognized agents of development. Therefore, all post-war Yugoslav history textbooks began with "prehistory and the Middle Ages"¹¹²⁰ in order to resemble the history of any other nation-state (Germany, France, etc.), within which the "Yugoslav idea" was crowned with the creation of the Yugoslav state. Some historians justified "Ćorović's comeback" by the fact that "Ćorović's integral Yugoslavism was not the best recommendation at the time of Yugoslavia's collapse."¹¹²¹ In essence,

1119 Ibid., 5

1120 See also: Anto Babić, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*, Part 1 (Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1947); Dušan Perović, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Bigz, 1950); Marko Bošković, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije: od 1848 godine do danas* (Cetinje, :Zavod za udžbenike, 1958); Stevan Jantolek, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*, Part 1 (1950) and Part 2 (1952) (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga 1951 Fuad Slijepčević, *Istorija naroda Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije sa osnovama opšte istorije: Novi vijek od 1789. do 1914* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1951); Đuro Mrvaljević, Vukašin Radonjić and Dragomir Petrić, *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije: od 1848 do danas: za sedmi razred osmogodišnje škole (sa istoriskom čitankom)* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1958).

1121 Thus, Vojislav Pavlović, Director of the SASA Institute of Balkan Studies, argued at a round table on Vladimir Ćorović's book, *Odnosi između Srbije i Austrougarske u 20. Veku*, that "Vladimir Ćorović was one of the very rare Serbian historians capable of writing about the Middle Ages and contemporary events with the same zeal and competence ... [he] was also a philologist and public worker [who was] unjustly forgotten during Tito's Yugoslavia. His books about the suffering of Serbs in Austria-Hungary and his activities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia disqualified him in the eyes of communist censors. Ćorović's integral Yugoslavism was not the best

Ćorović's methodological discourse remained on the scene a long time. Hence the first megaprojects of the academic historiographical community, which appeared under the title *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* (History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia; 1953), were, in essence, *Istorije Jugoslavije* (Histories of Yugoslavia). This work was discontinued due to a different understanding of the (national) question, which actually caused the dissolution of the state.¹¹²² This example confirms most convincingly Lucien Febvre's words from the beginning of this text and explains why the first histories of Yugoslavia in socialist Yugoslavia appeared only in the early 1970s,¹¹²³ in the old historiographical package.¹¹²⁴ Such a historiographical concept was also "followed" by all legal histories of the Yugoslav state.¹¹²⁵ Naturally, there followed the first history of the party as the main revolutionary subject.¹¹²⁶ It was only after the establishment of the Department of the History

recommendation at the time of Yugoslavia's collapse. I believe that the time has come for Ćorović to be read as one extremely rare polyhistor in Serbian historiography and an author of clear thinking, precise style and comprehensive view of historical events. Serbian historiography and the public cannot afford to ignore Ćorović's work any more if it wishes to have a clear and impartial picture of the past. His book was translated into English so as to acquaint international historiographers with his work as well" (*Danas*, October 26, 2019).

- 1122 The second and last volume is: *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije (od početka XVI do kraja XVIII veka)* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1960).
- 1123 Ivan Božić, *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972, 1973); Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković and Milorad Ekmedžić, *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1973).
- 1124 Thus, these histories have the following parts: (I) The rise and fall of medieval states; (II) Life and struggles within large monarchies; (III) The struggle for nation-states and modern society; (IV) Unification paths and the struggle for social revolution.
- 1125 Dragoslav Janković, *Istorija država i prava naroda Jugoslavije I, Ranofeudalne države jugoslovenskih naroda (do XII veka)* (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga 1960); Ružica Guzina, *Istorija političko-pravnih institucija Jugoslavije (1918–1941)* (Belgrade: Anali pravnog fakulteta, 1964).
- 1126 Pero Morača, Dušan Bilandžić and Stanislav Stojanović, *Istorija saveza komunističke Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Mladost 1966; Zagreb: Globus, 1977).

of Yugoslavia at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (1979; Jovan Marjanović) that the historiography of Yugoslavia could no longer be viewed outside the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia, that is, the synthesis of national historiographies flowing into a single historical subject. It is interesting to observe the processes within which, in line with the 1974 constitutional system, national historiographies were institutionalized and often developed regardless of need or, as sometimes required, being at the service of the “historical unity of the subject within which they work” nor the objective to establish national particularism in line with a vertical historical idea on which the Yugoslav state was based. Yugoslav historiography could not be developed outside and beyond national historiographic traditions. Thus, there were two dominant emission centres, which, due to their academic, scholarly and institutional potential, had a decisive impact on choices in a broader area (Belgrade and Zagreb). Until the early 1970s, it was difficult to notice some important trends within “historiography under surveillance”¹¹²⁷ which were not in line with the general ideological and political views on the development of historiography. The essential indications of a change in the pattern and pluralization of historiographical interventions appeared toward the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. Studying the development of Serbian historiography, Srđan Milošević observes that its characteristic is discontinuity instead continuity, because after “every transition there appeared the tendency to throw the works from the previous system (and some historians) into the dustbin of history and equally uncritically rehabilitate historical works written during the previously rejected system.”¹¹²⁸ Andrej Mitrović prophetically predicted the results of this discontinuity: “You gave the old Yugoslavia a five. Now a

1127 Đorđe Stanković and Ljubodrag Dimić: *Istoriografija pod nadzorom I–II. Prilozi istoriji istoriografije* (Belgrade: Službeni list 1996).

1128 Srđan Milošević, “Kritički istoričar i društvo,” in *Snaga lične odgovornosti*, ed. Latinka Perović, 39, (Belgrade: bgcentar.org.rs 2008), 203

generation will come and give it a ten.”¹¹²⁹ He showed that the change in value judgement did not derive from “science” but from ideology and that it was impossible to follow the development of historiography outside the real social context. It is difficult not to agree with Radina Vučetić who, synthesizing the Serbian historiographical experience on the occasion of Yugoslavia’s centenary (2018), remarked: “When it comes to Serbian historiography, the mentioned lack of synthesis related to both the centenary of the Yugoslav state and its history is especially striking. In Serbia, there are neither synthesized works by Serbian historians nor the translations of numerous history books on Yugoslavia published abroad.”¹¹³⁰ Many researchers of this phenom-

1129 In a significant interview given to *Vreme* on January 9, 1999, titled “Javna i tajna porodična istorija,” Andrej Mitrović explains these phenomena in the following way: “It is very significant for the question of Yugoslavia that it has been insufficiently researched in a historical sense. This does not mean that there is no research worthy of attention, but in this context two external indicators can also be considered. How many histories of the Yugoslav state do we have? Two or three, written mostly in the 1980s, near the end of its breakup. In world historiography, every state has dozens of its ‘small’ and ‘big’ histories, booklets and multi-volume editions... In a discussion with my colleagues who were writing the history of Yugoslavia and whom I was helping to have it published, I said: ‘You gave the old Yugoslavia a five. Now a generation will come and give it a ten. In my opinion, that state deserved a solid seven.’ At that time, this was blasphemous, but I insist: if we compare that state, which could not be (sufficiently) studied for dogmatic reasons, with the situation in Greece – and at that time it used to be said ‘failed like Greece’ and ‘indebted like Greece’; or the question of Italy and Mussolini, Germany and Hitler, and today... – it turns out that the dictatorship of King Alexander was a kindergarten. When you take this into account, it becomes clear that we did not study that state, neither the Kingdom of Yugoslavia nor socialist Yugoslavia. Thus, we now have the picture based on political prejudices, either the ruling or opposition party prejudices that are mutually opposing. Both the first and the second Yugoslavia functioned on the basis of the Serbian-Slovenian concord and I am ready to defend this thesis. The moment the ‘Serbs’ said that the Slovenes ‘could go away,’ Yugoslavia was brought into question, at least because it was created as the union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes...”

1130 Radina Vučetić, “O jednom jubileju ili kako se (ne) sjećamo Jugoslavije,” *Historiografija.hr*, May 19, 2018, www.historiografija.hr/?p=9891.

enon will recognize the “autism,” self-sufficiency and mental isolation of Serbian historiography after the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. However, we are primarily interested in the previous decade during which an enviable historiographical experience was gained and re-examined. Researching the development of Serbian historiography, Christian Nielsen asked a question that would make little sense somewhere else:

Yugoslavia’s dissolution also led to an additional question: what should be done with the historians who inhabited the common Yugoslav state until 1991 and their own scholarly production, often produced in dialogue with colleagues in Serbia? Should one standard of scrutiny be applied to the work of ethnic Serbs – including those ‘stranded’ outside of Serbia – and another to those who are not Serbs – including those still residing in Serbia?¹¹³¹

In any case, the fact that a foreign researcher linked ethnic origin to historiographical results must be a serious warning to the guild of historians about the need to “check historiographical heritage.” In that sense, Latinka Perović observes:

In the mid-1980s, there was a sharp turn away from the left as a research topic in Serbian historiography. Thus, a peculiar paradox was created: instead of having a worn-out historical phenomenon preoccupy historical science, historical science later freed itself of its research results like a ballast. Without a critical valorization, which takes time and implies a certain methodology, the decades-long production of historians and institutions was labelled as ideologized and loaded onto trucks to be sent for recycling, while libraries are still removing it from their shelves. As always happens after major political and social changes, the change of the regime of the communist left as well as the need of the new regime to legitimize itself, primarily by completely negating the previous period, would lead, under the motto “a

1131 Christian Nielsen, “Srpska istoriografija posle 1991. godine,” Published online by Cambridge University Press 2019 https://yuhistorija.com/serbian/region_istoriografija_txt01.html.

new beginning”, to real or apparent discontinuities, especially in the social substratum, mentality, something Pierre Bourdieu calls “habitus” or “practice.”¹¹³²

On the other hand, analyzing the basic contents of Serbian historiography and the change of ideological discourse, Dubravka Stojanović observes: “The First World War and the creation of Yugoslavia were extensively analyzed during the 1980s and I think that the greatest scholarly progress relating to this issue was made in the works of Andrej Mitrović, Đorđe Stanković, Ljubinka Trgovčević and Dragoslav Janković.”

LITERATURE AND HISTORY

At the same time, the literary processing of that historical period began with a view to mythologizing Serbia’s role in the war and in the creation of Yugoslavia. Thus, the mythical image of Serbs as the victims and misunderstood heroes fallen for the wrong goal, Yugoslavia, was created from *Vreme smrti* (A Time of Death) to *Knjiga o Milutinu* (The Book of Milutin).¹¹³³

Here one new fact, which is important for the development of historiography, was introduced – the influence of literature and literary works. In this connection, we bear in mind that there is a lot of debate about the relationship between historians and writers, that is, the different ways in which they conceptualize the history and poetics of the past. In addition, it is usually borne in mind that, in its initial form, historiography was a part of the literary genre and that during its millennial development the writer was replaced by the craftsman. In other words, over time the task and the goal, in particular, were separated. Thus, it is now largely held that, in essence, the historian’s task has been reduced to the desire to explain the past through the

1132 Latinka Perović, “O istoriografiji i istoriji levice u Srbiji,” <https://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/edulit.html>, 2009

1133 Dubravka Stojanović, “Jugoslovensko iskustvo i budućnost regiona,” *Peščanik*, October 13–14, 2017.

process of “finding,” “identifying” or “revealing” the story left forgotten in historical sources. The main conclusion drawn on this basis is that the difference between “historian” and “writer” lies primarily in the fact that the historian “finds” his stories, while the writer of “novels” invents them.¹¹³⁴ Hence, from the viewpoint of their attitude towards the past, the novelist and the historian seek, in essence, to reactualize the meaning of history, using completely different patterns of cognition and interpretation. Both have a stake in recognizing the dual nature of history as art and science.¹¹³⁵ In this trend, Latinka Perović has recognized the process of introducing the “side defeated in the Second World War” into the public space.¹¹³⁶ In that sense, “taboo topics have been tackled.”

Various questions have begun to be raised from various sides. First about those being suppressed and then those who controversial figures: Jovan Radulović (*Golubnjača*, 1980), Gojko Đogo (*Vunena vremena*, 1982), Vuk Drašković (*Nož*, 1982), Atanasije Jevtić (*Od Kosova do Jadovna*, 1983), Branko Petranović (*Revolucija i kontrarevolucija*, 1–2, 1983), Kosta Čavoški and Vojislav Koštunica (*Stranački pluralizam ili monizam*, 1983), Mladen Markov (*Isterivanje boga*, 1984), Veselin Đuretić (*Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama*, 1–2, 1985).

A dilemma as to how much the characteristics of history and literature permeate or exclude each other will probably occupy the attention of thinkers for a long time, but one thing is certain: the historian envies the novelist for narrative freedom, while the novelist envies the historian for the richness of empiricism. It is only certain that both aspire towards the universal principle of truth, which is derived from a subconscious illusion that truth is possible and internal. At

1134 Srđa Pavlović, “Poetika prošlosti ili kako se konstruiše istorijska naracija?” *Matica*, no. 2 (2000), 197

1135 Stuart Hughs, *Istorija kao umetnost i kao nauka* (Niš: Gradina, 1989), 51.

1136 “In fact, in historiography, especially the literary narrative, in all Yugoslav republics – now independent states – the word has been given to the side defeated in the Second World War. After its mass emigration, this side created its interpretation of the Second World War and, after 1980, succeeded in securin

the same time, literary truth and historical truth differ significantly, not so much in their content as in their meaning. *Historical truth becomes meaningless if it cannot be verified, just as literary truth loses its meaning if it provokes the need for verification.* Here we encounter the substantial question of the meaning of this way of thinking. Is the effort to verify “literary truth” a legitimate intellectual effort or “butchering”? Or, in other words, is it possible to view critical thinking as a contribution to apologetics or is the need to question it part of the process of desacralizing the expressed views? Did the need to verify some “literary truths” call their meaning into question, or did the effect of the alleged “literary truths” point to the necessity of their verifications? In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is not a question of challenging, but of verification and that in this intellectual reasoning it must be assumed that “something is true only if it is verifiable” and that there is no *truth* that is given once and for all”. Hence the understanding of truth is conditioned by someone who ponders it and not by the opinion about him or her. It is binding and not limiting.¹¹³⁷ In the 1980s, being understood in this way, the dynamics of the development of historiography about Yugoslavia entered the phase of detecting its neuralgic spots, which they did not serve to rationalize knowledge as much as to stir up emotions in its understanding. Such a process was also detected on the other side of the country – in Zagreb. However, before we analyze the scope of Croatian historiography, we must try to answer one significant question. Did mythologization in historiography come from literature or historical science, that is, scientific historiography? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to determine the place and definition of myth in science. There is a general disagreement on the definition of this notion, primarily due to the different perspectives from which

1137 Šerbo Rastoder, “Andrićevstvo između književnosti i istorije (Muslimsko intelektualno nasljeđe u odbrani pluralnosti),” *Forum Bosne* 74–75 (2016), 313–336.

this phenomenon is observed.¹¹³⁸ For this author, the closest definition of myth is that it is a phenomenon whose truthfulness can neither be proved nor disputed. This would mean that myth is not based on verifiable facts, which would ultimately confirm that it cannot be a product of “historical science,” but can be its integral part taken from a related area. Analyzing the genesis and role of myth in the Serbian historiography of the late 20th century, Ana Antić identified three specific types that she marked as *sui generis*, *antemurale* and *antiquitas* myths.¹¹³⁹ In any case, mythologization has been rec-

1138 “Historijski mitovi na Balkanu,” in *Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa “Upotreba historijskih mitova,”* November 7–9, 2002, Institut za istoriju Sarajevo, 2003). In the conclusion of her research, author Ana Antić states: “The Serbian political and academic tradition of creating historical myths belonging to three analyzed types (*sui generis*, *antemurale* and *antiquitas*) has shown numerous serious logical specificities and practical departures from classical theoretical models and formulas. First of all, the mythologized concepts of a *sui generis* type in most Serbian political and scientific sources have been developed in a reverse form: The Serbs have mostly denied the political and academic denials of ethnic, cultural or linguistic similarity with other national groups that are or have been politically, militarily or numerically weaker. Political and scientific sources contain about the same number of claims that Macedonians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Croats have a common ethnobiological ancestor in the Serbian nation. The explanations of the crucial motives for the cultural and political distancing of these ethnic groups from their undeniable ties with the Serbs always include some kind of anti-Serb conspiracy theory: a foreign factor (usually a major international power or formal or informal alliance of such powers), whose primary global political goal – the weakening of the Serbian lands – has always played a crucial role in the fragmentation of the Serbian ethnic and political corps. This is exactly the way in which the most constructive aspect of the process of mythologizing Serbian history has been formulated: the *sui generis* and *antemurale* concepts ‘cooperate’ and are actually complementary because the Serbs, as the most sacrificial, persistent, successful and serious defensive force in the struggle against the changing external factor, must be resolutely and irreversibly eliminated, while the potentially deadliest strategy to achieve this goal is to dismember their broad ethnic base” (Ibid, 288).

1139 Ana Antić, “Evolucija i uloga tri kompleksa istorijskih mitova u srpskom akademskom i javnom mnjenju u posljednjih deset godina,” in *Historijski mitovi na*

ognized as a “Balkan” phenomenon, meaning that not one Yugoslav community has been immune to it. That is why the research on Croatian historiography conducted during the last decades of the 20th century points to the commonplaces. Thus, an analysis of the content of *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* (1969–1999) has shown that “socialist topics” were dominant at the time of stricter ideological control when, after the Maspok, the CPY/LCY resorted to repressive measures in the fight against nationalism and deviations in historiography. In the opinion of domestic researchers, those topics were dominant from 1972–1973 until 1980–1983 when, after the death of Josip Broz, the party “pressed even harder on all forms of deviation”. Accordingly, it has been concluded that the “topics dealing with national history and historiography were rather evenly distributed until 1989, when the increased choice of national history topics began to be felt. Thus, in 1992, the predominance of national history over historiography became significant, while ‘socialist’ topics disappeared.”¹¹⁴⁰ Miroslav Bertoša has described Croatian historiography in the second half of the 20th century as an “age of cliophobia” or the “fear of history,”¹¹⁴¹ which has been recognized as an overemphasized need for a radical discontinuity and rejection of the entire historiographical heritage of the second half of the 20th century.¹¹⁴² In this context, it has been

Balkanu, ed., 259–290 (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2003)..

- 1140 Jure Krišto, “Ideologija/politika i historiografija: primjer Časopisa za suvremenu povijest (1969–1999),” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, ed. Srećko Lipovčan and Ljiljana Dobrovšak, 75–91 (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005).
- 1141 Miroslav Bertoša, “Doba kliofobije: ideološke opsjene i osobna iskustva – Neke uspomene na historiografiju druge polovice prošlog stoljeća,” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, ed. Srećko Lipovčan and Ljiljana Dobrovšak, 96, (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005).
- 1142 Vidi Zlatko Matijević: “*Magnum Crimen* Hrvatske historiografije – Hrvatski katolički pokret i stvaranje Jugoslavске države u interpretaciji Viktora Novaka”, *Hrvatska historiografija XX. stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških*

argued that Viktor Novak's *Magnum crimen* has been published as an overture to the trial of Alojzije Stepinac.¹¹⁴³ At the same time, analyzing the characteristics of the works about the Independent State of Croatia, Hrvoje Matković argued that the “period of existence of the Independent State of Croatia was more exposed to politization and tendentious judgements than other periods in more recent Croatian history.”¹¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, Dragutin Pavličević argued that until 1991 it was impossible to deal with the synthesis of Croatian history “because it was insisted upon at the highest level of government on joint Yugoslav-wide projects.”¹¹⁴⁵ What is more important than any-

zahtjeva . u: *Hrvatska historiografija XX. stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb 2005.

- 1143 Zlatko Matijević, “*Magnum Crimen* Hrvatske historiografije – Hrvatski katolički pokret i stvaranje Jugoslavске države u interpretaciji Viktora Novaka,” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX. stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, ed. Srećko Lipovčan and Ljiljana Dobrovšak, 72 (Zagreb 2005: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, 2005).
- 1144 Hrvoje Matković, “Obilježja radova o nezavisnoj državi Hrvatskoj,” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, ed. Srećko Lipovčan and Ljiljana Dobrovšak, 37 (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005).
- 1145 “In the post-war period, during the so-called second or socialist Yugoslavia, there were no conditions or incentives for synthetic works, especially by authors, because the highest level of government insisted on joint projects relating to the history of the whole of Yugoslavia. The result of such efforts was *Historija naroda Jugoslavije* I, in which Croatian historiography was represented by the already mentioned Jaroslav Šidak, as one of three editors-in-chief. This work continued six years later, when the second volume was also published and Professor Šidak's role was taken over by Jorjo Tadić, a Croat only by his birthplace. From 1951 onwards, he was a Belgrade professor, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and supporter of the ‘Serbdom’ of Dubrovnik. Like in the case of the first volume, there were strong disagreements and as many compromises as there was political pressure from Belgrade. Already in the preface to that volume, the intention to take a step forward in the ‘materialist illumination of our past’ was emphasized. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the second volume only deals with the events taking place until the end of the 18th

thing else is the understanding that every history of Yugoslavia must be a “mechanical sum of national historiographies”.¹¹⁴⁶ In Croatia in the 1970s, “Croatian church history” was established. During its historiographical development, from the launching of the journal *Croatica christiana periodica* in 1977, until 1985, when the “action to write and publish the systematic history of Christianity and the Church among Croats was initiated,”¹¹⁴⁷ it institutionally completed the process of studying this issue.

Historiographical tradition

In general, the historiographical traditions of Belgrade and Zagreb are recognized in many respects by the identical trends in political influence on the historiographical development trends. There is as much Yugoslavia in it as in the policy of the elites – no more no less. They are thematically positioned in accordance with the social trends. There is no research on the methodological nature and “influence” of prestigious European historiographical schools.¹¹⁴⁸ In that sense, we most often come across the opinion that the “Zagreb school of historiography” has been “more open” and has continuously sought to incorporate “modern” trends into historiographical research within its historiographical heritage. The beginnings of Croatian historians’

century or, more exactly, until 1790 in the case of Croatian lands.”31, Vidi Dragutin Pavličević, “Problemi Hrvatskih povijesnih sinteza XIX. i XX. stoljeća”, *Hrvatska historiografija XX. stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, Institut Ivo Pilar, Zagreb 2005, 220.

1146 See Dragutin Pavličević, “Problemi Hrvatskih povijesnih sinteza XIX i XX stoljeća,” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, (Zagreb: , Institut Ivo Pilar, 2005), 220.

1147 Franjo Šanjek, “Suvremena Hrvatska crkvena historiografija između želja i stvarnosti (1941–2000),” in *Hrvatska historiografija XX. stoljeća: između znanstvenih paradigmi i ideoloških zahtjeva*, 61 (Zagreb: Institut Ivo Pilar, 2005).

1148 Miroslav Jovanović and Radivoje Radić, *Kriza istorije, srpska istoriografija i društveni izazovi kraja 20. i početka 21. veka* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009).

acquaintance with the achievements of contemporary West European historiography are usually associated with the name of Mirjana Gross. Her book *Historijska znanost*, published in Zagreb in 1976, promoted the approach to historical research as a combination of non-dogmatic Marxism and Braudelian understanding of time and structures, which she called “genetic structural history.” Although contested by dogmatists, Gross has stuck to her original standpoint and, with the book *Suvremena historiografija. Korijeni, postignuća, traganja*,¹¹⁴⁹ has supplemented and strengthened her opinion towards temporary historiographical trends that will be recognized in the journals and papers published on them during the 1980s. The generation of historians including Tomislav Raukar, Zdenka Janeković Römer, Drago Roksandić and others has tried to promote modern trends in historical science through innovative methodological interventions in their research. Regardless of whether it was a question of the *longue durée* (Annalists) or social structures, significant shifts in the understanding of history were noticeable.¹¹⁵⁰ Truly, such research was situated more within an earlier period of history than within a new and modern one, so that the history of the 20th century and thus the history of Yugoslavia mostly remained outside these methodological patterns. A traditional historiographical approach to the study of this historical period, dominant in both historiographies of the 1980s, which occurred at the end of the 20th century, would strengthen the impression of their “split.” Truly, while studying this issue within Serbian historiography, Miroslav Jovanović put forward the following arguments:

The claim that Serbian historiography is dominated by traditional positivism may seem overemphasized to some, especially if one keeps in mind the formal fact that a number of professional book titles point to topics that can come under social or cultural history. At the same time, it can provoke a reaction and counter-statement

1149 Mirjana Gross, *Suvremena historiografija. Korijeni, postignuća, traganja* (Zagreb: Globus, 1996),

1150 *Doprinos škole Anala historiografiji*, Osijek: Essehst, 2010.

that in many, even major world historiographies, the number of works coming under classical historicism is not lower than the number of works belonging to some modern trends, from Annaliste structuralism to historical anthropology, new economic history, microhistory or the history of everyday life. We can agree with such a statement in advance, but it cannot be an excuse or serve as a comparison that affirms the results of Serbian historiography. On the contrary. There can be no question of a schematically understood relationship: the preservation of “traditional values” against the breakthrough of the “new and modern” into science. Such an explanation, which can sometimes be heard, is in essence a replicated model of political demagoguery and its application to scholarly opinion.¹¹⁵¹

Back to the national

After the death of Josip Broz, one could observe an accelerated shift towards national historiographical topics. Until the early 1990s, they completely suppressed and even significantly marginalized the historiographical tradition of socialism. For its greatest part, the “escape from ideological shackles” was an excuse that would not be accompanied by a critical re-examination of the achievements of historical science as much as its new ideological positioning, which many referred to as the emergence of revisionism. What is important here is to resolve the following dilemma. Is revisionism in historical science a scientifically legitimate or ideologically constructed phenomenon? And does the use of this notion somehow hinder the pluralization of historical thought, which is a constant in society? In doing so, we have the following in mind. What has happened cannot be changed (revised). Only our opinion about what has happened changes. If it results from heuristics (putting unknown and unused historical sources into circulation), such a change is scientifically legitimate. But, if the change is prompted by ideological and political motives, as well

1151 Miroslav Jovanović, “Savremena srpska istoriografija: karakteristike i trendovi,” *Istorija 20. veka*, 1 (2010): 183–193.

as a different interpretation of the same sources, then we can speak about the revisionism of opinion and not about the revision of history. When studying the mentioned phenomenon, it is difficult not to agree with Todor Kuljić: “Changes took place through the intense clashes of differing opinions that were condensed in broader ideological and political currents. The base of new clashes was inseparable from the changed view of the past. History was openly acknowledged for its power to strengthen or weaken political legitimacy everywhere in Europe.”¹¹⁵² It is only important to distinguish the phenomena of a “completely ‘new’ reading and history writing, with little or no respect for the facts that are simply pushed aside, silenced, erased and very often constructed”¹¹⁵³ from legitimate, scholarly established knowledge. All works on this topic indicate that the trends of “rectifying the opinion about something that has happened” are mainly focused on the history of the 20th century and thus the history of Yugoslavia, that is, “the most documented period of human history,” which again relativizes the importance of historical facts in constructing the opinion about history. The genesis of constructing such an opinion, presented through the historiographical traditions of the two major centres of the “constructed opinion about the past”, outside general views, does not provide the basis for generalization. Therefore, we must also turn to other, smaller centers in an attempt to detect the specificities that (do not) differ from the general trends. So, for example, in Montenegro, in the early 1960s, the generational change of history researchers

1152 Todor Kuljić, *Prevladavanje prošlosti, uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka*: Zbornik radova. – Sarajevo : Institut za istoriju, 2007

1153 *Preispitivanje prošlosti i istorijski revizionizam*, ed. Milo Petrović (Belgrade: Udruženje Španski borci 1936–1939 u saradnji sa Fakultetom političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2014). In these extraordinary proceedings of a scientific meeting with the same title (Rethinking the Past and Historical Revisionism) – organized by the Association of Spanish Fighters 1936–1939 at Belgrade University’s Faculty of Political Science and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung – South-east Europe, October 12–13, 2012 – many exceptionally substantiated papers on revisionism were published.

was observed. With its positivist stand, the older generation, educated before 1941, maintained the traditional historiographical approach, while the younger one brought a new dynamism, but also a more pronounced ideologization of historical science. It was dictated by the demands and impulses coming from outside the guild of historians and can also be recognized on the organizational plane. As early as 1952, the Archive for the History of the Workers' Movement and the People's Liberation War of Montenegro was established within the Historical Institute, as the Historical Archive of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro, modelled after similar archives and institutions in other Yugoslav republics. In the next decade already, that is, in the 1970s, the ideological demand for strengthening the interest in studying the history of the communist party and revolution brought about a change of the ideological and thematic paradigm within Montenegrin historiography and shifted its interest from the earlier period (mostly the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries) to the latest period of Montenegrin history (the 20th century). Topics related to the workers' movement, the CPY, the war and the revolution soon became the dominant historiographical reading. Montenegrin historiography entered the phase of searching for the subject of the class struggle, creation of the illusion about a communist political tradition as the dominant form of political organization in the 20th century and the revolution as the main inspirer and moral catalyst at the present time. In line with this orientation, by the early 1980s, the first books (mostly doctoral dissertations) of the younger generation of Montenegrin researchers had appeared, which were devoted to the national history of the 20th century and mostly to the revolutionary subject in it. The published monographs were dedicated to the Montenegrin partisan detachments,¹¹⁵⁴ the leftist

1154 Đuro Vujović, *Lovčenski NOP odred i njegovo područje u Narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945* (Cetinje: Obod, 1976).

youth movement,¹¹⁵⁵ Chetnik and federalist movements as the counterpart of the revolution¹¹⁵⁶ and the people's government as a euphemism for the revolutionary government of 1941–1945.¹¹⁵⁷ Historiography spilled from strictly professional journals into strict ideologically profiled publications such as the journal *Praksa*, where the younger generation of researchers published a larger number of their papers.¹¹⁵⁸ Some of them also published the first works on the methodology of history writing.¹¹⁵⁹ With these works, Montenegrin historiography incorporated into its memory the latest period of Montenegrin history, which the ruling establishment logically encouraged in the process of creating its government's historical legitimacy. The new generation of Montenegrin historians encouraged archival research and the reassessment of the revolutionary heritage of Montenegrin history, giving it the basic content aroma until the early 1990s, with a pronounced ideological apologetic connotation.¹¹⁶⁰

By the mid-1980s, Montenegrin historiography increased its thematic dispersivity by opening the main currents and contents for the period up to 1918, and established the research directions for the post-1918 period, confining research mostly to the revolutionary subject. In a methodological sense, the traditional historical methods of

1155 Jovan Bojović, *Napredni omladinski pokret u Crnoj Gori 1918–1941* (Cetinje: Obod 1976).

1156 Radoje Pajović, *Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori, četnički i federalistički pokret 1941–1945* (Cetinje; Obod, 1977).

1157 Zoran Lakić, *Narodna vlast u Crnoj Gori 1941–1945* (Cetinje/Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1981).

1158 During the period 1964–1984, the largest number of contributions to *Praksa* was made by the historians having the greatest professional and formal influence on the historiographical trends in Montenegro, including Zoran Lakić (23 papers), Miomir Dašić (14), Radoje Pajović, Jovan Bojović and Dimo Vujović (five articles each).

1159 Zoran Lakić, "Kakvim stilom pišemo istorijske tekstove," *Praksa* 1 (1966): pp.

1160 Zoran Lakić, "Tito i revolucionarni pokret u Crnoj Gori," *Praksa* 5–6 (1977):28.; Zoran Lakić, "Jugoslavija 1941," *Praksa* 1 (1981): 34, (an overview of a scientific meeting).

positivist heritage were wrapped in new ideological clothes. In a content sense, political history was absolutely dominant. The topics were ethnocentric, regardless of whether their base was a Montenegrin or Serbian national connotation. One gets an impression that from the phase of a higher content and methodological dispersivity and interdisciplinarity, noticeable from the beginning to the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the Montenegrin historiography of the 1970s and 1980s entered the total zone of event and political history, and was more oriented towards the history that could communicate daily with the demands of the time. This was clearly indicated by an analysis of the projects carried out by the Historical Institute during the period 1980–1991. Six out of nine projects carried out at that time were directly related to the CPY/LCY and the revolutionary movement, one to cultural history, one to the unification of Montenegro and Boka, and a broader-based one to Yugoslav history. On the other hand, the prepared collections of documents were mostly related to the period from the late 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries (involving Bishops Petar I and Petar II, Valtazar Bogišić and the annexation crisis of 1908). Out of 18 scholarly meetings held during the same period, only six (one third) did not belong to the thematic circle of the revolutionary subject and war of 1941–1945, while only one dealt with scholarly periodicals and their role in historiography. During the communist period, 1945–1991, Montenegrin historiography was characterized by an enviable production. According to the available data, during the period 1945–1985, about 360 Montenegrin historiography books with about 81,000 pages were published. In journals, yearbooks, anthologies and other periodicals (excluding the daily and family presses) about 2,500 articles, supplements, reviews and the like, with over 36,000 pages were published. During the same period, in *Istorijski zapisi* alone, over 1,600 papers with a total of 22,000 pages were published. In other words, the total number of pages dealing with the history of Montenegro exceeded 117,000 pages, or 2,925 on average per year. Such an impressive historiographical production (given the size of the country and its population) testified convincingly about the

status of the past within Montenegrin society and its need for self-recognition. Unable to answer the essential questions relating to the historical legitimacy of the Montenegrin state until 1918, its state and national attributes in the Yugoslav federation during the period 1945–1991 and the state union of Serbia and Montenegro since 1992, Montenegrin historiography opened the strictly controlled and suppressed disputes from the communist period. After the collapse of communism, the controlled monologue, exposed to a constant ideological arbitration taking strict care of the limits of scientific freedom, evolved into the monologue enjoying limitless freedom, that is, a parallel monologue that did not bind anyone. Analysts link the beginning of this kind of dispute to the end of the 1960s (January 1968) when one participant (who was not a historian) in the meeting dedicated to Montenegrin national culture categorically refused to discuss the national dichotomy of culture in Montenegro, arguing that *when there is a nation there is also national culture as the basic component of the national ethos, as the inalienable cultural heritage and wealth of a nation*.¹¹⁶¹ As early as 1970, the then leading Montenegrin historian Dimo Vujović told a daily newspaper that it would be possible to speak about the Montenegrin nation only after the emergence of a civil society, thus linking the nation to a capitalist society. At the same time, he presented his stand, which was later elaborated, that Montenegrins formed part of the ethnic Serbian ethos and evolved into a nation due to their specific historical development.¹¹⁶² Pavle Mijović tried to challenge this stand arguing that *no nation is created on the basis of the peculiarities of some other people, but possibly on the basis of the peculiarities of its own people. One cannot speak about the existence of the Montenegrin nation if the existence of the Montenegrin people is not recognized, since otherwise it would be illusory to empha-*

1161 Radoje Radojević, *Crnogorska nacionalna kultura i putevi njenog razvoja* (Titograd: Pobjeda, 1968), 40

1162 Dimo Vujović, "O nekim nepravilnim pristupima crnogorskom nacionalnom pitanju," *Pobjeda*, July 19 and 23, 1970.

size the centuries-long development of uniqueness.¹¹⁶³ When the old revolutionary Savo Brković published the book *O postanku i razvoju crnogorske nacije* in 1974, the proponents of the theory of Montenegrins' ethnic autochthony also formally entered the historiographical heritage of Montenegro.¹¹⁶⁴ At the same time, it could be noticed that this controversy temporally corresponded with the more clearly expressed demand of the political elites for the greater independence of the republics making up the Yugoslav federation (which was fulfilled by the 1974 Constitution) and the trend of affirming the national cultures within the multinational federation. Scholarly disputes included ideological arbitration by the highest communist bodies and individuals, who formally refused to arbitrate directly within the Montenegrin quadrature of the circle, and the essential question: did the nation create the state or the state create the nation? In the period 1967–1975, there appeared the three-volume *Istorija Crne Gore*, which further polarized the two opposite views on understanding Montenegrin history. *Istorija Crne Gore* remained an unfinished project (it ended, not accidentally, with the 18th century, as did *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*). At that time, there emerged the first institutions (the Institute of Lexography and the Republican Editorial Board for *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*) around which the proponents of the ethnic autochthony and national peculiarity of Montenegrins could rally. In their frequent confrontations, these two groups defended their views using ideological vocabulary. The supporters of the thesis that the *two related nations emerged from the same Serbian ethnic base – Serbian and Montenegrin* – and that the awareness of Montenegrin national individuality would be fully expressed only in socialist Yugoslavia, accused the other side of an *incorrect, non-Marxist view of the Montenegrin national question* and included them mostly in the group of

1163 Pavle Mijović, "O metodu u raspravljanju o crnogorskom nacionalnom pitanju," *Pobjeda*, August 2, 1970.

1164 Savo Brković, *O postanku i razvoju crnogorske nacije* (Gragički zavod, Titograd 1974).

Montenegrin nationalists. The other side accused its opponents of being the *protagonists of civic historiography* (which in that context also had a tone of accusation for a non-Marxists understanding) and, as a rule, included them in the group of Greater Serbian nationalists. The appearance of Špiro Kulišić's book *O etnogenezi Montenegri-
anan*¹¹⁶⁵ in 1980 further fuelled the conflict between these intellectual groups. The "supreme arbiter" was called again and, in June 1981, the Marxist Centre of the Central Committee of Montenegro organized a gathering on the occasion of the book that introduced "heresy" into the traditional teachings of the established historiography. The announcements were published in the party journal (*Praksa* 4 [1981]). The party body (the History Commission of the Central Committee of Montenegro) discussed "some current issues in Montenegrin historiography," while the University of Montenegro and the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts organized a scientific meeting titled "The State, Role and Development of Science in Montenegro" in 1985. In the leading historical journal, *Istorijski zapisi*, the four most influential Montenegrin historians (Đ. Vujović, V. Strugar, M. Dašić and J. Bojović) published their statement "On the Development and Problems of Historical Science in Montenegro,"¹¹⁶⁶ which had the character of a platform and the ambition to exert influence on the further development of historical science in this area. "Amateurism" and "politicization" were identified as the main problems of historical science in Montenegro. The first was recognized as a danger to the "identity and integrity" of historical science. Thus, it was stated that historical science could be dealt with "only by qualified history scholars."¹¹⁶⁷ Nationalism was recognized as the "darkest form of politicization of historical science. Montenegrin historiography is con-

¹¹⁶⁵ Špiro Kulišić, *O etnogenezi Montenegriana* (Gragički zavod, Titograd, 1980).

¹¹⁶⁶ D. Vujović, V. Strugar, M. Dašić and J. Bojović, "On the Development and Problems of Historical Science in Montenegro," Titograd, *Istorijski zapisi* 3–4 (1985): 133–145.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 68–89

stantly accompanied by the emergence of (Greater Serbian or Montenegrin) nationalism,"¹¹⁶⁸ while the lack of adequate scientific criticism was identified as a major problem that should be "solved by our Marxist historians."¹¹⁶⁹ The "basic tasks" facing historical science were the requirements for strengthening the existing institutions, such as the Historical Institute that should be preserved as the "main factor responsible for work on historical science in Montenegro,"¹¹⁷⁰ including the strengthening of its staff and financial status, development of cooperation with the Faculty of Philosophy History Department, coordination of work with the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, resumption of work on the multi-volume *History of Montenegro*, and the leading of a constant struggle for a higher level of historical science in Montenegro. "To this end, it is necessary to develop objective scholarly criticism and fight for a Marxist approach to the study of Montenegrin history and against all unscholarly interpretations of its past and, in particular, amateurism and nationalism... The processing of the problems of special social interest should be put in the foreground."¹¹⁷¹ On the eve of the downfall of communism, Montenegrin historiography had the most abundant production related to its justification. However, this did not prevent it from changing its ideological discourse when the majority realized that the downfall did happen. It is interesting to note that this was most radically done by the most ardent promoters of communist ideology – they very easily replaced one ideological matrix with another. However, they remained the strongest defenders of a historiographical heritage, especially the part corresponding to the ideas of national ideologies. While the 1941–1945 war period was already going beyond the dominant framework and interest of journalism and scholarly historiography from 1989 onwards, some topics related to the period of commu-

1168 Ibid., 68

1169 Ibid., 71

1170 Ibid., 76

1171 Ibid., 82

nist rule after 1945 began to be opened more intensively. In that sense, the published memoirs of the victims of the CPY's conflict with Cominform in 1948 were indicative. They were first published in daily newspapers in the early 1990s and then in book form,¹¹⁷² thus creating, in essence, a new historiographical topic – the suffering of the supporters of Stalinism in Montenegro, which provided an impetus for extensive historiographical production. This topic was “created” at the time of the removal of the then Montenegrin communist leadership by the supporters of Slobodan Milošević's policy and significantly influenced the awareness about the “democratic image” of reformed communists. In addition to the relatively abundant so-called camp literature, in the form of memoirs and other historiographical works from this thematic circle,¹¹⁷³ these testimonials were especially significant for Montenegro due to an extremely high percentage of its citizens suffering in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split. As for the pronouncement of relevant scholarly judgements, this issue remained largely unresolved, because immediately after opening, it was deeply immersed into the socio-political context of its time and eventually followed a classical pattern of abuse of the principles of historical rehabilitation. In this connection, the “center”

1172 Rifat Rastoder, Branislav Kovačević, *Crvena mrlja* (Pobjeda: Pobjeda, 1990).

1173 Milinko Stojanović, *Golotočka trilogija* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1991), *Svjedočanstva golotočkih zločina* (Stručna knjiga Belgrade, 1994), *Na golotočkom poprištu* (: : Stručna knjiga, Belgrade 1994), *Antologija golotočke misli i riječi* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1996), *Vječito na poprištu* (Belgrade: : Stručna knjiga, 2001); S. Božović, *Golotočki genocid* (Belgrade: Književne novine 1992); Vukašin Radonjić, *Moje viđenje Golog otoka* (Podgorica: Pobjeda, 1994); Svetozar Pejović, *Goli otok. Ispod ljudskog dostojanstva* (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1995); Milinko Stojanović (ed.), *Antologija golotočke misli i riječi: sjećanja, osvrti, komentari, dokumentacija* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga 1996); Ljubo Vušurović, *Cetinje, vrijeme zla: 1948–1953* (Cetinje: Obod, 1997); Rosanda Dragović Gašpar, *Let iznad Golog otoka* (Belgrade: Aquarius Bgd 1990); Dobrovoje Jovančević, *Informbiro u Beranskom i Andrijevačkom srezu* (Berane: Informativni centar 1996); Jelisavka Komnenić Džaković, *U paklu Informbira* (Belgrade, NU Vladimir Dujić, 1991); Krsto Perućica, *Kako su nas prevaspitavali* (Belgrade: Dereta 1990).

trends were also recognized in the periphery within the “verification” of scholarly, historical knowledge. In that sense, the need for a professional, scholarly and political verification of the Serbian nationalist discourse was phenomenologically recognized through Aleksandar Stamatović’s book *Istorijska osnova nacionalnog identiteta Montenegriana 1918–1953*,¹¹⁷⁴ which was defended as a doctoral dissertation under the same title (on January 17, 2000) at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (under professors Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Đorđe Stanković and Ljubodrag Dimić). The book is interesting not only because it was published by a political party (the Serbian Radical Party), which is a unique example in Montenegrin historiography in general, but also because of the nationalist pattern applied by a “neutral” judge, otherwise a member and activist of various Serbian political parties and nationalist movements, in order to critically re-evaluate the existing historiographical heritage. In a scholarly sense, this study did not bring anything new, except the confirmation of the Serbian nationalist stereotype that the “Montenegrin nation was established by decree and repression by the communists aiming at the ethnic, territorial and perhaps even religious (since there exists the Montenegrin autocephalous church) breakup of the Serbian nation and will live as long as it has a social influence and power.” In this connection, the words of Academician Matija Bećković at a gathering in Podgorica in 1990 were also quoted: “I was born before this nation and I hope to die after it!”¹¹⁷⁵ In any case, the scholarly verification of this doc-

1174 Aleksandar Stamatović, *Istorijska osnova nacionalnog identiteta Montenegriana 1918–1953* (Zemun: Srpska radikalna stranka 2000).

1175 For more details about Montenegrin historiography see: Šerbo Rastoder, “The Development of Historiography in Montenegro, 1989–2001” *Historiographi in Southeast Europe after Socialism*, LIT, Verlag Münster – Hamburg – Berlin – London, 2004, 201 – 236, Ulf Braunnbauer (ed.), *(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism* (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 201–236; Šerbo Rastoder, “Istoriografija u Crnoj Gori 1989–2001 (s posebnim osvrtom na istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine)”, *Forum Bosne* 32 (2006): 165–213; Rastoder Šerbo, “Počeci

toral dissertation should be put in the context of the then situation at the University of Belgrade and the conflict of the Milošević regime with Montenegro.

A somewhat more extensive presentation of the trends in Montenegrin historiography point to the interconnectedness and dependence of historiographical trends in a broader Yugoslav area. In this sense, studying the historiographical trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Husnija Kamberović states:

When historiography in Bosnia and Herzegovina is mentioned, one first thinks of three different views on history: Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak. This is followed by the thesis that there are three historiographies: Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak. In my opinion, this is an utterly simplified presentation of this issue. Here we can follow Professor Andrej Mitrović's thesis according to which one can only speak about historiography, on the one end, and parahistoriography, on the other end. I do not wish to deny the influence of a complex, almost divided Bosnian-Herzegovinian society regarding the perception of the past of its ethnic communities, but claiming that those are the only boundaries dividing historiography within this country is completely wrong.¹¹⁷⁶

Regardless of the attempt to defend "historical science" as the intellectual need of every fan of the "craft of a historian," it is still acknowledged in the concluding remarks:

detabuizacije crnogorske istoriografije i raspad ideološke paradigme, 1989 do 2006," *Crnogorski anali* 1 (2013): 5–59; Šerbo Rastoder: "Balkanska istoriografija i osnove razumijevanja prisutstva Osmanlija na Balkanu," (izdanje na turskom) *Ulusal Tarih Araştırmaları Metodolojik Yaklaşımlar*, Balıkesir Üniversitesi, oktobar 26–28, 2013; Šerbo Rastoder "Istorija se ne može napisati ona se piše," a discussion at the round table held in Berane on July 18, 2014, on the occasion of Academician Miomir Dašić's book, *Sporenja u istoriografiji – Knjiga poruka i pouka* (Berane: Komovi, 2014), 19–25.

1176 Husnija Kamberović, "Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Preispitivanje prošlosti ili istorijski revizionizam?" in *Preispitivanje prošlosti i istorijski revizionizam*, ed. Milo Petrović (Belgrade:, 2014), 175.

As of late, the phenomenon that Serbian historiography has gone through has also appeared here – instead of communist antifascism, World War II national antifascism has been promoted and this is the way in which the Chetnik movement has been promoted into an anti-fascist movement. Here, the members of the SS units are well on their way to be promoted into antifascists.¹¹⁷⁷

It is difficult not to agree with this statement, noting that what Serbian historiography has gone through could also apply to historiography in Croatia and all other postcommunist societies. This has also been confirmed by the analyses of the development of historiography in Macedonia,¹¹⁷⁸ Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and, to some degree, Slovenia in the 1980s. The general trends of suppressing revolutionary heritage, “nationalizing history” and marginalizing the common Yugoslav experience, thus considering it solely a conflict experience, have not derived from historical science and its field of research, but from the society outside it. At the same time, the influence of literature, the development of media and technology and the pluralization of society has increased the significance of alternative thinking and influence on historical consciousness. In that context, historical science was increasingly less capable of defending itself as a science, and was increasingly becoming the basis for justifying the present. Thus, it lost its credibility as a scientific arbitrator of the past and reduced its influence on the present. The reasons should not be understood as the dramaticality of the crisis of historical science and scientific historiography; instead, one should focus on the affirmation of its scientific quality and the need to separate it from pre-scientific and para-historiography. It is difficult to imagine that the guild of professional historians can ever be organized again as a monolithic academic community like in socialist Yugoslavia. This does not mean,

1177 Ibid., 181.

1178 Ulf Brunbauer, “Drevna nacionalnost i vjekovna borba za državnost: Historiografski mitovi u Republici Makedoniji,” *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu* (2003): 291–329. Euro Clio, 2003.

however, that the experience of such an organized guild should be discarded. The first attempts to organize the guild of historians are linked to the 1930s. Even before the January 6 Dictatorship, in 1927, the Yugoslav Historical Society was founded in Belgrade.¹¹⁷⁹ It published *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* (JIČ; 1935–1939, Ljubljana, Belgrade, Zagreb), whose founder and director was Stanoje Stanojević. Its editor was Viktor Novak and associates were Vladimir Ćorović, Milko Kos (Ljubljana) and Ferdo Šišić (Zagreb).¹¹⁸⁰ It is interesting to note that the first issues of the journal were published only after it was given support by the International Congress of Historians, which was held in Warsaw in 1935. JIČ was launched with the aim of “overcoming the regional and partial character of historical studies” and the ambition to “open pages for discussing general Yugoslav historiographical problems, dealing with general historical events, phenomena and processes, primarily those concerning the state and national entity (integral Yugoslavism),” addressing the history of the significant parts of the Yugoslav peoples living in the neighboring countries, and relations with the Balkan peoples in the past.¹¹⁸¹

GUILDS OF HISTORIANS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON HISTORIOGRAPHY

This was also the first attempt to organize the guild of historians at the Yugoslav level, within the scope of the policy of integral Yugoslavism, all the more so because the sections and associations at the provincial or national level already existed and operated. It is interesting to note that this journal, which changed its editorial concept very little and was intended for the whole of Yugoslavia and printed in Latin and Cyrillic alphabets, Ekavian and Ijekavian in Belgrade (Zagreb

1179 Dobrilo Aranitović, “Bibliografija 1935–1997,” in *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, ed. JIČ (Belgrade 1999), 6. The first president of the society was Stanoje Stanojević until his death (1937). He was succeeded by Vladimir Ćorović.

1180 Statut Jugoslovenskog istorijskog društva, SKA, 1929.

1181 Aranitović, “Bibliografija,” 8.

and Ljubljana were also indicated as the places of publication), failed to ensure the continuity of publication during the existence of the Yugoslav state. Although financial problems were given as the reason, it was clear, although never fully explained, that these problems often served as an excuse to cover up conceptual differences. Thus, bibliographers identified four “series” of this journal during its publication: Series I (1935–1939) published 16 issues; Series II (1962–1981) published 72 issues; Series III (1986–1989) published 16 issues; and Series IV (1996–1997) published two double issues or four issues.¹¹⁸² We are especially interested in series II and III. Namely, after the First Congress of Yugoslav Historians (Belgrade 1954) adopted the conclusion to restore the JIČ, its publishing began in 1962. Its director, until the abolition of this function, was Branislav Đurđev (1962–1965) and its editors-in-chief were Jovan Marjanović (1962–1969), Vlado Strugar (1970–1973), Radovan Samardžić (1974–1981), Čedomir Popov (1986–1989) and Momčilo Zečević (1996–1997). Although the journal mostly retained the tradition of the first, prewar JIČ, its first issue published in 1962 emphasized that it would cover the basic activities in the field of historical science, attempting to “evaluate the phenomena and scholarly works, as well as the overall development of Yugoslav historiography from the contemporary scholarly viewpoint, exert influence on this development as much as it can.” It was also stated that the JIČ would bring together “researchers working on the national history of the Yugoslav peoples and the history of Yugoslavia.”¹¹⁸³ The need to synthesize and present the common Yugoslav experience was the scholarly ideal of the historians’ guild, especially after it was organized according to the same principles as the state. Namely, the republican and provincial associations of historians delegated their

1182 Ibid., 27–29.

1183 *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis* 1 (1–1962), 3; Miomir Dašić, “Riznica istoriografskih podataka za istoriju Jugoslavije, predgovor,” in *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, Bibliografija 1935–1997*, ed. Dobrilo Aranitović, (Belgrade: JIČ, 1999), 11: “Except for the ideological Marxist approach to and view on the tasks of national historiographies, there was almost no departure from the prewar editorial concept.”

representatives to the Presidency of Yugoslav Historians. On the other hand, in addition to Serbian and Croatian history, space in the post-war journal series was also given to Montenegrin, Slovenian and Macedonian history, and the issues concerning the creation and development of the Yugoslav state. The contributors to the journal were from Belgrade (266), Zagreb (82), Ljubljana (41), Sarajevo (43), Skopje (44), Titograd (16), Novi Sad (41), Priština (7) and abroad (51).¹¹⁸⁴ After more than 20 years, the JIČ ceased publication in 1981, because the Federal Executive Council redirected its funding to the self-management agreements of the republics and provinces, which could not or would not agree on how to finance the journal. Thus, the JIČ became one of the first “victims” of disintegration processes in the country, because it seems that no one needed an “integrative journal in historical science.”¹¹⁸⁵ The ambition to be the “collective brainpower of Yugoslav historiography and the basis of its future common development strategy and global scholarly doctrine and methodology” obviously could not be realized under the existing social system, within which the process of affirming national historiographies was heating up. This was especially so because the “scientific authority” was constituted in the same way as the political one and, from 1986 onwards, the new journal series was financed by the Self-Management Community of the Interests of Serbia, which also confirmed the “dying out” of the journal’s Yugoslav character. In the 1980s, the Association of Yugoslav Historians, a professional organization and formal owner of the journal, plunged into a crisis. The Congress of Historians, held every four years, fluctuated in the number of participants and in what the notion of “Yugoslavia” meant for the guild from the Fifth to the Tenth Congress. In addition to 800 Yugoslav historians, the Fifth Congress was attended by a number of historians from Bulgaria, Hungary, the

1184 *Ibid.*, 13.

1185 *Ibid.*, 14.

JIČ Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis ,

Soviet Union, Austria, the GDR and FR Germany,¹¹⁸⁶ while the tenth and last congress was attended by historians from Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Srpska, who presented 86 statements.¹¹⁸⁷ While the Fifth Congress (Ohrid, 5–7 September 1969) was dedicated to ethnic and national problems in our country, the main topic of the Tenth Congress (Arandelovac, 15–17 January 1998) was migration. Thus, in just 30 years, the Congress of Historians witnessed of the ongoing events in the country instead of being the depositors and analysts of its historical experience. The presidents of the Association of Yugoslav Historians testified to the events; in 1983, Galib Šljivo pointed out:

The Seventh Congress of Yugoslav Historians was held in Novi Sad in 1977 and it was agreed to hold the Eighth Congress in Priština in 1981. Due to the well-known events in Kosovo and the fact that the President of the Association of Yugoslav Historians was also from Kosovo, it was impossible to organize this congress. At the same time, the work of the Association of Historical Societies of Yugoslavia was paralyzed.

Since the Eighth Congress was held in Arandelovac as a compromise solution, the first public disputes came to light. According to the President of the Association of Yugoslav Historians:

The Eighth Congress of Yugoslav Historians was held at the time when a lot was written about history, but it would probably be better to say that some “hot topics” were tackled and that they were the reason why many opened the books that would otherwise rest peacefully on the shelves. The causes of this phenomenon are much deeper and historians would be frivolous people if they gave greater meaning to the occasion than the causes themselves.¹¹⁸⁸

1186 Ahmet Hadžirović, “Peti kongres istoričara Jugoslavije, Ohrid, 5–7. IX 1969”, 386–389 (<http://iis.unsa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/5-Prilozi-Osvrti-Ahmed-Hadžić-Bećirović.87.pdf>).

1187 Sonja Dujmović, „Deseti kongres istoričara Jugoslavije (15–17. januar 1998)“, *Prilozi*, 30 (2001): 275–281.

1188 See: Galib Šljivo: “Povijest nešto nosi,” *Oko*, Zagreb, December 8–22, 1983 Šljivo also commented on the results of the Eighth Congress: “In addition to discussing

“History teaching” was a constant theme of the associations of historians during the 1980s. One reason was that from the mid-1970s onwards there was increasingly less space for history as a subject in the reformed schools,¹¹⁸⁹ while the other was that this reduced and disintegrated teaching of history displayed the process of disintegration in society.¹¹⁹⁰ In other words, history was decreasingly common

the basic topic, liberation and social trends in all periods, the participants dealt with those issues which were unavoidable at all meetings of historians. It was about the status of history teaching in schools and historiographical works such as *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije*. It is known to our public that two volumes of this important work were published a long time ago (the first in 1953 and the second in 1960) and that after 23 years there is still no third volume nor will it appear soon. In the meantime, several national history books were published, including *Istorija Jugoslavije* ([by] Božić, Ćirković, Dedijer, Ekmečić). Without waiting for the third volume, our history was also published abroad by, for example, Soviet historians and others. The Presidency of the Federation of Associations of Yugoslav Historians considers its task to encourage, follow and support the work on *Istorija Jugoslavije*... “

- 1189 In that sense, Dr Galib Šljivo states: “For six years now, historians have been pointing to the unfavorable status of history as a subject in primary and secondary vocationally-oriented schools. In primary schools where history was taught from the third to the final grade with three hours each, or 14 hours during schooling, it has been reduced to only seven hours. History is even less represented in secondary vocationally-oriented education. It is about the inclusion of history in the general vocational group of subjects, so that it is taught during the first two years of secondary vocationally-oriented education.”
- 1190 In an interview in 1986, Academician Miomir Dašić, the successor of Galib Šljivo as President of the Association of Yugoslav Historians, posed the following question: “Why do we reject Yugoslav patriotism? ... Yugoslav patriotism – that historical category of the feeling of similarity and closeness among all Yugoslav peoples and nationalities, acquired after their long struggle against foreigners, conquerors – was almost rejected and declared an archaic form of feeling and historical consciousness. In some environments and, unfortunately, in schools they speak and write about Yugoslav patriotism as a non-historical and fictional category and artificial creation, or they simply declare it a unitarist spectre. I believe that the key historical misconception is the current insistence only on national differences and the story that only they can bring Yugoslavia to full

as a topic. This was one of the main topics of the Eighth Congress of the Association of Yugoslav Historians (October 1983),¹¹⁹¹ the Ninth Congress (Priština, October 1997)¹¹⁹² and the Tenth Congress (January 1998), as well as the subject of discussion at the highest forums of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia.¹¹⁹³ The fact that 14 years passed between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses of the Association of Yugoslav Historians and less than a year between the Ninth and Tenth Congress speaks enough about the status and treatment of historians and historical science in Yugoslavia in the 1990s or, in other words, about their instrumentalization. Regular symposia on history teaching, like the Thirteenth Symposium (Maribor, August

unity. Naturally, I am not against overcoming differences, but only against their excessive emphasis, multiplication and deepening. And that is exactly what is happening in Yugoslavia today." See: Miomir Dašić, "Agonija učiteljice života," *Duga* (October 1986): 17..

1191 Miomir Dašić: *Istorija, politika* (Podgorica, CANU, 2018), 175, 270. "These debates, with a justified concern about the fate of this subject, were dominant both during the preparations for the Eighth Congress of Yugoslav Historians (held on October 20–22, 1983) and during its work. At this largest gathering of Yugoslav historians it was argued that the study of history in our schools was impoverished, especially in secondary vocational oriented education and that this would leave severe consequences for shaping the historical consciousness of the younger generation. Namely, while in elementary school the status of history was mostly satisfactory, in reformed secondary schools, the study of this subject was reduced to only two hours a week in the first and second grades of the core curriculum. In the final phase of vocationally-oriented education only about 5% of students study some historical content."

1192 Ibid.

1193 See: Miomir Dašić, "Položaj nastave istorije u jugoslovenskom obrazovno-vaspitnom sistemu," introductory speech at the joint session of the Section for Education and Science and the Section for Culture of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, June 10, 1985; Miomir Dašić, *Istorija, politika* (Podgorica: CANU, 2018), 190.

1988), detected “mad nationalisms,”¹¹⁹⁴ but failed to provide generally acceptable answers to these phenomena.

TURN TO THE RIGHT

In the abundant historiographical literature of the 1980s, when history “came out of the researcher’s study and became the source of everyday political clashes,” it seems that three studies (or three authors) are worth mentioning from both a scholarly and phenomenological viewpoint. These works above all else represent the state of mind in historiography and clearly indicate its further direction. In that sense, Veselin Đuretić’s books *Vlada na bespuću*¹¹⁹⁵ and *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama*¹¹⁹⁶ are the books interpreted by the Serbian academic public as the studies that break the calculative symmetry of “Tito’s Yugoslavia.” Otherwise, the “holy trinity” of Ljotić, Nedić and Mihailović represents the basis for Đuretić’s thesis on the “Serbian existential dialectic,” that is, the teaching according to which their movements have been patriotic and liberation movements. This will constitute the public opinion that will eventually formally rehabilitate some of them. There are some opinions that Radovan Samardžić

1194 Miomir Dašić, “O naučnoj, idejnoj i metodološkoj zasnovanosti udžbenika istorije,” paper presented at the Thirteenth Yugoslav Symposium on History Teaching, Maribor, August 25–27, 1988. “Mad nationalisms – towards which, as I see, the natiocracies are complaisant and, why not say, some are also very benevolent, suffocating historical science – hinder the appearance of critical historiography, which destroys their national myths, persistently and tenaciously rewrite, forge and ‘correct’ historical facts at the will of militant national elites, which was inevitably reflected and is still reflected in the preparation of history curricula for our schools. Thus, history teaching also failed to escape the trappings of ‘parochial’ historiography in certain republican and provincial politicized historical theses.”

1195 Veselin Đuretić, *Vlada na bespuću* (Beograd, Stručna knjiga, 1982).

1196 Veselin Đuretić, *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* (Beograd, Narodna knjiga 1985).

“discovered” Đuretić,¹¹⁹⁷ whose books were published by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Serbian Radical Party. This representative of “cheerful science” (S. Basara)¹¹⁹⁸ and an “academician” who has never been elected by any academy, but only by the “people,” has become a typical representative of populism in historiography¹¹⁹⁹ and the use of historical “science” in everyday political clashes at the time of Yugoslavia’s collapse. With his views that the “Yugoslav idea has been used to break up the Serbian nation” and that “the Vatican has stood behind this project, while the main problem, according to the Russian and British historical archives, has been made by Russia due to Serbia’s reception of White Russian emigrés,” Đuretić introduced conspiracy theories into public discourse, for which he has sought to obtain scholarly legitimacy.

1197 “Veselin Đuretić would have remained on the sidelines forever had it not been for historian Radovan Samardžić who noticed him and helped him to present his ‘work’ to the public through the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA). On that occasion, he told Đuretić that with his book *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* ‘he broke the calculative symmetry of Tito’s Yugoslavia’ and sent the message to his people and the world that the union should be reconstructed. Dr Samardžić later wrote the preface to Đuretić’s book *Razaranje srpstva u XX veku* (1992) and was also its editor. Đuretić’s text on the Comintern’s anti-Serbian activities can be found in the book *Catena Mundi* (1992). This closeness with Dr Samardžić and the SASA identified Veselin Đuretić as a man who was close to the core of the Serbian nationalist project, which is why he was one of the few to receive the unofficial title of academician, which he actually never was.” See: *Beton*. 54 (September 16, 2008).

1198 Basara on Đuretić, <https://www.danas.rs/kolumna/svetislav-basara/vesela-nauka/>, February 10, 2010.,16

1199 Veselin Đuretić was the recipient of the Ravna Gora Award and the Slobodan Jovanović Award. He was also the recipient of the Njegoš Medal of the First Order, given to him by Karadžić. Together with the Academicians Ljubomir Tadić and Matija Bečković, he tried to “preserve” his ancestral homeland by founding the Movement for the Common European State of Serbia and Montenegro. He was close to the leadership of the (original) Serbian Radical Party, as well as the *Obraz* and *Svetozar Miletić* movements. See: *Beton* (Literary supplement in daily paper *Danas*) 54, September 16, 2008.

CONFLICT OF HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITIONS

University professor Branko Petranović, a great scholarly authority of his time and researcher who shaped generations of historians from all parts of Yugoslavia, was the first to turn away from the traditional view of the history of Yugoslavia as the sum of the histories of its “tribes.” He established a historiographical pattern according to which the history of Yugoslavia had been a unique and indivisible subject within the chronological borders since its creation (1918). Such a concept does not exclude the understanding that the Yugoslav idea is older than the state, but such a state has its boundaries and its history as a historical subject.¹²⁰⁰ His three-volume *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade 1988)¹²⁰¹ will prove to be not only the most complete synthesis of the history of the Yugoslav state, but also the “last defence” of the postwar historiographical heritage. The fact that the three-volume *Istorija Jugoslavije* appeared only eight years after the publishing of the single-volume *Istorija Jugoslavija* (1980) speaks convincingly about the “fire” that was heating up historiographical trends. During the period 1980–1993, Branko Petranović alone or as a co-author published 16 major historiographical studies.¹²⁰²

1200 Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1978* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1980).

1201 The first volume covers the period 1918–1941; the second is dedicated to the period of the Second World War, 1941–1945; the third to the period of socialist Yugoslavia since 1945.

1202 The following works are all (co-)authored by Branko Petranović: *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1978* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1980), *Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1943–1945: Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1981), *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945)*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945)* vol. 2 (Belgrade: Rad, (1983); with Slobodan Nešović, *AVNOJ i revolucija: Tematska zbirka dokumenata 1941–1945* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1983); *Istoriografija i revolucija* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1984); with Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918–1984: Zbirka dokumenata* (Belgrade: Rad, 1985); with Slobodan Nešović, *Jugoslavija i Ujedinjeni narodi 1941–1945* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985); *Revolucije i pokreti otpora u Evropi 1939–1945* (Skopje: Zavod za unapređivanje na stopanstvo, 1985); with Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslovenski federalizam: Ideje i stvarnost*, vol 1 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1987); with Momčilo Zečević,

When the book by Professor Dr Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* was translated and published in Zagreb (1988),¹²⁰³ few could have predicted that it would be one of the last historiographical studies that had the ambition to provide historiographical answers to the key question of the former Yugoslav state – the national question. Today, we can speculate on whether this book came “late,” but having in mind the development of historiography in Yugoslavia,¹²⁰⁴ it is certain that the appearance of this book reactualized numerous questions of which the national one is essential. All the more so because it is difficult not to agree with Banac’s argument that the cause of all later problems of the Yugoslav state should be sought in the fact that the national question became the most important problem of Yugoslavia’s internal relations. By substantiating the opinion on the “original sin of Yugoslav politics,” that is, the foundations on which the Yugoslav state was created, Banac reactualized the essential historical question of Yugoslavia. The historical pessimism that permeates this study is best illustrated by its last chapter, titled “The Building of Skadar.” It ends metaphorically and prophetically with the following conclusion: “The national question permeated every aspect of Yugoslavia’s public life after 1918. It was reflected in internal, external, social, economic and even cultural affairs. It was solved by democrats and autocrats, kings and communists. It was solved by day and unsolved by night. Some days were particu-

Jugoslovenski federalizam: Ideje i stvarnost, vol. 2. (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1987); Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, vols. 1–3 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988); .with Momčilo Zečević, Jugoslavija 1918–1988: Tematska zbirka dokumenata (Belgrade: Rad, 1988); Balkanska federacija 1943–1948 (Šabac: Zaslón, 1991); with Momčilo Zečević, Agonija dve Jugoslavije (Šabac: Zaslón, 1991); Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992); Југословенско искуство српске националне интеграције (Belgrade: Службени лист СРЈ, (1993).

1203 Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988).

1204 See more in: Ljubodrag Dimić, “Jugoslovenska država i istoriografija,” *Tokovi istorije* 1–1 (1999): 326–339.

larly bright for builing, some nights particularly dark for destroying. One horn of the dilemma was that a single solution could not satisfy all sides. Was the other that a firm citadel could be maintained only by human sacrifice.”¹²⁰⁵

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1205 Banac. *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji*, 386; see also: Šerbo Rastoder, “Crnogorsko nacionalno pitanje u djelima dr Iva Banca,” Speech given at the 15th International Conference of the International Forum Bosnia, “Unity and Plurality in Europe: In Memory of the Life and Work of Ivo Banac,” Sarajevo, July 26, 2020.

XII

EPILOGUE

Mitja Velikonja

POETRY AFTER SREBRENICA? CULTURAL REFLECTION OF THE YUGOSLAV EIGHTIES

I

*It seemed than that nothing could stop
the brilliant future in front of us.*

—IGOR ŠTIKS¹²⁰⁶

HOW ARE WE to understand the Yugoslav 1980s today, how are we to write about them, paint them, record or put them into poetry, music or the stage, to sing about them; how are we to value them after the *bloody tale* of the 1990s? Can we still *write poetry* on the last Yugoslav decade after what happened in Srebrenica, Vukovar, Ahmići, Sarajevo, and the hundreds other killing fields, or is this *too barbaric* as well?

This chapter analyses the various types of cultural and artistic reflection – i.e. the construction and the perception – upon the 1980s in socialist Yugoslavia as they have developed from its ashes since 1991. In contrast to the previous authors in this publication, I do not write about the historical 1980s but about their contemporary cultural representations. I am not a historian of Yugoslavia; I am a cultural scientist of post-Yugoslavia. I study various forms of memory and change, the construction and deconstruction of the past: the way images about it are formed in art and culture, to be more exact. I am interested in how historiographical precision and hard facts are opposed by current, therefore posterior art projections and cultural interpretations of the late socialist federation. In other words, I am not doing historiographical trips from the post-Yugoslav present to the Yugoslav 1980s, but posing culturological questions about how

1206 Igor Štikš, *W* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2019), 226.

the Yugoslav 1980s are present on the artistic and wider cultural map of the post-Yugoslav present.

That being said, I will nevertheless begin with a historical framework. Our *short 1980s*, to borrow Eric Hobsbawm's phrase, were symbolically and literally marked by two deaths: the death of the Yugoslav leader Tito on 4 May 1980, and the death of Yugoslavia in mid-1991. During that time, the political legitimacy of Yugoslavia – which was, in my opinion, based internally and externally on five essential accomplishments¹²⁰⁷ – irreversibly eroded. After three and a half decades of rapid economic, social, and cultural development – in which stable periods alternated with more difficult ones, prosperity alternated with regression, and authoritarianism with liberalism – the country experienced a multifaceted and multi-layered crisis. The governing political set was unable to lead the economic, political, and cultural development as it had before, bringing the modernization of society to a standstill.¹²⁰⁸ In order to retain power, its protagonists sooner or later, openly or covertly grabbed the new ideological compositions and concrete politics that remain triumphant in the successor states (and everywhere in transitional Eastern Europe) to this day: ethno-nationalism and neoliberalism. Both are, of course, militantly anti-Yugoslav and anti-socialist.¹²⁰⁹ The price of this was the catastroph-

1207 These five essential accomplishments being: (1) authentic anti-fascism and national liberation in 1941–1945; (2) the social emancipation of previously subordinate groups (women, the young, peasants), (3) rapid modernization from agrarian to an industrial agrarian society, or, viewed from a wider perspective, from a pre-modern to a modern and even post-modern society, (4) a political alternative (domestically socialist self-management and internationally non-alignment and active co-existence); and (5) specific multiculturalism (inwardly, *brotherhood and unity*; outwardly, a strong connection to the non-European, recently de-colonized world).

1208 Along with the endemic, inner reasons, an external factor must also be considered: the disintegration of the Cold War system of power in Europe.

1209 For a study of ethno-national homogenization and the mutual rivalry of intellectual elites during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, see the article by political sociologist Ana Dević, "Ethnonationalism, Politics, and the Intellectuals: The

ic 1990s: the 1991–1995 war in Croatia, armed conflicts in Slovenia in the summer of 1991, the 1992–1995 Bosnian War, the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, and finally the 2001 insurgency in Macedonia – not to mention the marginalization and impoverishment of all these countries to a greater or lesser extent.

On the other hand and speaking in the most general terms, it is post-Yugoslav culture and art that offer a much different and more complex image than the bare demonization of socialist Yugoslavia that is, without exception but with varying degrees of intensity, still present in the official discourses and practices *from the Vardar to Triglav*.

This analysis encountered two difficulties. Firstly, I focused exclusively on the 1980s in Yugoslavia which are extremely difficult to isolate from the previous decades and from the wider environment (especially the environment of the then-contemporary global urban cultures), but easy to separate from the later, the post-Yugoslav decades. Cultural reflection on the 1980s is therefore trapped in the continuity of the preceding and the discontinuity of the following decades (the deepest being the tragic 1990s). It must be said from the beginning that the 1990s were given incomparably greater attention in scientific literature, in the media, in culture, and in art than their pre-history, the 1980s. And secondly, it is practically impossible for one chapter to encompass all dimensions of the current reflection on the Yugoslav 1980s from the perspective of the 1990s, the 2000s, the 2010s, and now from 2020 onwards, as I notice them intertwined with areas of political, cultural, and social life: in political programs, in politicians' statements, in official positions of states as well as government and opposition parties, in critical and non-critical science, in tourism and consumerism, in Yugophobic and Yugophilic media, in nostalgia and anti-nostalgia, in culture and in art. This is why I have limited myself to the latter two areas, i.e. to literature, music, film,

Case of Yugoslavia," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 11, no. 3 (1998): 375–409.

popular and consumer culture, cultures and subcultures, art retrospectives and exhibitions on the 1980s, online valuations of the period, and the urban and everyday culture. Even here, I was forced to make a selection of what I estimate to be the most prominent ones. Therefore, I completely omitted today's perspectives of (political) historians¹²¹⁰ and the experts on the 1980s coming from commentary and journalism.¹²¹¹ In contrast to them, Croatian scholar of comparative literature, Maša Kolanović,¹²¹² claims that "fiction in general has no ambition to provide complete or privileged truth, but rather works in a space in which there is a plurality of truths".

In short, my research's starting point is based in cultural science. I perceive cultural reflection as a two-sided and intertwined process: firstly, as an analysis of construction and the fruit of the author's work;

1210 Among numerous perspectives, I would like to point out the excellent studies by Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije 1974–1990* (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003); Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija – Struktura raspadanja: Ogled o uzrocima strukturne krize jugoslovenskog društva* (Belgrade: Rad, 1990); Božo Repe and Darja Kerec, *Slovenija, moja dežela: Družbena revolucija v osemdesetih letih* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2017); Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy – Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Mitja Hafner Fink, *Sociološka razsežja razpada Jugoslavije* (Ljubljana: Znanstvena knjižnica FDV, 1994); and two collections: *Debating the End of Yugoslavia*, edited by Florian Bieber, Armina Galijaš, and Rory Archer (London: Routledge, 2014), and *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, edited by Pedro Ramet (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985). A lucid analysis of the late-Yugoslav political and media newspeak (*stabilization, ideal and political differentiation, a flood of rising prices, the inflation dragon, a lack of coordination, the silt of stagflation*, etc.) was performed during Yugoslav times by Ivo Žanić in his *Mitologija inflacije – Govor kriznog doba* (Zagreb: Globus, 1987).

1211 E.g. Viktor Meier in his overview *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996) or Vlado Miheljak's *Slovenci padajo v nebo – 99 razlag tisočletnih sanj* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1995).

1212 Maša Kolanović, "Back to the Future of (Post)Socialism: The Afterline of Socialism in Post-Yugoslav Cultural Space," in *The Future of (Post)Socialism*, ed. John Frederick Bailyn, Dijana Jelača and Danijela Lugiarić (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018), 177.

and secondly, as an analysis of perception, the public's ways of accepting and interpreting. I am not interested in bare remembering – I have already written on that¹²¹³ – but rather in today's creation and mediation of verses, sounds, vignettes, cadres, words, clips, or images of Yugoslavia in the 1980s and how all of these resonate in today's society, 40 years after its beginning and 30 years after its end. I do not follow trips down the 1980s' memory lane, but their narrative, fictional reconstructions: anything that contains the magical syntagma *the Yugoslav 1980s* in the field of culture today. What is today therefore the cultural image of *antebellum* Yugoslavia; what is its – to upgrade Hobsbawm's concept – invented, yet roughly interrupted tradition? Speaking most generally, there are three types of reflections on the Yugoslav chronotope of the 1980s in various fields of contemporary culture and art: the affirmative (sweet), the balanced (bittersweet), and the negative (bitter) reflections.

II

*For a man who no longer has a homeland,
writing becomes a place to live.*

—THEODOR ADORNO¹²¹⁴

Allow me to begin with the last of these, with the dark retrospective representation of the 1980s – especially because it completely corresponds to the main political and media discourses in every successor state. The mantras of *communist terrors*, *Yugoslav unity*, its *artificial formation*, and the party's *single-mindedness* have neither changed nor lost their power in the past three decades. The dominant narrative of recent history varies between demonizing communism and equating it with Nazism and fascism. What is more, this is not only

1213 Mitja Velikonja, "The Yugoslav Rear-View Mirror – Ways of Remembering Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective*, ed. Latinka Perović, Drago Roksanđić, Mitja Velikonja, Wolfgang Hoepken, Florian Bieber (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2017), 515–547.

1214 Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia – Reflections from Damaged Life* (London: Verso, 2005), 87.

the case with East European revisionists, revanchists, and converts, but has become the official position of the European Union and the Council of Europe.¹²¹⁵ It is a striking fact that the most fervent critics of transition from the former times and the former state are often the same people who then held high positions in politics, the economy, academia, the media, or the public sphere in general. Metaphorically speaking, they are now beating a (dead) horse with the same passion and with the same gains as when they once rode it. Almost without exception they were members of the League of Communists, but a swift ideological conversion aided by political resourcefulness allowed them to remain at the forefront. Due to such chameleon skills, no post-Yugoslav space saw the lustration of previous authorities; there was no *thick line* policy that some other transitional countries implemented.

However, there was a different sort of lustration: the lustration of material tradition – of everything that was reminiscent of the previous times and the previous state. The new or refurbished old leaders intentionally began renaming institutions, streets, and toponyms,¹²¹⁶

1215 Among other authors, this equi-distance is extensively criticized by Laure Neumayer (*The Criminalisation of Communism in the European Political Space After the Cold War* [London: Routledge, 2019]), Tomaž Mastnak (*Liberalizem, fašizem, neoliberalizem* [Ljubljana: Založba/*cf., 2015], 74–85) and Dragan Markovina (*Povijest poraženih* [Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 2015], 114–205).

1216 In his brave and precise study of these processes in Banja Luka, Bosnian cultural studies scholar Srđan Šušnica (*Pop-Mythological Urine Marking of “Our” Streets – Case Study Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina*, [MA thesis, University of Ljubljana, 2015].34–43) reveals that the new authorities during and after the 1992–1995 war changed or “Serbianized” 26% place names in the region and a half of local community names in the town itself. Street name distribution was also radically changed: in 1998, 69.4% of streets were named after Serbian personalities (compared to 28.1% in 1991), 3.2% after Croatian personalities (13.7% in 1991), and 1.1% after Muslim/Bosnian personalities (21.2% in 1991). In the decade following the overthrow of Milošević, Belgrade saw 800 streets change names (Dubravka Stojanović, *Ulje na vodi – Ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije* [Belgrade: Peščanik, 2010], 134, 135).

destroying monuments,¹²¹⁷ cleaning out libraries,¹²¹⁸ repressing or blackening the Yugoslav decades in curricula and textbooks,¹²¹⁹ changing national holidays,¹²²⁰ etc., etc., and another etc. A veritable exorcism, as if Yugoslavia never even existed! They tried to systematically erase everything that reminded one of the former state, of the former political system – everything except for themselves. The partner of this material cleansing of everything Yugoslav is one of the most prolific literary genres in the region today – memoirs of political protagonists of the 1980s, their “discourse of authenticity.”¹²²¹

Broadly, I divide the authors into two categories: those who wrote on the dissolution, and those who stood for “independence”. Among the first are Raif Dizdarević (*Put u raspad*),¹²²² Borisav Jović (*Od*

1217 Croatian historian of memory Vjeran Pavlaković (“Blowing Up Brotherhood and Unity: The Fate of World War Two Cultural Heritage in Lika.” In *The Politics of Heritage and Memory*, edited by Petra Jurlina [Zagreb: University of Zagreb, Center for Peace Studies, 2014], 378) states that around 3,000 National Liberation Movement statues and monuments were destroyed in the 1990s.

1218 See Dora Komnenović’s PhD thesis *Everything by the Book? A Sociological Reading of the Discarding of Books from Public Libraries in Post-Socialist Croatia and Slovenia*, Justus Liebig University Giessen, 2019.

1219 See the remarkable studies by the Belgrade historian Dubravka Stojanović, who calls this a process ‘na tihoj vatri’ (on low heat) (*Ulje na void*, 85–159), and the Swedish researcher of post-socialism and cultural studies Anamaria Dutceac Segesten (*Myth, Identity, and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian Textbooks* [New York: Lexington Books, 2011]).

1220 Case studies concerning (the former) Yugoslavia can be found in the edited volume by Ljiljana Šarić, Karen Gammelgaard, and Kjetil Rå Hauge (*Transforming National Holidays – Identity Discourses in the West and South Slavic Countries, 1985–2010* [Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012]).

1221 Veronika Pehe, *Velvet Retro: Postsocialist Nostalgia and the Politics of Heroism in Czech Popular Culture* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2020), 131

1222 Raif Dizdarević, *Put u raspad (Road to Disintegration – Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2011).*

Gazimestana do Haga – Vreme Slobodana Miloševića),¹²²³ and the two Yugoslav People's Army senior officers Veljko Kadrijević (*Moje viđenje raspada: Vojska bez države*)¹²²⁴ and Branko Mamula (*Slučaj Jugoslavija*),¹²²⁵ while Vidoje Žarković also dedicated a few pages to that era (*Moje viđenje Tita*).¹²²⁶ Probably in fear of being unable to capitalize on their *historical role*, the *liberators* began writing their own heroic epics. Among those, I can include self-proclaimed prophets such as Stipe Mesić (*Kako smo srušili Jugoslaviju*),¹²²⁷ Martin Špegelj (*Sjećanja vojnika*),¹²²⁸ Alija Izetbegović (*Moj bijeg u slobodu: Bilješke iz zatvora 1983–1988*),¹²²⁹ Janez Janša (*Premiki: nastajanje in obramba slovenske države 1988–1992*)¹²³⁰, and Dimitrij Rupel (*Skrivnost države – Spomini na domače in zunanje zadeve 1989–1992*),¹²³¹ but also Slobodan Milošević, with his collection of speeches (*Godine raspleta*).¹²³²

1223 Borisav Jović, *Od Gazimestana do Haga – Vreme Slobodana Miloševića* (*From Gazimestan to The Hague – Time of Slobodan Milošević* – Belgrade: Metaphysica, 2009).

1224 Veljko Kadrijević, *Moje viđenje raspada: Vojska bez države* (*My Views on Disintegration: The Army Without the State* – Belgrade: Politika, 1993).

1225 Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (*Case: Yugoslavia* – Podgorica: CID, 2000).

1226 Vidoje Žarković *Moje viđenje Tita* (*My Views on Tito* – Podgorica: Pobjeda, 2005).

1227 Stipe Mesić, *Kako smo srušili Jugoslaviju* (*How We Overthrew Yugoslavia* – Zagreb: Globus 1992). Two years later, he opportunistically changed the title from *How We Overthrew Yugoslavia* to a more suitable *How Yugoslavia Was Overthrown* (Zagreb: Mislavpress, 1994).

1228 Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika* (*Memories of the Soldier* – Zagreb: Znanje, 2001).

1229 Alija Izetbegović, *Moj bijeg u slobodu: Bilješke iz zatvora 1983–1988* (*My Escape to the Freedom: Prison Notes 1983–1988* – Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1999).

1230 Janez Janša, *Premiki: nastajanje in obramba slovenske države 1988–1992* (*Moves: Creation and Defence of Slovenian State 1988–1992* – Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1992).

1231 Dimitrij Rupel, *Skrivnost države – Spomini na domače in zunanje zadeve 1989–1992* (*The Mystery of the State – Memories on Internal and Foreign Affairs 1989–1992* – Ljubljana: Delo, Slovenske novice, 1992).

1232 Slobodan Milošević, *Godine raspleta* (*Years of Unravelling* – Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989).

The narrative self-construction of these “memory entrepreneurs”¹²³³ is based on a fervent, convert demonization of the recent past, the 1980s. Despite its many differences, these memoirs have a recognizable *leitmotif*: emphasizing the delusions and errors of their contemporaries, glorifying their own accomplishments and apologizing for them, as well as equating their own personal histories with the wider political one – in perfect alignment with the famous Louis XIV’s quote (*L’État, c’est moi!*).

Daily media channels produce an abundance of negative presentations and judgments of the Yugoslav 1980s, not necessarily just of the political right. They feature economic crisis and failed *stabilization*, increasing unemployment and poverty, high inflation, disruptions of basic provision supplies (coffee, the *even-odd* system, etc.), limited trips abroad, political repression, the smoldering Kosovo conflict and the beginning of international friction, economic and political affairs such as Agrokomerc from Velika Kladuša and Jadral from Obrovec, ideological campaigns such as the Stipe Štivar’s “White Book,” confiscations of the *Mladina* and *Tribuna* journals in Slovenia, and the general control of the media. The winners of the transition monopolized the story of the 1990s by creating images of the *difficult 1980s*, which are almost exactly the same as other smear campaigns that happened directly after a radical turn.¹²³⁴

On the other side, the post-Yugoslav popular culture is awash with uncritical images of the *sweet 1980s* that sometimes border on mania. Where to begin? With the omnipresent popular-music performers, whom Serbian musicologist Ana Petrov claimed to be the “great pacifiers of the region.”¹²³⁵ The “indestructible” bands and solo artists that dominated that decade continued to fill concert halls (and still

1233 Neumayer, *The Criminalisation of Communism*, 8.

1234 Once a *safe home*, Austria-Hungary, too, became a *prison of nations* soon after its dissolution in October 1918.

1235 Ana Petrov, *Jugoslovenska muzika bez Jugoslavije – Koncerti kao mesta sećanja* (Belgrade: Fakultet za medije i komunikacije, 2016), 12.

do today!) practically everywhere, in every successor state and in the diaspora too.¹²³⁶ Former punk bands are also getting back together having obviously forgotten their previously numerous stated aversion to *old farts* when they became ones themselves.¹²³⁷ Homage to this decade also appears in new songs. “Osamdesete” (The Eighties) by the Split band Daleka obala (covered also by the Slovenian Agropop) from the late 1990s paints a Dionysiac image of that decade with nights full of partying, dancing, playing music, and drinking – in short, this was a time of “happy, crazy days.”¹²³⁸ In their song with the same title, the Tuzla-based Jutro complain that the “Osamdesete su bile nešto, sad su samo godine, Kako dođu-tako prođu, novu boru ostave...” (The 1980s were something, now there’s just years; the way they come, so they go, leaving a new wind; 2017). In 1996, Riblja čorba published a double album, recorded live back in 1988, that bore the sarcastic title of the informal *Yugoslav anthem from the 80s: Od Vardara pa do Triglava* (From the Vardar to Mt Triglav or, originally, *Jugoslavijo*), while the cover featured the former federation’s coat-of-arms.

Slovenian Yugonostalgics Zaklonišče prepeva describe their rock youth in the song entitled “In Memoriam,” but with a necessary critical reflection (e.g. “slušali smo mitove, a džaba su bile sve njihove beskrajne molitve”; we listened to myths, but all their endless prayers were in vain).¹²³⁹ Songs speak fondly also of the cute unpleasantnesses of the era, such as the notoriously uncomfortable car, the Yugo (Zabran-

1236 Parni valjak, Prljavo kazalište, Riblja čorba, Novi fosili, Denis i Denis, Tereza Kesovija, Zdravko Čolić, Oliver Dragojević, Električni orgazam, Laibach, Borghesia, etc., as well as Goran Bregović, Zoran Predin, Darko Rundek, or Vlatko Stefanovski and countless others, each with their new band. For nostalgic catharses at concerts of Yugoslav music stars, e.g. the Tereza Kesovija Belgrade concerts of 2011 and 2013, see Petrov *Jugoslovenska muzika*, 41–62.

1237 Paraf, Pankrti, Pekinška patka, Buldogi, etc.

1238 An interesting fact: the song was first published on the Agropop album *Pleše kolo vsa Slovenija* and only a year later, in 1999, its original came out on Daleka obale’s 1999–2000 album (1999).

1239 The *Sellam alejkum* album, 2004.

jeno pušenje: “Yugo 45”)¹²⁴⁰ or the Wartburg and Trabant (Atheist Rap: “Wartburg limuzina and Blu Trabant”).¹²⁴¹ These and similar songs persistently sketch an idyllic picture of the lost world of Yugoslav socialism and are therefore true pop-nostalgia hits.¹²⁴² On various ends of the former country, you can go to *Eighties* music and dance evenings that gather an extremely diverse crowd – far from only middle-aged people, the *jeans generation* of the 1980s, to quote another popular song of the time. In his sarcastic manner, Damir Avdić criticizes such a nostalgic outpourings of Yugoslavia into music – which is, just like its demonization, a wrong answer to the question of how it really was. In “Bratstvo i jedinstvo,”¹²⁴³ Avdić thunderously rejects the *nostalgic cunts* together with some Yugoslav music icons from the late ‘70s and early ‘80s (Bijelo Dugme, Lepa Brena, Johnny Štulić, and Paket aranžman). Otherwise, there are practically no negative dealings with this era in the post-Yugoslav popular music if I disregard the musical duel of *newly composed* nationalists Jura Stublić from Film and Bora Đorđević from Riblja čorba (who even got the title of a *Chetnik vojvode* in 2012).¹²⁴⁴ A general criticism of Yugoslavia, its communism, and its leaders is, together with the demonization of the neighboring nations, otherwise present in the “war music” of nationalist inciters, be it turbo folk singers or the skinhead bands (I only mention the song “Bando crvena” [The Red Mob] on the album *Čistite ulice* [You’ll Clean the Streets] by the Belgrade band Direktori).

An entire genre of musical studies, collections, and biographies is dedicated to keeping the memory alive of times when the entire *Yugoslavia was dancing to rock’n’roll*. The most comprehensive approach

1240 The *Agent tajne sile* album, 1999.

1241 The *Maori i Crni Gonzales* album, 1993/1994.

1242 For more on this, see Velikonja, “The Yugoslav Rear-View Mirror.”

1243 The *Život je raj* album, 2010.

1244 In 1991, the latter immediately responded to the former’s song ‘E moj druže beogradski’ (Oh, My Belgrade Mate) with ‘E moj druže zagrebački’ (Oh, My Zagreb Mate).

was done by Croatian music publicist Ante Perković in the book meaningfully entitled *Sedma republika*.¹²⁴⁵ In his typical essayistic style, he vehemently analyzed the topic with as much affection as bitter restraint. New Wave was researched by two authors. Branko Kostelnik, one of its protagonists – a musician, journalist, and event organizer – published a book of talks with the then New-Wavers, the title of which is self-explanatory: *Moj život je novi val* (My Life Is New Wave).¹²⁴⁶ He was followed by Dušan Vesić, another active participant in the era, with a substantial analytical chronology spanning the period from 1977 to 1982: *Zamisli život... Novi val – prva generacija*.¹²⁴⁷ In his *Novi rock – rockovski festival v Križankah 1981–2000*,¹²⁴⁸ their Slovenian counterpart Igor Bašin critically and not a bit nostalgically explored the rich 20-year history of Ljubljana’s festival, The New Rock. The various genres of Slovenian pop music were thoroughly described by the music buff Žiga Valetič in his substantial chronological overview *Osemdeseta: desetletje mladih*,¹²⁴⁹ based on which, a digital album with the same name was published featuring 36 songs by different authors.¹²⁵⁰ Cultural historian Ljubica Spaskovska offered a succinct recapitulation of the last decade of Yugoslav popular and alternative music, and its unsuccessful attempt at resisting the growing nationalism in her article “Stairway to Hell: The Yugoslav Rock Scene and Youth during the Crisis Decade of 1981–1991.”¹²⁵¹

1245 Ante Perković, *Sedma republika – pop kultura u Yu raspadu* (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2011).

1246 Branko Kostelnik, *Moj život je novi val* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2004).

1247 Dušan Vesić, *Zamisli život... Novi val – prva generacija* (Zagreb: Knjižara Ljevak, 2020).

1248 Igor Bašin, *Novi rock – rockovski festival v Križankah 1981–2000* (Maribor: Subkulturni azil, 2006).

1249 Žiga Valetič, *Osemdeseta: desetletje mladih* (Ljubljana: Založba Zenit, 2018).

1250 Založba kaset in plošč Radiotelevizije Slovenija, Ljubljana, 2018.

1251 Ljubica Spaskovska, “Stairway to Hell: The Yugoslav Rock Scene and Youth during the Crisis Decade of 1981–1991,” *East Central Europe* 38 (2011): 1–22. She ends the article establishing that “the rock/punk scene in Yugoslavia was more often

Gregor Tomc tackled the controversies of the emerging punk music in Slovenia in the concluding part of his *Profano – Kultura v modernem svetu*.¹²⁵² And to round things up, two resounding biographies on the leaders of the cult group Ekatarina Velika: *Magi – kao da je bilo nekad* about Margita Stefanović by the already mentioned Vesić,¹²⁵³ and *Mesto u mećavi* by Aleksandar Žikić about Milan Mladenović.¹²⁵⁴

In shops or online, you can find countless compilations of music from the 1980s¹²⁵⁵ or cult movies from that time – they are also often screened in various retrospectives on national and private TV channels with two Croatian channels in the lead. On their website its editors claim that the Klasik TV has the ambition of opening “a meeting place of regional films” and enabling the young generation to see and the older generation to remember many legendary and anthological cinematic works. Jugoton TV, on the other hand, promotes itself as the “national music television that shows music clips from the past times,” predominately from the *golden era* of Yugoslav popular and alternative music – the 1980s. Sports channels of post-Yugoslav countries every so often play *Zlatni momenti YU sporta* – a show on the golden moments of YU sport that systematically cultivates memories on the successes of Yugoslav athletes and which, again, are dominated by those of the 1980s (awards for basketball, water polo, and handball national teams; club accomplishments, the first major wins by Alpine and Nordic skiers, etc.). Slovenian commercial radio stations (Radio Ekspres, Radio City, etc.) have regular shows with symptomatic titles *à la Relive the '80s* or *The '80s at 8*. All of these programmes and shows

than not acting as a corrective, a critical and intelligent observer of social realities, assuming a progressive and critical role even during the last years of emerging violence and nationalist madness” (15).

1252 Gregor Tomc, *Profano – Kultura u modernem svetu* (Ljubljana: Krt – Študentska organizacija UL, 1994).

1253 Dušan Vesić, *Magi – kao da je bilo nekad* (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2018).

1254 Aleksandar Žikić, *Mesto u mećavi* (Belgrade: Matica srpska, 1999).

1255 See, for instance, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4pZDB5WL_k (accessed 29 January 2020).

are narrated in neutral language, with no special valuations: they are only interested in films, documentaries, music, and sport as such.

Somewhat less of the 1980s can be found in feature films and TV shows than in popular music. The era is also portrayed with less enthusiasm, is less carnival-like. Only symbolically does Tito's death on 4 May 1980 coincide with the suicide of the protagonist in Andrej Košak's film *Outsider* (1997) and with the birth of the protagonist in Srđan Dragojević's Serbian film *Rane* (Wounds, 1998). In the notorious film *Lepa sela lepo gore* (Pretty Village, Pretty Flame, 1996) by the same director, the Bosnian war from the first half of the 1990s is interrupted by flashbacks from the innocent 1980s, when the two protagonists – a Bosniak and a Bosnian Serb – were inseparable friends and companions. The dialogues always contain an implicit and/or an explicit criticism of the Yugoslav socialist decades, also the one just passed, the 1980s: the bloody 1990s now settle the bill for the leisurely past, for every lie and delusion *of that regime*, for the comfortable life, and its unpaid credit. In 2006, Rajko Grlić directed the blockbuster *Karaula* (The Border-Post), in which he upgraded the content of the comic novel by the writer and screenwriter Ante Tomić.¹²⁵⁶ In a combination of Schweik and sarcastic *Yugoslav-army humor*, the story charmingly portrays relationships of love and friendship, and the military hierarchy in the microcosmos of a border-post and the near-by town at the border between Yugoslavia and Albania in the late 1980s. A similarly witty tone is found in the Croatian family TV show, *Crno-bijeli svijet* (Black & White World),¹²⁵⁷ by Goran Kulenović, which has run three seasons since 2015 and the fourth is in the making. Here, too, the narrower environment (two Zagreb families in the early 1980s) is inextricably connected to what is happening in the wider, multi-ethnic, and socialist country, while the authentic backdrop is sketched by constant references to the music of the period (especially New Wave) and its protagonists. The 2016 *ZG80* Croatian

1256 Ante Tomić, *Ništa nas ne smije iznenaditi* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2003).

1257 It took the title of a famous song by Prljavo kazalište from 1980.

action comedy (directed by Igor Šeregi) shows the rivalry between two sports fan groups, the Bad Blue Boys (rooting for the Zagreb football team, Dinamo) and the Delije (rooting for the Belgrade team, Crvena Zvezda), in the circumstances of late 1980s that were already tainted with nationalism.

On the other side, many quality documentaries were made, especially in the vibrant alternative culture and the music of the time. The first that comes to my mind is the *Sretno dijete* (Happy Child)¹²⁵⁸ rockumentary by Croatian director and writer Igor Mirković, whose autobiographical approach employs interviews with the artists and shows original clips from the time to present the prolific Yugoslav punk and New Wave scene on the Ljubljana–Belgrade–Sarajevo–Zagreb axis.¹²⁵⁹ In 2006, director Igor Zupe made a documentary about the band Pankrti, and in 2018 on Laibach. The documentary series *Borderline Soundtrack* by Belgrade director and screenwriter Brankica Drašković (2018) makes an in-depth and multifaceted analysis of how the music generation of the 1980s rebelled against the wars of the 1990s.¹²⁶⁰ In an entirely different direction, away from Yugoslavia, is the documentary *Nekoč je bila dežela pridnih* (There Once Was a Land of Hardworking People, 2012) by the young Slovenian director Urša Menart. Sadly, it merely presents the period between 1977 and 1991 uncritically: it shows *the independence of Slovenia* as a successful marketing project helped also by popular and alternative cultures. Both word and image are given to the winners of the transition, leaving out completely its painful and dark sides.

1258 This is also the title of a song by Prljavo kazalište from 1979.

1259 Almost simultaneously, he also published a book with the same title.

1260 According to the author, “The series has no pretensions to impose any framework of a nostalgic journey through the lost spirit of the time, but critically questions the sociological aspect of the music’s connection with political processes, as well as its emancipatory potential in developing critical awareness” (<https://zurnal.info/novost/21970/sloboda-se-mora-neprestano-osvajati>, accessed 5 February 2020).

The cultural virus of the 1980s has also migrated online. The internet is full of Facebook events, webpages, once-popular blogs, chat rooms, and everything that enables digital networking and fetishizes the late-Yugoslav *belle époque*. One of the more typical is the Facebook group “Osamdesete u Zagrebu” (The 1980s in Zagreb), which has brought together around 35,000 members since 2014; its posts mostly focus on topics such as music, fashion, sports, design, popular books and magazines, and everyday life.¹²⁶¹ Furthermore, such an exclusively positive valuation of the 1980s was gradually adapted as profitable by the commercial sector. The nostalgic entrepreneurs know well: nostalgia sells! Supermarket chains, even those owned by foreigners, organize various weeks of *nostalgic shopping*, in which they offer products of the surviving former Yugoslav giants – from Bajadera chocolates to the obligatory Cockta. A global bloom of retro culture brings topical retro parties – among which the ‘80s-flavoured ones are the most popular – to *the region*, which is the neutral metonym for Yugoslavia after 1991.¹²⁶² Hipsters here are like their worldwide contemporaries obsessed with this decade, which can either be shown through a vintage look or Normcore fashion, with Vaporwave, which also recycles the 1980s, as the musical background. Fashion otherwise constantly repeats creative jumps to the past, usually to the eccentric 1980s with their wide padded shoulders, large collars, limit of three basic colors, and wild Punkoid hair.

The situation is similar in design; there is excitement over the computer aesthetics of Atari and Commodore computer times, the cute basic graphics of the first computer games, the *plastic-fantastic* decorations or the Crass font. Yugo-nostalgic tourism follows this trend, too, although its main focus goes even further back than the 1980s (e.g. to famous Partisan battle sites). In Sarajevo, on the other hand, the

1261 <https://www.facebook.com/groups/zagreb80s/> See also <https://www.facebook.com/vesele80/> (accessed 1 February 2020).

1262 See, for instance, an advertisement for fun costumes from the 1980s: <https://partypops.hr/proizvodi/kostimi-i-dodaci/tematske-maskare/osamdesete/> (accessed 1 February 2020).

successful Winter Olympics has been the motor of promotion ever since 1984, in a museum as well as in popular and consumer culture (its mascot, Vučko, can be found practically everywhere). To resume: in nostalgic simulacra, there is a dominance of reveries from pop culture, sports, love, or everyday life in the *paradise lost*. They are just as powerful as political ones about the *hell on Earth* pursued by anti-nostalgics. To summarize both with the well-known Faulkner maxim: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

The further we are from the 1980s, the more we get symposia, exhibitions, retrospectives, conferences, overviews, catalogues and the like about them. In his research opus spanning different decades, one of the most prominent experts on Yugoslav – and, more specifically, Serbian – fine arts and curator Ješa Denegri also expanded on the 1980s in his work *Osamdesete: Teme srpske umetnosti, 1980–1990* (*Eighties: Topics of the Serbian Art, 1980–1990*).¹²⁶³ Slovenian journalist and publicist David Tasić has done valuable work in collecting Slovenian subcultural and political graffiti from the 1980s but has sadly done so without any accompanying research.¹²⁶⁴ In 2016 and 2017, the Ljubljana Museum of Modern Art carried out an ambitious three-part project *Osemdeseta skozi prizmo dogodkov, razstav in diskurzov* (*Eighties Through the Prism of Events, Exhibitions and Discourses*), looking at the 1980s through the prism of events, exhibitions, and discourses. Its curators wrote: “In the 1980s, every foundation of our contemporaneity and the current relationships between the state and global capital, politics, ethics, economy, and art were formed.”¹²⁶⁵ The third part, *Dediščina leta 1989. Študijski primer: druga razstava Jugoslovanski dokumenti* (*Legacy of the 1989. Case Study: The Second Exhibition Yugoslav Documents*), was dedicated to the last group exhibition of

1263 Ješa Denegri, *Osamdesete: Teme srpske umetnosti, 1980–1990* (Novi Sad: Biblioteka Svetovi, 1997).

1264 David Tasić, *Grafiti* (Ljubljana: Založba Karantanija, 1992).

1265 Zdenka Badovinac, Bojana Piškur, and Igor Španjol, “Editorial,” in *Osemdeseta* (Ljubljana: Moderna galerija, 21 April 2017), 3.

Yugoslav artists gathered in Sarajevo in 1989, including combined original works, front pages of daily journals of the time, art installations, discussions, archives of the event, and workshops.

Much wider in its contents – and much more appealing commercially – was the 2015 Zagreb exhibition *Osam-de-se-te! – Slatka dekandencija postmoderne (Eigh-ti-es! – The Sweet Decadence of the Postmodernity)*, which topically also covered popular culture, fashion, music, theatre, sports, comics, etc.¹²⁶⁶ The same year Sarajevo sent to Belgrade and Ljubljana a much-visited ethnographic exhibition *Nikad im nije bilo bolje (Life Was Never Better)*, which gathered exhibits from the everyday Yugoslav life, many of which were from the 1980s. Comparably well-received was a similar exhibition with just as meaningful a title *Živeo život – Međunarodna izložba lepog života od '50-te do '90-te (Long Live Life – International Exhibition of the Good Life from the 1950s to the '90s [in Yugoslavia])* but with one, also meaningful specificity: it was displayed in two completely commercial venues – the Belgrade Robna kuća and the Ljubljana Blagovno trgovinski center. In 2017, the Croatian capital opened what they call “a new type of museum” entitled *Zagreb 80-ih* with hundreds of objects from that decade.¹²⁶⁷ In a unique way, the 1980s in Yugoslavia are also reflected in the exhibition on the then most popular comic book, Alan Ford, which began its path of *brotherhood and unity* towards Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo in Ljubljana’s National Gallery with much success in May 2019.¹²⁶⁸

I will conclude the analytical overview of the portrayals of the Yugoslav 1980s with post-Yugoslav literature and essays. Personal or social happenings, often autobiographical, strongly reflect this

1266 The co-authors of the exhibition and the co-editors of the catalogue are Branko Kostelnik and Feđa Vukić.

1267 <https://www.zagreb80.com> (accessed 1 February 2020).

1268 <https://www.ng-slo.si/si/razstave-in-projekti/razstava/alan-ford-tece-castni-krog?id=4606> (accessed 4 February 2020).

temporal and spatial framework.¹²⁶⁹ Despite their many differences, we can again find certain similarities in them: an implicit fondness of the period despite their critical hesitations and considerations, and dark premonitions of the coming catastrophe. Such vignettes are convincing, for instance, in the melancholy essay “Somrak idolov”,¹²⁷⁰ a prosaic elegy of sorts by poet and essayist Aleš Debeljak, and in *Nedokončane skice neke revolucije*,¹²⁷¹ by poet Brane Mozetič, while author Lejla Kalamujić writes on childhood in the multi-ethnic Sarajevo in *Zovite me Esteban* (Call Me Esteban).¹²⁷² In passing but with great intensity, the 1980s are also addressed in the moving short novel by Darko Cvijetić *Schindlerov lift*¹²⁷³ (the [dis-]continuous narra-

1269 On literary narrativization (and often nostalgization) of remembering Yugoslavia, see the short and lucid studies by Anisa Avdagić (“Narrative Images of the Yugoslav Totality (and Totalitarianism) in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Short Story in the Transition from the 20th to the 21st Century,” in *Balkan Memories – Media Construction of National and Transnational History*, ed. Tanja Zimmermann, 139–146 [Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012]), Davor Beganović (“Reflective and Restorative Nostalgia – Two Types of Approaching Catastrophe in Contemporary Yugoslav Literature,” in *Balkan Memories – Media Construction of National and Transnational History*, ed. Tanja Zimmermann, 147–154 [Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012]), and Alma Denić-Grabić (“The Narrativization of Memories – Trauma and Nostalgia in the Novels *Museum of Unconditional Surrender* by Dubravka Ugrešić and *Frost and Ash* by Jasna Šamić,” in *Balkan Memories – Media Construction of National and Transnational History*, ed. Tanja Zimmermann, 155–162 [Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012]).

1270 Aleš Debeljak, *Somrak idolov* (*Twilight of the Idols: Recollections of a Lost Yugoslavia* – Celovec: Wieser, 1994).

1271 Brane Mozetič, *Nedokončane skice neke revolucije* (*Unfinished Sketches of a Certain Revolution* – Ljubljana: Založba ŠKUC – Lambda, 2013). He describes March 1985 with “all this incomprehensible language of attraction I was never any good at. is the time of the Chernobyl radiation near yet? or the first cracks in the Eastern Bloc? the illusionary victory of capital?” (29).

1272 Lejla Kalamujić, *Zovite me Esteban* (*Call me Esteban* – Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga, 2015).

1273 Darko Cvijetić, *Schindlerov lift* (*Schindler's Elevator* – Sarajevo/Zagreb: Savremena bh. Književnost, 2018).

tion begins with moving into a new block of flats in the 1970s, continues with growing up in the 1980s, turns into a tragedy in the 1990s, and resets itself in the post-apocalypse of the new millennium). This decade is also examined through works that tell family stories in the first person. As two examples, I provide Maja Haderlap's novel on growing up in a profoundly divided everyday life and similarly divided recent history of the Austrian side of Carinthia, *Angel pozabe*,¹²⁷⁴ and illustrator Samira Kentrić's graphic novel *Balkanalije – Odraščanje v času tranzicije*¹²⁷⁵ on just as painful class, ethnic, and gender divisions in Slovenian society then – and now. Both works excel in providing strategies for fighting and overcoming such situations. In his *Bildungsroman*, *Dvori od oraha*,¹²⁷⁶ Miljenko Jergović spins his epic tale of two families chronologically back through the *novecento*, also through the intensive 1980s.

An especially common topic of such literature is a musically-vaccinated adolescence à la Yugoslav – what we could call *sex&drugs&red stars* literature. In his *Sjaj epohe*,¹²⁷⁷ Croatian writer Borivoj Radaković graphically described, early on – right after the sad ending of the 1980s – the profiling of the Punk and New Wave subculture and the subculture of football fans with the simultaneous erosion of the political system: i.e. the tension between the old and the new, the London-like and the Zagreb-like, the rough poetics of the street and the literary

1274 Maja Haderlap, *Angel pozabe* (*Angel of Oblivion* – Maribor: Litera, 2012).

1275 Samira Kentrić, *Balkanalije – Odraščanje v času tranzicije* (*Balkanlies – Growing Up in the Times of Transition* – Ljubljana: Beletrina, 2015).

1276 Miljenko Jergović, *Dvori od oraha* (*The Walnut Mansion* – Zagreb: Durieux, 2003).

1277 Borivoj Radaković, *Sjaj epohe* (*Splendor of an Era* – Zagreb: Mladost, 1990). The apocalyptic future is foretold in the prophetic paragraph on page 254: 'Horrible times are coming to the Balkans, the people are quarreling, the people are taking to the streets, the ulcer is about to burst. He will be alone because he has no one to lean on and will have nowhere to hide. The stampede will rumble, people will be slaughtered, a terrible comma will dangle a sickle over his neck.'

classics. *Kad su padali zidovi*,¹²⁷⁸ a novel by Kristijan Vujičić, paints Zagreb in the rhythm of rock'n'roll and first loves, in the time when old ideologies and systems were fading out and new ones began smoldering. In the newest short novel by Nenad Rizvanović, *Longplej*,¹²⁷⁹ everything is centered around music and youth, this time from a Slavonian perspective. *Šjetva soli*, by Bosnian writer Muharem Bazdulj, is a novelistic adaptation of the infamous *Nazi affair* that happened towards the end of 1986 in Sarajevo and resounded across the entire federation.¹²⁸⁰ The end of the 1980s is also the subject of a new novel by the Slovenian writer and university professor Andrej Blatnik entitled *Trg osvoboditve*.¹²⁸¹ Zagreb in the 1980s is also the chronotope of Ratko Cvetnić's substantial novel *Polusan*,¹²⁸² in which the eve of a coming catastrophe intertwines the personal fate of the protagonist with the (sub-)cultural, musical, and political context of late socialism. Similarly inert as the main character of this last novel, yet not ironical to its environment, is the protagonist of the award-winning novel *V Elvisovi sobi*¹²⁸³ by Sebastijan Pregelj. Consequently, the book lacks the needed distance towards the mainstream interpretation of recent Slovenian history, which only detects the symptoms of Yugoslavia disintegrating without critically questioning them.

In her collection of essays *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*, which were first published abroad in the early 1990s due to the media lynching she received at home, Slavenka Drakulić sketches the image of socialist countries – also Yugoslavia and also in the 1980s

1278 Kristijan Vujičić, *Kad su padali zidovi* (*When the Walls Fell* – Zagreb: Fraktura, 2019).

1279 Nenad Rizvanović, *Longplej* (*Long Play* – Zagreb: Buybook, 2020).

1280 Muharem Bazdulj, *Šjetva soli* (*Sowing Salt* – Belgrade: Rende, 2010).

1281 Andrej Blatnik, *Trg Osvoboditve* (*Square of Liberation* – Novo mesto: Goga, 2021).

1282 Ratko Cvetnić, *Polusan* (*Half Asleep* – Zagreb: Mozaik knjiga, 2009).

1283 Sebastijan Pregelj, *V Elvisovi sobi* (*In Elvis' Room* – Novo mesto: Goga, 2019).

– in the exact way as the then-triumphal West pictured them.¹²⁸⁴ With all genuine respect to the author and the feminist perspective she also uses here, the book is full of unbearable generalizations and exaggerations (as if all those decades were always the same everywhere in the socialist world and contained no differences), as well as self-denigrating essentialism of the East and the Balkans (as if certain phenomena are only possible there).¹²⁸⁵ If such a renowned and otherwise critical author was able to make a bestseller with such messages, I cannot be surprised at other interpretations of the socialist decades, including the Yugoslav 1980s, that are full of radical hate. On the other side, Dubravka Ugrešić's essayistic novel *Ministarstvo boli* (The Ministry of Pain)¹²⁸⁶ vividly describes the painful immigrant experience of Yugoslav refugees; on the one hand, it is intersected with nostalgic escapades in the *better yesterday*, on the other, by the persistent attempts of social, professional, personal, and emotional reconstruction in the diaspora.

Authors who write on the 1980s often use a satirical strategy in their narrations, known in literary criticism as *roman-à-clef*: fictitious renderings of actual events and persons. This is also present in essayistic works: humour is abundant in *Historijska čitanka 1*, by Miljenko Jergović, who makes a narrative arch over what he estimates to be relevant popular and everyday culture of "his" Yugoslavia, beginning with the memories of reading Sarajevo's *Oslobođenje* newspaper and ending with the first *sarma* dish of the new year.¹²⁸⁷ A similar principle guided the editors and writers of *Leksikon Yu mitologije* (Lexicon

1284 Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (London: Hutchinson, 1992). To be clear, it was written on the direct request of an American journal.

1285 Sadly, this is a tried and an extremely similar recipe to the one recently used with great success by Marina Abramović.

1286 Dubravka Ugrešić, *Ministarstvo boli* (*The Ministry of Pain* – Belgrade: Fabrika knjiga, 2004).

1287 Miljenko Jergović, *Historijska čitanka 1* (*History Textbook No. 1* – Zagreb: V.B.Z., 2006). He likes to use the Yugoslav 1980s also in some of his other works.

of Yugoslav Mythology), which originated in the finding that “there are no articulated notions of Yugoslav popular culture that would help define our identities.”¹²⁸⁸ In both cases, the selection of entries and emphases is from the 1980s, which is reflected also by the ages of the authors. In his *Hardfuckers* series, Slovenian comic book writer Zoran Smiljanić (alias Vittorio de la Croce)¹²⁸⁹ offers a piercing criticism of the disintegrating former political system and of the emerging new one – both share the alienation and the perversion of the authorities and, on the other hand, the strategies of survival of the common people. In the grotesque bestselling satire *E baš vam hvala* (Eh, Thank you very much) tellingly subtitled *Smrt bandi – Sloboda Jugoslaviji* (Death to the Gang – Freedom to Yugoslavia) by Marko Vidojković, SFR Yugoslavia goes through unforeseen technological and social development due to the simple fact that in 1989 a plane crash killed the entire Yugoslav presidency and the president of every republic.¹²⁹⁰ It is interesting, that the literary field also lacks any strikingly negative reflections on the 1980s. Even the undoubtedly ethno-nationalistically tuned, but still subtle and funny – therefore even more dangerous – book of memories *Fajront u Sarajevu* by Dr. Nele Karajić, cannot deny the generally pleasant image of the 1980s, the New Primitivism movement, the band Zabranjeno pušenje, and the popular TV show *Top lista nadrealista* (The Top List of Surrealists). He summarizes them with “This was the beginning of the end to a fairytale.”¹²⁹¹

1288 Edited by Iris Adrić, Vladimir Arsenijević, and Đode Matić, *Leksikon Yu mitologije* (Belgrade: Rende / Zagreb, Postscriptum, 2004), 4.

1289 Zoran Smiljanić, *Hardfuckers* (Ljubljana: BUCH, 2011).

1290 Marko Vidojković, *E baš vam hvala. Smrt bandi – Sloboda Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Laguna, 2017). The author described his position with the words “I would not say that I do not cultivate sympathy for Yugoslavia; I’m just realistic” (<https://www.dw.com/bs/e-baš-vam-hvala-novi-način-jugonostalgije/a-41595634-0>, accessed 26 January 2020).

1291 Nele Karajić, *Fajront u Sarajevu* (*Closing time in Sarajevo* – Belgrade: Laguna, Novosti, 2014), 103.

III

*In every defeat, I saw a part of freedom,
And when I'm done, that's when it really begins ...*

—EKATARINA VELIKA¹²⁹²

What connects this colorful cultural and artistic universe of the retrospective representation of the lively Yugoslav 1980s? I can already hear the exclamations (and screams!) that there are too many differences for any common points to be made. And even more criticism on the account of not including this or that work or author in my selection. The topic is indeed almost too unwieldy and would merit a wider research, an independent monograph or even more. Nevertheless, I am certain that the works and artists listed can produce some recognizable characteristics.

I will begin on a fairly wide level. The cultural and artistic trips to the 1980s (in literature, cinema, arts, fashion, music, or design) are not limited to post-Yugoslav or post-socialist reality; they are not another *East-European curiosity*, if I repeat the ready-made platitude of the transition victors. The magnetism of the *Iconic eighties!* is a part of a global *retromania trend*, as defined by the cultural critic Simon Reynolds.¹²⁹³ In the re-decades after the 1980s, every one of these fields has seen things reproduced, re-cycled, re-vitalized, re-habilitated, re-vised, and so on and so forth: “re-” has become the magical prefix. *Comebacks* are becoming a motor not a brake, a rule not an exception! Suddenly, the 1980s have become the closest cultural, aesthetic, and artistic inspiration, worthy of being re-used in completely changed circumstances after the *end of history* (the post-war situation, the internet revolution, the growing divide between the North and the South, new class divisions, the global co-dependency on various fields, the triumphs of neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism, ecological challenges, etc.).

1292 “Zemlja” from Ekatarina Velika’s album *Ljubav* (1987).

1293 Simon Reynolds, *Retromania – Pop Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2011). See also Elizabeth Guffey, *Retro – The Culture of Revival* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006).

Secondly, in part, these cultural representations can also be explained with the history of the 1980s itself; with the specific situation in which socialist Yugoslavia found itself. Economically and politically, it began declining early on in the decade. As a consequence, friction and then open conflict between ethnic groups became harder to conceal and even harder to control. From a “top-down” perspective, Yugoslavia was sinking – this was becoming more and more clear. On the other hand, the same decade was marked by *a creative explosion within the cultural and artistic fields*, unlike any before or after, which happened on various levels and in different areas: from alternative and “high” art to everyday cultures. The culturally *liberal eighties* came after the politically *lead seventies* and before the war-stained nineties. The cultural renaissance was building Yugoslavia from the “bottom-up,” not in the sense of the state-ordered and organized politics of *brotherhood and unity* or even the unitarian desire for a single, directed *Yugoslav culture*, but horizontally, through popular culture, subcultures, tourism, civil society initiatives, identity politics, etc. The most propulsive and the most widespread culture of the 1980s was in its essence transnational, spontaneously pan-Yugoslav: it has shaped the generation as much as the generation shaped it. At the same time, it spread well over its state boundaries, undoubtedly becoming a part of the global pop and alternative cultural scene.

The reflections on the 1980s today show how the generations then switched the heroes of times past with the protagonists of rock ‘n’ roll bands, comic books, student revolutions, or pulp fiction; how *Serbo-Croatian* language was adopted with no nationalist sentiments, purely technically, to be a certain Yugoslav Esperanto. These works suggest that without any pre-planning, the young people of the 1980s built their own, new Yugoslav cultural identity through distancing themselves from the previous Yugoslav past: as the *newest Yugoslavia* in a cultural sense, since to them, the AVNOJ *new Yugoslavia* was already old, *passé*, it had collapsed into itself. I draw a daring parallel with Weimar Germany or the post-October Soviet Union: two environments, torn apart by political shocks and an economic crash on the one hand, and by

artistic and cultural climaxes on the other. The newest – and the last – Yugoslav culture formed while its institutional framework was being brought down; the culture was Yugoslavia's swan song, a certain decadent reaction to the collapse.¹²⁹⁴ I believe this contradiction bears an important influence – it would be too radical to say that it determines – today's cultural reflection on the Yugoslav eighties.

The third common characteristic of the cultural reflection on the 1980s: literary historian and Czech language expert Petra James (2020) finds that today's Central European literary representations of the socialist past are located *between trauma and nostalgia* as two extremes of the same process: mourning. I can say the same for post-Yugoslav representations of various fields of art and culture. Nostalgia – this sentimental and auratic companion to retro,¹²⁹⁵ which either passively contemplates the story from the 1980s that is closed in on itself, is intimate, or commodifies it, instrumentalizes it, uses it for a purpose – is inextricably connected to a painful end, a goodbye, a collapse. In the cultural reflections on the 1980s, we can quickly find a narrative juxtaposition: on the one hand, there is the Dionysiac nature of the 1980s and on the other hand, the bloody collapse of the 1990s. On the one hand, reserved pride and a critical knowing that a different world is not merely possible but was also realized; on the other, a blunt sadness, even bitterness at the fact that it has all passed (that these works are transformed either into gallows humor, disappointed melancholy, or cynicism). To paraphrase both: on the one hand, I read, hear, or see in these works a *hard desire to endure*, while on the other, there is a macabre twilight *before the rain*.¹²⁹⁶ The later catastro-

1294 Kolanović found a perfect expression for these last Yugoslav years: “decadent socialism” (“Back to the Future of (Post)Socialism,” 166).

1295 The discussion about the relationship between retro and nostalgia is broad. At this point I would give my brief definition that retro is nostalgic in content, but without sentimental charge – so, unlike nostalgia, it is emotionally cold, rational, instrumental, and often ironic.

1296 I am thinking of two titles: Paul Éluard's poetry collection *Le dur désir de durer* (1946) and the renowned Macedonian film by Milcho Manchevski *Before the Rain* (1994).

phe could not leave the cultural reflection on the past decade intact, inert. Quite the opposite: it also – or mainly – broke it. In these works, trauma and nostalgia coexist in conflict, which can be explained with the concept of meta-modernism’s oscillations¹²⁹⁷: these works do not bring the two sentiments together but leave them autonomous, they are stretched between them, are nostalgic and at the same time (not or!) traumatic, playful, and fatalistic.

I can compare the post-Yugoslav cultural and artistic revision of the 1980s with the revisions of another former traumatized and yet nostalgic decade: WW2 (especially its brother-against-brother perspective) and the brutal post-war way of dealing with political and ideological opposition (the quislings, the various *class enemies*, the Inform-biro members, non-conformists, etc.). In Yugoslavia itself, not just in emigration, the 1980s have publicly revealed the reverse side of the Yugoslav *People’s Liberation Struggle* (the original acronym is NOB) and the construction of socialism that had previously been immaculate. Many works on this topic were written and presented: (auto-)biographical books on the suffering on Goli Otok or on bitter events of the war,¹²⁹⁸ theatre plays,¹²⁹⁹ and films.¹³⁰⁰ This lateness is not due to a lack of reflection on these taboo topics by the artists, but to a more

1297 Timotheus Vermeulen, and Robin Van den Akker, “Notes on Metamodernism,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Culture*, no. 2 (2010).

1298 Allow me to only mention the infamous novel by Vuk Drašković, *Nož*, which has been published numerous times in various publishing houses since its first edition in 1982.

1299 E.g. the award-winning 1983 play, *Golubnjača*, by the Dalmatian-Serbian writer and playwright and later also politician Jovan Radulović.

1300 E.g. *Na svidenje v naslednji vojni* (See You in the Next War; directed by Živojin Pavlović, 1980); *Rdeči boogie ali Kaj ti je deklica* (Red Boogie; directed by Karpo Godina, 1982), *Moj ata, socialistični kulak* (My Dad, the Socialist Kulak; directed by Matjaž Klopčič, 1987), and, finally, *Glavi barut* (Silent Gunpowder; directed by Bahrudin Čengi, 1990).

open political and social climate that enabled it. These topics were forbidden to touch until the 1980s.¹³⁰¹

Furthermore, in the cultural reflection on the 1980s, *geographical and temporal identity overlap*, spatiality overlaps temporality. There are innumerable stories and images of growing up, of personal, social, and cultural “growth,” of temporal transitions, but with an important addition: a complete and infamous break. The geography and the temporality of loss coincide: the space-time is diametrically divided into before and after 1991, and into being in Yugoslavia and not. The double chronological narration – personal/social and the wider, political/historical – flows up until the moment when it is radically cut. The naïve childhood faith and the expectance of youth when everything seems to be possible, that the best is yet to come, are brusquely interrupted. “In the eighties, there was a future, or at least its vision,” writes Croatian writer and journalist Maja Hrgović,¹³⁰² and if this is apparent anywhere, it is in also the works on this decade. In their creative way – through personal story, as a rule – the authors reconstruct the decade situated just before the transition “from socialism to feudalism,” as anthropologist Katherine Verdery pins down the essence of the transition with precise sarcasm.¹³⁰³

Fifthly, the 1980s are often cursorily understood *en bloc*, as a unified period. Yet a lot of the mentioned works explicitly or implicitly divide them into a first and second half – we therefore have the “*double eighties*.” In the first, happier part, the plot deals with the sprouting of new subcultures, music, civil society, new lifestyles, first loves, leisurely everyday life, and, yes, consumerism. The narration of the second part is more sober and bitter: the economic and political crises

1301 In 1952, the authorities excluded Edvard Kocbek from public and political life for writing *Strah in pogum* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1951), a collection of novellas focused on these topics.

1302 <https://www.novelist.hr/vijesti/Hrvatska/80-e-su-jos-bile-godine-kad-je-jos-postojala-buducnost/> (accessed 4 August 2020).

1303 Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

increasingly influence the protagonists; we feel mistrust towards everything that had so far been considered self-evident; socialist idols fall; nationalism grows. The heroes of the stories are written in the same vein: if the first part of the decade mostly saw young people who expected a better future with more freedom and opportunities, the narrations of the second half of the 1980s focuses rather on the small crooks, described with a plethora of succulent expressions from *mutivoda* (swindler), *hohštapler* (impostor), smuggler, *kruhoborec* (bread-winner), or *lumpenproletariat*, all with the ideology of cutting corners and the everyday practice of being resourceful. The optimism of the early decade is replaced not only by sobering up, but also by depression and the repression of the later part. We put the two together and – *voilà* – there is the often a bittersweet image of the eighties.

Just like the 1980s must be diversified and perceived with inherent differences, so must its cultural reflections be diversified as they developed into the following decades. In other words, *the subsequent decades produced different images of the eighties*. In her analysis of post-Yugoslav Croatian literature, Kolanović¹³⁰⁴ effectively refers to the three phases of cultural remembering of socialism defined by film and media theorist Temenuga Trifonova, upgrading them with a fourth. The beginning of the 1990s is marked by revisionism and the aggressive rejection of socialism; after 2000, there is a period of bittersweet nostalgia, both the sentimental and the consumerist kind; in the 2010s, when socialism seems a far-away historical curiosity, books are written, films and TV shows produced, music recorded, exhibitions held, etc. on the various (dis-)functionalities of the everyday life, popular culture, art, design, etc. of the time. Kolanović sees the fourth phase of cultural remembering of Yugoslav socialism in the discovery (however slowly) of its revolutionary and emancipative political potential, which first appears at the creative edges of the “desert

1304 Kolanović, “Back to the Future of (Post)Socialism,” 2018.

of post-socialism”¹³⁰⁵: in radical art, cultural alternatives, worker and student revolts, various non-conformist lifestyles and aesthetic practices, growing new subcultures and progressive sub-politics.

The seventh common denominator of cultural perspectives of the 1980s is the symptomatic fact that the majority of current artistic and cultural production on the 1980s was done by *the last Yugoslav generation*, the one that lived through its cultural blossoming and political disintegration. These people were then children or young adults, the generations born somewhere between the late ‘50s and the early ‘70s,¹³⁰⁶ who lived in Yugoslavia through their *donkey years* (tough teens), to borrow the title of Ćopić’s young-adult novel. The non-compulsory end of Yugoslavia coincided with the compulsory end of their adolescence/childhood – quite literally *goodbye teens*, as sung by Plavi orkestar. The cultural and artistic reflection on the 1980s is largely connected to this age cohort; I could even talk about a special, trans-realist genre of this generation. In their literature, music, painting, cinema, etc., (auto)biographical bits can easily be found even in what defines fiction. As a rule, the personal destinies of the authors are, as much as the fates of their heroes, connected to the wider situation, the state and society that were in rapid decline at the time. Microlevel personal dramas coincide with macrolevel historic dramas, and the authors process this through art and into art. They do not feature as heroes in the *Great History*, but neither are they victims. A significant number of those cathartic narrative projections back give another, practically conclusive dimension to these creative pursuits.

I do not perceive these authors as the *lost generation* – as those from the recent art past are known: politically resigned yet artistically much

1305 As goes the title of the Srećko Horvat and Igor Štikš’ volume (*Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism – Radical Politics after Yugoslavia* [London: Verso, 2015]).

1306 Speaking generally, those generations between the after WW II baby-boomers (generation *pedeset i neke, born in 1950s*, as mentioned in Balašević’s well-known song) and the millennials (or Generation Y, the first generation of the internet revolution, who know more about the dissolution of Yugoslavia than Yugoslavia itself).

more active. Much less to I treat them as the *hero generation* that would lay down ideological and aesthetical canons on the era and then jealously guard them. I believe the exact opposite applies: despite their expressive heterogeneity, their works are, on the one hand, permeated by a more than obvious shock of lost illusions and the consequences of the dissolution, i.e. the previously-mentioned state between nostalgia and trauma. On the other hand, their works are permeated by the *personal and common construction of resistance to what exists*. Their “exclusive individuality” (to employ a term coined by sociologist Niklas Luhmann) – that was shaped first in the 1980s and then in the 1990s – hides a seed of revolt. Growing up, they revolted against the worn-out but still repressive Yugoslav socialism, while later, as adults, against the newly formed, but again repressive, suffocating post-Yugoslav nationalism and neoliberalism. They have designed their revolt in their own fashion: they are breaking the closed spaces of ethno-nationalist revanchism and neoliberal triumphalism with the non-conformity of (post-Yugoslav) internationalism.¹³⁰⁷ This is more than obvious from their *prose/poetry/music/images in jeans* as opposed to the neo-traditional turn in the culturally autarkic 1990s (and later), which is symbolized by such traditional garments as the *opanak* (traditional Balkan peasant shoe), *šajkača* (Serbian national cap), *avba* (Alpine-style mobcap), *dirndl* (Alpine-style female dress), *kićanka* (Lika-style cap), *fes* (traditional Muslim cap), and their turbofolk derivations. This fact was also pointed out by the expert on contemporary Balkans, Tim Judah,¹³⁰⁸ who coined the term “Yugosphere” to explain the re-connection of the former Yugoslav space, predominately in the cultural, artistic, and social arenas, slowly followed by economic and political arenas. These authors are to be given credit for the survival of the post-Yugoslav cultural space from its former Yugoslav political space.

1307 For more on the emancipatory potential of cultural remembering inside and outside retro-utopian frameworks, see Boris Buden, *Cona prehoda – O koncu postkomunizma* (Ljubljana: Založba Krtina, 2014), 155–170.

1308 Tim Judah, *Yugoslavia is Dead: Long Live the Yugosphere* (London: LSE – Research on South Eastern Europe, 2009).

This is why it is not enough to say that these authors are merely (re-)constructing the complexity and the intricacy of the decade, that they are only stuck there. Even less to say that they resonate with the eighties and paint it through rose-colored glasses; and much less that they adopt the aftermath intelligence of the *generals after the battle*, the prophetic moralizing and smart-assing on how *they had already foreseen it*. They are close enough to the period not to forget and far enough away for critical consideration. In my opinion, the primary wider social achievement – and therefore its immanent political relevance – of such pursuits is a revolt against the omnipresent historical revisionism that “outlined our historical memory and our political horizon”¹³⁰⁹; a revolt against anti-communism and anti-Yugoslavism that are the hard revanchist cores of the victorious neoliberalism and ethno-nationalism as new total state ideologies. A revolt against the historical amnesia and repression of the past, a revolt against exclusion from social life, against new injustice, against conservative regression, against anti-intellectualism, and against “repressive infantilization”¹³¹⁰ in the successor states. A revolt against their gradual yet determined slide towards an illiberal or reactionary democracy.

In their cultural reflections on the 1980s, a great majority of authors neither ride the ever-present nostalgic wave nor exploit the commodification of trauma, which is what their critics often claim. No, their position both then and now is one of active co-creation, participation, fellow traveling, witnessing to their time; young then and artists now, but in both cases implicit or even explicit critics of the past and present situation. The past haunts them in the same way as it inspires them: they are breaking the pop-cultural imperative ‘*80s forever!*’ with a creative skepticism, with ‘*80s forever?*’ Under the burden of later history, they identify with loss, yet they do not end in mourning but in emancipation. Encouraged with this bittersweet, pleasant, and simultaneously difficult experience, they are looking forward, proposing new

1309 Mastnak, *Liberalizem, fašizem, neoliberalizem*, 75

1310 Buden, *Cona prehoda*, 36.

beginnings. This is not only apparent from their work but also in their current engagements that go beyond art and towards “activism”: many of the people mentioned are important public personalities, activists, journalists, opinion-makers; some are engaged in direct political confrontations. Dević rightfully emphasizes that it was the creators from this last Yugoslav generation – then young freelancers outside any art or academic institutions – that massively joined the anti-war movements in contrast to many of their senior colleagues established in the institutions in Yugoslav times who became fervent nationalists overnight.¹³¹¹

Finally, I return to Adorno’s dilemma on writing poetry after atrocities (quoted at the beginning of the second section of this chapter). American objectivist poet Charles Reznikoff offered an answer I was able to recognize in the majority of the cultural reflections and artistic representations of the 1980s that I analyzed: they are “doing what the artist has always done and finding the appropriate technical means” for it.¹³¹² Critical depictions, questioning verbalizations and multi-perspective cinematic and musical recordings of the recently existing multi-ethnic coexistence, of a fairer society, autochthonous anti-fascism, concrete realized utopias, the emancipation of weaker groups, working sociality – these are not merely cultural inspirations, creative ideas, aesthetic preferences or artistic fictions, but also the seeds of social dissent, emancipatory calls for action, oppositional warnings, political slaps to the ideological constructions and political practices in power today. The cultural and artistic reflections on the Yugoslav eighties offer a politically relevant otherness to the (non-)working post-Yugoslav situation of today; they claim that if an alternative existed then – inside and outside the state framework – it does so also now.

Translated by Sonja Benčina

1311 Dević, “Ethnonationalism, Politics, and the Intellectuals,” 402.

1312 <https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/jan/11/poetry-after-auschwitz> (accessed on 26 September 2020).

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to Reading Historical Sources) (2019) *Ljudi, događaji i knjige* (People, Events and Books) (2003), *Između anarhije i autokratije, srpsko društvo na prelazu vekova 19–20. vek* (Between Anarchy and Autocracy, Serbian Society at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries) (2006), *Zemlja, ljudi i knjige. Studije, zapisi, ogledi* (Country, People and Books. Studies, Records, Essays) (2020).

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She is the President of the Assembly and founding member of the Foreign Policy Forum (2021). She was the official candidate of the Republic of Croatia for the position of the UN Secretary General (2016), as well as Minister of Foreign and European Affairs and the first Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia (2011–2016). She was elected for six terms as a member of the Croatian Parliament (2000; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015; 2016). She served as President of the National

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NAMES INDEX

A

Abadžiev Georgi 725
 Aceva Vera 727, 728, 735
 Aćin Zdenka 756
 Adorno Theodor 613, 951, 979
 Adžić Blagoje 114
 Ajanović Midhat 591
 Ajtić Predrag 368
 Albahari David 877, 881
 Aleksić Branko 888
 Aleksiev Aleksandar 731
 Alić Sead 560
 Alimpić Dušan 215
 Aljinović Rudi 588
 Anderson David 220
 Andonov Metodija 723, 724
 Andreevski Petre 726
 Andrić Ivo 82, 83, 712, 717
 Andrić Mato 715
 Andropov Yuri 474
 Angeli Radovani Kosta 857
 Antevski Vasil 729
 Antić Ana 915
 Antonijević Nebojša 647
 Apih Jure 760
 Arato Andrew 669
 Arent Hana (Arendt Hannah) 31
 Arsovski Mihajlo 593, 623
 Arzenšek Vladimir 517
 Atanasijević Ksenija 83
 Athenagoras I, the Patriarch of
 Constantinople 813
 Avdić Damir 957
 Avramović Dragoslav 413

B

Babić Jasna 550, 551, 565
 Babović Spasenija 728
 Babun Mladen 606

Bach Johann Sebastian 883
 Bačić Hrvoje 251
 Badinter Robert 246, 271
 Badovinac Tomislav 285, 286, 287, 289,
 305
 Baeuerlein Stjepan 814
 Bajagić Momčilo 636, 641
 Bajić Mrdan 847
 Bajramović Sejdo 177, 189
 Bakalović Rene 602
 Bakarić Vladimir 24, 25, 92, 93, 176
 Baker James 457
 Bakić Vojin 857, 858, 863, 864
 Bakić Zoran 858
 Bakotin Jerko 549, 550, 551, 562
 Balašević Đorđe 637, 638, 860
 Balázs Attila 891
 Bambur Ramiz 376
 Banac Ivo 40, 942
 Banjević Mirko 371
 Bardić Zinka 560
 Basara Svetislav 877, 881
 Bašin Igor 958
 Bavčar Igor 107
 Bazdulj Muharem 967
 Beban Breda 847
 Bebek Željko 626, 630
 Bečić Hrvoje 255
 Bečković Matija 374, 573, 682, 683, 851,
 881, 886, 897, 900, 930
 Bednjanec Ivica 587, 589
 Beker Žarko 588, 596
 Belan Branko 595
 Belan Neno 634
 Bele Boris 653
 Belić Dragan 96
 Bellow Saul 559
 Benda Julien 677
 Benderly Jill 564
 Berčić Vojdrag 586
 Berger Peter 797
 Bernardi Bernard 623
 Bertoša Miroslav 916

- Bešker Ana Marija 463
 Bešlin Milivoj 96, 97
 Beszédés István 891
 Beuve-Mery Hubert 560
 Bijedić Džemal 198, 205
 Bilandžić Dušan 23, 287, 310, 585
 Bilić Jure 310
 Biserko Sonja 553, 569, 570, 571, 679, 883
 Biuković Edvin 600
 Bjelica Slobodan 311
 Blagojević Slobodan 876, 877, 881, 886
 Blatnik Andrej 967
 Blažević Dunja 529
 Blažević Krešo 634
 Boarov Dimitrije 48, 364
 Boca Stefan 818
 Bogdanović Bogdan 39, 82, 584, 677, 857, 861, 864, 865, 880, 900
 Bogdanović Žika 594
 Bogičević Bogić 177, 179, 192, 193
 Bogišić Valtazar 924
 Bogunović Pif 655
 Bojanić Ivo 555
 Bojović Jovan 927
 Bon Branko 863
 Bor Matej 746
 Borštinar Ivan 112
 Bošković Ratko 602
 Bowie David 638
 Božić Vedran 655
 Bozsik Péter 891
 Brajović Radivoje 52, 376
 Brašnarov Panko 723, 724
 Brebanović Predrag 895
 Brecelj Marko 593, 653
 Bregović Goran 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 635, 638, 655, 656
 Brešan Ivo 712, 730
 Brezhnev Leonid 471, 474, 485
 Brežnjev, Leonid Iljič (Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich) 30
 Brigić Ivan 142, 143
 Briški Alojz 107
 Brixly Nenad 590
 Brković Savo 926
 Broch Hermann 667
 Brodarić Željko 634
 Brown Keith 735
 Broz Josip 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 64, 69, 70, 72, 77, 81, 84, 86, 93, 94, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 151, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 198, 201, 204, 208, 211, 212, 213, 215, 217, 219, 222, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, 271, 275, 285, 299, 302, 303, 305, 306, 309, 310, 316, 318, 322, 344, 347, 349, 356, 374, 394, 402, 461, 465, 466, 467, 468, 470, 471, 472, 473, 475, 476, 478, 485, 486, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 514, 524, 549, 553, 554, 556, 561, 584, 587, 618, 696, 698, 699, 723, 724, 726, 727, 729, 730, 779, 800, 803, 827, 845, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 869, 870, 916, 920, 948
 Broz Jovanka 132, 172
 Bruno Đordano (Bruno Giordano) 32
 Brzezinski Zbigniew 305, 306
 Bućan Boris 606
 Bučar France 770, 771
 Bućin Nenad 177
 Bukvić Saša 847
 Bulajić Veljko 869
 Bulatović Kosta 884
 Bulatović Miodrag 693, 694
 Bulatović Momir 119, 163, 165, 187, 190, 381, 382
 Bulc Marko 178
 Burhan Rahim 732
 Burić Zlatko 606
 Bush George H. W. 220, 223, 457, 476
 Buzadžić Milovan 243

C

Cage John 623
 Calic Marie-Janine 882
 Camdessus Michael 223
 Cankar Ivan 756
 Carrington Peter 193, 464, 469, 810, 835
 Carter Jimmy 467, 471, 475
 Castels Manuel 286
 Cecić Ivo 262, 265
 Cenevski Kiril 726
 Ceranić Ilija 112
 Cerić Mustafa 825
 Cerović Stojan 574
 Chernenko Konstantin 474
 Chomsky Noam 559
 Cieslewicz Roman 601
 Ciulli Roberto 732
 Cohen Jean 669
 Colombo Emilio 473
 Crepas Guido (Crepax) 594
 Crnčević Brana 573, 886
 Crumb Robert 594
 Crvenčanin Vera 867
 Crvenkovski Krste 727, 733, 735
 Cvetičanin Radivoj 887, 900
 Cvetnić Ratko 967
 Cvijetić Darko 965
 Cvitan Vladimir 602

Č

Čašule Kole 724
 Čavoški Kosta 679, 913
 Čemerski Angel 733
 Čengić Bata 84
 Čengić Enes 264
 Čerčil Vinston (Churchill Winston) 71
 Černigoj Davor 655
 Čkrebić Dušan 142, 143, 144, 153, 347,
 356, 702
 Čokrevski Tomislav 735
 Čolak Andrija 152, 157, 166
 Čolić Zdravko 860
 Čubrilović Vasa 906

Čubrilović Vaso 372
 Čučkov Emanuel 723
 Čudić Marko 891
 Čudić Predrag 876, 898, 899
 Čukli Marcel 588
 Čulić Marinko 550, 563
 Čupić Čedomir 867

Ć

Ćelić Stojan 680
 Ćirković Sima 14, 15, 34, 82, 88
 Ćopić Branko 84, 976
 Ćorović Vladimir 906, 908, 933
 Ćosić Bora 883, 894, 895
 Ćosić Dobrica 19, 27, 29, 33, 37, 48, 50,
 51, 60, 86, 92, 96, 97, 374, 570, 679,
 680, 682, 683, 769, 851, 872, 883,
 884, 885, 886, 888, 889, 892, 897,
 901
 Ćurin Alem 611

D

Dabčević-Kučar Savka 519
 Damjanov Sava 877
 Danojlić Milovan 886, 900
 Darwin Čarls (Darwin Charles) 32
 Dašić Miomir 927
 Daud 466
 Davičo Oskar 698, 699
 David Filip 677, 846
 Debeljak Aleš 965
 De Deus Pinheiro João 191, 453
 Dedić Arsen 624, 625, 632, 633, 634,
 637, 638
 Dedijer Vladimir 20, 21
 Delač Vladimir 588
 Delčev Goce 723
 Delors Jacques 187, 456
 Delor Žak (Delors Jacques) 58
 Demači Adem 525
 De Mikelis Đani (De Michelis Gianni)
 58
 Denegri Ješa 963

- Deretić Jovan 371
 Despot Blaženka 565
 Dević Ana 979
 Devlić Radovan 579, 592, 596, 599, 600, 601
 Dežulović Boris 267, 899
 Dimić Ljubodrag 905, 930
 Dimić Veljko 701
 Dimitrov Dimitar 735
 Dimitrović Drago 700, 701
 Divljan Vladimir 645
 Dizdarević Raif 134, 149, 156, 157, 177, 180, 184, 188, 215, 218, 225, 327, 335, 347, 479, 481, 953
 Dmitrović Ratko 67
 Dobrović Vladimir 865
 Dolanc Stane 112, 130, 131, 132, 133, 148, 177, 214, 307, 345
 Dolničar Ivan 107
 Domonkos István 891
 Donić Vojislav 892
 Dorfman Ariel 594
 Doroghy Ivan 603, 604, 606
 Doronjski Stevan 134, 176
 Došen Mato 634, 655
 Dovniković Borivoj 588, 596
 Dragan Zvone 213, 217, 218, 220
 Dragičević Adolf 286
 Dragičević Šešić Milena 686
 Dragić Nedeljko 591, 610
 Draginčić Slavko 588
 Dragojević Oliver 634, 656
 Dragojević Srđan 960
 Dragosavac Dušan 134, 308
 Dragović Soso Jasna 758, 884
 Drakulić Slavenka 559, 560, 565, 566, 567, 602, 846, 967
 Drašković Brankica 961
 Drašković Vuk 886, 913
 Drndić Daša 892
 Drnovšek Janez 116, 120, 123, 134, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 192, 193, 318, 540
 Dučić Jovan 895
 Duda Igor 43
 Duras Marguerite 565
 Durutović Svetozar 372
 Dvornik Dino 638
 Dvorniković Vladimir 906
- D**
- Đaković Đuro 63
 Đilas Milovan 21, 41, 64, 75, 76, 77, 84, 94, 259, 399, 664, 698, 855, 882
 Đinđić Zoran 57, 85, 89, 96, 526
 Đogo Gojko 850, 851, 886, 913
 Đonović Branko 371
 Đorđević Borisav 632, 633, 635, 636, 637, 957
 Đorđević Dragoljub 792, 799
 Đorđević Mirko 885
 Đorđević Puriša 870
 Đorić Hranislav (Patriarch German) 807, 813, 815
 Đukanović Milo 163, 382
 Đukić Radivoje 677
 Đukić Slavoljub 96
 Đuranović Veselin 176, 177, 198, 207, 208, 211, 214, 215, 217, 282, 368
 Đurđev Branislav 934
 Đuretić Veselin 913, 939, 940
 Đurić Ivan 34, 82, 672
 Đurić Mihajlo 679
 Đurić Miloš 83
- DŽ**
- Džamonja Dušan 857, 861
- E**
- Eagleburger Lawrence 467
 Eco Umberto 594
 Ekmečić Milorad 82
 Erić Milan 847
- F**
- Fabić-Holi Vjekoslav 602
 Faulkner William 963

Febvre Lucien 905, 908
 Fece Ivan 643, 652
 Fenyvesi Ottó 891
 Fio Zvezdana 847
 Flegar Vojko 143
 Ford Gerald 475
 Ford John 556
 Foster Hal 594
 Foucault Michel 666
 Franić Frane 800, 814
 Freud Sigmund 667
 Furlan Mira 567
 Furlan Slavko 593
 Furtinger Zvonimir 588

G

Gačić Radiša 142, 143
 Gagro Božidar 851
 Gall Zlatko 599
 Galović Špiro 343
 Gams Andrija 517
 Ganić Ejup 187
 Garašanin Milutin 87
 Gašić Rade 713
 Gatnik Kostja 592, 593
 Gavran Miro 846
 Gavrović Milan 305
 Géczi János 891
 Genschler Hans-Dietrich 59, 451
 Georgievski Ljubiša 732
 Georgievski Taško 726
 Geremek Bronisław 523
 Gilevski Paskal 740
 Glavan Darko 598, 599, 627
 Glid Nandor 863
 Gligorov Kiro 56, 119, 187, 199, 724
 Gligorov Vladimir 91
 Gogovski Gligorie 737
 Gojković Srđan 646, 647
 Goldštajn (Goldstein) Ivo 23, 26, 64
 Goldštajn (Goldstein) Slavko 23, 26, 64,
 558
 Golub Marko 607

Golubović Dragan 559
 Golubović Predrag 870
 Golubović Zagorka 560, 679
 Gomišček Anton 599
 Gonin Jean-Marc 318
 Gorbachev Mikhail 21, 456, 459, 460,
 479, 481, 484, 485
 Gorkić Milan 64
 Gošev Petar 727
 Gotovac Vlado 138, 560
 Gračanin Petar 114, 163
 Grafenauer Bogo 82
 Grafenauer Niko 750
 Gramsci Antonio 90, 145
 Grass Günter 559
 Grebo Zdravko 671
 Greiner Boris 608, 609
 Grizelj Jug 571, 677
 Grljić Rajko 870, 960
 Gros (Gross) Mirjana 82
 Gross Mirjana 919
 Grubiša Damir 451, 463
 Grünwald Davor 623
 Gullit Ruud 559
 Guofeng Hua 465
 Gustinčić Dragotin 37

H

Habjan Stanislav 608
 Haderlap Maja 966
 Hadžiabdić Naim 801
 Hadžić Ibrahim 893
 Hadžifejzović Jusuf 847
 Hafner Vinko 153, 162
 Haig Alexander 476
 Hankiss Elemér 523
 Hanks Tom 210
 Hanzlovski Mladen 595
 Harriman Averell 467
 Hasanefendić Husein 633, 645
 Hasani Sinan 176, 177, 479
 Hauser Arnold 585
 Havel Václav 30, 522, 523

- Hebrang Olga 559
 Hemon Aleksandar 574
 Herbert Zbigniew 876
 Hercen, Aleksandr Ivanovič (Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich) 34
 Hite Shere 559
 Hitler Adolf 561
 Hobsbaum Erik (Hobsbawm Eric) 91
 Hobsbawm Eric 948, 951
 Hodža Fadilj (Hoxha Fadil) 176
 Horvat Branko 216, 516, 517, 613, 670, 677
 Horvatić Hrvoje 847
 Horvat Joža 851
 Horvat Pintarić Vera 595
 Houra Jasenko 650
 Hoxha Enver 465
 Hoxha Fadil 309
 Hrgović Maja 974
 Hribar Spomenka 769
 Hruščov, Nikita Sergejevič (Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich) 30, 79
 Hyseni Sanija 309
- I**
- Iglberger Lorens (Eagleburger Lawrence) 18
 Ignjatović Srba 598
 Ilić Mirko 579, 587, 590, 592, 594, 596, 599, 600, 601, 607, 610, 640
 Inić Slobodan 347
 Isaković Antonije 374, 679, 680, 682, 683, 684, 686, 698, 699, 703, 897, 900, 901
 Ivančić Nina 847
 Ivančić Viktor 549, 550, 562
 Ivandić Boro 602, 603
 Ivan IV Grozni 21
 Ivanov Blagoja 731
 Ivanovski Vasil 725
 Iveković Rada 565, 566, 674
 Ivić Pavle 680
- Izetbegović Alija 56, 119, 138, 187, 202, 817, 954
- J**
- Jakovina Tvrtko 23, 57
 James Petra 972
 Janečić Helena 612
 Janeković Römer Zdenka 919
 Janeš Želimir 863
 Janjić Dušan 301, 302, 311, 678
 Janković Dragoslav 912
 Janković Nenad (Nele Karajlić) 969
 Janković Nikola 868
 Janša Janez 107, 112, 561, 954
 Jašari Kačuša 351, 354
 Jazov Dmitrij 123
 Jazov, Dmitrij 55
 Jelčić Kažimir 707, 708, 709
 Jergović Miljenko 574, 966, 968
 Jevtić Atanasije 806, 815, 831, 832, 835, 913
 Jokanović Vukašin 190
 Joksimović Zdravko 847
 Josip Seissel 863
 Jovanović Arso 73
 Jovanović Biljana 743
 Jovanović Dragoljub 63
 Jovanović Dušan 875
 Jovanović Jovan 906
 Jovanović Rastislav 62
 Jovanović Slobodan 89, 906
 Jovanović Vladimir 85
 Jović Borisav 67, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 124, 177, 178, 179, 184, 190, 243, 339, 457, 953
 Jović Dejan 512, 513, 517
 Jovičić Georgije 142
 Jovičić Georgije 143
 Jurić Ante 817
 Jurleka Marjan 602

K

- Kadijević Veljko 55, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118,
119, 123, 149, 180, 189, 190, 192, 231,
233, 454, 461, 954
- Kafka Franz 667
- Kalamujić Lejla 965
- Kamberović Husnija 931
- Kambovski Vlado 733, 734
- Kanazir Dušan 680
- Kangrga Milan 285
- Kapor Momo 886
- Karadorđević Aleksandar 62, 63
- Karadžić Radovan 39, 833, 836, 883
- Karamanlis Konstantinos 469
- Kardelj Edvard 17, 25, 37, 41, 42, 79, 86,
92, 94, 133, 172, 173, 174, 176, 275,
349, 509, 511, 512, 513, 517, 556, 699,
709
- Kardelj Pepca 172, 173
- Karge Heike 861
- Karpov Vyacheslav 797, 798
- Kašanin Milan 878, 879
- Kaštelan Jure 863
- Katz Vera 187
- Kavčić Stan 297
- Kavčić Stane 202, 204
- Keane John 528, 669
- Keković Vlado 378
- Kelemen Milko 623
- Keljmendi Aziz 109
- Kentrić Samira 966
- Kermauner Taras 884, 897
- Kertes Mihalj 363, 487
- Kesić Vesna 559, 564, 565, 566, 568
- Kesovija Tereza 634, 656
- Khomeini Ruhollah 580
- Kieslowski Krzysztof 559
- Kilibarda Novak 896
- Kim Srečo 107
- Kiš Danilo 82, 846
- Kišević Enes 851
- Klakočar Helena 606, 607, 612
- Klasić Hrvoje 586
- Klein Richard 561, 874
- Klimovski Savo 733, 734
- Kljakić Ljubomir 588, 595, 597, 598
- Klopčič France 66
- Kocijančič Janez 158, 164
- Kočović Bogoljub 318
- Kojić Dušan 642, 643
- Koka Jirgen (Kocka J 30
- Kokotović Nada 875
- Kořakowski Leszek 30
- Kolanović Maša 950, 975
- Kola Pjeter 255
- Kolendić Antun 728
- Koliševski Lazar 176, 177, 724, 727, 728,
729, 734, 737, 738
- Koljević Svetozar 896
- Komar Silvo 163
- Komnenić Milan 886
- Komšić Ivo 463, 464
- Končar Rade 137
- Končar Ranko 48
- Koneski Blažo 84
- Konstadinović Nikola 579
- Konstantinović Mihailo 87
- Konstantinović Radomir 82, 879, 881,
883, 887, 888, 889, 900, 901
- Kontić Radoje 381
- Kordej Igor 579, 587, 596, 599, 600, 601
- Kornai János 395
- Korošec Štefan 142, 143, 161, 224
- Korošić Marijan 287
- Košak Andrej 960
- Koščević Želimir 599
- Kos Milko 933
- Kostandinović Nikola 598
- Kostelnik Branko 958
- Kostić Branko 177, 189, 190, 192, 193, 381,
810
- Kostić Jugoslav 177, 189, 190
- Kostić Zoran 647
- Koštunica Vojislav 679, 913
- Kovačić Jani 652

- Kovač Miha 750, 751
 Kovač Mirko 846, 892
 Kovač Mišo 634, 655, 656
 Kovač Vojin 746
 Krajger (Kraigher) Boris 44, 199
 Krajger (Kraigher) Sergej 132, 176, 177,
 216, 323
 Kralj Stjepan 853
 Krasniqi Memli 306, 307, 308, 309, 311
 Kraus Eduard 888
 Kraus Karl 667
 Kreisky Bruno 469
 Krešić Andrija 677
 Krestić Vasilije 680, 681
 Kristan Ivan 243, 244, 245, 246, 247,
 248, 249, 251, 252, 253
 Krivic Matevž 759
 Krleža Miroslav 74, 83, 258, 259, 260,
 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267,
 462, 664, 845, 882, 894, 895
 Kropilak Branislav 609
 Kropotkin Petar 78
 Krstonošić Mirko 866
 Krulčić Veljko 588
 Krunić Boško 134, 142, 143, 144, 148, 150,
 155, 336, 355
 Kržavac Sava 96
 Kučan Milan 38, 107, 111, 112, 119, 140,
 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153,
 156, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164, 187, 249,
 298, 299, 313, 337, 540, 708
 Kučukalić Alija 865
 Kuharić Franjo 561, 800, 804, 811, 818
 Kujović Dragan 784
 Kulenović Goran 547, 960
 Kulenović Skender 716, 717
 Kulenović Vuk 867
 Kulišić Špiro 927
 Kuljić Todor 26, 69, 921
 Kuljiš Denis 602
 Kulušić Joško 562
 Kunc Ninoslav 579, 592, 596, 599, 600
 Kundera Milan 523
 Kuroń Jacek 523
 Kurteši (Kurteshi) Ilijaz 215
 Kusić Ivan 602
 Kustić Ivan 603, 604
 Kustić Živko 820
 Kusturica Emir 82
 Kuzmanović Jasmina 565
 Kvesić Perko 851
 Kvesić Pero 579, 594, 603
- L**
- Laban Miloš 267
 Ladányi István 891
 Lampe John 43
 Lasić Enzo 639
 Lasić Stanko 82, 83, 88
 Law John 239
 Lazanski Miroslav 126
 Lazarovski Jakov 143
 Lazičić Goran 885
 Leko Zoran 599
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 66
 Letinić Ljubica 551
 Lisac Josipa 625, 627
 Ljotić Dimitrije 699, 939
 Ljubičić Nikola 29, 114, 147, 177, 356
 Lobačev Đorđe 594
 Lokar Sonja 162
 Lončar Budimir 23, 55, 219, 451, 452,
 453, 458, 463, 464, 481, 482, 483,
 486
 Lončar Vukašin 144
 Lovrić Jelena 563, 565, 566, 567
 Lovšin Petar 639, 640
 Lubarda Vojislav 895, 896
 Lucić Predrag 899
 Luhmann Niklas 977
 Luketić Katarina 575
 Luković Petar 652
- M**
- Macan Darko 587, 589, 597, 600
 Madžar Ljubomir 210

- Magdalenić Bantić Nataša 560
 Makavejev Dušan 17, 82, 84, 554, 851
 Maković Zvonko 621
 Maksimović Desanka 554
 Malevich Kasimir 654
 Malić Zdravko 458
 Maltarić Aleksandar 865
 Mamula Branko 101, 107, 108, 109, 110,
 111, 112, 113, 118, 126, 142, 147, 214,
 954
 Mancenaro Rodolfo 609
 Mandić Igor 531, 667, 846, 851
 Mandić Oliver 638, 641
 Manev Kole 726
 Manolić Josip 463
 Marangunić Nikola 594
 Marelj Živan 48
 Marinac Andrej 217
 Marina Panta 724
 Marinc Andrej 297, 331, 332, 335
 Marinković Gojko 761, 762, 763
 Marjanović Đorđe 733
 Marjanović Jovan 909, 934
 Markoski Nešo 735
 Marković Ante 45, 55, 114, 115, 116, 122,
 134, 168, 180, 182, 186, 187, 198, 201,
 209, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229,
 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 300, 338,
 404, 410, 413, 454, 481, 536, 537, 571
 Marković Dragan 96
 Marković Dragoslav 50, 93, 134, 215, 303,
 313, 321, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332,
 333, 334, 338, 345, 346, 347, 349,
 352, 354
 Marković Dragoslav 332
 Marković Mihailo 45, 48, 374, 680
 Marković Miodrag 610
 Marković Mira 117
 Marković Ratko 250, 253
 Marković Slobodan 893
 Marković Svetozar 24, 78, 89
 Markovina Dragan 276, 624, 632
 Markov Mladen 913
 Markovski Venko 725
 Marks (Marx) Karl 78, 89
 Marošević Toni 560
 Martinisa Dalibor 606
 Martinović Đorđe 357, 358
 Martonyi János 522
 Marušić Joško 579, 596, 599
 Marušić Živko 847
 Masleša Veselin 699
 Mastnak Tomaž 528, 540, 616, 745, 746,
 747, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754,
 755, 763
 Matić Dušan 883
 Matković Hrvoje 917
 Mattelart Armand 594
 Matvejević Predrag 285, 677, 851
 Maurović Andrija 587, 588, 594, 595
 Mazev Petar 740
 Mazowiecki Tadeusz 523
 Medaković Dejan 680, 682, 684
 Mehmedinović Semezdin 574
 Meier Viktor 180, 762
 Mekuli Esad 84, 892
 Melik Anton 906
 Menart Urša 961
 Merenik Lidija 873
 Mešić Emir 579, 596
 Mesić Stjepan 58, 120, 177, 179, 184, 189,
 190, 191, 192, 193, 454, 463, 954
 Meštrović Ivan 462, 628
 Michnik Adam 522, 523
 Mićunović Veljko 73, 79
 Mihailović Dragoljub 69, 699, 827, 939
 Mihailović Kosta 209
 Mihajlović Borislav 374, 886, 889, 890,
 896, 897
 Mihajlović Dragomir 643
 Mihajlović Kosta 680
 Mihaljević Rade 34
 Mihaljek Vlado 112
 Mijatović Čedomilj 88
 Mijatović Cvjetin 176, 177, 703
 Mijović Pavle 925

- Mijušković Radovan 699
 Mikulić Branko 45, 115, 142, 144, 176, 180,
 198, 221, 222, 223, 322, 327, 345,
 473, 474, 481, 514, 712, 751, 753, 754
 Milanović Đurđa 548, 565
 Milčín Vladimir 742, 744
 Milić Anđelka 564
 Milišić Milan 898
 Miljanić Ana 35
 Miller Arthur 559
 Miller Nick 755, 769
 Milles Maja 565
 Mill John Stuart 527
 Milosavljevski Slavko 733, 735
 Milosavljević Olivera 681, 683
 Milošević Mića 870
 Milošević Milan 574
 Milošević Simo 699
 Milošević Slađana 638
 Milošević Slobodan 27, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54,
 56, 57, 60, 87, 95, 96, 114, 115, 117,
 119, 121, 123, 124, 143, 144, 145, 146,
 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
 157, 158, 160, 163, 165, 167, 173, 180,
 181, 182, 187, 188, 190, 192, 204, 221,
 226, 231, 232, 233, 234, 242, 243,
 245, 250, 252, 255, 281, 282, 283,
 300, 304, 313, 314, 318, 336, 337,
 338, 339, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356,
 359, 360, 361, 362, 364, 374, 375,
 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 386,
 400, 455, 459, 461, 462, 513, 517,
 525, 526, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540,
 555, 561, 562, 563, 570, 571, 572,
 573, 633, 636, 658, 744, 782, 783,
 810, 821, 830, 833, 835, 851, 865,
 871, 872, 873, 878, 881, 883, 889,
 899, 900, 901, 929, 931, 954
 Milošević Srđan 43, 909
 Milosz Czesław 523
 Mimica Vatroslav 851
 Minić Miloš 48, 348
 Mirić Jovan 287, 325, 672
 Mirković Brana 863
 Mirković Igor 547, 961
 Mišić Zoran 886
 Mišković Ivan 23, 26
 Mitrović Aleksandar 55, 232, 234
 Mitrović Andrej 34, 82, 909, 912, 931
 Mitrović Nemanja 877
 Mladenović Milan 642, 643, 881, 895,
 959
 Mladenović Tanasije 679
 Mladenov Nikola 722
 Mladić Ratko 125, 836
 Mlinarac Drago 634
 Močivnik Radko 246, 251, 252
 Močnik Rastko 671
 Mojsov Lazar 134, 147, 176, 177, 214, 215,
 220, 346, 724
 Molotov Vjačeslav 72
 Montesquieu 575, 576
 Mozetič Brane 965
 Mrđa Nikolaj 832
 Mujić Husein 561
 Muminović Ahmet 610
 Munitić Ranko 595, 893
 Munjin Bojan 574
 Mušić Marko 863
 Musil Robert 667
 Mužević Boris 138, 145, 152, 156
- N**
- Nedelkovski Kole 725
 Nedić Milan 83, 699, 939
 Neimarlija Hilmo 825
 Nemanjić Miloš 595
 Nemeć Krešimir 877
 Nenadović Aleksandar 96
 Netkov Milan 735
 Neugebauer Norbert 588
 Neugebauer Walter 588
 Nielsen Christian 911
 Nikezić Marko 80, 88, 97, 303, 328, 400,
 554
 Nikolić Pavle 244

- Nikolić Živko 883
 Nikoliš Gojko 570
 Nikšić Stevan 96
 Nixon Richard 475
 Nogo Rajko Petrov 881, 886
 Novaković Stojan 87
 Novak Viktor 906, 917, 933
 Novković Đorđe 655
 Nozick Robert 669
- O**
- Obradović Vuk 123
 Ognjenović Vida 743
 Oljača Mladen 706
 Orbán Viktor 543
 Orcsik Roland 891
 Orlandić Marko 52, 143, 144, 155, 282
 Orwell George 732
 Oštrić Zoran 532
- P**
- Pađen Jurica 633
 Palavestra Predrag 679, 886, 887, 892
 Pančevski Milan 134, 143, 144, 154, 158,
 165, 166, 318
 Panić Milan 234
 Pankov Radovan 363
 Pantić Mihajlo 877, 881
 Papić Žarana 529, 564, 674
 Paraga Dobroslav 138, 804
 Pašić Nikola 62, 88, 95
 Pauling Linus Carl 559
 Paul VI, the Pope 800, 813
 Pavić Milorad 683, 886, 897
 Pavličević Dragutin 917
 Pavlović Dragan 728
 Pavlović Dragiša 51, 146, 338, 352, 353,
 354
 Pavlović Jovan 818, 832
 Pavlović Živojin 81, 84, 851, 870
 Pavlović Zoran 601
 Pećanin Senad 574
 Pečar Bojan 643
- Pečujlić Miroslav 678
 Pejić Bojana 614
 Pekić Borisav 644
 Pekić Borislav 371
 Perasović Benjamin 648, 651
 Perazić Gavro 244
 Perišić Miodrag 886, 888
 Perišić Vuk 871, 884, 889
 Perković Ante 628, 958
 Perović Latinka 66, 303, 339, 554, 685,
 686, 911, 913
 Peruško Vindakijević Ivana 23
 Pešić Vesna 574, 678
 Peterle Lojze 318
 Petković Radoslav 877, 880, 881
 Petković Velibor 876
 Petranović Branko 23, 78, 82, 913, 941
 Petrić Ratko 594, 602, 867
 Petrov Ana 955
 Petrović Aleksandar 82
 Petrović Boško 634
 Petrović Miodrag 202, 637
 Petrović Rastko 886
 Petrušev Kiril 723
 Pichard Georges 610
 Pirjevec Dušan 37, 82, 86, 768
 Pirjevec Jože 18, 24, 26, 92
 Piroćanac Milan 87
 Pištalo Vladimir 877
 Pius XII, the Pope 827
 Planinc Milka 45, 198, 214, 215, 216, 217,
 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 338, 473,
 474, 477, 514
 Platini Michel 559
 Pleše Mladen 602
 Pleština Diana 207, 225
 Pleština Lenko 866
 Podrimja Ali 891
 Pogačar Marko 894
 Polšek Darko 575
 Poos Jacques 191, 453
 Popit Franc 148
 Popit France 132, 297, 331, 335

- Popov Čedomir 683, 934
 Popović Daniel 641, 657
 Popović Danko 885
 Popović Jovan 699
 Popović Justin 814, 815
 Popović Konstantin 678
 Popović Konstantin (Koča) 25, 64, 96
 Popović Milentije 25, 44, 699
 Popović Miodrag 82, 679, 851
 Popović Miodrag (Miša) 868
 Popović-Perišić Nada 678
 Popović Petar 637
 Popović Srđa 338, 560, 573, 574, 671
 Popović Zoran 892
 Popov Nebojša 96, 678, 679
 Popov Stole 726
 Potočnik Vika 107
 Pozderac Hamdija 177, 327, 330, 345,
 346, 714
 Predina Zoran 653
 Predin Zoran 632
 Pregelj Sebastijan 967
 Prodanović Mileta 847
 Protić Miodrag 848, 849
 Puhovski Žarko 670, 677
 Puljak Ivica 579
 Puljić Vinko 811
 Pupovac Milorad 672, 677
 Pusić Eugen 287, 516, 517, 670
 Pusić Vesna 43, 564
 Pus Žak (Poos Jacques) 58
- R**
- Račan Ivica 53, 119, 143, 144, 150, 152,
 165, 167, 807
 Radaković Borivoj 966
 Radičević Branko 878
 Radilović Julio 588
 Radosavljević Artemije 831
 Radović Amfilohije 832
 Radović Miljan 143, 372, 373
 Radulović Jovan 850, 913
 Rafajlović Aleksandar 847
- Rajić Vlado 550
 Rakezić Saša 606
 Rakić Milan 895
 Rakitić Slobodan 886
 Rakovac Milan 851
 Raković Aleksandar 625, 658, 659
 Ranković Aleksandar 19, 25, 26, 27, 37,
 48, 51, 85, 92, 94, 105, 128, 172, 303,
 553, 698, 727, 728, 733, 855
 Rašković Jovan 883
 Ratković Radoslav 66
 Raukar Tomislav 919
 Rawls John 669
 Raymond Alex 594
 Ražnatović Željko 818
 Reagan Ronald 471, 477, 580
 Reiser Jean-Marc 594
 Renovica Milanko 134, 143, 144, 712
 Repe Božo 46, 294, 297
 Reufi Kadri 702
 Reynolds Simon 970
 Reznikoff Charles 979
 Ribar Ivo (Lola) 855
 Ribičić Ciril 159, 162, 164, 298
 Ribičić Mitja 134, 141, 198, 201, 202, 203,
 204, 205, 215
 Risteski Blagoja 730
 Ristić Ljubiša 678, 870, 875
 Ristić Marko 260, 879, 882, 886, 887,
 894
 Rizvanović Nenad 967
 Rockefeller David 471
 Roksandić Drago 919
 Romanov Alexander II 21
 Romanov Peter I The Great 21
 Rončević Igor 847
 Roosevelt Franklin Delano 71, 853
 Rosenfeld Stephen Samuel 560
 Rožanc Marjan 770, 771
 Rundek Darko 645, 646, 895
 Rupel Dimitrij 745, 746, 747, 748, 750,
 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762,
 763, 764, 954

- Rupnik Dimitrije 851
 Rustemagić Ervin 590
 Rus Veljko 516, 517, 672, 673
 Ruvarac Ilarion 34
- S**
- Sabalić Ines 565
 Sacher Srđan 645
 Samardžić Radovan 680, 934, 939
 Sandel Michael 669
 Santer Jacques 187, 456
 Sapundžić Milan 866
 Sapundžiju (Sapunxhiu) Riza 177, 189
 Saračević Sead 601
 Sasso Alfredo 279
 Savelić Periša 729
 Savić Pavle 570, 699, 700
 Scalfari Eugenio 560
 Seissel Silvana 863
 Sekelj Laslo 678
 Sekulić Isidora 83, 879
 Selimoski Jakub 811, 817
 Selimović Meša 712, 717
 Seton-Watson Robert 906
 Sforza Carlo 906
 Shatorov Metodi Tasev – Sharlo 728
 Shelton Gilbert 594
 Shevardnadze Eduard 460
 Sidran Abdulah 846
 Simić David 599
 Simić Mirko 678
 Simić Pero 26
 Simić Petar 150
 Simović Ljubomir 886
 Simović Ljubomir 897
 Skerlić Jovan 879
 Sklevicky Lydia 565, 674
 Skozret Krešimir 579, 594, 601
 Slak Jože 847
 Slapšak Svetlana 674, 678
 Smiljanić Radomir 888
 Smiljanić Zoran 969
 Sokić Damir 847
 Soklić Milan 751
 Sokolović Mirnes 880
 Sokolović Zoran 363, 382
 Soldatović Jovan 866, 867
 Solev Dimitar 729
 Solzhenitsyn Aleksandr 30
 Sontag Susan 559
 Spaić Kosta 851
 Spaskovska Ljubica 958
 Spasović Grujica 762
 Spiegelman Art 594
 Srebrić Borislav 332, 333
 Srejšević Dragoslav 40
 Srzentić Vojo 215
 Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich 156, 465, 515
 Staljin, Josif Visarionovič Džugašvili 71, 72, 74, 75
 Stamatović Aleksandar 930
 Stambolić Ivan 51, 146, 313, 314, 330, 333, 334, 336, 338, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 358, 359, 372, 377, 526, 700, 900
 Stambolić Petar 176, 177, 198, 215, 303, 313, 345, 347, 348
 Stančić Ivan 634, 646
 Stanisavljević Miodrag 881
 Stanković Đorđe 912, 930
 Stanojević Lazar 594
 Stanojević Stanoje 906, 933
 Stanovnik Janez 46
 Stefan Dušan, srpski car 39
 Stefanović Margita 643, 959
 Stefanovski Goran 731, 743
 Stepinac Alojzije 816, 827, 917
 Stevanović Vidosav 846, 860
 Stipanović Đuro 713
 Stipetić Vladimir 287
 Stockhausen Karlheinz 623
 Stojadinović Milan 63
 Stojanović Dubravka 912
 Stojanović Lazar 554, 574

- Stojanović Nikola 326, 327, 340, 341,
342, 343, 344, 345, 346
- Stojanović Slobodan 897
- Stojčević Gojko (Patriarch Pavle) 811,
817, 831
- Stojčević Stanko 143
- Stojić Mile 574
- Stojić Vojin 863, 867
- Stojković Živorad 679
- Stojšić Đorđe 52, 143
- Ströhm Carl Gustaf 212
- Strossmayer Josip Juraj 814
- Strugar Vlado 781, 927, 934
- Stublić Jura 957
- Subotić Milan 62
- Sudžuka Goran 600
- Sundhaussen Holm 684
- Supek Ivan 560
- Supek Rudi 287, 517, 531, 670
- Svetina Ivo 746
- Svetina Tone 746
- Szerbhorváth György 891
- Sziveri János 891
- Š**
- Šafrenek Ingrid 565
- Šalamun Andraž 847
- Šalamun Tomaž 894
- Šantić Aleksa 880
- Šaper Srđan 645
- Šarac Dušan 655
- Šaranović Radomir 869
- Šarić Dragana (Bebi Dol) 638
- Šćekić Radenko 280
- Šeks Vladimir 250, 251, 253, 255
- Šeparović Lidija 560
- Šeparović Zvonko 463
- Šeper Franjo 815
- Šerbedžija Rade 875
- Šerbetić Berislav 864
- Šeregi Igor 961
- Šerić Branko 550
- Šešelj Vojislav 138, 233, 751, 851, 892
- Šetinc Franc 143, 144, 145
- Šifrer Andrej 652
- Šimić Petar 117
- Široka Kolj 143, 144
- Šišić Ferdo 906, 933
- Škanata Krsto 736
- Škarica Siniša 626, 639
- Šljivo Galib 936
- Šolević Miroslav 51, 281, 487, 884
- Šotra Jovo 701, 702
- Šotra Zdravko 869
- Špadijer Marko 369, 371, 372
- Špegelj Martin 121, 954
- Špiljak Mika 176, 177, 198, 215, 475, 476,
556
- Štiks Igor 947
- Štrajn Darko 754
- Štrbac Dušan 243
- Štulić Branimir 582, 632, 633, 641, 642,
650, 658, 895, 957
- Štuvar Stipe 955
- Šubašić Ivan 69, 70
- Šukrija Ali 134, 139
- Šukriju (Shukriu) Ali 215
- Šuštar Alojzij 803
- Šuvar Stipe 134, 138, 139, 143, 150, 151,
152, 153, 155, 177, 179, 180, 287, 310,
337, 613, 850
- Švabić Mihailo 46
- T**
- Tadić Jorjo 85
- Tadić Ljubomir 374, 678, 756, 757, 758,
761, 762, 763, 900
- Tadić Radoslav 847
- Tahir Ćamuran 735
- Tahmišćić Husein 694
- Tasić David 112
- Tax Meredith 565
- Tenzera Veselko 531, 598, 627, 628, 657,
667
- Tepavac Mirko 80, 303
- Tepavica Milorad 866

Thatcher Margaret 580, 581
 Thomas Aquinas 663
 Tijanić Aleksandar 563, 656, 657, 678
 Tirnanić Bogdan 595
 Tišma Aleksandar 22
 Tišma Slobodan 652
 Todorović Mijalko 25
 Todorovski Gane 741
 Toholj Miroslav 886
 Tojnbi (Toynbee) Arnold 77
 Toljati (Togliatti) Palmiro 81
 Tolnai Ottó 891
 Tomc Gregor 639, 647, 648, 959
 Tomeković Dubravka 560
 Tomić Ante 960
 Tošić Desimir 63
 Tozija Ljupčo 731
 Trajkoska Navomoska Jasmina 291
 Trajkovski Goran 654
 Trajskoska Novomoska Jasmina 293
 Trbovc Jože 225
 Trenc Milan 607, 608, 610
 Trgovčević Ljubinka 912
 Trifonova Temenuga 975
 Trifunović Bogdan 115, 312, 375
 Tripalo Miko 511
 Tršar Drago 867
 Trump Donald 581
 Tuđman Franjo 53, 56, 59, 119, 120, 125,
 138, 187, 191, 192, 234, 250, 386, 458,
 459, 462, 551, 610, 611
 Tupurkovski Vasil 143, 153, 177, 192, 734

U

Ugljanin Sulejman 455
 Ugrešić Dubravka 547, 565, 566, 846,
 896, 968
 Ugričić Sreten 877
 Ugrinov Pavle 881, 889, 890
 Unkovski Slobodan 731, 743
 Urbančić Ivan 768, 770, 771
 Uzelac Milan 143, 707, 709, 710, 716, 717
 Uzelac Uglješa 144

V

Vadić Vasilije 818, 832
 Valetić Žiga 958
 Vance Cyrus 830
 Van den Broek Hans 191, 192, 193, 453
 Van den Bruk (Broek) Hans 58
 Vaništa Josip 601
 Vapcarov Nikola 725
 Varadi Tibor 678
 Varenne Alex 610
 Varga Tihomir 634
 Vasić Milo 655
 Vasić Miloš 574
 Vdović Ivan 642, 643
 Vegeč Laslo 678
 Vežzović Fadil 601
 Veličković Nenad 896
 Velikonja Mitja 42
 Velimirović Jovan 806
 Velimirović Nikolaj 810, 815
 Verdery Katherine 974
 Vernet Daniel 318
 Veselica Marko 138
 Veselinov Jovan 25
 Vesić Dušan 958, 959
 Vidaković Zoran 678
 Vidak Radmila 892
 Vidmar Igor 593, 595, 599
 Vidmar Josip 746
 Vidojković Marko 969
 Visković Nikola 287
 Višnjici Svetozar 111, 112
 Vladulov Lukijan 818
 Vlahov Dimitar 724
 Vlahović Veljko 45
 Vlajković Radovan 176, 177, 215
 Vlasi (Vllasi) Azem 47, 52, 53, 143, 144,
 156, 157, 351, 355, 538
 Vlaškalić Tihomir 340
 Vojnić Dragomir 287
 Vojvodić Ljubo 867
 Voljevica Ico 592

Vranicki Predrag 66, 677
 Vrcan Srđan 287, 799
 Vrdoljak Antun 562
 Vrdoljak Dražen 627, 634
 Vrhovec Josip 177, 467, 475, 477, 480
 Vrhovnik Majda 113
 Vučetić Radina 96, 910
 Vučurević Božidar 39
 Vujičić Kristijan 967
 Vujović Dimo 925
 Vujović Đuro 927
 Vukadin Mirjana 606
 Vukić Feđa 623
 Vukmanović Svetozar 631, 724, 727, 728
 Vukobratović Miomir 680
 Vukomanović Milan 798
 Vukotić Dušan 82
 Vukotić Veselin 381, 382
 Vuksanović Velisav 375
 Vulić Jure 624

W

Wałęsa Lech 522
 Walzer Michael 669
 Weber Max 759
 Wendel Herman 906
 Wheare Kenneth 239
 Willem Bernard 594
 Willis Bruce 210
 Wolinski Georges 594
 Wynaendts Henry 191

Y

Yat-sen Sun 464
 Yeltsin Boris 458, 459, 461

Z

Zafranović Lordan 851, 870
 Zappa Frank 653
 Zavrl Franci 112
 Zečević Momčilo 934
 Zečević Vlada 699
 Zedong Mao 465
 Zelenović Dragutin 177
 Zhivkov Todor 470
 Zimmerman Warren 178
 Zimonić Krešimir 579, 589, 594, 596,
 599
 Zogović Radovan 371
 Zorica Željko 606
 Zupan Zdravko 588
 Zupe Igor 961
 Zuppa Jelena 565

Ž

Žanko Miloš 700, 701, 702, 710
 Žarković Dragoljub 574
 Žarković Vidoje 134, 141, 143, 144, 154,
 155, 176, 215, 282, 954
 Žerjavić Vladimir 318
 Žeželj Danijel 609
 Žigon Stevo 554
 Žikić Aleksandar 652, 959
 Žilnik Želimir 82, 851
 Živadinov Dragan 874, 875
 Živković Miodrag 857, 861, 862
 Živojinović Dragoljub 930
 Živojinović Fahreta 631, 656, 657, 957
 Žižek Slavoj 560
 Županov Josip 287, 288, 289, 516, 517,
 673

In this book, about thirty authors analyzed the period of the post-Tito crisis and the beginnings of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in a multidimensional and layered way. This makes it fundamental for our understanding of the period that determined not only the fate of the states, but also the fate of the millions of people living in the area of the once-common state.

prof. Ivo Goldstein

The book *Jugoslavija: Poglavlje 1980-1991* (Yugoslavia: Chapter 1980-1991) is a major scientific work. Although the entire libraries of books have been written about the Yugoslav wars, we have not so far had a work that has explained their deepest causes in such a systematic way. Because it can be said: the eighties are critical, the nineties are just the consequence. The book before us is the work of scientists whose goal is not to confirm and strengthen the narratives with which the nations entered the disintegration of the common state, but to critically re-examine them in order to understand the processes and explain the present that has not moved far from the tragic past.

prof. Dubravka Stojanović

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